The Grounds of the Christian Faith, Book 2 · Chapter 8

The Grounds of the Christian Faith · Book 2 · Chapter 8

p. 226CHAP. VIII. General Hypotheses concerning the Truth of the Doctrine of Christ.

The great prejudice against our Saviour among Iews and Heathens, was the means of his appearance. The difference of the miracles at the delivery of the Law and Gospel. Some general Hypotheses to clear the subserviency of miracles to the Doctrine of Christ. 1. That where the truth of a doctrine depends not on evidence, but authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Testimony of the revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of natural knowledge. The existence of God, the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matters of faith proved from the same principle. Our knowladge of any thing supposeth something incomprehensible. The certainty of faith as great as that of knowledge; the grounds of it stronger. The consistency of rational evidence with faith. Yet objects of faith exceed reason; the absurdities following the contrary opinion. The uncertainty of that which is called reason. Philosophical dictates no standard of reason. Of transubstantiation and ubiquity &c. why rejected as contrary to reason. The foundation of faith in matters above reason. Which is infallible Testimony that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved: 2. Hypoth. A Divine Testimony the most infallible. The resolution of faith into Gods veracity as its formal object. 3. Hypoth. A Divine Testimony may be known, though God speak not immediatly. Of Inspiration among the Iews and Divination among the Heathens. 4. Hyp. The evidences of a Divine Testimony must be clear and certain. Of the common motives of faith, and the obligation to faith arising from them. The original of Infidelity.

HAving now cleared that the Law of Moses was capable of a repeal, I come to the second enquiry, whether the p. 227Sect. 1.miracles of our Saviour did give a sufficient evidence of his power and authority to repeal it. I shall not (to prevent too large an excursion) insist on any other evidences of our Saviours being the promised M…ssias, but keep close to the matter of our present debate concerning the evidence which ariseth from such a power of Miracles as our Saviour had in order to his establishing that doctrine which he came to publish to the world. The great stumbling-block in reference to our blessed Saviour among both the Iews and learned Heathens, was the meanness of his appearance in the world, not coming attended with that state and magnificence, which they thought to be inseparable from so great a person. The Iews had their senses so poss…ssed with the thundrings and lightnings on mount Sinai, that they could not imagine the structure of their Ceremonial worship could be taken down with less noise and terror then it was er…cted with. And withall collecting all those passages of the Old Testament which seemed to foretell such glorious things of the dayes of the Messias, (which …ither refer to his second coming, or must be understood in a spiritual sense) they having their minds oppressed with the sense of their present calamities, applyed them wholly to an external greatness, whereby they might be delivered from the Tyranny of the Roman Power. The Heathens as appears by Celsus and others, thought it very strange that the Son of God should appear in the world with so little grandeur, and have no greater Train then twelve such obscure persons as the Apostles were. For saith Celsus, foreign. As the Sun which inlightens all other things, d…th A…ud Orig. l. 2.first discover himself, so it was fitting the Son of God should do when he appeared to the world. And so we say he did to all such whose minds were not blinded through obstinacy and willfull ignorance. For although this Sun of righteousness was pleased for the better carrying on his design in the world to wrap up himself in a cloud, yet his glory could not be confined within it, but did break through that dark vail of his humane nature, and did discover its self in a most clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like those upon Mount Sinai, because his design was not to p. 228amuse men with the glory of his Majesty, and to terrifie them from Idolatry, (which was a great reason of those dreadful phaenomena at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all men to him by the power and energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all rational convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Saviours miracles was considerable as well as the greatness of them; The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the world off from its sin and folly, to the embracing of that holy doctrine which he came to publish to the world.Sect. 2.

Now that such a power of miracles in our Saviour had the greatest subserviency to the giving full and convincing evidence that he was the person he declared himself to be, and that his doctrine was thereby so clearly attested, that it was nothing but obstinacy, which could withhold assent, will appear by these following Hypotheses which I lay down in order to the proving it.

Where the truth of a doctrine depends not on the evidence of Hyp. 1.the things themselves, but on the authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that revealed it to be infallible. Several things are necessary to be proved for the clearing this proposition.

