Sermons and Discourses Volume 3, Sermon 3
A SERMON Preached at WHITE-HALL, April 4th, 1679.
1 JOHN IV. 1.
Beloved, believe not every ſpirit, but try the ſpirits whether they are of God; becauſe many falſe Prophets are gone out into the World.
THIS caution and counſel was given upon occaſion of the falſe Prophets and Teachers that were riſen up in the beginning of the Chriſtian Church, who endeavoured to ſeduce men from the true Doctrine of the Goſpel delivered by the Apoſtles of our Lord and Saviour. And theſe teaching contrary things, could not both be from God: and therefore St. John calls upon Chriſtians to examine the Doctrines and Pretences of thoſe new Teachers, whether they were from God or not. Believe not every Spirit; …hat is, not every one that takes upon him to be inſpired and to be a Teacher come from God: But try the Spirits; that is, examine thoſe that make this pretence, whether it be real or not; and examine the Doctrines which they bring, becauſe there are many Impoſtors abroad in the World.
This is the plain ſenſe of the Words: In which there are contained theſe four Propoſitions.
Firſt, That men may, and often do, falſly pretend to Inſpiration. And this is the reaſon upon which the Apoſtle grounds this Exhortation: Becauſe many falſe Prophets are gone out into the world, therefore we ſhould try who are true, and who are falſe.
Secondly, We are not to believe every one that pretends to be inſpired, and to teach a Divine Doctrine: This follows upon the former; becauſe men may falſly pretend to Inſpiration, therefore we are not to believe every one that makes this pretence. For any man that hath but confidence enough, and conſcience little enough, may pretend to come from God. And if we admit all pretences of this kind, we lie at the mercy of every crafty and confident man to be led by him into what deluſions he pleaſeth.
Thirdly, Neither are we to reject all that pretend to come from God. This is ſufficiently implied in the Text; for when the Apoſtle ſays believe not every Spirit, he ſuppoſeth we are to believe ſome; and when he ſaith try the Spirits whether they be of God, he ſuppoſeth ſome to be of God, and that thoſe which are ſo are to be believed. Theſe three Obſervations are ſo plain that I need only to name them, to make way for the
Fourth, Which I principally deſigned to inſiſt upon from theſe Words. And that is this, That there is ſome way to diſcern mere pretenders to Inſpiration, from thoſe who are truly and Divinely inſpired: And this is neceſſarily implied in the Apoſtles bidding us to try the Spirits whether they are of God. For it were in vain to make any trial, if there be no way to diſcern between pretended and real Inſpirations.
Now the handling of this will give occaſion to two very material Enquiries, and uſeful to be reſolved.
I. How we may diſcern between true and counterfeit Doctrines: thoſe which really are from God, and thoſe which only pretend to be ſo?
II. To whom this judgement of diſcerning doth appertain?
I. How we may diſcern between true and counterfeit Doctrines and Revelations? for the clearing of this I ſhall lay down theſe following Propoſitions.
I. That Reaſon is the faculty whereby Revelations are to be diſcerned; or to uſe the phraſe in the text, it is that whereby we are to judge what Spirits are of God, and what not. For all Revelation from God ſuppoſeth us to be men, and to be indued with Reaſon; and therefore it does not create new Faculties in us, but propounds new Objects to that Faculty which was in us before. Whatever Doctrines God reveals to men are propounded to their Underſtandings, and by this Faculty we are to examine all Doctrines which pretend to be from God, and upon on examination to judge whether there be reaſon to receive them as Divine, or to reject them as Impoſtures.
2. All ſupernatural Revelation ſuppoſeth the truth of the Principles of Natural Religion. We muſt firſt be aſſured that there is a God, before we can know that he hath made any Revelation of himſelf: and we muſt know that his Words are true, otherwiſe there were no ſufficient reaſon to believe the Revelations which he makes to us: and we muſt believe his Authority over us, and that he will reward our obedience to his Laws, and puniſh our breach of them; otherwiſe there would neither be ſufficient obligation nor encouragement to Obedience. Theſe and many other things are ſuppoſed to be true, and naturally known to us, antecedently to all ſupernatural Revelation; otherwiſe the Revelations of God would ſignifie nothing to us, nor be of any force with us.
3. All Reaſonings about Divine Revelations muſt neceſſarily be governed by the Principles of Natural Religion: that is, by thoſe apprehenſions which men naturally have of the Divine perfections, and by the clear Notions of good and evil which are imprinted upon our Natures. Becauſe we have no other way to judge what is worthy of God and credible to be revealed by him, and what not, but by the natural notions which we have of God and of his eſſential perfections: which, becauſe we know him to be immutable, we have reaſon to believe he will never contradict. And by theſe Principles likewiſe, we are to interpret what God hath revealed; and when any doubt ariſeth concerning the meaning of any divine Revelation (as that of the Holy Scriptures) we are to govern our ſelves in the interpretation of it by what is moſt agreeable to thoſe natural Notions which we have of God, and we have all the reaſon in the World to reject that ſenſe which is contrary thereto. For inſtance, when God is repreſented in Scripture as having a humane ſhape, eyes, ears and hands, the Notions which men naturally have of the Divine Nature and Perfections do ſufficiently direct us to interptet theſe expreſſions in a ſenſe worthy of God, and agreeable to his Perfection: And therefore it is reaſonable to underſtand them as rather ſpoken to our capacity, and in a Figure, than to be literally intended. And this will proportionably hold in many other caſes.
