The Grounds of the Christian Faith, Book 3 · Chapter 2

The Grounds of the Christian Faith · Book 3 · Chapter 2

p. 421CHAP. II. Of the Origine of the Universe.

The necessity of the belief of the creation of the world in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict Moses: with a particular examination of them. The ancient tradition of the world consonant to Moses: proved from the Ionick Philosophy of Thales, and the Italick of Pythagoras. The Pythagorick Cabbala rather Aegyptian then Mosaick. Of the fluid matter which was the material principle of the universe. Of the Hypothesis of the eternity of the world asserted by Ocellus Lucanus, and Aristotle. The weakness of the foundations on which that opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philosophy. The possibility of creation proved. No arguing from the present state of the world against its beginning shewed from Maimonides. The Platonists arguments from the goodness of God for the eternity of the world answered. Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the eternity of matter; whether reconcilable with the text of Moses. Of the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the praeexistence of matter to the formation of the world. The contradiction of the eternity of matter to the nature and attributes of God. Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origine of the Universe. The World could not be produced by a casual concourse of Atoms proved from the nature and motion of Epicurus his Atoms, and the Phaenomena of the Universe, especially the production and nature of Animals. Of the Cartesian Hypothesis, that it cannot salve the Origine of the Universe without a Deity giving motion to matter.

THE foundations of religion being thus established in Sect. 1.the Being of God and the immortality of the soul, we now come to erect our super structure upon them, by asserting the undoubted truth▪ and certainty of that account of the p. 422world which is given us in the writings of Moses. Which beginning with the world its self leads us to a particular consideration of the Origine of the Universe, the right understanding of which hath very great influence upon our belief of all that follows in the Word of God. For although we should assert with Epicurus the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add that the world was made by a casual concourse of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of God is unavoidably destroyed. All that is left, is only a kind of Veneration of a B…ing more excellent then our own, which reacheth not to the government of mens lives, and so will have no force at all upon the generality of the world, who are only allured by hopes or awed by fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Besides what expressions of gratitude can be left to God for his goodness if he interpose not in the affairs of the world? what dependence can there be on divine goodness, if it be not at all manifested in the world? what apprehensions can we have of Gods infinite Wisdom and Power, if neither of them are discernable in the Being of the world? And as the opinion of Epicurus destroys Religion, so doth that of Aristotle which attributes eternity to the Universe, and a necessary emanation of it from the first cause, as light comes from the Sun; for if so, as Maimonides well observes, the whole Religion of Moses is overthrown, all his miracles are but M…e N…-…h. p. 2. cap. 25.impostures, all the hopes which are grounded on the Promises of God, are vain and fruitless. For if the world did of necessity exist, then God is no free agent; and if so, then all instituted Religion is to no purpose; nor can there be any expectation of reward, or fear of punishment from him who hath nothing else to do in the world, but to set the great wheele of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to enquire into the true Original of the world; and on what evidence of reason those opinions are built, which are so contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the B…oks of Moses. Wherein we read the true Origine of the world to have been by a production of it by the omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain assertion of Moses we come to compare it in point of reason, with all those several Hypotheses p. 423which are repugnant to it, which have been embraced in several ages by the Philosophers of greatest esteem in the world. Which may be reduced to these four: 1. Such as suppose the world to have existed as it is from all eternity. 2. Such as attribute the formation of the world as it is to God: but withall assert the praeexistence and eternity of matter. 3. Such as deny any eternity to the world, but assert the Origine of it to have been by a casual concourse of Atoms. 4. Such as endeav…ur to explain the Origine of the Universe and all appearances of nature, meerly by the Mechanical Laws of the motion of matter.

I begin with those who asserted the eternity of the world as Sect. 2.it is among whom Aristotle hath born the greatest name; who seems to have arrogated this opinion to himself; for when he enquires into the judgment of the Philosophers, who had writ-before him, he sayes of them foreign, Aristot. de Caelo l. 1. cap. 10.all the Philosophers asserted that the world was made, though some one way, some another. And were this true which Aristotle-saith, it would be the strongest prejudice against his opinion; for if the world had been eternal, how should it come to pass, that the eldest Philosophers should so readily and unanimously embrace that opinion which asserted the production of the world? Was it not a strong presumption of the Novity of the Universe, that all Nations to whom the Philosophers resorted, had memorials left among them of the first Origine of things? And from hence it is observable, that when the humour of Philosophizing began to take the Greeks (about the XL. Olympiad when we may suppose Thales to flourish) the beginning of the world was no matter of dispute, but taking that for granted, the enquiry was out of what material principle the Universe was formed; of which Thales thus delivers his opinion in Tully; aquam De Na…, Dcor. l. 1. cap. 25.dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material cause of the world. The prime efficient was God, the material principle water. It is a matter of some enquiry, whether the first principles of Philosophy among the Greeks, were not rather some traditional things conveyed to them from others, then any certain Theoryes p. 424which they had formed from their own experiments and observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first principles of the two founders of the chief sects of Philosophers, viz. the Ionick, and Italick, (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origine of the world. For this opinion of Thales seems to have been part of that universal tradition which was continued in the world concerning the first principles of things: For I do not see any reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to Moses, must presently converse with the Iews, transcribe their opinions out of the Scriptures, or have it conveyed to them in some secret Cabbala of the Creation, as it is affirmed of Pythagoras and Plato, and may be with no less reason of Thales. But this I suppose may be made evident to any considerative person, that those Philosophers of Greece who conversed most abroad in the world, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, then such who only endeavoured by their own wits to improve or correct those principles which were delivered by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the Mosaick writings, as to that universal tradition of the first ages of the world, which was preserved far better among the Phaenicians, Aegyptians, Chaldeans, and others then among the Greeks. For which we have this evident reason, that Greece was far more barbarous and rude in its elder times then those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some monuments and general reports of the first ages of the world when the Graecians wanted them. And therefore we finde that Greece from its beginning shined with a borrowed light; and saw not by an extromission of rayes of knowledge from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were received from other Nations. Those who formed Greece first into civil societies, and licked it into the shape of well ordered Commonwealths, were such who had been traders for knowledge into sorraign parts. To which purpose p. 425Diodorus Siculus informs us that Lycurgus and Solon, as well as the Poets, Orpheus, Musaeus, Melampus and Homer, Biblioth. l. 1 V. Euseb. P…aep. …vang. l. 10and the Philosophers, afterwards Pythagoras, Plato and others, had gained most of their knowledge and wisdom out of Aegypt; nay, he saith in general, foreign. All those who were renowned among the Greeks for wisdome and learning, did in ancient time resort to Aegypt, to be acquainted with their Laws and knowledge. On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine tradition of the world from the native and home-bred Greeks, such as Aristotle and Epicurus, but from those who took the pains themselves to search into those records which were preserved among the elder and more knowing Nations; And although the Nations they resorted to, sought to advance their own reputation in the histories of their ancient times, of which we have already given a large account, yet they were more faithful in the account which they gave of the Origine of the whole Universe. For it appears from Diogenes Laertius that the Aegyptians did constantly believe, that the world had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was sphaerical and the Stars were of the nature of fire; that the soul was of an immortal Diog. Lacrt. proaem. p. 7.nature, and did pass up and down the world. Which Lacrtius cites from Hecataeus and Ariscagoras. So that we need not make Pythagoras acquainted with such a Cabbala of the Creation, which in all probability neither the Iews nor he ever dreamt of; we finde a fair account may be given of most of the opinions of Pythagoras, and whence he derived them, without forcing the words of Moses into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the writings of Moses argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent testimonies of Hermippus and Aristobulus, V. Selde…. de jure nat. & geat. apud Ebraeos. l. 1. c. 2.besides Origen, Porphyrie, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others, that Pythagoras might have had opportunity of conversing with the Iews, (which it is most probable was in Chaldea after the Captivity, at which time Pythagoras was there among them) but that Pythagoras should converse with the successors of Elisha on mount Carmel, as V…ssius p. 426thinks, or that Moschus the Sidonian Philosopher in Iamblichus should be Moses, as others fancy, or that praeexistence Voss. de Sectis Philosoph. c. 6. sect. 5.of souls should be part of the Mosaick Cabbala, or that the Pythagorick numbers, as they are explained by Nicomachus Gerasenus in Photius, should be adaequate to the dayes of the Creation Cabbalistically understood, are fancyes too extravagant and Pythagorean to be easily embraced. If Pythagoras was circumcised, it was more for Love of the Aegyptians then the Iews, among whom he spent his twenty two years; if praeexistence of souls be a rational hypothesis, we may thank the Aegyptians for it, and not Moses; if numbers be so expressive of the work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphicks of Aegypt for them. But although Pythagoras might not be acquainted with such a Philosophick V. Math…m. Hieroglyph. Kircheri. To. 3 Occlip. Aegypt.Cabbala of the Creation, which none of the Iews as far as we can finde understood, till one more versed in Plato and Pythagoras then in the learning of his own Nation, viz. Philo of Alexandria, began first to exercise his wit on the text of Moses with Platonick notions; yet I shall easily grant that Pythagoras by means of his great industry and converse with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledge of many mysterious things in natural Philosophy, and as to the Origine of the Universe, then any of the Homebred Philosophers of Grecce, or it may be then any one of the Nations he resorted to, because he had the advantage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judged the best of them. And hence Plutarch tells us, that the first principles of the world according to Pythagoras, were these two, the one was foreign an active and forming Plutarch. de plac. Philos. l. 1. cap. 3.principle, and that was God whom he called Mind (as Anaxagoras likewise did) the other was foreign passive and material, which is, the visible world.