1. That it is not repugnant to reason that a doctrine should be true which depends not upon the evidence of the thing its self. By evidence of the thing I understand so clear and distinct a perception of it, that every one who hath the use of his rational faculties, cannot but upon the first apprehension of the terms yeild a certain assent to it; as that the whole is greater then a part; that if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder must be equal. Now we are to observe, that as to all these common notices of humane nature which carry such evidence with them, the certainty of them lyes in the proposition as it is an act of the mind abstracted from the things themselves; for these do not suppose the existence of the things; but whether there be any such things in the world or no as whole or parts, the understanding is assured that the Idea of the whole carryes more in its representation then that of a part does. This is the great reason of the certainty and evidence p. 229of Mathematical truths, not as some imagine, because men have no interest, or design in those things, and therefore they never question them, but because they proceed not upon sensible but abstracted matter; which is not lyable to so many doubts as the other is; for that a Triangle hath three Angles no man questions, but whether such sensible parts of matter make a Triangle, may be very questionable. Now that the truth of beings, or the certainty of existence of things cannot be so certain as Mathematical demonstrations, appears from hence: because the manner of conveyance of these things to my mind cannot be so clear and certain as in purely intellectual operations, abstracted from existent matter. For the highest evidences of the existence of things must be either the judgement of sense, or clear and distinct perception of the mind; now proceeding in a meer natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in either of these; For the perception of the mind in reference to the existence of things being caused so much through those Idea's or Phantasmes which are conveyed to the understanding through the impressions of sense, if these may be demonstrated to be fallacious, I may well question the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; supposing then I should question the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my mind, I may soon out-go even Pyrrho himself in real Scepticism. Neither can I conceive how clear and distinct perception of any thing though not coming through the senses, doth necessarily infer the existence of the thing; for it only implyes a non-repugnancy of it to our natural faculties, and consequently the bare possibility of it. For otherwise it were impossible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer then it exists, nay then we know it to exist; for existence or non-existence is all one to the understanding, while it is not assured of either. And it is withall evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the mind as well as real; for I may have as real and distinct perception of a Phoenix in my mind, as of a Partridge; doth it therefore follow that the one is really existent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to assign a certain difference between imagination and pure intellection in such things, which though, p. 230not actually existent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the faculties of mens minds. It is evident then that there cannot be so great certainty of the existence of things as there may be of Mathematical demonstrations.

And if that principle be supposed as the foundation of all Physical certainty as to the being of things, viz. that there Sect. 3.is a God who being infinitely good will not suffer the minds of men to be deceived in those things which they have a clear and distinct perception of (without which supposition we cannot be assured of the certainty of any operations of the mind, because we cannot know but we were so made that we might be then most deceived, when we thought our selves most sure) If this principle, I say, be supposed as the foundation of all certain knowledge, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantagious to our certainty in matters of faith.

That the foundation of all certainty lies in the necessary existence 1.of a being absolutely perfect. So that unless I know that there is a God, I cannot be assured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I must necessarily apprehend him to be absolutely perfect; because the grounds of my knowledge that there is a God, are from those absolute perfections which there are in him; and if I could suppose him not absolutely perfect, I must suppose him not to be God; for that is necessarily implyed in his definition. Now then if all certainty doth suppose the existence of a being so absolutely perfect; I must before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of knowledge, wisdom, power and goodness in this God; for those are things which all who understand them, will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they must be absolute, i. e. infinite. And if they be infinite, it necessarily follows that they must transcend our apprehensions; so that now we have gained this principle in order to faith; that we must grant something to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that those who will not believe any thing to be true because it is above their apprehensions, must deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth suppose something to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

p. 231That we have as great certainty of what-ever is revealed to Sèct. 4. 2.us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we most clearly understand. For the truth of knowledge depending on this supposition, that there is a God whose goodness will not suffer us to be deceived in the things we clearly understand; there is the same foundation for the act of faith as for that of knowledge, viz. That God will not suffer us to be deceived in matters which himself hath revealed to us. Nay there seems to be far greater on these accounts. First, That there is not so great danger to be deceived in reference to objects of sense, as there is in reference to objects of Divine revelation: because objects of sense make a continual impression upon the Organs of sense; and as to these things we see the whole world agrees in them so far as they are necessary to life, and withall they bear a greater correspondency to the present state of imperfection which the soul is now in: but now matters of Divine revelation are of a more sublime and spiritual nature, which mens minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, then of things obvious to sense; and withall they call the mind so much off from sense that on these accounts the proneness to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of certainty from Gods not suffering us to be deceived must be stronger. Secondly, There is not so great danger in being deceived as to matters of sense or knowledge, as there is in things of Divine revelation. For we see granting sense to be deceived, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of life are managed still; mens outward welfare depends not on the judgement of sense; the merchant hath never the less gold in his Ship because his sense deceives him in judging that the earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the less inlighten the world, though our senses be a…l of Epicurus his mind, that the Sun is no bigger then he seems to be; but now as to matters of Divine revelation, they are things of the most unspeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them. And therefore if the goodness of God be such as it will not suffer us to be deceived in our judgement of material and sensible beings, how much less in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things p. 232Divinely revealed? We see then what rational evidence there is not only consistent with, but necessarily implyed in the foundation of faith, even as great as in any thing which we do most perfectly know; so that the in-evidence which is so much spoken of as an ingredient of the nature of faith, must not be understood of the foundation whereon the act of faith doth stand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of divine revelation, is a thing not obvious to our senses: In which sense the Apostle speaks that faith is foreign, the firm Heb. 11. 1.Heb 11:1expectation of things hoped for, and strong conviction of things which are not seen: In which words, as Erasmus well observes, is contained only an high Encomium of faith, and no Dialectical definition of it; viz. that faith soars above things of sense or present enjoyment; yea, though the objects of it be never so remote from either, yet where there is sufficient evidence of Divine Revelation, faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly resolved that that God, who hath revealed these things, can and will bring them to pass in his own time. There is not then any such contrariety between the foundation of faith and knowledge, as the Schoolmen have perswaded the world, we see both of them proceed on the same foundation of certainty; all the difference is, faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Testimony; knowledge proceeds upon it, supposing no Divine revelation, as to the things it doth discover.

