Five Cases of Conscience, Case 2
The CASE of UNLAWFUL LOVE.
TWo Gentlemen who were very good Friends, and both of them Maried, used to converse together familiarly; one of these took a special liking in the company and conversation of the others Wife, and she answerably in his; which afterwards proceeded to some degree of Love; which though ever restrained, and preserved without any violation of Chastity, grew yet in the end to this issue, that they mutually vowed either to other, that if happily either of them should at any time be freed from the Bond of Matrimony (either he by the death of his Wife, or she by the death of her Husband) that party so freed should continue afterwards unmarryed, and stay for the other, till the other should be freed also, though it were during life: Now so it is, that this Gentlewomans Husband died, and her affections and resolution so altered, that gladly she would Marry, if she might be released of the Engagement of that Vow; or perswaded of the unlawfulness or nullity thereof.
Concerning the present Case, as it is propounded, sundry Points are needful to be resolved, that so we give a right judgment de praeterito, of what is already done for the time past, in respect of the Gentlewomans former promise, and sound direction also de futuro, which is further to be done for the time to come, in respect of her present distresses.
Point I.
§. 1. First of all, It is considerable, whether the promise made by the Gentlewoman and her friend, were properly a Vow or no? so it is called in the proposal of the present Case, and that agreeable to the common use of speech with us here in England, who extend the word [Vow] very far; neither shall I make scruple in the ensuing Discourse, sometimes to call it so; for Loquendum ut Vulgus. But to speak properly, a Vow is a word of a narrower extent then a Promise, every Vow being indeed a Promise, but not every Promise necessarily a Vow; aVotum soli Deo fit, sed Promissio potest fieri etiam Homini Aquit 2 2. q. 88. 5. ad. 3.Promises may be made indifferently, either to God or Men; but Promises made to Men are no Vows: wherefore it is usually inserted into the definition of a Vow, as a condition bPromissio Deo facta est essentia v…ti, Ibid.essentially requisite thereunto, that it be made unto God alone, insomuch as to make a Vow to any Creature, is interpretative to exalt the Creature into the place of God, and so to make it an Idol, which is clear not only from the express cPsal. 76. 11.precept of God, and the constant dNumb. 21. 2. Judg. 11. 30. 1 Sam. 11. 25.examples of godly men, and the usual eJudg. 11. 36. Psal. 56. 12.phrases of the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures; but also from the universal consent of all learned men, both Divines and others, and even of fSponsio quâ …oliga…nur Deo. Cic. 2. Leg.Heathens also: This Gentlewomans promise then being made to the Gentleman her Friend alone, as was his also to her, and neither of both to God, is therefore to be taken for a meer Promise; but no Vow.
§. 2. If for more confirmation thereof, she bound herself also by Oath, as it is not unlike, yet is it no more for all that but a meer promise still, and not a Vow; for albeit the very using of an Oath be a calling in of God into a business, and the person that taketh an Oath doth thereby set himself in the presence of God; yet an Oath calleth him in only to be aaIurare nihil est aliud quam Deum Testem invocare Aquit. 2. 2. qu. 89. 1. ex, Aug. de ver. Apost. Serm. R. 28. quod affirmas, si D… Teste… promiseris, id tenendum est, Cic. 3. de Offic. witness, without any intent to make him a party to the business, whereas in a Vow he is made a party and not only a witness; whereunto agree those formes so frequent in holy Scripture, in Oaths both assertory, and stipulatory; bGen. 31. 50. Judg. 11. 10. Mal. 2. 14.The Lord be witness between us: cRom. 1. 9. 1 Thess. 1. 5.God is my witness: d1 Cor. 1. 3. Phil. 1. 28.I take God to Record, and the like: for even as when a promise is made unto God, whereunto for the more solemnity, the presence of some men is required as witnesses, such a Promise is to be held for a Vow; because it is made to God alone, although in the presence of Men: So on the other side, when a Promise is made unto some Man, whereunto for the more assurance, the presence of God is required as a witness, such a Promise is not to be held for a Vow, because it is made unto Man alone, although in the presence of God.
