The Obligation of Promissory Oaths, Lecture 7

The Obligation of Promissory Oaths · Lecture 7

p. 226The seventh Lecture. Of the Solution of the Bond of an Oath; and of the use and abuse of Oathes; containing five Cases, and so many Conclusions.

Summary.

1 What truth is required in a promissory oath.

2 What the solution of the Bond is.

3 Whether an oath may be dispensed withall?

4 The Popes power of dispensing with oathes examined.

5 Whether an oath may be commuted.

6 The Superior may invalidate the oath of his Subject.

7 The matter of an oath ceasing, the obligation ceaseth.

8 An oath may be released by him unto whom it is made.

p. 2279 It is not unlawfull to swear.

10 The custome of swearing in ordinary …discourse evill.

11 A man ought not to swear without necessity.

12 Cautions in oathes required by others.

13 An oath is not to be taken with an unsati…fied Conscience.

SECT. I.

THe solution of the bond or tye wherewith he who sweareth bindeth his soul, and whereof we have hitherto so largely discoursed, is the task of this day, and conclusion of the work proposed. Of which solution before we descend unto the particular kindes, two things are to be observed in generall. First, that solution of the bond is proper unto a Promissory oath, and hath nothing to doe at all with the Assertory. In every oath whether assertory, or promissory, there ought to be truth; but with this difference, in p. 228the assertory, a single truth, and for the present sufficeth, where in the promissory a double truth is required, one respecting the present, the other the future. The present truth regardeth the act of swearing, and consisteth in this, that the party swearing say true when he sweareth; that is, that his minde agree with his words, and that he be resolved to hold unto that which he promiseth. Which act of swearing in the promissory wholly agreeth as to the truth and falsehood with the act of swearing in the assertory. For the matter of that truth in either act, seeing it regardeth the time present, passeth as it were into a kinde of immutable necessity, in as much as an oath, so soon as it is made, may instantly be said to have been true or false; which truth or falsehood, when the act hath once passed, is as impossible to be altered, as it were to make a fact to have been no fact. That obligation therefore whereby the party swearing is bound for the present to say truth, falleth upon the act it self of swearing; and is inseparably conjoyned with that act, and for that reason cannot be loosed, nor separated p. 229from the oath: and of an assertory oath, except this for the present, there is no further obligation, because the matter thereof is some fact past or present. But in a promissory oath, the matter whereof is a thing to be performed for the future, another truth is also required for the future, which regardeth the matter of the oath; and consisteth in this, that the party swearing make that which he hath promised to be true; that is, that he fulfill his promise. Now seeing the matter of a promissory oath, to wit, things to be performed for the future, are through the uncertainty of future events, obnoxious to manyfold changes and alterations: hence it cometh to passe, that the obligation which falleth upon that matter, and whereby the party swearing is bound in future to fulfill his promise, is mutable, and separable from the oath. And this is that, which we call Solution of the Bond. From whence also followeth that which is to be observed in the second place; to wit, that the solution of the Bond in a promissory oath, ought not to be understood in relation unto the former p. 230obligation, which ariseth from truth for the present, and is common with this, and the assertory oath; but ought to be understood only in relation unto the later obligation, which ariseth from truth for the future; which is proper and peculiar unto this. That is to say, every person swearing promissorily, ipso facto, and by vertue of the act of swearing is simply, and indissolubly obliged in present, to intend faithfully and from his heart to effect that afterwards which he promiseth; but having sworn, it may come many wayes to passe, that he may not be bound for the future, to fulfill that afterwards which he formerly promised and intended. In a word thus, He is alwayes forsworn, who intendeth not that which he promiseth; but he is not alwayes forsworne, who performeth not that which he promised.

SECT. II.

NOW that a thing promised may neverthelesse lawfully, and without danger of perjury or other sin, not be performed, must necessarily happen p. 231one of these two wayes, either that there was no obligation from the beginning, or that it was (by solution of the bond) since taken away. If the thing promised were, when it was sworn, either impossible, or unlawfull, the oath taken unto the same imposeth no obligation, nor needeth solution, but penitence; for as much as in so swearing grievous sin is contracted, but no bond; for we have already shewn, that impossible things, and unlawfull things are in no wise obligatory. Wherefore solution of the bond supposeth antecedent obligation, and implyeth that the same may be afterwards so taken away, or at the least obstructed, that he who was formerly bound up so close with the bond of his oath, that he might not under pain of perjury doe otherwise then he had promised, is now no farther bound unto the performance of his promise. The businesse therefore now in hand is to find out a certain reason, whereupon he who hath obliged himself by the bond of an oath unto the performance of a thing, may rest secure in his Conscience that he is delivered from that bond; and no farther p. 232bound unto the performance of that promise. To which solution those five wayes commonly assigned, we shall examine in their order.

SECT. III.

