The Wisdom of Being Religious, Sermon

The Wisdom of Being Religious · Sermon

The Wiſdom of being Religious.

JOB. 28. 28.

And unto man he ſaid, Behold the fear of the Lord that is Wiſdom, and to depart from evil that is underſtanding.

IN the beginning of this Chapter Job diſcourſeth of the knowledg of Nature, and the ſecret and unaccountable operations of Natural Cauſes, and of the unſearchable perfections of the Works of God. And enquiring at the 12^th Verſe, where this Wiſdom is to be found, he tells us, that it is not to be met with in any of the Creatures; It is not found in the land of the living; The depth ſaith, It is not in me, and the Sea ſaith, It is not in me, &c. Therefore he puts the queſtion again, ver. 20. Whence then cometh Wiſdom, and where is the place of underſtanding, ſeeing it is hid from the eyes of all living? To which he returns an anſwer, ver. 23. God underſtandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof, for he looketh to the ends of the earth, and ſeeth under the whole heaven to make the weight for the wind, &c. The reſult of which diſcourſe is, That a perfect p. 2knowledg of nature is no where to be found but in the Authour of it; no leſs wiſdom and underſtanding then that which made the World, and contrived this vaſt and regular frame of Nature, can throughly underſtand the Philoſophy of it, and give a perfect account of all its motions and operations. But there is a wiſdom and knowledg which is very proper to man, and lies level to a humane underſtanding, which is ſuited and accommodated to the end, and uſes, and neceſſities of man: and that is, the knowledg of God, and of that duty which we owe to him; the wiſdom of pleaſing God, by doing what he commands, and avoiding what he forbids: This Knowledg and Wiſdom may be attained by man, and is ſufficient to make him happy. And unto man he ſaid, Behold the fear of the Lord, that is Wiſdom, and to depart from evil is underſtanding.

Which words conſiſt of two propoſitions, which are not diſtinct in ſenſe, but one and the ſame thing variouſly expreſſed; For wiſdom and underſtanding are Synonymous words here, and though ſometimes they have different notions, yet in the Poetical books of Scripture they are moſt frequently uſed as words equivalent, and do both of them indifferently ſignifie either a ſpeculative knowledg of things, or a practical skill about them, according to the exigency of the matter or thing ſpoken of. And ſo likewiſe the fear of the Lord, and departure from evil, are phraſes of a very near ſenſe, and like importance, and therefore we find them ſeveral times put together in Scripture. Prov. 3. 7. Fear the Lord and depart from evil. Prov. 16. 6. By the fear of the Lord men depart from evil. So that they differ onelyonly as cauſe and effect, which by a Metonymy uſual in all ſorts of Authours, are frequently put for one another.

Now, To fear the Lord, and to depart from evil, are phraſes which the Scripture uſeth in a very great latitude, to expreſs to us the ſum of Religion, and the whole of our duty. And becauſe p. 3the large acceptation of theſe phraſes is to be the foundation of my ſubſequent diſcourſe, I ſhall for the further clearing of this matter endeavour to ſhew theſe two things.

1. That it is very uſual in the language of Scripture, to expreſs the whole of Religion by theſe, and ſuch like phraſes.

2. The particular fitneſs of theſe two phraſes to deſcribe Religion by.

I. It is very uſual in the language of Scripture, to expreſs the Whole of Religion by ſome eminent Principle or part of Religion. The great Principles of Religion are Knowledg, Faith, Remembrance, Love and Fear; by all which, the Scripture uſeth to expreſs the Whole duty of man. In the Old Teſtament, by the Knowledg, Remembrance, and Fear of God. Religion is called The knowledg of the holy, Prov. 30. 3. And wicked men are deſcribed to be ſuch as know not God. So likewiſe, by the fear of the Lord, frequently in this book of Job, and in the Pſalms, and Proverbs. And Mal. 3. 16. Then they that feared the Lord ſpake often one to another. And Eccleſ. 12. 13. the fear of God is expreſly ſaid to be the ſum of Religion; Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole of man. And on the contrary, the wicked are deſcribed to be ſuch as have not the fear of God before their eyes, Pſal. 36. 1. And ſo likewiſe by the remembrance of God, Eccleſ. 12. 1. Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth: that is, enter upon a Religious courſe betimes. And on the contrary, the Character of the Wicked is, that they forget God, Pſal. 9. 17. The wicked ſhall be turned into Hell, and all the Nations that forget God. In the New Teſtament, Religion is uſually expreſſed by faith in God and Chriſt, and the love of them, Hence it is that true Chriſtians are ſo frequently called believers, and wicked and ungodly men, unbelievers. And Rom. 8. 28. Good men are deſcribed to be ſuch as love God, All things ſhall work together for good to them that love God, and p. 4ſuch as love the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, Epheſ. 6. 24. Now the reaſon why theſe are put for the Whole of Religion, is, becauſe the belief, and knowledg, and remembrance, and love, and fear of God, are ſuch powerful principles, and have ſo great an influence upon men to make them Religious, that where any one of theſe really is, all the reſt, together with the true and genuine effects of them, are ſuppoſed to be. And ſo likewiſe the ſum of all Religion is often expreſſed by ſome eminent part of it; which will explain the ſecond phraſe here in the Text, Departing from evil. The Worſhip of God is an eminent part of Religion; and Prayer, which is often in Scripture expreſſed by ſeeking God, and calling upon his Name, is a chief part of Religious Worſhip. Hence Religion is deſcribed by ſeeking God, Heb. 11. 6. He is a rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him; and by calling upon his Name, Act. 2. 21. Whoſoever calleth upon the name of the Lord, ſhall be ſaved. And ſo by coming to God, and by departing from evil. In this fallen ſtate of man, Religion begins with Repentance and Converſion, the two oppoſite terms of which are God and ſin; hence it is that Religion is deſcribed ſometimes by coming to God, Heb. 11. 6. He that cometh to God muſt believe that he is; that is, No man can be religious, unleſs he believe there is a God. Sometimes by departing from ſin, Iſa. 59. 15. And he that departeth from evil maketh himſelf a Prey: that is, ſuch was the bad ſtate of thoſe times the Prophet complains of, that no man could be religious, but he was in danger of being perſecuted.

II. For the fitneſs of theſe two phraſes to deſcribe Religion by. 1. For the firſt, The fear of the Lord; the fitneſs of this phraſe will appear, if we conſider that very great influence which the fear of God hath upon men to make them religious. Fear is a paſſion that is moſt deeply rooted in our natures, and flows immediately from that principle of ſelf-preſervation which God p. 5hath planted in every man. Every man deſires his own preſervation and happineſs, and therefore hath a natural dread and horrour of every thing that can deſtroy his being, and endanger his happineſs; Now the greateſt danger is from the greateſt power, and that is Omnipotency. So that the fear of God is an inward acknowledgment of a Holy and juſt Being, which is armed with an almighty and irreſiſtible power; God having hidin every mans conſcience a ſecret awe and dread of his infinite Power, and eternal Juſtice. Now Fear, being ſo intimate to our natures, it is the ſtrongeſt bond of Laws, and the great ſecurity of our duty. There are two Bridles or reſtraints which God hath put upon humane nature, Shame, and Fear. Shame is the weaker, and hath place onelyonly in thoſe in whom there are ſome remainders of Virtue; Fear is the ſtronger, and works upon all who love themſelves, and deſire their own preſervation. Therefore, in this degenerate ſtate of man-kind, Fear is that paſſion which hath the greateſt power over us, and by which, God and his Laws take the ſureſt hold of us: Our Deſire, and Love, and Hope, are not ſo apt to be wrought upon by the repreſentation of Virtue, and the promiſes of Reward and Happineſs as our Fear is from the apprehenſions of Divine diſpleaſure; For though we have loſt, in a great meaſure, the guſt and reliſh of true happineſs, yet we ſtill retain a quick ſenſe of pain and miſery. So that Fear relies upon a natural love of our ſelves, and is complicated with a neceſſary deſire of our own preſervation; therefore Religion uſually makes it's firſt entrance into us by this paſſion; and hence it is that Solomon, more then once, calls the Fear of the Lord the beginning of Wiſdom. 2. As for the ſecond phraſe, departing from evil; the fitneſs of it to expreſs the whole duty of Man will appear, if we conſider the neceſſary connexion that is between the negative and poſitive part of our duty. He that is careful to avoid all ſin, will ſincerely endeavour p. 6to perform his duty; for, the ſoul of man is an active principle, and buſie, and will be employed one way or other, it will be doing ſomething; if a man abſtain from evil, he will do good. Now there being ſuch a ſtrait connexion between theſe, the whole of our duty may be expreſſed by either of them, but moſt fitly by departing from evil, becauſe that is the firſt part of our duty: Religion begins in the forſaking of ſin; Virtus eſt Vitium fugere, & Sapientia prima Stultitiâ caruiſſe; Virtue begins in the forſaking of Vice, and the firſt part of Wiſdom is, not to be a Fool. And therefore the Scripture, which mentions theſe parts of our duty, doth conſtantly put departing from evil firſt; Pſal. 34. 14. and Pſal. 37. 27. Depart from evil, and do good. Iſa. 1. 16, 17. Ceaſe to do evil, learn to do well. Iſa. 55. 7. Let the wicked forſake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord. Epheſ, 4. 23, 24. We are firſt to put off the old man which is corrupt according to deceitful luſts, and then to be renewed in the ſpirit of our minds, and to put on the new man, &c. 1 Pet. 3. 11. Let him eſchew evil, and do do good. To all which I may add this further Conſideration, That the Law of God, contained in the Ten Commandments, conſiſting moſtly of prohibitions, Thou ſhalt not do ſuch or ſuch a thing, our obſervance of them is moſt fitly expreſſed by departing from evil, which yet includes obedience likewiſe to the poſitive Precepts implied in thoſe prohibitions.

From the words thus explained, the Propoſition that I ſhall ſpeak to is this, viz.

Doctr. That Religion is the beſt Knowledge and Wiſdom.

Or thus,

He that is truly Religious is the moſt wiſe and knowing perſon.

I ſhall firſt endeavour to confirm the truth of this Propoſition, and then make ſome Uſe and improvement of it.

p. 7The Confirmation of it I ſhall attempt theſe three ways.

1. By a direct Proof of it.

2. By ſhewing on the contrary, the folly and ignorance of irreligion and wickedneſs.

3. By vindicating Religion from thoſe common Imputations which ſeem to charge it with Ignorance or Imprudence.

I. I begin with the direct proof of this; And becauſe Religion comprehends two things, the knowledg of the Principles of it, and a ſuitable life and practice; (the firſt of which being ſpeculative may more properly be called knowledg, and the latter, becauſe 'tis practical, may be called wiſdom or prudence) therefore I ſhall endeavour diſtinctly to prove theſe two things.

1. That Religion is the beſt Knowledg.

2. That it is the trueſt Wiſdom.

1. Firſt, That it is the beſt knowledg. The knowledg of Religion commends its ſelf to us upon theſe two accounts.

1. 'Tis the knowledg of thoſe things which are in themſelves moſt excellent.

