Fourteen Sermons, Sermon 2
AD CLERUM. The Second Sermon. At a Visitation at Boston, Lincoln, 24. Apr. 1621.
ROM. 3.8.
And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say) Let us do evil that good may come: whose damnation is just.
A Little before, at the fourth verse, S. Paul had delivered a Conclusion sound and comfortable: and strengthened it from Davids both experience, and testimony in aThat thou might'st be justified in thy sayings, and mightest overcome when thou art judged. Psal. 51.4.Ps. 51. A place pregnant, and full of sinews, to enforce it. The Conclusion in effect was, that Nothing in man can anull the Covenant of God. Neither the originall unworthinesse of Gods Children, through the universall corruption of nature; nor their actuall unfaithfulnesse bewrayed (through frailty) in particular trials, can alienate the free love of God from them, or cut them off from the Covenant of Grace: but that still God will be glorified in the truth and faithfulnesse of his promises, notwithstanding any unrighteousnesse or unfaithfulnesse in man.
But never yet was any Truth so happily innocent, as to maintain it self free from Calumny and Abuse. Malice on the one hand, and Fleshlinesse on the other; though with different aimes, yet doe the same work. They both pervert the Truth, by drawing pestilent Corollaries from sound Conclusions: as the Spider sucketh poyson from medicinable herbs. But with this difference; Malice slandereth the Truth, to discountenance it; but Fleshlinesse abuseth the Truth, to countenance it selfe by it. The cavilling Sophister, he would faine bring the Apostles gracious Doctrine into discredit: The carnall Libertine, he would as faine bring his own ungracious behaviour into credit. Both, by making false (yet colourable) Inferences from the former Conclusion. There are aTriplex inconveniens. Lyranus hic.three of those Inferences: but never a good. The first; If so, then cannot God in reason and justice take vengeance of our unrighteousnesse. The Colour: for why should he punish us for that, which so much magnifieth and commendeth his righteousnesse? [bVerse 5. But if our righteousnesse commend the righteousnesse of God, what shall we say? Is God unrighteous that taketh vengeance?] The second Inference: If so; then it is injust either in God or Man to condemne us as sinners, for breaking the Law. The Colour: for why should that action be censured of sin, which so abundantly redoundeth to the glory of God? [cVerse 7. For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lye unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner?] The third, and last, and worst Inference: If so, then it is a good and wise resolution, Let us sin freely, and boldly commit evil. The Colour: for why should we fear to do that, from which so much good may come? in this verse of my Text, [And not rather let us do evil that good may come.]
This last cavilling Inference, the Apostle in this Verse both bringeth in, and casteth out again: bringeth in as an objection; and casteth out by his answer. An answer which at once cutteth off both it, and the former Inferences. And the Answer is double: Ad rem, Ad hominem. That concerneth the force and matter of the objection: this the state, and danger of the objectors. Ad rem, in the former part of the Verse; [And not rather (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say) let us do evil that good may come.] Ad hominem in the latter end; [Whose damnation is just.] In the former part there is an Objection; and the Rejection of it. The Objection, And not rather, Let us do evil that good may come. The Rejection thereof with a Non sequitur; implying not onelyonly the bare inconsequence of it upon the Apostles conclusion, but withall, and especially the falsenesse and unsoundnesse of it taken by it self; As we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say, Let us do evil, &c.
My aime at this present is to insist especially upon a Principle of practick Divinity: which by joynt consent of Writers old and new; Orthodox and Popish; resulteth from the very body of this verse, and is of right good use to direct us in sundry difficulties, which daily arise in vita communi, in point of Conscience. The Principle is this; We must not do any evil, that any good may come of it. Yet there are besides this, in the Text divers other inferiour observations not to be neglected. With which I think it will not be amisse to begin, and to dispatch them first briefly; that so I may fall the sooner, and stay the longer upon that which I mainly intend.
Observe first the Apostles Method, and substantiall manner of proceeding: how he cleareth all as he goeth;Observ. I. how diligent he is and carefull, betimes to remove such cavils, (though he aPropter hos arguendos fecit Paul 9. hic, quasi digres…ionem tractando haec. Cajetan. hic.step a little out of his way for it) as might bring scandall to the Truth he had delivered. When we preach and instruct others, we should not think it enough to deliver positive truths: but we should take good care also, as near as we can, to leave them clear; and by prevention to stop the mouths of such as love to pick quarrells at the Truth, and to bark against the light. It were good we would (so far as our leisure and gifts will permit) wisely forecast, and prevent all offence that might be taken at any part of Gods truth: and be carefull, as not to broach any thing that is false, through rashnesse, errour, or intemperance; so not to betray any truth by ignorant handling, or by superficiall, slight, and unsatisfying answers. But then especially concerneth it us to be most carefull herein; when we have to speak before such, as we have some cause before-hand to suspect to be, through ignorance, or weaknesse, or custome, or education, or prejudice, or partiall affections, or otherwise contrary-minded unto, or at leastwise not well perswaded of those Truths we are to teach. If the wayes be rough and knotty, and the passengers feeble-joynted and dark-sighted, it is but needfull the guides should remove as many blocks and stones out of the way, as may be. When we have gone as warily as we can to work, Cavillers (if they list) will take exceptions: it is our part to see we give them no advantage; lest we help to justifie the principals, by making our selves Accessories. Those men are ill-advised, how ever zealous for the Truth, that stir in controversed points, and leave them worse than they found them. bAut animo d mas, aut viribus addas. D…ct…m Archidam… ad filium. apud Plutarch. in Laconicis.Stomach will not bear out a matter without strength: and to encounter an adversary are required cAs Zuinglius said of Carolostadius (whom he j…dged too weak to undertake the defence of the truth against Luther in the point of Consubstantiation) N…a satis hum…rorum haber. Sleidan.Shoulders as well as Gall. A good cause is never betrayed more, than when it is prosecuted with much eagernesse, but little sufficiency. This from the Method.
Observe secondly the Apostles manner of speech, foreign, Translators render it, As we are wrongfully blamed. As we are slandered. As we are slanderously reported. And the word indeed from the aforeign.Originall importeth no more:Observ. II. and so Writers both profane and sacred use it. But yet in Scriptures by a specialty it most times signifieth the highest degree of Slander; when we open our mouths against God, and speak ill, or amisse, or unworthily of God: that is foreign, and properly the sin we call blaspemy. And yet that very word of Blaspemy, which for the most part referreth immediately to God, the Apostle here useth, when he speaketh of himself and other Christian Ministers, foreign, as we are slandered, nay as we are blasphemed. A slander, or other wrong, or contempt done to a Minister, quà talis, is a sin of a higher strain, than the same done to a Common Christian. Not at all for his persons sake: for so he is no more Gods good creature than the other; no more free bforeign. Acts 14.15. & Jam. 5.…7.from sins, and infirmities, and passions, than the other. But for his Callings sake; for so he is Gods c2 Cor. 5.20.Embassadour, which the other is not: and for his works sake; for that is Gods d1 Thes. 2.1….Message, which the others is not. Personall Slanders and Contempts are to a Minister, but as to another man: because his person is but as another mans person. But slanders and contempts done to him as a Minister, that is, with reference either to his Calling or Doctrine, are much greater than to another man: as reaching unto God himself, whose Person the Minister representeth in his Calling; and whose errand the Minister delivereth in his Doctrine. For Contempts, S. Paul is expresse elsewhere; e1 Thes. 4.8.He that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God. And as for Slanders; the very choice of the word in my Text inferreth as much. The dignity of our Calling enhaunceth the sin: and every slander against our regular Doctrines, is more than a bare Calumny; if no more, at least petty fWe have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses, and against God. Acts 6.11.blasphemy, foreign, as we are slandered, as we are blasphemed. That from the word.