And thus we see these two renowned founders of the Ionick Sect. 3.and Italick societies of Philosophers, both giving their concurrent Testimony with Moses as to the true Origine of the world, and not at all differing from each other; for thus Thales speaks in Diogenes Laertius, foreign. p. 427V. Thalet.foreign. God is the eldest Being, because unbegotten, the world the most beautiful, because it is Gods workmanship. To which those expressions of Plato in his Timaeus come very near (whose Philosophy was for substance the same with the Pythagorean) when he had before Plato i… Timaeo. p. 1047. cd. Ficini.ascribed the production of the world to the goodness of God, which goodness of his did incline him to make all other things like himself. foreign. For the most excellent Being cannot but produce the most excellent effects. And as to the material principle out of which the world was made, there appears no great difference between the foreign of Thales, and the foreign of Plato and Pythagoras; for Plato, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material principle was, he describes it thus, foreign, which as Chalcidius Chalcid. Timaeus. p. 24. ed. Meurs.renders it, is motis importuno fluctuans neque unquam quiescens; it was a visible corporeal thing (foreign) which was never at rest, but in continual disorderly motion and agitation: which is a full explication, I suppose, of what Thales meant by his water, which is the same with that foreign or mixture of mud and water together, which others speak of as the Principle of the Universe; as Orphius in Athenagoras, and the Scholiast on Apollonius cited by Grotius and Aanot. in l. 1. deVerit. Christ. Reli.others. Which we have the more reason to believe, because the successors of Thales, Anaximander and Anaxagoras, express themselves to that purpose: Anaximander called the Sea foreign, the remainder of the Primitive moisture: and Anaxagoras sayes before the foreign or God set things in their order, foreign, all things were at first confused together: which must needs make that which Chalcidius tells us Numenius attributes to Pythagoras which his translator calls Sylvam fludiam, or fluid matter. Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.Which is the same likewise with the Phaenicians foreign, which as appears by Eusebius, some call foreign, others foreign, some mud, or slime, others the putrefaction of watery Eus…b. Praep. Evang. l. 1. cap. 10.mixtures, which they say was foreign, the seedplot of the Creation and the Generation of things. Thus we see how Thales with the Phaenicians from whom he was derived, as Laertius tells us and Pythagoras, with the Aegyptians p. 428and others concur with Moses, not only in the production of the world, but in the manner of it, wherein is expressed a fluid matter which was the material principle out of which the world was formed, when we are told that the earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon Gen. 1. 2.Gen 1:2the face of the waters, i. e. that all at first was but fluid matter; for P. Fagius from R. Kimchi renders foreign by foreign, which fluid matter was agitated and moved by the Divine spirit, or the vis plastica mundi, so Chrysostom calls it foreign: and so Drusirts and P. Fagius explain foreign by motion or agitation. And herein we have likewise the consent of those for… named excellent Philosophers, who attribute the Origine of particular things in the world to this agitation or motion of the fluid matter. For Chalcidius speaking not only of Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, but of Anaximenes, Heraclitus and others, sayes thus of them, omnesigitur hi—in motu positam rerum …. in T…m. p. 378.originem censuërunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origine of things was to be ascribed to the motion of the parts of matter. So the Phaenicians called this motion of the particles of matter foreign, a dark and blustering wind. And how suitable this explication of the Origine of things from the motion of fluid matter is to the history of nature, appears by those many experiments by which mixt bodyes are shewed to spring from no other material principle then the particles of fluid matter. Of which you may read a discourle of that ingenious and learned Gentleman Mr. Boyle in his Sceptical Chymist. Only thus much may here suffice to have made it Sceptical Chymist. p. 115. &c.appear, that all those Philosophers who were most inquisitive after the ancient and genuine tradition of the world concerning the first beginning of things, did not only concur with Moses in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular circumstances of it, as to the fluid matter and the motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add; if it be material, the Testimony of Homer in Plutarch, foreign. Iliad. ξ.And in Chalcidius: Inque eadem sententia Homerus esse invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetim dicat parentes esse geniturae; p. 429Odyss. ξ. Chalcid. p. 378.cumque jusjurandum Deorum constituat aquam, quam quidem ipse appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jure V. Meurs. in Chal. p. 37.jaranao nihil constituens reverentius. To which purpose likewise Aristotle speaks in his Metaphysicks, that the reason Metaphys. l. 1. c. 3.why Styx was made the oath of the Gods, was because water was supposed to be the material principle of Things, which he saith was foreign, a most ancient tradition concerning the Origine of the Universe. And tells us before, that some were of opinion foreign, that the most ancient and remote persons and first writers of Theology, held this opinion of water being the first material principle of things.

Having thus made it appear what a consent there was between the ancient tradition of the world, and the writings of Sect. 4.Moses concerning the Origine of the world; I now come to consider upon what pretence of reason this tradition came to be contradicted, and the eternity of the world asserted. For which we are to consider that the difference of the former Philosophers of the Ionick sect, after the time of Thales, as to the material principle of the world, one substituting air, another fire instead of water, rendred the tradition its self suspected among other Philosophers, especially when the humour of innovating in Philosophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unless they contradicted their Masters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects presently among them, and that Philosophy which at first went much on the original tradition of the world, was turned into disputes and altercations, which helped as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a dunghil doth the finding out the Iewel that lyes there. For which, scraping and searching into the natures of things had been far more proper, then contentions & wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humour Philosophy from being a design grew to be a meer Art, and he was accounted the best Philosopher, not that searched further into the bowels of nature, but that dressed and tricked up the notions he had in the best posture of defence against all who came to oppose him. From hence those opinions were most plausible, not p. 430which were most true, but which were most defensible, and which like Des-Cartes his second element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their adversaries might have an advantage of justling upon them, and then their opinions were accounted most pure when they were so sphaerical, as to pass up and down without interruption. From such a degeneracy of Philosophy as this we have now mentioned, arose the opinion of the eternity of the world; For the certain tradition of the world being now lost in a croud of Philosophers, whose main aim was to set up for themselves, and not to trade with the common bank, so that there could be no certain and convictive evidence given to a shuffling Philosopher that things were ever otherwise then they are, they found it most defensible to assert that the world never had a beginning nor would have an end, but alwayes did and would continue in the State they were in. This opinion, though Aristotle seems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched as far as we can finde at first, under Pythagoras his successors by Ocellus Lu…anus, as appears by his book still extant foreign of the nature of the Universe; to whom Aristotle hath not been a little beholding, as Ludov. Nogarola hath in part manifested in his notes on Ocellus, although Aristotle had not the ingenuity of Pliny, agnoscere per quos profecerit. From Aristotle this opinion, together with his name, spread its self much farther, and became the opinion most in vogue among the Heathen Philosophers, especially after the rise of Christianity; for then not only the Peripateticks, but the modern Platonists, Plotinus, Apuleius, Taurus, Iamblichus, Alcinous, Proclus and others were all engaged in the defence of the eternity of the world, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Christianity. Hence came the hot and eager contests between Proclus, Simplicius, and Philoponus, who undertook to answer Proclus his eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world, and to charge Aristotle with self-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubled about then to reconcile the Timaeus of Plato with the eternity of the world, which they made to be a meer Hypothesis and a kind of Diagramme to salve providence withall; although the plain words of Pl…to p. 431not only there but elsewhere do express, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real judgement to have been for the production of the world by God. For which purpose we have this observable Testimony in his Sophista, where he Platon. Sophist. p. 185. ed. Fic.divides all manner of productions of things into divine and humane, and opposes the opinion that conceived all things to be produced by an eternal power, to the opinion of the vulgar which saith he, was foreign, that all things were produced by a blind force of nature without any reason or counsel, to which he opposeth the other opinion, that they are made foreign, by a divine power with infinite reason and wisdom; and when Theaetetus expresseth himself in an Academical way as to either of these opinions, the hospes Eleatensis who there acts the part of the Philosopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other opinion, foreign. He would undertake to make him confess the contrary by the evidence of reason which he would bring. And we shall see what great reason there is for this opinion, when we consider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the arguments which either Ocellus, or Aristotle, or the modern Platonists make use of, are built on these following suppositions which are all false. 1. That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been in any other state then they are. 2. That there is no other way of production but by Generation. 3. That God is no free agent, but produceth the world by necessity of nature.