2. Of thoſe things which are moſt uſeful and neceſſary for us to know.

Firſt, It is the beſt knowledg, becauſe it is the knowledg of thoſe things which are in themſelves moſt excellent, and deſireable to be known, and thoſe are God, and our duty. God is the ſum and comprehenſion of all perfection. It is delightful to know the Creatures, becauſe they are ſome ſhadows of the divine perfections; There are particular excellencies ſcattered and diſperſt among the Creatures, which 'tis very pleaſant to contemplate; But in God all perfections in their higheſt degree and exaltation meet together and are united; how much more delightful then muſt it needs be, to fix our minds upon ſuch an object in which there is nothing but beauty and brightneſs, what is amiable and what is excellent; what will raviſh our affections and p. 8raiſe our wonder, pleaſe us and aſtoniſh us at once? And that the finite meaſure and capacity of our underſtandings is not able to take in and comprehend the infinite excellencies and perfections of God, this indeed ſhews the excellency of the object, but doth not at all detract from the delightfulneſs of the knowledg; for it is a greater pleaſure for a finite underſtanding to be loſt in the contemplation of its object, and to view unlimited excellencies, which have no ſhore nor bounds, then to look upon thoſe perfections of which we can ſee the end and utmoſt; as 'tis more pleaſant to the eye to have an endleſs proſpect, then to be terminated; for this is that which properly cauſeth admiration, when we diſcover a great deal in an object which we underſtand to be excellent, and yet we ſee we know not how much more beyond that, which our underſtandings cannot fully reach and comprehend.

And as the knowledg of God in his nature and perfections is excellent and deſireable; ſo likewiſe to know him in thoſe glorious manifeſtations of himſelf in the works of Creation and Providence; and above all (though it be little ſpoken of by the Saints of the Old Teſtament, by reaſon of the obſcure degree of its diſcovery in thoſe times) the knowledg of God in his Son Jeſus Chriſt, in that ſtupendious manifeſtation of his wiſdom and mercy in the contrivance of our Recovery, which is ſuch a myſtery, and ſo excellent a piece of knowledg, that the Angels deſire to pry into it, 1 Pet. 1. 12.

And as the knowledg of God is excellent, ſo likewiſe of our Duty, which is nothing elſe but vertue and goodneſs and holineſs, which are the Image of God, a conformity to the nature and will of God, and an imitation of the Divine excellencies and perfections ſo far as we are capable: For to know our duty, is to know what it is to be like God in Goodneſs, and Pity, and Patience, and Clemency, in pardoning injuries, and paſsing by provocations, p. 9in juſtice and righteouſneſs, in truth and faithfulneſs, and in a hatred and deteſtation of the contrary of theſe. In a word, it is to know what is the good and acceptable will of God, what it is that he loves and delights in, and is pleaſed withal, and would have us to do in order to our perfection, and our happineſs. It is deſervedly accounted a piece of excellent knowledg, to know the Laws of the Land, and the Cuſtoms of the Country we live in, and the Will of the Prince we live under; How much more, to know the Statutes of Heaven, and the Laws of Eternity, thoſe immutable and eternal Laws of Juſtice and Righteouſneſs? to know the will and pleaſure of the great Monarch, and Univerſal King of the World, and the Cuſtoms of that Country where we muſt live for ever? This made David to admire the Law of God at that ſtrange rate he doth in the 119^th Pſalm, and to advance the knowledg of it above all other knowledg, I have ſeen an end of all perfection, but thy Commandment is exceeding broad.

Secondly, 'Tis the knowledg of thoſe things which are moſt uſeful and neceſſary for us to know. The goodneſs of every thing is meaſured by its end and uſe, and that's the beſt thing which ſerves the beſt end and purpoſe; and the more neceſſary any thing is to an end, the better it is: So that the beſt knowledg is that which is of greateſt uſe and neceſſity to us in order to our great end, which is Eternal happineſs, and the Salvation of our Souls. Curious ſpeculations, and the contemplation of things that are impertinent to us, and do not concern us, nor ſerve to promote our happineſs, are but a more ſpecious and ingenious ſort of idleneſs, a more pardonable and creditable kind of Ignorance. That man that doth not know thoſe things which are of uſe and neceſſity for him to know, is but an ignorant man, whatever he may know beſides; Now the knowledg of God, and of Chriſt, and of our duty, is of the greateſt uſefulneſs and neceſſity p. 10to us in order to our happineſs: It's of abſolute neceſſity that we ſhould know God and Chriſt, in order to our being happy: Joh. 17. 3. This is life eternal (that is, the onelyonly way to it) to know thee the only true God, and him whom thou haſt ſent, Jeſus Chriſt. It is neceſſary alſo in order to our happineſs, to know our Duty, becauſe 'tis neceſſary for us to do it, and it is impoſſible to do it except we know it: So that whatever other knowledg a man may be endued withal, he is but an ignorant perſon who doth not know God, the Authour of his being, the Preſerver and Protector of his life, his Soveraign, and his Judg, the giver of every good and perfect gift, his ſureſt refuge in trouble, his beſt friend or worſt enemy, the preſent ſupport of his life, his hopes in death, his future happineſs, and his portion for ever; Who does not know his relation to God, the duty that he owes him, and the way to pleaſe him who can make him happy or miſerable for ever; Who does not know the things of his peace, and the way how to get his ſins pardoned, and himſelf reconciled to an offended God; Who doth not know the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who is the way, the truth, and the life. So that if a man by a vaſt and imperious mind, and a heart large as the ſand upon the Sea ſhore, (as it is ſaid of Solomon) could command all the knowledg of Nature and Art, of words and things; could attain to a Maſtery in all Languages, and ſound the depth of all Arts and Sciences, meaſure the Earth and the Heavens, and tell the Stars, and give an account of their order and motions; could diſcourſe of the Intereſts of all States, the Intrigues of all Courts, the reaſon of all Civil Laws and Conſtitutions, and give an account of the Hiſtory of all ages; could ſpeak of Trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, even unto the Hyſop that ſpringeth out of the wall, and of beaſts alſo, and of fowls, and of creeping things, and of fiſhes; and yet ſhould, in the mean time, be deſtitute of the knowledg of God, and Chriſt, and his duty; all this would p. 11be but an impertinent vanity, and a more glittering kind of Ignorance; and ſuch a man (like the Philoſopher, who whileſt he was gazing upon the Stars, fell into the ditch) would but Sapienter deſcendere in infernum, be undone with all this knowledge, and with a great deal of wiſdom go down to Hell.

2. Secondly, That to be Religious is the trueſt Wiſdom; and that likewiſe upon two accounts.

1. Becauſe it is to be wiſe for our ſelves.

2. It is to be wiſe as to our main intereſt and concernment.

Firſt, 'Tis to be wiſe for our ſelves. There's an expreſſion, Job 22. 21. He that is wiſe is profitable to himſelf; and Prov. 9. 12. If thou be wiſe, thou ſhalt be wiſe for thy ſelf; intimating, that Wiſdom regards a mans own intereſt and advantage, and he is not a wiſe man that doth not take care of himſelf and his own concernments, according to that of old Ennius, Nequicquam ſapere ſapientem, qui ſibi ipſi prodeſſe non quiret; that man hath but an empty title of Wiſdom, and is not really wiſe, who is not wiſe for himſelf. As Self preſervation is the firſt principle of Nature, ſo care of our ſelves and our own intereſt is the firſt part of Wiſdom: He that is wiſe in the affairs and concernments of other men, but careleſs and negligent of his own, that man may be ſaid to be buſie, but he is not wiſe; he is employed indeed, but not ſo as a wiſe man ſhould be: Now this is the wiſdom of Religion, that it directs a man to a care of his own proper intereſt and concernment.

2. It is to be wiſe as to our main intereſt. Our chief end and higheſt intereſt is happineſs; Now this is happineſs, To be freed from all (if it may be,) however, from the greateſt evils; and to enjoy (if it may be) all good, however, the chiefeſt. To be happy, is not onelyonly to be freed from the pains and diſeaſes of the body, but from anxiety and vexation of Spirit; not onelyonly to enjoy the pleaſures of ſence, but peace of Conſcience and tranquill…ty p. 12of mind. To be happy, is not onelyonly to be ſo for a little while, but as long as may be, and if it be poſſible, for ever. Now Religion deſigns our greateſt and longeſt happineſs; it aims at a freedom from the greateſt evils, and to bring us to the poſſeſſion and enjoyment of the greateſt good. For Religion wiſely conſiders, that men have Immortal Spirits, which as they are Spirits, are capable of a pleaſure and happineſs diſtinct from that of our bodies and our ſenſes; and becauſe they are Immortal, are capable of an everlaſting happineſs. Now our Souls being the beſt part of our ſelves, and Eternity being infinitely the moſt conſiderable duration; the greateſt wiſdom is to ſecure the intereſt of our Souls, and the intereſt of Eternity, though it be with the loſs, and to the prejudice of our temporal and inferiour Intereſts: Therefore Religion directs us rather to ſecure inward peace, then outward eaſe; to be more careful to avoid everlaſting and intolerable torments, then ſhort and light afflictions which are but for a moment; to court the favour of God more then the friendſhip of the World; and not ſo much to fear them that can kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, as him who after he hath kill'd can deſtroy both body and ſoul in hell. In a word, our main Intereſt is to be as happy as we can, and as long as is poſſible; and if we be caſt into ſuch circumſtances, that we muſt be either in part and for a time, or elſe wholly and always miſerable; the beſt wiſdom is to chooſe the greateſt and moſt laſting happineſs, but the leaſt and ſhorteſt miſery: Upon this account Religion preferrs thoſe pleaſures which flow from the preſence of God for evermore, infinitely before the tranſitory pleaſures of this world; and is much more careful to avoid eternal miſery, then preſent ſufferings. This is the Wiſdom of Religion, that upon conſideration of the whole, and caſting up all things together, it does adviſe and lead us to our beſt Intereſt.

II. The ſecond way of Confirmation ſhall be by ſhewing the Ignorance and Folly of Irreligion and Wickedneſs: And this I p. 13might do by the Rule of Contraries; for, if he that is truly Religious be the wiſeſt and moſt knowing perſon, then thoſe that are irreligious and wicked are neither knowing nor wiſe. But becauſe this may ſufficiently appear by applying what I have ſaid in the direct proof of the Propoſition the juſt contrary way, therefore I ſhall not enlarge upon this in the ſame method, but proceed upon other Heads to ſhew the Ignorance and Folly of ſuch perſons. Now all that are irreligious are ſo upon one of theſe two accounts; Either, Firſt, Becauſe they do not believe the Foundations and Principles of Religion, as, The Exiſtence of God, The Immortality of the Soul, and Future and Eternal Rewards; and of this kind there are but few, in compariſon, who do not in ſome ſort believe theſe things: Or elſe, Secondly, Men are irreligious, becauſe though they do in ſome ſort believe theſe things, yet they act contrary to their belief; and of this kind are the far greateſt part of wicked men: The firſt ſort are guilty of that which we call Speculative, the latter of Practical Atheiſm I ſhall endeavour to diſcover the Ignorance and Folly of both theſe.

1. Speculative Atheiſm, is Firſt, abſurd in the Theory and ſpeculation, which argues Ignorance; and Secondly, it is an imprudent Opinion, both becauſe it is againſt our preſent intereſt, and is alſo unſafe in the ultimate iſſue of it; which argues Folly.