4. Nothing ought to be received as a Revelation from God which plainly contradicts the Principles of Natural Religion, or overthrows the certainty of them. For inſtance, it were in vain to pretend a Revelation from God, That there is no God, becauſe this is a contradiction in terms. So likewiſe to pretend a command from God, That we are to hate and deſpiſe him; becauſe it is not credible that God ſhould require any thing of Reaſonable Creatures ſo unſuitable to their Natures, and to their Obligations to him; Beſides that ſuch a Law as this does tacitly involve a contradiction; becauſe upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, to deſpiſe God would be to obey him; and yet to obey him is certainly to honour him. So that in this caſe to honour God, and to deſpiſe him, would be the ſame thing, and equal contempts of him. In like manner, it would be vain to pretend any Revelation from God, That there is no life after this, nor rewards and puniſhments in another World: becauſe this is contrary to thoſe natural apprehenſions which have generally poſſeſt mankind, and would take away the main force and ſanction of the divine Laws. The like may be ſaid concerning any pretended Revelation from God, which evidently contradicts thoſe natural Notions which men have of good and evil; as, That God ſhould command, or allow Sedition and Rebellion, Perfidiouſneſs and Perjury; becauſe the practiſe of theſe would be apparently deſtructive of the peace and happineſs of Mankind, and would naturally bring confuſion into the World: But God is not the God of Confuſion, but of Order, which St. Paul appeals to as a Principle naturally knowu. Upon the ſame account nothing ought to be entertained as a Divine Revelation which overthrows the certainty of the Principles of natural Religion; becauſe that would take away the certainty of Divine Revelation it ſelf, which ſuppoſeth the truth of thoſe Principles. For inſtance, whoever pretends any Revelation that brings the Providence of God into queſtion, does by that very thing make ſuch a Revelation queſtionable. For if God take no care of the World, have no concernment for humane affairs, why ſhould we believe that he makes any Revelation of his Will to men? And by this Principle Moſes will have falſe Prophets to be tried: Deut. 13.1. If there ariſe among you a Prophet, and giveth thee a ſign or wonder, and the ſignor the wonder come to paſs whereof he ſpake unto thee, ſaying, Let us go after other Gods, and let us ſerve them; thou ſhalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet: And he gives the reaſon of this, ver. 5. Becauſe he hath ſpoken unto you to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the Land of Egypt. Here is a caſe wherein a falſe Prophet is ſuppoſed to work a true Miracle to give credit to his Doctrine, (which in other caſes the Scripture makes the ſign of a true Prophet) but yet in this caſe he is to be rejected as an Impoſtor: Becauſe the Doctrine he teacheth would draw men off from the worſhip of the true God who is naturally known, and had manifeſted himſelf to the people of Iſrael in ſo miraculous a manner, by bringing them out of the Land of Egypt. So that a Miracle is not enough to give credit to a Prophet who teacheth any thing contrary to that natural Notion which men have, That there is but one God, who only ought to be worſhipped.
5. Nothing ought to he received as a Divine Doctrine and Revelation, without good evidence that it is ſo: that is, without ſome Argument ſufficient to ſatisfie a prudent and conſiderate man. Now (ſuppoſing there be nothing in the matter of the Revelation that is evidently contrary to the Principles of Natural Religion, nor to any former Revelation which hath already received a greater and more ſolemn atteſtation from God) Miracles are owned by all Mankind to be a ſufficient Teſtimony to any Perſon, or Doctrine, that are from God. This was the Teſtimony which God gave to Moſes to ſatisfie the people of Iſrael that he had ſent him; Exed. 4.1, 2. Moſes ſaid, They will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice; for they will ſay, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee. Upon this God endues him with a power of Miracles, to be an evidence to them, That they may believe that the God of their Fathers, Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob, hath appeared unto thee. And all along in the Old Teſtament, when God ſent his Prophets to make a new Revelation, or upon any ſtrange and extraordinary meſſage, he always gave credit to them by ſome Sign or Wonder which they foretold or wrought. And when he ſent his Son into the World, he gave Teſtimony to him by innumerable great and unqueſtionable Miracles, more and grearer than Moſes and all the Prophets had wrought. And there was great reaſon for this: becauſe our Saviour came not only to publiſh a new Religion to the World, but to put an end to that Religion which God had inſtituted before. And now that the Goſpel hath had the confirmation of ſuch Miracles as never were wrought upon any other occaſion, no Evidence inferiour to this can in reaſon controul this Revelation, or give credit to any thing contrary to it And therefore though the falſe Prophets and Antichriſts, foretold by our Saviour, did really work Miracles, yet they were ſo inconſiderable in compariſon of our Saviour's, that they deſerve no credit in oppoſition to that Revelation which had ſo clear a Teſtimony given to it from Heaven by Miracles, beſides all other concurring Arguments to confirm it.
