The Rule of Faith, Part 2 – Part 3

The Rule of Faith · Part 2 – Part 3

p. 51THE RULE of FAITH.

PART. II. Concerning the Properties of the Rule of Faith; and whether they agree solely to Oral Tradition.

SECT. I.

§ 1. HAving thus endeavoured to bring the Controversy between us, to its clear and true state, that so we might not quarrel in the dark, and dispute about we know not what; I come now to grapple more closely with his Book. And the main foundations of his Discourse may be reduced to these three Heads.

First, That the essential Properties of such a way and means, as can with certainty and security convey down to us the Doctrine of Christ, belong solely to Oral Tradition. This he endeavors to prove in his five first Discourses.

p. 52Secondly, That it is impossible that this way of Oral Tradition should fail. And this he pretends to prove in his four last Discourses.

Thirdly, That Oral Tradition hath been generallly reputed by Christians in all Ages, the sole way and means of conveying down to them the Doctrine of Christ. And this he attempts to shew in his last Chapter, which he calls The Consent of Authority to the substance of his foregoing Discourses. If he make good these three things, he hath acquitted himself well in his undertaking. But whether he hath made them good or not, is now to be examined.

§ 2. First, Whether the essential Properties of such a way and means, as can with certainty and security convey down to us the knowledge of Christ's Doctrine, belong solely to Oral Tradition?

The true way to measure the essential Properties of this or that means, is by considering its sufficiency for its end. For whatsoever is necessary to make any means sufficient for the obtaining of its end, is to be reputed and essential Property of that Means, and nothing p. 53else. Now, because the end we are speaking of, is the conveyance of the knowledg of Christ's Doctrine to all those who are concerned to know it, in such a manner as they may be sufficiently certain and secure that it hath received no change or corruption from what it was when it was first delivered. From hence it appears, that the means to this end must have these two Properties. 1. It must be sufficiently plain and intelligible. 2ly. It must be sufficiently certain to us, that is, such as we may be fully satisfied concerning it, that it hath received no corruption or alteration. If it have these two conditions, it is sufficient for its end; but if it want either of them, it must necessarily fall short of its end. For if it be not plain and intelligible, it cannot convey this Doctrine to our knowledg; if it be not certain, we cannot be assured, that that Doctrine which it brings down to us for the Doctrine of Christ, is really such.

§ 3. I know he assigns more Properties of this Means which he calls the Rule of Faith; but upon examination it will appear, that they either fall in with these two, or do not at all belong to it. As,

p. 54First, That **P. 11.it must be plain and self-evident to all, as to its existence. Nothing can be more frivolous, than to make this a Property of any thing; because whosoever enquires into the Properties of a thing, is supposed to be already satisfied that the thing is.

Secondly, That it be **P. 11.evidenceable, as to its Ruling power, that is, as he explains himself, **P 3.that men be capable of knowing, that it deserves to be relied on as a Rule. By which he must either understand, the certainty of it; and then it falls in with the second Property I mentioned, and is the same with the sixth, which he lays down. Or else he means more generally, that it is the property of a Rule, that men be capable of knowing that it hath the Properties of a Rule. For I understand not, how a man can know that any thing deserves to be relied on as a Rule, otherwise than by knowing that it hath the properties of a Rule, that is, that it is sufficient for its end. But at this rate, a man may multiply the Properties of things without end, if the evidence of a thing, as to its existence, be one Property; and then, that we be capable of knowing that it is such a thing, be another.

p. 55§ 4. Thirdly, That it be P. 12.apt to settle, and justifie undoubting Persons. What he means here, by setling undoubting Persons, I am not able, on the sudden, to comprehend; because I understand not what unsettles a man besides doubting: for if a man be but so well satisfied about any thing, as to have no doubt concerning it, I do not easily apprehend how he can be setled better, that is, how his mind can be more at rest, than not to doubt. But if by undoubting Persons, he means those who do not doubt for the present, but afterwards may doubt, then I perceive what he means by apt to settle undoubting Persons, viz. apt to settle Persons when they do doubt, that is, when they are not undoubting Persons. As for justifying undoubting Persons, if he means that whosoever securely relies on this Rule, ought of right to be acquitted, as acting rationally in so doing; this is plainly consequent upon the two Properties I have laid down. For, if the means of conveying Christ's Doctrine be sufficiently plain and certain, every man that relies upon it is justified in so doing, because he trusts a means which is sufficient for its end.

p. 56§ 5. Fourthly, That **P. 12.it be apt to satisfie fully the most Sceptical Dissenters, and Rational Doubters: For it's aptitude to satisfie Rational Doubters, that plainly follows from the sufficient certainty of it. But why it should be a necessary property of a Rule of Faith, to be apt to satisfie the most Sceptical Dissenter, I can no more divine, than I can, why he should call a Dissenter Sceptical, which are repugnant terms: For a Sceptick is one who neither assents to any thing, nor dissents, but is in a perpetual suspence; because he looks upon every opinion, as balanced by a contrary opinion of equal probability, without any inclination of the Scales either way. But if by the most Sceptical Dissenter he means only a Sceptick, one that doth not believe the Doctrine of Christ, nor any thing else; then would I fain know, what that is which in reason is apt fully to satisfie such a person. If any thing will, sure a Demonstration will; but there is no aptitude at all in a Demonstration, to satisfie him who doubts whether there be any such thing as a Demonstration; and likewise questions the certainty of all those Principles, from p. 57whence any conclusion can be demonstrated. And those who are most Sceptical, profess to doubt of all this.

§ 6. Fifthly, That it **P. 11, 12.be apt to convince the most obstinate, and acute Adversary. If the Rule be plain and certain, the most acute Adversary may be convinced by it if he will, that is, if he be not obstinate; but if he be obstinate, that is, such a one as will not be convinced, but will persist in his Error in despite of all evidence that can be offered him, then I must profess that I do not know any kind of evidence that is apt to convince that man that will not be convinced by any reason that can be propounded to him. And that he ought not to have expected this from any Rule of Faith, though never so self-evident, he might have learn't from the same Author, in whom he may find his chief Properties of the Rule of Faith, if he had but had the patience to have consider'd his Explication of them; I mean Dr. Holden **Analys. Fid. L. 1. c. 3., who layes down the second Property of the Rule of Faith, (or, as he calls it, the means whereby we come to the knowledge of Revealed Truth) in these words, Another (viz. Condition of this Means, &c.) is, That it be apt of its own Nature, to afford p. 58the greatest true and rational certainty, to all men without exception to whom the knowledg of it shall come; provided they be furnish'd with the faculty of Reason, and have their minds purified from all Passion and Lust, which do (as he tells us, Cap. 6.) often hinder the most sagacious Persons from understanding the most evident and manifest Truths. Now I suppose Obstinacy to be the effect of Passion and Lust.

If Mr. S. mean, that the Rule of Faith must be apt to conquer Obstinacy, and make men lay it aside, I cannot understand this neither; unless he mean, that the Rule of Faith must be a Cudgel, which the Traditionary Church have been good at, and may use it again when occasion serves; for none but they have Title to it upon a Church-account, as Mr. S. tells us, Corol. 10. But setting aside this, I do not know any thing else that is apt to conquer Obstinacy: Not the clearest Reason, or the strongest Demonstration; for that I am sure is no ways fitted to combat a wilful and unreasonable humour with any probability of success. And if any one doubt of this, if he will but make trial, he may easily be convinc'd by experience, how unapt obstinate p. 59Persons are to be convinc'd by Reason. I do not know any thing that ever carried greater evidence than the Doctrine of Christ, preached by himself and his Apostles to the obstinate Jews, and confirmed by multitudes of unquestionable miracles; and yet we do not find by the success of it, that it was so very apt to convince those that were obstinate. And no man can judg of the aptitude of a means to an end, otherwise than by the usual and frequent success of it when it is applied. Nor do I think that the Doctrine of the Gospel was ever intended for that purpose. God hath provided no remedy for the wilful and perverse, but he hath done that which is sufficient for the satisfying and winning over of those who are teachable and willing to learn: And such a disposition supposeth a man to have laid aside both Scepticism and Obstinacy.

§ 7. Sixthly, That **P. 12.it be certain in it self.

Seventhly, That **P 12.it be absolutely ascertainable to us.

These two are comprehended in the second Property I laid down; so that I have nothing to say against them, but that the p. 60last looks very like a contradiction, absolutely ascertainable to us; which is to say, with respect to us, without respect to us; for absolutely seems to exclude respect, and to us implies it.

Having thus shewn, that the seven Properties he mentions, are either coincident with those two I have laid down, or consequent upon them, or absurd and impertinent; it remains, that the true Properties of a Rule of Faith are those two which I first named, and no more.

SECT. II.

That the Properties of a Rule of Faith belong to Scriptute.§ 1. LEt us now see how he endeavors to shew, that these Properties agree solely to Oral Tradition: He tells us there are but two Pretenders to this Title of being the Rule of Faith, Scripture, and Oral Tradition; these Properties do not belong to Scripture, and they do to Oral Tradition; therefore solely to it. A very good Argument, if he can prove these two things, That these two Properties do not belong to Scripture; and that they do to Oral Tradition.

§ 2. In order to the proving of the First, p. 61that these Properties do not belong to Scripture, he premiseth this Note, **P. 13.That we cannot by the Scriptures mean the sense of them, but the Book, that is, such or such Characters not yet sensed, or interpreted. But why can we not, by the Scriptures, mean the sense of them? He gives this clear and admirable reason; because the sense of Scripture, is, the things to be known, and these we confess are the very points of Faith, of which the Rule of Faith is to ascertain us. Which is just as if a man should reason thus: Those who say the Statute-Book can convey to them the knowledg of the Statute-Law, cannot by the Statute-Book mean the sense of it, but the Book; that is, such or such Characters not yet sensed or interpreted: Because the sense of the Statute-Book is the things to be known; and these are the very Laws, the knowledg whereof is to be conveyed to them by this Book; which is to say, that a Book cannot convey to a man the knowledg of any matter, because if it did, it would convey to him the thing to be known. But that he may farther see what excellent reasoning this is, I shall apply this Paragraph to Oral Tradition; for the Argument holds every whit as well concerning p. 62that. To speak to them in their own language, who say that Oral Tradition is their Rule, we must premise this Note, that they cannot mean by Oral Tradition, the sense of it, that is, the things to be known; for those, they confess, are the very Points of Faith, of which the Rule of Faith is to ascertain us; when they say then, that Oral Tradition is the Rule of Faith, they can only mean by Oral Tradition, the words wherein it is delivered, not yet sensed or interpreted, but as yet to be sensed; that is, such or such sounds, with their aptness to signifie to them assuredly God's mind, or ascertain them of their Faith; for abstracting from the sense, and actual signification of those words, there is nothing imaginable left but those sounds, with their aptness to signifie it. When he hath answered this Argument, he will have answered his own. In the mean while this Discourse, that he who holds the Scriptures to be the Rule of Faith, must needs by the Scriptures mean a Book void of sense, &c. Because otherwise, if by Scripture he should understand a Book, that hath a certain sense in it, that sense must be the Doctrine of Christ, which is the very thing that this Book is to convey to us; I say, this Discourse tends only p. 63to prove it an absurd thing for any man, that holds Scripture the means of conveying Christ's Doctrine, to understand by the Scripture, a Book that conveys Christ's Doctrine. This being his own reason, put into plain English, I leave the Reader to judg, whether it be not something short of perfect Science and Demonstration. Nay, if it were throughly examined, I doubt whether it would not fall short of that low pitch of Science which he speaks of in his Preface, where he tells us, that the way of Science is to proceed from one piece of sense to another.