I. It is abſurd in the Theory and Speculation; and that upon theſe five accounts.

1. Becauſe it gives no probable account of the Exiſtence of things. We ſee a World of Creatures, and a vaſt Frame of things, which we who believe a God attribute to God as the Authour, (i e.) to a Being endued with infinite Goodneſs and Wiſdom and Power, which is a very likely Cauſe to produce a World: For, what more likely to communicate Being to ſo numerous a progeny of goodly Creatures, then infinite Goodneſs? What more likely to create ſo vaſt a World, that is, to ſtretch p. 14forth the Heavens and lay the foundations of the Earth, to form theſe and all the Creatures in them out of Nothing, then infinite Power? What ſo likely to contrive all theſe Creatures each of them ſo perfect in their kind, and all of them ſo fitly and harmoniouſly ſuited to each other and to the whole, as infinite Counſel and Wiſdom? This ſeems to be a reaſonable account. But what account doth the Atheiſt give of this? Either he muſt ſay, that the World was Eternal, and that things alwayes were as they are, without any firſt Cauſe of their Being, which is the way of the Ariſtotelian Atheiſts; or elſe he muſt aſcribe the Original of the World to Chance, and the caſual concourſe of Matter, which is the way of the Epicurean Atheiſts. But neither of theſe ways gives a probable account of the Exiſtence of things.

Firſt, Not the Ariſtotelian way; For, though we may conceive the ſame thing always to have been, yet it is utterly unimaginable how there ſhould have been an infinite orderly ſucceſſion of things, that is, a third, fourth, fifth, &c. without a firſt. I ſay, this is utterly unimaginable; But yet I will ſuppoſe that this matter doth admit of ſeeming and unanſwerable Demonſtrations both ways, viz. both That an eternal ſucceſſion of things is poſſible, and that it is impoſſible; as the Queſtion about the infinite diviſibility of Quantity doth, and indeed all Queſtions about any thing that is infinite, it being but reaſonable to expect that our finite Underſtandings ſhould be puzzled and loſt about any thing that is infinite. Now granting this, which is the utmoſt any man can challenge in this Queſtion, this Account of things from an Eternal order and ſucceſſion of Cauſes comes to juſt nothing; For, though it be granted, that there are plauſible Arguments for the poſſibility of this, yet ſo long as they are countepoiſed by other Arguments every whit as ſtrong and unanſwerable, they can ſignifie nothing p. 15in the ballance of Reaſon, becauſe the ſtrength of them is wholly enervated and taken off by equal Demonſtrations on the other ſide; and ſo long as their hands are thus tied, ſuch a ſuppoſition is altogether uſeleſs, and nothing can be built upon it; For what man will allow it probable that there hath been an Eternal ſucceſſion of things, without any Original, or firſt Cauſe, whileſt it is an even Queſtion, whether an Eternal ſucceſsion of things be ſo much as poſſible? And beſides all this, Ariſtotle himſelf (who is ſuppoſed to be the great Patron of this Opinion of the Eternity of the World) doth elſewhere in ſeveral places of his works, own it as one of the greateſt abſurdities that can be, to aſſert an infinite progreſs of Cauſes, and ſays, that it is unworthy of a Philoſopher to reſolve any thing this way, and that the mind of man can have no reſt, nor any reaſonable and ſatisfactory account of things be given, but by ſtaying in ſome firſt Cauſe. But I needed not have ſaid ſo much to this, becauſe the Modern Atheiſts do generally deſert this way.

Secondly, Nor the Epicurean way, which imputes this vaſt pile of the World, this regular and orderly Frame of things (which it acknowledges to have had a beginning) not to goodneſs, and power, and counſel, and wiſdom; but to a fortunate chance, and happy caſualty. Now there is nothing can be more unreaſonable then obſtinately to impute that to Chance, which doth plainly and apparently contain in it all the Arguments and Characters of a wiſe deſign and contrivance. Was ever any conſiderable work, in which there was required great variety of parts, and a regular and orderly diſpoſition of thoſe parts, done by Chance? Will Chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thouſand inſtances, and not fail in any one? How often might a man, after he had jumbled a ſet of Letters in a Bag, fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact Poem, yea, or make a good Diſcourſe in Proſe? And may not a little p. 16Book be as eaſily made by Chance, as this great Volume of the World? How long might a man be in ſprinkling colours upon Canvas with a careleſs hand, before they would happen to make the exact picture of a Man? And is a Man eaſilier made by chance then his Picture? How long might twenty thouſand blind Men. which ſhould be ſent out from the ſeveral remote parts of England, wander up and down before they would all meet upon Salisbury Plains, and fall into Rank and File in the exact order of an Army? And yet this is much more eaſie to be imagined, then how the innumerabe blind parts of Matter ſhould Rendezvous themſelves into a World. A man that ſees Henry the Seventh's Chappel at Weſtminſter, might with as good reaſon maintain (yea, with much better, conſidering the vaſt difference betwixt that little Structure, and the huge Fabrick of the World) that it was never contrived or built by any Man, but that the ſtones did by Chance grow into thoſe curious Figures into which they ſeem to have been cut and graven; And that upon a time, (as Tales uſually begin) the Materials of that building, the Stone, Morter, Timber, Iron, Lead and Glaſs, happily met together, and very fortunately rang'd themſelves into that delicate order in which we ſee them now ſo cloſe compacted, that it muſt be a very great Chance that parts them again. What would the world think of a man that ſhould advance ſuch an opinion as this, and write a Book for it? If they would do him right, they ought to look upon him as mad, with a little more reaſon then any man can have to ſay that the World was made by Chance, or that the firſt Men grew up out of the Earth as Plants do now. And yet they who give this account of the Original things, aſſume to themſelves to be the Men of Reaſon, the great Wits of the World, the onelyonly cautious and wary perſons, that hate to be impoſed upon, that muſt have convincing evidence for every thing, and can aſſent to nothing without a clear Demonſtration for it.

p. 172. Becauſe it gives no reaſonable account of the Univerſal Conſent of Mankind in this apprehenſion, that there is a God. That men do generally believe a God, and have done in all Ages, the preſent experience of the World, and the Records of former times do abundantly teſtifie. Now how comes this perſwaſion to have gained ſo univerſal a poſſeſſion of the mind of Man, and to have found ſuch general entertainment in all Nations, even thoſe that are moſt barbarous? If there be no ſuch thing as God in the world, how comes it to paſs that this object doth continually encounter our underſtandings? whence is it that we are ſo perpetually haunted with the Apparition of a Deity, and followed with it where-ever we go? If it be not natural to the mind of Man, but proceeds from ſome accidental diſtemper of our underſtandings, how comes it to be ſo Univerſal, that no differences of age, or temper, or education, can wear it out, and ſet any conſiderable number of men free from it? Into what can we reſolve this ſtrong inclination of mankind to this error and miſtake? how come all Nations to be thus ſeduced? It is altogether unimaginable, but that the Reaſon of ſo Univerſal a conſent in all places and ages of the world, and among all differences of perſons, ſhould be one and conſtant; But no one and conſtant reaſon of this can be given, but from the nature of Mans mind and underſtanding, which hath this Notion of a Deity born with it, and ſtamped upon it; or, which is all one, is of ſuch a frame, that in the free uſe and exerciſe of it ſelf, it will find out God; And what more reaſonable then to think, that if we be Gods Workmanſhip, he ſhould ſet this mark of himſelf upon all reaſonable Creatures, that they may know to whom they belong, and may acknowledg the Author of their Beings? This ſeems to be a credible and ſatisfactory account of ſo Univerſal a conſent in this matter. But now what doth the Atheiſt reſolve this into? He is not at one with himſelf what account to give of it; nor can it p. 18be expected he ſhould; For he that will over-look the true reaſon of a thing, which is but one, may eaſily find many falſe ones, Error being infinite. But there are three which he principally rellyes upon, Fear, Tradition, and Policy of State. I ſhall briefly conſider theſe.

Firſt, He would fain make us believe that this apprehenſion of a God, doth ſpring from an infinite jealouſie in the mind of Man, and an endleſs fear of the worſt that may happen, according to that Divine ſaying of the Poet, (which he can never ſufficiently admire) Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor, Fear firſt made Gods. So that it is granted on both ſides, that the fear of a Deity doth univerſally poſſeſs the minds of Men: Now the queſtion is, whether it be more likely that the exiſtence of a God ſhould be the cauſe of this fear, or that this fear ſhould be the cauſe why men imagine there is a God? If there be a God who hath impreſſed this image of himſelf upon the mind of Man, there's great reaſon why all men ſhould ſtand in awe of him; But if there be no God, it is not eaſie to conceive how fear ſhould create an univerſal confidence and aſſurance in men that there is one. For, whence ſhould this Fear come? it muſt be either from without, from the ſuggeſtion of others, who firſt tell us there is ſuch a being, and then our fear believes it; or elſe it muſt ariſe from within, viz. from the Nature of Man, which is apt to fancy dreadful and terrible things. If from the ſuggeſtion of others who tell us ſo, the queſtion returns, who told them ſo? and will never be ſatisfied till the firſt Author of this report be found out; ſo that this account of fear reſolves it ſelf into Tradition, which ſhall be ſpoken to in its proper place. But if it be ſaid, that this fear ariſeth from within, from the Nature of man which is apt to imagine dreadful things, this likewiſe is liable to inexplicable difficulties. For, Firſt, the proper object of fear is ſomething that is dreadful, that is, ſomething that threatens p. 19Men with harm, or danger, and that in God muſt either be Power, or Juſtice; and ſuch an object as this, fear indeed may create: But Goodneſs and Mercy are eſſential to the Notion of a God, as well as Power and Juſtice; Now how ſhould fear put men upon fancying a Being that is infinitely good and merciful? No man hath reaſon to be afraid of ſuch a Being as ſuch. So that the Atheiſt muſt joyn another cauſe to Fear, viz. Hope, to enable men to create this imagination of a God. And what would the Product of theſe two contrary Paſsions be? The imagination of a Being, which we ſhould fear would do us as much harm, as we could hope it would do us good; which would be Quid pro Quo, and which our Reaſon would oblige us to lay aſide ſo ſoon as we had fancied it, becauſe it would ſignifie juſt nothing. But Secondly, Suppoſe fear alone could do it; how comes the mind of Man to be ſubject to ſuch groundleſs and unreaſonable fears? The Ariſtotelian Atheiſt will ſay, it always was ſo; But this is to affirm, and not to give any account of a thing: The Epicurean Atheiſt, if he will ſpeak conſonantly to himſelf, muſt ſay, that there happened in the original conſtitution of the firſt men ſuch a contexture of Atomes, as doth naturally diſpoſe men to theſe panick fears; unleſs he will ſay, that when the firſt men grew out of the earth, and afterwards broke looſe from their root, finding themſelves weak, and naked, and unarmed, and meeting with ſeveral fierce creatures ſtronger then themſelves, they were put to ſuch a fright as did a little diſtemper their underſtandings, and let looſe their imaginatians to endleſs ſuſpicious, and unbounded jealouſies, which did at laſt ſettle in the conceit of an inviſible Being, infinitely powerful, and able to do them harm; and being fully poſſeſt with this apprehenſion, (nothing being mo…e ordinary then for crazed perſons to believe their own fancies) they became Religious, and afterwards when mankind began p. 20to be propagated in the way of generation, then Religion obliged them to inſtill theſe principles into their Children in their tender years, that ſo they might make the greater impreſſion upon them; and this courſe having been continued ever ſince, the Notion of a God hath been kept up in the world. This is very ſuitable to Epicurus his Hypotheſis of the Original of Men; but if any man think fit to ſay thus, I cannot think it fit to confute him. Thirdly, Whether Men were from all Eternity ſuch timorous and fanciful Creatures, or happened to be made ſo in the firſt conſtitution of things; it ſeems however, that this fear of a Deity hath a foundation in Nature; And if it be natural, ought we not rather to conclude, That there is ſome ground and reaſon for theſe Fears, and that Nature hath not planted them in us to no purpoſe, then that they are vain and groundleſs? There is no Principle that Ariſtotle (the grand Aſſertor of the Eternity of the World) doth more frequently inculcate then this, That Nature doth nothing in vain; and Epicurus is forced to acknowledge, (and ſo will every man, who attentively conſiders the frame of the World) That although things were made by Chance, yet they have happened as well as if the greateſt Wiſdom had had the ordering and contriving of them; And ſurely Wiſdom would never have planted ſuch a vain principle as the fear of a Deity in the Nature of Man, if there had not been a God in the World.

