Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Discourse · Chapter 10

Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity · Discourse · Chapter 10

p. 230CHAP. X. The Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason answer'd.

HAving in the foregoing Chapters endeavour'd to clear the Doctrine of the Trinity from the Charge of Contradictions, and to prove it agreeable to the Sense of Scripture, and the Primitive Church;

I now come in the last place to Examine the remaining Objections, in Point of Reason; and those are,

1. That this Doctrine is said to be a Mystery, and therefore above Reason, and we cannot in reason be obliged to believe any such thing.

2. That if we allow any such Mysteries of Faith as are above Reason, there can be no stop put to any absurd Doctrines, but they may be receiv'd on the same Grounds

1. As to this Doctrine being said to be above Reason, and therefore not to be believ'd; we must consider two things;

1. What we understand by Reason;

2. What ground in Reason there is, to reject any Doctrine above it, when it is proposed as a Matter of Faith.

p. 2311. What we understand by Reason. I do not find that our Vnitarians have explained the Nature and Bounds of Reason in such manner, as those ought to have done, who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But sometimes they speak of clear and distinct Perceptions, sometimes of natural Ideas, Answer to my Sermon p. 4. Letter of Resolution, p. 3.sometimes of congenit Notions, &c. But a late Author hath endeavour'd to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear; and to be sure to do so, he begins with telling us,Christianity not Mysterious, p. 8, 9. That Reason is not the Soul abstractedly consider'd; (no doubt of it) but the Soul acting in a peculiar manner is Reason. (And this is a ver… peculiar way of explaining it) But farther we are told, It is not the Order or Report (respect I suppose) which is naturally between all things. (But that implies a Reason in things.) But the thoughts which the Soul forms of things according to it, may properly claim that Title, i. e. such thoughts which are agreeable to the Reason of things are reasonable thoughts. This is clear and distinct. And I perfectly agree with him, That our own Inclinations, or the bare Authority of others is not Reason. But what is it? Every one experiences in himself a Power, or Faculty of form…ng various p. 232Ideas, or Perceptions of things; of affirming, or denying according as he sees them to agree or disagree, and this is Reason in General It is not the bare receiving Ideas into the Mind, that is strictly Reason, (who ever thought it was?) but the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas in a greater of lesser Number; wherein soever this Agreement or Disagreement may consist. If the Perception be immediate without the Assistance of any other Idea, this is not call'd Reason, but Self-Evidence: but when the mind makes use of intermediate Ideas to discover that Agreement or Disagreement, this method of Knowledge is properly call'd Reason or Demonstration. And so Reason is defined to be that Faculty of the Soul, which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious, or obscure by comparing it with something evidently known.

This is offer'd to the World, as an Account of Reason; but to shew how very loose, and unsatisfactory it is, I desire it may be consider'd, that this Doctrine supposes, that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our Minds, and that the only Way to attain this certainty, is by comparing these Ideas together. Which p. 233excludes all certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas. But if there are many things of which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them; if those Ideas we have, are too imperfect and obscure to form our Judgments by; if we cannot find out sufficient intermediate Ideas; then this cannot be the Means of Certainty, or the Foundation of Reason.

But I shall keep to our present Subject; and our certainty of it in Point of Reason, depends upon our Knowledge of the the Nature of Substance, and Person and the Distinction between them: but if we can have no such clear Ideas in our Minds concerning these things, as are required from Sensation, or Reflection; then, either we have no use of Reason about them, or it is in sufficient to pass any Judgment concerning them.

1. I begin with the Notion of Substance. And I have great Reason to begin with it; for, according to this Man's Principles there can be no certainty of Reason at all about it. And so our new Way of Reason is advanced to very good Purpose. For we may talk and dispute about Substance, as long as we please, but, if his Principles of Reason be true, we can come p. 234to no certainty; since we can have no clear Idea in our Minds concerning it, as will appear from his own Words; and the method he proceeds in.

Chap. I.(1.) He saith, That the Mind receives in Ideas two ways. 1. By Intermission of the Senses, as Colours, Figures, Sounds, Smells, &c. 2. By the Souls considering its own Operations about what it thus gets from without, as knowing, doubting, affirming, denying, &c.

(2.) That these simple and distinct Ideas, thus laid up in the great Repository of the Vnderstanding, are the sole matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning.

Then it follows, That we can have no Foundation of Reasoning, where there can can be no such Ideas from Sensation, or Reflection.