6. And Laſtly, No Argument is ſufficient to prove a Doctrine or Revelation to be from God, which is not clearer and ſtronger than the Difficulties and Objections againſt it: Becauſe all aſſent is grounded upon Evidence, and the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt evidence always carries it: But where the evidence is equal on both ſides, that can produce nothing but a ſuſpenſe and doubt in the mind whether the thing be true or not. If Moſes had not confuted Pharaoh's Magicians by working Miracles which they could not work, they might reaſonably have diſputed it with him who had been the true Prophet: But when he did works plainly above the power of their Magick and the Devil to do, then they ſubmitted, and acknowledged that there was the Finger of God. So likewiſe, though a perſon work a Miracle (which ordinarily is a good evidence that he is ſent by God) yet if the Doctrine he brings be plainly contrary to thoſe natural Notions which we have of God, this is a better objection againſt the truth of this Doctrine than the other is a proof of it; as is plain in the caſe which Moſes puts, Deut. 13. which I mentioned before.
Upon the ſame account no man can reaſonably believe the Doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation to be revealed by God: becauſe every man hath as great evidence that Tranſubſtantiation is falſe, as any man can pretend to have that God hath revealed any ſuch thing. Suppoſe Tranſubſtantiation to be part of the Chriſtian Doctrine, it muſt have the ſame confirmation with the whole, and that is Miracles: But of all Doctrines in the world it is peculiarly incapable of being proved by a Miracle. For if a Miracle were wrought for the proof of it, the very ſame aſſurance which a man hath of the truth of the Miracle, he hath of the falſhood of the Doctrine, that is, the clear evidence of his ſenſes for both. For that there is a Miracle wrought to prove, that what he ſees in the Sacrament is not bread but the body of Chriſt, he hath onelyonly the evidence of his ſenſes; and he hath the very ſame evidence to prove, that what he ſees in the Sacrament is not the body of Chriſt, but bread. So that here ariſeth a new controverſie, whether a man ſhould believe his ſenſes giving teſtimony againſt the Doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation, or bearing teſtimony to the Miracle which is wrought to confirm that Doctrine: For there is juſt the ſame evidence againſt the truth of the Doctrine, which there is for the truth of the Miracle. So that the Argument for Tranſubſtantiation, and the Objection againſt it, do juſt ballance one another; and where the weights in Both Scales are equal, it is impoſſible that the one ſhould weigh down the other: and conſequently Tranſubſtantiation is not to be proved by a Miracle; for that would be, to prove to a man by ſomething that he ſees, that he does not ſee what he ſees.
And thus I have endeavoured, as briefly and clearly as I could, to give ſatisfaction to the firſt Enquiry I propounded, viz. How we may diſcern between true and counterfeit Revelations and Doctrines: I proceed now to the
II To whom this judgement of Diſcerning does appertain. Whether to Chriſtians in general, or to ſome particular Perſon, or Perſons, authoriſed by God to judge for the reſt of mankind, by whoſe judgment all men are concluded and bound up. And this is an enquiry of no ſmall Importance; becauſe it is one of the moſt fundamental Points in difference between Us and the Church of Rome. And however in many particular Controverſies, as concerning Tranſubſtantiation, the Communion in one kind, the Service of God in an unknown Tongue; the buſineſs of Indulgences, the Invocation of Saints, the Worſhip of Images, they are not able to offer any thing that is fit to move a reaſonable and conſiderate man; yet in this Controverſie, concerning the Judge of Controverſies, they are not deſtitute of ſome ſpecious appearance of Reaſon which deſerves to be weighed and conſidered. Therefore that we may examine this matter to the bottom, I ſhall do theſe three things.
1. Lay down ſome Cautions and Limitations whereby we may underſtand how far the generality of Chriſtians are allowed to judge in matters of Religion.
2. I ſhall repreſent the grounds of this Principle.
3. Endeavour to ſatisfie the main Objection of our Adverſaries againſt it: And likewiſe to ſhew, that there is no ſuch reaſon and neceſſity for an univerſal infallible Judge as they pretend.
I. I ſhall lay down ſome Cautions and Limitations, by which we may underſtand how far the generality of Chriſtians are allowed to judge in matters of Religion.
Firſt Private Perſons are onelyonly to judge for themſelves, and not to impoſe their Judgement upon others, as if they had any Authority over them. And this is reaſonable, becauſe if it were otherwiſe, a Man would deprive others of that Liberty which he aſſumes to himſelf, and which he can claim upon no other account, but becauſe it belongs to others equally with himſelf.
Secondly, This liberty of judging is not ſo to be underſtood as to take away the neceſſity and uſe of Guides and Teachers in Religion. Nor can this be denied to be a reaſonable limitation; becauſe the knowledge of Revealed Religion is not a thing born with us, nor ordinarily ſupernaturally infuſed into men; but is to be learned as other things are. And if it be to be learned, there muſt be ſome to teach and inſtruct others: And they that will learn, muſt be modeſt and humble; and in thoſe things, of which they are no competent Judges, they muſt give credit to their Teachers, and truſt their skill: For inſtance, every unlearned man is to take it upon the credit of thoſe who are skilfull, that the Scriptures are truly and faithfully tranſlated; and for the underſtanding of obſcure Texts of Scripture, and more difficult points in Religion, he is to rely upon thoſe, whoſe proper buſineſs and employment it is to apply themſelves to the underſtanding of theſe things. For in theſe caſes every man is not capable of judging himſelf, and therefore he muſt neceſſarily truſt others: And in all other things he ought to be modeſt; and unleſs it be in plain matters, which every man can judg of, he ought rather to diſtruſt himſelf than his Teacher.
