The Grounds of the Christian Faith, Book 3 · Chapter 1

The Grounds of the Christian Faith · Book 3 · Chapter 1

p. 360CHAP. I. Of the Being of God.

The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and immortality of the soul: from them the necessity of a particular Divine revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine authority of the Scriptures. Why Moses doth not prove the Being of God, but suppose it. The notion of a Deity very consonant to reason. Of the nature of Idea's, and particularly of the Idea of God. How we can form an Idea of an infinite Being. How far such an Idea argues existence. The great unreasonableness of Atheism demonstrated. Of the Hypotheses of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists. The Atheists pretences examined and refuted. Of the nature of the arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of universal consent and the evidence of that to prove a Deity and immortality of souls. Of necessity of existence implyed in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God. The order of the world and usefulness of the parts of it, and especially of mans body an argument of a Deity. Some higher principle proved to be in the world then matter and motion. The nature of the soul, and possibility of its subsisting after death. Strange appearances in nature not solvable by the power of imagination.

HAving in the precedent book largely given a rational Sect. 1.account of the grounds of our faith, as to the persons whom God imployes to reveal his mind to the world; if we can now make it appear that those sacred records p. 361which we embrace as Divinely inspired, contain in them nothing unworthy of so great a name, or unbecoming persons sent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to justifie our Religion in point of reason to be true, and of revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themselves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be such as they pretend to be, unless we have ground to question the general foundations of all religion as uncertain, or this particular way of religion as not suitable to those general foundations. The foundations of all religion lie in two things; that there is a God who rules the world, and that the souls of men are capable of subsisting after death; for he that comes unto God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of Heb. 11. 6.Heb 11:6them that seek him; so that if these things be not supposed as most agreeable to humane reason, we cannot imagine upon what grounds mankind should embrace any way of religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to serve and obey, and if I have not a soul of an immortal nature, there can be no sufficient obligation to religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to obedience must suppose the existence of such a Being which hath power to command me; and by reason of the promis…uous scatterings of good and evil in this life, the motives engaging men to the practice of religion, must suppose the certainty of a future State. If these things be sure and the foundations of religion in general thereby firmly established, it will presently follow as a matter most agreeable to reason, that the God whom we are to serve should himself prescribe the way of his own worship; and if the right of donation of that happiness which mens souls are capab…e of be alone in himself, that he alone should declare the termes on which it may be expected; For man being a creature endued with a free principle of acting, which he is conscious to himself of, and therefore not being carried to his end by necessity of nature or external violence, without the concurrence of his own reason and choice, we must suppose this happiness to depend upon the performance of some conditions on mans part, whereby he may demonstrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other interests that he might obtain the enjoyment of it. p. 362Which conditions to be performed being expressions of mans obedience towards God as his Creator and Governour, and of his gratitude for the tenders of so great a happiness which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot suppose any one to have power to prescribe these conditions, but he that hath power likewise to deprive the soul of her happiness upon nonperformance, and that must be God himself. But in order to mans understanding his duty and his obligation to obedience, it is necessary that these conditions must not be locked up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but mu… be so far declared and revealed, that he may be fully acqua…ted with those terms which his happiness depends upon; else his neglect of them would be excusable, and his misery unavoidable. Had man indeed remained without offending his Maker, he might still have stood in his favour upon the general terms of obedience due from the creature to his Creator, and to all such particular precepts which should bear the impress of his Makers will upon them, beside which, the whole volume of the Creation without, and his own reason within would have been sufficient directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abusing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of A…ostacy from God (as is evident by a continued propensity to sin, and the strangeness between God and the souls of men) a particular revelation is now become necessary, that mankind may thereby understand on what terms God will be pleased again, and by what means they may be restored into his favour. And lastly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine goodness (which was the first original of the worlds Creation) to suffer all mankind to perish in their own folly, we must suppose this way for mans recovery to be somewhere prescribed, and the revelation of it to be somewhere extant in the world. So that from the general principles of the existence of God and immortality of the soul, we have deduced by clear and evident reason the necessity of some particular Divine revelation, as the Standard and measure of religion. And according to these principles we must examine what ever pretends to be of D…vine revelation; for it must be suitable to that Divine nature from whom it is supposed to come, and it must be agreeable p. 363to the conditions of the souls of men; and therefore that which carries with it the greatest evidence of Divine revelation, is, a faithful representation of the State of the case between God and the souls of men, and a Divine discovery of those wayes whereby mens souls may be fitted for eternal happiness. A Divine revelation then must be faithful and true in all its narrations; it must be excellent and becoming God in all its discoveries. And therefore all that can with any reason be desired for proof of the Divine authority of the Scriptures will lie in these three things. First, That the foundations of religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there ie a God, and that mens souls are immortal. Secondly, That the Scriptures do most faithfully relate the matters of greatest antiquity therein contained (which do most concern the history of the breach between God and man.) Thirdly, That the Scriptures are the only authentick records of those Terms on which happiness may be expected in another world.

I begin with the first of them, which concerns the existence Sect. 2.of God and immortality of the soul; both which seem to be supposed as general Prolepses in the writings of Moses, and as things so consonant to humane nature, that none to whom his writings should come could be supposed to question them. And therefore he spends no time in the operose proving of either of these, knowing to how little purpose his writings would be to such who denyed these first principles of all religion. But beside this there may be these accounts given, why these main foundations of all religion are no more insisted on in the first books of the Scripture which contain the originals of the world. First, Because these were in the time of the writing of them believed with an universal consent of mankind. In those more early dayes of the world, when the tradition of the first ages of it was more fresh and entire, it is scarce imaginable that men should question the Being of a God, when the history of the flood and the propagation of the world after it by the Sons of Noah, and the burning of Sodom and Gomorrab were so fresh in their memories, as having been done so few Generations before them. And by what remains of any history of other Nations in those elder times men were p. 364so far from Atheism, that Polytheism and Idolatry were the common practice of the world, as is most evident in all relations of the antient Chaldeans, Aegyptians, Phaenicians, and other Nations, who all supposed these two principles, as well as those who served the true God. And in all probability as men are apt to run from one extream to another, Polytheism was the first occasion of Atheism, and Idolatry of irreligion. And thence we finde the first appearance of Atheists to be in the most blind and superstitious age of Greece, when the obscene Poets had so debauched the common understandings of the people, as to make them believe such things concerning their Gods which were so incongruous to humane nature, that all who had any sense of goodness left, could not but loath and abhor such Deities. And therefore we finde all the flouts and jears of the reputed Atheists among them, such as Dionysius, Diagoras, Theodorus, Euhemerus, Messenius and others, were cast upon their venerable Deities, which they so solemnly worshipped: who had been before as Euhemerus plainly told them, poor mortal men, and those not of the best reputation neither: and therefore as the Epicurean in Tully well sayes, omnis eorum cultus esset De Nat. Deor. l. 1… cap. 38.in luctu, the most suitable devotion for them had been lamenting their death. Now when these common Deities were so much derided by intelligent men, and yet the order of the world seemed to tell them there was really a God, though those were none; those who had Philosophical wits, such as Democritus and Epicurus, set themselves to work to see if they could solve the Phaenomena of nature without a Deity, and therefore asserted the origine of the universe to be only by a fortuitous concourse of infinite little particles; but herein they befooled themselves and their greedy followers, who were glad to be rid of those anxieties of mind which the thoughts of a Deity and an immortal soul did cause within them. And although Lucretius in a bravado tells us of his Máster, that when mens minds were sunk under the burden of religion,

p. 365Humana ante oculos faede cum vita jaceretDe rerum Nat. lib. 1.

In terris oppressa gravi sub religione:

Primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contr…

Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contrà.

that Epicurus was the first true Gyant who durst encounter the Gods, and if we believe him, overthrew them in open field;

Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim

Obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo.

Yet Cotta in Tully reports the issue of this battel quite otherwise; for although the greatest triumph in this victory had been only to become like the beasts that perish; yet if we believe Cotta, Epicurus was so far from gaining any of his beloved case and pleasure by his sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a rod, nor did any enemy more dread a Conqueror, then Epicurus did the thoughts of a God and death. Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quae timenda esse negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos. So hard it is for De Nat. D…or. lib. 1…. cap. 86.an Epicurean even after he hath prostituted his conscience, to silence it; but (whatever there be in the air) there is an Elactical power in conscience that will bear its self up notwithstanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labours of Epicurus, he knew it was to no purpose to endeavour to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the world, because of the unanimous consent of the world in it; and therefore he admits of it as a necessary Prolepsis or Anticip…tion of humane nature, quod in omnium animis deorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura, that nature its self had stamped a… Idea of God upon the minds of men; cum enim De Nat. Deor. lib. …. cap. 44.non instituto aliquo, aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, manet at que ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est Deos esse, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habeamus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est, as Velleius the Epicurean argues. Since the belief of a Deity neither rise from custom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimously assented to by all mankind; p. 366it necessarily follows that there must be a Deity, because the Idea of it is so natural to us. If it were thus acknowledged in the Philosophical age of Greece, when men bent their wits to unsettle the belief of such things as tended to religion; how much more might it be esteemed a general principle of humane nature in those elder times, when not so much as one dissenter appeared that we read of among the more antient Nations? But Secondly, it was less needsul for Moses to insist much on the proof a Deity in his writings, when his very imployment and the history he wrote, was the greatest evidence that there was one. Could any of them question, whether there were a God or no, who had heard his voyce at mount Sinai, and had received a Law from him, who had been present at so many miracles which were done by Moses in Aegypt and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God could be desired, then those many unparalleld miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who would not be convinced by them that there was a God, would certainly be convinced by nothing. Thirdly, It was unsuitable to the purpose of Moses to go about to prove any thing he delivered by the meer force of humane reason, because he writ as a person imployed by God; and therefore by the arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in what ever he writ, they could not but believe there was a God that imployed him. And from hence it is that Moses with so much M…jesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation with In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth. There could be no greater evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, then that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him, and what reason could there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who manifested not only that there was a God, but that he was imployed by him, by the miracles which he wrought: so that all our former discourse concerning the evidences of Divine revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of nature when he please, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infinite; which is the same which we mean by God.

p. 367But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as Sect. 3.to any thing of Divine revelation, we want not sufficient evidence in point of reason to prove to them the existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following propositions.

1. That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of mens souls, and most consonant to reason and the light of nature.

