The Obligation of Promissory Oaths, Lecture 1

The Obligation of Promissory Oaths · Lecture 1

De Iuramento.

SEVEN LECTURES CONCERNING THE OBLIGATION Of Promissory OATHES. Read publickly in the Divinity School at OXFORD.

By ROBERT SENDERSON D. D. His MAJESTIES Publick Professor there.

Translated into English by His late MAJESTIES speciall Command, and afterwards Revised and approved under His MAJESTIES own hand.

London, Printed by E. C. for Humphrey Moseley, Octavian Pulleyn, and Andrew Crook and are to be sold at their shops in St. Pauls-Ch…ch…yard 1655.

TO THE READER.

SHould I tell thee no more but the Authors Name, and by whose Command this Book was made English, 'twere sufficient Commendation; But (because I intend not to waste many words) know, that whether thou be a Ruler, or a Subject, Single, or Marryed, this Book will concern thee; Since thou canst not make any Oath, Promise, or Stipulation, (and thou canst not quietly live without them) but mayst here read how far thou stand'st obliged; So that whether thou lovest thy own conscience, or thy Neighbours, the Author, (and perhaps the Translator have here done thee a courtesie.

Farewell.

p. 1OF THE OBLIGATION OF OATHES.

The first Lecture.

NUMB. 30. 2.

If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to binde his soul with a Bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.

The Summary.

1. The things to be handled proposed.

2. The definition of an oath.

p. 23. An Oath is a Religious Act.

4. In an Oath God is called to witnesse.

5. The matter of an Oath is something in doubt.

6. The end of an Oath is credit.

7. The definition given, containeth all the four kindes of Causes.

8. Oaths assertory and promissory.

9. Oathes Comminatory.

10. Oathes Execratory.

11. The definition and distinction of Obligation.

12. Obligation to guilt and to punishment.

13. An Oath is in the nature of it Obligatory.

14. The different obligation of the Assertory, and Promissory.

p. 3SECT. I.

I Shall handle this matter with the more expedition, and your better profit, (as I conceive) if in the very entrance I lay before your eyes as it were a generall Map of my future discourse; for so both you may better understand my design, and I more certainly bound my speech; that I may either contain it within the due compasse, or if it chance to start out a little, it do not so loosly wander, but that it may be maturely brought in order, and reduced unto the point. I shall therefore deliver the whole matter under three heads.

First, That it may be the better understood 1of what I speak, I wil shew what an Oath is in generall, what a Promissory Oath is in particular, & what Obligation.

Then because the determination of uncertain things is to be drawn from 2such as are certain, I shall propose certain axioms or generall rules, derived p. 4from the fountains of naturall Law, and confirmed by generall consent, as Hypotheses, and Touch-stones of the future disquisition, from whence the decisions of particular cases are to be deduced, and to which they are to be brought as unto their rules & Canons. These two necessarily premised, of which one will give light to that which is to be spoken, the other strength and foundation: I shall come in the third place to salve those doubts, which may have any 3difficulty in them worthy of debate, or may serve to cast any scruple into the mindes and consciences of pious men: which as it is the principall part of the whole work, and by far the largest, I shall endevour to bring all the variety of Cases into certain Classes, and that according to the four kindes of Causes so far as it concerns the bond of obligation; reserving to the conclusion of the work, both those things which appertain to the solution of that bond, and any other which I shall either finde to have been omitted in their due place, or judge fit for the better regulation of life, and Conscience, to be annexed.

p. 5SECT. II.

THE draught of the whole future treaty thus delineated as in a map, now I betake my self to the matter. Where first is to be explained what an Oath is. I shall not need to insist upon the name, and the defining thereof: for the ill custome of swearing is grown to that passe, and the familiar abuse of this so sacred a thing is such in these debauched times, that it can be unknown to no man, nay not unto children, what an Oath is. Authors (as the manner is) variously expresse the definition of the thing it self, according to their particular fancies. That of Cicero is the most concise, An Oath, saith he, is a religious affirmation. Where by the way I both admire and am angry at the forward youths of this age, who I know not out of what erroneous prejudice, but I am confident, to their own great hurt, avoid Cicero, as a writer of too much prolixity. But I return: if any man desire a fuller definition of an oath, let him take this, An Oath is a religious act, by which God is called p. 6to witnesse for the confirmation of some matter in doubt. Every member of this definition I shal particularly explain.

SECT. III.