Secondly, If Fear be not a ſufficient account of this Univerſal Conſent, the Atheiſt thinks it may very probably be reſolved into Univerſal Tradition. But this likewiſe is liable to great exception; For, whence came this Tradition? It muſt begin ſome time, it muſt have its original from ſome body; and it were very well worth our knowing, who that Man was that firſt raiſed this Spirit which all the Reaſon of mankind could never conjure down ſince; Where did he live, and when? In what Countrey, and p. 21in what Age of the World? What was his Name, or his Sons Name, that we may know him? This the Atheiſt can give no punctual account of; onelyonly he imagines it not improbable, that ſome body long ago (no body knows when) beyond the memory of all Ages, did ſtart ſuch a notion in the world, and that it hath paſt for currant ever ſince. But whatever he imagine, that is very improbable which relies upon no ſtronger arguments then his own conceit: But beſides, If this Tradition be granted ſo very ancient as to have been before all Books, and to be elder then any Hiſtory, it may, for any thing any body can tell, have been from the beginning; and then it is much more likely to be a Notion which was bred in the mind of Man, and born with him, then a Tradition tranſmitted from hand to hand through all generations; eſpecially if we conſider how many rude and barbarous Nations there are in the World which conſent in the Opinion of a God, and yet have no certain Tradition of any thing that was done among them but two or three Ages before.

Thirdly, But if neither of theſe be ſatisfactory, he hath one way more; which although it ſignifie little to Men of ſober and ſevere Reaſon, yet it very unhappily hits the jealous and ſuſpicious humour of the generality of men, who from the experience they have had of themſelves and others, are very apt to ſuſpect that every body, but eſpecially their Superiours and Governours, have a deſign to impoſe upon them for their own ends. In ſhort, it is this; That this noiſe about a God is a meer State Engine, and a Politick device, invented at firſt by ſome great Prince, or Miniſter of State, to keep people in awe and order. And if ſo, from hence (ſaith the Atheiſt) we may eaſily apprehend, how from ſuch an original it might be generally propagated, and become univerſally currant, having the ſtamp of publick Authority upon it; beſides, that People have always been found eaſie p. 22to comply with the inclinations of their Prince. And from hence likewiſe we may ſee the Reaſon why this Notion hath continued ſo long; for being found by experience to be ſo excellent an Inſtrument of Government, we may be ſure it would always be cheriſhed and kept up. And now he triumphs, and thinks the buſineſs is very clear: Thus it was; ſome time or other, (moſt probably towards the beginning of the world, (if it had a beginning) when all Mankind was under one Univerſal Monarch;) ſome great Nebuchadnezzar ſet up this Image of a Deity, and commanded all People and Nations to fall down and worſhip it: And this being found a ſucceſsfull device, to awe people into obedience to Government, it hath been continued to this day, and is like to laſt to the end of the world. To this fine conjecture I have theſe four things to ſay: 1. That all this is meer conjecture and ſuppoſition; he cannot bring the leaſt ſhadow of proof or evidence for any one tittle of it. 2. This ſuppoſition grants the opinion of a God to conduce very much to the ſupport of Government and order in the World, and conſequently to be very beneficial to Mankind; ſo that the Atheiſt cannot but acknowledge that it is great pity that it ſhould not be true, and that it is the common intereſt of Mankind, if there were but probable Arguments for it, not to admit of any ſlight Reaſons againſt it; and to proſecute all thoſe who would ſeduce men to Atheiſm, as the great diſturbers of the world, and peſts of humane ſociety. 3. This ſuppoſition can have nothing of certainty in it, unleſs this be true, That whoever makes a politick advantage of other mens Principles, is preſumed to contrive thoſe Principles into them; whereas it is much more common (becauſe more eaſie) for men to ſerve their own ends of thoſe Principles or Opinions, which they do not put into men, but find there; ſo that if the queſtion of a God were to be decided by the probability of this Conjecture, (which p. 23the Atheiſt applauds himſelf moſt in) it would be concluded in the affirmative; It being much more likely, that becauſe Politicians reap the advantages of obedience and a more ready ſubmiſſion to Government from mens believing that there is a God, that they found the minds of men prepoſſeſt to their hands with the notion of a God, then that they planted it there; and we need not doubt but that they would be very well contented to reap where they did not ſow, and to gather where they did not ſtrew. 4. We have as much evidence of the contrary to this ſuppoſition as ſuch a thing is capable of, viz. that it was not an Arcanum Imperii, a Secret of Government, to propagate the belief of a God among the people, when the Governours themſelves knew it to be a cheat. For we find in the Hiſtories of all Ages of which we have any Records, (and of other Ages we cannot poſſibly judge) that Princes have not been more ſecure from troubles of Conſcience, and the fears of Religion, and the terrours of another World, (nay, many of them more ſubject to theſe) then other men, as I could give many inſtances, and thoſe no mean ones: What made Caligula creep under the Bed when it thunder'd? What made Tiberius (that great Maſter of the Crafts of Government) complain ſo much of the grievous ſtings and laſhes he felt in his Conſcience? What mov'd that Great Emperour, Charls the Fifth, to quit his Kingdom, and retire into a Monaſtery to prepare for another World? What made Cardinal Wolſey (one of the greateſt Miniſters of State that ever was) to pour forth his ſoul in thoſe ſad words? Had I been as diligent to pleaſe my God as I have been to pleaſe my King, he would not have forſaken me now in my gray hairs. What reaſon for ſuch Actions and Speeches, if theſe Great Men had known that Religion was but a cheat? Now if ſuch great and politick perſons (as the three laſt of theſe were) knew nothing of this Secret, I think we may ſafely conclude, that the p. 24Notion of a God did not come from the Court, that it is not the invention of Politicians, and a juggle of State, to cozen the people into obedience. And now from all this that hath been ſaid it ſeems to be very evident, that the general conſent of Man-kind in this apprehenſion That there is a God, muſt in all Reaſon be aſcribed to ſome more certain and univerſal Cauſe then Fear, or Tradition, or State Policy, viz. to this, That God himſelf hath ſtamped this Image of himſelf upon the Mind of Man, and ſo woven it into the very frame of his Being, that (like Phidias his Picture in Minerva's Shield) it can never totally be defaced without the ruine of humane nature.

Object. I do but know one Objection that this Diſcourſe is liable to; it is this: The Univerſal Conſent of Man-kind in the apprehenſion of a God is no more an Argument of the Being of a God, then the general agreement of ſo many Nations for ſo many Ages in Polytheiſme and Idolatry is an Argument for theſe. Anſw. To this I anſwer, 1. That the generality of the Philoſophers and wiſe men of all Nations and Ages did diſſent from the multitude in theſe things; they believed but one Supreme Deity, which, with reſpect to the various benefits men received from him, had ſeveral Titles beſtowed upon him; and although they did ſervilely comply with the People in worſhipping God by ſenſible Images and Repreſentations, yet it appears by their Writings that they deſpiſed this way of Worſhip as ſuperſtitious, and unſuitable to the Nature of God. So that Polytheiſme and Idolatry are far from being able to pretend to Univerſal Conſent from their having had the Vote of the multitude in moſt Nations for ſeveral Ages together; becauſe the opinion of the vulgar ſeparated from the Conſent and Approbation of the Wiſe, ſignifies no more then a great many Cyphers would do without Figures. 2. The groſs Ignorance and Miſtakes of the Heathen about God and his Worſhip are a good Argument p. 25that there is a God, becauſe they ſhew, That men ſunk into the moſt degenerate condition, into the greateſt blindneſs and darkneſs imaginable, do yet retain ſome ſenſe and awe of a Deity; that Religion is a property of our Natures, and that the Notion of a Deity is intimate to our Underſtandings, and ſticks cloſe to them, ſeeing Men will rather have any God then none, and rather then want a Deity, they will worſhip any thing. 3. That there have been ſo many falſe Gods invented, is rather an Argument that there is a true One, then that there is none: There would be no Counterfeits, but for the ſake of ſomething that is real; for, though all Pretenders ſeem to be what they really are not, yet they pretend to be ſomething that really is: For, to counterfeit is to put on the likeneſs and appearance of ſome real Excellency; There would be no Braſs-money, if there were not good and lawful Money; Briſtol-ſtones would not pretend to be Diamonds, if there never had been any Diamonds; Thoſe Idols in Henry the Seventh's time (as Sir Francis Bacon calls them) Lambert Simnell, and Perkin Warbeck, had never been ſet up, if there had not once been a real Plantagenet and Duke of York; ſo the Idols of the Heathen, though they be ſet up in affront to the true God, yet they are a probable Argument that there is one.

3. Speculative Atheiſme is abſurd in the Theory, becauſe it requires more evidence for things then they are capable of. Ariſtotle hath long ſince well obſerved, how unreaſonable it is to expect the ſame kind of proof and evidence for every thing, which we have for ſome things. Mathematical things, being of an abſtracted nature, are onelyonly capable of clear Demonſtration; But Concluſions in Natural Philoſophy are to be proved by a ſufficient Induction of experiments; things of a moral nature, by moral Arguments; and matters of Fact, by credible Teſtimony: And though none of theſe be capable of ſtrict Demonſtration, p. 26yet we have an undoubted aſſurance of them, when they are proved by the beſt Arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear. No man can demonſtrate to me, that there is ſuch an Iſland in America as Jamaica; yet upon the Teſtimony of credible perſons who have ſeen it, and Authors who hauehave written of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as I am from doubting of the cleereſt Mathematical Demonſtration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm principle by all thoſe who pretend to be certain of any thing at all; That when any thing is proved by as good arguments as that thing is capable of, and we have as great aſſurance that it is, as we could poſſibly have ſuppoſing it were, we ought not in reaſon to make any doubt of the exiſtence of that thing? Now to apply this to the preſent Caſe: The being of a God is not Mathematically demonſtrable, nor can it be expected it ſhould, becauſe onelyonly Mathematical matters admit of this kind of evidence; Nor can it be proved immediately by ſenſe, becauſe God being ſuppoſed to be a pure Spirit, cannot be the Object of any corporeal ſenſe. But yet we have as great aſſurance that there is a God as the nature of the thing to be proved is capable of, and as we could in reaſon expect to have, ſuppoſing that he were. For let us ſuppoſe there were ſuch a Being as an Infinite Spirit cloathed with all poſsible perfection, that is, as Good and Wiſe and Powerful, &c. as can be imagined, what conceiveable ways are there whereby we ſhould come to be aſſured that there is ſuch a Being, but either by an internal impreſſion of the Notion of a God upon our Minds, or elſe by ſuch external and viſible Effects as our Reaſon tells us muſt be attributed to ſome Cauſe, and which we cannot without great violence to our Underſtandings attribute to any other Cauſe but ſuch a Being as we conceive God to be, that is, One that is infinitely Good, and Wiſe, and Powerful? Now we have this double aſſurance that there is a God, and greater or other then this the thing p. 27is not capable of. If God ſhould aſſume a Body, and preſent himſelf before our eyes, this might amaze us, but could not give us any rational aſſurance that there is an Infinite Spirit; If he ſhould work a Miracle, that could not in reaſon convince an Atheiſt more then the Arguments he already hath for it; If he were to ask a ſign in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, what could he deſire God to do for his conviction more then he hath already done? Could he deſire him to work a greater Miracle then to make a World? Why if God ſhould carry this perverſe man out of the limits of this World, and ſhew him a new Heaven and a new Earth, ſpringing out of nothing, he might ſay, that innumerable parts of Matter chanc'd juſt then to rally together, and to form themſelves into this new World, and that God did not make it. Thus you ſee that we have all the rational aſſurance of a God that the thing is capable of, and that Atheiſm is abſurd and unreaſonable in requiring more.