THe first Case is of the dispensability of an oath; Whether and in what the dispensation of a Superiour, may take away the obligation thereof. Dispensation, as the word is commonly taken, signifieth exemption of a person from the ordinary course of Law granted, by speciall favour of him who is in authority. As if a man who is subject to any Law, should by especiall grace of his Prince be exempted from obedience unto that Law, as we see daily practised in Universities, where upon reasonable grounds dispensations are usually granted unto particular persons, whereby they are in some things freed from the observation of the Statutes. Now the right of dispensation is founded upon that equity, which requireth that sometimes the rigour of Law be in some things p. 233remitted, to the end that equity may not be excluded. For seeing Laws were of necessity made in generall tearms, and have regard unto that which is commonly and for the most part good and profitable for the publick, which neverthelesse pro hic & nunc, may happen to be unprofitable, or at the least lesse convenient; it therefore seemed good, where that which is established by Law appeareth to be exceeding burthensome, or inconvenient to some private person, and the publick to receive no great detriment by the omission thereof, that the Prince, or other legitimate Superiour, should have power to determine, that the Law in such cases is not to be observed. And this is that which in Law we call Dispensation. Now what power is in secular Princes to dispense with their Laws, the same doe the Popes of Rome arrogate to themselves in dispensing with Vows and Oathes. Whose impudence in this kinde, whilest they absolve subjects of their Allegiance to Kings, null Leagues and Contracts made by Princes, untye the straightest knots of vows and oathes by commutation, relaxation, dispensation, p. 234contrary command, or other artifices at their pleasure, and for their profit, I could wish some who most justly condemn, did not most wickedly imitate. But though others de facto exercise this power of dispensing with oathes, yet the Pope only challengeth it unto himself de jure. Many even before Luther have grievously complained of this thing, and sharpely inveighed against the abuse of Papall Dispensations; unto whose writings I referre the studious, and betake my self by some arguments to prove the bond of an oath simply indispensable, so that no power at all of dispensing with it, is either in Pope or any other. First, because the obligation of an oath is of Divine naturall Law. But Naturall Law is not subject to Humane Power, seeing God alone is the Author and Lord of Nature: nor could it ever yet be shewn, that God hath granted unto any kinde or order of men, authority to dispense with the Law of Nature. Secondly, because this power of dispensation being granted, the chief end of an oath, which is security (as I may call it) for the thing promised, would utterly p. 235be overthrown: for he unto whom the oath is made can have no assurance, if the promise of the party swearing may be dispensed with, that it should ever be fulfilled. Thirdly, because an oath in that very act and instant, whereby it imposeth the obligation of swearing, and the promise of performance, acquireth right of the thing promised unto the party to whom the oath is made; which two effects of an oath are so combined, that the one granted or denyed, the other also at the same time must necessarily be granted or denyed. Wherefore suppose the obligation of the party swearing taken away by dispensation, and it followeth that the right of him to whom the oath was made, is also taken away by the same; and farther, that such Dispensation must be either needlesse, or unreasonable: needlesse and superfluous, if it be done with his consent, to whom the oath was made; if against it, unreasonable and unjust. For he being willing, the obligation (as I shall shew) may be remitted, even without dispensation; but to take away his right against his will, is injury. Fourthly, because in a promissory p. 236oath, obligation is not only made unto our neighbour, as it is promissory, but to God also as it is an oath. Wherefore granting, which is not to be granted, that Superiours have power to take away the obligation, whereby in regard of promise man is obliged to man; yet would it be unsupportable presumption, that dust and ashes should arrogate unto it self authority to take away the obligation, whereby man is obliged unto God as witnesse and revenger. Fifthly, because humane dispensation is a matter of externall Judicature. But the obligation of an oath, is in the conscience within, which is subject unto no Judge but God; and belongeth not unto the Empire of man. Wherefore he who claimeth the right of dispensing with oathes, be he what he will, assumeth unto himself divine Power, seateth himself upon the bench of internall Judicature, and exerciseth Dominion over the Conscience. And such dispensation is de jure null, and invalid; even as that sentence is invalid unto all intents and purposes of the Law, which is given by a Judge in a Court where he hath nothing p. 237to doe, because there he is no Judge.

SECT. IV.