FIrst, I say it is a religious act. Act is put as the Genus; for though an Oath be properly in the Predicament of Relation, yet because the relative respect which is in an oath is founded upon the act of the party swearing, it is not for that reason impertinently defined by such an act; for as much as in the definition of Relatives, the matter or ground of that relation is usually put in for the Genus. Now that it is a religious Act, is manifest, first, by the authority of Scripture, Deut. 6. 13. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and swear by his name. From which place the Schoolmen unanimously conclude, that an Oath is (to use their term) Cultus latriae, that is, an act of such holy worship as is due unto God alone.

Socondly, It is manisest by the consent of all Nations, amongst whom as p. 7led by one light of nature, the religion of an oath hath been ever held most sacred; insomuch that the very words, Sanctity, Religion, and others of like sense, are scarse in any other so frequently used amongst Heathen writers, as in this matter of Oathes; and though they had many rites amongst them, which they held sacred, yet to an Oath only, for no other cause then that it was in a manner the most holy of their holy things, remained as peculiar right by the name of Sacrament. From whence that name passed afterwards into the Church, from some similitude with the military Sacrament of the Romans, yet to signifie some other things. The French also at this day framing the Latine word Sacramentum unto their pronuntiation call an oath, Unserement.

Thirdly, it is manifest from most evident Reason: because an Oath tends to the honour of God as being an acknowledgement of his truth, wisdome, justice, and divine power. For although a falfe oath, or an oath lightly, rashly, or otherwise unduly taken, discover a certain irreverence to, or rather contempt of God in the party swearing, p. 8and savour too much of Atheisme: the act neverthelesse of swearing in its own nature implies a reverence of the divine Name. For since every oath is made for confirmation of that which is avouched by the party swearing; and all confirmation ought to be made by something that is most certain, and of greater authority, (Heb. 6. Menverily swear by the greater:) He who swears, ipso facto acknowledgeth God to be his superior, a witnesse of the highest authority; of infallible truth, the searcher of hearts, and the most just, and powerfull punisher of all perjury and falshood. An oath therefore is a religious act.

SECT. IV.

SEcondly, I say, In which God is called witnesse. Wherein are these three things; God called, as a witnesse, and by way of invocation. In all oathes God is chiefly called; for although there was a solemnity heretofore amongst Heathens, Jewes, and Christians of swearing either by Creatures, or at least in swearing not to expresse the name of God, but the names of creatures p. 9only, as might if need were be proved by infinite testimonies drawn both from Scripture, and other authors, (to dispute which two things, whether they be, o… how far they may be lawfull, is not to the present purpose) yet in every oath which is truly and formally an oath, the testimony of God is either explicitly, or implicitly used; for both he who sweareth by idols, which indeed are nothing, 1 Cor. 8. 4. & Jer. 5. 6. are no Gods, swears by those he thinks to be Gods: and he who swears by any creature, doth that in some sort in order and relation unto God, because he calleth the creature to witnesse, as it were something of God, that is to say, in which the truth, goodnesse, and power of God appeareth, and which he both acknowledgeth that by the mercy of. God he enjoyeth, and would be loth by the justice of God to be deprived of For example; if a man swear by his life, by his soul, by his head, by his salvation, &c. it is as much as if he should say, by that God to whom I owe my life, my soul, my head, from whom I expect salvation, &c. And in this particular is the difference between an Oath, and p. 10bare assertion or promise, which two men make without any interposition of the divine Name, either expresse or tacite. Now in that God is called to witnesse, therein an oath is distinguished from a Vow; for in a Vow God himself is contracted withall as a party, to whom vowes are immediately addressed. But man is contracted withall in an oath, and God brought in not as a party, but witnesse. Now in the definition I have said God to be witnesse simply and precisely, not a judge and revenger; which neverthelesse is added by some indeed truly, but perhaps not necessarily; and no superfluous thing should be brought into a definition. I confesse he who swears doth both adduce God witnesse of truth, and avenger of falshood; but that primarily, and perse, this secondarily, and by consequence. For that God be witnesse unto truth, appertaineth simply to the nature of testimony: but that he punish falshood, concerns not so much the nature of testimony, as the effect. But neither is it sufficient unto an oath, that God be made the witnesse, except he be also invocated; for God may be p. 11brought a witnesse, and that for the confirmation of a doubtfull thing too, even without an oath. As if for the confirmation of this Thesis, Images are not to be adored, I should alledge some places out of Scripture; certainly this were to adduce the testimony of God for confirmation of a thing in doubt, and yet as certainly this were no oath; for it is quite another matter to cite God a witnesse in respect of a testimony already given, which may be done without invocation; and to invoke God a witnesse with respect unto a testimony now to be exhibited, wherein the formality of an oath consisteth.