1. That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been any otherwise then they are. The reason of which supposition Sect. 5.was this, that the general conclusions of reason which they proceed upon in Philosophy, were taken up from the observation of things as they are at present in the world. Which is evident from the ground of Aristotles condemning the opinion of Empedocles who asserted the production of the world, and yet the incorruptibility of it. foreign, which he accounts impossible and gives this as his reason. foreign. Arist. de coelo l. 16. cap. 10.For, saith he, nothing else p. 432can be rationally asserted, but what we finde to be in all things or at least in most; now because there could nothing be found in the world which was produced (i. e. by generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impossible it should be so with the Universe. By which we evidently see what the grand principles of reason among the Philosophers were: viz. such observations as they had made from the present course of nature in the order of the Universe. From hence arose that strong presumption among them, which hath been so taken for granted, that it hath been looked on as a common notion of bumane nature, viz. exnihilo nihil fit, which was the main argument used by them to V. Laert. in vi…. Democriti.prove the eternity of the world: and by others to prove the praeexistence of matter. So Ocellus argues against both the dissolution and production of the world from this principle; if the world be dissolved, saith he, it must either be foreign, either into that which is, or into that which is not; it cannot be dissolved into that which is, because then the Universe cannot be destroyed; for that which is, is either the Universe or a part of it: neither can it be dissolved into that which is not, foreign. For it is impossible that a thing should be made out Ocellus Lucanus p. 16. cd. Commel.of that which is not, or be dissolved into nothing. And Aristotle somewhere tells us, that it is a principle which all the writers of natural Philosophy are agreed in (foreign) which is foreign, Physi…. l. 4.that it is impossible for any thing to come out of nothing. But now when we observe upon what grounds this Principle was took up by these Philosophers, we have no reason to admit of it as an Universal standard of nature. For we finde by these Naturalists who thus asserted this principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the course of Generations in the world, or from the works of art, both which suppose matter praeexistent, and from these short collections they form this universal Maxime. And from hence when they discoursed of the manner whereby God did De Nat. l. 1.produce the world, their imaginations ran presently upon that which the Epicurean in Tully enquires after, quae molitio? quaeferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri p. 433tanti oper is fuërunt? they apprehend God only as an Artificer that contrives the world first into a platform, and then useth instruments to erect it, and consequently still suppose the matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of Balbus in Tully when he comes to discourse of the nature of God; in quo nihil est difficilius quam à consuetudine De Nat. Deor. l. 2.oculorum aciem mentis abducere; nothing is more difficult then to abstract our minds from the observations of this visible world when we se…k to apprehend the nature of the Deity. Thus we see upon what general grounds the Philosophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how insufficient any collections from the present order of the Universe are to determine any thing concerning its production by. For supposing a production of the world, several things must of necessity be supposed in it, different from what the present order of the world is; and it is an unreasonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greatest perfection, to what must alwaies have been in the same thing; for by this means we must condemn many things for falsities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently false. For which Maimonides useth an excellent fim litude. Suppose, saith he, one of exquisite natural parts, whose mother More N… voch. p. 2. c. 17.dies assoon as he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Island, where he may have no society with mankind till he be grown up to years of understanding, and that he never saw any female of either man or beast: Suppose now this person to enquire of the first man he speaks with how men are born, and how they come into the world. The other tells him, that every man is bred in the womb of one of the same kind with our selves, thus and thus formed; and that while we are in the womb we have a very little body, and there move, and are nourished, and we grow up by little and little till we come to such a bigness, and then we come forth into the world, and yet grow still till we come to such a proportion as we are of. Here presently this young man stops him and enquires, when we were thus little in the womb and did live, move, and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our mouth and nostrils as we do now? did we not ease nature as now we do? If it be answered him, no; them he presently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonstrations p. 434that it was utterly impossible it should be so. For, saith he, if either of us, cease breathing but for an hour, our motion and life is gone; how is it then possible for one of us though never so little, to live and move in the womb for so many months, when it is so close and shut up & in the middle of the body? If one of us, saith he, should swallow a little bird, it would resently dye as soon as it came into the stomack, how much more if it were in the belly? If we should be but for few dayes without eating and drinking, we could not live; how can a childe then continue so many months without it? Again if one doth eat and not void the excrements of what he eats, he will be kild with it in few dayes; how can it possibly be otherwise with a child? If it be replyed that there is a passage open in the belly at which the child receives his nourishment, he will presently say that it is as impossible as the other; for if our bellyes were so open, we should be quickly destroyed. And again if the child bath all its limbs perfect and sound, how comes it not to open its eyes, use the feet, mouth and hands as we do? And so concludes it impossible that man should ever be born after this manner. Much after this way, saith that excellent Author, do Aristotle and others argue against the production of the world; for if the world were produced, say they, it must have been thus and thus, and it is impossible that it should have been so: why? because we see things are otherwise now in the world. Which how infirme a way of arguing, it appears from the consideration of the former similitude, in which the arguments are as strong to prove the impossibility of that which we know to be true; as in the case about which we dispute.

And this now leads us to the second false Hypothesis Sect. 6. 2.which the opinion of the worlds eternity was founded on, which is, that there is no other way of production but by Generation. Most of the arguments which are used by Ocellus and Aristotle against the production of the world, run upon this supposition, that it must be generated as we see things are in the world. So Ocellus argues foreign p. 435De Natur. Univer. p. 8.foreign. Every thing that comes into being and is subject to dissolution, hath two observable mutations in it; the one is whereby it grows from less to greater, and from worse to better, and this is called Generation, and the height of this mutation, perfection; the other begins from better to worse, and from bigger to less, and the conclusion of this is, corruption and dissolution. But now, saith he, if the world had a beginning, there would be such a mutation in it, and it would have grown by degrees greater till it had come to its perfection, and from thence it would sensibly decay till it came to dissolution; but no body hath ever observed such a mutation in the world, neither is there any appearance of it; foreign; but the world is semper idem, it varyes not nor alters any thing from its self. For which, he particularly instanceth in the courses, Symmetryes, figures, positions, intervals, proportions of motion which are in the world, which things are all capable of such a mutation, yet we see no such thing in the Universe, from whence he infers that the Universe was alwayes and will be as it is. Upon the same principle doth Aristotle dispute for the eternity of the world from the nature of his materia prima, because if the first matter were generated it must be generated of other matter and so in infinitum; and so he argues from the nature of the Heavens that they are not capable of generation and corruption as other bodyes are. All which arguments signifie no more then this, that the world was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and who ever right in his wits asserted that it was? But do any of these arguments prove it impossible that God having infinite power should produce the Universe after another way then any of those things are produced in, which we observe in the world? For we assert an infinite and eternal Being which was the efficient cause of the world, who by his omnipotcut power produced it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expressed by the author of the refutation of Aristotle in Iustin Martyrs works. We assert, saith he, one God who is eternal Arislot. dogmat. evers. p. 111.himself, that hath nothing else coaeval with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose power is so great that nothing p. 436can hinder it, by which power he produced the world. foreign; which hath no other cause, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will. Who sully answers in a Philosophical manner, the particular Allegations out of Aristotle, concerning the eternity of the world: his design being, as he saith, to shew foreign. That the Greek Philosophers in their discourses concerning God and the creation, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the Laws of demonstration, but instead of them proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures. And as to this particular of the possibility of another way of production, besides that of generation, he proves it from Aristotles own opinion, from the equal necessity of the existence of matter, as of God. For, saith he, if God can produce any thing out of matter, which is as necessarily existent as himself, he may produce something out of nothing. For, the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced, Justin. M…rtyr. op. p. 123.the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent. How then can God produce something out of matter, which necessarily exists, & not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if matter have its original from its self, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we acknowledge God to have his being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to matter. But whatever hath infinite power in its self, hath a power upon something beyond its self; but if God and matter have it both, they can never have power upon each other, or without themselves. Which is a far greater absurdity then the meer asserting a power to produce something out of nothing, which is implyed in the very notion of infinite power; for if it be confined to any matter, the power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no further then matter doth. So that a power of creation is implyed in the very notion of a Deity; and therefore it is a meer Sophism to argue because the world could not be generated, therefore p. 437it could not be produced, unless any other way of production but by generation, be proved impossible.

A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this, that the Being of the world was no effect of Gods will, but of the Sect. 7. 3.necessity of nature. For although the Philosophers we now speak of, did-assert a Deity, which in some sense might be called the cause of the world, yet they withall asserted that the world was Coaeval with God himself, and so though there might be some priority in order of causes between them, yet there was none in order of time, or duration, as we see the light, though it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without light. This Aristotle he proves from the necessity of motion and time: For, saith he, what ever is moved, must be moved by something else, and cons…quently there must be a running in Infinitum; but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual Physical motion in things, which we deny, since God by his infinite power may give motion to that which had it not before; and so all that can be proved, is the necessity of some first cause which we assert, but no necessity at all of his continual acting, since he may cause motion when he please. And for Time continually existing, it denotes nothing real in its self existing, but only our manner of conception of the duration of things, as it is conceived to belong to motion; and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity. But the later Platonists look upon these as insufficient wayes of probation, and therefore argue from those attributes of God, which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to Gods nature; and by which the world was produced if at all: so that by the same arguments whereby we prove that the world was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eternity. It was well and truly said of Plato in his Timaeus, that the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the world; from which speech the more modern Platonists gather a necessity of the worlds eternity; for from hence they infer, that since God was always good, he must always have an object to exercise his goodness upon; as the Sun disperseth his light assoon as he is himself. True, were God of the nature of the Sun, it would be so with him; or were the Sun of p. 438the nature of God, it would not be so with it. But there is this vast difference between them, that though God be essentially and necessarily good, yet the communications of this goodness are the effect of his Will, and not meerly of his nature; For were not the acts of beneficence and goodness in God the free acts of his will, man must be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his first existence in the world, but as long as it should continue, by meer necessity of nature without any intervention of the will or actions of men. And so there could be no such difference as that of good and bad men in the world; for if the lettings forth of Gods goodness to the world be so necessary, all men must become necessarily good, if Gods goodness be so great as to be able to make men so; which I suppose will not be questioned. By this then we see that the communications of Gods goodness to the world are free, and depend upon the eternal counsels of his will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into; by what necessity then, if God be a free Agent, and of Infinite wisdom, as well as goodness, must we either assert the eternity of the world, or fear to deprive God of his essential Goodness? Whereas to make the communications of Gods goodness ad▪extra necessary, and therefore to make the world from eternity, that he might have an object to exercise his goodness on, is to take as much off from the Infinite perfection and self sufficiency of the divine nature as it would seem to flatter his goodness. For God cannot be himself without his goodness; and if his goodness cannot be without some creature to shew or display it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy without his creatures because these are necessary issues of his goodness; and consequently we make the Being of the creatures necessary to his Being God. Which is the highest derogation from the absolute perfection of the Divine nature. We assert then so much goodness in God, as none can be imagined greater; we assert, that it was the communication of this Divine goodness which gave being to the world; but withall we acknowledge God to be an Agent infinitely wise and free, who dispenseth this goodness of his in such a way and manner as is best pleasing to himself, though ever agreeable to his Nature. As God is p. 439infinitely good in himself, so whatever he doth is suitable to this nature of his; but the particular determinations of the acts of Gods beneficence belong to the Will of God, as he is a most free and Independent Agent; so that goodness as it imports the necessary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implyes a perfection inseparable from the true Idea of God; but as it is taken for the expressions of Divine bounty to somewhat without, as the object of it, it is not implyed in our conception of God, as to his nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of Gods bounty towards the whole universe, or any part of it, any further then God himself hath declared it to us. Now we see the world exists, we have cause to adore that goodness of God, which not only gave a Being to the Universe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for all the Creatures which he hath made in it. Which the Heathen was so sensible of, that the Stoick in Tully taking notice of the abundant provision which is made in the world, not only for De Nat. Dcor. l. z.mans necessity, but for delight and ornament, cryes out, ut interdum Pronaea nostra Epicurea esse videatur: Gods providence doth abundantly exceed mans necessity. We see then from this discourse, how unsafe and unsatisfactory (that I may not say bold and presumptuous) those arguments are, which are drawn from a general consideration of the Divine nature and Goodness, without regard had to the determinations of his Will, as to the existence of things in the world. It cannot certainly then be an argument of any great force with any candid enquirers after Truth and Reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that Pythagorean hypothesis of the praeexistence of souls, viz. That if it be good for mens souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the Wisdom and Goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not) they must be before they come into these bodies. Wherefore the praeexistence of souls is a necessary result of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, then he can to understand p. 440it. I now seriously enquire of such who love reason above Plato and Pythagoras, whether if the eternity of the world were put into the argument instead of the Praeexistence of souls, this argument would not hold as strongly for that, as it doth for Praeexistence; and if I am bound to believe Praeexistence on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the souls of men eternal, if not the Universe. But how reconcileable the eternity of the world is to the Pythagorick Cabbala of the Creation, I am yet to understand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the eternity of the world, as we have shewed it doth not, much less doth it praeexistence of souls.