2. That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true.

3. That we have as certain evidence that there is a God, as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature.

That the true notion of God is most agreeable to the faculties Prop. 1.of mens souls, and most consonant to reason and the light of nature: i. e. that the Idea of God, (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is so far from being any wayes repugnant to any principle of reason within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other notion which hath sewer entanglements in it, to a mind so far Metaphysical as to abstract from sense and prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impossible, for those to have any true setled notion of a God, who search for an Idea of him in their fancies, and were never conscious to themselves of any higher faculty in their souls then meer imagination. Such may have imaginem Iovis or galeatae Minerva, as he in Tully speaks, some Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we may as soon come by the sight of colours to understand the nature of sounds, as by any corporal phantasmes come to have a true Idea of God. And although sometimes an Idea be taken for that impression of things which is lodged in the P hantasie, yet here we take it in a more general sense, as it contains the representation of any thing in the mind; as it is commonly said in the Schools, that the Divine Intellect doth understand things by their Idea's, which are nothing else but the things themselves as they are objectively represented to the understanding. So that an Idea in its general sense in which we take it, is nothing else but the objective being of a thing as it terminates the understanding; and is the form of p. 368the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately represented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or notion of it. Now such an Idea as this is, may be either true or false. For better understanding of which we must consider that an Idea in the soul may be considered two wayes. 1. As it is a mode of cogitation or the act of the soul apprehending an object; now this way no Idea can be false; for as it is an act of the mind, every Idea hath its truth; for whether I imagine a golden mountain or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, considering it meerly as an act of the mind. For the mind is as really imployed about the one as the other; as the will is about an object whether it be feasible or no. 2. The Idea may be considered in regard of its objective reality, or as it represents some outward object; now the truth or falshood of the Idea lies in the understanding passing judgement concerning the outward object as existent which doth correspond to the Idea which is in the mind. And the proneness of the understandings error in this case ariseth from the different nature of those things which are represented to the mind; for some of them are general and abstracted things, and do not at all suppose existence, as the nature of truth, of a Being, of cogitation; other Idea's depend upon existence supposed, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my mind because I have seen it; but besides these there are other Idea's in the mind which the understanding forms within its self by its own power as it is a principle of cogitation; such are those wh…ch are called entiarationis, and have no other existence at all but only in the understanding, as Chimaera's, Centaures, &c. Now as to these, we are to observe, that although the composition of these things together by the understanding, be that which makes these Idea's to be only fictitious, yet the understanding would not be able to compound such things, were they not severally represented to the mind; as unless we had known what a horse and a man had been, our minds could not have conjoyned them together in its apprehension. So that in these which are the most fictitious Idea's, we see, that although the Idea its self be a meer creature of the understanding, yet the mind could not form such an Idea but upon praeexistent p. 369matter, and some objective reality must be supposed in order to the intellectual conception of these Anomalous entityes. By which we see that that strange kind of omnipotency which some have attributed to the understanding, lies not in a power of conceiving things wholly impossible, or fancying Idea's of absolute non-entityes, but in a kind of African copulation of such species of things together, which in nature seem wholly incompossible, (as the Schools speak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the universe. So that had there never been any such things in the world as matter and motion, it is very hard to conceive, how the understanding could have formed within its self the variety of the species of such things, which are the results of those two grand principles of the Universe. But because it is so impossible for minds not very contemplative and Metaphysical to abstract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagine such a power in the understanding, whereby it may form Idea's of such things which have no objective reality at all. I grant those we call entia rationis have no external reality as they are such; but yet I say, the existence of matter in the world, and the corporeal phantasmes of outward beings, are the foundation of the souls conception of those entityes, which have no existence beyond the humane Intellect.

The great enquiry then is, how far this Plastick power of Sect. 4.the understanding, may extend its self in its forming an Idea of God. That there is such a one in the minds of men, is evident to every one that consults his own faculties, and enquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a setled and consistent notion of a Being which is absolutely perfect. For that is all we understand by the Idea of God; not that there is any such connate Idea in the soul, in the sense which connate Idea's are commonly understood; but that there is a faculty in the soul, whereby upon the free use of reason it can form within its self a setled notion of such a Being, which is as perfect as it is possible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming such a notion in ones mind, let the person who scruples it, only enquire of himself, whether he judges all Beings in the world equal; whether a mushrome hath in it all the perfections which man p. 370hath? which I suppose none, who have a minde within them can question. If then it be granted that man hath some perfections in him above inferiour creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to shew wherein man exceeds other inferiour Beings. For is not life a greater perfection then the want of it? is not reason and knowledge, a perfection above sense? and so let us proceed to those things, wherein one man differs from another; for it is evident, that all men are not of equal accomplishments; is not then forecast and prudence above incogitancy and folly? is not the knowledge of causes of things better then stupidity and ignorance? is not beneficence and liberality more noble then parsimony and narrowness of spirit? is not true goodness far above debauchery and intemperance? and are not all these far better, when they are joyned with such a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not possible for a mans mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of intellection, to form a notion of such a Being, which hath wisdom, goodness and power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of those abatements which any of these perfections are found with in man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of man can attribute to its self absolute perfection, when it cannot but see its own defects in those things it excells other creatures in; and supposing it had power, goodness, and knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but say, that these perfections would be greater if it were alwayes possessed of them, and it were impossible that it should ever cease to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite goodness, wisdom and power, with eternity and necessity of existence, the result is the notion of a Being absolutely perfect. So that now who ever questions the suitableness of such a notion or Idea to the faculties of mens souls, must question the truth of his own faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their clearest conceptions and ratioeinations. And the mind of man may as well question the truth of any Idea it hath within its self, as of this we now discourse of. Nay it may be far sooner puzled in any of those Idea's, which are transmitted into the Phantasie by the impressions of corporeal Beings upon the Organs of sense, then in this more intellectual and abstracted p. 371Idea, which depends wholly upon the mind.

All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of such an absolutely Sect. 5.perfect Being, be any thing else but the understandings Plastick power, whereby it can unite all these perfections together in one conception, or doth it necessarily imply, that there must be such a Being really existent, or else I could never have formed such a setled notion of him in my mind? To this I answer, 1. It is as much as I desire at present, that the forming of such an Idea in the mind, is as suitable and agreeable to our faculties, as the forming the conception of any other Being in the world. For hereby it is most evident, that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to reason, or repugnant to the faculties of our souls; but that the mind will form as setled and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgement of Epicurus, his infallible senses did the most assure him of. So that there can be no shadow of a pretence, why any should reject the Being of a God, because of the impossibility to conceive any such Being as God is. If to this it be objected, that such things are implyed in this Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the perfections in this Being are supposed to be infinite, and infinity transcends our capacity of apprehension. To this I answer, 1. That those who deny infinity in God, must necessarily attribute it to something else, as to infinite space, infinity of successions of ages and persons, if the world were eternal; and therefore it is most unreasonable to reject any notion for that, which it is impossible, but if I deny that, I must attribute it to some thing else, to whose Idea it is far less proper then it is to Gods. 2. Least I should rather seek to avoid the argument then to satisfie it, I say, that though infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and distinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be assigned to it, as to its power or presence; which is as much as to understand it to be infinite. The ratio formalis of infinity may not be understood clearly and distinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its self cannot be on this account, because how ever positive we apprehend it, yet we alwayes apprehend it in a negative way, because we conceive it by denying all limitations and p. 372bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a positive manner, although not adaequately, because we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and distinctly see the Sea, though we cannot discover the bounds of it; so may we clearly and distinctly apprehend some perfections of God when we fix our minds on them, although we are not able to grasp them all together in our narrow and confined intellects, because they are Infinite. Thus we see that Gods Infinity doth not at all abate the clearness and distinctness of the notion which we have of God; so that though the perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to mens natural faculties to have a settled Idea of a Being Infinitely perfect in their minds.

To the Question I answer, It seems highly probable and far more consonant to reason then the contrary, that this Idea of Sect. 6.God upon the mind of man, is no meerly fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whose Idea it is, and therefore doth suppose a reality in the thing correspondent to that objective reality which is in the understanding. For although I am not so well satisfied that the meer objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly considered in its self, because of the unlimited power of the understanding in conception: Yet I say, considering that Idea in all the circumstances of it, it seems highly probable that it is no meer ens rationis, or figment of the understanding; and that will appear on these considerations. 1. This Idea is of such a nature as could not be formed from the understandings consideration of any corporeal phantasms. Because whatever hath any thing of matter in it, involves of necessity many imperfections along with it; for every part of matter is divisible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to natural light, that it is a greater perfection not to be divisible then to be so. Besides, corporeal phantasms are so far from helping us. in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a distinct conception of it, while we attend to them; because these bear no proportion at all to such a being. So that this Idea however must be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore supposing there were no other faculty p. 373in man but imagination, it would bear the greatest repugnancy to our conceptions, and it would be according to the principles of Epicurus and some modern Philosophers, a thing wholly impossible to form an Idea of God, unless with Epicurus we imagine him to be corporeal, which is to say he is no God. Which was the reason that Tully said Epicurus did only nomine poncre, re tollere Deos, because such a notion of God is repugnant to natural light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abstract from corporeal phantasms, it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in mans soul then meer imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends its self to an infinite object, should come but from an infinite Being: especially if we consider, 2. That the understanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by distinct acts, first collect one perfection, and then another, and at last unite these together, but the simplicity and unity of all these perfections is as necessarily conceived as any of them. Granting then that the understanding by the observing of several perfections in the world, might be able to abstract these severally from each being wherein they were, yet whence should the Idea of the unity and inseparability of all these perfections come? The mind may, it is true, knit some things together in fictitious Idea's, but then those are so far from unity with each other, that in themselves they speak mutual repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper entia rationis; but these several perfections are so far from speaking repugnancy to each other, that the unity and inseparability of them is as necessary to the forming of this Idea, as any other perfection whatsoever. So that from hence it appears that the consideration of the perfections which are in the creatures, is only an occasion given to the mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea its self depends upon those perfections as the causes of it; as in the clearest Mathematical truths the manner of demonstration may be necessary to help the understanding to its clearer assent, though the things in themselves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the same truths; some are of quicker apprehension then others are; now although to slower apprehensions a more particular way of demonstrating p. 374things be necessary, yet the truths in themselves are equal, though they have not equal evidence to several persons.

3. It appears that this is no meer fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call entia rationis, we find by experienee in our minds, that they are formed ad placitum; we may imagine them as many wayes as we please; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God; for in those attributes or perfections which by the light of nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have devested their minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a being absolutely perfect, there hath been no dissent in the perfections which have been attributed to it; none have questioned but infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, joyned with necessity of existence, have been all implyed in this Idea. So that it is scarce p…ssible to instance in any one Idea, no not of those things which are most obvious to our senses, wherein there hath been so great an uniformity of mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the most gross corporeal Idea of the most sensible matter hath been more lyable to heats and disputes among Philosophers, then this Idea of a being Infinite and purely spiritual. Which strongly proves my present proposition, that this Idea of God is very consonant to natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there should be so universal a consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a natural result from the free use of our reason and faculties. And that which adds further weight t… this argument, is, that although Infinity be so necessarily implyed in this Idea of God, yet men do not attribute all kind of Infinite things to God; for there being conceivable Infinite number, Infinite longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledge, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abstract the other from his nature, which is an argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues reality in the thing correspondent to our conception of it. So much may suffice to clear the first proposition, viz. that the notion of a God is very suitable to the p. 375faculties of mens souls, and to that light of nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.

Those who deny that there is a God, do assert other things Sect. 7. Prop. 2.on far less evidence of reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true. One would expect that such persons who are apt to condemn the whole world of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and would fain be admired as men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and sagacity then others, would when they have exploded a Deity, at least give us some more rational and consistent account of things, then we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reasons on which they reject a Deity so lamentably weak, and so easily retorted upon themselves, and the hypotheses they substitute instead of a Deity so precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other argument to evince the reasonableness of Religion, then from the manifest folly as well as impiety of those who oppose it. Which we shall make evident by these two things. 1. That while they deny a Deity, they assert other things on far less reason. 2. That by those principles on which they deny a Deity, they must deny some things which are apparently true.

1. That they assert some things on far less reason then we do that there is a God. For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the world out of nothing, it must necessarily follow according to the different principles of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists, that either the world was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was at first made by the fortuitous concourse of Atoms. Now I appeal to the reason of any person who hath the free use of it, Whether either of these two Hypotheses, urged with the same or greater difficulties, &c. be not far more weakly proved, then the existence of a Deity is, or the production of the world by him.

