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Fourteen Sermons · Robert Sanderson

Fourteen Sermons, Sermon 4

AD CLERUM. The Fourth Sermon. At a Metropoliticall Visitation, at Grantham, Lincoln, 22. August 1634.

ROM. 14.23.

— For whatsoever is not of Faith is sin.

ONE remarkable difference (among many other) between Good and Evil, is this: that there must be a concurrence of all requisite conditions to make a thing good; whereas to make a thing evil, a single defect in any one condition alone will suffice. aAquin. 1.2. qu. 18. art. 4. ad 3.Bonum ex causa integra, malum ex partiali. If we propose not to our selves a right end; or if we pitch not upon proper and convenient means for the attaining of that end, or if we pursue not these means in a due manner, or if we observe not exactly every materiall circumstance in the whole pursuit; if we fail but in any one point: the action, though it should be in every other respect such as it ought to be, by that one defect becommeth wholly sinfull. Nay more, not onelyonly a true and reall, but even a supposed and imaginary defect; the bare opinion of unlawfulnesse, is able to vitiate the most justifiable act, and to turn it into sin. [I know there is nothing unclean of it self: but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean, at the 14 verse of this Chapter.] Nay yet more, not onelyonly a setled opinion that the thing we do is unlawfull; but the very suspension of our judgement, and the doubtfulnesse of our minds whether we may lawfully do it or no, maketh it sometimes unlawfull to be done (of us,) and if we do it, sinfull. [He that but doubteth is damned, if he eat; because he eateth not of faith:] in the former part of this verse. The ground whereof the Apostle delivereth in a short and full Aphorism; and concludeth the whole Chapter with it, in the words of the Text, [For whatsoever is not of faith, is sin.]

Many excellent instructions there are, scattered throughout the whole Chapter, most of them concerning the right use of that Liberty we have unto things of indifferent nature well worthy our Christian consideration, if we had time and leisure for them. But this last Rule alone will find us work enough: and therefore omitting the rest, we will (by Gods assistance with your patience) presently fall in hand with this, and intend it wholly, in the Explication first, and then in the Application of it. For by how much it is of more profitable and universall use for the regulating of the common offices of life: by so much is the mischief greater if it be, and accordingly our care ought to be so much the greater that it be not, either misunderstood, or misapplyed. Quod non ex fide, peccatum: that is the rule. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. In the Explication of which words, there would be little difficulty, had not the ambiguity of the word Faith occasioned difference of interpretations, and so left a way open to some misapprehensions, Faith is verbum foreign, as most other words are. There be that have aMarlorat. in Enchirid.reckoned up more than twenty severall significations of it in the Scriptures. But I find three especially looked at by those, who either purposely or occasionally have had to do with this Text: each of which we shall examine in their Order.

First and most usually, especially in the Apostolicall writings, the word Faith is used to signifie that Theologicall vertue, or gracious habit, whereby we embrace with our minds and affections the Lord Iesus Christ, as the onelyonly begotten Son of God, and alone Saviour of the world, casting our selves wholly upon the mercy of God through his merits, for remission and everlasting salvation. It is that which is commonly called a lively or justifying faith: whereunto are ascribed in holy Writ those many gracious effects, of aActs 15.9.purifying the heart, bJoh. 1.12. & Galat. 4.26.adoption, cRom. 3.28. & 5.1.justification, dHab. 2.4. & Gal. 2.20.life, eRom. 15.13. 1 Pet. 1.8.joy, fRom. 5.1.peace, gActs 16.34. Ephes. 1.8.salvation, &c. Not as to their proper and primary cause; but as to the instrument, whereby we apprehend and apply Christ, whose merits and spirit are the true causes of all those blessed effects. And in this notion many of our later Divines seem to understand it in our present Text: whilest they alledge it for the confirmation of this Position, that All the works (even the best works) of unbelievers are sins.

A position condemned indeed by the Trent-Council, and▪ that under a curse; taking it (as I suppose) in a wrong construction;aSi qui… dixerit opera omnia quae ante justificationem fiunt verè esse peccata, Anathema sit. Con-Trident. Sess. 6. Can. 7. but not worthy of so heavy a censure, if it be rightly understood; according to the doctrine of our Church in the thirteenth Article of her Confession, and according to the tenour of those Scriptures whereon that doctrine is grounded, Viz. Mat. 12.33. Rom. 8.8. Tit. 1.15. Heb. 11.6, &c. Howbeit I take it (with subjection of judgement) that that Conclusion, what truth soever it may have in it self, hath yet no direct foundation in this Text. The Verb foreign to believe, and the Nown foreign faith or belief, are both of them found sundry times in this Chapter: yet seem not to signifie in any place thereof, either the Verb the Act, or the Nown the Habit, of this saving or justifying Faith, of which we now speak. But being opposed every where, and namely in this last verse unto doubtfulnesse of judgement concerning the lawfulness of some indifferent things; must therefore needs be understood of such a perswasion of judgement concerning such lawfulness, as is opposite to such doubting. Which kind of Faith may be found in a meer heathen man: who never having heard the least syllable of the mystery of salvation by Christ, may yet be assured out of clear evidence of reason, that many of the things he doth are such as he may and ought to do. And as it may be found in a meer heathen man, so it may be wanting in a true believer: who stedfastly resting upon the blood of Christ for his eternall redemption, may yet through the strength of temptation, sway of passion, or other distemper or subreption incident to humane frailty, do some particular act or acts, of the lawfulnesse whereof he is not sufficiently perswaded. The Apostle then here speaking of such a Faith as may be both found in an unbeliever, and also wanting in a true believer: it appeareth that by Faith he meaneth not that justifying Faith, which maketh a true believer to differ from an unbeliever; but the word must be understood in some other notion.

Yet thus much I may adde withall in the behalf of those worthy men that have alledged this Scripture for the purpose aforesaid, to excuse them from the imputation of having (at least wilfully) handled the Word of God deceitfully. First, that the thing it self being true, and the words also sounding so much that way, might easily induce them to conceive that to be the very meaning. And common equity will not that men should be presently condemned, if they shall sometimes confirm a point from a place of Scripture not altogether pertinent, if yet they think it to be so: especially so long as the substance of what they write is according to the analogy of Faith and Godlinesse. Secondly, that albeit these words in their most proper and immediate sense will not necessarily enforce that Conclusion: yet it may seem deducible therefrom with the help of some topicall arguments, and by more remote inferences; as some learned men have endeavoured to shew, not altogether improbably. And thirdly, that they who interpret this Text as aforesaid, are neither singular nor novell therein; but walk in the same path, which some of the ancient Fathers have trod before them. The aThough S. August. sometimes applyeth it also to prove, that all the actions of infidels (meaning, &c.) be sin Rhem. annot. in loc.Rhemists themselves confesse it of S. Augustine: to whom they might have added also bEt omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est: ut sc. intelligat justitiā in…ideliū non esse justitiam: quia sordet natura sine gratia. Prosper. in Epist. ad Rufin. V. etiam eundem contra Collat.S. Prosper, and (whose authority alone is enough to stop their mouthes for ever) cExtra Ecclesiam Catholicam nihil est integrum, nil…l castum, dicente Apostolo, Omne quod non, &c. Leo serm. 2. de jejun. Pentec.Leo Bishop of Rome, who have all cited these words for the self-same purpose.