We have thus far considered the first hypothesis, which is repugnant to Moses concerning the Origine of the Universe, Sect. 8.which is that which asserts the eternity of the world as it is; we come now to the second, which attributes the Formation of the world as it is, to God as the efficient cause, but attributes eternity to the matter out of which the world was framed. I am not ignorant that some who would be taken for the Masters of reason, are so far from conceiving this Hypothesis to be repugnant to the text of Moses, that they V…lkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, viz. that there was a praeexistent matter, out of which God formed the World. But I would willingly understand how Moses would have expressed that matter its self was created, supposing it had been his intention to have spoken it; for although the word foreign may not of its self imply necessarily the production of things out of nothing, i. e. out of no praeexistent matter; yet it is acknowledged by all that no word used by the Iews is more proper to that then foreign is; and P. Fagius cites it from R. Nachmani, that the Hebrew Language hath no other word to signifie such a production out of nothing but foreign. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, that because foreign is sometimes used for no more then foreign, therefore the world was created out of praeexistent matter; all that can rationally be inferd, is, that from the meer force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: but if other places of Scripture compared, and the evidence of reason, do make it clear that there could p. 441be no praeexistent matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow that creation must be taken in its proper sense. And in this sense it is evident, that not only Iews and Christians, but even the Heathens themselves understood Moses, as is plain by Galen, where he compares the opinion Galen de usa part. l. 11.of Moses with that of Epicurus, and ingenuously confesseth that of Moses, which attributed the production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable then that of Epicurus which assigned the Origine of things to a meer casual concourse of Atoms: But withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with Moses as to the Origine of such things as depend on Generation, but asserts the praeexistence of matter, and withall that Gods power could not extendits self beyond the capacity of the matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est, saith he, in quo ratio nostra ac Platonis, tum aliorum qui apud Graecos de rerum natura recte conscripserunt, à Mose dissidet. How true these words are, will appear afterwards. Chaleidius in his Commentaries on Plato's Timaeus, where he speaks of the Origine of foreign, which in him is still translated sylva, and enquires into the different opinions of all Philosophers about it, takes it for granted that according to Moses, this foreign had its production from God. Hebraei sylvam generatam esse confitentur; quorum Chalcid. in T…m. p. 372.sapientissimus Moyses non humana facundia, sed divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit coelum & terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila: Caput rerum condidit Deus coelum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; vel nt Symachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus coelum & terram. Terra porro fuit otiosum quid, confusumque, & inordinatum. Sed Origenes asseverat ita sibi ab Hebraeis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit à vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exemplari, Terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen haec in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata sit …a quae subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur. Where we finde by the Testimony of Chalcidius an universal consent as to the production of the p. 442universal corporeal matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of generata est. But this same author afterwards tells us, that by Heavens and Earth in the first verse of Genesis we are not to understand the visible Heavens and earth: For, saith he, the Heavens which are called the firmament, were created after, and on the third day when the waters were separated, the dry Land appeared, which was called earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, coelum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua subvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant, hoc coelum ab initio factum, sed secundo die. And therefore by the heavens he understands incorpoream naturam, and by earth foreign or the primigenial matter. And this, saith he, appears by the following words, The earth was invisible, and without form; i. e. this corporeal matter, before it was brought into order by the power and wisdom of God, remained a rude and indigested lump; and that which is so, might well be called invisible, and without form. And therefore it is called inanis and nihil, because of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. Symmachus calls it otiosa & indigesta; the former because of its inability to produce any thing of its self: the latter because it wanted a divine power to bring it into due order. That stupidity and admiration which Origen attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majesty of God, who was the orderer and contriver of it, siquidem opificis & auctoris sui majestate capta stuperet. Thus we see that according to Moses, the first matter of the world was produced by God, which is largely manifested by Origen against the Marcionists, a fragment of which is extant in his Philocalia; and by Tertullian against Hermogenes, and Origen. Philoc. cap. 24. Tertul. ad. Hermog. per tot. Sect. 9.others, who from the opinion of the praeexistence of matter are called Materiarii.

Having thus cleared the sense of Moses, it is far more difficult to find out the true opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the production or eternity of corporeal matter, there having been so great dissensions, not only about the thing its self, but about the opinions of some about it. For it is plain by Plutarchs foreign, as well as De Animae procreat. … Timaeo.the discourses of the later Platonists, how eager some have p. 443been to interpret Plato's Timaeus in favour of the eternity at least of matter, if not of the world. But although Plato doth assert therein a praeexistence of rude matter before the formation of the world, yet I see no reason why he should be otherwise understood then in the same sense that we believe a Chaos to have gone before the bringing the world into the order it is now in. And in that sense may those places in Plutarch be interpreted, foreign, and so likewise those following words, foreign; for the meaning may be no more then that Plato conceived that all the productions of the kinds of things which are in the the world, was out of a Praeexistent Hyle, the one spiritual and intelligible, out of which he supposed souls to be formed, the other sensible and corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more gross and material, were produced. So Chalcidius tells us, that both Pythagoras and Plato looked upon constitutionem sylvae to be opus providentiae: which I suppose relates not only to the bringing of matter into form, but to the production of Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377matter its self. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to search out the true meaning of Plato concerning the Origine T. 401.of Hyle, and mentions the great diss…nsions among the Platonists about it, and the obscurity of the Timaeus in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewise brings in Numenius largely discoursing concerning the opinion of Pythagoras about it, who condemns all those, as not understanding Pythagoras, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle. These are his words, Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pag. 393.Pythagorae dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem singularitatis nominasse Col. nomine appellasse, sylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam esse dicere. Hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero at que illustratam, à Digestore Deo esse generatam. Atque it a quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, aequaevum Deo, à quo p. 444est ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim sententiaenon recte assccutos, putasse, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immensam duitatem, ab una singularitate institutam, recedente à natura sua singularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante. But however these Pythagoreans might be deceived, who thought the Unity its self became the Duity; yet it is evident by Numenius, that he looked on the undetermined and confused matter to have been coaeval with God himself and not produced by him. And if Numenius be as much to be credited in this as when he calls Plato Moses Atticus, then the Creation of Universal matter can be no part of Pythagoras his Philosophick Cabala. But whatever were the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the first origine of matter, we are certain that the Stoicks generally asserted the improduction of matter, and make that to be as necessary a passive principle for the Being of the world, as God is the active and efficient cause. So Diogenes Laertius reports of the Stoical principles concerning the Origine of the Universe: foreign. V. Zenon.They make two principles of the V. Lipsium in Physiol. Sto. l. 1. c. 4.Universe, one active, and the other passive; the passive, an essence without quality, called Hyle or confused matter; the active, the reason which acts in the other, which is God. These two principles Seneca calls causa & materia; …sse vero debet, saith he, aliquid unde fiat; deinde à quo fiat, hoc causa est, illud Epist. 65.materia. Although Seneca seems to make a query of it elsewhere; quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an Presat. ad Nat Quaest. Eclog. Physic.datâ utatur? But Zeno is express in Stobaeus, foreign. The first essence of all is matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution. To the same purpose Chalcidius speaks, Stoici ortum sylvae rejiciunt, In Tim. p. 388.quin potius iosam & Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; D… um ut opificem; Sylvam ut quae operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentia praeditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute; quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam …sse.