§ 3. Having premised this, that by the Scriptures we must mean only dead Characters, that have no sense under them, He proceeds to shew that these dead Characters have not the Properties of a Rule of Faith belonging to them. Which, although it be nothing to the purpose when he hath shewn it, yet it is very pleasant to observe, by what cross and untoward Arguments he goes about it: Of which I will give the Reader a tast, by one or two instances.

In the first place he shews, that it cannot be evident to us that these Books were written by men divinely inspired, because p. 64**P. 14.till the seeming contradictions in those Books are solved; which to do, is one of the most difficult tasks in the world, they cannot be concluded to be of God's enditing. Now how is this an Argument against those, who by the Scriptures, must mean unsensed letters and characters? I had always thought contradictions had been in the sense of words, not in the letters and characters; but I perceive he hath a peculiar opinion, that the four and twenty letters do contradict one another.

The other instance shall be in his last Argument **P. 17., which is this, that the Scripture cannot be the Rule of Faith, because those who are to be ruled and guided by the Scriptures letter to Faith, cannot be certain of the true sense of it; which is to say, that unsensed letters and characters cannot be the Rule of Faith, because the Rule of Faith must have a certain sense, that is, must not be unsensed letters and characters; which in plain English amounts to thus much, unsensed letters and characters cannot be the Rule of Faith, that they cannot.

§ 4. And thus I might trace him through all his Properties of the Rule of Faith; p. 65and let the Reader see, how incomparably he demonstrates the falshood of this Protestant Tenet (as he calls it) that a sensless Book may be a Rule of Faith. But I am weary of pursuing him in these airy and phantastical combats, and shall leave him to fight with his own fancies, and batter down the Castles which himself hath built. Only I think fit here to acquaint him, once for all, with a great Secret of the Protestant Doctrine, which it seems he hath hitherto been ignorant of (for I am still more confirmed in my opinion, that he forsook our Religion before he understood it) that when they say, the Scriptures are the Rule of Faith, or the means whereby Christ's Doctrine is conveyed down to them, they mean by the Scriptures, Books written in such words as do sufficiently express the sense and meaning of Christ's Doctrine.

§ 5. And to satisfy him, that we are not absurd and unreasonable in supposing the Scriptures to be such a Book, I would beg the favour of him to grant me these four things, or shew reason to the contrary.

p. 66First, That whatever can be spoken in plain and intelligible words, and such as have a certain sense, may be written in the same words.

Secondly, That the same words are as intelligible when they are written, as when they are spoken.

Thirdly, That God, if he please, can endite a Book in as plain words as any of his creatures.

Fourthly, That we have no reason to think that God affects obscurity, and envies that men should understand him, in those things which are necessary for them to know, and which must have been written to no purpose, if we cannot understand them. St. Luke **Luke 1.3, 4.Luke 1:3Luke 1:4tells Theophilus, that he wrote the History of Christ to him, on purpose to give him a certain knowledg of those things which he writ. But how a Book which hath no certain sense, should give a man certain knowledg of things, is beyond my capacity. St. John **John 20.31.John 20:31saith, that he purposely committed several of Christ's miracles to Writing, that men might believe on Him. But now had Mr. S. been at his elbow, he would have advised him to spare his labour, and would have given him this p. 67good reason for it; because when he had written his Book, no body would be able to find the certain sense of it without oral Tradition, and that alone would securely and intelligibly convey both the Doctrine of Christ, and the certain knowledg of those miracles which he wrought for the confirmation of it. If these four things be but granted, I see not why, when we say that the Scriptures are the means of conveying to us Christ's Doctrine, we may not be allow'd to understand by the Scriptures, a Book which doth in plain and intelligible words express to us this Doctrine.

SECT. III.

6 1. ANd now,Mr. S's Exceptions against Scripture examined. although this might have been a sufficient Answer to his Exceptions against the Scriptures, as being incapable of the Properties of a Rule of Faith; because all of them suppose that which is apparently false and absurd, as granted by Protestants, viz. That the Scriptures are only an heap of dead letters, and insignificant characters, without any sense under them; and that oral Tradition is that p. 68only which gives them life and sense; Yet because several of his Exceptions pretend to shew, that the true Properties of a Rule of Faith do not at all appertain to the Scriptures; therefore I shall give particular Answers to them; and as I go along, shew that Tradition is liable to all or most of those Exceptions, and to far greater than those.

§ 2. Whereas he says, **P. 13.it cannot be evident to Protestants, from their Principles, that the Books of Scripture were originally written by men divinely inspired; I will shew him that it may, and then answer the reasons of this Exception.

It is evident, from an universal, constant, and uncontrolled Tradition among Christians, not only oral, but written, and from the acknowledgment of the greatest Adversaries of our Religion, that these Books were originally written by the Apostles and Evangelists. And this is not only a Protestant Principle, but the Principle of all mankind, That an undoubted Tradition is sufficient evidence of the Antiquity and Author of a Book, and all the extrinsecal Argument p. 69that can ordinarily be had of a Book written long ago.

Next, it is evident, that the Apostles were men divinely inspired, that is, secured from error and mistake in the writing of this Doctrine, from the miracles that were wrought for the confirmation of it. Because it is unreasonable to imagine that the Divine power should immediately interpose for the confirmation of a Doctrine, and give so eminent an attestation to the Apostles to convince the World that they were immediately appointed and commissioned by God, and yet not secure them from error in the delivery of it. And that such miracles were wrought, is evident from as credible Histories as we have for any of those things which we do most firmly believe. And this is better evidence that the Apostles were men divinely inspired, than bare oral Tradition can furnish us withal. For setting aside the authentick relation of these matters in Books, it is most probable, that oral Tradition of it self and without Books, would scarce have preserved the memory of any of those particular miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, which are recorded in p. 70Scripture. And for the probability of this, I offer these two things to his consideration.

First, No man can deny that memorable persons have lived, and actions been done in the world innumerable, whereof no History now extant makes any mention.

Secondly, He himself will grant, that our Saviour wrought innumerable more miracles, than are recorded in Scripture. And now I challenge him to shew the single vertue of oral Tradition, by giving an account of any of those persons, or their actions, who lived 1500 or 2000 years ago, besides those which are mentioned in Books; or to give a catalogue but of ten of those innumerable miracles wrought by our Saviour, which are nor recorded by the Evangelists, with circumstances as punctual and particular as those are clothed withal. If he can do this, it will be a good evidence that oral Tradition singly and by it self can do something; but if he cannot, 'tis as plain an evidence on the contrary, that if those actions of former times, and those miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, which are recorded in Books p. 71had never been written, but entrusted solely to oral Tradition, we should have heard as little of them at this day, as we do of those that were not written.

§ 3. Now to examine his Reasons for this Exception:

First, He saith, **P. 13.'tis most manifest that this cannot be made evident to the vulgar, that Scripture was written by men divinely inspired. This Reason is as easily answered, by saying 'tis most manifest that it can: But besides saying so, I have shewed how it may be made as evident to the vulgar, as other things which they do most firmly and upon good grounds believe. Even the rudest of the vulgar, and those who cannot read, do believe upon very good grounds that there was such a King as William the Conqueror; and the miracles of Christ and his Apostles are capable of as good evidence as we have for this.

Secondly, He says, **P. 13, 14.this cannot be evident to the curious and most speculative Searchers, but by so deep an inspection into the sense of Scripture, as shall discover p. 72such secrets, that Philosophy, and human Industry could never have arrived to. As if we could not be assured that any thing were written by men divinely inspired, unless it were above the reach of human understanding; and as if no man could know that this was our Saviours Doctrine, Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, that do ye likewise unto them, because every one can understand it. But if there were more mysteries in the Scriptures than there are, I hope a man might be satisfied that they were written by men divinely inspired, without a clear comprehension of all those mysteries. The evidence of the inspiration of any person doth not depend upon the plaineness or sublimity of the things revealed to him, but upon the goodness of the arguments which tend to perswade us that the person is so inspired: And the Argument that is most fit to satisfy us of that is, if he work miracles. Now I would gladly know why a learned man cannot be assured of a miracle, that is, a plain sensible matter of Fact done long ago, but by so deep an inspection into the sense of Scripture, as shall discover such p. 73secrets that Philosophy and human Industry could never have arrived to.

§ 4. Thirdly, Because **P. 14.all the seeming contradictions of Scripture must be solved, before we can out of the bare letter conclude the Scripture to be of God's enditing; to solve which literally, plainly, and satisfactorily (he tells us) the memory of so many particulars, which made them clearer to those of the Age in which they were written, and the matter known, must needs be so worn out by tract of time, that it is one of the most difficult tasks in the World. As if we could not believe a Book to be of God's enditing, because there seem now to be some contradictions in it, which we have reason to believe could easily have been solved by those who lived in the Age in which it was written. Or as if oral Tradition could help a man to solve these contradictions, when the memory of particulars necessary for the clear solution of them is (as himself confesses) worn out by tract of time. If Mr. S. can, in order to the solution of the seeming contradictions of Scripture, demonstrate, that oral Tradition hath to p. 74this day preserv'd the memory of those particulars (necessary for that purpose) the memory of which must needs be long since worn out by tract of time, then I will readily yield, that his Rule of Faith hath in this particular, the advantage of ours. But if he cannot do this, why does he make that an Argument against our Rule, which is as strong against his own? This is just like Capt. Everard's Friend's way of arguing against the Protestants, That they cannot rely upon Scripture because it is full of plain contradictions, impossible to be reconciled; and therefore they ought in all reason to submit to the infallibility of the Church. And for an instance of such a contradiction, he pitched upon the three fourteen Generations mentioned in the first of St. Matthew, because the third Series of Generations, if they be counted, will be found to be but thirteen. Not to mention now, how this difficulty hath been sufficiently satisfied both by Protestant and Popish Commentators, without any recourse to oral Tradition; that which I take notice of, is the unreasonableness of making this an Exception against the p. 75Protestants, when it comes with every whit as much force upon themselves. Suppose this Contradiction not capable of any solution by Protestants (as he affirms) and I should submit to the infallibility of the Church; can he assure me, that infallibility can make thirteen, fourteen? If it cannot, how am I nearer satisfaction in this point, by acknowledging the infallibility of the Church? The case is the very same, as to Mr S's. Exception, if I owned oral Tradition, I should be never the nearer solving the seeming contradictions of Scripture, and consequently I could not in Reason conclude it to be of God's enditing. So that in truth, these Exceptions if they were true, would not strike at Protestancy, but at Christian Religion; which is the general unhappiness of most of the Popish Arguments; than which there is no greater evidence, that the Church of Rome is not the true Mother, because she had rather Christianity should be destroyed, than it should appear that any other Church hath a claim to it. It was a work very proper for the Heretick Marcion, to assault Religion this way; who, as Tertullian **L. 1. contr. Marcion.tells us, writ a p. 76whole Book, which he call'd Antitheses, wherein he reckoned up all the Contradictions (as he thought) between the Old and New Testament: But methinks it is very improper for the Papists who pretend to be the only true Christians in the World, to strain their wits to discover as many contradictions as they can in the Scripture, and to prove that there is no way of reconciling them: The natural consequence of which is, the exposing of this sacred Instrument of our Religion, and even Christianity it self, to the scorn of Atheists. Therefore, to be very plain with Mr. S. and Captain Everard, I am heartily sorry to see, that one of the chief fruits of their Conversion is to abuse the Bible.

