Natural and Moral Impotency, Appendix
An APPENDIX to the Diſcourſe of Natural and Moral Impotency.
BEcauſe in the Diſcourſe of Natural and Moral Impotency I ſaid nothing concerning the manner of the traduction of Sin, and that deſignedly as reſolving to Speak only of things that I thought I could Speak Satisfactorily about, and knowing I ſhould Speak leſs Satisfactorily concerning that as both oppoſite parties ſeem to do, and eſpecially knowing that it would be no way helpful to clear the great controverſies there ſpoken to; becauſe, one ſort of Impotency, come which way it will, doth excuſe, and the other not; and ſo the difference of them lieth not at all (whatever hath been pretended to the contrary) in one ſort coming one way, and the other another, but in the eſſential difference of their Natures; now becauſe of this ſuppoſed neglect, ſome that have nothing elſe to object (ſo far as I can underſtand) pretend as if nothing was ſaid except. I ſpeak of this thing wherein both differs amongſt themſelves, and which I never yet ſaw fully clear'd to my mind, and wherein I can puzzle my ſelf. I ſhall here only mind ſuch of thoſe things that I have thence made more fully apparent.
1. I have made this, or nothing, apparent, viz. That that ſort of Impotency which being upon a man would excuſe from the future obedience that he hath the Impotency to, if he did not bring it upon himſelf, I ſay, that ſort of Impotency would excuſe equally from ſuch future obedience if a man did bring it upon himſelf, as Lameneſs, Madneſs, want of an object, yea, all natural Impotency as I have explained it.
Yet take notice, that when I ſpeak of natural Impotency excuſing though a man bring it upon himſelf, I only ſay it excuſeth from future Obedience. For I grant that by bringing it upon himſelf, he may be ſaid interpretatively to be guilty of all the conſequent failings of Service and Obedience that follow upon making himſelf ſo Impotent. As an Apprentice or Servant that voluntarily†Like the murci or Murcenarij, the Italian Souldiers that Anntian, Marcel. Lib. 15. Speaks of, that Cut off their Thumbs, that they might be freed from material Service, called, as he faith, Joculariter Murci. Lameth himſelf, or maketh himſelf drunk, and ſo diſenableth himſelf for his maſters Service, is not only formally guilty of wounding himſelf, or drunkenneſs (as he would be was he ſui juris, and not Servant to any man,) but is alſo in ſo doing interpretatively guilty of the following neglect of his Maſters ſervice and commands, that he by ſo doing renders himſelf Impotent to perform. Only I mean he is ſo far made excuſable in his following neglects, that we cannot ſay he is guilty of a new fault in not ſerving his Maſter when he cannot, and it would be irrational in his Maſter to be angry at him or puniſh him, only for his former fault in making himſelf ſo Impotent, but alſo for his not ſerving him when he knows he cannot. For the whole malitia or culpability of ſuch after diſſervice is to be aſcribed only to the former diſinabling himſelf, becauſe he did or might probably foreſee that ſuch loſs to his Maſter would follow. I ſaid probably; For I ſcarce think that ſuch interpretative guilt reacheth all poſſibilities that are very remote or improbable. I do not think that if a man being ignorant whoſe he was, or of his Maſters affection, had Stolne Lipſius's darling Dog†Which he makes Verſes on. Lipſy Epiſt. Page. 104. & 294. Saphirus, he would have been Interpretatively guilty of Murder, though Lipſius had dyed with grief for the Loſs.
Now if this be true, that that ſort of Impotency which would excuſe from Obedience if a man did not bring it upon himſelf, would alſo excuſe equally if a man did bring it upon himſelf; then he muſt be very ſtupid that cannot hence ſee, that the determining which way one of theſe Impotencies came, and which the other, will neither help nor hinder in the putting an end to the great Controverſies of this Day, nor can be any account why one excuſes, and the other not. Though yet I grant that both the Natural Impotency which will excuſe, and the Moral which will not, came on us from Adams ſin and our own, and ſo no Reaſon can be fetched hence from this conceſſion of one excuſing, and the other not.
2ly. I have alſo made apparent, that the moral Impotency, or the culpable impotency which the Scripture ſpeaks of, come which way it will, doth not excuſe from future Obedience; and that this is no Reaſon why it doth not excuſe, becauſe of its coming one way or an other, for it is eſſentially culpable and inexcuſable, but the Reaſon is becauſe not-withſtanding this Impotency, a man hath the natural faculty and power to do what he hath this moral Impotency to.
And indeed let any man conſider it, and he will be as ſure as he can be of any thing. That whatſoever divine command a man hath the natural Power to obey (I mean that the man is no Child, or Fool, that hath not the faculty or ability to know, and chuſe the good, and refuſe the Evil,) ſo that he is no way hindered but by his own wickedneſs (or by that which we call a vitious habit of the Will, be it what it will)) I ſay ſuch a man is bound to obey ſuch command, ſo that his wickedneſs though never ſo great will not excuſe him; And this every man is ſure of, however ſome can make a ſhift to puzle themſelves with the undiſtinguiſhed words of can or cannot.