§. 3. Nay further, if the Gentlewoman when she thus engaged her self, did use these very words [I VOW TO GOD] or words to that effect, as we know is often done in solemn Promises, between Man and Man; yet neither is that sufficient to make it properly a Vow; for to judge rightly when Question is made, concerning any particular promise, whether it be a Vow yea or no; we are not to be guided so much by the formes of speech, (which are subject to change, impropriety, and many defects) as by the true intention and purpose of the parties, especially the Promiser. Now what was the whole intent and purpose of these Parties, when they mutually bound themselves in such sort, as in the Case propounded is laid down, no reasonable man can be ignorant; even this and no other, to give as good assurance as they could devise, either to other, and to receive the like assurance again, that the thing by them agreed on and promised, should be faithfully performed; and if either Oaths or Protestations, were also used by way of Confirmation, they are all in common intendment to be taken as tending to the self same purpose, without looking at any further thing; and clearly where the Promiser hath no intention to bind himself to God, but to Man only, the Promise so made is no Vow, whatsoever formality of words may be used in the making of it.
§. 4. Neither is the examination of this Point a curiosity either in it self fruitless, or impertinent to the Case in hand; for albeit, in that which seemeth to be the very main point of all, viz. the power of binding the Conscience, there be no material difference between a Vow and an ordinary Promise; a lawfull Promise no less binding unto performance, than a lawfull Vow; and an unlawfull Vow no more binding than an unlawfull Promise: yet there is some difference between them, and that of some importance too, in respect of the relaxation of that Bond; for since it belongeth to him to whom a bond is made, to grant a release thereof: It belongeth therefore to God alone to release the obligation of a Vow; and no man hath power so to do, because the Vower by his Vow, bindeth himself to God, not to Man: whereas the obligation of a meer Promise, wherein the Promiser bindeth himself but to some Man, may be released by that Man; and a release from him is to the conscience of the Promiser a sufficient discharge from the said obligation: which Consideration of what use it will be in the present Case, will in the due place further appear. In the mean time we have evidently proved, that this Gentlewoman bound her self by Promise only, and not by Vow.
Point II.
§. 5. We are next to enquire concerning the validity thereof, whether or no the GentlewomanaRom. 7. 2. having an foreign. Husband at that time, were so disabled in that respect from making such a promise, that the promise then made by her, without the Husbands consent, was utterly void from the very beginning: For the Wife is underbRom. 7. 2. the Law, andc1 Cor. 7. 4. under the power of her Husband, and so is not sui juris, nor can bind her self by Vow, Oath, Promise, or otherwise without the privity and consent of her Husband, which consent we may presume this Gentlewoman never had, the promise being of that nature, that it had been not only immodesty, but even madness, at all to have sought it. And it is certain from the dNumb. 30. 3.Law of God, by Moses (to the equity whereof Christians are still bound, because it's founded upon right Reason, and the light of Nature) that every Vow and Promise made by a person that of right hath not power to make it, is de jure nullum, altogether void from the first instant, and bindeth the Party no more then if it never had been made.
§. 6. If any Scruple shall arise from this Consideration, that albeit the promise made by the Wife in her Husbands life time, bind her not without his consent, so long as he liveth, because she is all that while under his power; vet after that she is loosed from the law of her Husband by his death, it shall thenceforth bind her, because she then becometh sui juris: I say, this maketh no difference at all in the Case; for this is a general Rule, that what bQuod initio vitiosum est, non potest tractu temporis convalescere, l. 29. F. de Div. Reg. ju.act soever had a nullity in it at the first, when it was done, cannot by any succeeding tract of time grow to be of force. As if a young Scholar shall be instituted to a Benefice, being not of lawful years; or a young Heir make a sale of his Lands during minority, the institution and the sale as they were both void at the beginning, so they shall continue void, as well after the Clerk is of lawful years, and the Heir at full age, as before; so that to judge of the validity of any Vow, Promise, or Covenant, respect must be had tocIn stipulationibus id tempus spectatur quo cantrabimus, L. 18. F. eodem. that very time wherein it was made, and to the present condition of the person at that time, and not to any time or condition before or after: If then there were indeed, a nullity in this Gentlewomans Vow, at the time when she made it, there is a nullity in it still; and if it were indeed of no force to bind her then, neither is it of any force to bind her now.