4. The Atheiſt is abſurd, becauſe he pretends to know that which no man can know, and to be certain of that which no body can be certain of; that is That there is no God, and (which is conſequent upon this, as I ſhall ſhew afterwards) That it is not poſsible there ſhould be one. And the Atheiſt muſt pretend to know this certainly; for it were the greateſt folly in the world for a man to deny and deſpiſe God, if he be not certain that he is not. Now whoever pretends to be certain that there is no God, hath this great diſadvantage; He pretends to be certain of a pure Negative: But of Negatives we have far the leaſt certainty, and they are always hardeſt, and many times impoſsible to be proved: Indeed ſuch Negatives as only deny ſome particular mode or manner of a things exiſtence, a man may have a certainty of them, becauſe, when we ſee things to be, we may ſee what they are, and in what manner they do, or do not exiſt; For inſtance, we may be certain that Man is not a creature that hath Wings, becauſe this p. 28onelyonly concerns the manner of his exiſtence; and we ſeeing what he is, may certainly know that he is not ſo, or ſo. But pure Negatives, that is, ſuch as abſolutely deny the exiſtence of things, or the poſſibility of their exiſtence, can never be proved; for after all that can be ſaid againſt a thing, this will ſtill be true, That many things poſſibly are which we know not of, and that many more things may be then are; and if ſo, after all our arguments againſt a thing, it will be uncertain whether it be or not; and this is univerſally true, unleſs the thing denied to be, do plainly imply a contradiction, from which I ſhall afterwards ſhew the Notion of a God to be free. Now the Atheiſt pretends to be certain of a pure Negative, viz. That there is no ſuch Being as God, and that it is not poſſible there ſhould be; But no man can reaſonably pretend to know thus much, but he muſt pretend to know all things that are, or can be; which if any man ſhould be ſo vain as to pretend to, yet it is to be hoped, that no body would be ſo weak as to believe him.

5. Speculative Atheiſm is abſurd, becauſe it is ſelf-contradictions. There are theſe two great contradictions in the denial of a God. 1. He that denies a God, ſays that that is impoſſible which he muſt grant to be poſſible. He ſays it is impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a Being as God, in ſaying that de facto there is no ſuch Being; for Eternity being eſſential to the Notion of a God, if there be not a God already, it is impoſſible now that there ſhould be one; becauſe ſuch a Being as is ſuppoſed to be eſſentially Eternal and without beginning, cannot now begin to be. And yet he muſt grant it poſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a Being, becauſe it is poſſible there ſhould be ſuch a Being as hath all poſſible perfection; and ſuch a Being as this is that which we call God, and is that very thing which the Atheiſt denies, and others affirm to be; for he that denies a God, muſt deny ſuch a Being as all the world deſcribe God to be, and this is the general Notion which all men p. 29have of God, That he is a Being as perfect as is poſſible; that is, endued with all ſuch perfections as do not imply a contradiction, as none of thoſe perfections which we attribute to God do; Not neceſsity of being, and ſelf-exiſtence, and eternity, and immenſity or unlimitedneſs; theſe the Atheiſt muſt grant poſsible and free from contradiction, becauſe he aſcribes them to the World, or at leaſt to Matter; Not Goodneſs, or Wiſdom, or Power, or Truth, or Juſtice, becauſe he aſcribes theſe to Men, nor conſequently the utmoſt degrees of theſe that are poſſible; nor, laſtly, doth immateriality or the Notion of a Spirit imply a contradiction, becauſe the Atheiſt muſt either grant that there is a Spirit in Man, that is, ſomething that is not Matter, (and conſequently, that an immaterial principle is not impoſsible) or elſe give a fair and ſatiſfactory account how meer Matter can think and underſtand, and how that which moves by certain and neceſſary Laws, that is, cannot move unleſs it be moved by another, and cannot but move if it be impell'd by another, is capable of Liberty and Freedom; which I think is impoſſible to be done. 2. Another contradiction which attends the denial of a God, is this; Atheiſm denies ſuch a Being to be, as doth in the eſſential Notion of it include neceſſary exiſtence, that is, an impoſſibility of not being; And this in plain Engliſh, is to deny that thing to be, which cannot but be. Now that the Notion of a God doth eſſentially include in it neceſsary exiſtence, appears from the general Notion that all men have of God, viz. that he is a Being that hath all poſſible perfection; But that neceſſary exiſtence is a perfection, is evident, becauſe if Being be good, it is better to have it neceſſarily, then contingently; to have it ſecur'd, then to be in danger of loſing it: And that it is a poſſible perfection, the Atheiſt cannot deny, becauſe he aſcribes it to Matter, as I ſhewed before. So that Atheiſm doth finally reſolve it ſelf into theſe two groſs Contradictions, viz. That it is impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a Being p. 30as hath all poſſible perfections; that is, That that which may be, cannot be: And, That ſuch a Being as neceſſarily exiſts, doth not, nor can poſſibly exiſt; that is to ſay, That a thing which cannot but be, is not, nor can be.

II. Atheiſm, as it is an abſurd, ſo it is an imprudent Opinion; and that upon theſe two accounts.

Firſt, It is againſt mens preſent Intereſt. Did but Men conſider what God is, they would ſee him to be ſo lovely a Being, and ſo full of goodneſs and all deſireable perfections, that even thoſe very perſons, who are of ſuch irregular Underſtandings as not to believe that there is a God, yet could not (if they underſtood themſelves) refrain from wiſhing with all their hearts that there were one. For, is it not every mans intereſt that there ſhould be ſuch a Being in the World as takes particular care of him, and loves him, and is able and willing to do him good, and to make him happy; to ſupply all his wants, and to relieve him in all his ſtraits, when no body elſe can; to preſerve him in the greateſt dangers, and aſſiſt him againſt his greateſt enemies, and ſecure him from miſery and deſtruction? Is is not every mans intereſt that there ſhould be ſuch a Being in the World, as would govern us for our advantage, and require nothing of us, but what is highly for our intereſt, and what (if we rightly underſtood our own concernment) we our ſelves would chooſe to do? And God is ſuch a Being, if he be at all. Now why ſhould any man be aggrieved that there is ſuch a Being as this, or count it his intereſt to ſhut Him out of the World? Why ſhould any man be concern'd or troubled that there is a Being as good as we can poſſibly deſire or imagine? I dare ſay, if a wiſe and conſiderate man were left to himſelf and his own choice, to wiſh the greateſt good to himſelf he could deviſe; the ſum of all his wiſhes would be, that there were juſt ſuch a Being as God is; nor would he chooſe any other Benefactor or Friend or Protector for himſelf, or Governor for the whole p. 31World, then infinite Power conducted & managed by infinite Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and Juſtice, which is the true Notion of a God. I confeſs, it is not a wicked Mans intereſt, if he reſolve to continue ſuch, that there ſhould be a God; But then it is not mens intereſt to be wicked: It is for the general good of humane ſociety, and conſequently, of particular perſons, to be true & juſt; it is for mens health to be temperate; and ſo I could inſtance in all other vertues. But this is the myſtery of Atheiſm, men are wedded to their luſts, and reſolv'd upon a wicked courſe, & ſo it becomes their intereſt to wiſh there were no God, and to believe ſo if they can; whereas if men were minded to live righteouſly and ſoberly and vertuouſly in the world, to believe a God would be no hinderance or prejudice to any ſuch deſign, but very much for the advancement and furtherance of it. Men that are good and vertuous do eaſily believe a God; ſo that it is vehemently to be ſuſpected, that nothing but the ſtrength of mens luſts, and the power of vicious inclinations, do ſway their minds, and ſet a byaſs upon their Underſtandings towards Atheiſm.

Secondly, Atheiſm is imprudent, becauſe it is unſafe in the iſſue. The Atheiſt doth, as it were, lay a Wager againſt the Religious man that there is no God; but upon ſtrange inequality and odds; for he ventures his Eternal Intereſt: whereas the other ventures onelyonly the loſs of his Luſts, (which it is much better for him to be without) or at the utmoſt, of ſome temporal convenience; and all this while is inwardly more contented and happy, and uſually more healthful, and perhaps meets with more reſpect, and faithfuller friends, and lives in a more ſecure and flouriſhing condition, and freer from the evils and puniſhments of this world, then the Atheiſtical perſon does, (however, it is not much that he ventures;) And after this life, if there be no God, is as well as he; but if there be a God, is infinitely better, even as much as unſpeakable and eternal happineſs is better then extream and endleſs miſery.

p. 32So that if the Arguments for and againſt a God were equal, and it were an even Queſtion Whether there were one or nor, yet the hazard and danger is ſo infinitely unequal, that in point of prudence and intereſt every man were obliged to incline to the Affirmative; and what-ever doubts he might have about it, to chooſe the ſafeſt ſide of the Queſtion, and to make that the Hypotheſis to live by. For, he that acts wiſely, and is a throughly prudent man, will be provided in emnem eventum, will take care to ſecure the main chance, what-ever happens: but the Atheiſt, in caſe things ſhould fall out contrary to his belief and expectation, he hath made no proviſion for this caſe; if, contrary to his confidence, it ſhould prove in the Iſſue that there is a God, the man is loſt and undone for ever; If the Atheiſt when he dies ſhall find that his ſoul remains after his body, and has onelyonly quitted it's lodging, how will this man be amazed and blank'd, when, contrary to his expectation, he ſhall find himſelf in a new and ſtrange place, amidſt a world of Spirits, entred upon an everlaſting and unchangeable ſtate? How ſadly will the man be diſappointed when he finds all things otherwiſe then he had ſtated and determined them in this world? When he comes to appear before that God whom he hath denied, and againſt whom he hath ſpoken as deſpightful things as he could? Who can imagine the pale and guilty looks of this man, and how he will ſhiver and tremble for the fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his Majeſty? How will he be ſurprized with terrors on every ſide, to find himſelf thus unexpectedly and irrecoverably plunged into a ſtate of ruine and deſperation? And thus things may happen for all this mans confidence now: For our belief or diſ-belief of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing; we cannot fancy things into being, or make them vaniſh into nothing by the ſtubborn confidence of our imaginations; things are as fullen as we are, and will be what they are, what-ever we think of them; and if there be a God, a p. 33man cannot by an obſtinate diſ-belief of him make him ceaſe to be, any more then a man can put out the Sun by winking.

