The Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome, Part 6
VI. Of Merits and Good Works.
FOR the true stating this Controversy, we are to observe;
1. That we do not charge those of the Church of Rome, That they believe Christ's Death and Passion to be ineffectual and insignificant, and that they have no dependence on the Merits of his Sufferings, or the Mercy of God for attaining Salvation; but that they are to be saved only by their own Merits and Good Works; as the Misrepresenter saith, Pag. 12.
2. We do not charge them with denying the necessity of Divine Grace in order to Merit; or with asserting that they can merit independently thereupon.
3. We do by no means dispute about the Necessity of Good Works, in order to the Reward of another Life; or assert that Christ's Merits will save Men without working out their own Salvation; but do firmly believe, that God will judg Men according to their Works.
The Question then is, Whether the Good Works of a just Man, as our Author expresses it, are truly meritorious of Eternal Life? Which he affirms, but qualifies with saying, That they proceed from Grace, and that Pag. 13.through God's Goodness and Promise, they are truly meritorious. But the Council of Trent denounces an Anathema against those who deny the Good Works of justified Concil. Trident. Sess. 6. Can. 32.Persons, to be truly meritorious of the increase of Grace, and of Eternal Life.
Here then lies the Point in difference, (1.) Whether such Good Works can be said to be truly meritorious? (2.) Whether those who deny it, deserve an Anathema for so doing? As to what relates to God's Acceptance and Allowance, and his Goodness and Promise, we freely own all that he saith about it; and if no more be meant, what need an Anathema about this matter? There must therefore be something beyond this, when Good Works are not only said to be truly meritorious, but we are cursed if we do not say the same.
To make any thing truly meritorious, we must suppose these Conditions requisite.
1. That what we pretend to merit by, be our own free Act.
2. That it be not defective.
3. That there be an Equality between it, and the Reward due to it.
4. That there be an Obligation in point of Justice, to give that Reward to him that doth it.
And from these Considerations, we deny that, Good Works, even of justified Persons, can be truly meritorious.
1. It is granted by themselves, That what is truly meritorious, must be a free Act of the Person who doth it. Now the Good Works of Justified Persons cannot Meritum est Actio libera cui Merces debetur ex justitiâ. Coster. Enchirid. de Merit is bo…. Oper. c. 7.be said to be their own free Acts, if the Power of doing them depend upon Divine Assistance, and there was an antecedent Obligation upon them to perform them: So that they can do nothing but what they are bound to, as God's Creatures; and their very Power of doing it is from the Grace of God. If Men pretended to merit at anothers hands by what God gives, there were some colour for it; but to merit from God himself by what he gives us, seems very incongruous. If I owe a Man an 100 l. and another knowing me unable to pay it, gives me so much to pay the Debt, this is no more In quantum homo propriâ voluntate facit id quod debet, meretur apud Deum, alioquin reddere debitum non esset mer…torum. Aquin. 1, 2. qu. 114, artic. 1. resp. ad 1.than what may be called strict Payment, as to the Creditor; but if the Creditor himself gives me this 100 l. to pay himself with, will any Man call this strict Payment? He may call it so himself, if he pleases, but that only shews his Kindness and Favour; but it doth not look very modestly or gratefully, for the Debtor to insist upon it as true legal Payment. Just so it is in good Works done by the power of God's Grace, which we could never have done without it; and therefore such cannot be truly Meritorious.
2. What is truly meritorious must not be defective; because the Proportion is to be equal between the Act, and the Reward due to it; which being perfect, requires that there be no Defect in the Acts which merit it. But this can never be said of Good Works of Justified Persons, that they have no Defects in them. We do not say, they are not Good Works, but they are not exact and perfect: for altho the Grace of God, as it comes from him, be a perfect Gift; yet as it acts upon Mens Minds, it doth not raise them to such a degree, but that they have Imperfections in their best Actions. And whatever is defective, is faulty; whatever is faulty, must be forgiven; whatever needs forgiveness, cannot be truly meritorious. But not only their Good Works are defective; but if they would merit, they ought to have none but Good Works, whereas the mixture of others renders the good uncapable of being meritorious, because there is so much to be pardoned, as takes away all claim of Merit in the good they perform. And themselves do not pretend, that Men can merit the Grace of Remission; but it is very strange that those who cannot deserve to be forgiven, should deserve to have an infinite Reward bestowed upon them.
3. There must be an exact Proportion between the Meritum se habět ad praemium sicut pretium ad illud quod emitur. Altisiodor. l. 3. tr. 12. Absoluta aequalitas inter mercedem & meritum ponitur per modum Justitiae commutativae. Bell. Justif. l. 5. …. 14.Act and the Recompence: for to merit, is to pay a Price for a thing; and in such Acts of commutative Justice, there must be an Equality of one thing with another. But what Equality can there be between the imperfect Good Works of the best Men, and the most perfect Happiness of another World? especially when that consists in the fruition of the Beatifical Vision? For what Proportion can there be between our Acts towards God, and God's Acts towards the Blessed in Heaven? Let the Acts be of what Person soever, or of what Nature soever, or from what Principle soever; as long as they are the Acts of finite imperfect Creatures, it is impossible there should be any Equality, or exact Proportion between them and the Eternal Favour of God, which is the Reward promised.
4. Where Acts are truly meritorious, there follows an Obligation of strict Justice, to pay the Recompence due to them. But what strict Justice can there be between the Creator and his Creatures, to recompence the Service they are bound to perform; when their very Being, Power to act, Assistance in acting, and Recompence for it, are all from his Bounty and Goodness? But our Author would avoid all this, by saying, that though Good Works are truly meritorious; yet it is through the Merits of Christ, and as they proceed from Grace, and through his Goodness and Promise that they are so; i. e. they are truly meritorious, because it appears from all these things they neither are, nor can be meritorious. For,
(1.) How come the Merits of Christ to make Good Works truly meritorious? Are the Merits of Christ imputed to those Good Works? Then those Good Works must be as meritorous as Christ's own Works; which I suppose he will not assert. Or, is it that Christ hath merited the Grace whereby we may merit? But even this will not make our personal Acts truly meritorious; and the nature of Merit relates to the Acts, and not to the Power.
(2.) How comes the Power of Grace to make them truly meritorious; when the Power of Grace doth so much increase the Obligation on our side? If it be said, That the state of Grace puts Men into a Capacity to merit: we might more reasonably infer the contrary, that it puts them out of a Capacity of meriting; because the Remission of Sins, and the Favour of God, are things for which we can never make him any Recompence.
(3.) How comes a Divine Promise to make Acts truly meritorious? For God's Promise is an Act of meer Kindness, which is very different from strict Justice: and although by the Promise God binds himself to performance; yet how come those Acts to be more meritorious of Heaven, than the Acts of Repentance are of Remission of Sins? Yet none will now say, that there can be any Acts meritorious of that. Yet certainly there is as clear a Promise of Pardon upon Repentance, as there is of Heaven upon Good Works: and if the Promise in the other case, doth not make Repentance meritorious of Pardon; how can it make Good Works truly meritorious of Eternal Life? But notwithstanding, we do not deny God's Fidelity to his Promise may be called Justice; and so God, as a Righteous Judg, may give a Crown of Rightcousness 2 Tim. 4. 8.to all that follow St. Paul's Example, without making Good Works to be truly meritorious.