But we are content, for the reasons already shewn, to let it passe as a collection impertinent: and that I suppose is the worst that can be made of it. There is a second acception of the word Faith: put, either for the whole systeme of that truth which God hath been pleased to reveale to his Church in the Scriptures of the old and new Testament, or some part thereof: or else (foreign) for the assent of the mind thereunto. In which signification some conceiving the words of this Text to be meant, do hence inferre a false and dangerous conclusion; which yet they would obtrude upon the Christian Church as an undoubted principle of truth: that aT C l. 1 p. 59 &c. apud Hooker lib. 2.men are bound for every particular action they do to have direction and warrant from the written word of God, or else they sinne in the doing of it. For (say they) faith must be grounded upon the word of God, bRom. 10.17.(Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, Rom. 10.) Where there is cT.C. l. 1 p. 27 apud Hooker lib. 2. Sect. 4.no Word then, there can be no Faith: and then, by the Apostles doctrine, that which is done without the Word to warrant it, must needs be sin, for whatsoever is not of faith is sin. This is their opinion, and thus they would inferre it.

I know not any piece of counterfeit doctrine, that hath passed so currently in the world, with so little suspicion of falshood, and so little open contradiction as this hath done. One chief cause whereof I conjecture to be, for that it seemeth to make very much for the honour and perfection of Gods sacred Law: the fulnesse and sufficiency whereof none in the Christian Church but Papists or Atheists will deny▪ In which respect, the very questioning of it now, will perhaps seem a strange novelty to many, and occasion their miscensures. But as God himself, so the Holy Word of God is so full of all requisite perfection, that it needeth not to begge honour from an untruth. (aJob 13.7 Will you speak wickedly for God? or talk deceitfully for him?) I hold it very needfull therefore, both for the vindicating of my Text from a common abuse, and for the arming of all my brethren as well of the Clergy as Laity against a common and plausible errour, that neither they teach it, nor these receive it: briefly and clearly to shew, that the aforesaid opinion, in such sort as some have proposed it, and many have understood it, (for it is capable of a good interpretation, wherein it may be allowed;) first is utterly devoid of truth; and secondly draweth after it many dangerous consequents and evil effects; and Thirdly, hath no good warrant from my present Text.

The Opinion is, that to do any thing at all without direction from the Scripture is unlawfull and sinfull. Which if they would understand onelyonly of the substantials of Gods worship, and of the exercises of spirituall and supernaturall graces, the assertion were true and sound: but as they extend it, to aI say that the Word of God containeth whatsoever things can fall into any part of mans life. T. C. lib. 1. p. 20. apud Hooker lib. 2. Sect. 1.all the actions of common life whatsoever, whether naturall or civil, even so farre as to the taking up of a straw: so it is altogether false and indefensible. I marvell what warrant they that so teach have from the Scripture for that very doctrine: or where they are commanded so to believe or teach. One of their chiefest refuges is the Text we now have in hand: but I shall anon drive them from this shelter. The other places usually alleaged speak onelyonly, either of divine and supernaturall truths to be believed, or else of workes of grace or worship to be performed▪ as of necessity unto salvation: which is not to the point in issue. For it is freely confessed, that in things of such nature the Holy Scripture is, and so we are to account it, a most absolute and sufficient direction. Upon which ground we heartily reject all humane traditions, devised and intended as supplements to the doctrine of faith contained in the Bible, and annexed as Codicils to the holy Testament of Christ, for to supply the defects thereof. The question is wholly about things in their nature indifferent, such as are the use of our food, raiment, and the like; about which the common actions of life are chiefly conversant: Whether in the choice and use of such things, we may not be sometimes sufficiently guided by the light of reason and the common rules of discretion: but that we must be able, (and are so bound to do, or else we sinne) for every thing we do in such matters, to deduce our warrant from some place or other o… Scripture.

Before the Scriptures were written it pleased GOD by visions, and dreames, and other like revelations, immediately to make known his good pleasure to the Patriarches and Prophets, and by them unto the people: which kind of Revelations served them to all the same intents and purposes, whereto the sacred Scriptures now do us, viz. to instruct them what they should believe and do for his better service, and the furtherance of their own salvations. Now as it were unreasonable for any may to think, that they either had or did expect an immediate revelation from God every time they ate, or drank, or bought, or sold, or did any other of the common actions of life, for the warranting of each of those particular actions to their consciences: no lesse unreasonable it is to think, that we should now expect the like warrant from the Scriptures for the doing of the like actions. Without all doubt the Law of nature, and the light of reason, was the rule whereby they were guided for the most part in such matters: which the wisdome of God would never have left in them or us, as a principall relike of his decayed image in us, if he had not meant, that we should make use of it, for the direction of our lives and actions thereby. Certainly God never infused any power into any creature, whereof he intended not some use. Else, what shall we say of the Indies and other barbarous nations, to whom God never vouchsafed the lively oracles of his written word? Must we think that they were left a lawlesse people, without any Rule at all whereby to order their actions? How then come they to be guilty of transgression? for where there is aRom. 4.15.no Law, there can be no transgression. Or how cometh it about that their consci…nces should at any time or in any case either bRom. 2.15.accuse them, or excuse them, if they had no guide nor rule to walk by? But if we must grant they had a Rule, (and there is no way, you see, but grant it we must;) then we must also of necessity grant that there is some other Rule for humane actions besides the written word: for that we presupposed these nations to have wanted. Which Rule what other could it be, then the Law of Nature and of right reason, imprinted cRom. 2.15.in their hearts! Which is as truly the Law and Word of God, as is that which is printed in our Bibles. So long as our actions are warranted either by the one or the other, we cannot be said to want the warrant of Gods Word: dTertul. de coron. milit. cap. 4.Nec differet Scripturâ an ratione consistat, saith Tertullian; it mattereth not much from whether of both we have our direction, so long as we have it from either.

You see then those men are in a great errour, who make the holy Scriptures the sole rule of all humane actions whatsoever. For the maintenance whereof, there was never yet produced any piece of an argument, either from reason, or from authority of holy writ, or from the testimony either of the ancient Fathers, or of other classicall Divines of later times; which may not be clearely and abundantly answered, to the satisfaction of any rationall man not extremely fore-possessed with prejudice. They who think to salve the matter by this mitigation; that at least wise our actions ought to be framed according to those generall rules of the Law of Nature, which are here and there in the Scriptures dispersedly contained; (as viz. That we should do as we would be done to; That all things be done decently, and orderly, and unto edification; That nothing be done against conscience, and the like:) speak somewhat indeed to the truth, but little to the purpose. For they consider not, First, that these generall Rules are but occasionally and incidentally mentioned in Scripture; rather to manifest unto us a former, than to lay upon us a new obligation. Secondly, that those rules had been of force for the ordering of mens actions, though the Scripture had never expressed them: and were of such force, before those Scriptures were written, wherein they are now expressed. For they bind not originally quà scripta, but quà justa; because they are righteous, not because they are written. Thirdly, that an action conformable to these generall rules might not be condemned as sinfull, although the doer thereof should look at those rules meerly as they are the dictates of the law of nature; and should not be able to vouch his warrant for it from any place of Scripture, neither should have at the time of the doing thereof any present thought or consideration of any such place. The contrary whereunto, I permit to any mans reasonable judgement, if it be not desperately rash and uncharitable to affirm. Lastly, that if mens actions done agreeably to those rules are said to be of faith, precisely for this reason, because those rules are contained in the word: then it will follow, that before those particular Scriptures were written wherein any of those rules are first delivered, every action done according to those rules had been done without faith, (there being as yet no Scripture for it;) and consequently had been a sin. So that by this doctrine it had been a sin (before the writing of aMat. 7.12.S. Matthews Gospel) for any man to have done to others as he would they should do to him; and it had been a sin (before the writing of the b1 Cor. 14.40former Epistle to the Corinthians) for any man to have done any thing decently and orderly; supposing these two rules to be in those two places first mentioned: because (this supposed) there could then have been no warrant brought from the Scriptures for so doing.