§. 7. But after due pondering of the matter, I rather think, that there was not a nullity in the promise at the first, neither (supposing it had been rightly qualified in other respects) was it void upon this ground; because although she were not sui juris absolute, it is sufficient yet, that she was so quantum ad hoc. For a person that is under the power of another, hath yet power of himself, (and so is sui juris) to dispose of all such things, as by the free disposal whereof, the proper right of him, under whose power he is, is no way prejudiced; but in whatsoever may be prejudicial to the other in any of his Rights, he is juris alieni: neither may dispose thereof without the others consent; and if such a person shall make a vow, or other promise concerning any of those things, wherein he is sui juris, such vow or promise shall stand good, and is not void (though possibly it may be vitious in other respects) from the inability of the person that maketh it: As for example, if a Servant shall promise to his own Father to work with him a day or two in Harvest, this promise unless his Master consent thereunto, shall be void, because the Master hath a right in the Servants work, to which right it would be prejudicial if the Servant should dispose thereof after his own pleasure; but if such a Servant shall promise unto his needy Father to relieve him from time to time with a third or fourth part of all such wages as he shall receive for his service, this promise shall be good of it self; neither shall the Masters consent be requisite to make it so, because the Master hath no Right at at all in the Servants wages; wherein to be prejudiced by the Servants disposing thereof according to his own mind: Now forasmuch as the Husbands right and power over the Wife ceaseth together with his life, (as the ApostleaRom. 7. 2, 3. expresly teacheth) and so cannot be prejudiced by any act of the Wife done after his Decease; It is manifest that the Wife is sui juris to make a vow or promise during her Husbands life time, concerning something to be done after his decease, in case she overlive him, because his right will be expired before the performance of the said vow or promise be due; as to give instance in a Case not much unlike to this in question; A Wife estated upon her Marriage in a Iointure or Annuity for her life of an 100 l. per annum, maketh a promise in her Husbands life time to one of her younger Brothers, that hath but short Means, to allow him thence forward out of the said Estate, 10 l. yearly toward his better Maintenance; this promise is void unless the Husband consent, because the performance thereof would prejudice him in that right which he hath during his own life in the Revenue of all the Lands and Annuities estated upon the Wife in Reversion; but if such a Wife shall promise to her said Brother to allow him the said yearly sum of 10 l. after the decease of her Husband, in case she survive him, this promise is good, though made by the Wife in her Husbands life time, and without his consent, because the Husbands right (being to cease before the Promise is to be performed) cannot be prejudiced by the performance thereof: And this I find agreeable to the best Casuists, whose peremptory opinion it is, that bVot… uxorum vel s…rv… rum exequenda illo tempore quo … sui juris, … vel domini non possunt … 65. & alios.Husbands and Masters cannot disannul such Vows as their Wives and Servants make concerning things to be performed at such times; as they shall be from under their power. Which position if it be true (and I yet see no reason why it should not) then doubtless this Gentlewomans Vow made to her friend, though in the life time, and without the consent of her Husband, was not originally void from the inability to make it, upon this respect; that she was not sui juris so to do.
Point III.