Observe thirdly, the wrong done to the Apostle and to his Doctrine. He was slanderously reported to have taught that which he never so much as thought: Observ. III.and his Doctrine had many scandalous imputations fastened upon it, whereof neither he nor it were guilty, [As we are slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say.] The best truths are subject to mis-interpretation: and there is not that Doctrine, how firmly soever grounded, how warily soever delivered; whereon Calumny will not fasten, and stick slanderous imputations. Neither aMat. 11.17—19.Iohns mourning, nor Christs piping can passe the pikes: but the one hath a Devil; the other is a Glutton and a Wine-bibber. Though bMat. 5.17.Christ come to fulfill the Law, yet there be will accuse him as a destroyer of the Law, Matthew 5. And though he decide the question plainly for Caesar, and that in the case of Tribute, Mat. 22. [cMat. 22.21. Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesars:] yet there be that charge him, as if he dJohn 19.12.spake against Caesar, Iohn 19. and that in the very case of Tribute, as if he eLuke …3.2.forbade to give Tribute unto Caesar, Luke. 23. Now if they fMat. 10.25.called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his houshold? If Christs did not; think we the doctrine of his Ministers and his Servants could escape the stroke of mens tongues, and be free from calumny and cavill? How the Apostles were slandered as Seducers and Sectaries, and vain bablers, and Hereticks, & broachers of new & false & pestilent doctrines; their Epistles and the book of their Acts witnesse abundantly to us. And for succeeding times, read but the Apologies of Athenagoras, and Tertullian, and others: and it will amaze you to see what blasphemous, and seditious, and odious, and horrible impieties were fathered upon the Ancient Christian Doctors, and upon their profession. But our own experience goeth beyond all. Sundry of the Doctors of our Church teach truly, and agreeably to Scripture the gActs 17.28. & Esay 16.12.effectuall concurrence of GODS Will and Power, with subordinate Agents in every, and therefore even in sinful actions; Gods hRom. 9.1…, 1…, 18, &c.free election of those whom he purposeth to save of his own grace, without any motives in, or from themselves; The immutability of Gods iJohn 13.1. Rom. 11.29. & 5.9, 10. & 8.35, 38, 39.Love and Grace towards the Saints elect, and their certain perseverance therein unto Salvation; The kRom. 3.28.Iustification of sinners by the imputed righteousnesse of Christ, apprehended and applied unto them by a lively faith; without the works of the Law. These are sound, and true, and (if rightly understood) comfortable, and right profitable doctrines. And yet they of the Church of Rome have the forehead, (I will not say to slander, my Text alloweth more,) to blaspheme GOD, and his Truth, and the Ministers thereof for teaching them. Bellarmine, Gretser, Maldonate, and the Jesuits; but none more than our own English Fugitives, Bristow, Stapleton, Parsons, Kellison, and all the rable of that crew, freely spend their mouths in barking against us, as if we made God the author of sin: as if we would have men sin and be damned by a Stoicall fatall necessity; sin whether they will or no, and be damned whether they deserve it or no: as if we opened a gap to all licentiousnesse and profanenesse; let them believe, it is no matter how they live, heaven is their own cocksure: as if we cryed down good works, and condemned charity. Slanders loud and false; yet easily blown away with one single word, foreign. These imputations upon us and our doctrine are unjust: but foreign, let them that thus mis-report us, know, that without repentance their damnation will be just.
It would be time not ill spent, to discover the grounds of this observation, and to presse the uses of it something fully. But because my aim lyeth another way; I can but point at them, and passe. If seldome Truth scape unslandered, marvel not: the reasons are evident. On Gods part, on Mans part, on the Devils part. God suffereth, Man raiseth, and the Devil furthereth these slanders against the Truth. To begin ordine retrogrado, and to take them backwards. First, on the Devils part: a kind of Contrariety and Antipathy betwixt him and it. He being the aJohn 8.44.Father of lies, and bEphes. 6.12.Prince of darknesse, cannot away with the Truth, and with the Light: and therefore casteth up slanders, as Fogs and Mists against the Truth to bely it, and against the Light to darken it. Secondly, on Mans part: And that partly in the understanding; when the judgement either of it self weak, or else weakened through precipitancy, prejudice, or otherwise, is deceived with fallacies instead of substance, and mistaketh seeming inferences for necessary and naturall deductions. Partly in the Will: when men of corrupt minds set themselves purposely against the known truth, and out of malicious wilfulnesse (against the strong testimony of their own hearts) slander it, that so they may disgrace it, and them that professe it. Partly in the Affections; when men overcome by carnall affections, are content to cheat their own souls, by giving such constructions to Gods Truth, as will for requitall, give largest allowance to their practices; and so rather choose to crooken the Rule to their own bent, than to levell themselves and their affections and lives according to the Rule. Thirdly, on Gods part; who suffereth his own Truth to be slandered and mistaken. Partly in his Iustice, as a fearfull judgement c2 Thes. 1.10, 11, 12.upon wicked ones, whereby their hard hearts become yet more hardened, & their most just condemnation yet more just. Partly in his goodnesse; as a powerfull fiery triall of true Doctors, whose constancy and sincerity is the more d1 Cor. 11.19approved with him, and the more eminent with men, if they eJohn 10.12.flye not when the Wolf cometh, but keep their standing, and stoutly maintain Gods truth, when it is deepliest slandered, and hotliest opposed. And partly, in his Wisdome; as a rich occasion for those whom he hath gifted for it, foreign, to awaken their zeal, f2 Tim. 1.6.to quicken up their industry, to muster up their abilities, to scour up their spirituall armour, (which else through dis-use might gather rust) for the defence and for the rescue of that g1 T…m 6.20. & 2 Tim 1.14.foreign, that precious truth whereof they are depositaries, and wherewith he hath entrusted them.
These are the Grounds. The Uses, for instruction briefly are, to teach and admonish every one of us: that we be not either first, so wickedly malicious, as without apparent cause to raise any slander; or secondly, so foolishly credulous, as without severe examination, to believe any slander; or thirdly, so basely timorous, as to flinch from any part of Gods truth for any slander. But I must not insist. This from the slander.
Observe fourthly, how peremptorily the Apostle is in his censure against the slanderers or abusers of holy truths: Whose damnation is just. Observ. IV.aAmorasius, Lyra, Piscator, Pareus, &c.Some understand it with reference to the Slanderers; As we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say: Whose damnation is just: that is, their damnation is just, who thus unjustly slander us. bChrysostomus, Caj…t…nus, Erasmus, &c.Others understand it with reference to that ungodly resolution: Let us do evil, that good may come: whose damnation is just: that is, their damnation is just for the evil they do, who adventure to do any evil, under whatsoever pretence of good to come of it. Both expositions are good; and I rather embrace both, then prefer either. I ever held it a kind of honest spiritual thrift; where there are two senses given of one place, both agreeable to the Analogie of Faith and Manners, both so indifferently appliable to the words and scope of the place, as that it is hard to say, which was rather intended; though there was but one intended, yet to make use of both. And so will we. Take it the first way: and the slanderer may read his doom in it. Here is his wages, and his portion, and the meed and reward of his slander; Damnation. And it is a just reward. He condemneth Gods truth unjustly: God condemneth him justly for it, [whose damnation is just. … If we be countable (and we are countable at the day of Judgement) for cMat. 12.36▪every idle word we speak; though neither in it self false, nor yet hurtful and prejudicial unto others: what less than damnation can they expect, that with much falshood for the thing it self, and infinite prejudice in respect of others, blaspheme God and his holy Truth?