And this reſpect may be given to a Teacher without either ſuppoſing him to be infallibe, or making an abſolute reſignation of my judgment to him. A man may be a very able Teacher (ſuppoſe of the Mathematicks) and fit to have the reſpect which is due to a Teacher, tho he be not infallible in thoſe Sciences: and becauſe Infallibility is not neceſſary to ſuch a Teacher, it is neither neceſſary nor convenient that I ſhould abſolutely reſign up my Judgment to him. For though I have reaſon to credit him, within the compaſs of his Art, in things which I do not know, I am not therefore bound to believe him in things plainly contrary to what I and all mankind do certainly know. For example, if upon pretence of his skill in Arithmetick, which I am learning of him, he ſhould tell me, That twice two do not make four, but five; though I believed him to be the beſt Mathematician in the World, yet I cannot believe him in this thing: Nor is there reaſon I ſhould; becauſe I did not come to learn this of him, but knew as much of that before as he or any man elſe could tell me. The caſe is the ſame in matters of Religion; in which there are ſome things ſo plain, and lie ſo level to all capacities, that every man is almoſt equally judg of them: As I ſhall have occaſion farther to ſhew by and by.
Thirdly, Neither does this liberty of judging, exempt men from a due ſubmiſſion and obedience to their Teachers and Governors. Every man is bound to obey the lawful Commands of his Governors: and, what by publick conſent and Authority is determined and eſtabliſhed, ought not to be gainſaid by private Perſons, but upon very clear evidence of the falſhood or unlawfulneſs of it. And this is every mans duty, for the maintaining of Order, and out of regard to the Peace and Unity of the Church; which is not to be violated upon every ſcruple and frivolous pretence: And when men are perverſe and diſobedient, Authority is Judg, and may reſtrain and puniſh them.
Fourthly, Nor do I ſo far extend this Liberty of judging in Religion, as to think every man fit to diſpute the Controverſies of Religion. A great part of people are ignorant, and of ſo mean capacity as not to be able to judge of the force of a very good Argument, much leſs of the iſſue of a long Diſpute; and ſuch perſons ought not to engage in diſputes of Religion; but to beg God's direction, and to rely upon their Teachers; and above all to live up to the plain dictates of natural Light, and the clear Commands of God's Word, and this will be their beſt ſecurity. And if the providence of God have placed them under ſuch Guides as do ſeduce them into Error, their Ignorance is invincible, and God will not condemn them for it, ſo long as they ſincerely endeavour to do the will of God ſo far as they know it. And this being the caſe of many, eſpecially in the Church of Rome, where Ignorance is ſo induſtriouſly cheriſhed, I have ſo much charity as to hope well concerning many of them: And ſeeing that Church teacheth and enjoins the people to worſhip Images, it is in ſome ſenſe charitably done of them not to let them know the ſecond Commandment, that they may not be guilty of ſinning againſt ſo plain a Law. Having premiſed theſe Cautions, I proceed in the
II. Place, To repreſent to you the grounds of this Principle of our Religion, viz. That we all…w private perſons to judge for themſelves in matters of Religion.
Firſt, Becauſe many things in Religion, eſpecially thoſe which are moſt neceſſary to be believed and practiſed, are ſo plain that every man of ordinary capacity, after competent inſtruction in matters of Religion (which is always to be ſuppoſed) can as well judge of them for himſelf, as any man or company of men in the world can judge for him. Becauſe in theſe he hath a plain Rule to go by, Natural Light and clear Revelation of Scripture. And this is no new Principle of the Proteſtants, but moſt expreſly owned by the ancient Fathers: Whatever things are neceſſary, are plain, ſaith St. Chryſoſtom. All things are plainly contained in Scripture which concern faith and a good life, ſaith St Auſtin. And nothing can be more reaſonable than that thoſe things which are plain to every man ſhould be left to every man's judgment. For every man can judg of what is plain; of evident Truth and Falſhood, Virtue and Vice, of Doctrines and Laws plainly delivered in Scripture, if we believe any thing to be ſo, which is next to madneſs to deny. I will refer it to no mans Judgment upon earth to determine for me, Whether there be a God or not? Whether Murder and Perjury be Sins? Whether it be not plain in Scripture, That Jeſus Chriſt is the Son of God, That he became man, and died for us, and roſe again? So that there is no need of a Judg in theſe caſes. Nor can I poſſibly believe any man to be ſo abſolutely infallible, as not to call his infallibility into queſtion, if he determines any thing contrary to what is plain and evident to all mankind. For if he ſhould determine that there is no God, or that he is not to be woſhipped, or that he will not puniſh and reward men, or, which is the caſe that Bellarmin puts, that Virtue is Vice, and Vice Virtue; he would hereby take away the very foundation of Religion; and how can I look upon him any longer as a Judg in matters of Religion, when there can be no ſuch thing as Religion if he have judged and determined right?
