The Book of Nature Translated and Epitomized, Chapter 4 – Chapter 6
Chap. 3.
Section. 1.
The generall difference of man from other creatures.
THe difference of man from other creatures is also general and special, as well as his agrement with them. A greater degree of knowledg is atteinable, by considering his difference from, or excellency above them, then by considering those things, faculties, powers, organs, and operations, wherein he agrees with them. The knowledg atteinable from his agrement with them, wil profit us little or nothing, unlesse we proceed also to take notice of his difference from them. In order to this, we are first to consider the difference that the three inferiour degrees of creatures have from one another, which is also general and special.
Their general difference hath bin already spoken to. Things of the second degree excell those of the first, by having life, which is not to be found in the first. Things of the third, excell them both, by having sense, which is not found in either of them. Man ha…s being, life, and sense, in a generall community or fraternity with them; and he has, over and above, reason and free-will, which none of them have. Herein lies his general difference from, or excellency above them all.
There are also special differences to be found amongst inferiour creatures, under each of the three general degrees. There are many distinct natures, species or kinds, under the same general degree.
1. Under the first, the elements differ in dignity, nature, qualities, and scituation, one from another. Amongst metals, gold has a peculiar nature and excellency above silver; silver, above tinn; tinn, above lead, &c. Amongst stones, one is more excellent then another, by its peculiar nature, and specifical difference from others. Yet all these things do agree and meet together in one general degree of creatures, that have being only; not life, sense, or understanding.
2. Under the second general degree of things, that have being and life only, there are many also and great specifical differences. All the various kinds of trees and plants, have their peculiar natures, distinct from one another.
3. In the third general degree of creatures, there are many kinds of beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping things, that have their peculiar natures, very different from one another.
4. In the fourth and highest generall degree, are no such special differences. We find only one nature or species; humane. All men are of one and the same nature, or kind. They differ only as distinct individuals. One man may have many individual differences from, and excellencies above another, in his personal constitution, qualifications, acquirements, or gifts; but his nature is one and the same with his fellows. If God strip such a man of his accidental ornaments in mind or body, whereby he excell'd others, (as is familiar to observation) he does not thereby lose his nature; which demonstrates that those differencing incidents to his person, advanc'd him not above the sphere of that nature, which all men partake of. When many peeces of cloth, equal in worth, are variously coloured, the different value of the superadded tinctures makes them to be of different prices. But all such differences are accidental to the clothes. All men have the rational powers, called understanding and will, which equally difference them from all inferiour creatures. But accidental differences, incident to these rational powers, may render some men fit to ascend over the heads of others, into places of superiority.
Having thus taken notice of the differences that are found in the three inferiour orders of things, both general and special, let us now observe the difference that is found in the nature of man, from them all, which also is both general and special. page missing is wholly delectable, and that in him alone is absolute satisfaction to be had. He is an infinite, boundless good, and he is communicable to us, or capable to be enjoy'd by us. Yea, even his own infinite understanding and desire have absolute and compleat satisfaction in his own infinite being, and unutterably desireable goodnes.
2. Having thus ascended by the creatures, to some general knowledg of the creatour, as infinite in wisdom, power, goodnes, and all possible perfections; let us descend again to the consideration of ourselvs, and of our duty towards God. Man is generally differenced from brut's, by his understanding and will. All things then that we rightly conclude from this general difference, must be concluded from the due consideration of his understanding or will, or both together. Whatever he is bound to doe, as a man, perteins to one or both of these powers. These ought he to use in such a way only, as is conducible to his own true good, perfection, and blessednes; and not against himself, to his own disadvantage, damage and destruction. Whatever any creature received from the hād of God that made it, it received to its own advantage, and ought to use it so. Inferiour creatures fail not so to use it; and shall man only, the master-peece and lord of all the rest, miscarry in this great point? Each element enlarges itself as much as it can, and destroy's its contrary, but never does any thing against itself. Things of the second degree, trees and plants, do draw convenient nourishment from the earth and water, for their augmentation, growth, and support in life. They fix their roots in the earth, and multiply their kind. In like manner do things of the third degree, beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping things. They seek and lay hold on what's good for them; flie, avoid, and refuse what's hurtful; and multiply themselvs by generation. And ought not man, the lord of all these things, carefully to improve what he has, to the glory of his maker, and his own true profit and advantage (which is inseperably connexed therewith) as much as he can; and not at all against God, and consequently against himself, to his own detriment? If he do abuse them to his own ruine, he alone in the whole visible creation, act's contrary to the glory of God, to his own true good, to the order of the universe, and common law of nature in all creatures. He alone, for whose use and service the rest were made, does perversly deviate from the general order and due course of nature, in all.
The rational powers of man, as they are more excellent then any thing that is found in inferiour creatures, so ought they more heedfully to be improved, to the praise of him that gave them, and man's own true profit, advantage, joy, peace, consolation and blessednes; not against the honour of God, and so to his own damage. He ought to resist those fleshly, foolish, and hurtfull lusts, which war against his soul, and tend to the sinking and drowning of him in destruction and perdition. 1 Tim. 6. 9.