But if it be done of purpose, and in malice to despight the Truth, and the professors thereof: I scarce know whether there be a greater sin, or no. Maliciously to oppose the known Truth, is by most Divines accounted a principal branch of that great unpardonable sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost: by some, the very sin it self. I dare not say it is so; nor yet that it is unpardonable, or hath finall impenitency necessarily attending it: I would be loth to interclude the hope of Repentance from any sinner; or to confine Gods Mercy within any bounds. Yet thus much I think I may safely say; it cometh shrewdly neer the sin against the Holy Ghost, and is a fair (or rather a foul) step toward it, and leaveth very little hope of pardon. That great sin against the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost it self in the Scriptures chuseth, rather than by any other, to expresse by this name of aMat. 12.31, 32.Blasphemy, Mat. 12. And whereas our Apostle, 1 Tim. 1. saith, That though he were a Blasphemer, yet b1 Tim. 1.13.he obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief: he leaveth it questionable, but withall suspicious, whether there may be any hope of Mercy for such as blaspheme maliciously, and against knowledge. If any mans be; certainly such a mans damnation is most just.
But not all Slanderers of GODS truth are of that deep die: not all Slanderers, sinners in that high degree. GOD forbid they should. There are respects which much qualifie and lessen the sin. But yet allow it any in the least degree, and with the most favourable circumstances; still the Apostles sentence standeth good: Without Repentance their damnation is just. Admit the Truth be dark & difficult, and so easily to be mistaken: admit withall the man be weak and ignorant, and so apt to mistake; his understanding being neither distinct through incapacity to apprehend and sort things aright, nor yet constant to it self through unsetlednesse and levity of judgement. Certainly his misprision of the Truth is so much aInvoluntarium minuit de ratione peccati.lesser, than the others wilfull Calumny; as it proceedeth lesse from the irregularity of the Will to the Iudgement. And of such a man there is good hope, that both in time he may see his errour, and repent expresly and particularly for it; and that in the mean time he doth repent for it implicitè, and inclusively in his generall contrition for, and confession of the massie lump of his hidden and bPsal. 19.12.secret and unknown sins. This Charity bindeth us both to hope for the future, and to think for the present: and S. Pauls example and words in the c1 Tim. 1.13.place but now alledged, are very comfortable to this purpose. But yet still thus much is certain: He that through ignorance, or for want of apprehension or judgement, or by reason of whatsoever other defect or motive, bringeth a slander upon any divine Truth; though never so perplexed with difficulties, or open to cavil: unless he repent for it, either in the particular, (and that he must do, if ever God open his eyes, and let him see his fault,) or at leastwise in the generall; it is still a damnable sin in him; His damnation is just. We have the very case almost in terminis laid down, and thus resolved in 2 Pet. 3. d2 Pet. 3.18.In which are some things hard to be understood, (observe the condition of the things; hard to be understood) which they that are unlearned and unstable, (observe also the condition of the persons, unlearned and unstable,) wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction. Where we have the matter of great difficulty, hard to be understood; the persons of small sufficiency, unlearned and unstable: and yet if men, even of that weakness, wrest and pervert truths, though of that hardnesse, they do it foreign, to their own destruction, saith Saint Peter there; to their own just damnation, saith S. Paul in my Text. This from the Censure in the first sense.
Take it in the other sense, with reference to this ungodly resolution, Let us do evil, that good may come: it teacheth us, that no pretension of doing it in ordine ad Deum, for Gods glory, to a good end, or any other colour whatsoever, can excuse those that presume to do evil; but that still the evil they do is damnable, and it is but just with GOD to render damnation to them for it. [Whose damnation is just.] And thus understood, it openeth us a way to the consideration of that main Principle whereof I spake, and whereon by your patience I desire to spend the remainder of my time; namely this: We must not for any good, do any evil. For the farther opening, and better understanding whereof, (since the rule is of infinite use in the whole practice of our lives:) that we may the better know when, and where, and how far to apply it aright for the direction of our Consciences and Actions; we must of necessity unfold the extent of this word evil, and consider the several kinds and degrees of it distinctly and apart. We must not do evil, that good may come.
First, evil is of two sorts. The evil of fault, and the evil of punishment. Malum delicti, and Malum supplicii; as aTertul. l. 2. adv. Marcion. cap. 14.Tertullian calleth them: or as the more received terms are, Malum Culpae, and Malum Poenae. The evil we commit against God, and the evil God inflicteth upon us. The evil we do, unjustly, but yet willingly: and the evil we suffer, unwillingly, but yet justly. In a word, the evil of sin, and the evil of pain. Touching evils of pain; if the Case be put, when two such evils are propounded, and both cannot be avoided, whether we may not make choice of the one, to avoid the other. The resolution is bInter haec datur electio; & minus damnum ficere licet, ut evitetur majus. Parens hic.common and good from the old Maxime, E malis minimum, we may incur the lesse, to prevent the greater evil. As we may deliver our purse to a Thief, rather than fight upon unequal terms to save it: and in a tempest cast our wares into the Sea, to lighten the ship that it wreck not: and indure the lancing and searching of an old sore, to keep it from festering and spreading. And this Principle in my Text is not a rule for that Case: that being propounded concerning evils of pain; whereas my Text is intended onelyonly of the evils of sin. We are herehence resolved, that we are not to do any evil, that good may come of it: for all which yet we may suffer some evil, that good may come of it. Although (to note that by the way) the common answer è malis minimum, even in the evils of pain is to be understood (as most other practical conclusions are) not as simply and universally; but as commonly and ordinarily true. For (as cSlater on this place.one saith well) perhaps there are Cases, wherein two evils of Pain being at once propounded, it may not be safe for us to be our own carvers.
But I must let passe the Questions concerning the evils of Pain, as impertinencies. The evils of sin are of two sorts. Some are evil formally, simply, and per se; such as are directly against the scope and purpose of some of Gods Commandements: as Atheism against the first, Idolatry against the second, and so against the rest, Blasphemy, Profanenesse, Disloyalty, Cruelty, Adultery, Injustice, Calumny, Avarice, and the like; all which are evil in their own nature, and can never (positis quibuscunque circumstantiis) be done well. Othersome are evil onelyonly respectively, and by accident: but otherwise in their own nature indifferent; and such as may be, and are done sometimes well, sometimes ill. To know the nature of which things the better, since they are of singular use for the resolution of many Cases of Conscience: we must yet more distinctly inquire into the different kinds (or rather degrees) of indifferent things; and into the different means, whereby things otherwise in nature indifferent, become accidentally evil for their use.
Indifferent things are either equally, or unequally such. We may call them for distinctions sake (and I think it not altogether unfitly) aforeign.indifferentia ad utrumlibet; and bforeign.indifferentia ad unum. Indifferentia ad utrumlibet, or equally indifferent things are such, as (barely considered) are arbitrary either way, and hang in aequilibrio, between good and evil, without turning the Scale either one way or other, as not having any notable inclination or propension unto either rather than other: as to drink fasting, to walk into the fields, or to lift up ones hand unto his head, &c. Now concerning such things as these, if any man should be so scrupulous, as to make a matter of conscience of them, and should desire to be resolved in point of Conscience whether they were good or evil; as namely, whether he should do well or ill, to walk abroad into the fields a mile or two with his friend, the thing it self is so equally indifferent, that it were resolution enough to leave it in medio, and to answer him, there were neither good nor hurt in it: the Action of walking barely considered, being not considerably either morally good, or morally evil. I say [morally;] for in matter of health or civility, or otherwise it may be good, or evil: but not cQuia eorum …b…ectum non includit …liquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis. Aquin. 1.2. qu. 18. art. 8. in corp.morally, and spiritually, and in matter of conscience. And I say withall [barely considered,] for there may be circumstances, which may make it accidentally evil. As to walk abroad in the fields, when a man should be at Divine service in the Church, is by accident morally evil; through the circumstance of Time: as on the contrary, not to walk, if we have promised to meet a friend at such a time, and in such a place, who standeth in need of our present help, is by accident morally evil, through the obligation of that former promise. But yet still these and other circumstances set aside; barely to walk, or barely not to walk, and the like, are Indifferentia ad utrumlibet, things in their own nature (and that equally) indifferent.