SECT. V.

THirdly, I said, and it is the last member of the definition, that God is invoked a witnesse for the confirmation of some matter in doubt. In which words is contained both the end, and matter, or object of the oath. The materia circa quam, or object of an oath, is a Doubtful thing; that is, whose certitude so depends upon the credit of the speaker, that it can be no other way p. 12conveniently found out. Wherefore first, the Scibilia, of which kinde universall things be, which are ever certain and like themselves, nor can be otherwise; Secondly, particular things which rest upon the testimony of sense, which are either so clear and certain in History, universall tradition, or other publick testimony, free from all suspicion of falshood, that they can leave no occasion of doubt with men of sound mindes; are no fit matter for oathes. For how ridiculous were it, and unbeseeming a sober man to confirm by an oath, that a triangle hath three Angles; or that vertue is desirable for it self; or that Aristotle was a Philosopher; or that Cicero an Orator; or that a youth disputing in the Schools, and being to prove a proposition denied, should lay arguments aside, and swear it to be true? Wherefore particular things, such as are facts of peculiar persons with their circumstances, which for the various chances, and contingencies whereunto they are obnoxious, are so mutable, and doubtfull, that no certainty thereof can be had by way of demonstration, or other, except that p. 13which depends upon the credit of men: are those things, unto the confirmation whereof, oathes are properly of use: which the Apostle intimates in that Heb. 6. An oath is the end of all contradiction. As if he should say, an oath is there to take place where there is no end of contradiction; one, imagine the Plaintiffe, affirming; the other, imagine the Defendant, denying: except by the interposition of an oath, one part of contradiction being confirmed, the other part cease, and the whole strife be determined.

SECT. VI.

ANd this Confirmation (the Apostle in the place mentioned cals it foreign) is the true end of an oath. For since particular things would be uncertain, and through their contingency doubtfull, nor could be proved but by witnesses, and all humane testimony would be infirm and fallible, especially through two defects; one of knowledge, (for we are ignorant of very much) the other of conscience, (every man being a lyer) and yet it would make for mens p. 14convenience that the things in controversie amongst them, and mutually debated, should be reduced to some certainty, without which there would be amongst men no faith, nor justice, which are the most firm bonds of humane society; there lyeth a necessity of flying to the testimony of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. And thus oathes are received by all nations from divine institution, or the law of nature, as a fit remedy for this disease. In the judgement of all men, foreign, saith Diodorus Siculus, and Dionysius Haliearnasseus, foreign: And the Apostle greater, and more elegantly then, both foreign, an end of all strife, Heb. 6. When we arrive once at this point, Ne plus ultra; all humane dispute and contradiction must rest here. Not that every thing confirmed by an oath is simply certain (for then there would be no perjury, which alas is too common) but because in this condition of mortality (wherein it seemeth unto divine wisdome profitable for mankinde that they should be conversant with much obscurity and incertainty of p. 15things, to the end that their mindes may be raised unto the things above which are more certain) there can be no greater humane faith then that which in an oath, by the invocation of the name of God, is as it were attested and confirmed from heaven.

SECT. VII.

IN this definition of an Oath examined as you have heard, are in some sort contained all the causes of oathes. That first member in which it is said to be a religious Act, to wit, of him who sweareth, necessarily includeth the will of the Agent, that is to say, of the party swearing; (seeing every man is a free agent, and every humane act voluntary) as the primary Efficient cause. The second member expresseth the Formall cause of an oath, which is the attestation of the divine Name, or invocation of God as a witnesse. The third member contains the other two causes, to wit, the Materiall and Finall. For the proper Matter of an Oath is the thing in doubt; that is, the truth whereof is p. 16not sufficiently confirmed to him, before whom it is pleaded, by the bare testimony of the assertor; and the proper Finall cause of an oath is, that a doubtfull matter may have that certainty through invocation of divine testimony, then which no greater can be had in the contingency of humane affairs. This which I have said, Auditors, is to the end it may render me the more excusable unto you for the prolixity I have used in explaining the definition of an Oath. Because when with the help of God I come to state dubious cases, which I intend to do with respect unto the four kindes of causes, I doubt not but you will then easily perceive, how profitable it will be to the studious, and advantagious unto my purpose, to have had a foreknowledge of these things, which concerning the nature of oathes have been by me so largely handled.

p. 17SECT. VIII.