Well then, we see the former Opinion will by no means hold, neither in the rigour of it, nor yet in the mitigation. We are therefore to beware of it; and that so much the more heedfully, because of the evil consequents and effects that issue from it: to wit, a world of superstitions, uncharitable censures, bitter contentions, contempt of superiours, perplexities of conscience. First, it filleth mens heads with many superstitious conceits, making them to cast impurity upon sundry things, which yet are lawfull to as many as use them lawfully. For the taking away of the indifferency of any thing that is indifferent, is in truth Superstition: whether either of the two wayes it be done, either by requiring it as necessary, or by forbidding it as unlawfull. He that condemneth a thing as utterly unlawfull, which yet indeed is indifferent, and so lawfull, is guilty of superstition, as well as he that enjoyneth a thing as absolutely necessary, which yet indeed is but indifferent, and so arbitrary. They of the Church of Rome, and some in our Church, as they go upon quite contrary grounds, yet both false; so they run into quite contrary errours, and both superstitious. They decline too much on the left hand, denying to the holy Scripture that perfection which of right it ought to have; of containing all things appertaining to that supernatural doctrine of faith and holinesse which God hath revealed to his Church for the attainment of everlasting salvation: whereupon they would impose upon Christian people, & that with an opinion of necessity, many things which the Scriptures require not: and that is a Superstition. These wry too much on the right hand, ascribing to the holy Scripture such a kind of perfection as it cannot have; of being the sole directour of all humane actions whatsoever: whereupon they forbid unto Christian people, and that under the name of sinne, sundry things which the holy Scripture condemneth not: and that is a superstition too.

From which Superstition proceedeth in the second place uncharitable censuring: as evermore they that are the most superstitious, are the most supercilious. No such severe censurers of our blessed Saviours person and actions, as the superstitious Scribes and Pharisees were. In this Chapter the speciall fault, which the Apostle blameth in the weak ones, (who were somewhat superstitiously affected,) was their rash and uncharitable aVer. 3.4.10. & 13.judging of their brethren. And common and daily experience among our selves sheweth how freely some men spend their censures upon so many of their brethren, as without scruple do any of those things, which they upon false grounds have superstitiously condemned as utterly unlawfull.

And then thirdly, as unjust censures are commonly entertained with scorn and contumely; they that so liberally condemn their brethren of prophaneness, are by them again as freely flouted for their preciseness: and so whiles both parties please themselves in their own wayes, they cease not mutually to provoke and scandalize and exasperate the one the other, pursuing their private spleens so far, till they break out into open contentions & oppositions. Thus it stood in the Roman Church, when this Epistle was written. They aVer. 3.judged one another, and despised one another, to the great disturbance of the Churches peace: which gave occasion to our Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter. And how far the like censurings and despisings have embittered the spirits, and whetted both the tongues and pens of learned men one against another in our own Church; the stirs that have been long since raised, & are still upheld by the factious opposers against our Ecclesiasticall constitutions, government, and ceremonies, will not suffer us to be ignorant. Most of which stirs, I verily perswade my self, had been long ere this either wholly buried in silence, or at leastwise prettily well quieted, if the weaknesse and danger of the errour whereof we now speak, had been more timely discovered, and *It is indeed fully handled by M. Hooker in his second book of Eccles. Policy: but few men of that party will read his works though written with singular learning, wisdome, godliness, & moderation.more fully and frequently made known to the world, than it hath been.

Fourthly, let that doctrine be once admitted, and all humane authority will soon be despised. The commands of Parents, Masters, and Princes, which many times require both secrecy and expedition, shall be taken into slow deliberation; and the equity of them sifted by those that are bound to obey, though they know no cause why, so long as they know no cause to the contrary. aPet. Blesens. Epist. 131.Delicata est obedientia, quae transit in causae genus deliberativum. It is a nice obedience in bDelicata satis, imo nimis molesta est ista obedientia, &c. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.S. Bernards judgement, yea rather troublesome and odious, that is over-curious in cInfirmae prorsùs voluntatis indicium est, statuta lenio. ii studiosiùs discutere; haerere ad singula quae injunguntur; exigere de quibus que rationem; & malè suspicari de omni praecepto cujus causa latuerit; nec unquam libenter obedire, nisi, &c. Bern. Ibid.discussing the commands of superiours; boggling at every thing that is enjoyned, requiring a why for every wherefore, and unwilling to stir untill the lawfulness and expediency of the thing commanded shall be demonstrated by some manifest reason, or undoubted authority from the Scriptures.

Lastly, the admitting of this doctrine would cast such a snare upon men of weak judgements, but tender consciences, as they should never be able to unwind themselves thereout again. Mens daily occasions for themselves or friends, and the necessities of common life, require the doing of a thousand things within the compasse of a few dayes; for which it would puzzle the best Textman that liveth, readily to bethink himself of a sentence in the Bible, clear enough to satisfie a scrupulous conscience of the lawfulnesse and expediency of what he is about to do: for which, by hearkening to the rules of reason and discretion, he might receive easie and speedy resolution. In which cases if he should be bound to suspend his resolution, and delay to do that which his own reason would tell him were presently needfull to be done, untill he could haply call to mind some precept or example of Scripture for his warrant: what stops would it make in the course of his whole life? what languishings in the duties of his calling? how would it fill him with doubts and irresolutions, lead him into a maze of uncertainties, entangle him in a world of wofull perplexities, and (without the great mercy of God, and better instruction) plunge him irrecoverably into the gulph of despair? Since the chief end of the publication of the Gospel, is to aEsay 40.1, 2.comfort the hearts, and to revive and refresh the spirits of Gods people with bEsay 61.1-3.the glad tidindgs of liberty from the spirit of cRom. 8.15.bondage and d2 Tim. 1.7.fear, and of gracious acceptance with their GOD; to anoint them with ePsal. 45.7.the oyl of gladness, giving them beauty for ashes, and instead of fPsal. 30.11.sackcloth girding them with joy: we may well suspect that doctrine not to be Evangelicall, which thus setteth the consciences of men upon the rack, tortureth them with continuall fears and perplexities, and prepareth them thereby unto hellish despaire.

These are the grievous effects and pernicious consequents that will follow upon their opinion, who hold, that we must have warrant from the Scripture for every thing whatsoever we do: not onelyonly in spirituall things, (wherein alone it is absolutely true,) nor yet onelyonly in other matters of weight, though they be not spirituall, (for which perhaps there might be some colour) but also in the common affairs of life, even in the most slight and triviall things. Yet for that the Patrons of this opinion build themselves as much upon the authority of this present Text, as upon any other passage of Scripture whatsoever, (which is the reason why we have stood thus long upon the examination of it:) we are therefore … next place to clear the Text from that their mis-interpretation. The force of their collection standeth thus (as you heard already:) that faith is ever grounded upon the word of God; & that therefore whatsoever action is not grounded upon the word, being it is not of faith, by the Apostles rule here, must needs be a sin. Which collection could not be denied, if the word Faith were here taken in that sense which they imagine, and wherein it is very usuall taken in the Scriptures; viz. for the doctrine of supernaturall and divine revelation, or for the belief thereof: which doctrine we aSee Articles of the Church of England. Artic. 6.willingly acknowledge to be compleatly contained in the holy Scriptures alone, and therefore dare not admit into our belief, as a branch of divine supernaturall truth, any thing not therein contained. But there is a third signification of the word Faith, nothing so frequently found in the Scriptures as the two former; which yet appeareth both by the course of this whole Chapter, and by the consent of the best and most approved interpreters as well ancient as modern, to have been properly intended by our Apostle in this place: namely that wherein it is put for a certain perswasion of mind, that what we do may lawfully be done. So that whatsoever action is done by us, with reasonable assurance and perswasion of the lawfulnesse thereof in our own consciences, is in our Apostles purpose so far forth an action of Faith: without any inquiring into the means whereby that perswasion was wrought in us; whether it were the light of our own reason, or the authority of some credible person, or the declaration of Gods revealed will in his written Word. And on the other side, whatsoever action is done, either directly contrary to the judgement and verdict of our own consciences, or at leastwise doubtingly and before we are in some competent measure assured that we may lawfully do it: that is it which S. Paul here denieth to be of faith, and of which he pronounceth so peremptorily that it is (and that co nomine) a sin.