HEre the Patrons of Dispensation are wonderfully perplexed, how to ward the blow of the first argument, which is all they use to object unto themselves. It costs them much sweat to rowl this stone, (for they see it is the part of the Popes Authority, which lest his Kitching languish, must in any case be maintained) and they may put the gain in their eye; seeing they cannot finde wherewithall to make a solid defence, nor could ever yet agree amongst themselves, by what right the Pope arrogateth unto himselfe this power of dispensation. Which one thing were enough to argue them conscious of their weak pretences. For as in waging war, so in exercising power, the cause which is not stedily asserted, may well be presumed unjust. Some deduce this power of dispensing with vows, and oathes, from the absolute and Oecumenicall Authority, p. 238whereby the Pope is Lord of the Earth, and Emperour of the whole World. For seeing every person vowing or swearing is the Popes subject, this condition say they is understood in every vow or oath, to wit, If it please our Lord the Pope. Whereupon it followeth, that when the Pope signifieth, which he doth by way of dispensation, that he is not pleased the thing sworn should be ratified, the obligation presently ceaseth. Which opinion granted, the Pope at his pleasure may rescinde any oath, either with just cause or without it. Wherefore this rejected as too grosse, others, and among them some modern Jesuites deny, that the Pope can dispense with oathes, or dissolve Royall Contracts, or that he ever did it properly; that is, by taking away the obligation, or the obligation remaining by exempting any private person from the same: But they say that he dispenseth only improperly; that is, by declaring the oath in that case not obligatory, by reason of the hinderance of some good, or consequence of some ill, if the oath should be kept. But on the contrary, besides the evidence p. 239of his practice, which sheweth that the Pope exerciseth in this matter more then declaratory power, or (which cometh to as much) under pretence of declaratory power, can determine of Leagues, Vows, Oathes, Contracts between Kings, or any other at his discretion, being in this case Supreme and sole Judge, whose sentence must be obeyed, without appeal. It is worthy consideration, First, that either the Cause is manifestly just, why a thing promised by oath ought not to be performed, as if it be impossible, dishonest, or any way unlawfull; and then the party swearing may of his own authority, nay ought withoutwaiting for dispensation from the Pope or any other, to retract the thing sworn: for where there is no obligation, the Conscience is free, and needeth no dispensation. Or secondly, that no just cause appeareth why the oath should not be kept: and then it must be kept; and he who either asketh, or granteth Dispensation, sinneth; Because the obligation which neither can nor may be removed by humane power, remaineth. Or lastly, that the thing is doubtfull, and appeareth not by reason p. 240of difficulties on both sides, whether the party swearing be bound to the performance of his promise: and then it will be profitable to consult with pious, and prudent men, skilfull in divine Law, and to resolve with their advice what is most expedient. In which matter seeing knowledge is more requisite then power, I understand not why the Pope should be fitter then another man, unlesse it were certain the Pope excelled other men in prudence, and piety; for that which is not credible, certainly is not necessary. Thirdly, others not satisfied with this declaratory Dispensation, as detracting too much from the Popes authority, have beaten out an answer of wonderfull subtilty, that the obligation of an oath, which is of divine Naturall Law, may really be taken away by Dispensation of the Superiour: but that it must not therefore be said, that the Superior dispenseth with Divine and Natural Law; because say they, that Divine Law of Nature is, that an oath so long as the strength and obligation thereof remaineth, should be kept; and with this Law the Superiour dispenseth not, but by p. 241his Dispensation taketh away that strength of the oath, whereby it obliged the party swearing before the Dispensation. But this subtilty opened unto the quick would be found a meer trifle which availeth nothing, or implyes a contradiction; and is refuted by the Jesuite Achorius, though Sayrus the Monk be about his ears for it. So whilest these Cadmean brethren dispatch each other by mutuall blowes, nor can finde any reason whereby to arm themselves in proof; they really confesse that the cause which they have undertaken, cannot be defended. Wherefore I conclude that neither Pope, nor Prince, nor Synod, nor Senate, nor Ecclesiasticall nor Secular Superiour, hath any right to dispense with Leagues, Contracts, Oathes, or to absolve any man from that Bond wherein before the Dispensation granted he was engaged.

p. 242SECT. V.

WIth this first of Dispensation, the next question, or the second Case of Commutation of an Oath is allyed. Now Commutation (as the word expresseth) is nothing else but translation of the obligation from one matter to another, which whether greater, lesse, or equivalent, seemeth in some respect to be more convenient. And Commutation differeth from Dispensation, as a species from the genus, or part from the whole. For if a Bond could be loosed either by the one or other, it would be wholly unbound by Dispensation, by Commutation in part onelyonly. The doctrine of Cafuists concerning Commutation, amounteth to this sum: First, that a private man of his own authority, without his Superiours Dispensation, may commute a vow, or oath, into that which is evidently better; which they confirm by Gods example, who doth not always fulfill his temporall promises to the letter, but often changeth them for the p. 243better; and for confirmation of this opinion, they bring the speech of Gregory, He infringeth not his promise or purpose, who changeth it for the better. Secondly, that promise cannot be commuted to that which is evidently worse, or whereof question may be made, whether it be better, without authority of a Superiour qualified with legitimate power of judging and determining in that point. Thirdly, that by Commutation preexistent obligation is wholly taken off from the former matter, and new obligation brought in and laid upon a different matter. But this whole doctrine is built upon a false foundation, to wit, dispensability of an oath; which being (as we have proved) null, this superstructure of Commutation must necessarily fall to ruine. Wherefore briefly I say, that the bond of an oath cannot be remitted or losed, either in whole by Dispensation, or in part by Commutation, without consent of all the parties; But the consent of him unto whom the oath is made, is more especially required, because such right is acquired unto him, as without his own consent ought not to be taken p. 244away. For the example of God it suiteth not, because his promises as they are all of free bounty, so the temporall ones are also conditionall, and to be understood with exception of the Crosse, of the good pleasure of God, and of that which he knoweth to be most profitable for us. Neither is the case of a Vow, and of an Oath altogether alike in respect of Commutation; for in a vow seeing it is made to God alone, some liberty may perhaps be granted unto the person vowing of changing the same into another which may be evidently better, and more acceptable unto God, there being nothing in this alteration injurious unto a third person: but in an oath which is made unto man, injury might be done him, if it should without his consent, and against his will be commuted into any other thing. As if Caius sworn to pay ten pound unto Titius, should give him an Horse worth ten pounds, it would not satisfie his oath, for it is not reasonable that a man should be forced to commute a thing due unto him. Wherefore the bond of an oath cannot be loosed, nor the obligation p. 245taken away by either of these inventions.