And thus I have as briefly and clearly as I could endeavour'd to ſhew the ignorance and folly of Speculative Atheiſm in denying the exiſtence of God. And now it will be leſs needful to ſpeak of the other two Principles of Religion, the Immortality of the Soul, and future Rewards; For no man can have any reaſonable ſcruple about theſe, who believes that there is a God; becauſe no man that owns the exiſtence of an infinite Spirit, can doubt of the poſſibility of a finite Spirit, that is, ſuch a thing as is immaterial, and does not contain any principle of ſelf-corruption in it ſelf; And no man that believes the goodneſs of God, can doubt but that he hath made ſome things as good as may be, and for as long continuance as they are capable of. Nor can any man that acknowledgeth the holineſs and juſtice of God, and that he loves righteouſneſs, and hates iniquity, and that he is Magiſtrate and Governour of the World, and conſequently concerned to countenance obedience to, and puniſh the violation of his Laws; and withal conſiders the promiſcuous diſpenſations many times of Gods Providence in this World, think it unreaſonable to conclude, that after this life good men ſhall be rewarded, and ſinners puniſhed.

And now I think I may with reaſon intreat ſuch as are Atheiſtically enclined, to conſider theſe things ſeriouſly and impartially; And if there be weight in theſe Conſiderations which I have offered to them to ſway with reaſonable men, I would beg of ſuch, that they would not ſuffer themſelves to be by aſſed by prejudice, or paſsion, or the intereſt of any luſt or worldly advantage, to a contrary perſwaſion.

Firſt, I would intteat them ſeriouſly and diligently to conſider theſe things, becauſe they are of ſo great moment and concernment to every man; If any thing in the world deſerve our ſerious ſtudy and conſideration, theſe Principles of Religion do; p. 34For what can import us more to be ſatisfied in, then whether there be a God, or not? whether our Souls ſhall periſh with our Bodies, or be immortal, and ſhall continue for ever? And if ſo, Whether in that eternal ſtate which remains for men after this Life, they ſhall not be happy or miſerable for ever, according as they have demeaned themſelves in this world? If theſe things be ſo, they are of infinite conſequence to us; and therefore it highly concerns us to enquire diligently about them, and to ſatisfie our minds concerning them one way or other. For theſe are not matters to be ſlightly and ſuperficially thought upon, much leſs (as the way of Atheiſtical men is) to be played and jeſted withal. There is no greater argument of a light and inconſiderate perſon, then profanely to ſcoff at Religion; It is a ſign that that man hath no regard to himſelf, and that he is not touched with a ſenſe of his own intereſt; For, He jeſts with edg'd tools, and plays with Life and Death, and makes nothing of his Soul. He is the very mad-man that Solomon ſpeaks of, Prov. 26. 18. Who caſteth firebrands, arrows and death, and ſaith, Am I not in ſport? To examine ſeverely, and debate ſeriouſly the Principles of Religion, is a thing worthy of a Wiſe man; but if any man ſhall turn Religion into Raillery, and confute it by two or three bold jeſts, this man doth not render Religion, but himſelf ridiculous in the opinion of all conſiderate men, becauſe he ſports with his own Life. If the Principles of Religion were doubtful and uncertain, yet they concern us ſo neerly, that we ought to be ſerious in the examination of them; and though they were never ſo clear and evident, yet they may be made ridiculous by vain and frothy men, as the graveſt and wiſeſt Perſonage in the World may be abuſed by being put into a Fools Coat, and the moſt noble and excellent Poem may be debaſed and made vile by being turned into Burleſque. So that it concerns every man that would not trifle away his Soul, and fool himſelf into irrecoverable miſery, with p. 35the greateſt ſeriouſneſs to enquire into theſe matters whether they be ſo or not, and patiently to conſider the arguments which are brought for them; Many have miſcarried about theſe things, not becauſe there is not reaſon and evidence enough for them, but becauſe they have not had patience enough to conſider them.

Secondly, Conſider theſe things impartially. All wicked men are of a Party againſt Religion; Some Luſt or Intereſt engageth them againſt it. Hence it comes to paſs that they are apt to ſlight the ſtrongeſt Arguments that can be brought for it, and to cry up very weak ones againſt it. Men do generally and without difficulty aſſent to Mathematical Truths, becauſe it is no bodies intereſt to deny them; but men are ſlow to believe Moral and Divine Truths, becauſe the Luſts and Intereſts of men do prejudice them againſt them. And therefore you may obſerve, That the more vertuouſly any man lives, and the leſs he is enſlaved to any Luſt, the more ready he is to entertain the Principles of Religion.

Therefore, when you are examining theſe matters, do not take into conſideration any ſenſual or worldly Intereſt, but deal clearly and impartially with your ſelves; Let not temporal and little advantages ſway you againſt a greater and more durable intereſt. Think thus with your ſelves; That you have not the making of things true or falſe, but that the truth and exiſtence of things is already fix'd and ſetled, and that the Principles of Religion are already either determinately true or falſe, before you think of them: Either there is a God, or there is not; either your Souls are Immortal, or they are not; one of theſe is certain and neceſſary; and they are not now to be altered; The truth of things will not comply with your conceits, and bend it ſelf to your intereſts. Therefore do not think what you would have to be, but conſider impartially what is, and (if it be) will be whether you will or no. Do not reaſon thus; I would fain be wicked, and therefore is is my intereſt that there p. 36ſhould be no God, nor no life after this, and therefore I will endeavour to prove that there is no ſuch thing, and will ſhew all the favour I can to that ſide of the Queſtion; I will bend my underſtanding and wit to ſtrengthen the Negative, and will ſtudy to make it as true as I can. This is fond, becauſe it is the way to cheat thy ſelf; and that thou mayeſt do, if thou likeſt it: We may cozen our ſelves as often as we pleaſe, but Res nolunt decipi, The nature of things will not be impoſed upon. If then thou be as wiſe as thou oughteſt to be, thou wilt reaſon thus with thy ſelf; My higheſt intereſt is not to be deceived about theſe matters, therefore ſetting aſide all other conſiderations, I will endeavour to know the truth, and yield to that.

2. Secondly, The Practical Atheiſt, who is wicked and irreligious notwithſtanding he does in ſome ſort believe that there is a God, and a future ſtate; he is likewiſe guilty of prodigious Folly: The Principle of the Speculative Atheiſt argues more Ignorance, but the Practice of the other argues greater Folly. Not to believe a God and another Life, for which there is ſo much evidence of Reaſon, is great ignorance and folly; but 'tis the higheſt madneſs, when a man does believe theſe things, to live as if he did not believe them: When a man does not doubt but that there is a God, and according as he demeans himſelf towards him, he will make him happy or miſerable for ever; yet to live ſo as if he were certain of the contrary, and as no man in Reaſon can live, but he that is well aſſured that there is no God. It was a ſhrewd ſaying of the old Monk, That two kind of Priſons would ſerve for all offenders in the World, an Inquiſition, and a Bedlam; If any man ſhould deny the Being of a God, and the Immortallity of the Soul, ſuch a one ſhould be put into the firſt of theſe, the Inquiſition, as being a deſperate Heretick; if any man ſhould profeſs to believe theſe, and allow himſelf in any known wickedneſs, ſuch a one ſhould be put into Bedlam; p. 37becauſe there cannot be a greater folly and madneſs, then for a man in matters of greateſt moment and concernment to act againſt his beſt Reaſon and Underſtanding, and by his Life to contradict his Belief; ſuch a man does Vivus videnſque perire, periſh with his eyes open, and knowingly undoes himſelf; he runs upon the greateſt dangers which he clearly ſees to be before him, and precipitates himſelf into thoſe evils which he profeſſes to believe are real and intolerable; and wilfully neglects the obtaining of that unſpeakable good and happineſs which he is perſwaded is certain and attainable. But of this more in the Application of this Doctrine.

III. The Third way of Confirmation ſhall be by endeavouring to vindicate Religion from thoſe common Imputations which ſeem to charge it with Ignorance or Imprudence. The profane Wits of the world caſt upon Religion theſe three Imputations.

1. Of Credulity.

2. Of Singularity.

3. Of Making a fooliſh Bargain.

Firſt, Credulity: Say they, The Foundation of Religion is the belief of thoſe things for which we have no ſufficient Reaſon, and conſequently, of which we can have no good aſſurance; as the belief of a God, and of a future ſtate after this life; things which we never ſaw, nor did experience, nor ever ſpoke with any body that did; now it ſeems to argue too great a facility and eaſineſs of belief, to aſſent to any thing upon inſufficient grounds.

To this I anſwer,

1. That if there be ſuch a Being as a God, and ſuch a thing as a future ſtate, it cannot (as I ſaid before) in reaſon be expected that we ſhould have the evidence of ſenſe for ſuch things: For, he that believes a God, believes ſuch a Being as hath all p. 38perfections, among which this is one, that he is a Spirit, and conſequently, inviſible, and cannot be ſeen: He that believes another Life after this, profeſſeth to believe a ſtate of which in this life we can have no trial and experience.

2. We have the beſt Evidence for theſe things which they are capable of at preſent, ſuppoſing they were.

3. Thoſe who deny theſe Principles muſt be much more credulous, (that is) believe things upon incomparably leſs evidence of Reaſon. The Atheiſt looks upon all that are Religious as a Company of credulous Fools well met; But he, for his part, pretends to be wiſer then to believe any thing for Company; he cannot entertain things upon thoſe ſlight grounds which move other men; if you would win his aſſent to any thing, you muſt give him a clear Demonſtration for it. Now there's no way to deal with this Man of Reaſon, this rigid exactor of Demonſtration for things which are not capable of it, but by ſhewing him that he is an hundred times more credulous; that he begs more Principles, takes more things for granted without offering to prove them, and aſſents to more ſtrange Concluſions upon weaker grounds, then thoſe whom he ſo much accuſeth of Credulity. And to evidence this, I ſhall briefly give you an account of the Atheiſts Creed, and preſent you with a Catalogue of the Fundamental Articles of his Faith, or rather Unbelief. He believes, That there is no God, nor poſſibly can be, and conſequently that the wiſe as well as unwiſe of all ages have been miſtaken, except himſelf and a few more. He believes, that either all the world have been frighted with an apparition of their own Fancy, or that they have moſt unnaturally conſpired together to cozen themſelves; Or that this Notion of a God is a Trick of Policy, though the greateſt Princes and Politicians do not at this day know ſo much, nor have done time out of mind: He believes, either, that the Heavens and the Earth and all p. 39things in them had no original Cauſe of their Being, or elſe that they were made by Chance, and happened he knows not how to be as they are; and that in this laſt ſhuffling of Matter, all things have by great good Fortune fallen out as happily, and as regularly, as if the greateſt Wiſdom had contrived them; but yet he believes that there was no Wiſdom in the contrivance of them. He Believes, That that which is poſſible is impoſſible, and that that is not, which cannot but be. He believes, That meer Matter can Underſtand and Will, and moſt dextrouſly perform all thoſe fine and free operations which the Ignorant attribute to Spirits, and conſequently, that there are no ſuch things as immortal Spirits, or a Reſurrection of the Body, or everlaſting Life. This is his Creed. And ſeriouſly it is a wonder that there ſhould be found any perſon pretending to Reaſon or Wit, that can ſay Amen to ſuch a heap of abſurdities, which are ſo groſs and palpable that they may be felt, So that I think it will fall to the Atheiſts ſhare to be the moſt credulous perſon; that is, to believe things upon the ſleighteſt Reaſons.