BUt thus much of Oathes in generall, what a Promissory Oath is in particular comes in the next place, but more briefly to be explained. Sundry divisions and distinctions of oathes according to the diversities they respect are extant in Divines and Lawyers: by some they are divided into Judiciall and Extrajudiciall; by some into publick, and private; into simple, and solemn; into naked, and execratory; into absolute, and conditionall; by others, otherwise. But the noblest of all, and that which (as I remember) is not by any of them who have written of oathes, omitted, is that whereby they are distinguished into Assertory and Promissory. For whereas in every oath (as hath been said) the name of God is taken by the party swearing by way of invocation unto the testimony of some doubtfull matter, it is to be observed, that this may be done three waies. For a past matter may be doubted whether it were so, or not so: as, did you see Caius yesterday in the marketplace p. 18or no? or a present one, whether it be so or not; as, have you the money I left in your hands, or have you it not? or a future one, whether it will be so or not: as, will you lend me an hundred pound to morrow, or will you not? So often therefore as God by an oath is invoked witnesse to a thing past or present, such an oath is usually called Assertory; Because the party swearing without any promise for the future, only asserts the thing to have been, or to be as he then sweareth. But if God by the interposition of an oath be invoked witnesse to a future thing, that oath is called Promissory, because the party swearing promiseth to performe something, or not to perform it hereafter. The chief use of the Assertory is in judicature to determine suits, especially upon the question of fact. There is small use of the Promissory in judicature, but very much in promises, bargains, contracts. Many examples of this kinde of oath are found in sacred story, and elsewhere. The servant of Abraham devoutly sweareth faithfully Gen. 24. 9Gen 24:9to observe his Lords commands in the choice of a wife for his masters p. 19son. Joshua and the princes of the people of Israel swear, but inconsiderately, Josh. 9. 15.Josh 9:15to observe the League with the Gibeonites. King Herod sware, but Mat. 14. 7.Matt 14:7very rashly, to give unto the daughter of Herodias whatsoever she should aske.

SECT. IX.

FUrthermore it is to be advertised, that under the title of an oath Promissory, is also comprehended the Comminatory; such as was the rash oath of David for the destruction of Nabal, and the impious one of certain Jewes, who vowed that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed Paul. These and such like are not properly Promises, which word seems rather to signifie something that may be gratefull unto another, but by a kinde of Synecdoche joyned with a Catachresis (which as it is otherwise familiar amongst good Authors, so especially in words which respect some future thing; as sperare for timere, and the like) the name of Promises may Metaleptically be extended to Comminations. So Gods Oath, whereby he sware in his wrath p. 20that the Israelites, who had tempted him with divers provocations in the wildernesse, should not enter into his rest, may and useth no lesse to be called promissory (though not so properly) then the other of his whereby he sware unto their fathers that he would give them the land of Canaan for an heritage.

SECT. X.

NEither is it materiall to the nature or effect of a promissory oath, whether the oath be barely expressed, or with an execration added; for although there be some of the Schoolmen, unto whom that oath which is made by a simple calling to witnesse, seems to differ in specie, from that which is done with an execration added, they being induced unto that opinion for this reason, that God is invoked by that as a witnesse, by this as a judge; yet if we more attentively consider the matter, we shall finde by what hath been said, that they come both to on… For every oath in what manner soever uttered, whether barely, or with p. 21execration, either expresly, or at the least implicitly, invoketh God both as a Witnesse and Judge, but primarily and perse as a Witnesse; secondarily and consequently as a Judge; and that is the most explicate form of an oath, whereby God is both explicitly called to witnesse, and whereunto an execration, or imprecation is annexed: as if a man should swear thus, I call God to witnesse, who confound me if I do it not, that I will do this or that. But ordinarily either this or that part is omitted, and oathes are more succinctly given, as by those examples in holy Scripture where God is introduced swearing after the manner of men, is sufficiently manifest. There you may finde God swearing sometime by a simple attestation without any execration, as in these, As I live, saith the Lord, I have worn by my self, by my holinesse, &c. sometimes without any attestation, by an execration only, but that too, (for the honour and reverence of so great a Majesty, and after the manner of men almost suppressing by an Aposiopesis, words of ill omen) elliptically and diminutely uttered; as in that of the p. 22Psalme, I sware in my wrath, if they enter Psal. 95.Ps 95into my rest. This in the mean time seemeth certain, that every promissory oath under what forme soever conceived, brief, or large, so it be an oath, and no mere Asseveration or Obtestation, virtually containeth both, that is to say, Attestation, and Execration. For in an oath both Execration supposeth Attestation as athing before it in nature, and Attestation interreth Execration as its necessary consequent. That of Plutarch is …thy. foreign, Every Oath concudeth with a curse of perjurie. And thus much for the nature of a Promissory Oath.