We hence infer, that if the certainty of our knowledge Sect. 5. 3.depends on this principle, that God will not suffer us to be deceived, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, though we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to these things, we have the same ground of certainty, which we have as to any natural causes; for as to them, we now suppose from the former principle, that setting aside the existence of God, we could have no certainty of them, but that the formal reason of our certainty is resolved into this, that Gods goodness will not suffer the understanding to be deceived as to these things; the same I say as to spiritual mysteries revealed by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the evidence of the things, p. 233but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath revealed them. All that I can imagine possible to be replyed to this, is, that Gods veracity assures us in natural causes that we are not deceived only where we have a clear and distinct perception of the things; but now in matters above our reason to comprehend, there can be no clear and distinct perception. To this I answer.

First, it is evident in the foundation of all certainty of knowledge, that there may be a clear and distinct perception 1.of that which we cannot comprehend, viz. of a being absolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and distinct perception of God, the foundation of all certainty is destroyed, which is the necessary existence of such a being; and he that shall say he cannot have a clear perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himself; for if he be a being infinite, he must be incomprehensible; therefore there may be clear perception, where the object its self is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in nature for such a perception without comprehension; that and much more is there in such things as are revealed by God, though above our apprehension: For the Idea of God upon the soul of man cannot be so strong an evidence of the existence of a being above our apprehension, as the revelation of matters of faith is, that we should believe the things so revealed, though our understandings lose themselves in striving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their existence.

Secondly, that which is the only foundation of a scruple in this case, is a principle most unreasonable in its self, that we are 2.to imbrace nothing for truth, though divinely revealed, but what our reason is able to comprehend, as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its existence; on which account the doctrine of the Trinity, Incarnation, Satisfaction, and consequently the whole mysterie of the Gospel of Christ must be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, because although many expressions in Scripture seem to import all these things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another sense, because this is incongruous to our reason. But although Christianity be a Religion which comes in the highest way of credibility to the minds of men, although we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it p. 234appear that it is revealed by God, yet that any thing should be questioned whether it be of divine revelation, meerly because our reason is to seek, as to the full and adaequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence: And the Assertors of it must run themselves on these unavoidable absurdities.

First, of believing nothing either in nature or Religion to 1.be true, but what they can give a full and satisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumstance of it. Therefore let such persons first try themselves in all the appearances of nature; and then we may suppose they will not believe that the Sun shines, till they have by demonstrative arguments proved the undoubted truth of the Ptolomaick or Copernican hypothesis, that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly resolve the doubts which attend the several opinions of it. That there is no such thing as matter in the world, till they can satisfactorily tell us how the parts of it are united; nor that there are any material beings, till they have resolved all the perplexing difficulties about the several affections of them; and that themselves have not so much as a rational soul, till they are bound to satisfie us of the manner of the union of the soul and body together. And if they can expedite all these, and many more difficulties about the most obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handsome and consistent hypotheses, then to give a certain account of them) then let them be let loose to the matters of divine revelation; as to which yet (if they could perform the other) were there no reason for such an undertaking; for that were

Secondly, to commensurate the perfections of God with the narrow capacity of the humane intellect; which is contrary to 2.the natural Idea of God, and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of God; for the Idea of God doth suppose incomprehensibility to belong to his nature; and the manner whereby we form our conceptions of God, is by taking away all the imperfections we find in our selves, from the conception we form of a being absolutely perfect, and by adding infinity to all the perfections we find in our own natures. Now this method of proceeding doth necessarily imply a vast distance and disproportion between a finite and infinite p. 235understanding. And if the understanding of God be infinite, why may not he discover such things to us, which our shallow apprehensions cannot reach unto? what ground or evidence of reason can we have that an infinite wisdom and understanding, when it undertakes to discover matters of the highest nature and concernment to the world, should be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compass of our imperfect and narrow intellects? And that it should not be sufficient that the matters revealed do none of them contradict the prime results or common notions of mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumstance, as to the manner of existence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent power, must pass the scrutiny of our faculties, before it obtains a Placet for a Divine revelation?