Now this is the Case of Substance; it is not intromitted by the Senses, nor depends upon the Operations of the Mind; and so it cannot be within the compass of our Reason. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.Human understanding, l. 1. chap. 4. sect. 18. For they not only tell us. That we can have no Idea of it by Sensation or Reflection; but that nothing is signified by p. 235it, only an uncertain Supposition of we know not what. And therefore it is parallel'd, more than once,L. 2. c. 13. sect. 19. with the Indian Philosophers, He knew not what; which supported the Torto…se,Chap. 23. sect. 2. that supported the Elephant, that supported the Earth; so Substance was found out only to support Accidents. And, that when we talk of Substances we talk like Children, who being ask'd a Question, about somewhat which they know not, readily give this satisfactory Answer, that it is Something.

If this be the truth of the Case, we must still talk like Children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For, if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Substance, we can have no Principle of certainty to go upon in this Debate.

I do not say, that we can have a clear Idea of Substance, either by Sensation or Reflection; but from hence I argue, that this is a very insufficient Distribution of the Ideas necessary to Reason. For besides these, there must be some general Ideas, which the mind doth form, not by meer comparing those Ideas it has got from Sense or Reflection; but by forming distinct general Notions, of things from particular Ideas. And among these general Notions, or rational Ideas, Substance p. 236is one of the first; because we find that we can have no true Conceptions of any Modes or Accidents (no matter which) but we must conceive a Substratum, or Subject wherein they are. Since it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves, and therefore the Rational Idea of Substance is one of the first, and most natural Ideas in our minds.

But we are still told, That our Vnderstanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Sensation or Reflection. L. 2. ch. 1. sect. 5.And that, herein chiefly lies the Excellency of mankind, above Brutes, that these cannot abstract, and inlarge their Ideas as men do.

But how comes the general Idea of Substance, to be framed in our Minds? Is this by Abstracting and inlarging simple Ideas? No, but it is by a Complication of many simple Ideas together: because not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, L 2. ch. 23. sect. 1.we accustom our selves to suppose some Substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call Substance. And is this all indeed, that is to be said for the being of Substance, that we accustom our selves to suppose a Substratum? Is that Custom grounded upon true Reason or not? If not, p. 237then Accidents or Modes, must subsist of themselves, and these simple Ideas need no Tortoise to support them: For Figures and Colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for some Fancies men have accustomed themselves to. If it be grounded on plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection; and so we may be certain of some things which we have not by those Ideas.

The Idea of Substance, we are told again, is nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, which according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under, or upholding. But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the word is used in another sense by the best Authors, such as Cicero and Quintilian, who take Substance for the same with Essence; as Valla hath proved;Valla Disput. Dial. l. 1. c. 6. and so the Greek word imports; but Boethius in translating Aristotle's Predicaments, rather chose the word Substance as more proper, to …xpress a Compound Being, and reserved Essence, for what was more simple and immaterial. And in p. 238this Sense, Substance was not applied to God but only Essence, as S. Augustine observes, but afterwards, the names of Substance, and Essence were promiscuously used, with respect to God and his Creatures. And do imply, that which makes the Real Being, as distinguished from Modes and Properties. And so the Substance, and Essence of a Man are the same; not being taken for the individual Substance, which cannot be understood without particular Modes and Properties; but the general Substance, or Nature of Man abstractly from all the Circum…ances of Persons.

And I desire to know, whether according to true Reason, that be not a clear Idea of a Man; not of Peter, Iames or Iohn, but of a Man as such. This is not a meer universal Name, or Mark, or Sign; but there is as clear and distinct a Conception of this in our Minds, as we can have from any such simple Ideas, as are convey'd by our Senses. I do not deny that the Distinction of particular Substances, is by the several Modes and Properties of them, (which they may call a Complication of simple Ideas if they please) but I do assert, that the general Idea, which relates to the Essence without these p. 239is so just, and true an Idea, that without it the Complication of simple Ideas, will never give us a right Notion of it.

I must do that Right to the ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Vnderstanding (from whence these Notions are borrowed to serve other Purposes than he intended them) that he makes the Case of Spiritual, and Corporeal Substances to be alike, as to their Idea's, and that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit, as we have of a Body, the one being supposed to be the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without, Chap. 23. sect. 5.and the other of those Operations we find within our selves. And that it is as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we cannot know its Essence, as 'tis called, or have no Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we know not its Essence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Substance.