II. The Second Imputation is Singularity; the affectation whereof is unbecoming a Wiſe man: To this charge I anſwer.

1. If by Religion be meant the belief of the Principles of Religion, that there is a God, and a Providence, that our Souls are Immortal, and that there are Rewards to be expected after this life; theſe are ſo far from being ſingular Opinions, that they are the general Opinion of Mankind, even of the moſt Barbarous Nations; as Tully, Seneca, and others teſtifie; inſomuch, that the Hiſtories of ancient times do not furniſh us with the names of above three or four at moſt who denied a God; And Lucretius acknowledgeth, that Epicurus was the firſt who did oppoſe thoſe great Foundations of Religion, the Providence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul. Primùm Grajus homo, &c. meaning Epicurus.

p. 402. If by Religion be meant a living up to thoſe Principles, (that is) to act conformably to our beſt Reaſon and underſtanding, and to live as it does become thoſe who do believe a God, and a future State; this is acknowledged even by thoſe who live otherwiſe, to be the part of every wiſe man, and the contrary to be the very madneſs of folly, and height of diſtraction: Nothing being more ordinary then for men who live wickedly, to acknowledg that they ought to do otherwiſe.

3. Though according to the common courſe and practice of the World it be ſomewhat ſingular for men truly and throughly to live up to the Principles of their Religion; yet ſingularity in this matter is ſo far from being a Reflection upon any mans prudence, that it is a ſingular commendation of it. In two Caſes ſingularity is very commendable.

1. When there is a neceſſity of it in order to a mans greateſt Intereſt and happineſs. I think it to be a reaſonable account for any man to give, why he does not live as the greateſt part of the world do, that he has no mind to die as they do, and to periſh with them; he is not diſpoſed to be a fool, and to be miſerable for company; he has no inclination to have his laſt end like theirs who know not God, and obey not the Goſpel of his Son, and ſhall be puniſhed with everlaſting deſtruction from the preſence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

2. It is very commendable to be ſingular in any Excellency, and I have ſhewn that Religion is the greateſt Excellency: to be ſingular in any thing that is wiſe, and worthy, and excellent, is not a diſparagement, but a praiſe: every man would chooſe to be thus ſingular.

III. The Third Imputation is, that Religion is a fooliſh bargain; becauſe they who are Religious hazard the parting with a preſent and certain happineſs for that which is future and uncertain. To this I anſwer,

p. 411. Let it be granted, that the Aſſurance which we have of future Rewards falls ſhort of the Evidence of ſenſe; for I doubt not but that that ſaying of our Saviour, Bleſſed is he who hath believed and not ſeen; and thoſe expreſſions of the Apoſtle, We walk by faith and not by ſight; and faith is the evidence of things not ſeen; are intended by way of abatement and diminution to the Evidence of Faith, and do ſignifie, that the report and teſtimony of others, is not ſo great evidence as that of our own ſenſes: And though we have ſufficient aſſurance of another ſtate, yet not ſo great evidence as if we our ſelves had been in the other World, and ſeen how all things are there.

2. We have ſufficient aſſurance of theſe things, and ſuch as may beget in us a well grounded confidence, and free us from all doubts of the contrary, and perſwade a reaſonable man to venture his greateſt Intereſts in this World upon the ſecurity that we have of another World: for

1. We have as much aſſurance of theſe things as things future and at a diſtance are capable of; and he is a very unreaſonable man that would deſire more: Future and inviſible things are not capable of the Evidence of ſenſe; but we have the greateſt rational Evidence for them; and in this every reaſonable man ought to acquieſce.

2. We have as much as is abundantly ſufficient to juſtifie every mans diſcretion, who for the great and eternal things of another World, hazards or parts with the poor and tranſitory things of this Life. And for the clearing of this, it will be worth our conſidering, that the greateſt affairs of this world, and the moſt important concernments of this life, are all conducted onelyonly by Moral Demonſtrations: Men every day venture their lives and eſtates onelyonly upon Moral aſſurance. For inſtance, Men who never were at the Eaſt or Weſt Indies, or in Turky, or Spain; yet do venture their whole Eſtates in Traffick thither, though p. 42they have no Mathematical demonſtration, onelyonly Moral aſſurance that there are ſuch Places. Nay which is more, Men every day eat and drink, though I think no man can demonſtrate out of Euclide or Apollonius, that his Baker, or Brewer, or Cook, have not conveyed Poyſon into his meat or drink; And that Man that would be ſo wiſe and cautious as not to eat or drink till he could demonſtrate this to himſelf, I know no other remedy for him, but that in great gravity and wiſdom he muſt die for fear of death. And for any man to urge, that though men in temporal affairs proceed upon moral aſſurance, yet there is greater aſſurance required to make men ſeek Heaven and avoid Hell, ſeems to me to be highly unreaſonable; for ſuch an aſſurance of things as will make men circumſpect and carefull to avoid a leſſer danger, ought in all reaſon to awaken men much more to the avoiding of a greater: ſuch an aſſurance as will ſharpen mens deſires, and quicken their endeavours for the obtaining of a leſſer good, ought in all reaſon to animate men more powerfully, and to inſpire them with a greater vigour and induſtry in the purſuit of that which is infinitely greater: For why the ſame aſſurance ſhould not operate as well in a great danger as in a leſs, in a great good as in a ſmall and inconſiderable one, I can ſee no reaſon, unleſs men will ſay, that the greatneſs of an evil and danger is an incouragement to men to run upon it, and that the greatneſs of any good and happineſs ought in reaſon to diſhearten men from the purſuit of it.

Uſe I. The Uſe that I ſhall make of this, ſhall be

1. To put men out of conceit with Sin.

2. To perſwade men to be truly Religious.

Firſt, If Religion be the beſt Knowledg and Wiſdom, this challenges wicked men for their folly and ignorance; this conviction of the great imprudence and unreaſonableneſs of a wicked p. 43courſe ſhould ſhame men out of Irreligion. Wicked men are in Scripture deſcribed by this Character, they are thoſe that know not God; which argues monſtrous ignorance and ſtupidity; for to have an underſtanding, and not to know God, is in intellectual things juſt ſuch an abſurdity, as it is in natural things to have eyes, and not to diſcern the light; for as light is primum viſibile, the firſt object of our ſight, ſo God is primum intelligibile, the plaineſt and moſt obvious object of our underſtandings; He fills Heaven and Earth, every thing repreſents him to us; which way ſoever we turn our ſelves, we are encountred with clear evidences and demonſtrations of a Deity; For the inviſible things of him from the Creation of the world are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things made, even his eternal Power and God-head. So that men are without excuſe, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, Rom. 1. 20. foreign, ſuch men as know not God can have no Apology to make for themſelves, their ignorance is utterly inexcuſable: Or if men do underſtand, or believe there is ſuch a Being as God; not to conſider this, not to attend to the proper conſequences of ſuch a principle; not to know our Relation to him, and dependance upon him, and obnoxiouſneſs to his Power and Juſtice in caſe we neglect, contemn, and diſobey him: not to know the duty that we owe to him who hath made us, and hath an unqueſtionable right in us, and title to us, and authority over us; and is therefore our ſupream Law-giver, becauſe he hath power to make us happy or miſerable for ever, to ſave or to deſtroy us; and conſequently that it is our higheſt intereſt to pleaſe him, to know his Will and to do it; This is groſs ignorance, and inconſiderateneſs, and ſtupidity as can be imagined.

He that obſerves the lives and actions of the greateſt part of men, would verily think that they underſtood nothing of all this; therefore we find in Scripture that when God looks p. 44down upon the wickedneſs of men, he pronounces them to be without underſtanding, Deut. 32. 28. when God had reckoned up the rebellions and perverſneſſes of the Children of Iſrael, he concludes, It is a nation void of counſel, neither is there any underſtanding in them. In the 14 Pſalm at the beginning, the Pſalmiſt repreſents God as looking down from heaven upon the children of men; and when he ſaw how they had corrupted themſelves, and what abominable works they did, crying out, Have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge? Not that wicked men are deſtitute of the natural faculty of Underſtanding, but they have it as if they had it not; they have Underſtandings, but they do not uſe them, which in effect and by interpretation, is all one as if they had none; Nay, happy were it for them if they had them not, for then they would not be liable to the Judgment of God, nor accountable to Him as reaſonable creatures; but this ignorance is wilfull and affected; men are not blind, but they wink, and ſhut their eyes; they can underſtand, and will not; or if they do underſtand any thing, they impriſon the Truths of God, and detain them in unrighteouſneſs; they thruſt light into a dungeon, and hide the candle of the Lord that is in them under a buſhel, they do not ſuffer thoſe things that they know to have a due power and influence upon their hearts and lives: And this is an Ignorance that will be ſo far from excuſing men, that it will aggravate their condemnation; and therefore Irreligion is not onelyonly an argument of the greateſt Ignorance, but of the greateſt Folly. I know there are great pretenſions in the world to Knowledge and Wiſdom, but upon a true and juſt account of things, there's nothing more familiar and ordinary then Ignorance and Folly; theſe ill weeds are of a forward and plentifull growth in the nature of man; Nihil tam valde vulgare quam nihil ſapere, Nothing is more common then for men not to be wiſe. We talk much of Prodigies, p. 45but, as Tully ſayes well, Maximum portentum eſt vir ſapiens, One of the greateſt Wonders in the World is a truly wiſe and knowing perſon; ſo that it is not very eaſie to anſwer Job's Queſtion at the 12th. Verſe of this Chapter, Where ſhall Wiſdom be found? and where is the place of Underſtanding? So many wicked men as there are in the world, ſo many Fools, and that I am afraid amounts to a great number. Men generally ſtand upon the credit and reputation of their Underſtandings, and of all things hate to be accounted Fools, becauſe Folly is ſo great a reproach to the Underſtanding of a man, and ſo high a reflection upon his diſcretion: But I know no way for men to avoid this imputation, and to bring off the credit of their Underſtandings, but by being truly Religious, by fearing God, and departing from evil: For certainly, there is no ſuch imprudent perſon as he that neglects God and his Soul, and is careleſs and ſlothful about his everlaſting concernments, becauſe this man acts contrary to his trueſt Reaſon and beſt Intereſt; he neglects his own ſafety, and is active to procure his own ruine: He flies from happineſs; and runs away from it as faſt as he can; but purſues miſery, and makes haſte to be undone. Hence it is that Solomon does all along in the Proverbs give the title of Fool to a wicked man, as if it were his proper name, and the fitteſt character for him, becauſe he is eminently ſuch; There is no ſuch fool as the ſinning fool, who every time he ſins ventures his Soul, and layes his everlaſting Intereſt at the ſtake; every time a man provokes God, he does the greateſt miſchief to himſelf that can be imagined. A mad man that cuts himſelf, and tears his own fleſh, and daſhes his head againſt the ſtones does not act ſo unreaſonably as a ſinner, becauſe he is not ſo ſenſible of what he does; wickedneſs is a kind of voluntary frenzy, and a choſen diſtraction, and every ſinner does wilder and more extravagant things, then any man can do that is craz'd and beſide p. 46himſelf, and out of his wits; onelyonly with this ſad difference, that he knows better what he does. And that wicked men are many of them wiſe as to the things of this world, is no vindication of them any more then the more innocent actions of mad men, (as catching at ſhadows, and purſuing butter-flyes) about which poſſibly they may uſe as great an activity and diligence, as any man can do about the moſt weighty affairs; but this does not vindicate them from being mad, for becauſe ſuch actions are trifling and impertinent to the great concernments of life, we account ſuch men diſtracted for all that. I know the world applaud themſelves much in this wiſdom, and cry it up as the onelyonly prudence; but infinite Wiſdom, which is the beſt Judge of wiſdom, calls it folly. David, in Pſal. 2. when he brings in the Sages and Politicians of the world conſulting about a wicked deſign againſt Chriſt, he tells us, that as wiſe as they took themſelves to be, He that ſits in heaven laughs at them, and the Lord hath them in deriſion; and ſhall we account them wiſe at whom God laughs? Can we reckon that to be prudence which the Lord hath in deriſion? The Rich man, Luk. 12. who had enlarged his barns, and laid up goods for many years, no doubt took himſelf for a very prudent man; but God who calls things as they are, and does not call any body out of his name, calls this man fool, becauſe in the midſt of all this care, he had neglected his ſoul; Thou fool, &c. To them who believe another life after this, an eternal ſtate of happineſs or miſery in another world, (which is but a reaſonable Poſtulatum, or demand among Chriſtians) there is nothing in Mathematicks more demonſtrable then the folly of wicked men; for it is not a clearer and more evident principle that the whole world is greater then a part, then that Eternity and the concernments of it are to be preferred before Time.