§ 5. Secondly, He says **P. 14.that Protestants cannot know how many the Books of Scripture ought to be, and which of the many controverted ones may be securely put in that Catalogue, which not; This he proves, by saying, 'tis most palpable, that few, or at least the rude vulgar, can never be assured of it. And if this be a good Argument, this again is a good Answer, to say it is not most palpable. p. 77But I shall deal more liberally, and tell him, that we know that just so many ought to be received as uncontroverted Books, concerning which, it cannot be shewn there was ever any Controversy; and so many as controverted, concerning which it appears that Question hath been made: And if those which have been controverted, have been since received by those Churches which once doubted of them, there is now no further doubt concerning them, because the Controversy about them is at an end. And now I would fain know, what greater certainty oral Tradition can give us of the true Catalogue of the Books of Scripture. For it must either acknowledg some Books have been controverted, or not; if not, why doth he make a supposition of controverted Books? If oral Tradition acknowledg some to have been controverted, then it cannot assure us that they have not been controverted; nor consequently, that they ought to be received as never having been controverted; but only as such, concerning which those Churches who did once raise a Controversy about them, have been since satisfied that they p. 78are Canonical. The Traditionary Church now, receives the Epistle to the Hebrews as Canonical. I ask, Do they receive it as ever delivered for such? That they must, if they receive it from oral Tradition, which conveys things to them under this notion, as ever delivered; and yet St. Hierom speaking, (not as a Speculator, but a Testifier) saith expresly of it, **Com. in Esai. c. 6, &c. 8.Isa 6That the custom of the Latin Church doth not receive it among the Canonical Scriptures. What saith Mr. S. to this? It is clear from this Testimony, that the Roman Church in St. Hierom's time, did not acknowledg this Epistle for Canonical; and 'tis as plain, that the present Roman Church doth receive it for Canonical. Where is then the infallibility of oral Tradition? How does the living voice of the present Church assure us, that what Books are now received by her were ever received by her? And if it cannot do this, but the matter must come to be tried by the best Records of former Ages, (which the Protestants are willing to have their Catalogue tried by) then it seems the Protestants have a better way to know what Books are Canonical, than is the infallible p. 79way of oral Tradition; and so long as 'tis better, no matter though it be not called Infallible.

§ 6. Thirdly, He says **P. 15.the Protestants cannot know, that the very Original, or a perfectly true copy of these Books hath been preserved. It is not necessary that they should know either of these, it is sufficient that they know, that those copies which rhey have, are not materially corrupted in any matter of Faith or Practice; and that they have sufficient assurance of this, I have already shewn. And how doth he prove the contrary? By his usual Argument, with saying it is manifestly impossible. But how do the Church of Rome know that they have perfectly true copies of the Scriptures, in the Original Languages? They do not pretend to know this, the learned men of that Church acknowledg the various Readings as well as we, and do not pretend to know otherwise than by probable conjecture, (as we also may do) which of those Readings is the true one. And why should it be more necessary for us to know this, than for them? If they think it reasonable to p. 80content themselves with knowing, that no material corruptions have crept into those Books, so may we. And that there have not, we know by better Arguments than oral Tradition, even by the assurance we have of God's vigilant providence; and from a moral impossibility in the thing, that a Book so universally dispersed, and translated into so many Languages, and constantly read in the Assemblies of Christians, should have been materially corrupted, so as that all those copies and translations should have agreed in those corruptions. And this reason St. Austin **Ep. 48.gives of the preservation of the Scriptures entire rather than any other Book. If Mr. S. likes it not, he may call St. Austin to account for it.

§ 7. Fourthly, He says **P. 15., the Protestants, at least the rudest vulgar, can have no assurance that those Books are rightly translated, because they cannot be assured either of the ability or integrity of Translators.

Fifthly, Nor can they (says **P. 16, 17.he) be assured, that the Transcribers, and Printers, and Correctors of the Press have p. 81carefully and faithfully done their part, in Transcribing and Printing the several Copies and Translations of Scripture aright; Because, they only can have evidence of the right letter of Scripture, who stood at their elbows attentively watching they should not err in making it perfectly like a former Copy; and even then, why might they not mistrust their own eyes and aptness to oversee? I put these two Exceptions together, because the same Answer will serve them both. The grounds of these Exceptions, if they have any, are these: That no man is to be trusted, either for his skill, or honesty. And, that it is dangerous for men to trust their own eyes. Unless both these be true, these Exceptions are of no force: For if we can be assured, that other men have sufficient skill in any thing which we our selves do not sufficiently understand, we may be assured, that those who translated the Bible had skill in the Original Languages; because very credible persons tell us so; and we have no reason to doubt their testimony in this particular, more than in any other matter. So that if we can have sufficient assurance of mens integrity p. 82in any thing, we have no reason to doubt of the skill of Translators, or Transcribers, or Printers. And if we can have no assurance of mens integrity in any thing, then no man can be assured that there was such a man as Henry the Eighth; and yet I hope the Church of Rome makes no doubt of it: Nor can any man be assured there is such a City as Rome, who hath not seen it; nay, if he have **P. 16., why may he not mistrust his own eyes? And which is the saddest inconvenience of all, if no body be to be trusted, nor mens own eyes, (and for the same reason, sure not their ears) what becomes of the Infallibility of oral and practical Tradition? Which necessarily supposeth a competent understanding, a faithful memory, an honest mind, in the generality of those who delivered Christs Doctrine down to us: And by what means soever a man can be assured of these, by the same he may much more easily be assured of the ability and integrity of Translators, Transcribers, and Printers. But above all, it supposeth that mens ears and eyes cannot deceive them in those things which they are taught, and see practised.

p. 83Is it not very pretty to see what pitiful shifts men that serve an Hypothesis are put to? When to maintain Infallibility they are forced to run to the extremities of Scepticism; and to defend the certainty of oral Tradition, (which depends upon the certainty of mens senses, and an assurance of the ability and integrity of those who were dead 1500 years before we were born) are glad to take refuge in Principles quite contrary; such as these, That we can have no assurance, but that whole Professions of men **P. 16.might hap to be Knaves; that we can have no sufficient evidence that any man made his Copy perfectly like the former, unless **P. 16.we stood at his elbow, attentively watching him: Nay, and if we did so, we have still reason to distrust our senses. In short, all human Faith supposeth honesty among men; and that for matters of Fact, and plain objects of Sense, the general and uncontrolled testimony of mankind is to be credited; and for matters of peculiar skill and knowledg, that the generality of those who are accounted skilful in that kind, are to be relied upon: For, as Aristotle well observes, there is no p. 84greater sign of an undisciplin'd wit (or, to use one of Mr. S's. fine phrases Preface., of a man not acquainted with the paths of Science) than to expect greater evidence for things than they are capable of. Every man hath reason to be assured of a thing which is capable of sufficient evidence, when he hath as much evidence for it as the nature of that thing will bear, and as the capacity he is in will permit him to have. And, as Mr. White says well **Answ. to the Lord Falkland. P. 33.Satisfaction is to be given to every one according to his capacity; it is sufficient for a Child to believe his Parents; for a Clown to believe his Preacher. And this is universally true in all cases, where we have not better or equal evidence to the contrary. But such is the unhappiness of the Popish Doctrines, that if people were permitted the free use of the Scripture, they would easily discern them to have no probable foundation in it, and some of them to be plainly contrary to it; so that it cannot be safe for their Preachers to tell the people that the Scripture is the only Rule of Faith, lest they should find cause not to believe them, when they teach Doctrines so plainly contrary to that Rule.

p. 85§ 8. Lastly, He says **P. 17., the Protestants cannot be certain of the true sense of Scripture. Does he mean of plain Texts, or obscure ones? Of the true sense of plain Texts, I hope every one may be certain; and for obscure ones, it is not necessary every one should. But it may be there are no plain Texts in the Scriptures; then the reason of it must be (till Mr. S. can shew a better) either because it is impossible for any one to write plainly; or because God cannot write so plainly as men; or because we have good reason to think that he would not write things necessary for every one to believe, so as men might clearly understand him.

But he tells us **P. 17., The numerous Comments upon Scripture are an evidence that no man can be certain of the true sense of it. I hope not; for if those numerous Commentators do generally agree in the sense of plain Texts (as 'tis certain they do) then this Argument signifies nothing as to such Texts: And as for those which are obscure, let Commentators differ about them as much as they please, so long as all necessary p. 86Points of Faith and matters of Practice are delivered in plain Texts. He adds **P. 17., There are infinite disputes about the sense of Scripture, even in most concerning Points, as in that of Christ's Divinity. But are not Commentators, both Protestant and Popish, generally agreed about the sense of Scripture in that Point? And what if some out of prejudice do mistake, or out of perverseness do wrest the plainest Texts of Scripture for the Divinity of Christ, to another sense? Is this any argument that those Texts are not sufficiently plain? Can any thing be spoken or written in words so clear from ambiguity, which a perverse or prejudiced mind shall not be able to vex and force to another meaning. God did not write the Scriptures for the froward and the captious, but for those who will read them with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledg of the Truth. If Mr. S. had been conversant in the writings of the Fathers, he could not but have taken notice with what confidence they attempt to prove the Divinity of Christ out of Scripture, as if that did afford convincing arguments for this purpose. p. 87St. Chrysostom **Hom. 32 de Consubstant.professes to demonstrate out of Scripture, That the Son is of the same substance with the Father; and relies upon Scripture alone for this, without mentioning any other kind of Argument. So that it seems, St. Chrysostom was not acquainted with the insufficiency of Scripture for the conviction of Hereticks in this Point; and that he was either ignorant of the (infallible) way of Demonstrating this point from Oral Tradition, or had no great opinion of it. The same Father elsewhere **Hom. 7 de Sanctc Phoca., arguing against Hereticks about the Divinity of Christ, says, That they pervert the Scriptures, to strengthen their Heresie from thence. But then he does not (with Mr. S.) blame the Scripture, and say that this Doctrine is not there deliver'd with sufficient clearness; but contrarywise he says, That the Scripture is clear enough, but the corrupt minds of Hereticks will not see what is there contain'd. Had St. Chrysostom been a true Son of the Traditionary Church, he would have lain hold of this occasion, to vilifie the Scriptures, and to shew the necessity of regulating our faith not by such uncertain p. 86duplicate page p. 87duplicate page p. 88Records, but by the infallible Reports of Oral Tradition.