SECT. VI.

BUt it seemeth it may by the three wayes remaining; to wit, Irritation of the Superiour, Cessation of the matter, and Relaxation of the party. Wherefore the third Case is, of solution of the bond by irritation declared by the Superiour. Now Irritation, (for so with the Casuists, we must speak, though barbarously) signifieth an act of the legitimate superiour, whereby of his Authority he rendereth an oath made by his Subject without his consent null and void. For that legitimate Superiours may rescinde Vows, and Oathes, of such as are not free, but under their Authority, Moses teacheth (as when we were upon the efficient cause we observed) largely throughout this chapter. The reason is, that he who is in the power of another, is not in his own, nor can oblige himself in things wherein he is subject, without leave from his Superiour; and therefore p. 246he ought not by any act of his to bring obligation upon himself without the others consent, either expressed, or upon reasonable grounds presumed. For the rights of Rulers over their Subjects are by the immoveable and eternall Law of God perpetuall. Moreover the duty of Subjects together with the right of obedience and subjection, are by the same perpetuall Law, perpetually and indispensably obligatory. Which antecedent obligation (by our third Hypothesis) obstructeth the effect of a subsequent oath, in such manner as it cannot be binding: for the former obligation ever prejudgeth the latter, and rendreth every act introductive of new, and contrary obligation, invalid. Wherefore in this case I say first, that a Subject ought not by oath to promise any of those things wherein he is subject unto another, without the consent of his Superiour at the least presumed. Secondly, that if he have sworn, and the thing be lawfull, he is so long obliged unto performance, as it appeareth not to be against the will, dignity and profit of his Superiour. Thirdly, that the Superiour if p. 247he have by expresse consent, whether before or after, once ratified the promise of his subject, cannot make the same afterwards void, or null the obligation thereof. Fourthly, if the Superiour so soon as he cometh to know of the matter, openly and peremptorily, declaring his dissent, forbid the performance of the same, that the transitory obligation presently ceaseth, and the subject by vertue of his former obligation of duty, which is permanent, and perpetuall, is bound notwithstanding his oath to obey his Superiour. Whence if any man subject unto the power of another, whether Master, Father, or Prince, voluntarily compelled by force or fear, or misled through fraud, or example of others, happen to make any oath, whereunto he believeth his Master, Father, or Prince, had he bi… present, would not have condescended; the same hath sinned against his duty in swearing, and is bound in no wise to fulfill that oath. Resolved therefore upon this question, that irritation of a legitimate Superiour may cancell the Bond of an Oath.

p. 248SECT. VII.

THe fourth Case is of the solution of the Bond, by cessation of the matter, or some considerable alteration happening unto the principall cause of an oath: And it is then to be supposed that the matter ceaseth, when between the time of the oath sworn, and that wherein it is to be performed, the state of things is so changed, that if the party could have foreseen what would have followed, he would by no means have sworn. I answer briefly, that the matter of the Vow, Oath, or Promise ceasing, the obligation thereof must also cease: as in naturall and artificiall things, where matter is defective, the action of the agent must be likewise of necessity deficient. For neither can fire burn except it have combustible matter, nor a Carpenter make a fourm without wood. Wherefore if a Souldier swear obedience unto his General, the War ended, and the Generall reformed, he is not bound by his oath to yeeld him obedience. And if a p. 249Father swear never to alter the Will whereby he made his son his Heir, yet finding his Heir afterwards practising upon his life by poyson, the Father is no farther bound by his oath, but notwithstanding the same may alter his will, and adopt another Heir. The same may be said where a man having heard the Statutes of any College or Society read unto him, sweareth to observe them; if these Statutes happen afterward to be revoked or abrogated, the party swearing is absolved from the bond of his oath. The reason is, that the root of obligation being pulled up, the branch must needs wither. Now the matter which gave occasion unto the oath, was the root of that obligation which sprang from the oath. For an Oath followeth the nature and condition of the Act wherewith it is joyned, that is the matter which it containeth; as an accessory followeth the nature of its principal: and Accessories, say the Lawyers, are extinct, if you destroy the Principals.

p. 250SECT. VIII.