From hence it follows, That we may be certain, that there are both Spiritual and Bodily Substances, although we can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them. But, if our Reason depend upon our clear and distinct Idea's; how is this possible? We cannot reason without clear Ideas, and yet we may be certain without them: Can we be certain without Reason? Or doth our p. 240Reason give us true Notions of things, without these Idea's? If it be so, this new Hypothesis about Reason must appear to be very unreasonable.

Let us suppose this Principle to be true, That the simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning: I ask then, how we come to be certain, that there are Spiritual Substances in the World, since we can have no clear and distinct Ideas concerning them? Can we be certain without any Foundation of Reason? This is a new sort of Certainty, for which we do not envy these Pretenders to Reason. But methinks, they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these Ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them. If there be any other method, they overthrow their own Principle; if there be none, how come they to any Certainty, that there are both Bodily and Spiritual Substances?

As to these latter (which is my business) I must enquire farther, how they come to know that there are such. The Answer is by Self-Reflection, on those Powers we find in our selves, which cannot come from a mere Bodily Substance. I allow p. 241he Reason to be very good, but the Question I ask is, whether this Argument be from the clear and distinct Idea or not? We have Ideas in our selves of the several Operations of our Minds of Knowing, Willing, Considering, &c. which cannot come from a Bodily Substance. Very true; but is all this contained in the simple Idea of these Operations? How can that be, when the same Persons say, that notwithstanding their Ideas it is possible for Matter to Think. For it is said,Humane Underst. I. 4. ch. 3. That we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks or not; Sect. 6. 2d. Ed. p. 310it being impossible for us by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency hath not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a Power to perceive or think. If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking; Matter may have a Power of Thinking: and if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a Spiritual Substance in us, from the Idea of Thinking: For how can we be assured by our Ideas, that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking, to Matter so disposed as our Bodies are? Especially since it is said, That in respect of our Notions, it is not p. 242much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should super-add to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking. Whoever asserts this, can never prove a Spiritual Substance in us, from a Faculty of Thinking; because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter so disposed cannot Think. And he cannot be certain that God hath not framed the matter of our Bodies, so as to be capable of it.

It is said indeed elsewhere, That it is repugnant to the Idea of Sensless Matter, Book. IV. Chap. 10. sect. 5.that it should put into it self Sense, Perception and Knowledge: But this doth not reach the present Case; which is not what Matter can do of it self, but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do. And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have none from the Ideas; for those are given up in this Case; and consequently, we can have no certainty upon these Principles, whether we have any Spiritual Substance within us or not.

But we are told, That from the Operations of our Minds, Book. II. Chap. 23. sect. 15.we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit. How can p. 243that be, when we cannot from those Ideas be assured, but that those Operations may come from a material Substance. If we frame an Idea on such Grounds, it is at most but a possible Idea; for it may be otherwise; and we can have no Assurance from our Ideas, that it is not: So that the most men may come to in this way of Idea's is, That it is possible it may be so, and it is possible it may not; but that it is impossible for us from our Ideas, to determine either way. And is not this an admirable Way to bring us to a certainty of Reason?

I am very glad to find the Idea of a Spiritual Substance made as consistent, and intelligible, as that of a Corporeal; for as the one consists of a Cohesion of solid Parts, and the Power of communicating Motion by impulse, so the other consists in a Power of Thinking, and Willing, and moving the Body; and that the Cohesion of solid Parts, is as hard to be conceived as Thinking; and we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by impulse, Sect. 27.as in the Power of exciting Motion by thought. We have by daily experience clear Evidence of Motion produced, both by Impulse and by Thought; but the manner how, Sect. 28.hardly comes within our Comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both.

p. 244From whence if follows, That we may be certain of the Being of a Spiritual Substance, although we have no clear and distinct Idea of it, nor are able to comprehend the manner of its Operations: And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas; and that they have Reason to reject any Doctrine which relates to Spiritual Substances, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive Men, about the manner of Operation, both in material, and immaterial Substances. It is affirmed, That the very Notion of Body, Sect. 31.implies, something very hard, if not impossible to be explained, or understood by us; and that the natural Consequence of it, viz. Divisibility; involves us in Difficulties impossible to be explicated, or made consistent. That we have but some few Superficial Ideas of things; Sect. 32.that we are destitute of Faculties, to attain to the true Nature of them; and that when we do that, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity; and can discover nothing farther, but our own Blindness and Ignorance.