1. They run themselves into the same difficulties which they would avoid in the belief of a Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an intangled mind then this is: To deny a thing because of some difficulty in it, and instead of it to assert another thing which is chargeable with the very same difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a Deity, p. 376because they cannot understand what infinity means; both these Hypotheses are lyable to the same intricacy in apprehending the nature of something Infinite. For according to the Epicureans, there must be an Infinite space, and what greater ease to the mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that then of an Infinite Being. And if the world be eternal, there must have been past an Infinite succession of ages, and is not the understanding as easily lost in this, as in an eternal Being which created the world? For if the course of Generations in the world had no beginning at all, (which necessarily follows upon the eternity of the world) then an infinite number of successions are already past, and if past then at an end, and so we find an Infinite which hath had an end, which is a consequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a Deity, because Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Besides if the number of Generations hath been Infinite, these two consequences will unavoidably follow, which the reason of any one but an Atheist would startle at, that one Infinite may be greater then another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he please in the course of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-fathers time the succession of Generations was finite or Infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and so the world not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, Whether there were not a longer succession of Generations in the time of his great grand-children, and so there must be a number greater then that which was infinite; for the former succession was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it then that had; but if it be said that they were equal, because both infinite, then the succession of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his grand-children and posterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not now the notion of an Infinite Being enough to stumble an Atheists reason, when it can so nimbly leap over so apparent contradictions? I insist not on this as an evident demonstration to prove a Deity, which possibly it may not amount to, because it may only demonstrate the impossibility of our understandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth most evidently demonstrate the folly and unreasonableness of the Atheist who p. 377rejects the Being of God on the account of his Infinity, when his understanding is more lost in apprehending an infinite succession of Generations which follows from his supposition of the eternity of the world. If then it be impossible, as it is, upon any principles whatsoever, to avoid the conception of somewhat infinite and eternal, either matter or space, or some Being, let any one appeal to his own reason whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute these perfections to such a Being to whose Idea they necessarily belong, then to attribute them to this world in whose conception they are not at all implyed; but on the contrary they do far more puzzle our understandings then when we conceive them to be in God. If somewhat must have a continued duration, and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive wisdom, power, and goodness to be conjoyned with eternity and infinity, then to bestow these attributes upon an empty space, or upon dull and unactive matter? It cannot be reason then, but some more base and unworthy principle which makes the Atheist question the Being of God, because his perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own principles the most puzzling attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplieable manner.

As the Atheist must admit those things himself which he rejects the Being of God for, so he admits them upon far Sect. 8. 2.weaker grounds then we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to mans natural reason concerning the existence of a Being so infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great assurance of the Being of God; but how far must the Atheist go, how heartily must he begg before his Hypothesis either of the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, or eternity of the world will be granted to him. For if we stay till he proves either of these by evident and demonstrative reasons, the world may have an end before he proves his Atoms could give it a beginning; and we may find it eternal, à parte post, before he can prove it was so á parte ante. For the proof of a Deity, we appeal to his own faculties, reason and conscience; we make use of arguments before his eyes: we bring the universal sense of mankind p. 378along with us: But for his principles, we must wholly alter the present stage of the world, and crumble the whole Universe into little particles; we must grind the Sun to powder, and by a new way of interrment turn the earth into dust and ashes, before we can so much as imagine how the world could be framed. And when we have thus far begged leave to imagine things to be what they never were, we must then stand by in some infinite space to behold the friskings and dancings about of these little particles of matter, till by their frequent rancounters and justlings one upon another, they at last link themselves together, and run so long in a round till they make whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon, and Stars, and all the bodies of the Universe to emerge out of. But what was it which at first set these little particles of matter in motion? Whence came so great variety in them to produce such wonderful diversities in bodies as there are in the world? How came these casual motions to hit so luckily into such admirable contrivances as are in the Universe? When once I see a thousand blind men run the point of a sword in at a key-hole without one missing; when I find them all frisking together in a spacious field, and exactly meeting all at last in the very middle of it; when I once find as Tully speaks, the Annals of Ennius fairly written in a heap of sand, and as Keplers wife told him, a room full of herbs moving up and down, fall down into the exact order of sallets, I may then think the Atomical Hypothesis probable, and not before. But what evidence of reason, or demonstration have we that the great bodies of the world did result from such a motion of these small particles? It is possible to be so, saith Epicurus; what if we grant it possible? can no things in the world be, which it is possible might have been otherwise? What else thinks Epicurus of the Generations of things now? they are such certainly as the world now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwise: Must therefore a bare possibility of the contrary make us deny our reason, silence conscience, contradict the universal sense of mankind by excluding a Deity out of the world? But whence doth it appear possible? Did we ever find any thing of the same nature with the world produced in such a manner by such a concourse p. 379of Atoms? Or is it because we find in natural beings, how much these particles of matter serve to solve the Phoenomena of nature? But doth it at all follow, because now under Divine providence which wisely orders the world, and things in it, that these particles with their several affections and motion, may give us a tolerable account of many appearances as to bodies, that therefore the Universe had its original meerly by a concretion of these without any Divine hand to order and direct their motion? But of this more, when we come to the creation of the world; our design now is only to compare the notion of a Deity, and of the Atheists Hypothesis in point of perspicuity and evidence of reason: of which let any one who hath reason judge. Thus we see how the Atheist in denying a Deity, must assert something else instead of it, which is pressed with the same, if not greater difficulties, and proved by far less reason.

The Atheist by the same principles on which he denyes a God, Sect. 9. 2.must deny some things which are apparently true. Which will be evident by our running over the most plausible pretences which he insists upon.

1. Because the Being of God cannot be demonstrated. But how doth the Atheist mean it? is it because God cannot be demonstrated to sense, that we cannot digito monstrari & dieier hic est, point at him with our fingers? It is a sign there is little of reason left, where sense is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Must all Intellectual Beings be proscribed out of the order of Nature, because they cannot pass the scrutiny of sense? And by the same reason all colours shall be dashed out because they cannot be heard; all noises silenced because they cannot be seen; for why may not one sense be set to judge of all objects of sense with far more reason, then sense its self be set as judge over intellectual Beings? But yet it is wisely done of the Atheist to make sense his judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our cause is lost; for as he said of a Physician when one asked him, whether he had any experience of him, no said he, Si periculum fecissem, non viverem; If I had tryed him, I had been dead ere now; so here, If God were to be tryed by the judgement of sense, he must cease to be God; for how can an infinite and p. 380spiritual Being be discerned by the judgement of sense, and if he be not an infinite and spiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the Atheists meaning is not so gross, but he intends such a demonstration to reason as that two and two make four, or that the whole is greater then the parts; with such a demonstration he would sit down contented. But will no less then this serve him? what becomes then of the worlds being made by a sortuitous concourse of Atoms? is this as evident, as that two and two make four? And will the Philosophical Atheist really believe nothing in nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as that the whole is greater then the parts? By any means let Atheists then write Philosophy, that at last the clocks in London may strike together and the Philosophers agree; for I suppose none of them question that. But yet it is possible the Atheist may in a good humour abate some thing of this, and mean by demonstration such a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the ground of assent, we undertake it; if as to the object ap…rehended, we reject it as unreasonable, because it is impossible a Being infinite should be comprehended by us; for if it could, it were no longer infinite. But let us try this principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account some things must be denyed which himself will confess to be true? for instance, that osprobrium Philosophorum, the divisibility of quantity, or extended matter into finite and infinite parts; let him take which side he please, and see whether by the force of the arguments on either side, if he hold to this principle, he must not be forced to deny that there is any such thing as matter in the world: and then we may well have an infinite empty space, when by the force of this one Principle, both God and matter are banished quite out of the world. But if the Atheist will but come one step lower, and by his demonstration intend nothing else but such a sufficient proof of it, as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only speak most consonantly to reason, but may be in some hopes of gaining satisfaction. For it is most evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof, and that in some cases the possibility of the contrary must be no hindrance to an undoubted assent. What these proofs are, will p. 381appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the Atheists opinion, which is,

2. The weakness of some arguments brought to prove a Deity. But let us grant that some arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if some have proved the Sun to be the center of the world, and the motion of the earth, by very weak arguments, will the Atheist therefore question it? what if Epicurus hath proved his Atomical hypothesis by some silly Sophismes, will the Atheist therefore rather believe the creation of the world then it? What if the Atheist may make himself sport at some stories of apparitions insisted on to prove a D…ity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, because some persons have been overcredulous? What if some having more zeal then knowledge may attribute such things to Gods immediate hand, which may be produced by natural causes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the world at all? What if fears, and hopes, and perswasi…ns, may depend much on principles of education, must conscience then be resolved wholly into these? What if some devont melancholist may embrace the issues of his own imagination for the impressions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that religion is nothing but strength of fancy improved by principles of education? what if some of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only those made use of, which are of greatest force, would the truth suffer at all by that? I grant advantage is often taken against a thing more by one weak argument brought for it, then for it by the strongest proofs: but I say it is unreasonable it should be so; and were men rational and ingenuous it would not be so. Many times arguments may be good in their order, but they are misplaced; some may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; some may shew the absurdity of the adversaries rejecting the thing, which may be not sufficient to prove it; now when men number and not weigh their arguments, but give them in the lump to the main question, without fitting them to their several places, they do more disservice to the main of the battel by the disorder of their forces, then they can advantage it by the number of them.

p. 3823. Another great pretence the Atheist hath, is, that religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they aw people with as they please, and therefore tell them of a God and another world, as Mothers send young children to school to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater ease. To this I answer, 1. Religion I grant hath a great influence upon the well-governing the world, nay so great, that were the Atheists opinion true, and the world perswaded of it, it were impossible the world could be well governed. For the Government of the world in civil societies, depends not so much on force, as the sacred bonds of duty and allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns religion as true, in far surer obligations to endeavour the peace and welfare of a Nation then ever violence can do. For in this case only an opportunity is watched for to shake off that which they account a yoke upon their necks; whereas when mens minds are possessed with a sense of duty and obligation to obedience out of conscience, the rains may be held with greater ease; and yet the people be better managed by them, then by such as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true religion to be the most serviceable principle for the governing of civil societies; but withal I say, 2. It were impossible religion should be so much made use of for the governing of people, were there not a real propensity and inclination to religion imprinted on the minds of men. For as, did not men love themselves and their children, their estates and interests, it were impossible to keep them in obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, because Magistrates perswade people to obedience by suiting Laws to the general interest of men, that therefore the Magistrates first made them love themselves and their own concerns? So it is in religion, the Magistrate may make use of this propensity to religion in men for civil ends, but his making use of it doth suppose it and not instill it. For were religion nothing else in the world but a design only of Politicians, it would be impossible to keep that design from being discovered at one time or other, and when once it came to be known, it would hurry the whole world into confusion; and the people would make no scruple of all oaths and obligations, but every one would seek to do p. 383others what mischief he could if he had opportunity, and obey no further then fear and force constrained him. Therefore no principle can be so dangerous to a state as Atheism, nor any thing more promote its peace then true religion; and the more men are perswaded of the truth of religion, they will be the better subjects, and the more useful in civil societies. As well then may an Atheist say there is no such thing as good nature in the world because that is apt to be abused, nor any such thing as love because that may be cheated, as that religion is nothing but a design, because men may make it stalke to their private ends. Thus we see how the Atheist by the force of those principles on which he denyes a God, must be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confession are apparently true.