THe last Case is of Solution of the Bond by Relaxation of a party; to wit, of him to whom the oath was made: as if Caius should promise any thing to Titius, whether Titius remitting the obligation, Caius be obsolved of his promise? Where the first thing to be observed is, that this kinde of speech To remit an Oath, and the other which resembleth it, To favour a man of his oath, are not alwayes taken by good Authors in the same sense. For sometimes they are used in relation to an oath to be made, and so he is said to remit an oath unto another, or to favour him of his oath, who the other being prepared to swear, contented with his good will, waveth his oath, and crediteth him without it; or for any other reason requireth not an oath from a person of whom he hath right to require it. But for the most part they are taken with relation unto an oath made, and so he is said to remit or favour a person of his oath, who pardoneth the performance of that which the person had promised, nor though he have p. 251right to doe it, requireth the thing due by vertue of that oath. So Sue…onius saith, that Tiberius …voured a Roman Knight of his oath, suffering him to put away his wif… taken in Adultery with his son in law, though he had sworn never to repudiate her. And the Emperours Antoninus, and Verus, signified to one who had sworn never to be of the order, and yet was created Duumvir, that they f…oured him of his oath. And this is that remission or favouring of an oath which Casuists call Relaxation. Whereof I say first, that this Relaxation taketh place in Oathes, Leagues, Bargains, and other humane Contracts, not so in Vows. The reason of this difference is, becaus… vows are made unto God as a party, but man hath power to remit those only which are made to man. Secondly, I say, if an oath be sworn in favour of another, that is in order unto his honour, power, profit, or other convenience, that it is not binding, ex…pt he in whose favour it is made, accept, and ratifie the same. As in our Law, a bond obligeth not Caius to pay an hundred pounds unto Titius, though …gned with the hand of Caius, and p. 252sealed with his seal; except Caius deliver it unto Titius, and Titius, or some other accept of it, in his name, and to his use. Thirdly I say, an oath so made, if the person unto whom it is sworn confirm the same, and expect the performance, cannot be relaxed by any third person. The reason is, because no man can take away right acquired unto another, without consent of the party. Whence it followeth, that the obligation (as we have formerly said) of an oath cannot be taken away by dispensation, except the party be willing. Fourthly I say, if he to whom the oath is sworn remit it, and would not have it be kept, that the party swearing is forthwith absolved, and no more obliged in conscience to perform the thing which he had promised. Wherefore Caius being sworn to pay Titius an hundred pound, if Titius afterwards remit the debt, he is no farther bound by his oath. The reason is, because any man may recede from his own right, and pardon a debt due unto himself, and the debt being absolved, it must needs follow, that the obligation cease, seeing solution p. 253of the debt is the period of obligation, as appeared by the definition of the same, and amongst us by the form of a bond, the conditions whereof performed, the bond becometh void, and of none effect. If you object that the debt is not absolved, because the promise is not performed. I answer, it is the same to all intents and purposes of the Law, whether it be really fulfilled or acknowledged by the party whom it concerneth as fulfilled. The reason is, because the acceptation of the person interessed, is interpretatively payment: and so, the matter as it were ceasing, the obligation ceaseth, much after the manner whereof we have spoken in the foregoing Case. And this is that which Lawyers call Acceptilation, by which (though a Civill Solution, and not real) they affirm obligation to be no lesse taken away then by the reall. If again you object, that although the obligation made to man might be taken away, by Relaxation, yet it seemeth the obligation to God should remain, as was answered in case of an oath extorted by fear. I answer that the bond relaxed, p. 254after the manner expressed, doth no injury unto God in the violation of an extorted oath, because a promise made in favour of another, is only directed unto God as witnesse of the promise made unto man, and revenger of the violation of that faith which is engaged unto the other; which faith seeing he violateth not, but fulfilleth his promise, he is wholly absolved from all obligation, both towards God and man. Fifthly I say, that solution of the Bond by Relaxation of the party, extendeth so far as pleaseth the party relaxing. As if Caius have sworn to pay Titius an hundred pounds, and Titius have afterwards remitted fifty pounds, the obligation is not wholly absolved, but in part. That is, the bond as to the fifty pound remitted is void, but it remaineth good as to the fifty pound not remitted. Again, if Caius have sworn to pay Titius an hundred pounds within 20 dayes, and Titius perceiving that Caius cannot without inconvenience unto himself pay the mony at the time appointed, give him other twenty days: This Relaxation made by Dilation, or propagation of the p. 255time, remitteth so much of the obligation, that he is not bound to pay the money within the time limited, by his oath; yet he is bound, and that by vertue of his first oath, to make payment within forty dayes. Sixtly I say, that Relaxation by a party is of force, so far as that party is concerned, but is not of force to the prejudice of a third person. The reason is, because any man may by act remit, as much of his own right as he pleaseth, but no man can diminish the right of another, without his knowledge and against his will. Let men therefore so recede from their own, that the rights of others receive no detriment. Thus Abraham, Gen. 14. receded from his right, when after the victory won upon the four Kings, he bestowed his whole share of the spoyl upon the King of Sodome, reserving unto the three Commanders, his fellows in arms, their due proportions. Whence Caius sworn to pay an hundred pound unto Titius and Julius, if Titius pardon him his part of the debt, he is absolved as to that which was due unto Titius; but remaineth bound as to that which is due unto Julius. Upon the same p. 256ground Relaxation by consent of the parties availeth nothing in Contracts of Marriage; because therein mans profit is not regarded only, but the Ordinance of God also, to whom great injury would be done, if that contract though with mutuall consent of the party should be violated. For the vertue, and and efficacy, which this Relaxation, whereof we now speak, hath to null obligation, supposeth that act which introduced obligation, to have considered nothing else but the good, and profit only of the party relaxing. If any other party be by right of his own interessed, that the obligation should not be remitted, the obligation is not remitted.