§. 8. But though I dare not say, neither do I think, that there was a nullity in it, in respect of the person, to make it void that way; yet it cannot be denied, but there was much obliquity in it, in respect of the matter, to make it otherwise utterly unlawful: in which Point much need not be said, because the truth thereof will soon appear; for there was in it manifestly a threefold obliquity, and thereby also a breach of three several Commandements. The first obliquity was in respect of the unlawful affection from which it proceeded; which being placed upon another than the Husband, and that in such a high degree, as to produce a promise of this kind, must needs be vitious, both for the object and for the measure, and such inordinate affection by the Analogy of our SavioursaMat. 5. 28. expression of the Law, is a violation of the Chastity of the heart, and so a breach of the Seventh Commandement. The Second obliquity was, the want of that true conjugal love which ought to be between Husband and Wife, who ought to have a mutual bProv. 5. 18. Eccles. 9. 9.complacency and delight the one in the other, and to becProv. 5. 19. satisfied at all times with the Love, Comfort, and Society of the one of the other; which Love if it had been so throughly rooted and seated in the Gentlewomans heart, as it ought to have been, would have crushed all motions of unlawful affection towards a Stranger in the shell, long before they could grow to such strong Resolutions, as by the making of this vow it appeareth they did; for it is: not to be imagined that such a vow as this could be made, and really intended to be performed, but we must needs suppose in the parties so vowing, a kind of weariness at the least, if not rather some inward loathing of the present Yoak; which being contrary to that honour thst Marryed persons owe to their yoak fellows, is so a breach of the Fifth Commandement, A Third obliquity there was also as a breach of the Tenth Commandement, against those expresse words [Thou shalt not covet thy Neighbours Wife] every Man and Woman being to content themselves with that lot, which by Gods Providence hath befallen them, as in all other things, so especially in that which is of the greatest weight, the lot of Marriage, without coveting or lusting after that which it hath pleased the wisdom of God already to dispose upon another; this Gentlewomans promise then being such, as (if it should be brought to an impartial Tryal before that Tribunal which God hath erected in every ones conscience, and according to the tenor of that Divine Law, whereof no Christian should be ignorant) could not be reasonably acquitted from any one of these sinful Obliquities, but not possibly from them all, we may conclude to have been an Act utterly unlawfull.
Point IV.
§. 9. But because a Man may contract an Obligation by an act not free from Obliquity, as the saying in such Cases is [Fieri non debet, factum valet] and we have a Ruled case for it in the Covenant, which the Princes of Israel made with the Gibeonites, which thoughbJosh. 9. 14, &c. sinfully made at the first, wascIbid. ver. 19▪ 2 Sam. 21. 1, 2. necessarily to be kept afterwards: We are therefore to enquire into a Fourth Point, Whether the Gentlewoman having de facto bound her self, by such an unlawful promise, be still, by virtue of the said promise, bound in conscience to the performance thereof, or not? To answer directly to the Point, I take it she is not bound thereunto; for that saying [Fieri non debet, factum valet] hath place only there, where the obliquity that maketh the act unlawful, may be severed from the substance of the matter, about which the act is conversant; as when a Man voweth to do something, which is not in it self, and for the substance of the matter simply unlawful to be done; but yet voweth it, either rashly, and without due advisement, or for some indirect and unwarrantable end, or upon flight and insufficient inducements, or the like, any of these Obliquities are enough to make the vow unlawful, in respect of the act of vowing; yet because these Obliquities do not necessarily passe upon the matter it self, or the thing Vowed, but may be severed from it; therefore though the act of vowing were sinful, the Vow it self for all that may stand good▪ and bind the Party to performance, but where the sinful obliquity passeth upon the substance of the matter, or adhereth inseperably thereunto; there not only the act of vowing is sinful, but the performance also becometh unlowful: In which Cases those other sayings ought rather to have place, Iuram ent… non debet esse vinculum iniquitatis in malis promissis rescinde fidem, in turpi vot… muta decrètum, &c.