So I come to the third Proposition, which is, That we have Sect. 10. Prop. 3.as certain evidence that there is a God, as we can have considering his nature. When we demand the proof of a thing, our first eye must be to the nature of the thing which we desire may be proved; For things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonstration in Euclide will serve to prove that there are such places as the Indies: we cannot prove the earth is round by the judgement of sense; nor that the soul is immortal by corporeal phantasmes. Every distinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondered at, if the Supreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonstrating himself to the minds of men. If then we have as evident proofs of the existence of God, as we can have considering the infinity of his nature, it is all which in reason we can desire; and of that kind of proofs we have these following, For, 1. If God hath stamped an universal character of himself upon the minds of men. 2. If the things in the world are the manifest effects of infinite wisdome, goodness and power. 3. If there be such things in the world which are unaccountable without a Deity; then we may with safety and assurance conclude that there is a God.

1. That God hath imprinted an universal character of himself on the minds of men; and that may be known by two p. 384things. 1. If it be such as bears the same importance among all persons. 2. If it be such as cannot be mistaken for the character of any thing else.

1. I begin with the first, whereby I shall prove this character to be universal, because the whole world hath consented in it. This argument we may rely on with the greater security, because it was the only argument which retained the Deity in the ancient School of Epicurus; which could he have thought of as easie way of evading it, as he thought he had found out as to the Origine of the universe, he was no such great friend to the very name of a God, as to have retained it as an Anticipation or Prolepsis of humane nature. And this argument from the universal consent of the world, was that which bore the greatest sway among the Philosophers, who went by nothing but dictates of natural light, which they could not so clearly discover in any things, as in those which all mankind did unanimously consent in. Two things I shall make out this by. 1. That no sufficient account can be given of so universal a consent, unless it be supposed to be the voyce of nature. 2. That the dissent of any particular persons is not sufficient to controul so universal an agreement.

1. That no sufficient account of it can be given, but only by asserting it to be a dictate of nature. In so strange a dissent as there hath been in the world concerning most of those things which relate to mankinde in common, as the models of government, the Laws they are ruled by, the particular rites and customs of worship; we have the greatest reason to judge that those common principles which were the foundations on which all these several different customs were built, were not the effect of any positive Laws, nor the meer force of principles of education, but something which had a deeper root and foundation in the principles of nature its self. A common and universal effect must flow from some common and universal cause. So the Stoick argues in Tully, If there were no God, De Nat. Deor. l. 2.non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate remporis, nec una cum seculis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. It is strange to think that mankind in so many ages of the world should not grow wise enough to rid p. 385its self of so troublesom an opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

We see in all the alterations of the world, other vain opinions have been detected, refuted and shaken off; if this had been such, how comes it to remain the same in all ages and Nations of the world? Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. It is a great discredit to Time to make it like a river in that sense, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greatest weight are sunk to the bottom and past recovery; This may pass for a handsom allusion, as to the opinions and writings of particular persons, but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the universal consent of the world; for these common notions of humane nature are so suited to the temper of the world, that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built ship, though of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we must adhere to the Allegory, it is easily replyed, that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink, but the unsuitableness of their superficies to that of the water; so we see a small piece of wood will sink, when a stately ship is born up; so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the dictates of nature may soon be lost, but such as lye so even upon the superficies of the soul, will still float above the water, and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time. Thus we assert this universal consent of mankind, as to the existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our natural reason, that as long as there are men in the world it will continue.

But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of Epicurus, how mankind should universally agree in Sect. 11.some common sentiments; much less how it should have such an anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God. For if the soul be nothing else but some more active and vigorous particles of matter (as Diogenes Laertius tells us, that his opinion was that the soul was nothing else but a Systeme Lib. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gassend. To. 2. l. 3. sect 3.foreign, of the most smooth and round atoms) if so, it is very hard apprehending how any such things as anticipations or commctions can be lodged in p. 386the soul? For if our souls be nothing else but some small sphaericall corpuscles which move up and down the body, as the Epicurean Philosophy supposeth, then all our knowledge and perception must depend on motion, which motion must be by the impression of external objects: which Lucretius acknowledgeth and contends for.

Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam

Notitiam veri.Lib. 4.

If then our knowledge of truth comes in by our senses, and sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward objects, what becomes of all common notions and of the Prolepsis of a Deity? unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by sense, which Epicurus himself denyes when he attributes to the Deity not corpus, but quasi corpus, as De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.Tully tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of sense. So that it is impossible there should be any such thing as a natural notion which may be the ground of universal consent among men, according to the doctrine of Epicurus. And therefore it stands to all reason in the world, that if our senses be the only competent Iudges of truth, men should differ about nothing more then such things which cannot be tryed by the judgement of sense; Such as the notion of a God is; (for where should men be more uncertain in their judgements, then in such thing which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are so far from finding it so, that men are nothing so much agreed about the objects of sense, as they are about the existence of a Deity; and therefore we see this universal consent of mankind concerning a God, cannot be salved by the principles of those who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common notions.

Neither can this universal consent of mankind be enervated Sect. 12.with any greater probability by those Atheists who assert the eternity of the world, and resolve this consent wholly into meer tradition, such as the Fables of Poets were conveyed in from one to another. For I demand concerning this tradition, p. 387Whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it could be no tradition; for that must run up to some persons from whom it first came; again, if it had no beginning, it was necessary that it should alwayes be, on the same accounts on which they make the world eternal. And if it be necessary, it must be antecedent to any free act of mans will which tradition supposeth; and so some false opinion would be found to be as necessary as the worlds being eternal, (and by consequence, the worlds being eternal may be a necessary false opinion) but if any false opinion be once granted necessary, it then follows that our faculties are not true, and that nature is a necessary cause of some notorious falsity, which is the highest impeachment the Atheist could have laid upon his only adored nature; which must then have done that, (which Aristotle was ashamed to think ever nature should be guilty of) which is something in vain; for to what purpose should man have rational faculties, if he be under an unavoidable necessity of being deceived? If then it be granted that this tradition had once a beginning, either it began with humane nature, or humane nature did exist long before it; if it began with mankind, then mankind had a beginning, and so the world was not eternal; if mankind did exist before this tradition, I then enquire in what time, and by what means came this tradition first to be embraced, if it doth not supppse the existence of a Deity? Can any age be mentioned in history, wherein this tradition was not universally received? and which is most to our purpose, the further we go back in history, the fuller the world was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen histories; but however no age can be instanced in, wherein this tradition began first to be believed in the world; we can trace the Poetick Fables to their true original, by the testimonies of those who believed them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what course they took in divulging of them; we find great diversities among themselves in the meaning of them, and many nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwise in this tradition; we have none to fix on as the first Authors of it; if the world were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot understand by what artifice a fabulous p. 388tradition could come to be so universally received in the world, that no Nation of old could be instanced in by the inquisitive Philosophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it owned a Deity. How could such a tradition be spread so far, but either by force or fraud? it could not be by force, because embraced by an unanimous consent where no force at all hath been used, and hath been so rooted in the very natures of those people who have been most tender of their liberties, that they have resented no indignity so highly, as any affronts they conceived to be offered to their gods. Nay, and where any persons would seem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what force and violence they have used to their own reason and conscience to bring themselves to Atheisme, which they could not subdue their minds to any longer then the will could command the understanding, which when it gained but a little liberty to examine it self, or view the world, or was alarumed with thunder, earth-quakes, or violent sickness, did bring back again the sense of a Deity with greater force and power then they had endeavoured to shake it off with. Now had this tradition come by force into the world, there would have been a secret exultation of mind to be freed from it, as we see nature rejoyceth to shake off every thing which is violent, and to settle every thing according to its due order. It is only fraud then which can be with any reason imagined in this case; and how unreasonable it is to imagine it here, will appear to any one who doth consider how extreamly jealous the world is of being imposed upon by the subtilty of such who are thought to be the greatest Polititians. For the very opinion of their subtilty makes men apt to suspect a design in every thing they speak or do, so that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion so much among vulgar people, as that it comes from a person reputed very politick. So that the most politick way of gaining upon the apprehensions of the vulgar, is by taking upon one the greatest appearance of simplicity and integrity; and this now could not be done by such Polititians which we now speak of, but by accommodating themselves to such things in the people which were so consonant to their natures, that they could suspect no design at p. 389all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I assert it to have been in the present case, in all those Politick Governours who at first brought the world into both civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown rude and barbarous; for as it had been impossible to have brought them into civil Societies, unless there had been supposed an inclination to Society in them, so it had been equally impossible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unless there had been a natural propensity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the existence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the antient founders of Common-wealths go about to perswade the people, that there was a God, but this they supposed and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the people on to embrace that way of worship which they delivered to them, as most suitable to their own design. And this is plainly evident in the vast difference of designs and interests which were carried on in the Heathen world upon this general apprehension of a Deity. How came the world to be so easily abused into Religions of all shapes and fashions, had not there been a natural inclination in mens souls to Religion, and an Indeleble Idea of a Deity on the minds of men? Were then this propensity groundless, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greatest slurr imaginable which could be cast upon nature, that when the instincts of irrational agents argue something real in them; only man, the most noble being of the visible world, must be fatally carryed to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath so great a force and awe upon man, that nothing creates so great anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing layes him more open to the designs of any who have an intent to abuse him. But yet further, these Politicians who first abused the world in telling them there was a God, did they themselves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no such end as abusing the world into such a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the people were so ready, to believe there was one? Was that as certain a tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If so, then all those people whom they perswaded p. 390to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it possibly enter into the reason of any man to think, that people who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any state after this life, should all unanimously quit the principles of education which tended so much to their ease and pleasure here, to believe there was a God and another life, and thereby to fill themselves full of fears and disquietments; meerly because their Rulers told them so? Again, if these Rulers themselves were so wise as not to believe a Deity, can we imagine there ever was such an age of the world vvherein it fell out so happily, that only the Rulers vvere wise, and all the subjects fools? But it may be, it vvill be said, that all who were wise themselves did not believe a Deity, but yet consented to the practice of Religion, because it was so useful for the Government of mankind; but, can it be thought that all these wise men vvhichwhich vve must suppose of several ranks and degrees, (for Philosophers are not alvvayes States-men, nor States-men Philosophers) should so readily concurr in such a thing which tended most to the Interest of the Prince, and to the abuse of the world? Would none of them be ready to assert the truth, though it were but to make a party of their own, and discover to the people, that it was only the ambition and design of their Governours which sought to bring the people to slavery by the belief of such things which were contrary to the tradition of their fore-fathers, and would make their lives, if they believed them, continually troublesom and unquiet? Or if we could suppose things should hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole world which the Atheist here supposeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the world exactly agree in one moment of time, or at least in one age thus to abuse the world? Did the designs of Governours and the credulity of all people fall out to be so suitable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governours can have the judgements of people so at their command, that they can make them to believe what they please; if it were so, we may well say with that Atheistical Pope, Heu quam minimo regitur mundus; What a twine thread will rule the world! But granting these things, (which any but an Atheist will say are impossible) p. 391yet whence should it come to pass that the world which is generally led more by the opinions of their forefathers then by reason, should so cancell that former tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-steps of it can be traced in any history of those times? Or did the Governors all consent to abolish all records of it? Publick and written I grant they might, but not those out of mens minds and memories; which would have been for the ease of the minds of their posterity conveyed in some secret Cabala from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be said, so it was, but men durst not profess it for fear of the Laws; but, it is not evident that the Laws of all the antient Common-wealths were so severe against Atheism; and withall how came some of the wisest and most Philosophical men of Greece and Rome to embrace the existence of a Deity as a thing far more consonant to reason then the contrary opinion, and established their belief on such evidences from nature its self, that none of their Antagonists were able to answer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made men rational and inquisitive into the natures and causes of things; and yet those who were such amidst the great Idolatries of the heathen, & being destitute of divine revelation, yet freely and firmly assented to the existence of a Deity. Had it been only fraud and imposture which brought men to believe a God, whence came it to pass that this fraud was not discovered by these Philosophers who were far better able by their nearness to those eldest times, and much converse abroad in other Nations (for some travelled into Aegypt, Chaldea, Persia, India, meerly to gain knowledge) to have found out such an imposture, had it been such, then any of our modern Atheists? Whence come these now in this almost decrepite age of the world to be the first smellers out of so great a design? By what means, what tokens and evidence came such an imposture to their knowledge? Because, forsooth, the world is still apt to be abused by a pretence of Religion; but he that doth not see how silly and ridiculous a Sophism that is, either by his own reason, or by what hath gone before, hath wit and reason little enough to be an Atheist. Some therefore who would seem a little wiser then the vulgar sort of Atheists (for it seems there p. 392is a vulgus among them too, I wish it be more for their meanness then multitude) are so far convinced of the unreasonablenss of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by fraud, that finding it so general and universal, they attribute it to as general and universal a cause which is the Influence of the Stars. So true still is that of the Poet, Coelum ipsum petimus stultitia; for by what imaginable influence come the stars to plant opinions in mens minds so deeply and universally? But yet further, is this opinion which is thus caused by the Stars, true or false? if the opinion be true, we have what we desire; if false, what malignant influence is this of the Stars so powerfully to sway men to the belief of a falsity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to mankind, when they are so influential to deceive the world; but then by what peculiar influence come some men to be freed from this general imposture? If the cause be so universal, the effect must be universal too. But if only the Nativity and continuance of some particular religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as Cardan and Vaninus Atheistically suppose) whence then comes the general propensity and inclination to Religion in all ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caused by the Heavens in general, it must be produced necessarily and universally, and so to be an Atheist, were impossible; if it be caused by the influence of some particular Stars, then when that influence ceaseth, the world would universally relapse into Atheism. So that there is no possible way of avoiding this universal consent of mankind, as an argument that there is a God, when all the pretences of the Atheist against it are so weak, ridiculous, and impertinent.