Secondly, The Scripture plainly allows this liberty to particular and private Perſons to judg for themſelves. And for this I need go no farther than my Text, which bids men try the Spirits whether they be of God. I do not think this is ſpoken only to the Pope or a General Council, but to Chriſtians in general; for to theſe the Apoſtle writes. Now if St. John had believed that God had conſtituted an infallible Judge in his Church, to whoſe Sentence and Determination all Chriſtians are bound to ſubmit, he ought in all reaſon to have referred Chriſtians to him for the trial of Spirits, and not have left it to every man's private judgment to examine and to determine theſe things. But it ſeems St. Paul was likewiſe of the ſame mind; and though he was guided by an infallible Spirit, yet he did not expect that men ſhould blindly ſubmit to his Doctrine: Nay, ſo far is he from that, that he commends the Bereans for that very thing for which I dare ſay the Church of Rome would have check'd them moſt ſeverely, namely, for ſearching the Scriptures to ſee whether thoſe things which the Apoſtles delivered were ſo or not: This liberty St. Paul allowed; and though he was inſpired by God, yet he treated thoſe whom he taught like men. And indeed, it were a hard caſe that a neceſſity of believing Divine Revelations, and rejecting Impoſtures, ſhould be impoſed upon Chriſtians; and yet the liberty of judging, whether a Doctrine be from God or not, ſhould be taken away from them.
Thirdly, Our Adverſaries themſelves are forced to grant that which in effect is as much as we contend for. For though they deny a liberty of judging in particular points of Religion, yet they are forced to grant men a liberty of judging upon the whole. When they of the Church of Rome would perſwade a Jew, or a Heathen, to become a Chriſtian; or a Heretick (as they are pleaſed to call us) to come over to the Communion of their Church, and offer Arguments to induce them thereto; they do by this very thing, whether they will or no, make that man Judge which is the true Church, and the true Religion. Becauſe it would be ridiculous to perſwade a man to turn to their Religion, and to urge him with Reaſons to do ſo, and yet to deny him the uſe of his own judgement whether their Reaſons be ſufficient to move him to make ſuch a change. Now, as the Apoſtle reaſons in another caſe, If men be fit to judge for themſelves in ſo great and important a matter as the choice of their Religion, why ſhould they be thought unworthy to judge in leſſer matters? They tell us indeed that a man may uſe his judgement in the choice of his Religion; but when he hath once choſen, he is then for ever to reſign up his judgment to their Church: But what tolerable reaſon can any man give, why a man ſhould be fit to judge upon the whole, and yet unfit to judge upon particular Points? eſpecially if it be conſidered, that no man can make a diſcreet judgment of any Religion, before he hath examined the particular Doctrines of it, and made a judgment concerning them. Is it credible, that God ſhould give a man judgment in the moſt fundamental and important matter of all, viz. To diſcern the true Religion, and the true Church, from the falſe; for no other end, but to enable him to chuſe once for all to whom he ſhould reſign and inſlave his judgment for ever? which is juſt as reaſonable as if one ſhould ſay, That God hath given a man eyes for no other end, but to look out once for all, and to pitch upon a diſcreet perſon to lead him about blindfold all the days of his life. I come now to the
III. Thing I propounded, which is, To Anſwer the main Objection of our Adverſaries againſt this Principle; and likewiſe to ſhew that there is no ſuch Reaſon and neceſſity for an univerſal Inſallible Judge, as they pretend. Now their great Objection is this, If every man may judge for himſelf, there will be nothing but confuſion in Religion, there will be no end of Controverſies: ſo that an univerſal infallible Judge is neceſſary, and without this God had not made ſufficient proviſion for the aſſurance of men's Faith, and for the Peace and unity of his Church: Or, as it is expreſſed in the Canon Law, aliter Dominus non videretur fuiſſe diſcretus, otherwiſe our Lord had not ſeem'd to be diſcreet. How plauſible ſoever this Objection may appear, I do not deſpair but if men will lay aſide prejudice, and impartially conſider things, to make it abundantly evident, that this ground is not ſufficient to found an Infallible Judge upon. And therefore in anſwer to it, I deſire theſe following particulars may be conſidered.
Firft, That this which they ſay, rather proves what God ſhould have done according to their fancy, than what he hath really and actually done. My Text expreſly bids Chriſtians to try the Spirits, which to any man's ſenſe does imply that they may judge of theſe matters: But the Church of Rome ſays they may not; becauſe if this liberty were permitted, God had not ordered things wiſely, and for the beſt, for the peace and unity of his Church. But, as the Apoſtle ſays in another caſe, What art thou, O man, that objecteſt againſt God?