SECT. IX.

NOw the sum of what hath been said concerning Solution of the Bond in an Oath is briefly this, That the Bond of an Oath cannot be released by Dispensation of any Superiour, or Commutation, so as to free the Conscience of the party swearing from performance p. 257of the promise: but may neverthelesse be rescinded and made void by a Superiour having lawfull authority, cease through defect of the matter; or be relaxed by him unto whom the promise was made, so as to lose all strength of obligation. The promise which I made at my entrance upon the Office of Publique professor, being now (by Gods assistance) performed, according to my talent, with as much brevity, p…rspicuity and fidelity, as I have been able; I thought fit to adde some few admonitions concerning the use and abuse of Oathes, as Corollaries, whereby our lives, and Consciences may be profitably directed, not by way of exhortation, as they use in Sermons, but remembring I teach in the School, and not in the Church, by way of Thesis, or practicall Conclusions, briefly proposed, and clearly explained.

SECT. X.

THe first Conclusion is against Anabaptists and Socinians, That the use of Oathes is lawfull. I prove it first by p. 258the practise in the Old Testament. The godly Patriarchs sware; Controversies were determined by oath according to the Institution of Moses in the Law; the Prophets prescribed the condition of oathes to be observed. Nor can any just reason be rendered, why this should be lawfull for the pious under the Old, and not for the faithfull under the New Testament; seeing it is apparent from the end of an oath, whose use is perpetuall, that it appertaineth not unto the Ceremoniall Law abrogated by Christ; and from the form which seemeth to have nothing common with the type. I prove it, secondly, by the example of God, of Angels, of Apostles: those being often introduced in holy Scripture, swearing after the manner of men, these Historically. Thirdly, by the custome of all Nations, who directed by the light of Nature, have judged the bond of an oath for the convenience of Civill Society, the surest confirmation of Faith, then which there can be no clearer discovery of the Law of Nature. Fourthly, from the end of an oath, which is the confinmation of truth in doubtfull matters, where p. 259all other proofs are defi…int; which end seeing it is necessary for the composing and determination of Controversies, it must needs be that the necessary means unto the end, should be at the least lawfull. Fifthly, from the nature of an oath containing nothing in it self which is intrinsecally evill; for neither is a religious act evill, nor the Confirmation of a doubtful thing evill, nor Invocation of Divine testimony evill; of which members the essentiall definition of an oath consisteth.

SECT. XI.