The only thing then left for him, is to deny the truth of the thing, viz. that there is such an universal consent; because Sect. 13.some persons have been found in the world who have not agreed with the rest of mankind in this opinion. To this I answer, (which was the second particular for clearing this argument) that the dissent of these persons is not sufficient to manifest 2.the consent not to be universal, and to arise from a dictate of nature. For I demand of the greatest Atheist, Whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for men to have two legs, because some have been born with one, or that it is p. 393not natural for men to desire life, (which the Atheist loves so dearly) because there have been so many who have taken away their own lives? If it be said that these are Monsters and Anomalyes in nature, and therefore not to be reckoned in the regular account of things, the same I may with as great reason say of Atheists, that they are to be dispunged out of the Census of such who act upon free principles of reason; because there may be some peculiar reasons given of their dissent from the rest of mankind in the denyal of a Deity. We see by the old Philosophers how far the affectation of Novelty, and ambition of being cryed up for no vulgar wits, may carry men to deny such things which are most common and obvious in the world. Is there any thing more plain and evident to reason, then that it implyes a contradiction for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time? and yet if we believe Aristotle, who largely disputes against them, foreign. Metaphys. lib. 4. c. 4.There were some who affirmed that a thing might be and not be at the same time. What so evident in nature as motion, yet the Philosopher is well known who disputed against it, and thought himself subtile in doing so too? What are men more assured of, then that they live, and yet (if it be not too dogmatical, even in that to believe the Scepticks) it was a thing none could be assured of? What are our senses more assured of then that the snow is white, yet all the Philosophers were not of that opinion? Is this then sufficient reason on which to deny an universal consent, because some Philosophers opposed it, when it is most undoubtedly true which Tully sharply speaks of the antient Philosophers, Nihil tam absurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philosophorum; there was no absurdity so great, but it found a De Nat. Deor. l. 3.Philosopher to vouch it! But in this case those Philosophers who questioned the existence of a Deity, though they were not for number to be compared with those who asserted it, yet were not so inexcusable therein, as our modern Atheists; because they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyned with horrible superstition and ridiculous rites of worship; they were strangers to any thing of divine revelation, or to any real miracles wrought to confirm it, and to such a way of serving God which is most agreeable to p. 394the Divine nature, most suitable to our reason, most effectual for advancing true goodness in the world. And although this most excellent Religion, viz. the Christian, be subject to many scandals by reason of the corruptions which have been mixed with it by those who have professed it, yet the Religion its self is clear and untainted, being with great integrity preserved in the sacred records of it. So that now Athcism hath far less to plead for its self, then it had in the midst of the ignorance and superstition of the Heathen Idolatries. But, if we should grant the Athcist more then he can prove, that the number of such who denyed a Deity hath been great in all ages of the world; is it probable they should speak the sense of nature, whose opinion if it were embraced, would dissolve all tyes and obligations whatsoever, would let the world loose to the highest licentiousness without check or controul, and would in time overturn all civil Societies? For as Tully hath De Nat. D…or. l. 1. & De Legibus lib. 2.largely shewn, Take away the being and providence of God out of the world, and there follows nothing but perturbation and confusion in it; not only all sanctity, piety and devotion is destroyed, but all faith, vertue, and humane Societies too; which are impossible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch have fully demonstrated. Shall such persons then who hold an opinion so contrary to all other dictates of nature, rather speak the sense of nature then they who have asserted the Belief of a Deity, which tends so much to advance nature, to regulate the world, and to reform the lives of men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of nature that there was a God, it is impossible to conceive the world should be so constant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him breed so many anxicties in mens minds, and withall since God is neither obvious to sense, nor his nature comprehensible by humane reason. Which is a stronger evidence it is a character of himself which God hath imprinted on the minds of men, which makes them so unanimously agree that he is, when they can neither see him, nor yet fully comprehend him. For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denyal of a Deity, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous people in America, but it is since evident p. 395though they are grosly mistaken as to the nature of God, yet they worship something in stead of him, such as the Toupinambors, Caribes, Patagons, Tapuiae and others; of the last of which Vossius from one Christophorus Arcissewski a Polonian Addend. ad lib. 1. De Idol. p. 2.Gentleman who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their worshipping of their gods, both good and bad. And that which among these Indians much confirms our present argument, is, that only those who have been the most barbarous and savage Nations, have been suspected of irreligion, but the more civilized they have been, the more evident their sense of Religion. The Peruvians worship one chief God, whom they call Viracocha, and Pachacamak, which is as much as the Creator v. Acost…m lib. 5. c. 3. Lips. Monit. & exempl. Politic.of heaven and earth. And of the Religion of the Mexicans, Lipsius and others speak. So that the nearer any have approached to civility and knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to reason, let any one who hath it judge.

Another great evidence that God hath imprinted a character or Idea of himself on the minds of men is, because such Sect. 14. 2.things are contained in this Idea of God which do necessarily imply his existence. The main force of this argument lies in this, That which we do clearly & distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing; not that it may be affirmed with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty Tautology, but it may be affirmed with truth of the thing its self, as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an animal doth belong to the nature of man, I may with truth affirm that man is a living creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three angles equal to two right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle; but now we assume, that upon the most exact search and enquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm that God exists, as that man is a living creature, or a Triangle hath three angles equal to two right ones. But because many are so apt to p. 396suspect some kind of Sophism in this argument, when it is managed from the Idea in mens minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the mind, and that nothing can be thence interred as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavour to manifest more clearly the force of this argument, by proving severally the suppositions which it stands upon, which are these three. 1. That clear and distinct perception of the mind is the greatest evidence we can have of the truth of any thing. 2. That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God. 3. That if necessary existence doth belong to Gods nature, it unavoidably follows that he doth exist. Nothing can be desired more plain or full to demonstrate the force of this argument, then by proving every one of these.

1. That the greatest evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is, a clear and distinct perception of it in our minds. For otherwise the rational faculties of mans soul would be wholly useless, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right use of them, men were still lyable to be deceived. I grant the imperfection of our minds in this present state is very great, which makes us so obnoxious to errour and mistake; but then that imperfection lies in the pr…neness in mans mind to be led by interest and prejudice in the judgement of things; but in such things as are purely speculative and rational, if the mind cannot be certain it is not deceived in them, it can have no certainty at all of any Mathematical demonstrations. Now we find in our own minds a clear and conv…ncing evidence in some things, as soon as they are propounded to our understandings, as that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time; that, a non-entity can have no proper attributes; that, while I reason and discourse, I am; these are so clear, that no man doth suspect himself deceived at all in them. Besides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpose is there an Idea of true and false in our minds, if it be impossible to know the one from the other? But I say not, that in all perceptions of the mind we have certain evidence of truth, but only in such as are clear and distinct; that is, when upon the greatest consideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reason at all p. 397to doubt concerning it; and this must suppose the minds abstraction wholly from the senses; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our selves very certain and yet be deceived, as those who have an Icterism in their eyes, may judge with much confidence that they see things as clearly and distinctly as any other doth. Besides, there are many things taken for granted by men, which have no evidence of reason at all in them; Now if men will judge of the truth of things by such principles, no wonder if they be deceived. But when we speak of clear and distinct perception, we suppose the mind to proceed upon evident principles of reason, or to have such notions of things, which as far as we can perceive by the light of reason, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in such things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to say our Faculties are to no purpose; which highly reflects either upon God or nature. It is a noble question, as any is in Philosophy, What is the certain foreign of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the mind hath to proceed upon in its judgement of the truth of such objects as are represented to it? Nothing can render the Philosophy of Epicurus more justly suspected to any …ational and inquisitive mind, then his making the senses the only certain conveyers of the truth of things to the mind. The senses I grant do not in themselves deceive any, but if I make the impressions of sense to be the only rule for the mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greatest impostures, and the most erring judgements. For if my mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the imagination hath received from the impressions upon the Organs of sense, it will be impossible for me ever to understand the right natures of things. Because the natures of things may remain the same, when all those things in them which affect the Organs of sense may be altered; and because the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter may make such an impression upon the senses, which may cause an Idea in us of that in the things themselves, which yet may be only in the manner of sensation; As some Philosophers suppose it to be in heat and cold. Now if the mind judgeth of the nature of things according; p. 398to those Idea's which come from the impressions made upon the Organs of sense; how is it possible it should ever come to a right judgement of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the grossest material beings, it must be the perception only of the mind which can truly inform us of their proper nature and essence. Besides there are many Idea's of things in the mind of man which are capable to have properties demonstrated of them, which never owed their original to our senses, and were never imported to the mind at the Keyes of the senses. Such are most Mathematical figures which have their peculiar properties and demonstrations; such are all the mutual respects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the mind as its self is; now it is plain by this, that all certainty of knowledge is not conveyed by the senses; but our truest way of certain understanding the nature of any thing, is by the clear and distinct perception of the mind, which is founded on the Truth of our faculties; and that however we may be deceived when we do not make a right use of our reason, because of the imperfection of our present state; yet if we say our mind may be deceived when things are evident and clear to them upon plain principles of reason, it is highly to reslect upon that God who gave men rational faculties, and made them capable of discerning Truth from falshood.