Having now found out the certain assertors among the p. 445Sect. 10.Heathen Philosophers of the eternity and improduction of matter as the passive principle of things, we come to examine the reason of this Hypothesis, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon from all eternity? It might be sufficient prejudice against this opinion, that it was built on the same infirm conclusions which that of the eternity of the whole world was, viz. that Maxime which Lipsius attributes to Demoeritus, but was embraced by all those Philosophers who denyed production of matter, foreign, that nothing Physiol. Stoic. l. 2. c. 2.could be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing; which as we have already said, was only taken up from the established order of the Universe, and the manner of production of material Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this Hypothesis with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an omnipotent power; For otherwise we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God should give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, viz. the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was prod…ced. Now what repugnancy is there to any free principle of reason, that a power infinite should raise an Insect into Being without any passive principle out of which it was caused; and if an Infinite power can do that, it may as well produce the world out of nothing, else the power would not be Infinite; for it would have its bounds set, that thus far it could go and no further. Now if such a power in God implyes no contradiction in its self, I say the asserting the necessary existence of matter implyes a contradiction to this power. For, 1. A power to produce something out of nothing would be to no purpose, if a p…ssive principle or praeexistent matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend p. 446to the production of this matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not infinite, and so the same power is infinite and not infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the notion of a God to assert the necessary and eternal existence of matter.

2. If matter be unproduced, then necessary existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary existence belongs to matter, infinite power must belong to it too; For what ever necessarily exists, is self-originated; what ever is selforiginated, could not by any cause whatsoever be hindered from Being; what cannot by any cause be hindered from Being, hath Infinite power; what hath Infinite power, may produce any thing, and is God, and so matter cannot be a meer passive principle, but must be an active, and so must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods then one. To an argument something of this nature Hermogenes in Tertullian replyes, that matter would not lose the name or nature of matter, because of its coeternity with God, neither could it vers. Hermog. c. 4.be God meerly on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the nature of God as well as that. But I have already shewed that necessary existence implyes other perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus proved by Tertullian in answer to Hermogenes; the reason of the imperfections which are to be seen in any creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from its self, must on that account want those imperfections which other creatures in the world have; and therefore if necessary existence be of the nature of matter, all other perfections must belong to it too: and so there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and matter, because on both sides there will be necessary existence. Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica: and so Cap. 7.the eternal existence of matter is repugnant to the unity of God.

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God subject to matter, and not matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without praeexistent matter, the p. 447matter is necessary to his action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so Gods using matter, is as Tertullian speaks, ex necessitate mediocritatis suae, to help him in the production of things. Nemo non subjicitur ci cujus eget ut possit uti, as he goes on. Thus matter Cap. 8.at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so as Tertullian sharply sayes, God is beholding to matter for ever being known to the world; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognosceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, nisi quod jam non omnipotens, si non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre. Thus we see how irreconcilable this Hypothesis is with these Attributes of God.

4. It is repugnant to the immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this eternal matter, or was conjoyned with it; if conjoyned with it, then both made but one Being, as Maximus, or Orig…n argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be Orig. Philoc. c. 24.three real improduced things. If it be answered that they are neither conjoyned nor separate, but God is in matter as in his proper place, as the Stoicks asserted, it is easily replyed, that either then he is in a part of matter, or the whole matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole as his adaequate place, how could he then ever frame the world? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass that he might fashion that part of the world which he was about, or else he must likewise frame part of himself with that part of the world which he was then framing of, which consequence is unavoidable on the Stoical Hypothesis of Gods being corporeal and confined to the world as his proper place. And so much for this second Hypothesis concerning the Origine of the Universe, which supposeth the eternity of matter as coexisting with God.

I come now to that which makes most noise in the world, which is the Atomical or Epicurean Hypothesis, but will appear Sect. 11.to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origine of the Universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which produced p. 448the world and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the world, that many of the Phaenomena of the Universe are far more intelligibly explained by matter and motion then by substantial forms, and real qualities, few free and unprejudiced minds do now scruple. But because these little particles of matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of nature, that therefore there should be nothing else but matter and motion in the world, and that the Origine of the Universe should be from no wiser principle then the casual concourse of these Atoms, is one of the evidences of the proneness of mens minds to be intoxicated with those opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an Hypothesis its due place and subserviency to. God and providence, but think these Atoms have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the world. For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the serviceableness of this Hypothesis, which hath given it entertainment among men of Atheistical spirits. Epicurus himself in his Epistle to Pythocles urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his opinion that he brought no God down upon the stage to put things in order, foreign, which his Paraphrast Lucretius hath thus rendered;Apud Diog. Laert. l. 10. Lucret. de Nat. l. 5.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam

Naturam rerum.

If this opinion then be true, the history of the Creation quite falls to the ground, on which account we are obliged more particularly to consider the reason of it. The Hypothesis then of Epicurus is, that before the world was brought into that form and order it is now in, there was an infinite empty space in which were an innumerable company of solid particles or Atoms of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occursions of these all the bodies of the Universe were framed into that order they now are in. Which is fully expressed by Dionysius in Eusebius, and very agreeably to the sense of Epicurus in his p. 449Epistles to Herodotus and Pythocles, and to what Plutarch Praep. Evang. l. 14 c. 22. p 421 ed. R. St. De Placitis Phil. l. 1. c. 4 A…not. in Senec. de provid.reports of the sense of Epicurus, though he names him not (if at least that book be his which Muretus denyes) the words of Dionysius are these concerning the Epicureans, foreign. So that according to this opinion, all the account we have of the Origine of the world, is from this general Rendes-vous of Atoms in this infinite space, in which after many encounters and facings about, they fell into their several troops, and made up that ordered Battalia which now the world is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of Epicurus to make the worlds infinite, as well as his space and Atoms; for by the same reason that his Atoms would make one world, they might make a thousand; and who would spare for worlds, when he might make them so easily? Lucretius gives us in so exact an account of the several courses the Atoms took up in disposing themselves into bodyes, as though he had been Muster-Master-General at that great Rendes-vous; for thus he speaks of his Atoms,

Quae quia multimodis, multis mutata per omne

Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,De Nut. ret. l. 1.

Omne genus motus & caetus experiundo,

Tandem deveniunt in taleis disposituras,

Qualibus haec rebus consistit summa creata.

And more particularly afterwards;

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerumL…b. 5.

Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,

Ponderibusque suis consuërunt concita ferri,

Omnimodisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,

Quaecunque inter se possunt congressa creare;

Ut non sit mirum, si in taleis disposituras

Deciderunt queque, & in taleis venere meatus,

Qualibus haec rerum …enitur nunc summa novando.

Thus we see the substance of the Epicurean Hypothesis, that p. 450there were an Infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occursions did at last meet with those of the same nature with them, and these being conjoyned together made up those bodyes which we see: so that all the account we are able to give according to this Hypothesis of all the Phaenomena of the Universe, is from the fortuitous concourse of the Atoms in the first forming of the world, and the different contexture of them in bodies. And this was delivered by the ancient Epicureans not with any doubt or hesitation, but with the greatest confidence imaginable. So Tully observes of Velleius the Epicurean, beginning his discourse, fidenter De Nat. Deor. l. 1.sane ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset: Confidence was the peculiar genius of that sect, which we shall see in them to be accompanied with very little reason.

For those two things which make any principles in Philosophy Sect. 12.to be rejected, this Atomical Hypothesis is unavoidably charged with: and those are, If the principles be taken up without sufficient ground in reason for them; and if they cannot give any sufficient account of the Phaenomena of the world. I shall therefore make it appear, that this Hypothesis, as to the Origine of the Universe, is first, meerly precarious, and built on no sufficient grounds of reason. Secondly, That it cannot give any satisfactory account of the Origine of things.

1. That it is a precarious Hypothesis, and hath no evidence of reason on which it should be taken up; and that will be proved by two things. 1. It is such an Hypothesis as the Epicureans themselves could have no certainty of according to their own principles. 2. That the main principles of the Hypothesis its self are repugnant to those Catholick Laws of nature which are observed in the Universe.

1. The Epicureans according to their own principles could have no certainty of the truth of this Hypothesis. And that 1. Because they could have no certain evidence of its truth. 2. Because their way of proving it was insufficient.

1. That they could have no certain evidence of the truth of it, I prove from those criteria, which Epicurus lays down as the only certain rules of judging the truth of things by; p. 451and those were sense, Anticipation and Passion. Let sense be never so infallible a ruie of judgement, yet it is impossible there should be any evidence to sense of the truth of this Hypothesis; and let him extend his foreign as long as he please, which was his great help for correcting the errors of sense, viz. as it was in the Roman court when the case was not clear, ampliandum est; So Epicurus would have the object represented every way it could be before he past his judgement; yet this prudent caution would do him no good for this Hypothesis, unless he were so wise as to stay till this world were crumbled into Atoms again, that by that he might judge of the Origine of it. There is but one way left to finde out the truth of things inevident to sense, (as by Epicurus his own confession all these Atoms are, which are now the component particles of bodyes; much more those which by their fortuitous concourse gave Being to the world) and that is, if something evident to sense doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in nature from motion; but though that be easily answered by principles different from those of Epicurus, and more rational; yet that very way of probation fails him in his present Hypothesis. For what is there evident to sense which proves a fortuitous concourse of Atoms for the production of things? nay if we grant him that the composition of bodyes is nothing else but the contexture of these insensible particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to sense, that these particles without any wise and directing providence should make up such bodyes as we see in the world. And here when we speak of the evidence of sense, we may well ask as the Stoick in Tully doth, whether ever Epicurus found a Poeme made by the casual throwing of letters together; and if a concourse of Atoms did produce the world, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? why did it never produce D: Nat. Dear. l. 2.a cloyster, a temple, a house, a city, which are far easier things then the world? I know Epicurus will soon reply, that things are otherwise in the world now then when it was first produced; I grant it, and from thence prove, that because no such thing ever happens in the world now, as a meerly casual concourse of Atoms to produce any thing, Epicurus p. 452could have no evidence from sense at all to finde out the truth of his Hypothesis by. And as little relief can he finde from his second Criterium, viz. Anticipation; for by his own acknowledgement, all Anticipation depends on the senses, and men have it only one of these four wayes. 1. By V. Gassendum de Logica Epicuri. Op To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.incursion, as the species of a man is preserved by the sight of him. 2. By proportion, as we can inlarge or contract that species of a man either into a Gyant or Pygmy. 3. By similitude, as we may fancy the image of a City by resemblance to one which we have seen. 4. By composition, whereby we may joyn different images together, as of a horse and man to make a Centaure. Now though it be very questionable how some of these wayes belong to a Criterium of truth, yet none of them reach our case; for there can be no incursion of insensible particles as such upon our senses; we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them; but what is this to the proving the truth of the Hypothesis? Similitude can do no good, unless Epicurus had ever seen a world made so; the only relief must be from composition, and that will prove the Origine of the world by Atoms to be as true, as that there are Centaures in the world, which we verily believe. These are the only Criteria by which Epicurus would judge of the truth of natural things by (for the third, Passion relates wholly to things Moral and not Physical) and now let any one judge, whether the Hypothesis of the Origine of the Universe by Atoms can ever be proved true, either by the judgement of sense, or by Anticipation.