These are very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of humane p. 245Understanding, with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things, which we are most certain of the Being of, by constant and undoubted Experience. I appeal now to the Reason of mankind, whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine proposed to us, as of Divine Revelation, because we cannot comprehend the manner of it; especially, when it relates to the Divine Essence. For as the same Author observes,Sect. 33, 34, 35. Our Idea of God is framed from the Complex Ideas of those Perfections we find in our selves, but inlarging them so, as to make them suitable to an infinite Being, as Knowledge, Power, Duration, &c. And the Degrees or Extent of these which we ascribe to the Soveraign Being, are all boundless and infinite. Sect. 36.For it is infinity, which joyned to our Ideas of Existence, Power, Knowledge, &c. makes that Complex Idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the Supreme Being.

Now, when our Knowledge of gross material Substances is so dark; when the Notion of Spiritual Substances is above all Ideas of Sensation; when the higher any Substance is, the more remote from our Knowledge; but especially when the p. 246very Idea of a Supreme Being implies its being Infinite, and Incomprehensible, I know not whether it argues more Stupidity, or Arrogance to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it. But of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reason, from clear and distinct Ideas: and if we can attain to Certainty without them, and where it is confessed we cannot have them; as about Substances: then these cannot be the sole Matter and Foundation of our Reasoning, which is so peremptorily asserted by this late Author.

But I go yet farther: and as I have already shew'd, we can have no certainty of an Immaterial Substance within us, from these simple Ideas; so I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient Evidence, brought from them by their own Confession, concerning the Existence of the most Spiritual and infinite Substance, even God himself.

We are told, That the Evidence of it is equal to Mathematical Certainty; Book IV. chap. 10. sect. 1.and very good Arguments are brought to prove it, in a Chapter on purpose: but that which I take notice of is, that the Argument from the clear and distinct Idea p. 247of God is passed over. How can this be consistent with deducing our Certainty of Knowledge from clear and simple Ideas? I do not go about to justifie those, who lay the whole stress upon that Foundation; which I grant to be too weak to support so important a Truth; and that those are very much to blame, who go about to invalidate other Arguments for the sake of that; but I doubt all this Talk about clear and distinct Ideas, being made the Foundation of Certainty, came Originally from those Discourses, or Meditations, which are aimed at. The Author of them was an ingenious, Thinking man, and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of Certainty, as well as he could. The first thing he found any certainty in, was his own Existence; which he founded upon the Perception of the Acts of his Mind, which some call an Internal, infallible Perception that we are. From hence he proceeded, to enquire, how he came by this Certainty, and he resolved it into this, that he had a clear and distinct Perception of it; and from hence he formed his general Rule, That what he had a clear and distinct Perception of was true. Which in Reason ought to go no farther, than where there is the like Degree of Evidence: for p. 248the Certainty here, was not grounded on the clearness of the Perception, but on the Plainness of the Evidence Which is of that Nature, that the very Doubting of it proves it; since it is impossible, that any thing should doubt or question its own Being, that had it not. So that here it is not the Clearness of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true ground of Certainty. And this cannot extend to things without our selves; of which we can have no other Perception, than what is caused by the Impressions of outward Objects. But whether we are to judge according to those Impressions, doth not depend on the Ideas themselves, but upon the Exercise of our Judgment and Reason about them, which put the Difference between true and false, and adequate, and inadequate Ideas. So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves, but from the Evidence of Reason, that those Ideas are true, and just, and consequently that we may build our Certainty upon them.

But the Idea of an infinite Being hath this peculiar to it, that necessary Existence is implied in it. This is a clear and distinct Idea, and yet it is denied, that this doth prove the Existence of God. p. 249How then can the Grounds of our Certainty arise from clear and distinct Ideas; when in one of the clearest Ideas of our Minds we can come to no Certainty by it? I do not say, That it is denied to prove it; but this is said, That it is a doubtful thing from the different make of mens Tempers and Application of their thoughts. Sect. 7.What can this mean, unless it be to let us know, that even clear and distinct Ideas, may lose their Effect by the difference of mens Tempers and Studies; so that besides Ideas, in order to a right Judgment, a due Temper and Application of the mind is required.

And wherein is this different, from what all men of Understanding have said? Why then should these clear and simple Ideas be made the sole Foundation of Reason? One would think by this, that these Ideas would presently satisfie mens Minds, if they attended to them. But even this will not do, as to the Idea of an infinite Being. It is not enough to say, They will not examine how far it will hold: for they ought either to say, that it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas.