2. That we have clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God. For which we are to consider the vast difference which there is in our notion of the nature of God, and of the nature of any other being. In all other beings, I grant we may abstract essence and existance from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident reason, ex parte rei, why I cannot do it in the notion of God, then it will be more plain that necessity of existence doth immutably belong to his nature. It is manifest to our reason, that in all other beings which we apprehend the natures of, nothing else can be implyed in the natures of them beyond bare possibility of existence; no, although the things which do apprehend, do really exist, because in forming an Idea of a thing, we abstract from every thing which is not implyed in the very nature of the thing; now existence being p. 399only contingent and possible, as to any other being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, because it doth not belong to its essence; for we may fully apprehend the nature of the thing, without attributing existence to it. But now in our conception of a Being absolutely perfect, bare possibility or contingency of existence speaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of kim; for how can we conceive that Being absolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other perfections, which is existence? The only scruple, which mens minds are subject to in apprehending the force of this argument lies in this, Whether this necessary existence doth really belong to the nature of that being whose Idea it is, or else it be only a Mode of our conception in apprehending God? For clearing of this, we must consider by what certain rules we can know when the composition of things together in the understanding, doth depend upon the meer operation of the mind, and when they do belong to the things themselves and their immutable nature. For which we have no rule so certain and evident as this is, that in those things which depend meerly on the act of the mind joyning together, the understanding cannot only abstract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its conceptions from each other: but in such things which cannot be divided from each other, but the essence of the thing is quite altered, it is a certain evidence that those things were not conjoyned by the meer act of the mind, but do immutably belong to the natures of the things themselves. As for instance, when I conceive a Triangle inscribed in a square, a man walking, a horse with wings, it is evident I may understand the natures of all these things without these affections of them, because I can fully apprehend the nature of a Triangle without imagining a square, a man without walking, a horse without wings; thence it necessarily follows, that the joyning of these things together was meerly an act of the mind; but now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three angles equal to two right ones, nor a man that hath not rationality belonging to him; for if I divide these attributes from them, I destroy their natures; and therefore the joyning of these together is not any meer act of the mind, but these are such things as are implyed in the very notion of them, p. 400and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a body, I can imagine all perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it necessarily to exist; for it may be a body still, though it hath not its being from its self; but when I conceive a Being absolutely perfect, it is impossible to imagine it should have its being from any other; and if it be from its self, it must of necessity exist. For though the mind still be apt to doubt, whether existence in this Idea be only a mode of cogitation; yet that doubt may be easily removed, if the mind doth but attend to this, that at least possibility of existence doth belong to all those Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our minds; and the reason why we attribute bare possibility to them, is because we apprehend some reason in our minds which keeps us from attributing necessity of existence to them, as that it is not implyed in its nature, or that it doth depend on some other being, or that it wants infinite power, &c. Now all these reasons which make us attribute bare possibility of existence to any being, are taken away when we conceive a being absolutely perfect; for then existence is implyed among the number of perfections, and this being is dependent upon all others, and infinitely powerfull; so that nothing can hinder its existence; and therefore we must conclude that necessity of existence doth immutably belong to the nature and notion of God, and is not any mode only of our conception; because if we take away necessity of existence from God, we lose the notion of a Being absolutely perfect.

The third thing, that if necessary existence belongs to the nature of God, he doth exist, not only follows as a necessary conclusion from the other two, as the premises, but is in it vid. Des Cartes Metaphys. Medi…. & Resp. ad Object. D. H. More Antidote against Atheism, lib. 1. ch. 8. Append. ch. 5, 6, 7.self evident to any ones reason; for it implyes no less then a contradiction for a being to exist necessarily, and yet it be questionable, Whether he doth exist or no? Thus much I suppose may suffice here to explain and enforce this argument; if any are yet unsatisfied, I referr them to those judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar business to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: Which falls in only here as an evidence that God hath imprinted a character of himself on the minds of men, seeing we have so clear and distinct an Idea p. 401of such a being, from whom, if we take away necessity of existence, we destroy that notion which our minds have or an absolutely perfect Being. This is the first way whereby we …an conceive an Infinite Being may make himself known to mankind, by imprinting an Indelible character of himself upon the soul, which can be attributed to none besides himself, without doing manifest violence to our own faculties, and suspecting our selves deceived in things which are most clear and evident to us.

I come to the second evidence which God hath given us of Sect. 15.his own existence, which is the mark and impression which he hath left of an Infinite Wisdom and Counsel in the appearances which are in nature. There needs no great Criticism to find out the true Author of all the works of nature; the works themselves shew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curiosity and contrivance of any artificial engine speak the excellency of the Mechanical wit of the framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare mechanism of the works of nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of some particles of matter? Suppose a multitude of letters casually thrown together, should fall so handsomly in order, that we might read in them the names of Troja, Iuno, Aeneas, Dido, Turnus, Ascanius, or the like; is it possible for any to imagine that ever they should reach the grandeur, stile, matter and accuracy of the whole books of the Aeneids? So granting, that now matter being set in motion by a divine power, may by its continual agitation, at last produce some of the appearances of nature; yet what is this to the whole Universe, or the admirable contrivance of any one part in it? If these things had been the result of meer matter and motion, when once the particles of matter had been so united and settled together, as to produce any one species of animals in the world, (which it is almost unconceivable they should) yet we cannot think that if there had been but symmetry of parts enough for it meerly to subsist its self, and propagate more, there could have been any further attempt made by those Atoms which had been once settled in a determinate figure. How came it then to pass that there is not any one species of animals in the world, p. 402but what hath such an order, symmetry and contrivance of parts which speaks more then meer necessity of subsistence; and therefore speaks them to be the effects or a suprenm Governour of the world, and not the products of meer matter? Is it possible that any, who is not before hand resolved to exclude a Deity, should imagine that any particles of matter should fall into the exact form, order, motion, and serviceableness to the world which the Heavenly bodies are in, without divine counsel and wisdom disposing of them? Tully tells us of a speech of Aristotle to this purpose; If we could suppose De Nat. Dcor. l. 2. c. 95.persons to have lived in some caverns of the earth, and to have enjoyed every thing there of pleasure, and riches, or whatever it is which we think makes mens lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the surface of the earth, but had only had some obscure report of an Infinite power and Being; and that afterwards these persons should by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into these parts of the world, and should suddenly behold the earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and observe the vastness of the clouds and violence of winds, and behold the bigness, beauty, and influence of the Sun, and how the day depended upon his presence, and upon his withdrawing should view the face of the heavens again, (as it were the second course of nature) the order, and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the moon, their rising and setting, and their fixed, and immoveable courses, they could not hold from believing there was a Deity, and that these were the effects of his power. So vastly different are the free and natural emanations of our souls, from that which we force and strain out of our selves, by distorting and wringing those free principles of reason which God hath given us. When a few sorry experiments and some arbitrarious Hypotheses, must make us form other conceptions of things, then the Majesty, order and beauty of them do naturally suggest to us: We see when once we can but abstract our minds from those prejudices which continual conversation with the world brings upon us, by that speech of Aristotle, how readily our minds will frame an excellent commentary upon those words of the royal Psalmist, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament shews his bandy-work. To which purpose likewise those words of the p. 403excellent Orator himself in another place are very observeable; Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam De Legilus lib. 2.stultè arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet inesse, in coelo mundóque non putet? aut ea quae vix summâ ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? quem verb astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea quae gignuntur nobis ad fruexdum, non gratume esse cogant, hunc hominem omninò numerare qui decet? What monstrous arrogancy would it be in any man to think there is a mind and reason in himself, and that there is none in the world? Or to think those things are moved without reason and understanding, which all that he hath is scarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deserve the name of a man, from whom the observation of the courses of the stars, the succession and order of seasons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoyes in the world, does not extort gratitude towards that Being which ordered all these things. What a low opinion then had those more resined and generous spirits who went only upon principles of pure and undistorted reason, of those mean and ignoble souls which were inclined to Atheism; especially then, when Religion was so abused, that it was true of the wisest of them, what one said of Erasmus, Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid sequeretur, they knew what to avoid, but not what they should embrace? And vet when they saw so much into the folly and superstition of Heathen worship, they saw the greatest reason still to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly seen, especially in the second of those excellent Dialogues of Tully, de natura Deorum. Where this particular argument to prove a Deity from the admirable contrivance of the works of nature, is managed with a great deal of …loguence and reason, and by particular enumeration of most considerable parts of the Universe. So unbecoming a late Philosopher was that reason of his, why he waved the argument from the consideration of the world, to inferr a Deity, because the ends of God are unsearchable, as flowing from his Infinite wisdom. For what though God may conceal some things from men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for man to know, must therefore of necessity those ends of his be unsearchable in his works of Creation, p. 404which referr so immediately to the advantage of lfe, and tend so much to the veneration of the Deity?

Nay the peculiar use and serviceableness of many parts of Sect. 16.the Universe, especially of Animals, and chiefly of man, is so evident, that this hath been the main argument which hath induced some, otherwise Atheistical enough, to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And although the Epicureans be lamentably puzzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in nature, yet they nowhere discover so much weakness and ignorance, as when they come to discourse De usu partium, about the contrivance of the parts of mans body. Whose opinion is thus briefly delivered by Lucretius,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'st in corpore ut uti

Possemus; sed quodnatum'st id procreat usum.Lucret. l. 4.