The way they had to prove this Hypothesis was insufficient; Sect. 13. 2.and that was by proving that the bodyes of the world are compounded of such insensible particles; Now, granting the thing, I deny the consequence; for what though the composition of bodyes be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow; that these particles did casually produce these bodyes? nay doth it at all follow, that because bodyes upon their resolution do fall into insensible particles of different size, figure and motion, therefore these particles must be praeexistent to all bodyes in the world? For it is plain, that there is now an Universal lump of matter out of which these insensible particles arise, and whether they return on p. 453the dissolution of bodyes; and all these various corpuscles may be of the same uniform substance only with the alteration of size, shape and motion; but what then? doth this prove, that because particular bodyes do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of insensible paerticles of that matter which exists in the world, that therefore this whole matter was produced by the casual occursions of these Atoms? It will ask more time and pains then is usually taken by the Philosophers either ancient or modern, to prove that those things whatsoever they are, whether elements or particles out of which bodyes are supposed to be compounded, do exist separately from such compounded bodyes, and antecedently to them. We finde no Aristotelian elements pure in the world, nor any particles of matter destitute of such a size, figure and motion as doth make some body or other. From whence then can we infer either the existence of Aristotles materia prima, without quiddity, quantity or quality, or the Epicurean Atoms without such a contexture as make up some bodyes in the world? Our profound Naturalist Dr. Harvey, after his most accurate search into the natures and Generation of things, delivers this as his experience and judgement concerning the commonly reputed elements or principles of bodyes. For speaking of the different opinions D… Generat. Anim. Exercit. 72.of Empedocles and Hippocrates, and Democritus, and Epicurus, concerning the composition of bodyes, he adds, Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum similarium generatione, (sive ea partium animalium, sive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium, &c. fuerit) vel congregationem ejusmodi, vel miscibilia diversa in generation is opere unienda praeexistere, observare unquam potui. And after explaining the way which he conceived most rational and consonant to experience in the Generation of things, he concludes his discourse with these words; Idemque in omni generatione furi crediderim; adeo ut corpora similaria mista, elementa sua tempore priora non habeant, sed illa potius element is suis prius existant (nempe Empedoclis atque Aristotel is igne, aqua, aëre, terra, vel Chymicorum sale, sulphure, & Mercurio, aut Democriti Atomis) utpote natura quoque ipsis perfectiora. Sunt, inquam, mista & composita, etiam tempore p. 454priora element is quibuslibet sic dictis, in quae illa corrumpuntur & desinunt; dissolvuntur scilicet in ista ratione potius quam re…psa & actu. Elementa itaque quae dicuntur, non sunt priora ist is rebus, quae generantur aut oriuntur; sed posteriora potius, & reliquiae mag is quam principia. N…que Aristoteles ipsemet aut alius quispiam unquam demonstravit, elementa in rerum natura separati… existere, au… principia esse corporum similarium. If then none of these things which bodyes are resolved into, and are supposed to be compounded of, either have been or can be proved to exist separate from and antecedent to those bodyes which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms which are supposed by their concourse in an Infinite space to be the Origine of the world? I know not where to finde them, unless dancing with the Schoolmens Chimaera's in a Vacuum, or in a space as empty as the Infinite one, viz. some Epicureans brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great master Epicurus, if we believe the character which the Stoick in Tully gives of him, who saith he was homo sine arte, sine liter is, insultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore. De Nat. Deor. l. 2.But allowing the Stoick some of that passion, (which he disclaimed so much) in these words; yet we may rather believe what Tully himself elsewhere speaks of Epicurus his sentiments, that they were none of them handsome or becoming a man. At ille quid sentit? saith he of Epicurus; and soon replyes, sentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum; De Divinat. l. 1. De Finibus lib. 1.and in another place speaking of his Morals, he sayes, nihil generosum sapit atque magnificum, there was nothing noble and generous in him. Which censure of Epicurus, all the pains that P. Gassendus hath taken in the vindication of the life and opinions of Epicurus, hath not been able to wipe off. For although we should yeild what that learned man so much contends for, that all the calumnyes which were cast on Epicurus arise from the Antipathy between Zeno and the following Stoicks, and the School of Epicurus; yet all this will not make Epicurus to have been comparable with some other Philosophers for parts and judgement, whose principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them, then the Morals of Epicurus had, taking them in their more refined sense.

p. 455But it is not the Morality of Epiourus which we now enquire Sect. 14.after; out business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendring an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity. And so we come to consider the Hypothesis its self, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the Catholick Laws of nature which appear in the world. Two things I shall here enquire into, which are the main principles of Epicurus, viz. the motion of these Atoms in the Infinite space, and the manner of the concretion of bodyes by the concourse of these Atoms.

1. I begin with their motion; which Epicurus attributes to his Atoms without any hesitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origine of that motion; which argues his whole Hypothesis to be extreamly precarious. The thing then, (which he must assume as his main principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, that motion doth inseparably belong to the least Atom or insensible particle; for without this there cannot be imagined any concourse of Atoms at all, much less any such contexture of bodyes out of them. But for one to say that Atoms move, because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the least satisfaction to an inquisitive mind. And it will be the least of all pardonable in the exploders of substantial forms and occult qualities, when the Origine of the whole world is resolved into an …ccult quality which gives motion to Atoms. And herein the Atomists outdo the most credulous Peripateticks, seeing they lay the prime foundation of the world and of their own Philosophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all, which is, the motion of Atoms in an Infinite Vacuity. If it be replyed, which is all Epicurus hath to say, that the motion of Atoms depends upon their gravity; the question returns upon him with the same violence, how comes this gravity to belong to these Atoms in such an empty space, where there can be no impulsion from other bodyes, no attraction from any magnetick particles which are supposed to be the causes of the descent of heavy bodyes? nay, Epicurus himself takes away any center of that motion of Atoms; and yet attributes a necessary descent to his Atoms by vertue of p. 456their gravity; and if a Philosopher may beg such things as these are, so repugnant to the Phaenomena of nature, without Physic. s. 1. l 3. c. 7. De apparent. magnitud. Solis bumilis & sublimis. Sp. 4. sect. 3. De motu. Physic. s. 1. l. 5. c. 2. Vep de motu impresse à motore translato. To. 3. op. Sect. 15.assigning any other reason for them, but that it is their nature, let us never venture Philosophizing more, but sit down in that contented piece of Ignorance which attributes the causes of every thing into specifick forms and occult qualityes. For this is so shameful a piece of beggery, that P. Gassendus doth more then once disclaim it, and in his discourse of motion doth prove an impossibility of motion in an Infinite empty space. Might not Epicurus then have saved his credit better by sitting down with the opinions of his fore-fathers, then thus to go a begging for such Hypotheses, which none, who are not resolved to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental principle of Epicurus, viz. that there is a principle of motion in every insensible particle of matter, he plainly overthrows another principle of his, which is the solidity and different magnitude of these Atoms. These particles are supposed so solid, that Dionysius in Eusebius tells us the account given why they are called foreign, was foreign, because Praep. Evangel. l. 14. c. 22.of their indissoluble firmness; and the different sizes of these Atoms is so necessary a principle, that from thence they undertake to resolve many Phaenomena of the Universe: let us now see how consistent these things are with the inseparable property of motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be particles of such different sizes, then it is plain that there are some particles which may not only be conceived to be bigger then others, but are really so; and so there must be more parts of matter imagined in this bigger particle then in another less; and if there be more parts, these parts may be conceived separate from each other, that this particle may be equal to the other; now then, I demand, if motion doth inseparably belong to the least particle of matter, how comes one to be bigger then the other? for herein we see that every particle is not in distinct motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable particles in an Atome of a bigger size then in a less; and if so, there must be some union of those imaginable particles in that bigger Atome; and how could p. 457such an union be without rest, and what rest could there be if motion doth inseparably belong to every particle o… matter? And so it must be in all those Atoms which are supposed to have angles and hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other for the composition of bodyes▪ how come these hooks and angles to be annexed to this Atom? for an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if such a principle of motion, be in each particle? if it be answered, that motion did belong to all these particles, but by degrees the l…sser particles hitting together made up these angled and hooked particles; I soon reply, that the difficulty returns more strongly; for if these angled and hooked particles be supposed necessary to the contexture and union of bodyes, how came those least imaginable particles ever to unite without such hooks and angles? And so the question will return in Infinitum. If then the solidity and indivisibility of these angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and rest of those lesser imaginable particles joyned together, then it is evident that motion is no inseparable property of all these particles, but some are capable of union, in order to the making of such hooks and angles, which are necessary for the contexture of bodyes; and where there is union and solidity, there is rest, which is at least accompanied with it, if it be not one of the great causes of it. And without which the Atomists of all other Philosophers will be least able to give an account of firmness in bodyes, when they make bodyes to consist of an aggregation of particles, by which it will be very hard finding a sufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm bodyes, unless it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid bodyes, and the rest of the small and contiguous parts that make up the firm body, V Des Cartes Princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.according to that Catholick Law of nature, whereby things continue in the state they are in till some stronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the Epicurean Atomists have left to give any account of the solidity of particles of such different sizes, is, the want of vacuity; for say they, the ground of divisibility of bodyes is the interspersion of a disseminated Vacuum; now where there is no vacuity, though the particles be of different siz…, yet they may be solid and indivisible. p. 458But this is taken off by the instance produced against other persons by that ingenious & Honourable person M. Boyle in his Physiological Essayes, which is to this purpose; Suppose History of Fluid. and Firmness. p. 202.two of these presumed indivisible particles, both smooth and of a Cubical figure should happen to lye upon one another, and a third should ch…nce to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what should hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of some other corpuscles be broken in the midst of the whole concretion, and consequently in the middlemost body? For suppose them as solid as may be, yet since corpuscles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock against them, why may not those grate or break the middlemost corpuscles, or any of the others? And if there be a possibility of a breaking off these Cubical particles in the middle, then meer want of Vacuity is no sufficient account of their being indivisible. By this we see how far the Atomists are from giving any rational account of the Origine of the motion of the Atoms themselves without a Deity.