But instead of the proper Argument from Ideas, we are told,Sect. 6. That from the p. 250Consideration of our selves, and what we find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth; that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being. All which I readily yield; but we see plainly, the Certainty is not placed in the Idea, but in good and sound Reason from the Consideration of our selves and our Constitutions. What! in the Idea of our Selves? No certainly; for let our Idea be taken which way we please, by Sensation or Reflection, yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in, and about our Selves.

Sect. 5.But we find in our selves Perception and Knowledge. It's very true; but how doth this prove that there is a God? It is from the clear and distinct Idea of it. No, but from this Argument: That either there must have been a knowing Being from Eternity, or an unknowing; for something must have been from Eternity: but if an unknowing, then it was impossible there ever should have been any knowledge; it being as impossible, that a thing without knowledge should produce it, as that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones. Allowing the Argument to be p. 251good, yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from Principles of true Reason; as That no man can doubt his own Perception; that every thing must have a Cause; that this Cause must either have Knowledge or not: if it have, the Point is gained; if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and consequently, a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing.

Again, If we suppose nothing to be first, Sect. 10.Matter can never begin to be; if bare Matter without Motion eternal, Motion can never begin to be; if Matter and Motion be supposed Eternal, Thought can never begin to be. For, if Matter could produce thought, then Thought must be in the power of Matter; and if it be in Matter as such, it must be the inseparable Property of all matter; which is contrary to the Sense and Experience of mankind. If only some parts of Matter have a power of Thinking, how comes so great a difference in the Properties of the same Matter? What disposition of Matter is required to thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no account can be given in Reason.

This is the Substance of the Argument used, to prove an infinite spiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of; but that which I design, is to shew▪ p. 252That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it, which was the thing I intended to prove.

2. The next thing necessary to be clear'd in this Dispute is, the Distinction between Nature and Person, and of this we can have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection. And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the grounds of Identity and Distinction. But that these come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, I shall now make it appear;

1. As to Nature, That is sometimes taken for the Essential Property of a thing, as when we say, that such a thing is of a different Nature from another, we mean no more than that it is differenced by such Properties as come to our Knowledge. Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are; and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance, which had the Principles of Motion in it self: but Nature and Substance p. 253are of an equal extent; and so that which is the Subject of Powers, and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances. I grant, that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves. So that the Nature of things propery belongs to our Reason, and not to meer Ideas.

But we must yet proceed farther. For, Nature may be consider'd two ways.

1. As it is in distinct Individuals, as the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, Iames, and Iohn; and this is the common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them. For the Nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature, as it is in Iames and Iohn; otherwise, they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this Distinction of Persons in them is discerned both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence; not coming into it at once and in the same manner.

2. Nature may be consider'd Abstractly, without respect to individual Persons, p. 254and then it makes an entire Notion of it self. For however, the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same: which appears from this evident Reason; that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.

Let us now see, how far these things can come from our simple Ideas, by Reflection and Sensation. And I shall lay down the Hypothesis of those, who resolve our Certainty into Ideas, as plainly, and intelligibly, as I can.

1. We are told, That all simple Ideas are true and adequate. Humane Underst. l. 2. ch. 30, 31.Not, that they are the true Representation of things without us; by that they are the true Effects of such Powers in them, as produce such Sensations within us. So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us.

2. All our Ideas of Substances are imperfect and inadequate; because they refer to the real Essences of things, of which we are Ignorant, and no man knows what Substance is in it self: And they are all false, Chap. 32. sect. 18.when look'd on as the Representations of the unknown Essences of things.

Book 3. Chap. 3. sect. 6.3. Abstract Ideas are only general Names, made by separating Circumstances of time p. 255and place, &c. from them, which are only the Inventions, and Creatures of the Vnderstanding.

4. Essence may be taken two ways. 1. For the real, internal, Ib. sect. 15.unknown Constitutions of things, and in this Sense it is understood as to particular things. 2. For the abstract Idea, and one is said to be the Nominal, the other the Real Essence. And the Nominal Essences only are immutable; Sect. 19, 20.and are helps to enable Men to consider things, and to discourse of them.

But two things are granted, which tend to clear this Matter.

1. That there is a Real Essence, which is the Foundation of Powers and Properties.

2. That we may know these Powers and Properties, although we are ignorant of of the Real Essence.

From whence I inferr.