i. e. that no-parts of mans body were designed for that use which they are imployed for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and men by degrees brought them to their present use and serviceableness. An opinion at first view so strangely unreasonable, that we cannot think Epicurus should have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably followed upon his Hypothesis of all things in the Universe resulting only from a fortuitous concourse of Atoms: According to which he supposed in man a different configuration of parts would happen, from the various agitation and concretion of those little particles which at first run together in the fashion of a man; and because that man had in him a more florid and vivacious spirit, made up of the most subtile and moveable Atoms, thence motion came into the several parts, suitable to the different conformation of them. And because those Atoms of which the soul is composed, are capable of sensation, thence it comes to pass, that it sees in the eye, hears in the ear, and smells in the nostrills. This is the most which is made of the opinion of Epicurus by the late sedulous vindicator of him, which yet himself calls intoleranda opinio; and it will appear to be so, not only as contradicting what God himself hath delivered concerning man, but what reason its self will easily p. 405suggest from the consideration of the several parts of mans body. It must be confessed there were some Philosophers elder then Epicurus who were much inclined to this opinion, as Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and others; yet we find those who more narrowly searched into the natures of living creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledg a divine providence which with a great deal of wisdom did order the several parts of animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uses. And although Aristotle in his books de partibus animalium, hath said enough to refute the fond opinion of those Philosophers; yet none hath handled this argument with more exactness and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on Epicurus, then Galen hath done in his excellent piece De usu partium. Which Gassendus thinks Galen writ with a kind of Enthusiasm upon him, (adeo totum opus videtur Gassend. To. 2. lib 2. sect. 3.conscriptum foreign) and so that all those seventeen books of his on that subject, are a kind of 119. Psalm in Philosophy, or a perpetual Hymn upon the praise of the great Creator, or a just Commentary on those words of the Psalmist, Psal. 139. 14. I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well. In the entrance of those books, Galen first shews the great variety of parts which is in several animals suitable to their several natures; the horse because of his swiftness and pride; hath the strongest hoofs and most curled main; the Lyon because of his fierceness and courage hath his strength lying in his teeth and paws; the Bull in his horns; the Boar in his tusks; the Hart and Hare being timerous creatures, their parts are made fittest for flight: but man, because he hath a principle of reason in him, hath no defensive or offensive weapons in his body, but he hath hands to make use of both; which being joyned with and imployed by his reason, far exceed all those advantages which any other creatures have, being imployed not only to defend himself, but to build houses, make clothes, arms, nets, whatever is useful for himself, or hurtful to those creatures which he hath command over; but because man was made for society and civil converse, therefore his hands were not only imployed to defend himself or hurt other creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage p. 406of mankind; for by these were Laws written, Temples built, all instruments of Arts framed; by them we enjoy the benefit of others wits, we can discourse with Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, and other antients, though at such a dist…nce from us. Now that the configuration of parts is not the cause of the use of them afterwards; as the Lyons paw, of his courage, the Bulls horns of his fierceness, or the slenderness of the Hart of its fearfulness, appears by this, because the young ones of the several kinds of animals, before their parts are grown up, strive to make the same use of them which the others do. As Galen saith, he had often seen a Bullcalf pushing with his head before any horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himself with his jaws before he had any tusks; which is an evident argument that the parts were designed for the use, and not the use follow the parts. So, saith he, take three eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatched through a moderate heat, we shall find when they are but newly hatched, the two first will be striving to fly before they have wings, and the third endeavouring to creep away on its belly; and if you breed them up to greater perfection, and bring them into the open air, you will presently see the young Eagle mounting into the air, the Duck quoddling into a pool, and the Serpent creep under ground. Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the several parts of mans body, and first begins with the Hand, and shews in each part that it were impossible to have framed them with greater conveniency for their several uses then they have. The use of the hand is to take hold of any thing which man can use; now there being things of such different sizes which men may use, it had been impossible for the hand, if it had been one entire thing and undivided, that it could have held things greater or lesser then its self, but it must have been equal to it. But now as the fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of objects of any size or quantity; For the least things, as a Barley corn, are taken up with the fore-finger and the thumb, things somewhat bigger are taken up by the same, but not by the extremities of them as before; things somewhat bigger then these, p. 407with the thumb, fore-finger and middle-finger, and so on by degrees, till at last the whole hand is used; so that the division of the hand into fingers is necessary. Neither were this enough, but the very position of the fingers as they are, is necessary too; for they had been useless if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmest hold is either circular or at least in two opposite points; but now this is provided for, by the position of the thumb which may equally joyn with any of the fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely shews the patticular necessity of the softness, roundness of the flesh, and nails on the tops of the fingers; and the special usefulness of these; and then comes to the bones of the fingers, how necessary they are for firm hold, and if there had been but one bone in each finger, they would have served only for those things which we take up when they are extended; but now seeing they have three several joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our fingers we use them as though they had no bones at all, and when we stretch them out, as though they were all but one entire bone; and the several inflections of the joynts serve for all kind of figures: and then he shews the necessity of the flesh within the fingers, and on either side of them, and upon them; and so with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the bones, and nature of the joynts of the fingers, and then the tendons and muscles belonging to the several fingers, which after he hath discoursed on through his first Book, he concludes it with the manifest inconveniency which would follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, position, and figure in which it is. With the same exactness he goes through all the parts of the body, handling in the second Book all that belongs to the arm, in the third the legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of nutrition, in the sixth and seventh the lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable fabrick of the eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the face, in the twelfth the parts of the back, and so in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the genitals, in the sixteenth the arteryes, veins, and nerves, and in the last the peculiar disposition and figure of all these parts, and the usefulness of p. 408the whole design: Which is as great as can be in any work whatsoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable wisdom of God in contriving the several parts of the body of man: So that, that whole book contains in it a most full and pregnant demonstration of a Deity, which every man carries about with him in the structure of his body, on which account men need not go out of themselves to find proof of a Deity, whether they consider their minds or their bodies, of which it may be more truly said, then Heraclitus of old did of his Stove, Etiam hic Dii sunt. So that of all persons, I should A…sto…. de pa…t. A…im. l. 4.most wonder at those whose imployment particularly leads them to the understanding the parts and nature of mans body, if the proverb be not a great injury to them, since they have fuller insight into this demonstration of a Deity in the Fabrick of mans body, then many others who converse only with some jejune and sapless writings. And certainly, whatever is imagined to the contrary by men of weak understandings, the best way to cure the world of Atheism is true Philosophy, or a search into the natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impossible will it be found to explicate all the phaenomena of nature by meer matter and Motion. It was wisely observed of a great person and Philosopher, that a narrow and slight inspection into nature, enclined men of weak heads to Atheism; but a more through-insight into the causes of things, made them more evidently see the necessary dependence of things on the great and wise Creator of them. A little knowledge of Philosophy is apt to make mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the gulf of Atheism; but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into sobriety and their right wits again. Such a slight inspection had the followers of Epicurus into the nature of things; for when they found how in the present state of the world the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter would handsomly salve many appearances of nature, they drunk with the success, reel presently into an Infinite space, and there imagine they behold infinite worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever since their eyes have been so dusted with these little Atoms, that they could see nothing else in the world but them. Which how gross and unreasonable p. 409it is, will appear, from our present subject; for who but Lucretius or Epicurus could ever think that our nostrils were at first fashioned as they are meerly by the violent impulse of the air within, which would force its self a passage out? But how came the air into the body before it was forced out? did it first break open the lips, make all that round cavity in the mouth, for a passage through the aspera arteria? but if when it was in, it would come out again, was not the mouth wide enough to let it go? or did the first man shut his mouth on purpose to finde another vent for the air? if so, how chance the force of the air did not carry away the epiglottis? or if it got safely up to the nose, how came it not to force a passage out about the eyes rather then to go down so low first? But if we believe these rare contrivers of mans body, all the inward vessels of the body were made by the course of water, as channels are; but how is it possible, to imagine that the Oesophagus and the stomack should be so curiously contrived by the meer force of water? and that all the Intestines should be made only as channels to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then such a kind of reciprocation and Peristactick motion in those vessels? how come the several coats of them to be so firme? if it had been only a forced passage, it would have been direct and through the substance of the parts, as we finde it to be in all forced passages in the body of the earth. Besides, if the water received into the stomack forced the passage through the guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for its self? or did it not like that passage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more secret one into the bladder? but if that were made by the water, how came it to be so full of membranes, and so subject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will men make themselves, rather then shew themselves men in owning and adoring that infinitely wise and powerful God, who orders all things in the world according to the counsel of his Will. What can be more plain and evident then the peculiar usefulness of the several parts of mans body is? What other intent can be imagined that man is formed with a mouth, but only for taking in of nourishment, and for receiving and letting forth of air? or that an infant is so ready to open his p. 410mouth, but that there are breasts and milk for him to suck in order to his nourishment? Why should the Oesophagus be so hollow and the stomack so wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the meat down, and the other for the fermentation of it? whence come all the other vessels to be so conveniently placed, were it not for the distribution of nourishment into the several parts, or for conveying away the excrements of it? Can any one think that the several muscles and tendons should be placed in the more solid parts for any other end then for the better motion of them? or that the nerves should be derived from the brain into the several parts of the body for any other design then to be the instruments of sense and motion? or that the continual motion of the heart should be for any other purpose, then for receiving and distribution of the blood through the arteries into the parts of the body? or that the eye with all its curious fabrick should be only accidentally imployed in seeing? These things are so plain, that however the Epicureans may more easily lose themselves and deceive others in explaining the appearances of nature in some inanimate beings, yet when they come with their blind concourse of Atoms to give an account of the parts of animals, they miserably befool themselves and expose themselves only to contempt and pitty. It were easie to multiply examples in this kind, but I shall only mention one thing more, which is, if all the parts of mans body have no higher original then the concourse of Atoms in the first man and woman, by what were the umbilical vessels formed, whereby the Child in the womb receives its nourishment? by what atoms was the passage of the succus nutritius framed from the mother to the child? how come those vessels to close up so naturally upon the birth of the child, and it to seek its nourishment in quite another way? Will the particles of matter which by their concretion formed the first pair, salve this too? Thus still we see how impossible it is (to go no further then our selves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite power and Being which produced all these things, and hath left so plain an inscription of himself upon the works of nature, that none but those who shut their eyes can abstain from seeing it.

p. 411I come now to the third evidence of a Deity, which is, that Sect. 17. 3.there are some beings in the world which cannot depend upon matter or motion, i. e. that there are some spiritual and immaterial substances or Beings (for if the thing be acknowledged, it is unbecoming a man to contend about words) the consequence of this for the proving a Deity, neither hath been nor I suppose will be denyed by such who question an infinite Being, the same principles leading to the denying and the proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above matter in the world. If there be then such things in the world which matter and motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men, and to some extraordinary effects which are produced in the world.

1. I begin with the nature of the soul of man. And herein I must confine my self to those arguments which directly prove my present purpose, and on that account must quit all those common arguments to prove the souls immortality from the attributes of God; for all these do suppose the existence of a Deity as already evident; neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the soul meerly from the phoenomena of sensation, which they endeavour to prove cannot be performed by meer matter and motion; for granting all this, yet the utmost that can be proved by it is no greater immort…lity in our souls then in the souls of Brutes; and in the sense in which that is admitted, I suppose an Epicurean will not deny the soul of man to be immortal as Demonax in Lucian said, when he was asked whether the soul were immortal or no, it is (said he) but as all things else are; for those who make the soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are dispersed and dissipated, or in the Platonists phrase, may return to the soul of the world. These wayes I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in man which we now enquire for, much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an hypothesis as praeexistence, which makes men apt to suspect p. 412the cogency of such reasons which tend to prove the immortality of the soul, which are linked with a supposition, not only inevident either to sense or reason, but likewise needless and impertinent. For I know no one argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the soul that doth in the least infer any necessity of praeexistence, but on the same accounts it will prove the souls eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to enquire into the nature of the soul considered in her self, our only way must be to finde out such peculiar properties in the soul of man, which cannot be salved on supposition there were nothing else but matter and motion in the world. Supposing then that all sensation in man doth arise from corporeal motion which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the highest conceptions which depend on sense can amount no higher then imagination, which is evident; if it can then be proved that there is a principle of action in man which proceeds in a different way of operation then sensation does, and that there are such operations of the soul which are not imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a principle in man higher then matter and motion. Now although it be a task sufficiently difficult to explain the manner of sensation its self in a meer mechanical way, supposing no higher principle then meer matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impossible without a spiritual or immaterial Being to salve such appearances in man which transcend the power of imagination; which will appear by these following operations of the mind which every one who hath it, may finde within himself.