§ 9. But because Mr. S. lays great weight (in several parts of his Book) upon this Exception against Scripture, viz. That Protestants cannot be certain of the true sense of it: Therefore I shall not content my self, only to have shewn that we may be sufficiently certain of the sense of Scripture, so far as to understand all necessary matters of Faith and Practice, and that more than this is not necessary; but shall likewise return this Exception upon him by enquiring into these two things.

1. How the Traditionary Church can be more certain of the true sense of Scripture, than the Protestants?

2. How they can be more certain of the true sense of Tradition, than Protestants of the true sense of Scripture?

1. How the Traditionary Church can be more certain of the true sense of Scripture, than Protestants? They pretend to have an Oral Tradition of the true sense of it, delivered down from Father to Son. But this only reacheth to those Texts, which are coincident with the main body of Christian Doctrine; p. 89as for all other parts of Scripture, they are as useless to Papists, as they suppose they are to us; because wanting the help of Oral Tradition, they cannot be certain of one tittle of them. And as for those Texts, the sense whereof is conveyed down by Oral Tradition; this sense is, I hope, delivered in some words or other; And have all Preachers, and Fathers, and Mothers, and Nurses, the faculty of delivering this sense in words so plain as cannot possibly be mistaken or wrested to another sense? I am sorry that when every one hath this faculty of speaking their thoughts plainly, the Holy Ghost should be represented as not able to convey his mind to men in intelligible words. And does not his own Objection rebound upon himself? If the Church have a certain sense of Scripture orally delivered, whence are the numerous Comments of the Fathers upon it and of later Writers in their Church, and the infinite Disputes about the sense of it, in the most concerning Points? viz. The efficacy of Gods grace, the Supremacy of St. Peter. the infallibility of a Pope and Council by immediate assistance of p. 90the Holy Ghost? What a stir is made about the sense of Dabo tibi Claves, Tu es Petrus, & super hanc Petram, &c. Pasce oves? Do not they differ about the meaning of these Texts among themselves, as much as they do from the Fathers, and from the Protestants? Some understanding them of St Peters Supremacy only; others of his infallibility; others of his infallibility only in and with a general Council; which yet others do not allow to Pope or Council, from any immediate assistance, but only from the rational force of Tradition, supposing that the Pope and Council hold to it. If oral Tradition have brought down a certain sense of these Texts, why do they not produce it, and agree in it? If it have not (to use a hot phrase of his own **P. 17.) 'tis perfect phrenzy to say they can be certain of the true sense of Scripture.

If he say, they are by Tradition made certain of the true sense of Scripture, so far as it concerns the main body of Christian Doctrine, and do all agree in it, and that is suffcient; then I ask him, What are those points of Faith which make up the body of Christian p. 91Doctrine? He will tell me, they are those which all Catholicks agree to have descended to them from the Apostles by a constant and uninterrupted Tradition. I enquire farther, how I shall know what is the certain sense of Scripture so far as it concerns these points? He must answer as before, that that is the true sense which all Catholicks agree to have descended to them by Tradition. Which amounts to this, that all Catholicks do agree in the sense of Scripture so far as they do all agree in it. It is to be hoped, that the Protestants (how much soever at present they differ about the sense of Scripture) may in time come to as good an agreement as this. This brings to my remembrance a passage or two of Mr. Cressy; the one in his Appendix **Exomolog. 2d. Edit. p. 554., where he tells us, That as it is impossible that Hereticks should agree any other way than in Faction; so it is impossible that Catholicks should differ in points of Faith. Why so? Were not those Catholicks first, who afterwards became Hereticks; and when they became so, did they not differ in points of Belief? Yes; but here lies the conceit, when they began to p. 92differ, then they ceas'd to be Catholicks; therefore Catholicks can never differ in points of Faith. The other passage is where he says **Exomolog. c. 53. Sect. 2., That he hath forsaken a Church where Vnity was impossible, &c. and betaken himself to a Church where Schism is impossible. This last Clause, That Schism is impossible in their Church, cannot possibly be true but in the same absurd and ludicrous sense, in which it is impossible for Catholicks to differ in points of Belief. For he cannot deny, but that it is possible for men to break off from the Communion of their Church, which in his sense is Schism; but here is the subtilty of it, No Schismatick is of their Church, because so soon as he is a Schismatick he is out of it; therefore Schism is impossible in their Church. And is it not as impossible in the Church of England? Where Mr. Cr. might have done well to have continued, till he could have given a better reason of forsaking Her.

§ 10. But to return to our purpose. Mr. Rushworth **Dial. 2. Sect. 12.acknowledgeth, that the Scripture is of it self sufficiently plain, as to matters of practice; for he p. 93asks, Who is so blind, as not to see that these things are to be found in Scripture by a sensible, common, and discreet reading of it; though perhaps by a rigorous and exact balancing of every particular word and syllable, any of these things would vanish away we know not how? So that for the direction of our lives and actions, he confesseth the Scripture to be sufficiently plain, if men will but read it sensibly and discreetly; and (he sayes) that he is blind that does not see this. But who so blind as he that will not see, that the sense of Scripture is as plain in all necessary points of Faith? I am sure St. Austin makes no difference, when he tells us **De Doctr. Christ. L. 2., That in those things which are plainly set down in Scripture, we may find all those things in which Faith and Manners of life are comprehended. And why cannot men, in reference to matters of Faith as well as of Practice, read the Scriptures sensibly and discreetly without such a rigorous balancing of every word and syllable as will make the sense vanish away we know not how? If the Scripture be but sufficiently plain to such as will use it sensibly and discreetly, I do p. 94not understand what greater plainness can be desir'd in a Rule: Nor can I imagine what kind of Rule it must be that can be unexceptionably plain to captious Cavillers, and such as are bent to play the fool with it.

Well, suppose the Scripture be not sufficiently clear as to matters of Faith; and hereupon I have recourse to the Church for the true sense of Scripture: Must I believe the Churches sense to be the true sense of such a Text, though I see it to be plainly contrary to the genuine sense of the words; yes, that I must, or else I make my self and not the Church judg of the sense of Scripture, which is the grand Heresie of the Protestants. But then I must not suppose, much less belive, that the Churches sense of such a Text is contrary to the genuine meaning of it; no, although I plainly see it to be so: This is hard again on the other hand; especially if that be true which is acknowledged both by Dr. Holden, and Mr. Cressy, viz. That though general Councils cannot mistake in the Points of Faith which they decree, yet they may mistake in the confirmation of them from Texts of p. 95Scripture, that is, they may be mistaken about the sense of those Texts. And if Mr. S. think his Brethren have granted too much, he may see this exemplified in the second Council of Nice (to mention no other) which to establish their Doctrine of Image-worship, does so palpably abuse and wrest Texts of Scripture, that I can hardly believe that any Papist in the World hath the forehead to own that for the true sense of those Texts which is there given by those Fathers.

§ 11. Secondly, How the Traditionary Church can be more certain of the true sense of their Traditional Doctrines, than the Protestants can be of the true sense of Scripture? And this is worthy our enquiry, because if the business be search'd to the bottom, it will appear (besides all other inconveniences, which oral Tradition is much more liable to than Scripture) that the certain sense and meaning of Traditional Doctrine is as hard to come at as the sense of Scripture. And this I will make appear by necessary consequence from their own Concessions. Mr. White, and Mr. S. say p. 96that the great security of Tradition is this, that it is not tied to certain phrases, and set-forms of expression, but the same sense is conveyed and setled in mens hearts by various expressions. But according to Mr. Rushworth, this renders Tradition's sense uncertain; for he says **Dial. 2. Sect. 6., 'Tis impossible to put fully, and beyond all quarrel, the same sense in divers words. So that if men do not receive Tradition in a sensible, common, discreet way (as Mr. Rushw. speaks concerning reading the Scriptures) but will come to a rigorous and exact balancing of every particular phrase, word, and syllable, the sense of Tradition will be in the very same danger of uncertainty, and be liable to vanish we know not how. Dr. Holden **Analys. Fidei. L. 1. c. 9.lays down these two Principles. First, That no truth can be conveyed down from man to man but by speech; and speech cannot be but by words; and all words are either equivocal in themselves, or liable to be differently understood by several persons. Secondly, That such is the frame of mans mind, that the same truths may be differently apprehended and understood by different persons. And if this be p. 97true, then Traditional Doctrines, if they be deliverd by speech and words, will be liable to uncertainties and ambiguities as to their sense, as well as Scripture. Mr. Cressy **Append. c. 6.tells us, That Reason and Experience shews, that differences will arise even about the Writings of the Fathers, and any thing but the Testimony of the present Church. If this be true, Tradition wholly falls into uncertainty. For if difference will arise about the Writings of the Fathers how they are to be interpreted, I suppose the Writings of Councils will be liable to the same inconvenience: And if the whole present Church cannot declare her sense of any Traditional Doctrine otherwise than by a Council, (unless with the Jesuites they will epitomize the Church into the Pope), and the Decrees of a Council cannot be universally dispers'd (or at least never use to be) but by Writing: And if Differences will arise about the interpretation of that Writing, as well as any other; then this present infallible Authority (which Mr. Cressy magnifies so much for ending Differences) leaves all Controversies arising p. 98about the sense of Tradition, as indeterminable as ever; and they must for ever remain so, till general Councils have got the knack of penning their Decrees in words which will so infallibly express their meaning to the most captious Caviller, that no difference can possibly arise about the interpretation of them; or else (which will be more suitable to this wise Hypothesis) till general Councils (being convinc'd by Mr. S's Demonstrations) shall come to understand themselves so well, as not to entrust their Decrees any more to the uncertain way of Writing, but for the future to communicate them to the World by the infallible way of oral Tradition. And to mention no more, Mr Knott **Answ. to Chilling. c▪ 2. Sect. 6., (who agrees with the other thus far, that the certain sense of Scripture is only to be had from the Church) speaks to this purpose, That before we can be certain that this is the sense of such a Text, we must either be certain that this Text is capable of no other sense, as Figurative, Mystical, or Moral; or if it be, we must have some certain and infallible means to know in which of them it is taken, p. 99which can be known only by revelation. If this be true, then by a fair parity of reason, before I can be certain that this is the sense of a Doctrinal Tradition delivered down to me, I must either be certain that the words, in which this Tradition was expressed when it was delivered to me, are capable of no other sense (as Figurative, Mystical, or Moral) besides that in which I understood them; or if they be (as certainly they will be) capable of any of these other senses, then must I have some certain and infallible means whereby to know in which of these they are taken: And this can no more be known without a revelation, than which is the true sense of such a Text of Scripture. If it be said, that the sense of a Traditional Doctrine may by different expressions be still further and further explained to me till I come certainly to understand the sense of it; this will not help the matter: For if these kind of cavils be good, that a man cannot be certain of the meaning of any words, till he can by an infallible argument demonstrate either that they cannot be taken, or that they p. 100are not taken in any other sense; I say, if this cavil will hold, then every new expression whereby any one shall endeavor to explain any Traditional Doctrine, is liable to the same inconvenience which those words in which it was first delivered to me were liable to. From all which it is evident, that the Traditionary Church can be no more certain of the sense of their Traditional Doctrines, than Protestants may be of the sense of Scripture.