1. That from those true and adequate Ideas, which we have of the Modes and Properties of Things, we have sufficient certainty of the Real Essence of them: For these Ideas are allow'd to be true; and either by them we may judge of the truth of things; or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our selves.

p. 256If our Ideas be only the Effects we feel of the Powers of things without us; yet our Reason must be satisfied, that there could be no such Powers, unless there were some real Beings which had them. So that either we may be certain by those Effects of the real Being of Things; or it is not possible, as we are framed, to have any certainty at all of any thing without our selves.

2. That from the Powers and Properties of things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Essence of Things, as those Powers and Properties discover. I do not say, That we can know all Essences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that belong to them: but if we can know so much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with such distinct Powers and Properties, what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not see the bare Essence of things. What is that bare Essence without the Powers and Properties belonging to it? It is that internal Constitution of things from whence those Powers and Properties flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Discoveries p. 257that have been yet made, that is a good Argument to prove the uncertainty of Philosophical Speculations about the Real Essences of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of such Essences. For although we cannot comprehend the internal Frame, or Constitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Substance; yet by them we certainly know that there are such Essences, and that they are distinguished from each other by their Powers and Properties.

3. The Essences of things as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them: For they are founded on the natural Constitution of things. And however the abstract Ideas are the work of the Mind; yet they are not meer Creatures of the Mind; as appears by an instance produced of the Essence of the Sun, being in one single Individual; in which Case it is granted,Book Chap. Sect. 1. That the Idea may be so abstracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is as much a Sort as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. So that here we have a Real Essence subsisting in one Individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the same Essence remaining. But in this one Sun there is a p. 258Real Essence, and not a meer Nominal or abstracted Essence: but suppose there were more Suns; would not each of them have the Real Essence of the Sun? For what is it makes the second Sun to be a true Sun, but having the same Real Essence with the first? If it were but a Nominal Essence, then the second would have nothing but the Name.

Therefore there must be a Real Essence in every individual of the same kind; for that alone is it, which makes it to be what it is. Peter, and Iames, and Iohn, are all true and real Men; but what is it which makes them so? Is it the attributing a general Name to them? No certainly, but that the true and Real Essence of a Man is in every one of them. And we must be as certain of this, as we are that they are Men; they take their Denomination of being Men from that common Nature, or Essence which is in them.

4. That the general Idea is not made from the simple Ideas by the meer Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances, but from Reason and Consideration of the true Nature of Things. For, when we see so many Individuals, that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence infer, that there must be something common p. 259to all, which makes them of one kind: and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them of one kind and not of another, must not be a Nominal, but Real Essence. And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substance, whereby Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds; for let them mistake in the Complication of their Ideas, either in leaving out, or putting in what doth not belong to them, and let their Ideas be what they please; the Real Essence of a Man, and a Horse, and a Tree, are just what they were: and let their Nominal Essences differ never so much, the Real common Essence, or Nature of the several Kinds are not at all alter'd by them.

And these Real Essences are unchangeable: For, however there may happen some variety in Individuals, by particular Accidents, yet the Essences of Men, and Horses, and Trees remain always the same; because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of Beings.

2. Let us now come to the Idea of a Person. For, although the common Nature in mankind be the same, yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from p. 260one another: So that Peter and Iames, and Iohn are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not Iames, and Iames is not Iohn. But what is this Distinction founded upon? They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to difference of Features, distance of Place, &c. but that is not all; for supposing there were no such external difference; yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual, and is not Communicable to another. An Individual, intelligent Substance, is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it; for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else of the Kind; and this is it which is called Personality.

But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them, the difference of Nature and Person? We may understand the difference between abstracted Ideas, and particular Beings, p. 261by the Impressions of outward Objects; and we may find an Intelligent Substance in our selves by inward Perception; …ut whether that make a Person or not, must be understood some other Way; for, if the meer Intelligent Substance makes a Person, then there cannot be the Union of two Natures, but there must be two Persons.

Therefore a Person is a compleat Intelligent Substance, with a peculiar manner of Subsistence; so that if it be a part of another Substance, it is no Person; and on this account the Soul is no Person, because it makes up an entire Being by its Union with the Body.