Things unequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither universally good, nor absolutely evil; yet even barely considered, sway more or less rather the one way than the other. And that either unto good, or unto evil. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in Morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giving an Alms, hearing a Sermon, reproving an Offender, and the like. Which are in themselves good; and so be accounted, rather than evil, though some unhappy circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the latter sort are such outward actions, as being in Moral precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in some cases lawfull, and may be well done: as, swearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like. Which are in themselves rather evil, than good, because they are ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good. Now of these actions, though the former sort carry the face of good, the latter of evil; yet in very truth both sorts are indifferent. Understand me aright: I do not mean indifferent indifferentiâ contradictionis, such as may be indifferently either done, or not done; but indifferent onelyonly indifferentiâ contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good or evil: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also; as to be evil. But yet with this difference, that those former, though indifferent, and in some cases evil, are yet of themselves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather than evil; and these later proportionably unto evil rather than good. From which difference it cometh to passe, that to the Question barely proposed concerning the former actions, whether they be good or evil; the answer is just and warrantable, to say indefinitely they are good: and contrarily concerning the later actions, to say indefinitely they are evil.
Which difference well weighed (to note that by the way) would serve to justifie a common practice of most of us in the exercise of our Ministry, against such as distaste our doctrine for it, or unjustly otherwise take offence at it. Ordinarily in our Sermons we indefinitely condemn as evil, swearing, and gaming for money, and dancing, and recreations upon the Sabbath day, and going to Law, and retaliation of injuries, and Monopolies, and raising of rents, and taking forfeitures of Bonds, &c. and in our own coat Non-residency, and Pluralities, &c. Most of which yet, and many other of like nature, most of us do, or should know to be in some cases lawfull; and therefore in the number of those indifferent things which we call Indifferentia ad unum. You that are our hearers should bring so much charitable discretion with you, when you heare us in the Pulpits condemn things of this nature; as to understand us no otherwise, than we either do or should mean, and that is thus: that such and such things are evill, as now adaies, through the corruptions of the times, most men use them; and such as therefore should not be adventured upon without mature and unpartiall disquisition of the uprightnesse of our affections therein, and a severe triall of all circumstances, whether they carry weight enough with them to give our consciences aLet every man be fully perswaded (foreign) in his own mind. v…r. 5.sufficient security, not onelyonly of their lawfulnesse in themselves, and at large, but of their particular lawfulnesse too unto us, and then. But this by the way.
Now to proceed. There are divers meanes whereby things not simply evil, but in themselves (either equally, or unequally) indifferent, may yet become accidentally evil. Any defect or obliquity, any unhappy intervening circumstance, is enough to poyson a right good action, and to make it stark naught. I may as well hope to graspe the Sea, as to comprehend all those meanes. I make choice therefore to remember but a few of the chiefest; such as happen oft, and are very considerable. Things not simply evil, may accidentally become such; as by sundry other meanes, so especially by one of these three: Conscience, Scandall, and Comparison. First, Conscience; in regard of the Agent. Though the thing be good, yet if the Agent doe it with a condemning, or but a doubting Conscience, the Action becometh evill. [aRom. 14.14. To him that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane; and bIbid. v. 23.he that doubteth, is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of Faith, chap. 14. of this Epistle.] Secondly, Scandall; in regard of other men. Though the thing be good, yet if a brother cIbid. ver. 21.stumble, or be offended, or be made weake by it, the action becometh evill. [dIbid. ver. 20. All things are pure; but it is evill for that man who eateth with offence, verse 20. there.] Thirdly, Comparison; in regard of other actions. Though the thing be good, yet if we preferre it before better things, and neglect or omit them for it, the action becometh evill, [eMath. 9.13. Goe, and learne what that is, I will have mercy and not sacrifice: Mat. 9.]
The stuffe thus prepared, by differencing out those things, which undistinguished, might breed confusion; our next businesse must be, to lay the rule, and to apply it to the severall kinds of evill, as they have been differenced. I foresaw we should not have time to goe thorow all that was intended: and therefore we will content our selves for this time, with the consideration of this Rule, applyed to things simply evill. In them the Rule holdeth perpetually, and without exception: That which is simply evill, may not for any good be done. We know not any greater good (for there is not any greater good) than the Glory of God: we scarce know a lesser sinne (if any sinne may be accounted little) than a harmlesse officious lye. Yet may not aVide susè Augustinum in lib. de Mendacio, & contra Mendacium; & a libi·this be done; no not for that. Will you speake wickedly for God, and talk deceitfully for him? Iob 13.7. If not for the glory of God; then certainly not for any other inferiour end: not for the saving of a life, not for the bAd sempiternā salu…ē nulus ducendus est o…itulante mendacio. Aug. de mendac ca. 19.conversion of a soul, not for the peace of a Church, and (if even that were possible too) not for the redemption of a world. No cEa quae constat esse peccata, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. Aug. contra Mendac. c. 7.intention of any end can warrant the choice of sinfull meanes to compasse it.
The Reasons are strong. One is; because sinne in its own nature; is aSuapte natura repugnat peccato quod sit eligible: & propterea, nec propter se, nec propter aliud bonum est eligibile. Cajet. in hunc locum.de numero ineligibilium: and therefore as not eligible propter se, for it own sake, (there is neither forme nor beauty in it, that we should desire it;) so neither propter aliud, with reference to any farther end. Actus peccati non est ordinabilis in bonum finem; is the common resolution of the Schooles. In civil and popular elections, if men make choice of such a person, to beare any office or place among them; as by the locall Charters, Ordinances, Statutes or other Customes which should rule them in their choice, is altogether ineligible, the election is de jure nulla, naught and void; the incapacity of the person elected making a nullity in the act of election. No lesse is it in morall actions and elections, if for any intended end we make choice of such meanes, as by the Law of God (which is our rule, and must guide us) are ineligible; and such is every sinne.
Another reason is grounded upon that Principle, aAquin. 1. secundae. qu. 18. art. 4. ad 3. & qu. 19. art. 6. ad 1. ex Dionys…o, cap. 4. de Divin. nomin.Bonum ex ca… sa integra, Malum ex partiali. Any partiall or particular defect, in Object, End, Manner, or other Circumstance, is enough to make the whole action bad; but to make it good, there must be an universall bNon est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bon…tates concurrant: s…d quilibet defectus singularis causat malum. Aquin. 1.2. qu. 18. art. 4. ad 3.concurrence of all requisite conditions in every of these respects: As a disfigured eye, or nose, or lippe, maketh the face deformed; but to make it comely, there is required the due proportion of every part. And any one short Clause, or Proviso, not legall, is sufficient to abate the whole writ or instrument, though in every other part absolute, and without exception. The Intention then, be it granted never so good, is unsufficient to warrant an Action good, so long as it faileth either in the object, or manner, or any requisite circumstance whatsoever. c1 Sam. 15.20, &c.Saul pretended a good end, in sparing the fat things of Amalek; that he might therewith do sacrifice to the Lord: but God rejected both it and him, 1 Sam. 15. We can think no other, but that d2 Sam. 6.6, 7Vzzah intended the safety of Gods ark, when it tottered in the cart, and he stretched out his hand to stay it from falling: but God interpreted it a presumption, and punished it, 2 Sam. 6. Doubtlesse eMat. 16.22, 23.Peter meant no hurt to Christ, but rather good; when he took him aside, and advised him to be good to himself, and to keep him out of danger: yet Christ rebuked him for it, and set him packing in the Divels name, Get thee behind me, Satan. Matth. 16.