§ 12. These are his Exceptions contained in his second Discourse; and of what force they are, hath been examined. But because he foresaw that it might be replied that these defects might in part be provided against by History, by the Providence of God, by Testimonies of Councils and Fathers, and by the sufficient clearness of Scripture as to Fundamentals; He endeavors to shew that these signifie little to this purpose.

First, Not History **P. 17, 18.; because few are skilled in History, and they that are not, cannot safely rely upon those that are skill'd, unless they knew certainly that p. 101the Historians whom they rely on had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they writ, and that they were not contradicted by others either extant, or perished. How much credit is to be given to uncontrolled History by the learned, and how much by the vulgar to men of skill, I have already shewn. I shall only add now, that if this reasoning be true, it is impossible for any man to be certain by History of any ancient matter of Fact, as namely that there were such persons as Julius Caesar, and William the Conqueror, and that they invaded and conquered England, because (according to him) we cannot know certainly that the Historians, who relate these things, and upon whose authority we rely, had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they writ: And that they were not contradicted by others either extant or perished, is, I am sure, impossible for any man to know: For who can tell now what was contained in those Books which are perished? So that if this be requisite, to make every Historical Relation credible, to know certainly that it was not contradicted p. 102by any of those Books which we do not know what they were, nor what was in them, we can have no certainty of any ancient Fact or History; for who knows certainly that some Books that are perished did not contradict whatever is written in Books that are extant? Nay, if this reasoning hold, we can have no certainty of any thing conveyed by oral Tradition. For what though the Priest tell me this was the Doctrine of Christ delivered to him? unless I know that all others agree with him in this Tradition, I cannot rely upon his testimony: Nor then neither in Mr. Knott's **Answ. to Chilling. c. 1. Sect. 33.opinion, because the testimony of Preachers or Pastors is human and fallible; unless (according to his Jargon) a conclusion, deduced from Premises, one of which is only probable, may be sufficient to bring our understanding to an infallible act of Faith, viz. if such a conclusion be taken Specificative; whereas, if it be taken Reduplicative, as it is a conclusion, it can only beget a probable assent; which is to say, that considered barely as a conclusion, and so far as in reason it can deserve p. 103assent, it is only probable; but considered as it serves an Hypothesis, and is convenient to be believed with reason or without, so it is infallible. But to carry the supposition further, put the case, that the whole present Age assembled in a general Council, should declare that such a Point was delivered to them: yet (according to Mr. S.) we cannot safely rely upon this, unless we knew certainly, that those whom they relied on had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they delivered, and that they were not contradicted within the space of 1500 years by any of those that are dead; which it is impossible for any one now to know.

But to shew how inconsistent he is with himself in these matters, I will present the Reader with a passage or two in another part of his Book; where he endeavors to prove that men may safely rely on a general and uncontrolled Tradition. He tells us **P. 49., That the common course of human Conversation makes it a madness not to believe great multitudes of knowers, if no possible considerations can awaken in our p. 104reason a doubt that they conspire to deceive us. And a little after **Ibid., Nor can any, unless their brains rove wildly, or be unsetled even to the degree of madness, suspect deceit where such multitudes agree unanimously in a matter of Fact. Now if men be but supposed to write, as well as to speak, what they know, and to agree in their Writings about matter of Fact; then it will be the same madness not to believe multitudes of Historians, where no possible consideration can awaken in our reason a doubt that they have conspired to deceive us; and mens brains must rove wildly and be unsetled even to the degree of phrenzy, who suspect deceit where such multitudes unanimously agree in a matter of Fact. And this seems to me to be the great unhappiness of Mr. S's Demonstrations, that they proceed upon conrtadictory Principles; so that in order to the demonstrating of thc uncertainty of Books and Writings, he must supopse all those Principles to be uncertain, which he takes to be self-evident and unquestionable when he is to demonstrate thc Infallibility of Oral Tradition.

p. 105§. 13. Secondly, He tells us **P. 18., the Providence of God is no security against those contingencies the Scriptures are subject to; because we cannot be certain of the Divine Providence or assistance to his Church, but by the Letter of Scripture; therefore that must first be proved certain, before we mention the Church, or Gods assistance to her. As if we pretended there were any promise in Scripture that God would preserve the Letter of it entire and uncorrupted, or as if we could not otherwise be assured of it; as if the light of natural Reason could not assure us of Gods Providence in general, and of his more especial care of those things which are of greatest concernment to us, such as this is, That a Book containing the method and the terms of Salvation should be preserved from any material corruption. He might as well have said, That without the Letter of Scripture we cannot know that there is a God,

§. 14, Thirdly, Nor (says he**P 18, 19.) can Testimonies of Councils and Fathers be sufficient Interpreters of Scripture. We p. 106do not say they are. Our Principle is, That the Scripture doth sufficiently interpret it self, that is, is plain to all capacities, in things necessary to be believed and practised. And the general consent of Fathers in this doctrine of the sufficient plainness of Scripture (which I shall afterwards shew) is a good evidence against them. As for obscure and more doubtful Texts, we acknowledge the Comments of the Fathers to be a good help, but no certain Rule of interpretation. And that the Papists think so, as well as we, is plain; inasmuch as they acknowledge the Fathers to differ among themselves in the interpretation of several Texts: And nothing is more familiar in all Popish Commentators, than to differ from the ancient Fathers about the sense of Scripture. And as for Councils. Dr. Holden, and Mr. Cressy (as I said before) do not think it necessary to believe that alwayes to be the true sense of Texts which Councils give of them, when they bring them to confirm Points of Faith. Nay, if any Controversie arise about the sense of any Text of Scripture, it is impossible p. 107(according to Mr. Rushworth's Principles) for a Council to decide either that, or any other Controversie: for he **Dial. 2. Sect. 8.makes it his business to prove, That Controversies cannot be decided by words; and if this be so, then they cannot be decided at all, unless he can prove that they may be decided without words, and consequently that Councils may do their work best in the Quakers way, by silent Meetings.

§. 15. Fourthly, Nor can (says he **P. 20, 21.) the clearness of Scripture as to Fundamentals, be any help against these defects. Why not?

First, Because a certain Catalogue of Fundamentals was never given and agreed to by sufficient Authority, and yet without this all goes to wrack. I hope not, so long as we are sure that God would make nothing necessary to be believed but what he hath made plain; and so long as men do believe all things that are plainly revealed (which is every ones fault if he do not) men may do well enough without a precise Catalogue. But suppose we say, That the p. 108Articles of the Apostles Creed contain all necessary matters of simple belief, what hath Mr. S. to say against this? I am sure the Roman Catechism, set forth by the Decree of the Council of Trent, says **Praefat.as much as this comes to, viz. That the Apostles having received a command to preach the Gospel to every creature, thought fit to compose a form of Christian Faith, namely to this end, that they might all think and speak the same things, and that there might be no Schisms among those whom they had called to the unity of Faith, but that they might all be perfect in the same sense, and the same opinion: And this Profession of the Christian Faith and Hope, so fram'd by them, the Apostles called the Symbole or Creed. Now how this end, of bringing men to unity of Faith, and making them perfectly of the same sense and opinion, could probably be attained by means of the Creed, if it did not contain all necessary Points of simple belief, I can by no means understand. Besides, a certain catalogue of Fundamentals is as necessary for them as for us; and when Mr. S, gives p. 109in his, ours is ready. Mr. Chillingworth had a great desire to have seen Mr. Knott's catalogue of Fundamentals, and challenged him to produce it, and offered him very fairly, that when ever he might with one hand receive his, he would with the other deliver his own: But Mr. Knott, though he still persisted in the same demand, could never be prevailed with to bring forth his own, but kept it for a secret to his dying day. But to put a final stop to this Canting demand of a Catalogue of Fundamentals (which yet I perceive I shall never be able to do, because it is one of those expletive Topicks which Popish Writers, especialy those of the lowest Form, do generally make use of to help out a Book) however to do what I can towards the stopping of it, I desire Mr. S. to answer the reasons whereby his Friend Dr. Holden **Analys. Fid. L. 1. c. 4.shews the unreasonableness of this demand, and likewise endeavours to prove that such a Catalogue would not only be useless and pernicious if it could be given, but that it is manifestly impossible to give such a precise Catalogue.

Secondly, He asks **P. 21., Is it a Fundamental p. 110that Christ is God? If so, Whether this be clearer in Scripture, than that Gad hath hands, feet, &c? To which I answer by another question; Is it clear that there are Figures in Scripture, and that many things are spoken after the manner of men, and by way of condescension and accomodation to our capacities; and that custom and common sense teacheth men to distinguish between things figuratively and properly spoken? If so, why cannot every one easily understand, that when the Scripture saith God hath hands and feet, and that Christ is the Vine and the Door, these are not to be taken properly, as we take this Proposition, that Christ is God, in which no man hath any reason to suspect a Figure? When Mr. S. tells us, That he percheth upon the specifical nature of things, would it not offend him, if any one should be so silly as to conclude from hence that Mr. S. believed himself to be a Bird, and nature a Perch? And yet not only the Sciptures, but all sober Writers are free from such forc't and phantastical Metaphors.

I remember that Origen **L. 4.taxeth Celsus his wilful p. 111Ignorance in finding fault with the Scriptures, for attributing to God humane affections, as anger, &c. and tells him, that any one who had a mind to understand the Scriptures, might easily see, that such expressions were accomodated to us, and accordingly to be understood; and that no man, that will but compare these expressions with other passages of Scripture, need to fail of the true sense of them. But (according to Mr. S.) Origen was to blame to find fault with Celsus for thinking that the Scripture did really attribute humane affections to God; for how could he think otherwise, when the most fundamental Point is not clearer in Scripture, than that God hath hands, feet, &c? How could Origen in reason expect from Celsus (though never so great a Philosopher) that he should be able without the help of Oral Tradition, to distinguish between what is spoken literally, and what by a certain Scheme of speech? Theodoret **Haeret. Fabul. l. 4.tells us of one Audaeus, who held that God had a humane shape, and bodily members; but he does not say that the reason of this Error p. 112was, because he made Scripture the Rule of his Faith, but expresly because he was a fool, and did foolishly understand those things which the Divine Scriptures speak by way of Condescension. So that although Mr. S. is pleas'd to make this wise Objection, yet it seems, (according to Theodoret) that men do not mistake such Texts, either for want of oral Tradition, or of sufficient clearness in the Scriptures, but for want of common reason and sense. And if Mr. S. know of any Rule of Faith that is secure from all possibility of being mistaken by foolish and perverse men, I would be glad to be acquainted with it.

p. 113SECT. IV.