But it is not my work to revile ſinners, and to call them p. 47names, but to convince them if it be poſſible, and to reclaim them. I will therefore put the matter into a temporal Caſe, that wicked men who underſtand any thing of the Rules and Principles of worldly wiſdom, may ſee the imprudence of a ſinfull courſe, and be convinced that this their way is their folly, even themſelves being judges.

Let me then propound ſome Caſes to ſinners, and ask them a few Queſtions. Is that man wiſe, as to his body and his health, who onelyonly cloaths his hands, but leaves his whole body naked? who provides onelyonly againſt the Tooth-ach, and neglects whole troops of mortal diſeaſes that are ready to ruſh in upon him? Juſt thus does he who takes care only for this vile body, but neglects his precious and immortal Soul; who is very ſolicitous to prevent ſmall and temporal inconveniencies, but takes no care to eſcape the damnation of Hell.

Is he a wiſe man, as to his temporal Eſtate, that lays deſigns onelyonly for a day, without any proſpect to, or proviſion for the remaining part of his life? Juſt thus does he that provides for the ſhort time of this life, but takes no care for all Eternity; which is to be wiſe for a moment, but a fool for ever, and to act as untowardly and as croſly to the reaſon of things as can be imagined; to regard Time as if it were Eternity, and to neglect Eternity as if it were but a ſhort time.

Do you think him a wiſe man, who is ſerious about trifles, but trifles about the moſt ſerious matters? Juſt ſo is he who purſues the World and the petty intereſts of it with all his might, but minds Religion and the weighty concernments of Eternity, as if he minded them not.

Do you count him prudent, who throws himſelf overboard to ſave his goods? Juſt ſo doth he who to ſecure any thing in this world makes ſhip-wrack of his Conſcience, and caſts away his Soul.

p. 48Is he wiſe, who is wiſe in any thing but in his proper profeſſion and imployment? wiſe for every body but himſelf? who is ingenious to contrive his own miſery, and to do himſelf a miſchief; but is dull and ſtupid as to the deſigning of any real benefit and advantage to himſelf? Juſt ſuch a one is he who is a good Tradeſ-man, but a bad Chriſtian; for Chriſtianity is more our proper Calling and profeſſion then the very Trades we live upon; and juſt ſuch is every Sinner, who is wiſe to do evil, but to do good hath no underſtanding.

Is he wiſe, who neglects and diſobliges him who is his beſt friend, and can be his ſhrewdeſt Enemy? who with one weak Troop goes out to meet him that comes againſt him with thouſands of thouſands? who ſhes a ſmall danger, and runs upon a greater? Juſt ſo does every wicked man who neglects and contemns God, who can ſave or deſtroy him; who ſtrives with his Maker, and provoketh the Lord to jealouſie; and with the ſmall and inconſiderable Forces of a Man takes the Field againſt the mighty God the Lord of Hoſts; who fears them that can kill the body, but after that have no more that they can do; but fears not him who after he hath kill'd can deſtroy both body and ſoul in Hell; and juſt ſuch is he who for fear of any thing in this world ventures to grieve God; for in ſo doing he runs away from men, and falls into the hands of the living God; he flies from a temporal danger, and leaps into Hell.

Is he wiſe, who in matters of greateſt moment and concernment neglects opportunities never to be retriv'd? who ſtanding upon the Shore, and ſeeing the Tide making haſte towards him apace, and that he hath but a few minutes to ſave himſelf, yet will lay himſelf to ſleep there, till the cruel Sea ruſh in upon him, and overwhelm him? Juſt ſo does he who trifles away this day of Gods grace and patience, and fooliſhly adjourns the work of Repentance & the buſineſs of Religion to a dying hour.

p. 49And, to put an end to theſe Queſtions, Is he wiſe, who hopes to attain the end without the means? nay, by means that are quite contrary to the end? Juſt ſuch is every wicked man who hopes for Bleſſedneſs hereafter without Holineſs here; to gain the favour of God by offending him, and to come to the ſight of him by ſinning againſt him; and to be happy (that is) to find a pleaſure in the enjoyment of God, and in the company of holy Spirits, by rendring himſelf as unſuitable and unlike to them as he can.

Uſe II. The ſecond Uſe is to perſwade men to be throughly and ſeriouſly Religious, as ever they would acquit themſelves to be truly knowing and wiſe. Knowledg and Wiſdom are confeſſed Excellencies among men, Eccl. 2. 13. Wiſdom excels Folly as much as light doth darkneſs. There are ſome Vertues and perfections that gain affection from men, as Truth, and Meekneſs, and Kindneſs; but there are others that cauſe admiration and raiſe wonder, among theſe are Knowledg and Wiſdom, which if they be in any eminent degree, will caſt a great luſtre and glory upon a man, Eccl. 8. 1. The Wiſdom of a man maketh his face to ſhine. Now even the ſhadows of theſe latter ſort of Excellencies hit the vain-glorious nature of man more then the realities of the former, becauſe proud Man had rather be admir'd then lov'd. And that Knowledg and Wiſdom are generally acknowledged to be great Excellencies appears, in that men do ſo generally affect the reputation of Knowledg, and are ſo ambitious to be accounted Wiſe. There is not any thing that men value themſelves more upon then their Knowledg and Diſcretion: and on the contrary, Ignorance and Folly are reckoned among the greateſt defects of humane nature, ſo that they are accounted generally a greater reproach and diſgrace to a man then Vice and Wickedneſs; and they have got ſo ill a report in the world, that there are not many but had rather be accounted Knaves then Fools; hence p. 50it is that men generally pretend to theſe Excellencies of Knowledg and Wiſdom, even ſuch as are moſt deſtitute of them, and rather then want theſe Perfections, they will call even their Vices and Imperfections by this name: Craft, and Silence, and Secrecy, and Reſervedneſs, and Formality, and affected Gravity, all theſe put in for the Title of Wiſdom; ſo ambitious is the nature of man of the reputation of this Excellency. Job 11. 12. Vain man would be wiſe, though he be born like a wild aſſes colt. Now this very thing that men are ſo forward to counterfeit theſe perfections is an Argument of the Excellency of real Knowledg and Wiſdom; for (as I ſaid before) to counterfeit is nothing elſe but to put on the appearance of ſome real Excellency; common and ordinary things are not counterfeited, but onelyonly things of price and value, as Gold, and Silver, and precious Stones; And that men are ſo tenacious of theſe Excellencies, ſo loth to be ſtripp'd even of the ſhadow and appearance of them, is an argument that men highly eſteem them. So that it ſeems that theſe Excellencies are in great dearneſs among men, becauſe we hold them ſo faſt, that when we cannot poſſeſs the reality of them, yet we love to enjoy the opinion of them, and rather then be wholly diſſeiſed of them, will hold them by that ſleight and fantaſtick tenure of Imagination.

Now if we account them ſuch excellencies, we ſhould labour to be poſſeſt of them in truth and reality, and not take up with any counterfeits of them, but uſe ſuch a care and niceneſs about them as men do about Jewels, and precious ſtones, which becauſe they are of great value, all miſtakes about them are ſhameful and intollerable. I have ſhewed that Religion is the trueſt knowledg, and moſt real wiſdom, therefore every man that values his underſtanding, and ſtands upon the reputation of his prudence and diſcretion, ought to be Religious, Deut. 4. 6. Keep therefore my Statutes, for this is your wiſdom and underſtanding in p. 51the ſight of the nations. Thoſe who underſtand and know how to manage the petty intereſts of this world, we account them ſhrewd, and cunning, and deſigning men; but if we would ſpeak truly and wiſely of things, the Religious man is the notable man; he that contrives to be everlaſtingly happy, and lays deſigns for all Eternity, he is a man of the deepeſt reach; he that takes care of his Soul, and ſecures his Eternal intereſt, he is a ſhrewd man. That man who by the aſſiſtance of Gods grace can overreach his own deceitful heart, and defeat all the arts and wiles of the Devil, and eſcape thoſe pollutions that are in the world, and ſave himſelf from the ſins, and ſnares, and temptations of an untoward Generation; he is a cunning man indeed. Wouldſt thou then be truly knowing? labour to know God, and thy ſelf, thy intereſt, and thy end, and thy happineſs, and the way of attaining it. Wouldſt thou be truly wiſe? be wiſe for thy ſelf, wiſe for thy Soul, wiſe for Eternity; Reſolve upon a Religious courſe of life; Fear God and depart from evil; look beyond things preſent and ſenſible, unto things which are not ſeen, and are eternal; labour to ſecure the great intereſts of another world, and refer all the actions of this ſhort and dying life, to that ſtate which will ſhortly begin, but never have an end; and this will approve it ſelf to be Wiſdom at the laſt, what-ever the world judge of it now; for, not that which is approved of men now, but what ſhall finally be approved by God, is true wiſdom; that which is eſteemed ſo by him who is the fountain and original of all wiſdom, the firſt rule and meaſure of it, the beſt and moſt competent Judge of it.

I deny not but many that are wicked, and neglect Religion, may think themſelves wiſe, and may enjoy this their deluſion for a while, but there is a time a coming, when the moſt profane and Atheiſtical, who now account it a piece of gallantry, and an argument of a great ſpirit, and of a more then common wit and p. 52underſtanding, to ſlight God, and baffle Religion, and to level all the diſcourſes of another world, with the Poetical deſcriptions of the Fairy Land: I ſay, there is a day a coming, when all theſe witty fools ſhall be unhappily undeceived, and not being able to enjoy their deluſion any longer, ſhall call themſelves fools for ever.

But why do I uſe arguments to perſwade men to that which is ſo excellent, ſo uſeful, and ſo neceſſary? The thing it ſelf I am preſſing you to, hath allurements in it beyond all arguments: For, if Religion be the beſt knowledg and wiſdom, I cannot offer any thing beyond this to your underſtandings to raiſe your eſteem of it; I can preſent nothing beyond this to your Affections that may be attractive of your love and deſire. All that can be done, is to ſet the thing before men, and to offer it to their choice; and if mens natural deſire of wiſdom and knowledg and happineſs will not perſwade them to be Religious, 'tis in vain to uſe Arguments: if the ſight of theſe Beauties will not charm mens Affections, 'tis to no purpoſe to go about to compel a liking, and to urge and puſh forward a a match to the making whereof conſent is neceſſary. Religion is matter of our freeſt choiſe; and if men will obſtinately and wilfully ſet themſelves againſt it, there is no remedy, Pertinatiae nullum remedium poſuit Deus; If men will chooſe to befools, and to be miſerable, all that can be ſaid is this, God will leave ſuch perſons to in herit their own choice, to enjoy the portion of ſinners.

FINIS.

End of the text · John Tillotson, The Wisdom of Being Religious (1664)