SECT. XI.

IT remains that in the last place I adde something of the nature and force of Obligation. Of obligation Lawyers say much and with prolixity enough: they define it to be a Bond of Law, whereby a man is bound to pay that which he oweth. Which definition will be no leste fit to explain those things which are internall, and appertain unto the Court of Conscience, then those which are externall, and appertain p. 23to the Court of Judicature, whether in Church or in Common-wealth; if the terme of Law be not restrained to that which is humane, and positive only, but so extended, as it take in also universal Law divine and naturall. Now since every obligatory Bond, as may be gathered from the definition, derives it self from some Law, as the Law is twofold, the one part divine and naturall, the other civill and humane; so the bond or obligation arising from thence is also twofold; to wit, the naturall Bond which obligeth naturally, and in foro externo, by the vertue of divine Law; and the civill Bond which obligeth civilly, and in foro externo, by vertue of humane Law. Some call that the obligation of equity, this the obligation of justice; whether properly or improperly, I dispute not: for where we agree in the thing, to what purpose were it to contend about the terms? But whereas they adde a third kind of Obligation, compounded of the former two, that certainly is not very convenient, or at the least not necessary: For if a man be bound to the performance of the same duty (as for example, to p. 24feed his aged parents) both by naturall Law, and Civill; this would be no new species of obligation mixed of the other two, but rather two obligations conjoyned, both in the subject, and object, (in the subject, for as much as they binde the same person; and in the object, forasmuch as they binde unto the same duty) and yet naturally and originally distinct. The reason is manifest, for thi…gs cannot by their mixture produce a new species, without some reall immutation of themselves. Whence Aristotle defines Mistion, Misoibilium alteratorum unionem. For in all mistion there must be alteration, and every alteration is a reall mutation, as appears in the generation of mixed bodies out of the four elements, not entire, but broken, and altered. But where a new obligation is added unto a former one, as in this case, the civill to the naturall, no reall mutation is made of either. But the former obligation remains in the same state it was in before the accession of the new and latter. But I will not stay upon these subtleties. In the matter of oathes we consider the Mor…ll, or Naturall obligation p. 25only, or at the least especially; the other, the Civi…l we leave to Lawyers.

SECT. XII.

BEsides that distinction of obligation, which ariseth from its Originall, in relation unto the Law whence it deriveth: there is yet another, taken from the Object in relation unto the Debt to be paid, at which obligation aimeth, and whereunto it is carryed. Now debts are twofold. Debitum officii, according unto which every man is bound, by the precept of the Law to act: and Debitum supplicii, according to which every man is bound by the decree of the Law to suffer if he neglect his duty. In the former sense we say that the mutuall exercise of Charity is a debt, because the Law of God enjoynes it, according to that Rom. 13. 8. Owe no man any thing, but to lov one another. In the latter sense we say, that sins are debts, as in the Lords Prayer, Forgive us our debts, and that externall death is a debt, according to that Rom. 6. 23. The wages of sin is death. Neverthelesse it's to be observed, p. 26that the latter debt is contracted by non-payment of the former. So that if a man fully disingage his debitum offici…, by obeying what the Law commandeth, he remaineth not bound debito supplic…i, to suffer that which the Law denounceth. To this twofold debt an…wereth a twofold obligation, of the very same denomination, to wit, obligation ad officium, to the performance of duty; and obligation ad supplicium, to the sufferance of punishment; or according to the usuall terms, which comes all to one, obligation to guilt, and obligation to punishment. But so as the former be in the intention of the Law, as it is in its own nature, chief and preferred before the latter; for it is the part of a Tyrant, not of the Law, otherwise to inflict punishment then in relation to guil…: and that speech of the Apostle is true even in this sense, though perhaps more rightly to be understood in another, The Law is not made for a righteous man. The Law therefore intendeth primarily, directly, perse, and simply, to oblige unto duty, and obedience. But unto chastisement and punishment, it obligeth only secondarily, p. 27indirectly, consequently, and ex hypothesi, that is to say, supposing the neglect or contempt of du…y. The Apo…tle seemeth to have joyned both these obligations together, in Rom. 13. where he sp…aks of the subjection due unto the Soveraign power, Y… must needs (saith he) be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscrence sake: from which words I gather three things of concernment to my present intention. The first is, that we may be bound by a double bond to the performance of one and the same thing; by the bond of duty, and the bond of punishment; for this is implyed in the words of conscience and wrath. The second, that the conscience of duty ought with all good men to be valued, and preferred before the fear of punishment. The third, that the obligation of conscience ariseth preciselv out of the debt of duty. Whence also it is manifest, that we, when we speak of the obligation of oathes, as it concerneth conscience, are primarily and especially to be understood of the obligation which bindes us to the performance of Duty, not of that whereby we are bound to suffer the punishment due unto perjury.