§. 10. If it shall be said, that this difference being admitted, will nothing availe the Gentlewoman in our present Case, to free her from the obligation of her said promise; because here the matter of promise seemeth not to be in it self unlawful, especially on her part; for if the Gentleman her Friend, were presently free from the bond of Matrimony by the death of his Wife, as the Gentlewoman now is by the death of her Husband, they might perform what they had promised either to other, by joyning themselves in Matrimony, and that without sin, which is an argument that the sinful obliquity was only in the act of promising; which therefore they ought to repent of: but doth not cleave to the matter of the promise, which therefore they ought not to violate. To this I answer, what in my opinion is true, That if both the Parties were now actually free from the Marriage bond, they not only lawfully might, but were in conscience bound (unless some other lawful impediment should hinder) to joyn themselves together in Matrimony, because none of the forementioned Obliquities, which made the former act of promising unlawful, would fall upon the after-act of Marriage to make it unlawful. But that Allegation is not direct to the Point in hand, nor to the Case as it is propounded; for it may be observed from the very from of the proposal, that the matter of the promise, wherein the Parties interchangeably bound themselves, was not to Marry together, when they should be both free; upon which false ground the Objection runneth; that was indeed the thing they aimed at therein; but the end is one thing, and the matter another: but the very matter of the promise was, the continuance of their mutual affection either to other, with a resolution to stay the one for the other, when either Party should happen to be free from the bond of the present Matrimony, till the other should be also free. The continuance of which affection and resolution, will upon examination be found subject to all, or some of the three Obliquities aforesaid; and therefore as such an affection and resolution, could not be entertained at the first without sin; so neither can they be now continued in without sin; for, so long as they continue, the first of the said Obliquities remaineth still, both on his part and hers; the second indeed by the death of the Husband is ceased on her part, but remaineth still on his; and the third contrarily being on his part ceased, remaineth still on hers, as will evidently appear to the understanding of any Man, that shall take the pains to examine it.
§. 11. Yea, and it is further to be considered, that the continuance of such an affection and resolution may be likely to expose as well the one as the other to the assault of more strong and dangerous temptations, now since the Husbands death than before. The danger on the Gentlemans part, this, least by how much he is now by the Husband death, put into a nearer possibility of enjoying his unlawful hopes, he should grow into so much the deeper loathing of his own bed, and and so much the earnester longing that, that which is now the only obstacle to the fruition of his desires were removed; of which thoughts, who can tell how fearful the issues might be? the slie Enemy being most ready at all times, to practice upon the corruption that is in the naughty heart of Man; but especially having a mighty advantage against him, when he hath got his conscience as it were in a snare, by the engagement of some vow, promise, or setled resolution. And then on the Gentlewomans part, the danger, this, least having by her own voluntary act debarr'd her self, of that which is the only allowed remedy, namely Marriage; she should by the just judgement of God, be left to the rage of the Disease of burning Lusts: for upon what sound warrant can she be confident, or with what Reason expect, that God should either preserve her from, or assist her against temptations in that kind, though she should seek it of him with Fasting, and Prayers, and Tears, so long as she tempceth Him by persisting in a wilful obstinacy, against that means of Remedy which He hath appointed? Indeed, where the hand of God himself hath prevented the use of the Remedy (as if the Husband should be long detained in a foraign Land, or held in close Prison, or taken with a dead Palsie, or some other bodily impotence, or the like) there the Wife might comfortably implore Gods assistance to preserve her from being overcome by carnal temptations, and assuredly rest upon it by faith, if she be not wanting to her self, in putting to her own utmost endeavours, because she hath a Promise to rest upon for that purpose; and God who is faithful in all his Promises, is also faithful in this, of not suffering his Servants to be tempted beyond their strength: but for the Wife, by some inconsiderate act of her own, wherein she wilfully and obstinately persisteth to refuse the appointed means, and yet to expect Gods assistance nevertheless, for which she hath no Promise, is a fear, full tempting of God; and it is but a just thing with God, and she suffereth it worthily for her presumption, if she be left to her self, and so wrestle with the temptation by her own strength, and so be overcome thereby: For God who hath after a sort tied himself by his free and gracious Promise to protect us in Via Regia, so long as we walk in the ordinary known way that he hath appointed for us, hath no where bound himself to vouchsafe us the like powerful protection Extra viam Regiam, if we refuse that high way, to walk in by-paths of our own choosing, which present dangers on both sides, and the former Reasons laid together, do sufficiently prove, that the Gentlewoman is not at all bound to performe her said unlawful Promise.