THe second Conclusion, The use of Oathes in common discourse is unlawfull. The first proof is from the nature of an oath, Because every religious act being a part of Divine Wotship ought to be performed with due reverence, and with some both preparation and attention; all which must needs be far off, when oathes are rashly scattered without judgement, or heedlesly without consideration. The second from the end, which is the confirmation of a p. 260doubtfull businesse, seeing our ordinary discourse is for the most part upon frivolous matters, which either are not doubtfull, or not of moment to require religious confirmation; or if they were, would be little more credited for his oath, who maketh swearing his common custome; for such will be assoon believed, if that which they say seem true, without an oath, or if otherwise, no whit the sooner for swearing. The third from the Cause whence such kinde of Oathes are derived; which is either a vitious habit contracted by long and pernicious custome; which habit is the fruit, and mark of a profane, if not Atheisticall heart; or some exorbitant perturbation of the mind…, as excessive anger, intemperate joy, with which whilest the minde boyles, the mouth foameth to the dishonour of God; and at which those words of James seem peculiarly to aim; Chap. 5. vers. 1…. But above all things, my Brethren, swear not, neither by Heaven, neither by the Earth. In the foregoing ver…es, he exhorteth the faithfull to suffer injuries with patience, and in the following v…r…e teacheth the Christian p. 261how to entertain himself whether he be sad or cheerfull: a place worthy to be the exercise of learned men, and something more diligently considered, then as yet it hath been by Interpreters. Perhaps this cursory Paraphrase upon the words such as it is may contribute something towards that end; as it seemeth unto me they expresse thus much. Set the examples of antient Prophets and holy men before your eyes. If ye suffer adversity, imitate their patience. If in all things you cannot attain to that perfection, yet thus far at least, except ye be extreme negligent, you may goe with ease, above all things, take heed lest too impatient of your grief, or too much transported with your joy, ye break forth into rash oathes, to the dishonour of God, and shame of Christian conversation. But rather contain your selves, whether troubled or rejoycing, within the bounds of modesty; mingle not heaven, and earth… let not all things be filled with your oathes and clamours; if you affirm orderly a thing, let it be with calmnesse, and a meer affirmation, or negation: But if either of these passions be more impetuous, and strive to overflow the narrow channels of your bosomes, it will be your wisdomes to let it forth unto the glory of p. 262God. Doe you demand by what means? I will tell you: Is any amongst you afflicted? Let not his impatience break forth into oathes and blasphemies, the floodgates of wrath; but rather let him pray, and humbly implore God that he would vouchsafe him patience, till his heavy hand be removed. Is any merry? Let him not bellow it forth in Oathes, like a Bacchanalian, but rather sing it in Hymnes and Psalmes unto the praise of God; who hath made his cup to overflow, and crowned him with happy dayes. If any man admit not this latitude unto the Apostles words, let him use his own judgement. I have onelyonly expressed that which I think probable, and give no man Law. But to return, if I have digressed; it is certain that the words of James altogether condemn that evill custome, which is now grown amongst high and low▪ men of all sorts inveterate. It would cost me many leaves to sum up that which hath been declared against this impious use by holy Fathers, ancient Doctors of all Nations, Hebrews, Greeks, Latines, yea even Heathens; of many take a few: Sirach the wisest of the p. 263Hebrews, Accustome not thy mouth to swearing: As a servant that is continually beaten, shall not be without a blew mark, so he that sweareth, and nameth God continually, shall not be faultlesse. A man that useth much swearing shall be filled with iniquity. Amongst the Greeks, Eusebius the Heathen Philosopher, Many (saith he) exhort men to swear the truth, but I am of opinion that men ought not easily to swear at all. Amongst the Latines, Augustine; Beware of oathes as much as you may, because it were better not to swear, though a truth; not that it is sin to swear truth, but that it is a most grievous one to swear falsehood; into which he may the sooner fall, who accustometh himself to swearing. And in another place, a false oath is destructive, and even a true one dangerous. But what need is there of other testimonies, seeing this dayly and unnecessary use of swearing is so positively forbidden, as scarse any thing more in holy Scriptures; by Christ himself; But I say unto you swear Mat. 5. 34.Matt 5:34not at all; and by his Apostle St. James, in the place cited, Above all things swear not.

p. 264SECT. XII.

THe third conclusion, An oath ought not to be made but upon a just, weighty and necessary occasion. An oath is of those things which are neither evill in themselves, as murther, sacriledge, perjury, and all other vices be; nor of those which are desirable of themselves, as deeds of Charity, Justice, Obedience and all other vertues; but of such as are good only because necessary, by Hypothesis, and for their end, and not desirable, but in order unto that end, of which sort are all those which are ordained for the redresse of some defect, as Physick. For as a medicine was not invented for it self, but for health; and as there would be no use thereof, if mens bodies were not obnoxious unto diseases, (Honour the Physitian for necessity sake:) so an oath is instituted for the confirmation of faith amongst men; nor would be of any use, if mankinde were not alasse too subject unto ignorance, and perfidy; p. 265which perhaps was our Saviours meaning by those words, Matth. 5. 37. cometh of evill. Wherefore as the use of Physick, where it seemeth not necessary to the preservation of life and health, is to be avoided: so oathes are likewise to be avoided where necessary preservation of humane society, and confirmation of faith seem not to require them. That admonition of Epictetus (as all the rest of that Stoick) is wholesome, Avoid an oath, if you can, wholly: if not, as much you may. An oath is a sacred thing, but by how much the more sacred, by so much the more dangerous, if unduely taken. As medicines of the greatest vertue and efficacy are the more hurtfull unto the body, if rashly and unskilfully administred. The use of assertory oathes is necessary in Common-wealths, especially in Courts of Justice, for the investigation of truth in matter of particular fact, whereunto belong oathes, witnesses, Compurgators, &c. In extrajudiciall and private businesses, it is not so frequent, yet it may be sometimes necessary; to wit, where it p. 266concerneth a man very much to be believed, and he cannot be believed except he swear. The promissory oath is of no use in Justice, but of very great in extrajudicials, both publique and private. First publique, to keep subjects in allegiance unto their Princes; for the confirmation of Leagues and Contracts of Kings and Commonwealths; for the observation of Laws, and Statutes; and consequently honor, order, and peace of politique bodies, and Societies; for the faithfull administration of publique Offices, and the like. And also private, as the Antients often used it, for establishment of Contracts; performance of Conditions between buyer and seller; payment of debts; restitution, loans, profits, trusts, &c. But in most matters of private concernment, other wayes may be taken with lesse scruple of Conscience, and better assurance against the perfidy of wicked men: as Pawns, Feoffees, Bonds, Witnesses, and other judiciall obligations. And where such may be conveniently used, it is best to abstain altogether from oathes; p. 267lest by frequent swearing, and upon slight occasions, the too familiar use of a thing so sacred degenerate into contempt; or whilest we practise swearing, we learn perjury. Augustine saith truly; Except a man have tryed, he cannot know how hard a thing it is to shake off the custome of swearing; and not to doe that rashly, which sometimes he must doe necessarily.