p. 28SECT. XIII.

THese two distinctions of Obligations laid, it is furth rmore to be understood, that every oath is in its own nature binding: in…omuch, as if a man should swear without any intention to oblige himself, nay although he should swear with an intention not to oblige himself; neverthelesse, the oath taken, he becomes ipso facto obliged, as in its place (if it please God that I go so far) I shall more fully shew. Cicer… saith right, Our Ancestors would have no bond for the obligation of faith, stricter then that of an oath. But what could be more clearly said in this matter, then that which Moses saies in the text? If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to linde his soul with a b…nd: where that gemination after the manner of the Hebrewes, hath much emphasis, and fortifies the signification of the words: As in multiplying I will multiply; & in blessing I will blesse: that is, I will exceedingly multiply, I will greatly bless: so ligando ligamen, binding with a Bond, that is, strongly binding; as if he p. 29should have said, although even a bare promise oblige the conscience, and that with the addition of an asseveration, or obtestation, it oblige more strictly: yet a vow which is made to God, and an oath which is made to men, but with the witnesse of God, are the strongest of all obligations. Wherefore every oath obligeth the con…cience, as well the Assertory, as the Promissory. Of the Promissory, seeing it respecteth the time to come, no man can doubt. But of the Assertory, perhaps not without reason there may be some question made, because all obligation bindeth unto some thing that is future; but it hath been said before, that the difference of the Assertory Oath from the Promissory consisteth in this, that that respecteth a thing present or past, this a future. But the solution is easie, to wit, that the obligation of an oath qua tale, falleth not primarily upon the object, or matter of Oath; for so an Assertory Oath whose object is something past, or present, could not lay any obligation for the future. But obligation falleth immediately and directly upon the subject, that is the p. 30conscience of the swearer, who in both kindes of oath is bound to the performance of some duty for the future.

SECT. XIV.

WHich that it may be made more manifest, and that withall it may mo… clearly appear, what the obligation of a Promissory Oath (which I have undertaken to explain) is, I will do my best to shew, what is common to both kindes of Oath, so far as it concerneth the effect of obligation; and what is peculiar unto a Promissory Oath. And first it must be granted, which is in it self so evident, as its contradictory implyeth a manifest contradiction, That all obligation to duty respecteth the duty to be performed de futuro; that is, at the least some time, though perhaps a very small one, after the obligation contracted. Nor is it hard to be observed, if diligently considered, that this happeneth unto every Oath as well Assertory as Promissory; for whosoever sweareth, obligeth himself ipso facto, to manifest the truth in that which he is about to say, whether p. 31it be in a matter past, or present, by an Assertory, or in a future matter by a Promissory Oath. And hitherto this obligation is alike common to both kindes; so that if in either of them the words of the party swearing do not agree with his minde, he becometh guilty of the breach of his duty: and thence also … necessary consequence obnoxious unto punishment. But in the Promissory Oath, besides this obligation which fals upon the conscience of the party swearing, and is common to it and the Assertory, quatenus juramentum; there is another further obligation proper and peculiar unto it, quatenus Promissorium, which fals upon the matter of the Oath: by vertue whereof the Promissory party swearing is bound not only in present to intend to do that which he sweareth, that his words may agree with his minde, but also to indevour for the future (as much as in him lyeth) to fulfill that which he hath sworn, that his deeds may agree with his words; that is, he obligeth himself not only barely to promise that which he really intendeth; but also farther p. 32obligeth himself to performe all that which he hath promised by Oath; which the words of Moses in this verse clearly expresse, If a man (saith he) vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to binde his soule with a Bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. And thus as fully as I o…ght, & asclearly as I could, I have unfolded unto you my sense upon the first head of this discourse, what an Oath is, what a Promissory Oath, what Obligation. In my next Lecture (with the help of God) I shall proceed unto the rest in the order which I have proposed.