But what will we say (and let that stand for a third reason) if our pretended good intention prove indeed no good intention? And certainly, be it as fair and glorious, as we could be content to imagine it; such it will prove to be, if it set us upon any sinfull or unwarranted meanes: indeed no good intention, but a bad. For granted it must be, that the Intention of any end doth virtually include the meanes: as in a Syllogisme, the Premises do the Conclusion. No more then can the choice of ill means proceed from a good intention; then can a false Conclusion be inferred from true Premises: and that is impossible. From which ground it is, that the aGreg. lib. 28. Moral. cap. 13. Euseb. Emiss. hom. 26. and others.Fathers, and other Divines do oftentimes argue from the intention to the action, and from the goodnesse of the one, to the goodnesse of both: to that purpose applying those speeches of our Saviour, in the twelfth, and in the sixth of Matthew, bMat. 12.33.Either make the tree good, and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt; And, cMat. 6.12.if thine eye be single, the whole body shall be full of light: but if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darknesse. The light of the body is the eye; and of the work, the intention. No marvell, when the eye is evil, if the whole body be dark; and when the intention is evil, if the whole work be naught. That which deceiveth most men in judging of good or bad intentions, is, that they take the end and the intention for one and the same thing: betwixt which two there is a spacious difference. For the end, is the thing propter quid, for which, we work, that whereat we aime in working, and so hath rationem causae finalis: but the intention is the cause à qua, from which we work, that which setteth us on working; and so hath rationem causae efficientis. Now between these two kinds of causes, the finall and the efficient, there is not onelyonly a great difference, but even a repugnancy; in such sort, as that it is impossible they should at any time coincidere, which some other kindes of causes may do. It is therefore an error to think, that if the end be good, the intention of that end must needs be good: for there may as well be dSed videte ne fortè non sit verè oculus simplex, qui fallatur. Been. de praecept. & dispensat.a bad intention of a good end, as a bad desire of a good object. Whatsoever the end be we intend, it is certain that intention cannot be good, which putteth us upon the choice of evil meanes.
Methinkes the Church of Rome should blush, (if her forehead died red with the blood of GODS Saints, were capable of any tincture of of shame) at the discovery of her manifold impostures, in counterfeiting of Reliques, in coyning of Miracles, in compiling of Legends, in gelding of good Authors by expurgatory Indexes; in juggling with Magistrates by lewd Equivocations, &c. Practises warrantable by no pretense. Yet in their account but aSancta Hypocrisis, was Dominicus his word.piae fraudes; for so they terme them, no lesse ridiculously, than fasly: for the one word contradicteth the other. But what do I speak of these, but petty things, in comparison of those her lowder impieties? breaking covenants of truce and peace; dissolving of lawfull, and dispensing for unlawfull marriages; assoyling Subjects from their Oaths and Allegiance; plotting Treasons, and practising Rebellions; excommunicating and dethroning Kings; arbitrary disposing of Kingdomes; stabbing and murthering of Princes; warranting unjust invasions; and blowing up Parliament-houses. For all which, and divers other foul attempts, their Catholick defence is the advancement (forsooth) of the Catholick Cause: Like his in the Poet, bHorat. lib. 1. Epist. 1.Quocunque modo rem, is their Resolution: by right, or wrong, cGaudeo, sive per veritatem, sive per occasionem, Romanae Ecclesiae dignitatem ex…olli. Joseph. Stephanus de Osc. pe. in Epist. ad lect.the State of the Papacy must be upheld. That is their unum necessarium: and if heaven favour not; rather than faile, help must be had from hell, to keep Antichrist in his throne.
But to let them passe, and touch neerer home. There are (God knoweth) many Ignorants abroad in the world: some of them so unreasonable, as to think they have sufficiently non-plus't any reprover; if being admonished of something ill done, they have but returned this poore reply, Is it not better to doe so, than to doe worse? But alas, what necessity of doing either so, or worse; when Gods law bindeth thee from both? aJames 2.10, 11.He that said, Doe not commit adultery; said also, Doe not kill: and he that said, Doe not steale; said also, Doe not lye. If then thou lye, or kill, or doe any other sinne; though thou thinkest thereby to avo…d stealth, or adultery, or some other sinne: yet thou art become a transgressour of the Law, and by offending in one point of it, guilty of all. It is but a poore choyce, when a man is desperately resolved to cast himself away; whether he should rather hang, or drown, or stab, or pine himself to death: there may be more horror, more paine, more lingring, in one than another; but they all come to one period, and determine in the same point; death is the issue of them all. And it can be but a slender comfort for a man, that will needs thrust himself into the mouth of hell by sinning wilfully, that he is damned rather for lying, than for stealing, or whoring, or killing, or some greater crime: Damnation is the wages of them all. Murther can but hang a man; and (without favour) Petty Larceny will hang a man too. The greatest sinnes can but damne a man; (and without Gods mercy) the smallest will damne a man too. But what? will some reply: In case two sins be propounded, may I not do the lesser, to avoid the greater; otherwise must I not of necessity do the greater? The answer is short and easie: If two sins be propounded, do neither. E malis minimum, holdeth as you heard (and yet not alwaies neither) in evils of Pain: But that is no Rule for evils of sin. Here the safer Rule is, E malis nullum. And the reason is sound; from the Principle we have in hand. If we may not do any evil, to procure a positive good; certainly bEâdem doctrinâ, qua horremus facere mala ut eveniant bona, horrere debemus f…cere mala ut evitemus pejora. Evitare enim pejora, multò minus bonumest, quàm evenire bonum. Cajetan. hic.much lesse may we do one evil, to avoid or prevent another.