About which use and signification of the word Faith we need not to trouble our selves to fetch it from a trope, either of aHeming in Rom. 14.1.a Metonymie or bPiscat. ibid.Synecdoche, as some do. For though (as I say) it do not so often occur in Scripture; yet it is indeed the primary and native signification of the word foreign faith, derived from the root foreign to perswade. Because all kinds of Faith whatsoever consist in a kind of perswasion. You shall therefore find the words, foreign which signifieth properly to believe, and foreign which signifieth properly not to be perswaded, to be opposed as contrary either to other in cJoh. 3.3, 6. & Acts 14.1, 2.Iohn 3. and Acts 14. and other places. To omit the frequent use of the words foreign and Fides, in Greek and Latine authors in this signification: observe but the passages of this very Chapter, and you will be satisfied in it. At the second verse, Hic Verse 2.foreign, one believeth that he may eat all things: that is, he is verily perswaded in his conscience that he may as lawfully eat flesh as herbs, any one kind of meat as any other, he maketh no doubt of it. Again at the fourteenth verse, eVerse 14.foreign, I know and am perswaded that there is nothing unclean of it self. That is, I stedfastly believe it is a most certain and undoubted truth. Again at the two and twentieth verse, fVerse 22.foreign; Hast thou faith? have it to thy self before God: that is, art thou in thy conscience perswaded that thou maist lawfully partake any of the good creatures of God? Let that perswasion suffice thee for the approving of thine own heart in the sight of God: but trouble not the Church, nor offend thy weaker brother, by a needlesse and unseasonable ostentation of that thy knowledge. Lastly, in this three and twentieth verse, gVerse 23.foreign, He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith: that is, he that is not yet fully perswaded in his own mind, that it is lawfull for him to eat some kinds of meats, (as namely swines flesh, or bloodings,) and yet is drawn against his own judgement to eat thereof because he seeth others so to do, or because he would be loth to undergo the taunts and jears of scorners, or out of any other poor respect: such a man is cast and condemned by the judgement of his own heart as a transgressor, because he adventureth to do that which he doth not believe to be lawfull. And then the Apostle proceeding ab hypothesi ad thesin, immediately reduceth that particular case into a generall rule in these words, For whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. By the processe of which his discourse it may appear, that by Faith no other thing is here meant, than such a perswasion of the mind and conscience as we have now declared, and that the true purport and intent of these words is but thus much in effect: Whosoever shall enterprise the doing of any thing, which he verily believeth to be unlawfull, or at leastwise is not reasonably well perswaded of the lawfulnesse of it; let the thing be otherwise and in it self what it can be, lawfull or unlawfull, indifferent or necessary, convenient or inconvenient, it mattereth not: to him it is a sin howsoever.

Which being the plain evident and undeniable purpose of these words, I shall not need to spend any more breath either in the farther refutation of such conclusions as are mis-inferred hence, which fall of themselves; or in the farther Explication of the meaning of the Text, which already appeareth: but addresse my self rather to the application of it. Wherein, because upon this great principle may depend the resolution of very many Cases of Conscience, which may trouble us in our Christian and holy walking: it will not be unprofitable to proceed by resolving some of the most material doubts and questions, among those which have occurred unto my thoughts by occasion of this Text in my meditations thereon.

First, it may be demanded, What power the Conscience hath, to make a thing otherwise good and lawfull, to become unlawfull and sinfull? and whence it hath that power? I answer, First, that it is not in the power of any mans judgement or conscience to alter the naturall condition of any thing whatsoever, either in respect of quality or degree: but that still every thing that was good remaineth good, and every thing that was evil remaineth evil; and that in the very same degree of good or evil as it was before, neither better nor worse, any mans particular judgement or opinion thereof notwithstanding. For the differences between good and evil, and the severall degrees of both, spring from such conditions as are intrinsecall to the things themselves: which no aRespectus non mutant naturā.Outward respects, (and much lesse then mens opinions) can vary. He that esteemeth any creature unclean, may defile himself, but he cannot bring impurity upon that creature, by such his estimation. Secondly, that bOpinio nostra nobis legem facit. Ambr…. de paradis.mens judgements may make that which is good in its own nature, (the naturall goodnesse still remaining) become evil to them in the use: essentially good, and quoad rem; but quoad hominem, and accidentally evil. It is our Apostles own distinction in the fourteenth verse of this Chapter: Nothing unclean of it self: but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, unclean to him. But then we must know withall, that it holdeth not the other way. Mens judgements or opinions, although they may make that which is good in it self, to become evil to them; yet they cannot make that which is evill in it self, to become good either in it self, or to them. If a man were verily perswaded, that it were evil to ask his father blessing, that mis-perswasion would make it become evil to him: But if the same man should be as verily perswaded that it were good to curse his father, or to deny him relief being an unbeliever; that mis-perswasion could not make either of them become good to him. Some that persecuted the Apostles were perswaded they cJohn 16.2.did God good service in it. It was Saint Pauls case before his conversion, who dActs 26.9.verily thought in himself, that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Iesus. But those their perswasions would not serve to justifie those their actions. Saint Paul confesseth himself to have been e1 Tim. 1.13.a persecutor, and blasphemer, and injurious for so doing, although he followed the guidance of his own conscience therein: and to have stood in need of mercy for the remission of those wicked acts, though he did them ignorantly, and fActs 23.3, 4. & Phil. 3.6.out of zeal to the Law. The reason of which difference is, that which I touched in the beginning, even because any one defect is enough to render an action evill; and consequently a defect in the agent may do it, though the substance of the action remain still (as it was) good: but all conditions must concur to make an action good; and consequently a right intention in the agent will not suffice thereunto, so long as the substance of the action remaineth still (as it was) evill. Thirdly, that the Conscience hath this power over mens wils and actions by virtue of that unchangeable Law of God, which he establisheth by an ordinance of nature in our first creation: that the will of every man (which is the fountain whence all our actions immediately flow) should conforme it self to the judgement of the practique understanding or conscience, as to its proper and immediate rule, and yield it self to be guided thereby. So that if the understanding through Errour point out a wrong way, and the will follow it: the fault is chiefly in the understanding for mis-guiding the will. But if the understanding shew the right way, and the will take a wrong: then the fault is meerly in the will, for not following that guide which GOD hath set over it.