Secondly, If this reaſoning be good, we may as well conclude that there is an univerſal infallible Judge ſet over the whole world in all Temporal matters, to whoſe Authority all mankind is bound to ſubmit. Becauſe this is as neceſſary to the peace of the World, as the other is to the peace of the Church. And men ſurely are every whit as apt to be obſtinate and perverſe about matters of Temporal Right, as about matters of Faith. But it is evident in fact and experience that there is no ſuch univerſal Judge, appointed by God over the whole World, to decide all Caſes of temporal Right; and for want of him the World is fain to ſhift as well as it can. But now a very acute and ſcholaſtical man that would argue that God muſt needs have done whatever he fancies convenient for the World ſhould be done, might by the very ſame way of Reaſoning conclude the neceſſity of an univerſal infallible Judge in Civil matters, as well as in matters of Religion: And their aliter Dominus non videretur fuiſſe diſcretus, otherwiſe God had not ſeem'd to be diſcreet, is every whit as cogent and as civil, in the one Caſe as the other.
Thirdly, There is no need of ſuch a Judge, to aſſure men in matters of Religion; Becauſe men be ſufficiently certain without him. I hope it may be certain and clear enough That there is a God; and That his Providence governs the World; and That there is another Life after this, though neither Pope nor Council had ever declared any thing about theſe matters. And for Revealed Doctrines, we may be certain enough of all that is neceſſary, if it be true which the Fathers tell us, That all things neceſſary are plainly revealed in the Holy Scriptures.
Fourthly, An infallible Judge, if there were one, is no certain way to end Controverſies, and to preſerve the unity of the Church; unleſs it were likewiſe infallibly certain, That there is ſuch a Judge, and, Who he is. For till men were ſure of both theſe, there would ſtill be a Controverſy, whether there be an infallible Judge, and who he is. And if it be true which they tell us, That without an infallible Judge Controverſies cannot be ended, then a Controverſie concerning an infallible Judge can never be ended. And there are two Controverſies actually on foot about an infallible Judge; One, Whether there be an infallible Judge or not? which is a Controverſie between Us and the Church of Rome: and the other, Who this infallible Judge is? which is a Controverſie among themſelves, which could never yet be decided: And yet till it be decided, Infallibility, if they had it, would be of no uſe to them for the ending of Controverſies.
Fifthly, There is no ſuch abſolute need, as is pretended, of determining all Controverſies in Religion. If men would deveſt themſelves of prejudice and intereſt, as they ought, in matters of Religion, the neceſſary things of Religion are plain enough, and men would generally agree well enough about them: But if men will ſuffer themſelves to be by aſſed by theſe, they would not hearken to an infallible Judge, if there were one; or they would find out ſome way or other to call his Infallibility into queſtion. And as for doubtful and leſſer matters in Religion, charity and mutual forbearance among Chriſtians would make the Church as peaceable and happy, as perhaps it was ever deſign'd to be in this World, without abſolute unity in Opinion.
Sixthly and Laſtly, Whatever may be the inconveniences of mens judging for themſelves in Religion, yet taking this Principle with the Cautions I have given, I doubt not to make it appear, that the inconveniences are far the leaſt on that ſide. The preſent condition of humane Nature doth not admit of any conſtitution of things, whether in Religion or Civil matters, which is free from all kind of exception and inconvenience: That is the beſt ſtate of things which is liable to the leaſt and feweſt. If men be modeſt, and humble, and willing to learn, God hath done that which is ſufficient for the aſſurance of our Faith, and for the peace of his Church, without an infallible Judge: And if men will not be ſo, I cannot tell what would be ſufficient. I am ſure there were Hereſies and Schiſms in the Apoſtles Times, when Thoſe who governed the Church were certainly guided by an infallible Spirit. God hath appointed Guides and Teachers for us in matters of Religion, and if we will be contented to be inſtructed by them in thoſe neceſſary Articles and Duties of Religion, which are plainly contained in Scripture; and to be counſelled and directed by them in things that are more doubtful and difficult, I do not ſee why we might hot do well enough without any infallible Judge or Guide.
But ſtill it will be ſaid, Who ſhall judge what things are plain and what doubtful? The anſwer to this, in my opinion, is not difficult. For if there be any thing plain in Religion, every man that hath been duly inſtructed in the Principles of Religtion can judge of it, or elſe it is not plain. But there are ſome things in Religion ſo very plain, that no Guide or Judge can in reaſon claim that Authority over men, as to oblige them to believe or do the contrary; no, though he pretend to Infallibility; no, though he were an Apoſtle, though he were an Angel from heaven. S. Paul puts the caſe ſo high, Gal. 1.8. Though we, or an Angel from heaven, preach any other Goſpel unto you than what you have received, let him be accurſed: which plainly ſuppoſeth that Chriſtians may and can judge when Doctrines are contrary to the Goſpel. What? not believe an Apoſtle, nor an Angel from heaven, if he ſhould teach any thing evidently contrary to the plain Doctrine of the Goſpel? If he ſhould determine Vertue to be Vice, and Vice to be Vertue? No; not an Apoſtle, nor an Angel; becauſe ſuch a Doctrine as this would confound and overturn all things in Religion. And yet Bellarmin puts this very Caſe, and ſays, If the Pope ſhould ſo determine, we were bound to believe him, unleſs we would ſin againſt Conſcience.