But what if both cannot be avoided, but that one must needs be done? In such a strait may I not choose the lesser? To thee; I say again, as before, Choose neither. To the Case, I answer; It is no Case: because, as it is put, it is a case impossible. For Nemo angustiatur ad peccandum: the Case cannot be supposed, wherein a man should be so straitned, as he could not come off fairely without sinning. A man by rashness or feare, or frailty, may foully entangle himself; and through the powerfull engagements of sin drive himself into very narrow straits ▪ or be so driven by the fault or injury of others: yet there cannot be any such straits, as should enforce a necessity of sinning; but that still there is one path or other out of them without sin. The perplexity that seemeth to be in the things, is rather in the aNon enim datu… p…rplexio ex parte rerū: sed conting…re potest ex p…rte hominis nescientis evadere, nec videntis aditum evadēdi absque aliquo peccato. Cajer. hic. See the Glosse on dist. 13. item adversus, where he proveth against Gratian that there can be no perplexity.men who puzzle and lose themselves in the Labyrinths of sin, because they care not to heed the clue that would lead them out, if it were well followed. Say, a man through heat of blood make a wicked vow to kill his brother: here he hath by his own rashnesse brought himself into a seeming strait, that either he must commit a murther, or break a vow; either of which seemeth to be a great sin, the one against the fifth, the other against the third commandement. But here is in very deed no strait or perplexity at all: Here is a fair open course for him without sin. He may break his vow; and there an end. Neither is this the choice of the lesser sinne; but onelyonly the bNon docet eligere minus peccatum, sed solutionem mino…is nex…s. Cajetanus hic, speaking of th… Councell of Toledo. See. c. 22. q. 4. per tot.loosening of the lesser bond: the bond of charity being greater than the bond of a promise; and there being good reason that (in termes of inconsistencie, when both cannot stand,) the lesser bond should yield to the greater. But is it not a sin for a man to break a vow? Yes, where it may be kept salvis charitate & justitia, there the breach is a sin: but in the case proposed it is no sin. As Christ saith in the point of swearing, so it may be said in the point of breach of vow, cMat. 5.37.foreign. Never was any breach of vow, but it was peccatum, or ex peccato: the breaking is either it self formally a sin: or it argueth at least a former sin, in the making. So as the sin, in the case alledged, was before in making such an unlawfull vow; and for that sin the party must repent: but the breaking of it now it is made, is no new sin; (Rather it is a necessary duty, and a branch of that repentance which is due for the former rashnesse in making it,) because a hurtfull vow is, (and that virtute praecepti) rather to be broken then kept. The dExod. 1.16. &c.Aegyptian Midwives, not by their own fault, but by Pharaohs tyrannous command, are driven into a narrow strait, enforcing a seeming necessity of sin: for either they must destroy the Hebrew children, and so sin by Murther; or else they must devise some hansome shift to carry it cleanly from the Kings knowledg, and so sin by lying. And so they did; they chose rather to lye then to kill, as indeed in the comparison it is by much the lesser sinne. But the very truth is, they should have done neither: they should flatly have refused the Kings commandment, though with hazard of their lives; and have resolved rather to suffer any evil, than to do any. And so eSee August. contra mend…c. cap. 19.Lot should have done: he should rather have adventured his own life, and theirs too, in protecting the chastity of his Daughters, and the safety of his guests; then have *Gen. 19.8. P…rturbatio animi fui…, …n consilium. Hist. Scholast. in Gen. cap. 5▪offered the exposall of his Daughters to the lusts of the beastly Sodomites, though it were to redeeme his guests from the abuse of fouler and more abominable filthinesse. Absolutely: there cannot be a case imagined, wherein it should be impossible to avoid one sin, unlesse by the committing of another. The case which of all other cometh nearest to a Perplexity, is that of an erroneous conscience: Because of a double bond; the bond of Gods Law; which to fSin is the transgression of the Law, 1 John 3.4.transgress, is a sin; and the bond of particular conscience, which also to gWhatsoever is not of faith, is sin. Rom. 14.23. Omne quod fit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehenam. c. 28. q. 1. Omnes. sec. Ex his.transgress, is a sin. Whereupon there seemeth to follow an inevitable necessity of sinning; when Gods Law requireth one thing, and particular conscience dictateth the flat contrary: for in such a case, a man must either obey Gods Law, and so sin against his own conscience; or obey his own conscience, and so sin against Gods Law. But neither in this case is there any perplexity at all in the things themselves: that which there is, is through the default of the man onelyonly, whose judgement being erroneous mis-leadeth his conscience, and so casteth him upon a necessity of sinning. But yet the necessity is no simple and absolute, and unavoydable, and perpetual necessity: for it is onelyonly a necessity ex hypothesi, and for a time, and continueth but stante tali errore. And still there is a way out betwixt those sins, and that without a third: and that way is deponere erroneam conscientiam. He must rectifie his judgement, and reform the error of his Conscience, and then all is well. There is no perplexity, no necessity, no obligation, no expediency; which should either enforce, or perswade us to any sin. The resolution is damnable, Let us do evil that good may come.
I must take leave, before I pass from this point, to make two instances; and to measure out from the Rule of my Text an answer to them both. They are such, as I would desire you of this place to take due and special consideration of. I desire to deal plainly; and I hope it shall be (by Gods blessing upon it) effectually, for your good, and the Churches peace. One instance shall be in a sin of Commission; the other in a sin of Omission.
The sin of Commission wherein I would instance, is indeed a sin beyond Commission: it is the usurping of the Magistrates Office without a Commission. The Question is; whether the zealous intention of a good end may not warrant it good, or at least excuse it from being evil, and a sin? I need not frame a Case for the illustration of this instance: the inconsiderate forwardness of some hath made it to my hand. You may read it in the disfigured windowes and walls of this Church: Pictures and Statua's, and Images: and for their sakes the windows and walls wherein they stood, have been heretofore, and of late pulled down, and broken in pieces and defaced: without the Command, or so much as leave of those who have power to reform things amiss in that kind. Charity bindeth us to think the best of those that have done it: that is, that they did it out of a forward (though mis-governed) zeal; intending therein Gods glory in the farther suppression of Idolatry, by taking away these (as they supposed) likely occasions of it. Now in such a case as this, the Question is, whether the intention of such an end can justifie such a deed? And the fact of aNum. 25.7, 8.Phinehes, Nu. 25. (who for a much like end, for the staying of the people from Idolatry, executed vengeance upon Zimri and Cosbi, being but a private man, and no Magistrate;) seemeth to make for it.
But my Text ruleth it otherwise. If it be evil, it is not to be done, no not for the preventing of Idolatry. I pass by some considerations otherwise of good moment; as namely first, whether Statua's and Pictures may not be permitted in Christian Churches, for the adorning of Gods House, and for civil and historical uses, not onelyonly lawfully and decently, but even profitably? I must confess, I never heard substantiall reason given, why they might not: at the least, so long as there is no apparent danger of superstition. And secondly, whether things either in their first erection, or by succeeding abuse superstitious, may not be profitably continued, if the Superstition be abolished? Otherwise, not Pictures onelyonly, and Crosses, and Images; but most of our Hospitals, and Schools, and Colledges, and Churches too must down: and so the hatred of Idolatry should but usher in licentious Sacriledge, contrary to that passage of our Apostle in the next Chapter before this, aRom. 2.22.Thou that abhorrest Idols, committest thou Sacriledge? And thirdly, whether these forward ones have not bewrayed somewhat their own self-guiltiness in this Act, at least for the manner of it, in doing it secretly, and in the dark? A man should not dare to do that, which he would not willingly either be seen, when it is doing; or own, being done. To pass by these; consider no more but this one thing onelyonly, into what dangerous and unsufferable absurdities a man might run, if he should but follow these mens grounds. Erranti nullus terminus: Errour knoweth no stay, and a false Principle once received, multiplieth into a bforeign.thousand absurd conclusions. It is good for men to go upon sure grounds, else they may run and wander in infinitum. A little errour at the first, if there be way given to it, will increase beyond belief; As a small spark may fire a large City, and a c2 Kings 18.44, 45.cloud no bigger than a mans hand, in short space over-spread the face of the whole Heavens. For grant, for the suppression of Idolatry, in case the Magistrate will not do his office, that it is lawful for a private man to take upon him to reform what he thinketh amiss, and to do the part and office of a Magistrate (which must needs have been their ground, if they had any, for this action) there can be no sufficient cause given, why by the same reason, and upon the same grounds, a private man may not take upon him to establish Laws, raise Powers, administer Iustice, execute Malefactors, or do any other thing the Magistrate should do; in case the Magistrate slack to do his duty in any of the premises. Which if it were once granted (as granted it must be, if these mens fact be justifiable:) every wise man seeth, the end could be no other but vast Anarchy and confusion both in Church and Common-weale: whereupon must unavoidably follow the speedy subversion both of Religion and State. If things be amiss, and the Magistrate help it not; private men may lament it, and as occasion serveth, and their condition and calling permitteth, soberly and discreetly put the Magistrate in mind of it: But they may not make themselves Magistrates to reform it.