It may be demanded secondly, Whether or no in every particular thing we do, an actuall consideration of the lawfulnesse and expediency thereof be so requisite, as that for want thereof we should sinne in doing it? The reason of the doubt is, because otherwise how should it appeare to be of faith? and Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. I answer, First, that in matters of weight and worthy of consultation, it is very necessary that the lawfulnesse and expediency of them be first diligently examined, before they be enterprised. And secondly, that even in smaller matters the like examination is needfull when there is any apparent cause of doubting. But thirdly, that in such small and triviall matters, as it much skilleth not whether we do them or no, or whether we do this rather than that,Ubi est suspicio, ibi discus…io necessaria. Bernard. Ep. 7. and wherein no doubt ariseth to trouble us; an actuall consideration of their lawfulnesse or expediency is so far from being requisite, that it would rather be troublesome and incommodious. True it is, that all voluntary actions are done with some deliberation, more or lesse: because it is the nature of the will to consult with the understanding in every act; else it should be irrationall and brutish. Yet there are many things which we daily do, wherein aRatio in rebus manifestis non inquirit, sed statim judicat. Aquin. 1.2. qu. 144. ad 2.the sentence of the understanding is so quick and present, because there is no difficulty in them; that they seem to be, (and are therefore sometimes so termed) actus indeliberati: bforeign, &c. Arist. 1. Mag. Moral. 18.such as are to sit down and to rise up, to pluck a flower as we walk in a Garden, to aske the time of the day, or the name of the next Town as we travell by the way, or whether we eat of this or that dish at the table, cforeign. Arist. 2. Eth. 5.and the like. For the doing of every of which, it were a ridiculous servility to be imposed upon men, if they should be tyed to district examination of the lawfullnesse and expediency thereof. There is not in them dignus vindice nodus: and a mans time ought to be more precious unto him, than to be trifled away in such needless and minute enquiries. It is even as if we should tye a great learned man that is ready in his Latine tongue, to bethink himself first of some grammar rule or example for the declining and parsing of every word he were to speak, before he should adventure to utter a Latine sentence. But as such a man is sufficiently assured out of the habit of his learning, that he speaketh congruously and with good propriety, though he have no present actuall reference to his Grammar rules: so here, an habituall knowledge of the nature and use of indifferent things is sufficient to warrant to the conscience the lawfulnesse of these common actions of life; so as they may be said to be of faith, though there be no farther actuall or particular disquisition used about them. A very needfull thing it is the whilest, for Christian men to endeavour to have a right judgement concerning indifferent things: without which it can scarcely be avoided, but that both their Consciences will be full of distracting scruples within themselves, & their conversations full of unbrotherly carriage towards others.

It may be demanded thirdly, Since Whatsoever is not of faith is sin; What measure of Faith, or what degree of Perswasion is necessary for the warranting of our actions, so as lesse than that will not serve? I answer, that what is here demanded cannot be positively defined by any peremptory and immoveable rules. There is most an end a Latitude in such things as these are: which may be straitned or extended more or lesse, according to the exigence of present occasions, and as the different state or quality of particular businesses shall require. There is a foreign, a fulnesse of perswasion arising from evident infallible and demonstrative proofes, which is attainable for the performance of sundry duties both of civill Iustice and of Religion. And where it may be attained, it is to be endeavoured after, (though it be not of absolute necessity:) for we cannot make our assurances too strong. The Apostle useth that word at the fifth ver. (aVe…se 5. hic. plen… certus sit. Heming. Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind,) foreign: it is a metaphoricall word, and seemeth to be borrowed from a Ship under bQuasi plenis v…lis feratur. Piscat. in Sh…l. ad Rom. 14.5.full saile, that hath both wind and tide with it to carry it with a straight and speedy course to the desired point, and nothing to hinder it. But as men, when they are to purchase lands, will desire and propose to have as good assurance as by learned counsell can be devised; but yet must be content to take such assurance as the sellers can make, or else they shall make but a few markets: so although we may desire (ex abundanti) a full assurance of faith in every weighty action we shall enterprise; yet ordinarily and in most things we must content our selves to take up with a conjectural, probable, and moral certainty, or else we shall find very few things left for us to do. Fides Logica is not to be expected in all cases: in some and those the most, Fides Ethica must serve the turne. Nay I say yet further, and I beseech you (brethren) to take notice of it as a matter of speciall use both for the directing and quieting of your consciences: that ordinarily and in most things we need no other warrant for what we do than this onelyonly, that there is not (to our knowledge) any law either of Nature or Scripture against them. As the Lawyers use to say of mens persons, Quisque praesumitur esse bonus, &c. The Law taketh every man for a good man and true, till his truth and honesty be legally disproved; and as our Saviour sometimes said, cLuk. 9.50.He that is not against us, is for us: so in these matters we are to believe all things to be lawfull for us to do, which cannot be shewn by good evidence either of Scripture or Reason to be unlawfull. Those men therefore go quite the wrong way to work, to the fearefull puzling of their own and other mens consciences, who use to argue on this manner. [This I have no warrant to do; for where is it commanded?] Whereas they ought rather to argue thus, [This I have good warrant to do; for where is it forbidden?] Apply this now a little to those Ceremonies, that for orders sake, and to adde the greater solemnity to sacred actions, are appointed in the Church; Wearing the Surplize, bowing at the Name of the Lord Iesus, kneeling at the Holy Communion, and the rest. Though I might say, and that truly, that these also are commanded even by divine authority in genere, that is to say, as they fall within the compasse of decent Ceremonies, by virtue of that grand Ecclesiasticall Canon, (d1 Cor. 14.40. Let all things be done honestly and in order;) and that even in specie too they are commanded by the authority of those governors whom God hath set over us, and to whom we are bound in conscience, and by vertue of Gods commandement, to yield obedience: Yet I waive all this for the present, because it is not so direct to the point in hand. OnelyOnly I aske, Where are any of these things forbidden? if they be, let it be shewn: and that not by weake collections, and remote consequences, which are good for nothing but to engender strifes, and to multiply disputes without end; but by direct and full evidence either of Scripture-text or Reason, which (for any thing I know) was never yet done, neither (as I verily believe) will ever be done. But if it cannot be shown that these things are forbidden; without any more adoe, the use of them is by that sufficiently warranted. He that will not allow of this doctrine, besides that he cherisheth an errour which will hardly suffer him to have a quiet Conscience: I yet see not how he can reconcile his opinion with those sundry passages of our Apostle, [e1 Tim. 4.4. Every creature of God is good, fTit. 1.15.To the pure all things are pure, gRom. 14.14.I know nothing is of it self unclean, h1 Cor. 6.12.All things are lawfull, &c.] From which passages we may with much safety conclude, that it is lawfull for us to do all those things, concerning which there can be nothing brought of moment to prove them unlawfull. Upon which ground alone if we do them, we do them upon such a perswasion of faith as is sufficient. Provided, that we have not neglected to inform our judgements the best we could for the time past; and that we are ever ready withall to yield our selves to better information, whensoever it shall be tendred unto us, for the time to come.

It may be demanded fourthly, Suppose a man would fain do something, of the lawfulnesse whereof he is not in his conscience sufficiently resolved; whether he may in any case do it notwithstanding the reluctancy of his Conscience, yea or no? As they write of aHerodo…. in Clio; Senec. 3. de ira. 21Cyrus, that to make passage for his Army, he cut the great river Gyndes into many smaller chanels, which in one entire stream was not passable: so to make a clear and distinct answer to this great question, I must divide it into some lesser ones. For there are sundry things considerable in it; whether we respect the conscience, or the Person of the doer, or the Action to be done. As namely and especially, in respect of the conscience, whether the reluctancy thereof proceed from a setled and stedfast resolution, or from some doubtfulnesse onelyonly, or but from some scruple? And in respect of the person, whether he be sui juris his own Master, and have power to dispose of himself at his own choice in the things questioned; or he be under the command, and at the appointment of another? And in respect of the Action or thing to be done: whether it be a necessary thing, or an unlawfull thing, or a thing indifferent and arbitrary? Any of which circumstances may quite alter the case, and so beget new questions. But I shall reduce all to three questions: whereof the first shall concern a resolved Conscience, the second a doubtfull conscience, and the third a scrupulous conscience.