Point V.
§. 12. Hitherto we have proceeded in genere judiciali, by considering of the nature and validity, lawfulness and obligation of the Promise for the time past: Now we are to deal in genere deliberativo, and to consider what in Christian wisdom is meetest to be farther done, for the better both quieting and regulating of the Conscience for the time to come; wherein, submitting to Men of better judgements, and experience, I give my advice as followeth, viz.
First, That the Gentlewoman out of the serious consideration of the Promises, be brought to a through feeling of the grievousness of those sins which she hath committed against God, and wherein she hath so long continued, that so she may not only be humbled in his sight with true contrition of heart, and remorse for the same, proportionably to the greatness thereof; but also be provoked to a proportionable measure of thankfulness unto him, for his gratious goodness in restraining her unlawful affections from breaking out into actual uncleanness, and preserving her when she had run out so far in an evill way, from rushing into more desperate extremities; for, Erranti nullus terminus: as a stone that tumbleth down a steep hill; so Mans corruption when it is once set on going, hath no stay of self till it come to the bottom of Hell, unless the Lord lay a stop in the way: and it is to be acknowledged a blessed act of Gods mercimerciful Providence, when we have let loose the reins to our own lusts in any kind, if they be bridled from running headlong into tall excess of wickedness; great sins require more then ordinary Repentance, and great mercies more then ordinary Thankfulnesse.
§. 13. Secondly, That having thus humbled her self before God by inward Contrition, she also make an outward free Confession of her said sins, to him whom God hath delegated a Ministerial Power to remit sins, that she may receive Comfort and Absolution from his mouth; I mean the Priest: and this I think meetest to be done to the Bishop of the Diocess, with one or more of his Presbytery, such as he shall think good to take to him to assist him; or else to some other by his appointment: because the Bishop is the chief Pastor, to whom the care of Souls most immediately belongeth, within his own Diocess; besides, that both the quality of the person (if she be of eminent Place and Rank) and the weightiness of the case, make it so much the more proper for his cognisance: But howsoever it would be done to a Man of approved wisdom, and such an one, as will be both compassionate and secret, wherein the more freely she shall make confession of her said sins, and the more chearfully she shall subject her self to perform such further acts, whether of Humiliation or Charity, as the Bishop or Priest shall advise to be done, in testimony of her unfeigned Repentance, the more sound comfort undoubtedly with the sentence of Absolution bring unto the Soul.
§. 14. This done, then thirdly, that she endeavour by all fair means, that the Gentleman also her friend and partner, in the aforesaid Promise, may be brought to the like sight and acknowledgment, of the great sins that were enwrapped in that act, and to a true perswasion withal, that so long as he continueth in the former unlawful affection and resolution, he is not only still under the guilt of those sins, but also in near danger (without Gods great mercy preventing it) of falling into other and greater sins; for which purpose it will be expedient, that he be truly and effectually dealt withal, (yet with as much lenity as the state of his Soul will suffer, and with all possible secresie) and that by some such person especially as he holdeth a reverend opinion of both for Learning and Piety; and to procure that this be done, the Gentlewoman ought to take it into her own especially care; which it will concern her to do, not only in Christian Charity for the good of his Soul, but in Christian wisdom also for her own future benefit and security.