§. 1. IN his next Discourse he endeavours to shew,That Scripture is a sufficient Rule to the Unlearned, and to the most Rational doubters. that unlearned Persons cannot be justified as acting rationally in receiving the Scripture for the Word of God, and relying upon it as a certain Rule; because they are not capable of satisfaction concerning these matters. But I have already shewn that they are, and shall not repeat the same over again. And whereas he says **P. 24., That several Professions all pretend to Scripture, and yet differ, and damn, and persecute one another about these differences; the answer is easie: That they all pretend to Scripture, is an argument that they all acknowledg it to be the Word of God, and the Rule of Faith; and that they are generally agreed about the sense of those plain Texts which contain the fundamental Points of Faith is evident, in that those several Professions acknowledg the Articles contained in the Apostles Creed to be sufficiently delivered in Scripture: And if any Professions differ about the meaning of plain Texts, that is not an argument that p. 114plain Texts are obsure, but that some men are perverse. And if those Professions damn and persecute one another about the meaning of obscure Texts, the Scripture is not in fault, but those that do so.

§. 2. And whereas he pretends **P. 25.26, 27., That the Scripture is not able to satisfie Sceptical dissenters, and Rational doubters, because nothing under a demonstration can satisfie such persons so well concerning the incorruptedness of Originals, the faithfulness of Translations, &c. but that searching and sincere Wits may still maintain their ground of suspence with A Might it not be otherwise? This hath been answered already: partly, by shewing that the Scripture was not intended to satisfie Scepticks, and that a Demonstration is not sufficient to give satisfaction to them; and partly, by shewing that Rational doubters may have as much satisfaction concerning those matters, as the nature of the things will bear; and he is not a Rational doubter that desires more.

But that he may see the unreasonableness of this Discourse, I shall briefly shew him, That all Mankind do in matters p. 115of this nature accept of such evidence as falls short of Demonstration; and that his great Friends and Masters from whom he hath taken the main grounds of his Book (though he manageth them to less advantage) do frequently acknowledg, that it is reasonable for men to acquiesce in such assurance as falls short of Infallibility, and such evidence as is less than Demonstration. Do not mankind think themselves sufficiently assured of the Antiquity and Authors of several Books, for which they have not Demonstrative evidence? Doth not Aristotle say, that things of a moral and civil nature, and matters of Fact done long ago, are incapable of Demonstration; and that it is madness to expect it for things of this Nature? Are there no passages in Books so plain, that a man may be sufficiently satisfied that this and no other is the certain sense of them? If there be none, can any thing be spoken in plainer words than it may be written? If it cannot, how can we be satisfied of the certain sense of any Doctrine Orally delivered? And if we cannot be so satisfi'd, where's the certainty of Oral p. 116Tradition? But if Books may be written so plainly, as that we may be abundantly satisfied that this is the certain sense of such and such passages; then we may reasonably rest satisfied in evidence for these matters short of Demonstration. For was ever the sense of any words so plain as that there did not remain this ground of suspence, that those words might be capable of another sense. Mr. Rushworth **Dial. 2. Sect. 7.says, That disputative Scholars do find means daily to explicate the plainest words of an Authour to a quitc different sense: And that the World might be furnish't with an advantagious instance of the possibility of this, Raynaudus **De bonis & malis Libris.(a Writer of their own) hath made a wanton experiment upon the Apostles Creed, and by a sinister (but possible) interpretation, hath made every Article of it Heresie and Blasphemy, on purpose to shew that the plainest words are not free from ambiguity. But may be Mr. S. can out-do the Apostles, and can deliver the Christian Doctrine so clearly, that he can demonstrate it impossible for any man to put any other sense upon any of his words than that which he intended. p. 117I do not know what may be done, but if Mr. S. doth this, he must both mend his style, and his way of Demonstration.

Is Mr. S. sufficiently assured that there is such a part of the World as America? and can he demonstrate this to any man, without carrying him thither? Can he shew by any necessary Argument, that it is naturally impossible that all the Relations concerning that place should be false? When his Demonstrations have done their utmost, cannot **P. 27.a searching and sincere Wit at least maintain his ground of suspence with A Might it not be otherwise? and with an, Is it not possible that all men may be Lyars, or that a company of Travellers may have made use of their Priviledg to abuse the World by false Reports, and to put a Trick upon Mankind? or that all those that pretend to go thither, and bring their Commodities from thence, may go to some other Parts of the World, and taking pleasure in abusing others, in the same manner as they have been imposed upon themselves, may say they have been at America? Who can tell but all this may be so? and yet p. 118I suppose, notwithstanding the possibility of this, no man in his Wits is now possessed with so incredible a folly as to doubt whether there be such a place. The case is the very same as to the certainty of an ancient Book and of the sense of plain expressions: We have no demonstration for these things, and we expect none; because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any Book is so ancient as it pretends to be, or that it was written by him whose name it bears, or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it, it is possible all this may be otherwise; that is, it implies no contradiction: But we are very well assured that it is not; nor hath any prudent man any just cause to make the least doubt of it. For a bare possibility that a thing may be, or not be, is no just cause of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is possible all the people in France may dye this night, but I hope the possibility of this doth not encline any man in the least to think it will be so. It is possible the Sun may not rise to morrow morning, and yet for all this I suppose that no man hath the least doubt but that it will.

p. 119§. 3. But because this Principle, viz. That in matters of Religion a man cannot be reasonably satisfy'd with any thing less than that infallible assurance which is wrought by Demonstration, is the main Pillar of Mr. S's Book; therefore, beside what hath been already said to shew the unreasonableness of this Principle, I shall take a little pains to manifest to him how much he is contradicted in this by the chief of his Brethren of the Tradition, viz. Mr. Rushworth, Dr. Holden, Mr. Cressy, and Mr. White, who besides Mr. S. and one I. B. are (so far as I can learn) all the publick Patrons that ever this Hypothesis of Oral Tradition hath had in the World; and if Mr. White (as I have reason to believe) was the Authour of those Dialogues which pass under Rushworth's name, the number of them is yet less. Now if I can shew that this Principle (esteem'd by Mr. S. so fundamental to this Hypothesis) is plainly contradicted by the principal Assertors of Oral Tradstion, I shall hereby gain one of these two things; either that these great Patrons of Oral Tradition were ignorant of the true foundation of their own Hythesis, p. 120or that this Principle is not necessary for the support of it. Not that I would be so understood as if I did deny that these very Persons do sometimes speak very big words of the necessity of Infallibility: But if it be their pleasure to contradict themselves, as I have no reason to be displeased, so neither to be concerned for it; but shall leave it to Mr. S. to reconcile them first to themselves, and then (if he pleases) afterwards to himself.

§. 4. I begin with Mr. Rushworth of immortal memory, for that noble attempt of his to perswade the World that notwithstanding he was the first Inventer of this Hypothesis of Oral Tradition, yet he could prove that the Church had in all Ages owned it, and proceeded upon it as her only Rule of Faith. He in his third Dialogue Sect. 3. & 4., when his Nephew objects to him, That perhaps a Protestant would say that all his foregoing Discourse was but probability and and likelyhood, and therefore to hazard a mans Estate upon Peradventures, were something hard, and not very rationally done: Replies thus to him, What security do your Merchants, your States-men, your p. 121Souldiers, those that go to Law, nay, even those that Till your grounds and work for their livings, what security, I say, do all these go upon? Is it greater than the security which these grounds afford? surely no. And yet no man esteems them foolish. All humane Affairs are hazardous, and have some adventure in them. And therefore who requires evident certainty only in matters of Religion, discovers in himself a less mind to the Goods promised in the next life, than to these which he seeks here in this World upon weaker assurance. Howsoever, the greatest evidence that can be to him that is not capable of convincing Demonstrations (which the greatest part of Mankind fall short of) is but conjectural. So that (according to Mr. Rushworth) it is not reason and discretion, but want of love to God and Religion, which makes men require greater evidence for matters of Religion, than for Humane Affairs, which yet (he tells us) are hazardous, and have some adventure in them, and consequently are not capable of Demonstration. Besides, if demonstrative evidence be an essential Property of the Rule of Faith (as p. 122Mr. S. affirms) then this Rule cannot (according to Mr. Rushworth) be of any use to the greatest part of Mankind, because they are not capable of convincing Demonstrations. Again, Do but consider (says he **Ibid. Sect. 6.) how unequal and unjust a condition it is, that the claim of the present Church shall not be heard, unless she can confute all the Peradventures that Wit may invent, and solve all the Arguments which the infinite variety of time, place, and occasions may have given way unto; and then you will see how unreasonable an Adversary he is, who will not be content with any satisfaction, but such as mans nature scarcely affords. And is it not equally unjust in Mr. S. not to let Scripture's claim be heard, unless we can confute every Peradventure [and might it not be otherwise] that Wit may invent? See then how unreasonable an Adversary Mr. S. is, who will not be content with any satisfaction, but such as (according to Mr. Rushworth) mans nature scarcely affords.

Dr. Holden (I confess) states the matter somewhat cautiously, when he tells us **L. 1. c. 1., That it shall suffice for present p. 123to determine, that the Wisdom of the Creator hath afforded us such an assurance, especially of Truths necessary to Salvation, as is sutable to our nature, and best fitted for the safe conduct of our lives in Moral and Religious Affairs: But if we interpret these general expressions by the passages I before cited out of Mr. Rushworth (as in reason we may, since the Doctor is beholding to him for the best part of his Book) then nothing can make more against Mr. S's Principle.

§. 5. Mr. Cressy in his Exomologesis **C. 19. Sect. 5.says, That such Teachers, as approached nearest to the fountain of Truth, Christ and his Apostles, had means of informing themselves in Apostolical Tradition incomparably beyond us. Mr. S. may do well to shew what those means were which are so incomparably beyond his Infallibility and Demonstration. The same Author **C. 32. Sect. 4.does very much applaud Stapleton's determination of the question concerning the Churches Infallibility, which is as follows, That the Church does not expect to be taught by God immediately by new Revelations, but makes use of several means, &c. as being govern'd not by Apostles, &c. but by ordinary p. 124Pastors and Teachers. That these Pastors in making use of these several means of Decision, proceed not as the Apostles did, with a peculiar infallible direction of the Holy Spirit, but with a prudential collection not always necessary. That to the Apostles who were the first Masters of Evangelical Faith, and founders of the Church, such an infallible certitude of means was necessary: not so now to the Church, &c. If this be true, That an infallible certitude of means is not now necessary to the Church, and that her Pastors do now in deciding matters of Faith proceed only with a prudent collection not always necessary; then it should seem that a searching Wit may maintain his ground of suspence, even against their Church also, with A Might it not be otherwise? Again, Mr. Cressy **Append. c. 5.tells us, That truth and our obligation to believe it, is in an higher degree in Scripture, than in the Decisions of the Church, as Bellarmine acknowledges: which is to say, that we may have greater assurance of the truth of Doctrines contained in the Scriptures, than we can have of any Doctrine from the determination of the Church. p. 125But if we have the greatest assurance that can be of Truths deliver'd to us by the Church, as Mr. S. affirms, then I would fain learn of him what that greater degree of assurance is which Stapleton speaks of, and whether it be greater than the greatest? Not to insist upon that (which yet I cannot but by the way take notice of) that Mr. Cressy, by his approbation of this determination of Bellarmine's, doth advance the Scripture above the Church as to one of the most essential Properties of the Rule of Faith, viz. the certainty of it.