The First Question then is, if the Conscience be firmly resolved, that the thing proposed to be done is unlawfull; whether it may then be done, or no? Whereunto I answer in these two conclusions. The first conclusion. If the Conscience be firmly so resolved, and that upon a true ground, (that is to say, if the thing be indeed unlawfull, and judged so to be) it may not in any case or for any respect in the world be done. There cannot be imagined a higher aQui agit contra conscientiam qua credit Deum aliquid prohibuisse, licèt erret, contemnit Deum. Bonavent. 2. sent. dist. 39.contempt of God, than for a man to despise the power of his own conscience: which is the highest soveraignty under heaven, as being Gods most immediate deputy for the ordering of his life and waies. bMenand.foreign, a heathen man could say. Wofull is the estate of those men (unlesse they repent) who for filthy lucre, or vain pleasure, or spitefull malice, or tottering honour, or lazy ease, or any other reigning lust, dare lye, or sweare, or cheat, or oppresse, or commit filthinesse, or steal, or kill, or slander, or flatter, or betray, or do any thing that may advance their base ends: nothing at all regarding the secret whisperings, or murmurings, no nor yet the lowd roarings, and bellowings of their own consciences there against. cPers. Satyr. 5.Stat contra ratio, & secretam gannit in aurem. It doth so: but yet they turn a deaf eare to it, and despise it. Wonder not, if when they out of the terrours of their troubled consciences shall houle and roare in the eares of the Almighty for mercy, or for some mitigation at least of their torment; he then turn a deafe eare against them, and despise them. dJam. 4.17.To him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin, James 4. sin not to be excused by any plea or colour: But how much more inexcusably then is it sinne to him, that knoweth the evill he should not do, and yet will do it? There is not a proner way to eQuod fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam. c. 28. qu. 1. Omnes. Sect. ex his.Hell, than to sinne against Conscience. fRom. 14.22.Happy is he which condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth: but most wretched is he that alloweth himself to the practise of that, which in his judgement he cannot but condemne. Neither maketh it any difference at all here, whether a man be otherwise sui juris or not. For although there be a great respect due to the higher powers in doubtfull cases, (as I shall touch anon,) yet where the thing required is simply unlawfull, and understood so to be, inferiours must absolutely resolve to disobey, whatsoever come of it. Gods faithfull servants have ever been most resolute in such exigents. gDan. 3.16— 18.We are not carefull to answer thee in this matter; (belike in a matter of another nature they would have taken care to have given the King a more satisfactory, at least a more respective answer: but in this matter,) Be known to thee O King, that we will not serve thy gods. hc. 11. qu. 3. Qui resistit. ex Augustino.Da veniam Imperator, &c. You know whose answers they were. If we be sure God hath forbidden it, we sinne against our own consciences if we do it at the command of any mortall man whosoever, or upon any worldly inducement whatsoever. That is the first Conclusion.

The second is this. If a man be in his conscience fully perswaded that a thing is evil and unlawfull, which yet in truth is not so, but lawfull; the thing by him so judged unlawfull cannot by him be done without sin. Even an erroneous conscience bindeth thus far, that a man cannot go against it, and be guiltlesse: because his practise should then run crosse to his judgement; and so the thing done could not be of Faith. For if his reason judge it to be evil, and yet he will do it, it argueth manifestly that he hath a will to do evil, and so becometh a transgressour of that generall Law which bindeth all men to eschew all evil. Yet in this case we must admit of some difference, according to the different nature of the things, and the different condition of the persons. For if the things so judged unlawfull be in their own nature not necessary, but indifferent, so as they may either be done or left undone without sin; and the person withall be sui juris in respect of such things, no superiour power having determined his liberty therein: then, although he may not do any of these things, by reason of the contrary perswasion of his conscience, without sin; yet he may without sin leave them undone. As for example. Say a man should hold it utterly unlawfull (as some erroneously do,) to play at cards or dice, or to lay a wager, or to cast lots in triviall matters: if it be in truth lawfull to do every of these things, (as I make no question but it is, so they be done with sobriety and with due circumstances,) yet he that is otherwise perswaded of them cannot by reason of that perswasion do any of them without sin. Yet, forsomuch as they are things no way necessary, but indifferent; both in their nature, and for their use also, no superiour power having enjoyned any man to use them, therefore he that judgeth them unlawfull may abstain from them without sinne, and so indeed he is in conscience bound to do, so long as he continueth to be of that opinion. But now on the other side, if the things so mis-judged to be unlawfull be any way necessary; either in respect of their own nature, or by the injunction of authority: then the person is by that his error brought into such a straite between two sinnes, as he can by no possible meanes avoid both, so long as he persisteth in that his errour. For both if he do the thing, he goeth against the perswasion of his conscience, and that is a great sinne: and if he do it not, either he omitteth a necessary duty, or else disobeyeth lawfull authority; and to do either of both, is a sinne too. Out of which snare since there is no way of escape but one, which is to rectifie his judgement, and to quit his pernicious errour: it concerneth every man therefore that unfeignedly desireth to do his duty in the fear of God, and to keep a good conscience, not to be too stiffe in his present apprehensions, but to examine well the principles and grounds of his opinions, strongly suspecting that winde that driveth him upon such rocks, to be but a blast of his own fancy, rather than a breathing of the holy Spirit of truth. Once this is most certain, that whosoever shall adventure to do any thing repugnant to the judgement of his own conscience, (be that judgement true or be it false,) shall commit a grievous sin in so doing: foreign, because it cannot be of faith, and whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

That is now where the conscience apparently inclineth the one way. But say the scales hang even, so as a man cannot well resolve whether way he should rather take! Now he is a—animo nunc huc, nunc stuctuat illuc. Virg. Aeneid. 10.in one mind, by and by in another; but constant in neither: right Saint Iames his bJam. 1.8.foreign, a double minded man. This is it we call a doubting conscience: concerning which the second question is, what a man ought to do in case of doubtfulnesse. Perfect directions here, (as in most deliberatives) would require a large discourse: because there are so many considerable circumstances that may vary the case; especially in respect of the cause from which that doubtfulnesse of mind may spring. Many times it ariseth from meere ficklenesse of mind, or weaknesse of judgement; as the lightest things are soonest driven out of their place by the wind: Even as St. Iames saith, cIbid.a double minded man is wavering in all his wayes; and S. Paul speaketh of some that were like dEph, 4.14.children, off and on,, soon wherryed about with every blast of doctrine. Sometimes it proceedeth from tendernesse of Conscience, which is indeed a very blessed and gracious thing: but yet (as tender things may soon miscarry, if they be not the more choisely handled,) very obnoxious through Sathans diligence and subtilty to be wrought upon to dangerous inconveniencies. Sometimes it may proceed from the probability of those reasons that seem to stand on either side, betwixt which it is not easie to judge which are strongest: or from the differing judgements and opinions of learned and godly men thereabout, and from many other causes: But for some generall resolution of the Question, (what is to be done where the conscience is doubtfull?) I answer.

First, that if the doubtfulnesse be not concerning the lawfulnesse of any of the things to be done considered simply and in themselves, but of the expediency of them as they are compared one with another; (as when of two things proposed at once, whereof one must, and but one can be done, I am sufficiently perswaded of the lawfulnesse of either, but am doubtfull whether of the two rather to pitch upon:) in such a case, the party ought first to weigh the conveniencies and inconveniencies of both as well and advisedly as he can by himself alone; and to do that which then shall appeare to him to be subject to the fewer and lesser inconveniencies. Or if the reasons seem so equally strong on both sides, that he cannot of himselfe deside the doubt; then secondly, if the aforeign. Arist. 3. Ethic. 4.matter be of weight, and worth the while, he should doe well to make his doubts known to some prudent and pious man: (especially to his own spirituall Pastor, if he be a man meetly qualified for it,) resolving to rest upon his judgement, and to follow his direction. Or if the matter be of small moment, he may then thirdly do whether of both he hath best liking to; (as the Apostle saith in one particular case, and it may be applied to many more, b1 Cor. 7.36.Let him do what he will, he sinneth not:) resting his conscience upon this perswasion, that so long as he is unfeignedly desirous to do for the best, and hath not been negligent to use all cNon tibi imputabitur ad culpam, quod invitus ignoras. Aug. de nat & grat.requisite diligence to inform himself aright; God will accept of his good intention therein, and pardon his errour, if he shall be mistaken in his choice.