2. Supposing this motion to be granted them, yet they cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concretion Sect. 16.of bodyes by the casual occursions of these A…ms moving in an infinite empty space. Which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of Epicurus, in order to the making these Atoms of his so hit together that they make up any bodyes by their contexture.

1. He supposeth as it were two regions, a superior and inferior in an infinite empty space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any body, from which to measure those respects of above and below; as appears by his Epistle to Herodotus, wherein he saith, these terms of foreign and foreign, or upwards and downwards, must be conceived without any bounds or limits at all. So that though we conceive something superior, we must imagine nothing supreme, and so on the contrary. Whereby it is evident as Gass…ndus confesseth, that Epicurus thought the surface of the earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued Physic. s. 1. l. 3. c. 7.up in a level superficies to the heavens, and so to all that immense space of the Universe. So that all those heavy bodyes which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the earth, as in Europe, Asia, and Africa, p. 459would never meet (if they continued their motion) in the center of the earth, but would continue their motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagined that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the world, and so the descent of his Atoms must necessarily be downwards towards the earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy Mathematical supposition, for one who would undertake to give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity?

This motion of descent by reason of the gravity of Atoms would not serve his turn; for if the Atoms moved downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contexture of bodyes? Now for this purpose he invented a motion of declination; for finding the motion ad lineam, or ad perpendiculum as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of bodyes which are in the Universe, he supposed therefore the descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so seve…al particles in their descent m…ght make some occursions one upon another. And this Epicurus added to Democritus; but therein as Tully observes, was very unhappy, that where he adds to Democritus, ea quae corrig…re vult, mihi quidem De Fin. l. 1depravare videatur; that he mar'd what Democritus had said, by mending of it. The reason of which motion of declination, is thus given by Lucretius,

Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsumDe rerum nat. l. 2.

Imbris uti guttae caderent per Inane profundum;

Nec foret offensus natus, neque plaga creata

Principiis, it a nil unquam natura creasset.

It was obvious to object, that according to the principles of Epicurus, there could have been no concourse at all of Atoms in an infinite space, on the two grounds he went on, which were the natural descent of Atoms, and the aequi-velocity of the motion of all Atoms of what size so ever, which he likewise asserted (although one would think if gravity were the cause of motion, then the more gravity, the swister the motion would be) from hence, I say it were not easie to conceive p. 460how the Atoms should embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down as Lucretius expresseth it, like drops of rain; and therefore they saw a necessity to make their motion decline a little, that so they might justle and hit one upon another. But this oblique motion of the Atoms, though it be the only refuge left to salve the Origine of things by a concourse of Atoms, is yet as precarious and without reason as any other supposition of theirs whatsoever. Tully chargeth this motion of declination with two great faults, futility, and in…fficacy, quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit De Fin. bon. et mal. lib. 1.quidem quod vult. It is a childish fancy and to no purpose: For first, it is asserted without any reason at all given for it, which is unworthy a Philosopher; neither is it to any purpose; for if all Atoms, saith he, decline in their motion, then none of them will stick together; if some decline, and others do not, th…s is as precarious as any thing can be imagined, to assign a diversity of motion in indivisible particles, which yet have all the same velocity of motion; and as Tully saith, Hoc erit quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique f…rantur: as though Epicurus were the General at this Rendesvous of Atoms, who stands ready to appoint every one his task and motion. This Plutarch tells us was the great charge against Epicurus foreign, because he introduced such a motion of declination out of nothing De Animae procreat. … Timaeo. Tu…nebus in Ciceron. de Fato.upon no pretence of reason. And Turnebus tells us, that the ground why they desired so small a declination, was because they were conscious to themselves, that it was founded upon no ground of reason; Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpae, timide eam ponebant, & minimam sibi post ulabant. To which purpose Turnebus cites those verses of Lucretius,

Quare etiam at que etiam paulum inclinare necesse est

Corpora, nec plusquam minimum, ne fingere motusLib. 2.

Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.

Namque hoc in promptu manifest unique esse videmus

Pondera quantum in se est, non posse obliqua meare

Esupero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis.

Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai

Declinare, quis est qui possit cernere sese?

p. 461But this argument of Lucretius will hold if at all, further then this little declination (for it is no more they desire then as little as may be imagined, quo nihil possit fieri minus, Tully expresseth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay it is impossible to conceive, but a little oblique motion at first will in an infinite space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the motion which way it bends; now if there be never so little motion of declination, the Atom will be inclined that way; and what then should hinder, but that the obliquity in a motion through a great space should at last come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the motion towards, and the gravity not hindering this little declination? Therefore Tully asks that question, Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? why only it declines one minime, and not two or Lib. de Fato.three; for, saith he, it is no impulsion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minime; neither is there any impediment in the space to hinder it from declining more; so that, as he well saith, optare hoc quidem est, non disputare, this is to beg Hypotheses and not to prove them, which is the thing we have proved Epicurus to do. Which was the first thing promised, viz. that this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of reason.

2. It is unsatisfactory and insufficient, as well as precarious; for should we grant his two main principles, Atoms and his Sect. 17.infinite empty space; yet we deny that ever his Atoms with all their occursions would ever produce those things which are in the Universe. To run through the noted Phaenomena of the Universe, and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concourse of Atoms, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I shall rather suggest, then insist upon, to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them, and shall then leave it with the reader to judge, what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the Epicurean Hypothesis; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the world ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms?

p. 4621. The great varieiy of appearances in nature, which are attributed to particles of the same nature, only with the alteration of size, shape, and motion. That some things in the world, should have no other reason given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the objects and operations on the organs of sense, those affections which are mistaken for real qualities, &c. But that all those effects which are seen in nature should have no other cause but the different configuration and motion of Atoms, is the height of folly as well as impi…ty, to imagine that the particles of matter, as they are in men, should be capable of sensation, memory, Intell…ction, volition, &c. meerly because of a diff…rent shape, size and motion from what they have in a piece of wood, is a riddle that requires a new configuration of Atoms in us to make us understand. May it not be hoped, that at least one time or other by this casual concourse of Atoms, the particles may light to be of such a nature in stones, as to make them flic; in plants, to make them all sensitive; and in beasts to make them reason and discourse? What may hinder such a configuration or motion of particles, if all these eff…cts are to be imputed to no higher principle? We see in other bodies what different appearances are caused by a sudden alteration of the particles of the matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out so in the things mentioned? neither can this be unreasonable to demand. 1. Because the motion of these particles of matter is casual still according to them; and who knows what chance may do? for the seminal principles themselves are, I suppose, according to them of the same uniform matter with the rest of the world, and so are liable to different motion and configuration. 2. Because all particles of matter are supposed to be in continual motion, becaus… of that disseminated Vacuity, which is presumed to be in the world, and because a Coacervate vacuity is not only asserted as possible, but as probably existent: I assume only then (that which is insisted on as probable) viz. that that space which lies between our Atmosphere and the Stars is empty of any other thing, but only the rayes of the Stars which pass through it; I then supposing it a vacuity, whether would not the particles of those bodies p. 463which lie contiguous to that space presently dislodge from the bodies wherein they are, and begin a new Rendezvous of Atoms there? for all Atoms are supposed to be in perpetual motion; and the cause assigned, why in solid bodies they do not flie away, is, because of the repercussion of other Atoms, that when they once begin to stir, they receive such knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the bodies contiguous to this space; for both those bodies are more fluid, and so there is no such knocking of particles to keep them at rest; but which is more, those which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from motion, and so those particles will necessarily remove into that empty space where there is no impediment of their motion, and so the next Atoms to those must remove, because that space wherein the other were is made empty by their removal; and so the next, and so on, till not only the air, but the whole mass of the earth w…ll on supposition of such a vacuity be dissolved into its first particles, which will all mutiny in the several bodies wherein they are, and never rest till they come to that empty space, where they may again Rendezvous together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty space to these Democratical particles of the Universe. Neither can I see how a disseminated vacuity can salve the difficulty; for those particles of the most solid bodies, being in continual motion, and the ground of their union being reperc…ssion, it thence follows that towards that part where the disseminated vacuum is, the particles meeting with no such strokes may sairly take their leaves of the bodies they are in, and so one succeed in the place of another, till the configuration of the whole be altered, and consequently different appearances and effects may be caused in the same bodies, though it results from seminal principles. So that according to the Atomical principles, no rational account can be given of those effects which are seen in nature. This Dionysius in Eusebius urgeth against the Atomists, that Prap. Evang. l. 14. c. 24.from the same principles without evident reason given for it, they make of the same uniform matter some things conspicuous to sense, others not, some short-lived, others extreamly long-lived. foreign p. 462duplicate page p. 463duplicate page p. 464foreign; What ground can there be assigned of so vast a difference between things if they be all of the same nature, and differ only in size and shape? saith that excellent person, who there with a great deal of eloquence lays open …he folly of the Atomical Philosophy, foreign. It is a rare Democraty of Atoms, saith he, where the friendly Atoms meet and embr…ce each other, and from thenceforward live in the closest society together.