Thirdly, it must follow from this principle, that the pretenders to it must affirm the rules or maxims which they go by Sect. 6. 3.in the judgment of things, are the infallible standard of reason: Else they are as far to seek in the judgement of the truth of things as any others are. They must then, to be consistent with their principle, affirm themselves to be the absolute Masters of reason: Now reason consisting of observations made concerning the natures of all beings (for so it must be considered, as it is a rule of judging, viz. as a Systeme of infallible rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, must demonstrate these general maxims according to which they judge, to be …ollected from an universal undoubted history of nature, which lies yet too dark and obscure for any to pretend to the full knowledge of, and would be only a demonstration of the highest arrogance after so many succesless endeavours of the most searching wits in any society of persons to usurp it to themselves; especially if such persons are so far from searching into the depths of nature, that they suffer themselves very fairly to be led by the nose by the most dogmatical of all Philosophers; and that in such principles which the more inquisitive world hath now found to be very short, uncertain, and fallacious. And upon severe enquiry we shall find the grand principles which have been taken by these adorers of reason, for almost the standard of it, have been p. 236some Theories which have been taken up meerly from observation of the course of nature by such persons, who scarce owned any hand of providence in the world. Now it cannot otherwise be conceived but that these Theories, or principles formed from such a narrow inspection into the natures of things, must make strange work when we come to apply those things to them, which were never looked at in the forming of them: Whence came those two received principles, that nothing can be produced out of nothing; that there is no possible return from a privation to a habit, but from those Philosophers who believed there was nothing but matter in the world; or if they did assert the existence of a God, yet supposed him unconcerned in the Government of the world. Whence come our Masters of reason to tell us that the soul cannot subsist after death without the boay; from what Philosophy was this derived? certainly from that which was very loth to acknowledge the immortality of the soul of man: And any one who strictly observes the close coherence of the principles of the Peripatetick Philosophy, will find very little room left for an eternal being to interpose its self in the world; and therefore some have shrewdly observed that Aristotle speaks more favourably of the being of God in his Exotericks, then in his Acroamaticks, which all that know the reason of the names, will guess at the reason of. I demand then, must the received principles of Philosophy, and those short imperfect Theories, which were formed more from tradition then experience, by the ancient Greeks, be taken for the standard of reason or no? If they must, we may soon forsake not only the sublimer mysteries of the Trinity, Divinity of Christ, Resurrection, &c. but we shall soon shake hands with Creation, Providence, if not immortality of souls, and the Being of God himself. If these things be disowned as the standard of reason, let us know what will be substituted in the room of them? and what Laws our faith must be tryed by? Are they only Mathematical demonstrations, or the undoubted common notions of humane nature, which whosoever understands assents to them, let any of the forementioned mysteries be made appear to contradict these, and we will readily yield up our selves captives to reason: But in p. 237the mean time, let no jejune unproved hypotheses in Philosophy, be set as Iudges over matters of faith, whose only warrant for that office must be Stat pro ratione voluntas. Let the principles we proceed by, be first manifested to be collected from a most certain and universal inspection into the nature of all beings, let the manner of process be shewed how they were collected (lest they labour with the common fault of the Chymists, of establishing hypostatical principles from the experiments of some particular bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and lastly, let it be made appear that these principles, thus collected, will serve indifferently for all beings, spiritual as well as material, infinite as well as finite, and when this Task is exactly performed, we will make room for Reason to sit upon the Bench, and bring the Scriptures as the Prisoner to its Bar.

Fourthly, According to this principle, what certainty can Sect. 7. 4.we have at all of anything we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which men call reason? how shall we know that thus far it will come, and no further? If no banks be raised against it to keep it in its due channel, we may have cause to fear it may in time overthrow not only the Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection of the dead, but all other articles of the creed too? What prescription can be pleaded by one sort of men for reason more then for another? One will not believe this article of his faith, because against his reason, and why not another reject another article on the same pretence? for whatever the ground of unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of reason, it must by this principle pass uncontrouled; if a sullen Philosopher shall tell us, that the notion of an immaterial substance contradicts his reason as much as the Trinity doth theirs, and that the Universe is nothing else but a Systeme of bodies, by what Artifice will our Masters of reason purge away all that black choler that so clouds his mind, that he cannot see the notion of a spirit through it? And such one will make a hard shift, but he will reconcile his opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why should he be bound up to mens explications of Scripture, when there is no necessity, that he can see, of understanding it in any other way then his own? If another should come p. 238and tell us, that we must be all Anthropomorphites, and that otherwise the Scripture were not intelligible; shall not this man put in for reason too? Nay lastly, if another shall come and speak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of subtle men, that all things come to pass through chance, that the world was made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms, and that all are fools which are not Atheists, and that it is impossible to apprehend the Being of a God, and therefore by the same reason that they reject some mysteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all; because an infinite being is incomprehensible: whither now hath our Reason carried us? while we p…etend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, meerly on that account, that it is above our reason? But it may be replied, On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, and the ubiquity of the body of Christ, as repugnant to reason, if we do not make reason judge in matters of faith? I answer, 1. We reject these opinions not only as repugnant to reason, but as insufficiently proved from Scripture, whereas we here suppose (it not being our present business to prove it) that the several doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection of bodies, &c. are only rejected on that account, that though Scripture seems to speak fair for them, yet it is otherwise to be interpreted, because supposed to be repugnant to reason. 2. Those doctrines before mentioned are eminently serviceable to promote the great end of the Gospel, and are inlaid in the very foundation o… it, as that of the Trinity, and Divinity of Christ; but these we now mention are no ways conduceable to that end; but seem to thwart and overthrow it, and transubstantiation establisheth a way of worship contrary to the Gospel. 3. All the foundation of transubstantiation is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which must of necessity have some Tropes and Figures in them; but the doctrine of the Trinity is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is …videnced by visible appearance, as particularly at the baptism of our Saviour. 4. There is far greater ground why we should reject Transubstantiation and ubiquity, as inconsistent with reason, then that they should the Trinity, on this account, because the grounds of reason on which we reject p. 239those opinions, are fet…hed from those essential and inseparable properties of bodies, which are inconsistent with those opinions; now these are things within the reach of our understandings (in which case God himself sometimes appeals to reason) but it is quite another. case, when we search into the incomprehensible nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that such things cannot be in God, because we cannot comprehend them; which gives a sufficient answer to this objection. The substance then of this discourse is, that whatever d…ctrine is sufficiently manifested to be of divine revelation, is to be embraced and believed, as undoubtedly true, though our reason cannot reach to the full apprehension of all the Modes and circumstances of it. So that as to these sublime mysteries our faith stands upon this twofold bottom. First, that the being, understanding, and power of God doth infinitely transcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. Secondly, that whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, though we may not fully understand it; for this is a most undoubted principle, that God cannot and will not deceive any in those things which he reveals to men. Thus our first supposition is cleared, that it is not repugnant to reason, that a doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it self.