But secondly, if the question be concerning the very lawfulnsse of the thing it self, whether it may be lawfully done, or no; and the conscience stand in doubt, because reasons seem to be probable both pro and contra, & there are learned men as wel of the one opinion as of the other, &c. as we see it is (for instance) in the question of Usury and of second marriage after divorce, and in sundry other doubtfull cases in morall divinity: in such a case the person (if he be sui juris) is certainly bound to aNil faciendum, de quo dubites sit neone rectè factum. Cic. l. 1. de Offic.forbear the doing of that thing of the lawfulnesse whereof he so doubteth: and if he forbear it not, he sinneth. It is the very point the Apostle in this verse intendeth to teach; and for the confirming whereof he voucheth this Rule of the Text: He that doubteth, saith he, is damned if he eat; he is foreign, condemned of his own conscience: because he doth that willingly whereof he doubteth, when he hath free liberty to let it alone, no necessity urging him thereunto. And the reason why he ought rather to forbear than to adventure the doing of that whereof he doubteth, is; because in doubtfull cases wisdome would that the safer part should be chosen. And that part is safer, which if we chuse, we are sure we shall do well; than that, which if we chuse, we know not but we may do ill. As for example, in the instances now proposed. If I doubt of the lawfulnesse of Usury, or of Marrying after divorce, I am sure that if I marry not, nor let out my money, I shall not sin in so abstaining: but if I shall do either of both doubtingly, I cannot be without some fear lest I should sin in so doing; and so those actions of mine being not done in faith, must needs be sin, even by the Rule of the Text, foreign, For whatsoever is not of faith, is sin.

But then thirdly, if the liberty of the agent be determined by the command of some superiour power to whom he oweth obedience; so as he is not now sui juris ad hoc, to do or not to do at his own choice, but to do what he is commanded: this one circumstance quite altereth the whole case, and now he is bound in conscience to do the thing commanded; his doubtfulnsse of mind whether that thing be lawfull or no, notwithstanding. To do that whereof he doubteth, where he hath free liberty to leave it undone, bringeth upon him (as we have already shewn) the guilt of wilfull transgression: but not so where he is not left to his own liberty. And where lawfull authority prescribeth in alterutram partem, there the liberty ad utramque partem contradictionis is taken away, from so many as are under that authority. If they that are over them have determined it one way; it is not thenceforth any more at their choice, whether they will take that way, or the contrary: but they must go the way that is appointed them without gainsaying or grudging. And if in the deed done at the command of one that is endued with lawfull authority there be a sin, it must go on his score that requireth it wrongfully, not on his that doth but his duty in obeying. A Prince commandeth his Subjects to serve in his Warres: it may be the quarrel is unjust, it may be there may appear to the understanding of the subject great likelihoods of such injustice; yet may the subject for all that fight in the quarrell; yea he is bound in conscience so to do: nay he is deep in disloyalty and treason if he refuse the service, whatsoever pretensions he may make of conscience for such refusall. Neither need that fear trouble him lest he should bring upon himself the guilt of innocent blood; for aIs damnum dat, qui jubet dare: ejus verò nulla culpa est, cui p…rere necesse si…. L. 169. F. de div. Reg. jur.the blood that is unrighteously shed in that quarrel, he must answer for that set him on work, not he that spilt it. And truly it is a great wonder to me, that any man endued with understanding, and that is able in any measure to weigh the force of those precepts and reasons which bind inferiours to yield obedience to their superiours, should be otherwise minded in cases of like nature. Whatsoever is commanded us by those whom God hath set over us, either in Church, Common-wealth, or Family, (bB…rnard. de praecept. & dis. Quod tamen non sit certum displicere Deo, saith S. Bern.) which is not evidently contrary to the Law and will of God, ought to be of us received & obeyed no otherwise, then as if God himself had commanded it, because God himself hath commanded us to cRom. 13.1.obey the higher powers, and to dPet. 2.13.submit our selves to their ordinances. Say it be not well done of them to command it! Sed enim quid hoc refert tuâ? saith he; What is that to thee? Let them look to that whom it concerneth: Tolle quod tuum est, & vade. Do thou what is thine own part faithfully, and never trouble thy self further. Ipsum quem pro Deo habemus, tanquam Deum in his quae apertè non sunt contra Deum audire debemus; Bernard still Gods Vicegerents must be heard and obeyed in all things that are not manifestly contrary to the revealed will of God.

But the thing required is against my conscience, may some say; and I may not go against my conscience, for any mans pleasure. Judge I pray you what perversnesse is this, when the blessed Apostle commandeth thee aRom. 13.5.to obey for conscience sake, that thou shouldest disobey, and that for conscience sake too: He chargeth thee upon thy conscience to be subject; and thou pretendest thy conscience to free thee from subjection. This by the way; now to the point. Thou s…yest it is against thy conscience: I say again, that (in the case whereof we now speake, the case of doubtfulnesse) it is not against thy conscience. For doubting properly is bIsidor.motus indifferens in utramque partem contradictionis; when the mind is held cDubius, incertus q…asi duarum via…um. Isid. 10. E…m. foreign.in suspence between two wayes, uncertain whether of both to take to. When the scales hang even (as I said before) and in aequilibrio, without any notable propension or inclination to the one side more than to the other. And surely where things hang thus even, if the weight of authority will not cast the scale either way: we may well suppose, that either the authority is made very light, or else there is a great fault in the beame. Know (brethren) the gainsaying conscience is one thing, and the doubting conscience another. That which is done repugnante conscientiâ, the conscience of the doer flatly gainsaying it, that is indeed against a mans conscience, (the conscience having already passed a definitive sentence the one way:) and no respect or circumstance whatsoever can free it from sin. But that which is done dubitante conscientiâ, the conscience of the doer onelyonly doubting of it and no more; that is in truth no more against a mans conscience than with it, (the conscience as yet not having passed a definitive sentence either way:) and such an action may either be a sinne, or no sinne; according to those qualifications which it may receive from other respects and circumstances. If the conscience have already passed a judgement upon a thing, and condemned it as simply unlawfull; in that case it is true that a man ought not by any meanes to do that thing, no not at the command of any Magistrate, no not although his conscience have pronounced a wrong sentence, and erred in that judgement: for then he should do it, repugnante conscientiâ, he should go directly against his own conscience, which he ought not to do whatsoever come of it. In such a case certainly he may not obey the Magistrate: yet let him know thus much withall, that he sinneth too in disobeying the Magistrate; from which sinne the following of the judgement of his own conscience cannot acquit him. And this is that fearfull perplexity whereof I spake, whereinto many a man casteth himself by his own errour and obstinacy, that he can neither go with his conscience, nor against it, but he shall sinne. And who can help it, if a man will needs cherish an errour, and persist in it? But now if the conscience be onelyonly doubtfull whether a thing be lawfull or no, but have not as yet passed a peremptory judgement against it, (yea although it rather incline to think it unlawfull: dPlus est standum prae epto praelati, quam conscientiae. Bonav. 2. sent. distinct. 39.) in that case if the Magistrate shall command it to be done, the subject with a good conscience may do it, nay he cannot with a good conscience refuse to do it, though it be dubitante conscientiâ.