3. We may conclude from this general difference of man from other creatures, by his understanding and will (which are given him for his own true profit and advantage) that his understanding is able to se and conclude such truths, as are evidently conducible to his welbeing and comfort, and to oppose and reject the errours, contrary thereunto. T'is his true interest and advantage, that there is a God, infinitly powerful, wise, holy, just, and good; that there is a resurrection, and an eternal reward of just men; that God is able so to principle and qualify men, as to render them fit for such reward. These, with many other truths, which conduce to the true good and blessednes of man, may and ought, on that very account, to be owned and asserted. If the contraries thereunto be enterteined, owned, and asserted by him, his understanding which was given him to use for his profit, is abused to his ruine, against the law of nature. He enterteins and own's false perswasions, destructive to his own being, enemies to his own soul; and so abuses his understanding, to his damage, despondency, and ruine, that was given him to use for his profit and salvation. He does thereby, what in him lies, destroy and render void his own nature and all the rest, even the whole universe, whereas inferiour creatures do exactly use and improve their various natural powers to their own advantage, and for the preservation of the universe.
4. By man's will and the freedom thereof, duly considered, may we yet attein a more distinct and ful knowledg of God, of ourselvs, and of our obligation and duty to God. Inferiour creatures have no power over their own operations. They act by natural impulse and necessity. Man ha's power to consider of any thing, and deliberate within himself, whether he were best to do it or no, before he does it. He know's his own works, and can judg of his own actions, whether they be good or evil. By the freedom of his will, he is lord of his own operations. His works may properly be called his own, as done by the choice of his own will. Other creatures may rather be said to be acted, then to act, being carried by such an instinct and impulse, planted in them by the creatour, as determin's them constantly one way, exclusive to any exercise of deliberation or choice. Hence it follow's, that the works of man, being properly his own, are imputable to him; the works of inferiour creatures, not so to them. They sin not, because they have no power to do any thing upon deliberation, and by choice. Hence also may we conclude, that the works of man are honourable and praise-worthy, or culpable and shameful. The former are capable of approbation and reward: the latter, of detestation and punishment. The actions of man do leave behind them desert or guilt. They do adorn and cloath, or stain, vitiate and corrupt him, accordingly as they are good or evil. The actions of other creatures have none of all these properties. Good actions do more and more dispose and incline a man to good: evil ones do more deprave him, habituate and incline him unto evil. If man use not his understanding and will aright, in doing what he ought, he perverts what was given him for his good, to his own damage and confusion, and to the disturbance of the general order and harmony of the universe.
Four things do follow the works of man, desert, guilt, reward, punishment. Desert is the natural consequent of a good work; reward a consequent of desert. Guilt is the natural consequent of an evil work; and punishment is the certain consequent of guilt. The inseperable properties of the works of man, in distinction from the works of inferiour creatures, are, first; that they are his own; Secondly, that they are imputable to him; thirdly, that they leave merit or demerit, desert or guilt behind them; fourthly, that therefore reward or punishment is due unto man, for them.
SECTION. III.
Another use or fruit of this general difference.
FOrasmuch as the rewards and punishments, due unto all the good and evil works of man, are not dispensable by man; there must needs be some one above him, that can reward and punish him, in a suitablenes and correspondency to his works. This can be no other but God alone, who exactly know's all the works of all men, with all their aggravations and dimensions, to the full. If man can sin and deserve punishment, some one there is against whom he sin's, who know's all his sins, and can punish or pardon him. Both the fault, and the consequent guilt, obligation, or debt thereby contracted, do argue there is a God, that can punish man for his sins. This then is a good argument; man can sin, therefore there is a God; and this also; Man can do and deserve well, therefore there is a God, who is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. Heb. 11. 6. Thus from the works of man, as man, we may conclude there is a God, who is the only meet rewarder and punisher of his actions.
We may farther conclude from the works of men, and the recompence thereof, both wayes, in rewards and punishments, that the rewarder and punisher thereof is omniscient, omnipotent, and most just. He perfectly know's all the thoughts, intentions, desires, words, and actions of all men, that ever were, are, or shalbe. So can he exactly proportion rewards and punishments thereunto. He must be absolutely infallible in his knowledg of all the circumstances and aggravations of every step man makes, within or without, in thought, word, or deed. Otherwise, how can he be exactly and absolutly just, in recompencing them? And how numberless are the thoughts, words, and actions of one mā, in a race of 40, 50 or 60 yeers, more or less? How innumerable then must all the works, words, desires and thoughts of many millions of men, in all places and ages of the world, needs be? And what then must he be, that know's all, in such sort, as exactly to proportion rewards and punishments thereunto? His understanding must be infinite, who is the infallible judg of all these matters. And he must also be omnipotent, that is able to perform, and effectually to dispense such rightly proportion'd rewards and punishments unto all men, for their numberless thoughts, words, and actions, good or evil. Otherwise, the due recompence of all may yet faile. As for the justice of God, shall not the judg of all the earth do right? can he do wrong? His will is the supream rule of all justice.