The second is, That in matters whose truth depends not on 2.the evidence of the things themselves, infallible testimony is the fullest demonstration of them. For these things, not being of Mathematical evidence, there must be some other way found out for demonstrating the truth of them. And in all those things whose truth depends on Testimony, the more creditable the Testimony is, the higher evidence is given to them; but that testimony which may deceive, cannot give so pregnant an evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is so clear, that it needs no further proof; and therefore the third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Testimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by 3.these two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all those to p. 240whom it is propounded to believe it; now how could that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Testimony to be believed, or no. 2. Because God will condemn the world for unbelief: In which the Justice of Gods proceedings doth necessarily suppose that there were sufficient arguments to induce them to believe, which could not be, unless there were some certain way supposed whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible. These three things now being supposed, viz. that a doctrine may be true which depends not on evidonce of reason, that the greatest demonstration of the truth of such a doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Testimony, and that there are certain ways whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible: Our first principle is fully confirmed, which was, that where the truth of a doctrine depends not on evidence of reason, but on the authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.

The next principle or Hypothesis which I lay down, is, That there can be no greater evidence that a Testimony is infallible, Sect. 8. Hyp. 2.then that it is the Testimony of God himself. The truth of this depends upon a common notion of humane nature, which is the veracity of God in whatever way he discovers himself to men; and therefore the ultimate resolution of our faith, as to its formal object, must be alone into the veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the principium certitudinis, or foundation of all certain assent can be fetched no higher, neither will it stand any lower then the infallible verity of God himself; and the principium patefactionis, or the ground of discovery of spiritual truth to our minds, must be resolved into Divine Testimony, or revelation. These two then not taken asunder, but joyntly, God, who cannot lye, hath revealed these things, is the only certain foundation for a divine faith to rest its self upon. But now the particular exercise of a Divine faith lies in a firm assent to such a particular thing as Divinely revealed, and herein lyes not so much the Testimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the soul to believe peculiar objects of faith, as of Divine revelation. But the p. 241general ground of faith, which they call the formal object, or the ratio propter quam credimus is the general infallibility of a Divine Testimony. For in a matter concerning divine revelation, there are two great questions to be resolved; The first is, Why I believe a Divine Testimony with a firm assent? The answer to that is, because I am assured, that what ever God speaks is true: the other is, upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Testimony? the resolution of which, as far as I can understand, must be fetched from those rational evidences whereby a Divine Testimony must be distinguished from one meerly humane and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the mind, doth not carry it on by a brutish impulse, but draws it by a spiritual discovery of such strong and perswasive grounds to assent to what is revealed, that the mind doth readily give a firm assent to that which it sees such convincing reason to believe. Now the strongest reason to believe, is the manifestation of a divine Testimony; which the Spirit of God so clearly discovers to a true believer, that he not only firmly assents to the general foundation of faith, the veracity of God, but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter question is not here the matter of our discourse; our proposition only concerns the general foundation of faith; which appears to be so rational and evident, as no principle in nature can be more. For if the Testimony on which I am to rely be only Gods, and I be assured from natural reason, that his Testimony can be no other then infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of faith fall short of that in any Mathematical demonstration? Upon which account a Divine Testimony hath been regarded with so much veneration among all who have owned a Deity, although they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine revelation. And the reason why any rejected such a Testimony among the Heathens, was either because they believed not a Deity, or else that the particular Testimonies produced were meer frauds and impostures, and therefore no Divine Testimony as it was given out to be. But the principle still remained indisputable, that on supposition the Testimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greatest p. 242reason to believe it, although it came not in such a way of probation, as their sciences proceeded in. From which principle arose that speech of Tully which he hath translated I… fragment. Cicer.out of Plato's Timaeus, Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis sidem non haber…, quanquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum oratio confirmetur. By which we see what a presumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Testimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this principle it was the Devil gained so great credit to his oracles, for therein he did the most imitate Divine revelation. From hence then we see what a firm bottom faith in the general stands upon, which is nothing short of an Infallible Divine Testimony: other things may conduce by way of subserviency for the discovery of this; but nothing else can be a sure foundation for a Divine faith, but what is a Testimony of God himself.