But when we speak of Finite Substances and Persons, we are certain that distinct Persons do imply distinct Substances, because they have a distinct and separate Existence; but this will not hold in an infinite Substance, where necessary Existence doth belong to the Idea of it. And although the Argument from the Idea of God, may not be sufficient of it self to prove his Being; yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him, which is inconsistent with necessary Existence; therefore, if we suppose a Distinction of Persons in the same Divine Nature, p. 262it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite Perfections of it. And no objection can be taken from the Idea of God, to overthrow a Trinity of Co-existing Persons in the same Divine Essence. For necessary Existence doth imply a Co-existence of the Divine Persons; and the Unity of the Divine Essence, that there cannot be such a difference of individual Substances, as there is among mankind. But these things are said to be above our Reason, if not contrary to it, and even such are said to be repugnant to our Religion.

2. That therefore is the next thing to be carefully Examin'd, whether Mysteries of Faith, or Matters of Revelation above our Reason, are to be rejected by us. And a Thing is said to be above our Reason, when we can have no clear and distinct Idea of it in our Minds: And, that if we have no Ideas of a thing, it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it; Christianity not Myst. p. 28.and that, if such Doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand, we must have new Powers, and Organs for the Perception of them.

We are far from defending Contradictions to our natural Notions (of which I have spoken already) but that which we are now upon is, whether any Doctrine p. 263may be rejected, when it is offer'd as a Matter of Faith upon this account, that it is above our Comprehension, or that we can have no clear Idea of it in our Minds. And this late Author hath undertaken to prove, That there is nothing so Mysterious, or above Reason in the Gospel.

To be above Reason, he saith, may be understood two ways. P. 67.1. For a thing Intelligible in it self, but cover'd with figurative and mystical Words. 2. For a thing in its own Nature unconceivable, and not to be judged of by our Faculties, tho' it be never so clearly revealed. This in either Sense is the same with Mystery. And from thence he takes occasion to shew his Learning about the Gentile Mysteries, and Ecclesiastical Mysteries, which might have been spared in this Debate, but only for the Parallel aimed at between them, as to Priest-craft and Mysteries; without which a Work of this nature would want its due relish with his good Christian Readers. Others we see have their Mysteries too; but the Comfort is, that they are so easily understood, and seen through; as when the Heathen Mysteries, are said, to have been instituted at first in Commemoration of some remarkable Accidents, P. 71.or to the Honour of some great Persons that obliged the p. 262duplicate page p. 263duplicate page p. 264World by their Vertues and useful Inventions to pay them such Acknowledgments. He must be very dull that doth not understand the meaning of this; and yet this Man pretends to vindicate Christianity from being Mysterious.

P. 73.But there are some, he saith, that being strongly inclined out of Ignorance, or Passion to maintain what was first introduced by the Craft or Superstition of their Forefathers, will have some Christian Doctrines to be still Mysteries in the second Sense of the Word; that is, unconceiveable in themselves, however clearly revealed. I hope there are still some, who are so throughly perswaded of the Christian Doctrine, that they dare own and defend it, notwithstanding all the Flouts and Taunts of a sort of Men, whose Learning and Reason lies most in exposing Priest-craft, and Mysteries. Suppose there are such still in the world, who own their Assent to some Doctrines of Faith, which they confess to be above their Comprehension, what mighty Reason, and invincible Demonstration is brought against them? He pretends to Demonstrate; but what I pray? The Point in hand? No. But he will Demonstrate something instead of it? What is that? Why truly, That in the p. 265New Testament Mystery is always used in the first Sense of the Word. And what then? Doth it therefore follow, that there are no Doctrines in the Gospel above the reach and comprehension of our Reason? But how doth it appear, that the Word Mystery is always used in that Sense? When S. Paul saith in his first Epistle to Timothy, Chap. 3. v. 9. That the Deacons must hold the Mystery of Faith in a pure Conscience; doth he not mean thereby the same with the Form of sound Words, which Timothy had heard of him, 2 Tim. 1.13. And are not all the main Articles of the Christian Faith comprehended under it? Especially that whereinto they were Baptized, in the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost: and if the Doctrine of the Trinity were understood by this Form, as I have already proved, then this must be a part of the Mystery of Faith. And in the same Chapter, v. 16. He makes God manifest in the Flesh; the first part of the Mystery of Godliness. If it extends to all the other things, doth it exclude this, which is the first mention'd? (And that our Copies are true, is already made to appear.) There is no Reason therefore to quarrel with our Use of the Word Mystery in this p. 266Sense; but the Debate doth not depend upon the Word, but upon the Sense of it.