SECT. XIII.

THe fourth Conclusion; It is a grievous sin, unduly to exact an oath. Now he exacteth unduly, First, who compelleth another to take an oath, which is neither ordained by the Law, nor received by custome, nor established by undenyed prescription, without Intermission. Secondly, who exacteth an oath evidently repugnant, or which seemeth by that sense, which the words bear, according to their use in common speech, to be repugnant unto a former oath lawfully taken. Thirdly, who compelleth another to p. 268swear unto an unlawful thing; to wit, against his duty to God, to his Superiours, against the Laws of the Kingdome, against a good life. Fourthly, who offereth an oath of ambiguous sense, or any way captious; thereby to ensnare the conscience, life, liberty, or fortune of his neighbour. Fifthly, who without necessity either terrifieth any person by threatnings, compelleth him by authority, or inveigleth him by perswasion; example, deceipt, or other means to an oath, which he knoweth to be against the Conscience of that person. Would to God all such as are in Authority would seriously consider with what a foul and indelible brand, Jeroboam the son of Nebat hath stigmatized his name and Conscience, in causing the people of Israel to sin, and how grievously they provoke the Lord to wrath, who abuse the power he hath given them for the edification unto the destruction of others.

p. 269SECT. XIV.

THe fifth Conclusion; An Oath is not to be taken with a relucting and unsatisfied Conscience. The first proof, because that which is not of faith is sin. The second, because we ought to swear in Judgement: which certainly he doth not who goeth against the judgement of his Conscience. The third, because such an action must needs be occasioned by regard had unto some temporall advantage, or fear of some losse, or hope of some profit, or desire to obtain favour, or the like. And how ill doth it become a Christian to prefer the world before God, durt before heaven, the body before the soul, temporall gain before eternall joy, the follies of this before the hopes of eternall life, externall peace before the quiet of Conscience? The fourth, because the party so swearing evidently exposeth himself to the danger of perjury. For he who through fear, or p. 270hope of any temporall losse or gain, may be induced to swear, will hardly if the like fear or hope disswade, be induced to perform his oath, and yet Heathens themselves have numbred perjury amongst the most hainous crimes, which kindle the anger of the immortall Gods; not against the guilty only, and their posterity, but even to the destruction of whole Nations. How much more ought wee acknowledging the only true God, who hath solemnly professed that he will not hold him guil…lesse that taketh his Name in vain, to fear and tremble, lest whilest we behold on every side the plentiful… and luxurious crop of Oathes and Perjury, grown already ripe for the Harvest, God the most just Judge, to the utter destruction of so perfidious and profane a generation, should instantly thrust in the sharp sickle of his judgements? We have already been sensible that our most mercifull Father is provoked unto wrath, and his infinite patience wounded and (as I may say) overcome with our intolerable wickednesse, p. 271converted into fury. Where all are extream, it is not easie to say for what particular crime. Yet certainly he who seriously considereth how far we have been, since God hath smitten us with a more heavy hand, from bewailing those most grievous sins of oath…s and perjury, nay rather how vastly they are encreased, here through the uncontrouled, and unpunished licentiousnesse of oathes and blasphemies, there through the foul Hypocrisie of perjury hid under the specious pretence of Religion, cannot choose but think upon those words of the Prophet Jeremiah; Through Oathes the Land mourneth.

Wherefore Men, Fathers, and Brethren, I bese…ch you as many as are here present, and all, whereever they be, who wish well unto the publique peace of this Church, and Kingdom, or to the private of their own souls, and Consciences, that we take most diligent heed, lest we fall into contempt of Gods most holy Name, and violation of our own faith; that p. 272we flye all unnecessary Oathes, constantly refuse those which are unlawfully requi…ed, faithfully perform those which we have lawfully taken, as far as is in our power, couragiously restrain the licentiousnesse of sin in oathes; and continually implore our great and good God, that he would give us (being taught by his correction, and humbled under his most powerfull hand) hearts to flye unto his mercy, to acknowledge his Justice, to implore his grace, for the remission of all our sins, amendment of our lives, and salvation of our soules, by and through the merit of our Lord Jesus Christ; to whom with the Father, and the holy Spirit, three Persons, and one God, be the Kingdome, the power and the glory, for ever and ever.

Amen, Amen.

FINIS.