I will conclude this Diſcourſe by putting a very plain and familiar Caſe; by which it will appear what credit and authority is fit to be given to a Guide, and what not. Suppoſe I came a Stranger into England, and landing at Dover took a Guide there to conduct me in my way to York, which I knew before by the Mapp to lie North of Dover: having committed my ſelf to him, if he lead me for two or three days together out of any plain Road, and many times over hedge and ditch, I cannot but think it ſtrange, that in a civil and well inhabited Country there ſhould be no High-ways from one part of it to another: Yet thus far I ſubmit to him, though not without ſome regret and impatience. But then if after this, for two or three days more he lead me directly South, and with my face full upon the Sun at noon day, and at laſt bring me back again to Dover Pere; and ſtill bids me follow him: Then certainly no modeſty do's oblige a man not to diſpute with his Guide, and to tell him ſurely that can be no way becauſe it is Sea. Now though he ſet never ſo bold a face upon the matter, and tell me with all the gravity and authority in the world, That it is not the Sea but dry Land under the ſpecies and appearance of Water; and that whatever my eyes tell me, having once committed my ſelf to his guidance, I muſt not truſt my own ſenſes in the caſe; it being one of the moſt dangerous ſorts of Infidelity for a man to believe his own eyes rather than his faithful and infallible Guide: All this moves me not; but I begin to expoſtulate roundly with him, and to let him underſtand that if I muſt not believe what I ſee, he is like to be of no farther uſe to me; becauſe I ſhall not be able, at this rate, to know whether I have a Guide, and whether I follow him or not. In ſhort, I tell him plainly, that when I took him for my Guide, I did not take him to tell me the difference between North and South, between a Hedge and a High-way, between Sea and dry Land; all this I knew before, as well as he or any man elſe could tell me; but I took him to conduct and direct me the neareſt way to York: And therefore after all his impertinent talk; after all his Motives of Credibility to perſwade me to believe him, and all his confident ſayings, which he gravely calls Demonſtrations, I ſtand ſtifly upon the ſhore, and leave my learned and reverend Guide to take his own courſe, and to diſpoſe of himſelf as he pleaſeth; but firmly reſolved not to follow him. And is any man to be blamed that breaks with his Guide upon theſe Terms?
And this is truly the Caſe, when a man commits himſelf to the Guidance of any Perſon or Church: If by virtue of this Authority, they will needs perſwade me out of my ſenſes, and not to believe what I ſee, but what they ſay; that Vertue is Vice, and Vice Vertue, it they declare them to be ſo: And that becauſe they ſay they are Infallible, I am to receive all their Dictates for Oracles, tho never ſo evidently falſe and abſurd in the Judgment of all Mankind: In this caſe there is no way to be rid of theſe unreaſonable People, but to deſire of them, ſince one kindneſs deſerves another, and all Contradictions are alike eaſie to be believed, that they would be pleaſed to believe that Infidelity is Faith, and that when I abſolutely renounce their Authority, I do yield a moſt perfect ſubmiſſion and obedience to it.
Upon the whole matter, all the Revelations of God, as well as the Laws of men, go upon this preſumption, that men are not ſtark fools; but that they will conſider their Intereſt and have ſome regard to the great concernment of their eternal ſalvation. And this is as much to ſecure men from miſtake in matters of Belief, as God hath afforded to keep men from ſin in matters of Practice. He hath made no effectual and infallible proviſion that men ſhall not ſin; and yet it would puzzle any man to give a good Reaſon, why God ſhould take more care to ſecure men againſt Errors in belief, than againſt ſin and wickedneſs in their Lives.
I ſhall now only draw three or four Inferences from this Diſcourſe which I have made, and ſo conclude.
1. That it is every mans Duty who hath ability and capacity for it, to endeavour to underſtand the grounds of his Religion. For to try Doctrines is to inquire into the grounds and reaſons of them; which the better any man underſtands, the more firmly he will be eſtabliſhed in the Truth, and be the more reſolute in the day of Trial, and the better able to withſtand the Arts and aſſaults of cunning Adverſaries, and the fierce ſtorms of Perſecution. And on the contrary, that man will ſoon be moved from his ſtedfaſtneſs who never examined the Grounds and Reaſons of his belief. When it comes to the Trial, he that hath but little to ſay for his Religion will probably neither do nor ſuffer much for it.
2. That all Doctrines are vehemently to be ſuſpected which decline Trial, and are ſo loath to be brought into the light; which will hot endure a fair Examination, but magiſterially require an implicite Faith: Whereas Truth is bold and full of courage, and loves to appear openly; and is ſo ſecure and confident of her own ſtrength as to offer her ſelf to the ſevereſt Trial and Examination. But to deny all liberty of Enquiry and Judgment in matters of Religion is the greateſt injury and diſparagement to Truth that can be, and a tacite acknowledgment that ſhe lies under ſome diſadvantage, and that there is leſs to be ſaid for her than for Error.