To sum up all then. Man, by the free exercise of his rational powers, can perform works good or evill. There is therefore some rewarder and punisher of all men: and he must be infinitly wise, powerful, and just; that every thought, word, and action of every man, may receive its due recompence.
SECT. IV.
The principal reward or punishment of man, is intellectual, spiritual, and invisible; not corporeal, sensible, or visible.
THe rational powers, by which man is distinguish'd from beasts, and other inferiour creatures, are the root of all such operations as deserve reward or punishment. These being intellectual, invisible powers, the rewards and punishments must be so, too. The LIBERUM ARBITRIUM, or power of working arbitrarily, in its true and full extent, comprehend's both the rational powers, understanding and will. The former discern's, judges, propounds; the latter chuses and executes. The joynt operation of both, is required in every free action: and therefore, as joyntly considered, are they the proper reception and subject of reward or punishment. The principal riches or treasures then of man, as wel as his punishment, must be spiritual and invisible, not corporeal, sensible, or visible. They are also everlasting, as the powers that immediatly receive and possess them, are. The chief good of man, as man, consists not in any thing he has in common with beasts, and therefore not in any thing that can be perceived or received by such bodily senses and powers of life, as he hath in common with them. Consequently, it consist's not in any bodily delights or pleasures. Nor does the evil of man as man, principally consist in bodily punishment. They then that place the chief good of man in things bodily, visible, or sensible, do embrace and teach a lie, deceiving others and themselvs, to their own destruction.
CHAP. IV.
The special difference of man from all inferiour creatures, whereby a yet more compleat knowledg of him is to be gained.
THe general difference of man from all inferiour things, by having what they have not, is common to other degrees. The second hath what the first hath not; the third, what the second hath not. But there is a more peculiar and especial difference of man from all inferiour creatures; and that is, not that he has what they have not, but that he know's both what they have, and what he has, which none of them know. They know not at all, what value they are of, in themselvs, or comparatively with one another. They know not of what order or degree they are, or wherein they differ from and excell one another. Beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping things do not know what they have received from the hand of their creatour, beyond trees and plants. Nor do trees and plants know what they stand possess'd of, beyond elements, stones, metalls, mineralls, and all inanimate compounds. Man only, in the whole visible creation, know's what he hath of excellency and dignity above all the rest; and what they have above one another. He know's also that other creatures do not know either what he has, or what themselvs have. He knows that he only can know both.
There are five degrees of difference to be found amongst creatures; and four of them are peculiar unto man.
1. Man has that in his nature, which no inferiour creatures have. Things of the third degree have also that in their nature, which no things in the first or second have; &c. So this difference is common to other creatures, as wel as man.
2. The second difference is, that man know's what he has, beyond other creatures; and what they have, above and beyond one another. This difference is special and peculiar unto man only.
3. Man know's that what he has, he has not from himself, but hath receiv'd it from another; and that other things have not what they have, from themselvs, nor yet from him.
4. He can, by the right exercise and improvement of his rational powers, find out him, from whose bountifull hand, both he and all other things have received what they have.
5. He hath a capacity of cleaving fast unto him, when found out, and of being firmly and indissolubly united with him.
Again, man only can rejoyce in the things he has; inferiour creatures, not. What can it profit any creature to have a more noble and excellent nature then other things, unless it can kuow what it has? To have a great treasure, and not know it, will afford no matter of rejoycing. Trees and plants, on this account, as not knowing what they have, can have no joy in what they have beyond things without life. On like account, birds, beasts, and fishes, can have no joy or gladnes from what they have, beyond trees, plants, and other things, because they know not what they have. For joy arises, not barely from the having of any thing, but from the knowing that we have it, and of what value it is, in distinction from other things. Yea, even this knowledg alone, would nor yet be a sufficient ground of rejoycing unto man, unless he could also know him, from whose hand he has received all; unless he could find him out, and hold him fast when found, praising him and adhering to him eternally.
CHAP. V.
All inferiour things were made for man.
INferiour creatures were not made for their own sakes, but for man's; for his profit, necessity, comfort, and instruction. For what does any thing they have, profit themselvs, seing they know not what they have? What they have, they have it for man; and what is wanting in them, man has. He alone know's what they have, and what he has. They with man do make up one visible body, city, or Kingdom, of which he is head, ruler, and King. He, being the only creature for whose sake they were all made, stands obliged to return praise unto God, for himself and them. They are all freely given unto him; and he ought to give up himself unto God; and in himself, all the rest. They received not what they have, for themselvs. Man is the only receiver, properly, and God the only giver. And there arises a natural obligation in the receiver to the giver, from the gift received, especially when great, and freely given. The gift is all that man has in his own nature, and all that inferiour creatures have in their natures, for his use. There is no naturall debt or obligation on them, to God; nor can they perform any such thing. Man alone is obliged to paythe debt of pure obedience and thankfulnes unto his creatour, for himself and all the rest. He is not obliged to inferiour creatures, for the service they perform to him, because they serv him not by choice, but naturall necessity. He only is bound unto God for all, as affording therein, food for his body, and instruction to his mind.