But the most eminent Testimony to my purpose in Mr. Cressy, is that famous passage **C▪ 40. Sect. 3, &c.(which hath given so much offence to several of his own Church) wherein he acknowledges the unfortunateness (to him) of the word Infallibility, and tells us, That he could find no such word in any Council; That no necessity appear'd to him that either he or any other Protestant should ever have heard that word nam'd, and much less press'd with so much earnestness as of late it has generally been in Disputations and Books of Controversie; and that Mr. Chillingworth combats this word with too p. 126to great success, insomuch that if this word were once forgotten or but laid by, Mr. Chillingworth's Arguments would lose the greatest part of their strength; and that if this word were confin'd to the Schools where it was bred, there would be still no inconvenience: And that since by manifest experience the English Protetestants think themselves so secure, when they have leave to stand or fall by that word, and in very deed have so much to say for themselves when they are pressed unnecessarily with it: Since likewise it is a word capable of so high a sense that we cannot devise one more full and proper to attribute to God himself, &c. Since all this is so, he thinks he cannot be blamed, if such Reasons move him to wish that the Protestants may never be invited to combat the Authority of the Church under that Notion. A very ingenuous acknowledgment, and as cross to Mr. S's Principle as any thing can be. But the word Infallibility was not so unfortunate to Mr. Cressy, as is his untoward Explication of the fore-cited passage, in his Appendix which he afterwards published chiefly by way of Vindication of himself against the Learned p. 127Author of the Preface to my Lord Falkland's Discourse of Infallibility. There he **Append. Sect. 2. & 3.tells us, That there are several degrees of Infallibility. And that we may know what degree of Infallibility he thinks necessary to be attributed to the Church, this following passage will inform us: Methinks (says he) if God have furnished his divine and supernatural Truth, with evidence equal to this, that the Sun will shine to morrow, or that there will be a Spring and Harvest next year, we are infinitely obliged to bless his Providence, and justly condemned, if we refuse to believe the least of such Truths, as shewing less affection to save our souls, than the dull Plow-men to sow their Corn, who certainly have far less evidence for their Harvest, than Catholiques for their Faith; and yet they insist not peevishly upon every capricious Objection, nor exact an infallible security of a plentiful reaping next Summer, but notwithstanding all difficulties and contingencies proceed chearfully in their painful Husbandry. So that according to this Discourse, whatever degree of assurance the Church hath, or can give to those who rely upon her, it is plain p. 128that no further degree is necessary than what the Husbandman, when he sows, hath of a plentiful Harvest; and that men are justly condemned if they refuse to believe the least truth upon such security, which yet (by his own acknowledgment) is liable to Contingencies: Nay further, that men are not reasonable, but peevish, in exacting infallible security, and insisting upon every capricious Objection, such as is Mr. S's Might it not be otherwise? Now as to this degree of Assurance, or (as he calls it) Infallibility, I cannot but grant what he says of it to be most true, viz. That in a severe acception of the word it is not rigorously infallible, that is (as he explains it) it is not absolutely impossible, nor does it imply a flat contradiction that the thing whereof we are so assured may be otherwise: But then I utterly deny that according to any true acception of this word, such a degree of Assurance as he speaks of can be called Infallibility; and withall I affirm, That none of those several degrees of Infallibility which he mentions, excepting that only which imports an absolute impossibility, can with any tolerable p. 129propriety of speech or regard to the true meaning and use of the word, have the name of Infallibility given to them. For Infallibility can signifie nothing else but an utter impossibility that one should be deceived in that matter as to which he is supposed to be infallible; and to say such a thing is impossible, is to say that the existence of it implies a flat contradiction. So that whosoever asserts degrees of Infallibility, is obliged to shew that there are degrees of absolute impossibilities, and of perfect contradictions; and he had need of a very sharp and piercing wit that is to find out degrees where there neither are nor can be any. Indeed, in respect of the objects of knowledge, it is easie to conceive how Infallibility may be extended to more objects or fewer; but in respect of the degree of assurance (of which Mr. Cressy speaks) it is altogether unimaginable how any one can be more or less out of all possibility of being deceived in those things wherein he is supposed to be infallible; for no one can be more removed from the possibility of being deceived, than he that is out of all possibility of being p. 130deceived, and whosoever is less than this, is not infallible; because he only is so, who is out of all possibility of being deceived in those matters wherein he is supposed to be infallible. So that Mr. Cressy's lower degrees of Infallibility are no degrees of that assurance which may properly be called infallible (for that can have no degrees) but of that assurance which is less than infallible. And he needed not have raised all this dust about the degrees of Infallibility, had it not been that by the means of such a cloud he might make the more convenient escape out of that strait he was in between the clamours of his own Church, and the advantage which his Adversaries made of his free and open discourse against Infallibility. For any one that carefully reads his Book, will find that he understands nothing by the Infallibility of the Church, but an Authority of obliging all Christians to submit to her Decisions, which is no more but what every Supreme Civil Judg hath in Civil matters, viz. a power to determine those Controversies that lie before him as well as he can or will, and when that is done every one is p. 131bound to submit to such determinations; but yet for all this, no man ever dream't a Supreme Civil Judg to be infallible more than another man. I do not now dispute the extent of the Churches Authority; but if she have no other Infallibility but what a full Authority of decision does suppose, I am sure she hath none at all.

Before I leave Mr. Cressy, I cannot but take notice how unfortunate and disingenuous he is in explaining the meaning of these words of his own, viz. [Against this word of Infallibility Mr. Chillingworth's Book especially combats, and this with too too great success] which in his Appendix **C. 5. Sect. 6.he interprets thus, Success, I mean, not against the Church, but against his own Soul, and the Souls of his Fellow-English Protestants, &c. As if one that had wished well to Caesar should have said, That Pompey had fought against him with too too great success; and being afterwards challenged by Caesar's Party, as having said that Pompey had Conquered Caesar, he should explain himself thus, Success, I mean, not against Caesar, but against his own life, and the lives of his followers. Can p. 132any thing be finer than for a man to say that by Pompey's success in fighting against Caesar, he means that Caesar had beaten Pompey? which is no more than if one should take the liberty to interpret white by black.

§. 6. Lastly, Mr. White doth most expresly contradict this Principle of Mr. S's in these following passages. In his Preface to Mr. Rushworth he says, That such a certainty as makes the cause always work the same effect, though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherwise, ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true certainty; and that those Authors are mistaken who undervalue it. So that it seems Mr. S. is mistaken in affirming that a man cannot be certain of any thing so long as there is any possibility that it may be otherwise. In his Answer to my Lord Falkland, he says **P. 14, 15., That in Moral matters, and such as are subject to humane action, we must expect such assurance as humane actions bear. If for the government of your spiritual life you have as much as for the management of your natural and civil life, what can you expect more? Two or three p. 133witnesses of men beyond exception will cast a man out of not only his lands, but life and all. He that among Merchants will not adventure, where there is a Hundred to one of gaining, will be accounted a silly Factor. And among Souldiers, he that will fear danger where but one of a Hundred is slain, shall not escape the stain of Cowardize. What then shall we expect in Religion, but to see a main advantage on the one side which we may rest our selves on? and for the rest, remember we are men subject to chance and mutability, and thank God he hath given us that assurance in a supernatural way, which we are contented withall in our civil ventures and possessions, which nevertheless God knoweth we often love better, and would hazard less than the unknown good of the life to come. Again **P. 30., If God Almighty hath in all sorts and manners provided his Church that she may enlighten every man in his way, that goeth the way of a man, then let every man consider which is the sit way for himself, and what in other matters of that way he accounteth evidence. And if there be no interest in his Soul to p. 134make him loth to believe, what in another matter of the like nature he doth not stick at, or heavy to practise what he sees clearly enough, I fear not his choice. Once more; directing a man in his search after rational satisfaction in matters of Religion, he hath this passage; **P. 46.Besides this, he must have this care; that he seek what the nature of the subject can yield, and not as those Physitians, who when they have promised no less than Immortality, can at last only reach to some conservation of health or youth in some small degree: So I could wish the Author to well assure himself first, that there is possible an Infallibility, before he be too earnest to be contented with nothing less; for what if humane nature should not be capable of so great a good? Would he therefore think it fitting to live without any Religion, because he could not get such a one as himself desired, though with more than a mans wish? Were it not rational to see, whether among Religions some one have not such notable advantages over the rest, as in reason it might seem humane nature might be contented withall? Let him cast his account with the p. 135dearest things he hath, his own or friends lives, his estate, his hope of posterity, and see upon what terms of advantage he is ready to venture all these; and then return to Religion, and see whether, if he do not venture his soul upon the like, it be truly reason, or some other not confessed motive, which withdraws him. For my own part, as I doubt not of an Infallibility, so I doubt not but setting that aside, there be those Excellencies found on the Catholick party, which may force a man to prefer it, and to venture all he hath upon it, before all other Religions and Sects in the World. Why then may not one who after long searching findeth no Infallibility, rest himself on the like, supposing mans nature affords no better?

Are not these fair Concessions, which the evidence and force of Truth have extorted from these Authors? So that it seems that that which Mr. S. calls **Letter to his Answerer. p. 5.a civil piece of Atheistry, is advanced in most express words by his best Friends, and therefore I hope he will (as he threatens me) be smart with them in opposition to so damnable and fundamental an Error. And whenever he attempts this, p. 136I would entreat him to remember that he hath these two things to prove. First, That no evidence, but demonstration, can give a man sufficient assurance of any thing. Secondly, That a bare possibility that a thing may be otherwise, is a rational cause of doubting, and a wise ground of suspense; which when he hath proved, I shall not grudge him his Infallibility.

SECT. V.

