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The Unreasonableness of Separation · Edward Stillingfleet

The Unreasonableness of Separation, Part 3 · Section 34

2. As to the judgement of Conscience. §. 34.The Author of the Letter out of the Countrey lays the Foundation of the separation upon the force of Scruples, Letter out of the Country, p. 5, 6, &c.mighty Scruples, Scruples of a long standing, and of a large extent, Scruples that there is no hopes to remove, without some very overpowering impression on mens minds. I am so much of another mind, that I think a little impartiality, and due consideration would do the business; but as long as men read and hear and judge only of one side, and think it a temptation to examine things as they ought to do, and cry out, they are satisfied already, there is not much hopes of doing good upon such, but I think they can have no great comfort in such Scruples. Men that really scruple things out of tenderness of Conscience, are sincerely willing to be better informed, and glad of any light that brings them satisfaction, and do not fly out into rage, and violent passion against those who offer to remove their Scruples. Hath this been the temper of our scrupulous Brethren of late? Let their Scruples be touched never so tenderly, they cannot bear it, and take it extremely ill of those who would better inform them.Answ. p. 81. Mr. B. freely tells me, that he that thinks his own, or others reasonings will ever change all the truely honest Christians in the Land(as to the unlawfulness of the things imposed) knoweth so little of matters, or of men, or of Conscience, as that he is unmeet to be a Bishop or a Priest. What is the reason of such a severe saying? Where lies the strength and evidence of these Scruples? Why may not honest men be cured of their errors and mistakes, as I am perswaded these are such which they call Scruples? Is there no hopes to bring the People to a better temper, and more judgement? For I know nothing more is necessary for the cure of them. Here is no depth of learning, no subtilty of reasoning, no endless quotation of Fathers necessary about these matters. The dispute lies in a narrow compass, and men may see light if they will. But what if they will not? Then we are to consider, how far a wilfull mistake or error of Conscience, will justifie men? I say it doth not, cannot justifie them in doing evil; and that I am sure breaking the Peace of the Church for the sake of such Scruples, is. And this I had said in my Sermon, which I take to be very material for our scrupulous persons to consider. For suppose they should be mistaken, doth this error of Conscience justifie their separation, or not? If not, they may be in an ill condition, for all their Scruples, or their confidence. And so Mr. Baxter hath long since declared,5. Disputations of Church Gov. p. 48…. that if we do through weakness, or perverseness take lawful things to be unlawful, that will not excuse us in our disobedience. Our error is our sin, and one sin will not excuse another sin. But Mr. A. saith, (1) That I do ill to put together wilfull Error and mistake of Conscience, Mischief of Impos. p. 72.when I say they do not excuse from sin, since there is so great a difference between a wilfull Error and a mistake of simple ignorance. What strange cavilling is this? When any one may see that I join wilfull both to Error and Mistake. And is not a mistake or error of Conscience all one? If I had said a mistake of simple ignorance doth not excuse from sin, I had contradicted the whole design of that discourse, which is to shew that there must be wilfulness in the error or mistake which doth not excuse. For I say expresly, if the error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuse. This is but a bad beginning in a Discourse about Conscience.

2. If no error will excuse from sin, why is the Question afterwards put by me, What error will excuse? I answer, (1.) it is an exercise of patience, to be troubled with a cavilling adversary. (2.) Do not I say as plainly, as words can express it, that a wilful error doth not excuse from sin? And the question afterwards put, concerns the same thing; and the Answer I give to it is, if the error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuse, but if it be wilful it doth not. Is this mans conscience full of Scruples that writes at this rate, with so little regard to the plain meaning and words of him whom he pretends to confute?

3. He saith, I put one of the wildest cases that ever was put, P. 73.viz. If a man think himself bound to divide the Church by sinful Separation, that separation is nevertheless a sin for his thinking himself bound to do it. For (1.) It may be justly questioned, whether it be possible for a man in his Wits to think himself bound to divide the Church by sinful Separation. What Sophisters arguments are these? As though we did not commonly speak of the thing as it is, and not as the Person apprehends it. S. Paul did think himself bound to a sinful persecution, although he did not think it so, when he did it. The Iews thought themselves bound to kill the Apostles, which was wilful murder, and yet they were men in their wits. The false Apostles thought themselves bound to divide the Church by a sinful separation. How then comes this to be thought so impossible a case as to the thing it self? for I was not so foolish to put the case concerning men, who thought themselves bound to commit a sin, knowing it to be a sin. (2.) He much questions, whether ever any did think himself bound to divide a Church, he may possibly think himself bound to avoid it. If he may think himself bound to do that which makes divisions in a Church, it is sufficient to my purpose. And did not the false Apostles do so, and have not others followed their examples? And thus, after other trifling Cavils to the same purpose, after his manner, he yields all that I say, and saith, It is freely granted by all the world, that wilful Error doth not excuse from sin. And after many words about the case of an erroneous conscience, P. 77.he concludes that I deliver nothing but the common doctrine of all Casuists; only he thinks it not pertinent to the matter in hand. Why so? was not the matter in hand about the duty of complying with an established Rule? And was it not very pertinent to this, to shew how far an erroneous conscience may, or may not excuse from sin? But Mr. A. saith, it should have been about the Power of Conscience, concerning an established Rule of mans making; and such for which they have neither general nor particular warrant from God so to make. Is not this indeed to the purpose? First to suppose an unlawful rule imposed, and then to enquire what conscience is to do about it. My business was to shew, that men were not in doubtful cases to satisfie themselves with this, that they followed their consciences; because their consciences might err, and if that Error happened to be wilful, being contracted for want of due care, what they did, might not only be sinful in it self, but imputed to them as sins. Which all men who pretended any regard to conscience ought to have an eye to: for why do they pretend conscience, but to …void sin? And if under a wilful error of … they may still be guilty of great sins, as the Ie… and S. Paul were, then men ought not to satisfie the…selves barely with this pretence, that they do as … direct them. This was the plain … of that …art of my Sermon; and I leave any … whether it were not pertinent.

But he saith, …, P. 78.if they be such, are wholl… … invincible Ignorance. If … better for them. I hope they have … in their own breasts for it, than what appears in some of their late Books; for neither a peevish, angry, scornful, provoking way of writing about these matters; nor a light, scurrilous, cavilling, Sophistical Answer to a serious discourse, are any great signs of such an impartial endeavour after satisfaction, as Mr. A. boasts of. I cannot tell how much they have read the Scriptures, and studied this Controversie; nor how earnestly they have pray'd for direction; but I have seen enough of their unfriendly debates, which give me no great satisfaction in this matter. But I leave this to God and their own consciences to judge; being very willing to hope and believe the best.