§. 15. For when he shall be once throughly convinced in his judgement and conscience, of the unlawfulness of the Promise made between them, and of the sinful inconveniences that attend the continued purpose of fulfilling it, there is a fair way open for that which is next and fourthly to be done, viz. That he be then earnestly moved for his Relaxation of the said Promise to the Gentlewoman, which (being it was but a meer Promise, and no Vow, as in the first Point hath already been shewed) he hath in himself a full power to make, and this also to be done in the presence of such Persons, as they shall make choice of betwixt themselves to be witnesses of the said Release; for although the Promise being utterly unlawful, hath no power to bind, and so there needeth no Release, as of absolute necessity, in regard of the thing it self; yet such Release may be very behoofeful in regard of the Gentlewomans person, and for the quieting of her conscience, in case there should remain any fears or scruples behind, least perhaps her promise should still bind her; for as Satan laboureth to benum the conscience with security to make men bold to commit sins without scruple, till he has drawn them into the snare; so when he seeth them offer to get out of the snare again by Repentance, he is very cunning to inject needless Scruples and Fears, if possibly he can, to hold them in by means thereof; wherefore I hold it very expedient that such a Release, if it may be obtained, be not neglected; for thereby the binding power of the Promise, though we should suppose it lawful, should be quite taken away, so as there need no scruple to remain: Abundans Cautela non nocet, is a safe Aphorism; as wary men when they pay monies, besides seeing the Book crost, will crave to have an Aquittance: So it may be some satisfaction to the Gentlewomans mind, to have a solemn Release before witness, which say it should be more then needeth, yet can do no harme howsoever.
§. 16. Fifthly, that the Gentlewoman all the while before, and so ever after that time only excepted, when the Relaxation should be made, for then it is requisite, she should be personally present) carefully avoid the company of that Gentleman, and he likewise hers, so far as conveniently may be; but at leastwise, by no means converse together with any familiarity, especially in private; least the former unlawful affection should rekindle in either Party, and so the disease after some measure of cure grow to a re-laps, which many times proves more dangerous then the first malady; for commonly when the unclean spirit is ejected by Repentance, if once he make himself master of the heart again (as he will attempt it, and without a good watch haply effect it) he will be sure at the re-entry, to come with a new strength, and that sevenfold, to what he had before, and needs must the end of that man be worse then the beginning▪ she must therefore resolve to shun all likely occasions of falling again into the same snare, so far as the quality of her person and condition, and the common affairs of life will permit: And she had need also to use her best care and diligence (praying to God dayly for Grace to strengthen her thereunto) to withstand all wicked temptations of the flesh that she be no more foiled thereby, neither entangled again in such sinful inconveniences, as by Gods mercy she shall be now freed from.
§. 17. If in these Directions, I be thought to deal with too much rigour and strictness, it would be considered:
First, that it's much better to put the patient to a little more pain at the first, then by skinning the wound overly, to heal it deceitfully; and to suffer it to rankle inward, which will breed a great deal more grief at last.
Secondly, that since all men (through corrupt self-love, and privy Hypocrisie, cleaving to our depraved nature) are partial towards themselves, and apt to deal more favourably with their own sins, then they ought; it is therefore safest for them (in their own Cases especially) to encline to severity, rather then indulgence.
Thirdly; that there may be a mitigation used of the present Directions, according as the state of the Patient (in the several variations thereof) shall require; but that (for the avoiding of partiality) not to be permitted to the sole liberty of the party himself, but rather to be done by the advice of a Ghostly Physitian, who if he be a man of such wisdom and moderation, as is meet, will I doubt not allow a greater indulgence in case he see it expedient, then it could be safe for the Party her self to take of her own head.
Fourthly, That in all this Discourse, I take not upon me to write Edicts, but to give my advice, that is to say, not to prescribe to the judgment of others, if any shall see cause to dissent, but to deliver my own opinion (being requested thereunto by a Reverend Friend) with such a faithfulness and freedom as becometh me to do; and truly those Parties whom it most concerneth, ought not to blame me for it howsoever; inasmuch as there can be no cause to suspect that I should be carryed with any personal respects to be partial either for or against either of them; so God is my witness whom I desire to serve, I had not any intimation at all given me, neither yet have so much as the least conjecture in the World, who either of them both might be.