But you will yet say, that in doubtfull cases the safer part is to be chosen. So say I too; and am content that rule should decide this question: onelyonly let it be rightly applyed. Thou thinkest it safer, where thou doubtest of the unlawfulnesse, to forbear then to do: as for example, if thou doubtest whether it be lawfull to kneel at the Communion, it is safest in thy opinion therefore for thee not to kneel. So should I think too, if thou wert left meerly to thine own liberty. But thou dost not consider how thou art caught in thine own net, and how the edge of thine own weapon may be turned upon thee point-blank not to be avoided, thus. If authority command thee to kneel, which whether it be lawfull for thee to do, or not, thou doubtest; it cannot choose but thou must needs doubt also, whether thou maiest lawfully disobey, or not. Now then here apply thine own Rule, In dubiis pars tutior, and see what will come of it. Judge, since thou canst not but doubt in both cases, whether it be not the safer of the two,aGregor. to obey doubtingly, than to disobey doubtingly. Tene certum, demitte incertum, is S. Gregory his rule: where there is a certainty, and an uncertainty, let the uncertainty go, and hold to that which is certain. Now the generall is certain, that thou art to obey the Magistrate in all things not contrary to the will of God; but the particular is uncertain, whether the thing now commanded thee by the Magistrate be contrary to the will of God: (I say uncertain to thee, because thou doubtest of it.) Deal safely therefore, and hold thee to that which is certain, and obey.

But thou wilt yet alledge, that the Apostle here condemneth the doing of any thing, not onelyonly with a gainsaying, but even with a doubting conscience: because doubting also is contrary to faith; and he that doubteth is even for that condemned, if he eat. Oh beware of mis-applying Scripture! it is a thing easily done, but not so easily answered. I know not any one gap that hath let in more and more dangerous errours into the Church, than this: that men take the words of the sacred Text fitted to particular occasions, and to the condition of the times wherein they were written; and then apply them to themselves and others as they find them, without due respect had to the differences that may be between those times and cases, and the present. Sundry things spoken in Scripture agreeably to that infancy of the Church, would sort very ill with the Church in her fulnesse of strength and stature: and sundry directions very expedient in times of persecution, and when believers lived mingled with Infidels, would be very unseasonably urged where the Churc… is in a peaceable and flourishing estate, enjoying the favour and living under the protection of gracious and religious Princes. Thus the Constitutions that the Apostles made concerning Deacons and Widowes in those primitive times, are with much importunity, but very importunely withall, urged by the Disciplinarians: And sundry other like things I might instance in of this kind, worthy the discovery, but that I fear to grow tedious. Briefely then, the Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter, and so wheresoever else he toucheth upon the point of Scandals, is to be understood onelyonly in that case where men are left to their own liberty in the use of indifferent things: the Romans, Corinthians, and others to whom S. Paul wrote about these matters, being not limited any way in the exercise of their liberty therein by any over-ruling authority. But where the Magistrates have interposed, & thought good upon mature advice to impose Laws upon those that are under them, whereby their liberty is (not infringed, as some unjustly complain, in the inward judgement, but onelyonly) limited in the outward exercise of it: there the Apostolical directions wil not hold in the same absolute manner, as they were delivered to those whom they then concerned; but only in the equity of them, so far forth as the cases are alike, & with such meet qualifications & mitigations, as the difference of the cases otherwise doth require. So that a man ought not out of private fancy, or meerly because he would not be observed for not doing as others do, or for any the like weak respects, to do that thing of the lawfulness whereof he is not competently perswaded, where it is free for him to do otherwise: wch was the case of these weak ones among the Romans, for whose sakes principally the Apostle gave these directions. But the authority of the Magistrate intervening so alters the case, that such a forbearance as to them was necessary, is to as many of us as are commanded to do this or that, altogether unlawful, in regard they were free, & we are bound: for the reasons already shewn, wch I now rehearse not.

But you will yet say, (for in point of obedience men are very loth to yield so long as they can find any thing to plead,) those that lay these burdens upon us, at leastwise should do well to satisfie our doubts, and to inform our consciences concerning the lawfulnesse of what they enjoyn; that so we might render them obedience with better cheerfulness. How willing are we sinful men to leave the blame of our miscarriages any where rather than upon our selves! But how is it not incongruous the while, that those men should prescribe rules to their governours, who can scarcely brook their governours should prescribe Laws to them? aforeign Solon apud Stob. Serm. 3.It were good we would first learn how to obey, ere we take upon us to teach our betters how to govern. However, what governours are bound to do, or what is fit for them to do, in the point of information; that is not now the question. If they fail in any part of their bounden duty, they shall be sure to reckon for it one day: but their failing cannot in the mean time excuse thy disobedience. Although I think it would prove a hard task, for whosoever should undertake it, to shew that Superiours are alwayes bound to inform the consciences of their inferiours concerning the lawfulnesse of every thing they shall command. If sometimes they do it, where they see it expedient or needfull; sometimes again (and that perhaps oftner,) it may be thought more expedient for them, and more conducible for the publick peace and safety, onelyonly to make known to the people what their pleasures are, reserving to themselves the reasons thereof. I am sure, in the point of Ecclesiasticall ceremonies and Constitutions, (in which case the aforesaid allegations are usually most stood upon,) this hath been abundantly done in our Church, not onelyonly in the learned writings of sundry private men, but by the publick declaration also of authority, as is to be seen at large in the preface commonly printed before the book of Common prayer concerning that argument: enough to satisfie those that are peaceable, and not disposed to stretch their wits to cavill at things established. And thus much of the second Question, touching a doubting conscience: whereon I have insisted the longer, because it is a point both so proper to the Text, & whereat so many have stumbled.

There remaineth but one other Question, and that of far smaller difficulty; What is to be done, when the conscience is scrupulous? I call that a scruple, when a man is reasonably well perswaded of the lawfulnesse of a thing, yet hath withall some jealousies and fears, lest perhaps it should prove unlawfull. Such scruples are most incident to men of melancholy dispositions, or of timorous spirits; especially if they be tender-conscienced withall: and they are much encreased by the false suggestions of Satan; by reading the books, or hearing the Sermons, or frequenting the company of men more strict, precise, and austere in sundry points, than they need or ought to be; and by sundry other means which I now mention not. Of which scruples it behooveth every man, first, to be wary that he do not at all admit them, if he can chuse: or, if he cannot wholly avoid them, that secondly, he endeavour so far as may be to eject them speedily out of his thoughts, as Satans snares, and things that may breed him worser inconveniencies: or, if he cannot be so rid of them, that then thirdly he resolve to go on according to the more profitable perswasion of his mind, and despise those scruples. And this he may do with a good conscience, not onelyonly in things commanded him by lawfull authority, but even in things indifferent and arbitrary, and wherein he is left to his own liberty.

Much more might have been added for the farther both declaration and confirmation of these points. But you see I have been forced to wrap things together, that deserve a more full and distinct handling, that I might hold some proportion with the time. I had a purpose briefly to have comprised the summe of what I have delivered, concerning a gainsaying, a doubting, and a scrupulous conscience, in some few conclusions for your better remembrance, and to have added also something by way of direction, what course might be the most probably taken for the correcting of an erroneous conscience, for the setling of a doubtfull conscience, and for the quieting of a scrupulous conscience. But it is more then time that I should give place to other business: and the most, and most material of those directions, have been here and there occasionally touched in that which hath been delivered already: in which respect I may the better spare that labour. Beseech we God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ so to endue us all with the grace of his holy Spirit, that in our whole conversations we may unfeignedly endeavour to preserve a good conscience, and to yield all due obedience to him first, and then to every Ordinance of man for his sake.

Now to this Father, Son, and blessed Spirit, three persons, and one eternall God, be ascribed all the Kingdome, the power and the glory, both now and for evermore. Amen.

FINIS.