Take the wickedſt man in the World, that is moſt accuſtomed to do evil, and hath the greateſt averſation of will to good, and ſo one that cannot in the moral Senſe explained do well, nor obtain of him-ſelf to leave his evil ways without wonderful help from Heaven, yet we are ſure he is bound to leave off his wickedneſs and turn from his ſins, and is blameable in not turning from them this day, that he hath this moral Impotency, though God do not ſuch wonderful things for him; And is not only blameable interpretatively, becauſe he made himſelf thus morally Impotent, and brought this wicked averſation of will upon himſelf, but is blameable formally this day in not obeying and turning to God, becauſe he hath this day the natural Faculty and Power of obeying ſuch commands: For if he had not, but was made by his ſins (as I ſuppoſe ſome have been) a natural Fool, ſo that he had not the natural Power to underſtand and chuſe the good and refuſe the evil, it would not then be his duty this day ſo to obey and turn.
3ly. I have alſo ſhewed that one ſort of Impotency, the greater it is, the greater is the Fault; and the leſs it is, the leſs is the Fault; in not doing what a man hath the impotency to do; And that the other ſort of Impotency the greater it is, the leſs is the Fault; and the leſs it is, the greater is the Fault; which manifeſteth theſe two kinds of Impotency to be quite different in their own Natures, and that the difference of one excuſing, & the other not, cannot ariſe from one coming one way, and the other another.
4ly. To make this further apparent, if ſuch a thing can be made more apparent, conſider that (which I have alſo in part ſpoken of) Chriſt's humane Nature had ſuch an abundant effuſion of the Holy Spirit as cauſed in him a morally inſuperable Holy Rectitude of Will; And we are yet ſure notwithſtanding this, that his doing good and eſchewing evil, was morally laudable, becauſe this Holineſs of will did not take away his natural Power and Faculty of doing ſinfully, no more than mens morally inſuperable wickedneſs and everſation of will to good, taketh away their natural Power and Faculty of doing Well. Now we may with as much Reaſon deny the one as the other, viz. deny that Chriſt's Obedience was laudable bcauſe of the Spirits cauſing this Holineſs, though he had the natural Power to do otherwiſe, as deny that a man is culpable in not obeying god that hath the natural Power to obey, becauſe of his morally inſuperable wickedneſs, come this wickedneſs which way it will. Yea, let intelligent men conſider, and they will ſee that if ſome manichaean malum principium ſhould make a man wicked, juſt as the moſt wicked man now is, though he can give Reaſons why God would not permit this to be, and however not without ſome great Provocation of mankind, yet ſuch a man though he would not be to blame formally to be ſo made, yet he would be to blame to continue wicked as he is, and it would be his fault not to obey God; while he hath, notwithſtanding this wickedneſs, the natural Power to put off ſuch wickedneſs and to obey God; that is, while he is not a natural Fool, that hath not the faculty to know and chuſe the good, and refuſe the evil.
Now to conclude, though a man that will not diſtinguiſh, may puzle and confound his own Notions, and may be puzled by others by the words Can, and Cannot; as in ſuch Speeches as theſe, viz. Can a man obey without Grace? Can he actually obey without Grace? Can he actually without Grace obey ſpiritually or acceptably? Can he without Grace actually find in his heart to obey? Which Queſtions are to be anſwered affirmatively while by the word Can is meant the natural Power and Faculty; elſe it would not be men's duty ſo to obey: But ſuch queſtions are to be anſwered negatively when the meaning is, hath he not ſuch a wicked averſation of will as will certainly hinder him, except Grace overcome it. Now, I ſay, though ſuch a man as reſolves to be in the dark by not diſtinguiſhing, may thus be puzled, yet I think no man of competent abilities can eaſily be puzled, ſo as to be dubious about the ſubſtance of what I have ſpoken concerning one impotency excuſing, and the other not, would he but conſider when the words Can or Cannot, are objected before him, whether the oppoſers mean by thoſe words, the want of the very natural Faculty and Power or neceſſary object, or only a Cannot in reſpect of his being hindred by his wickedneſs or vitious habits.
Thus you ſee that what I have ſpoken in the Diſcourſe of Natural and Moral Impotency, can (as I there ſaid) ſtand on its own Legs, though I ſhould not know how to ſpeak a wiſe word concerning the propagation of the Soul and ſin; And though I incline to the Souls coming ex traduce as ſeeming to me the way moſt agreeable to Scripture, and the beſt to anſwer difficulties by; and I can almoſt as eaſily puzle my ſelf about the Soul of Beaſts being ex traduce as mens; yet my deſign is eſpecially till things I have ſpoken, be better conſidered, not to ſpeak ſuch things as may occaſion differences, when my deſign is to put an end to them. Nor to give occaſion to any that have a mind to reflect on what I have ſpoken, to run from the queſtion and things well intelligible, to things leſs intelligible, and no way helpfull to decide the important controverſies of free Will, Election, and ſpecial Grace.
Finished
End of the text · Joseph Truman, Natural and Moral Impotency (1675)