A Testimony may be known to be Divine and infallible, though God himself do not speak in an immediate way. By Sect. 9. Hyp. 3.being known, I do not mean the firm perswasion of a mind inlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are sufficient evidences ex parte rei to convince men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obstinate, i. e. that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of sufficient motives to faith, but to their own perversness and prejudice in not discerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his mind to the world, not in an immediate way, but by some instruments he may make use of to that end, is not only evident from the great suitableness of such a way to the conditions of the persons he speaks to, but from the general perswasion of the world concerning the possibility of Inspiration. The Iews are so far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their religion as well as ours, God discovering the most of his will to them by the Prophets or by persons Divinely inspired. And the general consent of all other Nations, that there is such a principle as Divination in the world, doth make it evident, that it carryes no repugnancy at all to natural light, supposing that there is a God, that he should reveal his mind by some particular persons unto the world. For which purpose the Testimony of Tully in the p. 243entrance of his books de Divinatione, is very considerable. Vetus opinio est jam usque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eáque L. 1. de Div.& populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci foreign appellant, i. e. praesensionem & scientiam rerum futurarum, and soon after adds, gentem quidem nullam video, neque tam humanam at que doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quae non significari futura, et à quibusdam intelligi, praedicique posse censeat. He makes it appear to be an universal sentiment of all Nations in the world, and instanceth particularly in the Assyrians, Aegyptians, Cilicians, Pisidians, Pamphilians, Grecians, Romans, Etrurians, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions some Philosophers who denyed it; but they were most part the followers of Epicurus, who denyed any providence, and therefore might well take away divination; but if Xenophanes Colophonius had any followers who asserted the one, and denyed the other (as Tully seems to intimate that he was alone in that perswasion) yet we may probably suppose the reason of their rejecting it might be the impostures which went under the name of Divination among them; which are excellently discovered by that Prince of Roman Philosophers as well as Orators, in his second book of Divination; but it is apparent by the same Author, that the generality of Philosophers consented with the people in this perswasion, as the followers of those three great sects of Socrates, Pythagoras, and Aristotle were all approvers of it; but of all persons the Stoicks were the most zealous contenders for it, especially Chrysippus, Diogenes Babylonius, Antipater and Possidonius; some indeed rejected some wayes of Divination, yet embraced others, as Dicaearchus and Cratippus, who rejected all but dreams and extasies; but in the general we find these two principles went together among them, the existence of a Deity, and the certainty of Divination; so that from Divination they proved a Deity, and from a Deity Divination. Si sunt genera divinandi vera, esse Deos; vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent, as Quintus Cicero there speaks: and at last thus triumphs in the multitude of his witnesses, An dum bestiae loquantur expectamus, hominum consenti…nte auctoritate contenti non simus? It may not be amiss to produce the chief p. 244argument on which the Stoicks insisted to prove the necessity of Divination, supposing the existence of a Deity. If there be Gods, say they, and they do not reveal to men things to come, it either is because they do not love them, or because they do not know themselves what shall come to pass, or they think it is of no concernment to men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majesty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to men if they would; but neither is it true that they do not love men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature and friends to mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, because they are appointed and decreed by them, neither is it of no concernment to men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majesty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble then bounty and doing good; and they must needs know these things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there must be some way whereby to know that they do so; or else they signifie them to no purpose. If now instead of the knowledge of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had insisted on the discovery and revelation by the true God of those wayes which may lead men to eternal happiness, that argument had been strong and convincing, which as it stands, is Sophistical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a possibility of Divination was acknowledged by those who wanted Divine revelation, but that this divination did not arise from meer natural causes, but from an afflatus Divinus, and a concitatio quaedam animi, as they there speak, which imports nothing short of Divine inspiration. Nay the opinion of this was so common among them, that they thought any extraordinary persons had something of Divine Enthusiasm in them, as Tully elsewhere tells us, Nemo vir …. 2. … Nat. Deorum.magnus sine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit. Although then these Heathens were greatly mistaken as to those things they took for a Divine afflatus and Divination, yet we cannot conceive so general a sense should be imprinted on the minds of men of such a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly consonant to principles of reason, that God should communicate his mind to the world by the inspiration of some persons. And therefore I conceive that Cicero and his brother p. 245Quintus, who manage that excellent dispute of Divination between them, have divided the truth between them too. For on the one side Quintus evidently proves the possibility of the thing, the consequence of it upon the acknowledgement of a Deity, and the general consent of mankind in the owning of it; and on the other side Tully himself excellently layes open the vanity, folly, and uncertainty, not only of the common wayes of Divination, but of the oracles which were in such great esteem among the Heathens. And although Tully doth so sharply and sarcastically answer the argument from the common consent of men; quasi verò quidquam sit, tam valdè, quam nihil sapere, vulgare; as though nothing men did more generally agree in, then in being fools; yet as it is evident that the ground of that scoffe was from the several manners of Divination then in use, so it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of humane nature in a thing so consequent upon the being of a God, which as himself elsewhere proves, is as clear from reason as from that Testimonium gentium in hac una re non dissidentium, as the Christian Cicero, Lactantius speaks, the consent of Nations, De fals. relig. cap. 2.which scarce agree in any thing else, but that there is a God. That which we now infer from hence is, that God may make known his mind in a way infallible, though not immediate; for in case of Inspiration of meer men, it is not they so much which speak, as God by them; and in case that God himself should speak through the vail of humane nature, the Testimony must needs be infallible though the appearance of the Divinity be not visible.