And as to the act of Phinehes: though I rather think he did; yet what if he did not well in so doing? It is a thing we are not certain of: and we must have certainer grounds for what we do, then uncertain examples. Secondly, what if Phinehes had the Magistrates authority to enable him to that attempt? It is not altogether improbable (to my apprehension) from the fifth verse of the Chapter, where the story is laid down, Num. 25.5. especially parallel'd with another Story of much like circumstances, Exod. 32.27. that as there the Levites, so here Phinehes drew the Sword in execution of the express command of Moses the supreme Magistrate. If neither thus, nor so: yet Thirdly, (which cutteth off all plea, and is the most common answer ordinarily given by Divines to this and the like instances drawn from some singular actions of Gods worthies;) Men of Heroical spirits & gifts, such as were David, Samson, Ehud, Moses, Elias, and some others, especially at such times as they were employed in some special service for the good of Gods Church, were exempt from the common rules of life: and did many things, (as we are to presume) not without the aN…c Samson aliter excusatur, quòd s…ipsum cum hostibus ruinâ domûs oppressit, nisi quod latenter Spiritus Sanctus hoc …usserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat. Aug. l…b. 1. de Civ. Dei. ca. 21 Si defenditur non fuisse peccatum, privatum habuisse consilium indubitanter credendus est. Bern. de prec. & disp…nsa….secret motion and direction of Gods holy and powerfull Spirit, which were therefore good in them (that secret direction being to them loco specialis mandati, like that to bGen. 22.2.Abraham for sacrificing his Son) but not safe, or lawfull for us to imitate. Opera liberi spiritûs, cChy…r. in Gen. 14. & in Exod. 3….say Divines, non sunt exigenda ad regulas communes, nec trahenda in exemplum vitae. The extraordinary Heroical acts of Gods Worthies are not to be measured by the common rules of life, nor to become exemplary unto others. Of which nature was d1 Sam. 17.David's single combat with Goliah; and eJud. 10.30.Samsons pulling down the house upon himself and the Philistines; And fExod. 2.12.Moses slaying the Egypan; and gJudg. 3.…5, &c.Ehuds stabbing of King Eglon; and h2 Kings 1.10—12.Eliahs calling down for fire from Heaven upon the Captains and their fifties, and divers others recorded in the Scripture. Of which last fact we have our blessed SAVIOURS judgement in Luc. 9. that it was done by the extraordinary and peculiar instinct of GODS Spirit, but it is not to be imitated by others, without iImitando ab aliis exprimi nec possunt, nec debent, nifi e… dem foreign Spiritûs exciteatur. Chy…r. in Exod. 2.particular certain assurance of the like instinct. Where when the Disciples would have called down for fire from Heaven upon the Samaritans, and alledged Elias for their precedent; kLuke 9.53.Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven and consume them, as Elias did? His answer was with a kind of indignation (as both his lforeign. Luc. 9.55.gesture and speeches shew) Nescitis cujus spiritûs estis; You know not what manner of spirit you are of. Elias was indued with an extraordinary spirit, in the freedome whereof he did what he then did: but it is not for you or others to propose his example, unlesse you can demonstrate his spirit. And if Phinehes Act also was (as most mDe Phinees autem dicendum est, quòd ex inspiratione divina, zelo D…i commotus, hoc fecit. Aqui. 2.2. qu. 60. art. 6. ad 2. & Theologi passim.think it was) such as these: it can no more justifie the usurpation of Magistracy; Then Davids act can bloody Duels; or Samsons self-murther, or Moses's secret slaughter, or Ehuds King-killing, or Eliahs private revenge. I have stood the longer upon the discovery of this sin, that men might take right judgement of it; and not think it either warrantable or excusable by any pretension of zeal, or of whatsoever other good: and that both such as have gone too far this way in their practice already, for the time past, may acknowledge their own over-sight, aSacerdos debitor est, ut veritatem quam audivit à Deo liberè praedicet. 11. qu. 3. noli timere. Ex Chrysost.and be sorry for it; and others seeing their errour, may for the time to come forbear such outrages, and keep themselves within the due bounds of Christian sobriety, and their particular Callings. And thus much of the former instance, in a matter of Commission. I am to give you another in a matter of Omission.
Every Omission of a necessary duty is simply evil, as a sin. But affirmative duties are but sometimes necessary; because they do not obligare ad semper: as, being many, it is impossible they should. And many times duties otherwise necessary, in case of Superiour reason and duties, cease to be necessary pro hîc & nunc: and then to omit them, is not to do evil. Among other necessary duties this is one, for a Minister furnished with gifts and abilities for it, to acquaint Gods people with all material needful truths, as he can have convenient occasion thereunto. And (such conveniency supposed) not to do this, is simply evil. Now then, to make the Case and the Question. The Case thus: A Minister hath just opportunity to preach in a Congregation, not his own: where he seeth or generally heareth some errour in judgement, or outragious sin in practice to be continued in with too publick allowance: He hath liberty to make choice of his Text and Theme, and leisure to provide in some measure for it; and his conscience telleth him, he cannot pro hîc & nunc direct his speech with greater service to Gods Church, then against those errours or sins. He seeth on the other side some withdrawments: his discretion may perhaps be called in question, for medling where he needed not; he shall possibly lose the good opinion of some, with whom he hath held fair correspondence hitherto; he shall preserve his own peace the better, if he turn his speech another way. This is the Case. The Question is, Whether these latter considerations, and the good that may come thereby, be sufficient to warrant unto him the omission of that necessary duty?
The rule of my Text resolveth it negatively: they are not sufficient. The Duty being necessary, pro hîc & nunc, it is simply evil to omit it; and therefore it may not be omitted for any other good. I deny not, but a Minister may with good discretion conceale many truths from his flock; at least the opening and amplifying of them: if they be not such as are needfull for them to know, either for the establishment of Faith, or practice of Life; as not onelyonly many nice School-points and Conclusions are, but also many Genealogies, and Levitical rites, and other things even in the Scriptures themselves. Nay more, a Minister not onelyonly in discretion may, but is even in Conscience bound, at least in the publick exercise of his Ministry, to conceal some particular truths from his Auditory; yea though they be such as are needful for the practice of life, and for the setling of mens Consciences: if they be such with all, as are not fit to be publickly spoken of; as are many Resolutions of Cases appertaining to the seventh Commandement (Thou shalt not commit Adultery;) and some also appertaining to the eighth (Thou shalt not steal.) Our men aMoulin. Buckler of Faith, part 2. sect. 4. and not onelyonly ours, but some of their own too: See Espenaecus ad Tit. cap. 1.justly condemn the Popish Casuists, for their too much liberty in this kind in their Writings: whereby they reduce vices into an Art, under colour of reproving them; and convey into the minds of bIn quibus plus proficit vitiorum ignoratio, quàm cognitio virtutis. Justin. lib. 2. Hist. cap. 2.corrupt men, Notions of such prodigious filthiness, and artificiall Legier-du-main, as perhaps otherwise they would never have dreamed on, or thirsted after. The loose writings of the unchaste Poets are but cQuis veterum Poetarum plus obscoenitatis, impuritatis, flagitiorum, professus est, quàm docet Poenitentiale Burchardi?— Quot sunt qui ignorarent multa quae ibi leguntur, nisi ex ipso didicissent? I.R. in confut. fab. Burdon. p. 305. Qui Principum, sacerdotum, negotiatorum, ac praecipuè mulierum vitia in c…ncionibus suis i…sectentur: quae saepius ita depingunt; ut obscoenitatem doceant. Erasm. in Adag. foreign.dull tutors of Lust, compared with the authorized Tomes of our severe Romish Votaries. There be enormous sins of this rank, which a modest man would be ashamed so much as to name, especially in publick. Now of these, onelyonly the generalities would be touched in the publick; the specialties not unfolded, but in the private exercise of our Ministry: nor yet that promiscuously to every one that should out of curiosity desire satisfaction in them; but onelyonly to such men, (and that but onelyonly so far) as they may concern in point of conscience, and of practice. Besides these there are other Cases many, in which it may be more convenient to conceale, than to teach some divine truths at some times, and in some places.