1. Correcting the errors of imagination. For if all our perceptions were nothing else but the images of corporeal things left in the brain, the judgement of the mind must of necessity be according to the impressions which are made upon the organs of sense. But now if our minds can and do form apprehensions of things quite different from those which are conveyed by sense, there must be a higher principle of knowledge in man then imagination is. For which the common instance of the just magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judge according to the image which is conveyed to the brain by our eyes, we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger then p. 413he seems to us to be; nay though the sight be advantaged by the help of Telescopes, it cannot receive such an image or Idea of the Sun which answers to its just magnitude, viz that it is 160. times bigger then the earth. From whence now comes this apprehension of the bigness of the Sun above that proportion which can possibly come in at our senses? If it be said, that by the observation of the lessening of objects according to the proportion of distance, the mind may come to understand how much bigger the Sun may be then he seems, I grant it; but withall enquire how the imagination comes to have proportions and distances which are me…r respects, and can have no corporeal phantasmes whereby to be represented to it; so that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is some principle in man beyond imagination. Again when the mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far and sindes the Sun to be so great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the mind? the mind cannot six its self on any thing but it must have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantasmes; for none of them could ever convey the cue magnitude of the Sun to the mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea must be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of imagination, and is a principle above it. So in the sight of a stick, when under water, the representation of it by the sense to imagination is as crooked, for corporeal motion carries things to the eye without any judgement upon them; the eye conveyes the image to the brain, and according to the rules of corporeal perception must presently take every thing for true which is conveyed thither; now from what principle is it that this error of our senses is correcteà? So in many other things wherein our imaginations are quite puzled, and when we go according to them, it is impossible to apprehend things as our reason tells us they are; thus as to the Antipodes, our imaginations are wholly of the mind of the ancients, that the Antipodes to us must needs be in danger of knocking their heads against the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it must be their heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other Hemisphere is below us; these are pertinacious srrors of imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our reason which makes p. 414it evident to be otherwise. Besides, there are many things our reason and understanding inform us that they may be, and yet our imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an Epicurean Philosopher try the power of his imagination in his Inane or Infinite empty space, and he will soon finde, that as strong as his Phancy is, it will soon tire and retreat as not being able to course through so unimaginable a Space. So for eternal duration our reason tells us the thing is possible, but when our imaginations begin to fardle up some conceptions of it, they are presently tying both ends together; which will make a strange Idea of eternity; the case is the same in the infinite divisibility of quantity, which Epicurus was somewhat aware of when he denied the thing. But how many Mathematical Problems are there which will jade our imaginations presently, and yet our reason stands still and assures us of the possibility of the things, as in two lines coming nearer still to each other, and yet never meeting, and in many other things, which most clearly evidence that there is a higher faculty in man which exceeds matter and motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to supply the defects of imagination.

2. Reflex acts of the mind upon its self argue a higher principle then imagination. That there are such things are Sect. 18.evident to any one who hath any use of cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex acts; for he could not doubt whether he had or no, but by reflection upon himself. Now that reflex acts should be caused through matter and motion, or through meer imagination, is unconceivable. For we see no matter can act upon its self; indeed one part of extended matter may act upon another, but not purely upon its self; the extremities of the fingers can never feel themselves, though they may touch each other; neither can imagination reflect on its self; for that proceeding upon corporeal images, must have such a representation from the senses of what it acts upon; now what image of its self can be conveyed to the imagination through the external organs of sense? The eye may see through the motion of the objects of sight pressing upon it; but how can it see that it sees? so the imagination receives the images conveyed to the brain; but p. 415what shop hath it to make new ones in of its self, and so be guilty of the greatest Idolatry of worshipping its own Image? But though the imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we finde such a principle within us that is very apt to retire into its self, and recollect things which could never have been conserved so long in that shop of shadows the imagination. For if imagination be nothing else but as a modern Philosopher defines it, conception remaining, and a little and little decaying from and after the act of sense, like the motion of water after a Hobbs Hu… man. nature ch. 3. sect. 1.stone is thrown into it, how is it possible that at so great a distance of years, as we commonly finde, the image of a thing may be retrieved with as much facility and freshness as to circumstances, as if it were but new done? and that account which he gives of remembrance is very weak and insufficient when he tells us, that remembrance is nothing else but the missing of parts, which every man expecteth should succeed after Sect. 7.they have a conception of the whole. For according to this, it is impossible for the mind to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and so there cannot possibly be a recollecting of all circumstances, when an object is once passed, and the motion begins to decay. But all this while, we understand nothing by what means this decaying motion should continue so long as our memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once passed, can be recovered again if memory be nothing else but decaying motion. Such perplexities must needs arise, when men will undertake to salve the inward operations of the soul by meer motion; but is it not evident that many times when the mind is imployed about other things, some phantasmes of things long ago past will come and present themselves to the mind, with as much clearness as if new done? whereas if memory were decaying motion, the longer past, the more impossible would it be to recover any thing; but, do we not finde that many old men will better remember the circumstances of many things they did in their Childhood then a year or two before? Besides we see what quickness and vivacity there is in our intellectual faculties above corporeal motion, with what facility the mind turns it self from one object to another, how suddenly it rangeth the whole world, how it trips over mountains, crosseth the ocean, p. 416mounts to the skies and at last quarryes upon its self, and all in the twinkling of an Intellectual eye? As quick as the eye of the body is, the mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the imagination from attending the organs of sense; thus do men who have their minds much fixed, fix their eyes too; and yet afterwards can scarce tell themselves what they have looked on all that while. Sometimes the mind sits and compares phantasmes together, and sports its self in sorting them into several ranks and orders, and making matches between such things which are sure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called entia rationis or the creatures of the mind. And can all these and many other such operations which men are conscious to themselves of, be nothing else but the motion of some flegmatick matter, the reaction of the brain, and the meer effects of imagination?

3. The profound speculations of the mind argue a power far above imagination and corporeal motion. I wonder how Epicurus his soul, when if we believe him, it was made up of Atoms, could ever imagine an Infinite Vacuity? Could meer Atoms ever dispute whether they were Atoms or no? For I doubt not but Epicurus was fain to argue much against himself, before he could perswade himself to so stupendious a piece of folly? Were there nothing in man but meer corporeal motion, whence came the dispute, whether the soul were corporeal or no? Can Atoms frame Syllogismes in mood and figure? and meer matter argue pro and con, whether it be matter or something else? What kinde of aëreal particles were their souls compounded of, who first fancied themselves to be immaterial? What strange agitations of matter were those which first made men think of an eternal state? which thoughts have ever since so stuck upon these little sphaerical bodyes, that they could never yet disburden themselves of them: Whence come such amazing fears, such dreadful apprehensions, such sinking thoughts of their future condition in minds that would fain ease themselves by believing that death would put a period both to soul and body? whence on the other side come such encouraging hopes, such confident expectations, such comfortable prepossessions of their future state in the souls of good men, when their bodyes are p. 417nearest to the grave? Seneca who was somewhat dubious sometimes as to the future condition of the soul, yet could tell his dear Lucilius with what pleasure he could think of it; and could elsewhere say of the soul, E… hoc habet argumentum Pres. ad Quaest. Natur.divinitatis suae quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis interest sed ut suis: the soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was most pleased with Divine speculations, and conversed with them as with matters which nearly concerned it. And when it hath once viewed the dimensions of the heavens, contemnit domicilii prioris angustias, it was ashamed of the cottage it dwelt in; nay were it not for these speculations, non fuerat operae pr…tium nasci, it had not been worth while for the soul to have been in the body; and as he goes on, detrahe hoc inaestimabile bonum, non est vita tanti ut sudem, ut aestuem. Could there be now so great an Epicurisme in contemplation, were the soul of man of Epicurus his mould, a meer complexion of Atoms? would dull and heavy matter ever have delighted to have searched so much into the causes of things, to have gone over the world in its speculations, and found more sweetness in knowledge, then the little Epicure the Bee tasts in his choicest flowers? Epicurus his own Philosophy is a demonstration against himself; if his soul had not been of a purer nature then he fancied, he would never have made his study of Philosophy a part of his Epicurisme? Had his soul been such Atoms, as he fancied, when his brain had been well heated at his study, those more vivid and spirituous particles, like the spirits of wine had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpish matter to compleat his work. Of all persons, I most admire that Philosophers who make so much use of their understandings, should so ungratefully requite them, and serve them like old horses, when they have made them do all the service they could, turn them into the highwayes and let them dye in a ditch. But yet all Philosophers have not been so unthankful; some have understood the worth of their souls and asserted it, if they have not used too high, i. e. Platonical expressions of it, making it a particle not of matter, but of the Divine nature its self, a little Deity in a Cottage, that stayes here a while and returns p. 418to that upper region from whence it came. As Manilius speaks,

An dubium est habitare Deum sub pectore nostro,

In coelum que redire animas, caelóque venire?Manil. l 4.

And while the soul is here in its cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighting to look out now at this part, and then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe; as the same Poet goes on

Quid mirum noscere mundum

Si possunt homines, quibus est & mundus in ip sis:

Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parvâ?

The soul hath nothing more delightful to it then knowledge, and no knowledge so pleasing and satisfactory as of him whose image and superscription it bears, who makes himself most known to such as enquire after him;

Seque ipsum inculcat & offert

Ut bene cognosci possit.

I conclude this with that of Seneca in that excellent Preface to his natural questions; O quam contempta res est homo nisi supra humana se erexerit! What a pittiful thing is man, were it not that his soul was apt to soar above these earthly things? And by this aptness to soar so high above these terrene objects, and to converse with so much freedome with spiritual Beings, as well as abstracted notions, we may certainly infer that our rational souls are of a far more noble and refined nature, then that more feculent principle of imagination which alwayes converses in faece Romuli, and can go no further then our senses carry it. And thus I have made good the first proof, that there is something above matter and motion in the world, which is from that immaterial Being which is in man.Sect. 19. 2.

The next evidence which we have of a Being above matter p. 419and motion, is from the extraordinary eff…cts which have been in nature. I speak not now meerly of such things which by their natures and effects are manifested to proceed from some Beings which bear ill-will to mankind, multitudes of which are related by men Philosophical and inquisitive, with such enumerations of circumstances, and particular evidences, that they are not meer impostures, that one may on the same grounds question any matter of fact which himself did not see, as such relations which are delivered by persons without interest or design, and such as were able to judge of the truth of circumstances; such are both ancient and modern Philosophers, Physitians, Statesmen and others. Neither shall I insist on such prodigies which ofttimes presage revolutions in states, if we believe Machiavel himself, who in a whole chapter designedly proves it; and professeth himself utterly Disput l. 1. cap. 56.to seek for the causes of them, unless they may be attributed to some spi…its and Intelligences in the air which give the world notice of such things to come. But those things which I suppose have the most clear and undoubted evidence of true and undoubted miracles, (the matters of fact being affirmed by eye-witnesses who sealed the truth of them with their lives) are those recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two wayes to evade, either by questioning the truth of the things, which I suppose in the precedent book we have proved with as much rational evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or else that the things therein recorded might be salved without a Deity. For which only two wayes have been excogitated by Atheistical spirits, either attributing them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and absurd opinion have been taken away by those many writers, who have rationally consuted the whole art of judicial Astrology; or V. D. H. Mores Mystery of Godl. l. 7. ch. 14, 15, 16, 17.else that they are done by the meer power of imagination, which is the way of Avicenna and some other Arabick writers, which is so wilde an effect of the power of imagination, that nothing doth so much demonstrate the irregular motions of it, as such an opinion doth; and is sufficiently derided and refuted by Pomponatius himself. p. 420Now then it being an acknowledged principle in nature, that every thing continues in the course it is in, till something more powerful put it out, if then such things have been in the world, which have been real alterations of the course of nature, as the Suns standing still in the time of Joshua, then there must be something above matter and motion, and consequently that there is a God.