Those evidences whereby a Divine Testimony may be known, must be such as may not leave mens minds in suspense, but are Sect. 10. Hyp. 4.of their own nature convincing proofs of it. For although as to the event some may doubt, and others disbelieve the Testimony so proved, yet it is sufficient for our purpose, that in the nature of the things (supposing them to be such as we speak of) they are sufficient for the eviction that the testimony attested by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great dispute among many, whether those things which are usually called the common motives of faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable perswasion of the truth of the p. 246doctrine as probable which they are joyned with, or else are they sufficient for the producing a firm assent to the doctrine as True? I grant they are not demonstrative so as to inforce assent; for we see the contrary by the experience of all ages; but that they are not sufficient foundation for an unprejudiced mind to establish a firm assent upon, is a thing not easie to be granted; chiefly upon this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom these evidences of a Divine Testimony are sufficiently discovered. And otherwise of all sins the sin of unbelief as to God revealing his mind, were the most excusable and pardonable sin; nay, it would be little less then a part of prudence; because what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a doctrine as true only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wisdom to withhold assent upon a meer verisimilitude? considering what the Lyrick Poet hath long since truly told us,

foreignPiadtr. Od. 1.

foreign

foreign

foreign.

That a falshood may frequently seem truer to common understandings then truth its self: and as Menander speaks, foreign, that a meer verisimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds then truth hath. If therefore there be no evidences given sufficient to carry the minds of men beyond meer probability, what sin can it be in those to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only discovered as probable: I cannot therefore see how an obligation to believe a Divine Testimony is consistent with their opinion, who make the utmost which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the doctrine attested by them. I can very well satisfie my self with the ground and reason why the more subtle wits of the Church of Rome do essert this; for if nothing else can be produced by all motives of faith but only a probable perswasion of the truth of Christian p. 247doctrine, then here comes in the fairest pretence for the Infallibility of their Church; for otherwise they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine faith, which can reach no higher then a moral inducement, and beget only a probable perswasion of the credibility of the doctrine of Christ? But on what account those who disown the Infallibility of the Church of Rome in the proposal of matters of faith, should yet consent with those of it in an hypothesis taken up in probability, meerly out of subserviency to that most advantagious piece of the mysterie of iniquity, is not easie to resolve. Unless the over-fondness of some upon the doctrine of the Schools, more then of the Gospel, hath been the occasion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Gospel which so evidently puts the most defensive weapons into the hands of unbelief? For doubtless in the judgement of any rational person, a meer probable perswasion of the credibility of the doctrine of Christ, where an assent to it as true is required, can never be looked on as an act of faith; for if my assent to the truth of the thing be according to the strength of the arguments inducing me to believe, and these arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Testimony, my assent can be no stronger then to a thing meerly probable; which is, that it may be or not be true; which is not properly assent, but a suspending our judgements till some convincing argument be produced on either side. And therefore according to this opinion those who saw all the miracles which Christ did, could not be bound to believe in Christ, but only to have a favourable opinion of his person and doctrine, as a thing which though not evidenced to be true by what he did, yet it was very piously credible; but they must have a care withall of venturing their belief too far, only on such moral inducements as miracels were, for fear they should go farther then the force of the arguments would carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the world upon the Preaching of Christ and his Apostles; when Christ saith, though ye believe not me, believe the works, Ioh 10. 38.John 10:38that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him; Nay saith this opinion, that is more then we are bound p. 248to do, though we see thy works, we are not bound to believe thy Testimony to be Divine and certainly true; but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favourable opinion of thy person and doctrine, and wait for somewhat else, but we do not well know what, to perswade us to believe. When the Apostles Preach the danger of unbelief, because the doctrine of the Gospel was confirmed by signs and wonders, Heb. 2. 3, 4.Heb 2:3Heb 2:4and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost; what a fair answer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithstanding all these signs and wonders, they were never bound to believe the Gospel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not so great in neglecting the salvation promised by the Gospel.