2. Not only the variety, but the exact order and beauty of the world is a thing unaccountable by the Atomical hypothesis. Were the whole world still a Hesiods Chaos (from the consideration of which Diogenes Laertius tells us Epicurus Laert. l. 10.began to Philosophize) we might probably believe an agitation of particles (supposing matter created) might settle it in such a confused manner; but that there should be nothing else but a blind impetus of Atoms to produce those vast and most regular motions of the heavenly bodies, to order the passage of the Sun for so great conveniency of nature, and for the alternate succession of the seasons of the year, which should cut such channels for the Ocean, and keep that vast body of the water (whose surface is higher then the earth) from overflowing it, which should furnish the earth with such seminal and prolifick principles, as to provide food and nourishment for those Animals which live upon it, and furnish out every thing necessary for the comfort and delight of mans life; to believe, I say, that all th…se things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourse of Atoms, is the most prodigious piece of credulity and folly, that humane nature is subject to. But this part which concerns the order and beauty of the parts of the Universe, and the argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous principle, but an Infinitely wise God, hath been so fully and D. H. More Antid. against Atheism, part 2.judiciously handled by a learned Person already, that I shall rather choose to refer the Reader to his discourse then insist any more upon it.

p. 4653. The production of mankind is a thing which the Atomists are most shamefully puzzled with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of mans body, of which I have already spoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pitty one to see what lamentable shifts the Atomists are put to, to find out a way for the production of mankind, viz. That our teeming mother the earth, at last cast forth some kind of bags like wombs upon the surface of the earth, and these by degrees breaking, at last came out children, which were nourished by a kind of juyce of the earth like milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be men. Oh what will not Atheists believe rather then a Deity and Providence! But least we should seem to wrong the Atomists, hear what Censorinus saith of Epicurus; Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros nescio quos, radicihus terrae cohaerentes, primum increvisse, Censor. de die Nat. c. ….& infantibus ex seeditis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante praebuisse; quos it a educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagasse. But because Lucretius may be thought to speak more impartially in the case, how rarely doth he describe it?

Crescebant uteri terrae radicibus apti,

Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit aetas

Infantum, fugiens humorem, aurasque petissens,

Convertebat ibi natura foramina terrae,

Et succum venis cogebat fundere apertis

Consimilem lactis; sicut nunc foemina quaeque

Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quodomnis

Impetus in mammas convert itur ille alimenti:

Terracibum pueris, vestem vapor, herbacubile

Praebebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had Lucretius been only a Poet, this might have passed for a handsomly described Fable; but to deliver it for a piece of Philosophy makes it the greater Mythologie; that mans body was formed out of the earth we believe, because we have reason so to do; but that the earth should cast forth such folliculi as he expresseth it, and that men should be brought up in such a way as he describes, deserves a place among the p. 466most incredible of Poetick Fables. But if Poets must be credited, how much more like a man did he speak, who told us,

Natus homo est; sive hunc divino semine fecit

Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris crigo,

Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto

Aethere, cognati retinebat semina coeli;

Quam satus Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis,

Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we considered the Epicurean Hypothesis, both as to the Principles on which it stands, and the suitableness of it to the Phaenomena of the Universe; and I suppose now there cannot be the least shadow of reason found from the Atomical Philosophy to make us at all Question that account of the Origine of the Universe, which ascribes it not to the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, but to the Infinite wisdom of a Deity. I conclude then this discourse of the Epicurean Hypothesis with the words of Automedon in the Greek Epigram.

foreignAntholog. l. 1. c. 15.

foreign.

Learn to be wise; let Epicurus chase

To find his Atoms, and his empty space.

I come now to the last Hypothesis mentioned, which undertakes to give an account of the Origine of the Universe Sect. 18.from the meer Mechanical Laws of motion and matter. Which is the Hypothesis of the late famous French Philosopher Mr. Des Cartes. For although there be as much reason as charity to believe that he never intended his Hypothesis as a foundation of Atheism, having made it so much his business to assert the existence of a Deity and immateriality of the soul; yet because it is apt to be abused to that end by persons Atheistically disposed, because of his ascribing so much to the power of matter; we shall therefore so far consider it as it undertakes p. 467to give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity. His Hypothesis therefore is briefly this. He Princip. p. 3. Art. 46. &c.takes it for granted, that all the matter of the world was at first of one Uniform nature, divisible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in motion, from hence he supposeth. 1. That all this matter of which the Universe is composed, was at first divided into equal particles of an indifferent size, and that they had all such a motion as is now found in the wo…ld. 2. That all these particles were not at first Sphaerical, because many such little Globes joyned together will not fill up a continued space, but that of what ever figure they were at first, they would by continued motion become sphaerical, because they would have various circular motions; for seeing that at first they were moved with so great force that one particle would be disjoyned from the other, the same force continuing would serve to cut off all angles which are supposed in them, by their frequent occursions against each other; and so when the angles were cut off, they would become sphaerical. 3. He supposeth that no space is left empty, but when those round particles being joyned, leave some intervals between them, there are some more subtile particles of matter, which are ready to fill up those void spaces, which arise from those angles which were cut …ff from the other particles to make them sphaerical; which fragments of particles are so little, and acquire thereby such a celerity of motion, that by the force of that, they will be d…vided into i…numerable little fragments, and so will fill up all those spaces which other particles could not enter in at. 4. That those particles which sill up the intervals between the sphaerical ones, have not all of them the same celerity of motion, because some of them are more undivided then others are, which filled up the space between three Globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore those particles must necessarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for motion, and thence it comes to pass that such particles easily stick together, and transfer the greatest part of their motion upon those other particles which are less, and therefore have a swifter motion; and because these particles are to pass through such triangular spaces which lye in the midst of three Globular particles touching each other, therfore he supposeth them as to their breadth p. 468and depth to be of a triangular figure, but because these particles are somewhat long; and the gl…bular particles through which they pass with so swift motion have their rotation about the poles of the heavens, thence he supposes that those triangular particles come to be wreathed. Now from these things being thus supposed, Des Cartes hath ingeniously and consonantly to his principles undertaken to give an account of the most noted Phaenomena of the world, and those three sorts of particles mentioned he makes to be his three elements; the first is that subtile matter which was supposed to arise from the cuttings off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the Sun and fixed Stars consill, as those particles of that subtile matter being in continual …o…ion have made those several vortices or aethereal whirlpools. The second element confists of the sphaerical particles themselves, which make up the Heavens; out of the third element which are those wreathed particles, he gives an account of the formation of the earth, and Planets, and Comets; and from all of them by the help of those common affections of matter, size, figure, motion, &c. he undertakes to give an account of the Phaenomena of the world. How far his principles do conduce to the giving mens minds satisfaction, as to the particular Phaenomena of nature, is not here our business to enquire, but only how far these principles can give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity? And that it cannot give a satisfactory account how the world was framed without a Deity, appears by the two grand suppositions on which all his elements depend, both which cannot be from any other principle but God. Those are, 1. The existence of matter in the world which we have already proved cannot be independent on God, and necessarily existent, and therefore supposing that matter existent and put into motion, would grind its self into those several particles by him supposed, yet this cannot give any account of the Origine of the Universe Antidote. b. 2. ch. 1. Immortality of the soul. b. 1. c. 11. s. 3. &c. Ep. 3 ad C…rtes. p. …8without a Deity. 2. The motion of the particles of matter suppose a Deity; for matter is no self-moving principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judicious Philosopher Dr. H. More, who plainly manifests that if motion did necessarily belong to matter, it were impossible p. 469there should be Sun, or Stars, or Earth, or Man in the World; for the matter being uniform, it must have equal motion in all its particles, if motion doth belong to it. For motion being supposed to be natural and …ss…ntial to matter, must be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle must be supposed in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and moved alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in bigness or motion, it is manifest that this universal matter, to whom motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in nature; for nothing could be caused by this thin and subtile matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our senses: and what a strange kind of visible world would this be? From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise God, who must both put matter into motion, and regulate the motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the world. And this necessity of the motion of matter by a power given it from God is freely acknowledged by Mr. Des Cartes himself in these words; Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa Resp. ad. ep. 3. H. Mori. p. 104.autem impellitur à Deo, tantundem motus five translationis in ea conservante quantum abinitio posuit. So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of matter, doth freely confess the necessity not only of Gods giving motion in order to the Origine of the Universe, but of his conserving motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this Hypothesis the excluding of a Deity from being the prime efficient cause of the world. All the question then is concerning the particular manner, which was used by God as the …fficient cause in giving being to the world. As to which I shall only in general suggest what Maimonides sayes of it. Omnia simul creata …rant, & postea successive ab invicem separata; although I am somewhat inclinable to that of More Nevoch. l. 2. c. 30. Physic s. 1. l. 7. c. 6.Gassendus, majus …st mundus opus, quam ut ass…qui mens humana illius molitionem possit: To which I think may be well applyed that speech of Solomon; Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot finde out the work that is done under p. 470Eccl. 8. 17.Eccl 8:17the Sun; because though a man labour to seck it out, yea further, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to sinde it.