I have often wonder'd why the People in the Church of Rome do not ſuſpect their Teachers and Guides to have ſome ill deſign upon them, when they do ſo induſtriouſly debar them of the means of Knowledge, and are ſo very loath to let them underſtand what it is that we have to ſay againſt their Religion. For can any thing in the world be more ſuſpicious than to perſwade men, to put out their eyes, upon promiſe that they will help them to a much better and more faithful Guide? If any Church, any Profeſſion of men, be unwilling their Doctrines ſhould be expoſed to Trial, it is a certain ſign they know ſomething by them that is faulty, and which will not endure the light. This is the account which our Saviour gives us in a like caſe, It was becauſe mens deeds were evil that they loved darkneſs rather than light. For every one that doth evil hateth the light; neither cometh he to the light lest his deeds ſhould be reproved: But he that doth the truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifeſt that they are wrought in God.
3. Since Reaſon and Chriſtianity allow this liberty to private perſons to judg for themſelves in matters of Religion, we ſhould uſe this priviledg with much modeſty and humility, with great ſubmiſſion and deference to our Spiritual Rulers and Guides, whom God hath appointed in his Church. And there is very great need of this Caution, ſince by experience we find this liberty ſo much abuſed by many to the nouriſhing of Pride and Self-conceit, of Diviſion and Faction; and thoſe who are leaſt able to judge, to be frequently the moſt forward and confident, the moſt peremptory and perverſe: and inſtead of demeaning themſelves with the ſubmiſſion of Learners, to aſſume to themſelves the authority of Judges, even in the moſt doubtful and diſputable matters.
The Tyranny of the Roman Church over the Minds and Conſciences of men is not to be juſtified upon any account; but nothing puts ſo plauſible a colour upon it, as the ill uſe that is too frequently made of this natural Privilege of mens judging for themſelves in a matter of ſo infinite concernment, as that of their eternal happineſs. But then it is to be conſider'd, that the proper remedy in this Caſe, is not to deprive men of this Privelege, but to uſe the beſt means to prevent the abuſe of it. For though the inconveniences ariſing from the ill uſe of it may be very great, yet the miſchief on the other hand is intolerable. Religion it ſelf is liable to be abuſed to very bad purpoſes, and frequently is ſo; but it▪ is not therefore beſt that there ſhould be no Religion: And yet this Objection, if it be of any force and be purſued home, is every whit as ſtrong againſt Religion it ſelf, as againſt mens liberty of judging in matters of Religion. Nay I add farther, that no man can judiciouſly embrace the true Religion, unleſs he be permitted to judge, whether that which he embraces be the true Religion or not.
4. When upon due Trial and: Examination we are well ſetled and eſtabliſhed in our Religion, let us hold faſt the proſeſſion of our Faith without wavering; and not be like Children, toſſed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of Doctrine, through, the ſleight of men, and the cunning craftineſs of thoſe who lye in wait to deceive. And above all, let us reſolve to live according to the excellent Rules and Precepts of our holy Religion; let us heartily obey that Doctrine which we profeſs to believe. We, who enjoy the Proteſtant Religion, have all the means and advantages of underſtanding the Will of God, free liberty and full ſcope of enquiring into it, and informing our ſelves concerning it: We have all the opportunities we can wiſh of coming to the knowledge of our Duty: The Oracles of God lie open to us, and his Law is continually before our eyes; his word is nigh unto us, in our mouths, and in our hearts; (that is, we may read it and meditate upon it) that we may do it: The Key of Knowledge is put into our hands, ſo that if we do not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, it is we our ſelves that ſhut our ſelves out. And where there is nothing to hinder us from the knowledge of our Duty, there certainly nothing can excuſe us from the practice of it. For the End of all knowledge is to direct men in their duty, and effectually to engage them to the performance of it:The great buſineſs of Religion is, to make men truly good, and to teach them to live well. And if Religion have not this effect, it matters not of what Church any man liſts and enters himſelf; for moſt certainly, A bad man can be ſaved in none. Though a man know the right way to Heaven never ſo well, and be entred into it, yet if he will not walk therein, he ſhall never come thither: Nay, it will be an aggravation of this man's unhappineſs, that he was loſt in the way to Heaven, and periſhed in the very road to Salvation. But if we will in good earneſt apply our ſelves to the practice of Religion, and the obedience of God's holy Laws, his Grace will never be wanting to us to ſo good a purpoſe.
I have not time to recommend Religion to you at large, with all its advantages. I will compriſe what I have to ſay in a few words, and mind them at your peril. Let that which is our great concernment be our great care, To know the Truth and to do it, To fear God and keep his Commandments. Conſidering the Reaſonableneſs and the Reward of Piety arid Vertue, nothing can be wiſer; and conſidering the mighty aſſiſtance of God's Grace, which he is ready to afford to us, and the unſpeakable ſatisfaction and delight which is to be had in the doing of our duty, nothing can be eaſier▪ Nothing will give us that pleaſure, while we live; nothing can miniſter that true and ſolid comfort to us, when we come to die: There is probably no ſuch way for a man to be happy in this World; to be ſure, there is no way but this to eſcape the intolerable and endleſs miſeries of another World.
Now God grant that we may all know, and do in this our day, the things that belong to our peace, for his Mercies ſake in Jeſus Chriſt; To whom with the Father and the Holy Ghoſt be all Honour and Glory now and for ever. Amen.