I cannot conceive that men otherwise learned and sober, Sect. 11.should with so much confidence assert that the rational evidences of a Divine Testimony are insufficient to prove a doctrine true, unless it be from hence, that they find that notwithstanding the strongest evidences many persons continue in unbelief. For, say they, if these arguments were scientifical and demonstrative, (as they speak) of the truth of the doctrine attested by them, then all persons to whom they are propounded, must certainly believe. But this is very easily answered; for we speak not of internal, but outward evidence, not of that in the subject, but of the object, or more fully of the reason of the thing, and not the event in us; for doubtless there may be undoubted truth and evidence in many things which some persons either cannot or will not understand. If Epicurus should contend still that the Sun and stars are no bigger then they seem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational demonstration of the contrary? Nay if the way of demonstration be offered him, and Telescopes put into his hands, yet if he be resolved to maintain his credit, and therefore his opinion, and will not use the Telescopes, or suspect still they are intended only to deceive his sight, what possible way will there be of convincing such a person, though the thing be in its self demonstrable? Now if the strength of prejudice or maintaining of credit can prevail so much in matters of Mathematical evidence to withhold assent, what power may we think a corrupt interest may have p. 249upon the understanding, as to the arguments which tend to prove the truth of that doctrine, which is so repugnant to that carnal interest which the heart is already devoted to. Our Blessed Saviour hath himself given us so full an account of the original and causes of unbelief in the persons he conversed with, that that may yield us a sufficient answer to this objection. He tels us the ground of it was not want of light, nay, there was light sufficient to convince any, but that those to whom the light came loved darkness rather then it, because their deeds were evil. That they could Joh. 3. 19.John 3:19not believe while they received honour one of another, and sought not the honour which was of God only, i. e. That they Joh. 5. 44.John 5:44were so greedy of applause from each other, that they would not impartially search into the truth of that doctrine, which did touch their sores so to the quick, that they had rather have them fester upon them, then go to the trouble of so sharp a cure. That the reason so few followed him was because the way was narrow and the gate straight which men must go in at; and therefore no wonder so few of the rich Matth. 7. 14.Matt 7:14and proud pharisees could get in at it; they were partly so sweld with a high opinion of themselves, and partly so loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpose for them to think of going in at so straight a gate, while they were resolved to part with neither.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readiness in Christ to receive them if they did, but it was a peevish, wilful, obstinate, malicious spirit, that they would not come Ioh. 5. 40.John 5:40to Christ, nor believe his Doctrine (for those import the same) but when the most convincing miracles were used, they would rather attribute them to the Prince of Devils, Matth. 1…. 24.Matt 1:24then to the power of God. And though our Saviour presently by rational and demonstrative arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we see thereby it was a resolution not to be convinced, or yield to the Truth, which was the cause why they did not believe. Now from this very instance of our Saviours proceedings with the Pharisees by rational arguments, I demand, whether these arguments of our Saviour were sufficient foundations for a divine assent p. 250to that truth that our Saviour did not his miracles by any Diabolical, but by Divine power or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational evidence may be a foundation for Divine faith; or that some motives to believe may be so strong, as to be sufficient evidence of the truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If these arguments were not sufficient proofs of what our Saviour spake, then well fare the Pharisees; it seems they said nothing but what might be thus far justified, that the contrary to it, could not be demonstrated. And if the evidence of our S…viours miracles were so great, as some suppose, that the Pharisees could not but be convinced that they were divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, to keep the people from following Christ; then we hence infer two things: First, how strong an evidence there was in the miracles of Christ, when it convinced his most resolute enemies that they were divine. Secondly, what power a corrupt will may have over a convinced understanding: For although the will may not hinder conviction, yet it may soon stifle it, by suggesting those things to the mind which may divert it from those convictions of Truth, and seek to find out any ways to disgrace it. It would be no difficult task to discover in all those instances wherein the unbelief of men is discovered in the New T…stament, that the persons guilty of it did not proceed like rational men, or such as desired Truth, but were wholly carried away through passion, interest, prejudice, disaffection, or some other cause of that nature, which may give us a sufficient account why those persons did not believe, although there might be clear and undoubted evidence to persw…de them to it. But although I assert that these rational evidences are sufficient arguments of the truth of the doctrine they come to manifest, yet I would not be so understood, that I thereby resolve all Religion into a meer act of reason and knowledge, and that no more power is required in the understanding to believe the Gospel, then to believe a Mathematical demonstration; which is another objection some lay in the way of this opinion; but it is… ot difficult getting over it. For the sufficiency which I attribute to rational evidence, is not absolute and simple, but in suo genere, as an objective p. 251evidence. Notwithstanding this, the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the soul, is left entire to its self: But then when the spirit works as to the planting of a truly divine faith, I do not think that it only perswades the soul of the Truth of a Divine Testimony, but withall represents the Truths revealed by that Testimony, with all that excellency and suitableness that there is in them, that by the most agreeable, yet effectual influence of the spirit upon the soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is revealed, and cordially yields up its self in obedience to it. This is the Divine faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not such a one as meerly believes the truth of a Divine Testimony; and as to the production of this faith, I acknowledge meer rational evidence to be insufficient, because they proceed in 2… very different ways; the one is to satisfie mens minds of the truth of the doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The asserting of the one therefore doth no more tend to destroy the other, then the saying that a Telescope will help us to discover very much of the heavenly bodies, doth imply that a blind man may see them, if he makes but use of them. Although therefore the natural man cannot savingly apprehend the things of God, yet there may be so much rational evidence going along with Divine revelation, that supposing reason to be pure, and not corrupted and steeped in sense as now it is, it would discover spiritual evidence to be the most real and convincing evidence. Thus far we have proved, that where there is any infallible Testimony, there is sufficient rational evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from God.