That Scripture is sufficient to convince the most acute Adversaries: and that it is sufficiently certain.§. 1. THE last part of this Third Discourse endeavours to shew that the Scripture is not convictive of the most obstinate and acute Adversaries. As for the obstinate, he knows my mind already. Let us see why the most acute Adversary may not be convinced by Scripture. Because as he objects **P. 28., First, We cannot be certain that this Book is Gods Word, because of the many strange Absurdities and Heresies in the open letter as it lies, as that God hath hands and feet, &c. and because of the contradictions in it: To which I have already returned an answer. Secondly, Because (as he saith **P. 31.) we p. 137cannot be certain of the Truth of the letter in any particular Text, that it was not foisted in, or some way altered in its significativeness; and if it be a negative proposition, that the particle [not] was not inserted, if affirmative, not left out. And if we pretend to be certain of this, he demands **P. 31.our demonstration for it. But how unreasonable this demand is, I hope I have sufficiently shewn. And to shew it yet further, I ask him, How their Church knows, that the particle [not] was not left out of any Text in which it is now found in their Copies? I know he hath a ready answer, viz. by Oral Tradition. But this (according to him **P. 116.) only reaches to Scriptures letter so far as it is coincident with the main body of Christian Doctrine; concerning the rest of Scripture it is impossible (according to his own principles) that they should have any security that the particle [not] was not unduly inserted, or left out by the Transcribers. Nay, as to those Texts of Scripture which fall in with the main body of Christian Doctrine, I demand his demonstration that the particle [not] was not unduly inserted, p. 138or left out, not only in those Texts, but also in the Oral Tradition of the Doctrines coincident with the sense of those Texts. If he say, It was impossible any Age should conspire to leave out or insert the particle [not] in the Oral Tradition; so say I it was that they should conspire to leave it out of the written Text: But then I differ from him thus far, That I do not think this naturally impossible, so as that it can rigorously be demonstrated, but only morally impossible, so that no body hath any reason to doubt of it; which to a prudent man is as good as a demonstration. Pyrrho himself never advanced any Principle of Scepticism beyond this, viz. That men ought to question the credit of all Books, concerning which they cannot demonstrate as to every sentence in them, that the particle [not] was not inserted (if it be affirmative) or left out (if it be negative). If so much be required to free a man from reasonable doubting concerning a Book, how happy are they that have attained to Infallibility? What he saith concerning the Variae Lectiones **P. 32.of Scripture, hath already had a sufficient answer.

p. 139§. 2. In his Fourth Discourse, he endeavours to shew **P. 33., That the Scripture is not certain in it self, and consequently not ascertained to us. First, Not certain, materially considered **P. 34.as consisting of such and such Characters, because Books are liable to be burnt, torn blotted, worn out. We grant, it is not impossible but that any, or all the Books in the World may be burnt: But then we say likewise, That a Book so universally dispersed may easily be preserved; though we have no assurance that God will preserve it, in case all men should be so foolish or so careless as to endeavour or suffer the abolition of it. But it seems the Scriptures cannot be a Rule of Faith if they be liable to any external accidents. And this (he tells us **P. 34.) Though it may seem a remote and impertinent Exception, yet to one who considers the wise dispositions of Divine Providence, it will deserve a deep consideration; because the salvation of Mankind being the end of Gods making nature, the means to it should be more setled, strong, and unalterable, than any other piece of nature whatever. But, notwithstanding this wise reason, this p. 140Exception still seems to me both remote and impertinent. For if this which he calls a Reason be a Truth, it will from thence necessarily follow, not only that the Doctrine of Christ must be conveyed by such a means as is more unalterable than the course of nature; but also by a clear parity of Reason, that all the means of our salvation do operate towards the accomplishing of their end with greater certainty than the fire burns, or the Sun shines; which they can never do, unless they operate more necessarily than any natural causes; now how they can do so upon voluntary Agents, I desire Mr. S. to inform me.

§. 3. He proceeds by a long Harangue to shew **P. 34., That not only these material Characters in themselves are corruptible, but in complexion with the causes, actually laid in the World to preserve them entire; because either those causes are material, and then they are also liable to continual alterations; or spiritual, that is, the minds of men, and from these we may with good reason hope for a greater degree of constancy, than from any other piece of nature; which p. 141by the way, is a very strange Paradox, that the actions of voluntary Agents have a greater certainty and constancy in them, than those of natural Agents; of which the fall of Angels and Men, compared with the continuance of the Sun and Stars in their first state, is a very good evidence.

§. 4. But he adds a Caution **P. 35., That they are perfectly unalterable from their nature, and unerrable, if due circumstances be observed, that is, if due proposals be made to beget certain knowledg, and due care used to attend to such proposals. But who can warrant, That due proposals will always be made to men, and due care used by them? If these be uncertain, where's the constancy and unerrableness he talks so much of? So that notwithstanding the constancy of this spiritual cause (the mind of man) of preserving Scriptures entire, yet in order to this (as he tells **P. 36.us) So many actions are to be done, which are compounded and made up of an innumerable multitude of several particularities to be observed, every of which may be mistaken apart, each being a distinct little action in its single self, such p. 142as is the transcribing of a whole Book, consisting of such Myriads of words, single letters, and tittles or stops; and the several actions of writing over each of these so short and cursory, that it prevents diligence, and exceeds humane care, to keep awake and apply distinct attentions to every of these distinct actions. Mr. Rushworth **Dial. 2. Sect. 7.much outdoes Mr. S. in these minute Cavils, for he tells us, That supposing an Original Copy of Christs words, written by one of the Evangelists in the same language, let him have set down every word and syllable, yet men conversant in noting the changes of meanings in words will tell us, that divers accents in the pronunciation of them, the turning of the speakers head or body this way or that way, &c. may so change the sense of the words, that they will seem quite different in writing from what they were in speaking. I hope that Oral and Practical Tradition hath been careful to preserve all these circumstances, and hath deliver'd down Christ's Doctrine with all the right Traditionary Accents, Nods, and Gestures necessary for the understanding of it; otherwise the omission p. 143of these may have so altered the sense of it, that it may be now quite different from what it was at first. But to answer Mr. S. We do not pretend to be assured, that it is naturally impossible that the Scriptures should have been corrupted or changed, but only to be sufficiently assured that they have not received any material alteration, from as good Arguments as the nature of the Subject will bear. But if his Reason had not been very short and cursory, he might easily have reflected, that Oral Tradition is equally liable to all these contingencies. For it doth as much prevent diligence, and exceed humane care, to keep awake and apply distinct attentions to the distinct actions of speaking, as of writing. And I hope he will not deny, that a Doctrine Orally delivered, consists of words, and letters, and accents, and stops, as well as a Doctrine written; and that the several actions of speaking, are as short and cursory as of writing.

§. 5. Secondly, He tells us **P. 38., Scripture formally considered as to its significativeness, is also uncertain. First, **P. 38.Because of the uncertainty of the letter. This is already answered. Secondly, p. 144**P. 38.Because the certain sense of it is not to be arrived to by the Vulgar, who are destitute of Languages and Arts. True, where men are not permitted to have the Scriptures in their own Language, and understand no other: But where they are allowed the Scriptures translated into their own Language they may understand them, all necessary points of Faith and Practice being sufficiently plain in any Translation of the Bible that I know of: And that **P. 38.eminent Wits cannot agree about the sense of Texts which concern the main points of Faith, hath been spoken to already.

§. 6. As for the Reverence he pretends to Scripture in the conclusion of his Fourth Discourse, he might have spared that, after all the raillery and rudeness he hath used against it. It is easie to conjecture, both from his principles and his uncivil expressions concerning them, what his esteem is of those Sacred Oracles. Probably it was requisite in prudence to cast in a few good words concerning the Scriptures, for the sake of the more tender and squeamish Novices of their Religion, or (as p. 145Mr. Rushworth's Nephew **Dial. 2. Sect. 14.says frankly and openly) for the satisfaction of indifferent men, that have been brought up in this verbal and apparent respect of the Scripture, who it seems are not yet attained to that degree of Catholick Piety and Fortitude as to endure patiently that the Word of God should be reviled or slighted. Besides that, in reference to those whom they hope hereafter to convert (who might be too much alienated from their Religion, if he had expressed nothing but contempt towards a Book, which Protestants, and Christians in all Ages till the very dregs of Popery, have been bred up to a high veneration of), it was not much amiss to pass this formal complement upon the Bible; which the wise of his own Religion will easily understand, and may serve to catch the rest. But let him not deceive himself, God is not mocked.

p. 146SECT. VI.

§. 1. SEcondly, He comes to shew **P. 41. That the Properties of a Rule of Faith do not belong to Oral Tradition., That the Properties of a Rule of Faith belong to Oral Tradition. And, First, He gives a tedious explication of the nature of this Oral Practical Tradition, which amounts to this; That as in reference to the civil Education of Children, they are taught their own and others names, to write, and read, and exercise their Trades: So in reference to Religion, the Children of Christians first hear sounds, afterwards by degrees get dim notions of God, Christ, Saviour, Heaven, Hell, Vertue, Vice, and by degrees practise what they have heard; they are shewn to say Grace, and their Prayers, to hold up their hands, or perhaps eyes, and to kneel, and other postures. Afterwards they are acquainted with the Creed, Ten Commandments, and Sacraments, some common Forms of Prayer, and other practises of Christianity, and are directed to order their lives accordingly, and are guided in all this p. 147by the actions and carriage of the elder faithful; and this goes on by insensible degrees, not by leaps, from a Hundred years to a Hundred, but from Month to Month, and even less. If this be all that Tradition doth, this is nothing but what is done among Protestants, and that with greater advantage; because we always teach Children to say their Prayers in a known Tongue so as they may understand them. And we also teach them the Creed, and Ten Commandments, and the Sacraments, so many as Christ hath instituted and no more. So that if this be so infallible a way of conveying the Doctrine of Christianity, we have it among us. And we do over and besides, instruct them in the Scriptures, which are the authentick Instrument whereby Christ's Doctrine is conveyed to us. But then we do not suppose (as his Hypothesis necessarily enforceth him to do) that the Christian Doctrine is equally taught and learned by all; but by some more, by others less perfectly, according to the different abilities and diligence of p. 148Parents and Teachers, and the various capacities and dispositions of Children; whereas his Hypothesis falls, if all or at least the generality of Parents do not instruct their Children with the like exactness, and if the generality of Children do not receive this Doctrine in the same perfection that it is delivered. For if it be taught or received with any variation, it must necessarily be so conveyed, and these variations will grow daily. I had thought he would have told us, how all Parents do teach their Children the whole Body of Christ's Doctrine, and explain to them every part of it in a Hundred or a Thousand several expressions signifying the same sense, and not have instanced in two Set-forms, such as the Creed, and Ten Commandments; for according to Mr. White **Apolog. P. 81., That cannot be a Tradition, which is delivered in set-words.

§. 2. Having thus explained Oral Tradition, he comes to shew that the Properties of a Rule of Faith agree p. 149to it. I have already shewed that the true Properties of a Rule of Faith are but two, viz. That it be plain and intelligible, and that it be sufficiently certain. The first of these, that Oral Tradition may deliver a Doctrine plainly and intelligibly, I grant him. All the difficulty is about the second Property, whether we have sufficient assurance that the Doctrine delivered down by Oral Tradition hath received no coruption or change in its conveyance? And all that he pretends to prove in this Discourse is, That if this Rule hath been followed and kept to all along, the Christian Doctrine neither hath, nor can have received any change; that is, if the next Age after the Apostles did truly, and without any alteration deliver the Christian Doctrine to their immediate Successors, and they to theirs, and so on, then upon this supposition the Doctrine of the present Traditionary Church must be the very same with that which was delivered to the Apostles. All this is readily granted to him. But that this Rule hath always p. 150been followed, nay, that it is impossible there should have been any deviation from it (as he pretends) this we deny, not only as untrue, but as one of the most absurd Propositions that ever yet pretended to demonstrative evidence.

p. 151THE RULE of FAITH.

PART III. In which Mr. S's Demonstrations and Corollaries are examined.