But yet in the Case is here proposed, if it be a truth questioned, about which GODS people are much distracted in their opinions; much mistaken by some through error in judgement; much abused by sinful, especially publick practice; occasioning Scandals and offences among brethren; likely to be overwhelmed with custome, or multitude of those that think or do against it; and be otherwise of material importance: I take it, the Omission of it upon seasonable opportunity, is a grievous sin, and not colourable by any pretence. Beloved, the Minister is not to come into the Pulpit, as a Fencer upon the Stage, to play his prize, and to make a fair aforeign. 1 Cor. 9.26.flourish against sin, (Here he could have it, and there he could have it, but hath it no where:) but rather as a Captain into the Field, to bend his forces specially against the strongest Troops of the Enemy; and to squander, and break thorow the thickest ranks; and to drive at the bFight neither with small nor great, save onelyonly with the King of Israel. 2 King. 22.31.fairest. It is not enough for a Prophet cEsay 58.1.to cry aloud, and to lift up his voice like a trumpet, and to tell Iudah and Israel of sins, and of transgressions at large: but if he would whet them up to the battel, he must give a more dIf the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battell? 1 Cor. 14.8.certain sound; he must tell Iudah of her sins, and Israel of her transgressions. If there be in Damascus, or Moab, or Ammon, or Tyrus, or Iudah, or Israel; eAmos 1▪ & 2.three transgressions, or four, more eminent than the rest: it is fit; they that are sent to Damascus, and Moab, and Ammon, and Tyrus, and Iudah, and Israel, should make them hear of those three or four, more than all the rest. Sins and Errours, when they begin to get head and heart, must be handled roughly. Silence in such a case is a kind of flattery: and it is fPenè idem est fidem nolle asserere & negare. Fulg. l. 1. ad Thrasim. c. 1. Sicut incauta locutio in errorem p…rtrahit, ita indiscr…tum silentium in errore relinquit. Greg. in Mor.almost all one, when sins grow outragious, to hold our peace at them; and to cry Peace, Peace unto them. Our Apostle in Act. 20. would not have held himself sufficiently discharged from the guilt of other mens blood; if he had shunned (as occasion was offered) to have declared unto them gActs 20.26, 27.foreign, even the whole counsel of God.
In my Application of this Instance and Case, blame me not, if I do it with some reference to my self. Being heretofore by appointment, as now again I was, to provide my self for this place against such a meeting as this is; as in my conscience I then thought it needful for me, I delivered my mind, (and I dare say, the Truth too, for substance) something freely, touching the Ceremonies and Constitutions of our Church. And I have now also with like freedome, shewed the unlawfulnesse of the late disorderly attempts in this Town; and that from the ground of my present Text. I was then blamed for that; I think unjustly; (for I do not yet see what I should rerract of that I then delivered:) and it is not unlikely, I shall be blamed again for this, unless I prevent it. You have heard now already, both heretofore, that to judge any mans heart; and at this time, that to slander any truth, are (without repentance) sins justly damnable: foreign, they that offend either in the one, or the other, their damnation is just. To preserve therefore both you from the sin, and my self from the blame; consider I pray you, with reason and charity, what I shall say.
You that are our hearers, know not with what hearts we speak unto you: that is onelyonly known to our own hearts; and to a1 …oh. 3.20.God who is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. That which you are to look at, and to regard, is, with what bforeign. Acts 17.11. Non requiritur quis, vel qualis praedicet; sed quid praedicet. Distinct. 19. Secundum. foreign. Plat. in Charmide.truth we speak unto you. So long as what we preach is true, & agreeable to Gods Word, & right reason: you are not, upon I know not what light surmizes or suspicions, to judge with what spirits, or with what dispositions of heart we preach. Whether we cPhil. 1.15, 16, 17, 18.preach Christ of envy, and strife, or of good will; whether sincerely, or of contention; whether in pretence, or in truth; it is our own good, or hurt: we must answer for that; and at our perill be it, if we do not look to that. But what is that to you? Notwithstanding every way, so long as it is Christ, and his truth which are preached, it is your part therein to rejoice. If an dGal. 1.8, 9.Angel from Heaven should preach any untruth unto you, foreign, Let him be accursed: but if the very Devil of hell should preach the truth, he must be heard, and believed, and obeyed. So long as eMat. 23.23.Scribes and Pharisees hold them to Moses's Text and Doctrine, let them be as damned fWoe unto you Scribes and Pharisees, Hypocrites, Mat. 23.13, 14, &c.Hypocrites as Scribes and Pharisees can be: yet all whatsoever they bid you observe, that you are to observe and do.
Let me then demand: Did I deliver any untruth? It had been well done then to have shewn it, that I might have acknowledged, and retracted it. Did I speak nothing but the truth? with what conscience then could any that heard me say, as yet I heard some did; that I preached factiously, That I came to cast bones among them, That I might have chosen a fitter Text, That I might have had as much thanks to have kept away? For Faction; I hate it▪ my desire and aim, next after the good of your souls, was, above all, the Peace of the Church, and the Unity of Brethren. For casting bones (if that must needs be the phrase) they were cast in these parts long before my coming by that great enemy to peace and unity, and busie sower of discord, the Devil: otherwise I should not have found at my first coming such snarling about them, and such gGal. 5.15.biting and devouring one another, as I did. My endeavour was rather to have gathered up the bones, and to have taken away the matter of difference, (I mean, the errour in judgement about, and inconformity in practice unto, the lawfull Ceremonies of the Church) that so if it had been possible all might h…ve been quiet, without despising or judging one another for these things; For thanks; I hold not that worth the answering▪ alas, it is a poor aim for Gods Minister, to preach for thanks.
For the choyce of my Text and Argument, both then and now: how is it not unequall, that men, who plead (so as none more) for liberty and plainness in reproving sin, should not allow those that come amongst them that liberty and plainness against themselves and their own sins? I dare appeale to your selves. Have you never been taught, that it is the Ministers duty, as to oppose against all errors and sins in the general, so to bend himself (as neer as he can) especially against the apparent errors and sins of his present auditory? And do you not believe it is so? Why then might I not; nay how ought I not, bend my speech, both then against a common errour of sundry in these parts in point of Ceremony; and now against the late petulancy, (or at least oversight) of some mis-guided ones? The noise of these things abroad; and the scandall taken thereat by such as hear of them; and the ill fruits of them at home in breeding jealousies, and cherishing contentions among neighbours: cannot but stir us up, if we be sensible (as every good member should be) of the damage and loss the Church acquireth by them, to put you in minde and to admonish you (as opportunities invite us) both privately and publickly. Is it not time, trow ye, to thrust in the sickle, when the fields look white unto the harvest? Is it not time our Pulpits should a little eccho of these things, when all the Countrey far and neer ringeth of them?
For my own part; however others censure me, I am sure, my own heart telleth me, I could not have discharged my Conscience; if being called to this place, I should have balked what either then or now I have delivered. My Conscience prompting me, all circumstances considered, that these things were pro hîc & nunc necessary to be delivered, rather than any other: if for any outward inferiour respect I should have passed them over with silence; I think I should have much swerved from the Rule of my Text, and have done a great evil, that some small good might come of it. But many thousand times better were it for me, that all the world should censure me for speaking what they think I should not; than that my own heart should condemn me for not speaking what it telleth me I should. And thus much of things simply evil.
I should proceed to apply this Rule, We must not do evil, that good may come; unto evils, not simply, but accidentally such: and that both in the generall, and also in some few specials of greatest use; namely, unto evils which become such through Conscience, Scandall, or Comparison. In my choice of the Scripture, I aimed at all this: and had gathered much of my provision for it. But the Cases being many and weighty; I foresaw I could not go onward with my first project, without much wronging one or both: either the things themselves, if I should contract my speech to the scanting of time; or you, if I should lengthen it to the weight of the matter. And therefore I resolved here to make an end, and to give place (as fit it is) to the businesse whereabout we meet. The Total of what I have said, and should say, is in effect but this: No pretension of a good end, of a good meaning, of a good event, of any good whatsoever; either can sufficiently warrant any sinfull action to be done, or justifie it being done: or sufficiently excuse the Omission of any necessary duty, when it is necessary. Consider what I say, and the Lord give you understanding in all things. Now to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, &c.