And therefore I pass over all that relates to the bare use of the Word, as not coming up to the main Point; which is, Whether any Point of Doctrine, which contains in it something above our Comprehension can be made a Matter of Faith?

For our Author concludes from his Observations,P. 145. That Faith is so far from being an implicit Assent to any thing above Reason, that this Notion directly contradicts the end of Religion, the Nature of Man, and the Goodness and Wisdom of God.

But we must not be frighted with this bold Conclusion, till we have Examin'd his Premises; and then we shall find, that some who are not great Readers, are no deep Reasoners. The first thing he premises is, That nothing can be said to be a Mystery, because we have not an adequate Idea of it, P. 75.or a distinct View of all its Properties at once, for then every thing would be a Mystery. What is the meaning of this, but that we cannot have an adequate Idea of any thing? And yet all our Reason depends upon our Ideas according to him, and our clear and distinct Ideas are by him made the sole Foundation of Reason. All p. 267our simple Ideas are said to be adequate, because they are said to be only the Effects of Powers in things which produce Sensations in us. But this doth not prove them adequate as to the things, but only as to our Perceptions. But as to Substances we are told, That all our Ideas of them are inadequate. So that the short of this is, that we have no true Knowledge or Comprehension of any thing; but we may understand Matters of Faith, as well as we understand any thing else, for in Truth we understand nothing. Is not this a method of true Reasoning to make us reject Doctrines of Faith, because we do not comprehend them, and at the same time to say we comprehend nothing? For I appeal to the common Sense of mankind, whether we can be said to Comprehend that, which we can have no adequate Idea of? But he appeals to the Learned; for he saith, That to comprehend in all correct Authors is nothing else but to know. But what is to know? Is it not to have adequate Ideas of the things we know? How then can we know, that of which we can have no adequate Idea? For if our Knowledge be limited to our Ideas, our Knowledge must be imperfect and inadequate where our Ideas are so.

p. 268But let us lay these things together. Whatever we can have no adequate Idea of is above our Knowledge, and consequently above our Reason; and so all Substances are above our Reason; and yet he saith, with great Confidence, That to Assent to any thing, above Reason, destroys Religion, and the Nature of man, and the Wisdom and Goodness of God. How is it possible for the same man to say this, and to say w…thal, that it is very consistent with that Nature of man, and the Goodness and Wisdom of God, to leave us without adequate Ideas of any Substance? How come the Mysteries of Faith to require more Knowledge than the Nature of Man is capable of? In natural things we can have no adequate Ideas; but the things are confessed to be above our Reason; but in Divine and Spiritual things, to Assent to things above our Reason is against the Nature of man.

How can these things consist?

But these are not Mysteries. Yes, whatever is of that Nature that we can have no Idea of it, is certainly a Mystery to us. For what is more unknown than it is known is a Mystery. The true Notion of a Mystery being something that is hidden from our Knowledge. Of which there may be several Kinds. For a Mystery may be taken for,

p. 2691. Something kept secret, but fully understood as soon as it is discover'd; thus Tully in his Epistles speaks of Mysteries which he had to tell his Friend,Ad. Attic. 4.87. ed. R S. but he would not let his Amanuensis know; no doubt such things might be very well understood as soon as discover'd.

2. Something kept from common Knowledge, although there might be great Difficulties about them when discover'd. Thus Tully speaks of Mysteries among the Philosophers, Acad. 4.18.particularly among the Academicks, who kept up their Doctrine of the Criterion as a Secret, which, when it was known, had many Difficulties about it.

3. Something that Persons were not admitted to know, but with great Preparation for it. Such were the Athenian Mysteries which Tully mentions with Respect, although they deserved it not:De Leg. l. 2. c. 14. but because they were not Communicated to any but with Difficulty, they were called Mysteries. And this is so obvious a piece of Learning, that no great Reading, or deep Reasoning is required about it. Only it may be observed, that the Word foreign is opposed to foreign, and so the Mysteries related to those who were initiated and not made Epoptoe; i. e. to those who p. 270did not throughly understand them, although they had more knowledge of them than such as were not initiated. Olympiodorus, in reckoning up the Degrees of Admissions, mentions the foreign before foreign. So that they were properly Mysteries to such, who knew something; though there were other things farther to be discover'd, but they did not yet know what they were, as the Epoptoe did.

From hence the ancient Christian Writers did not only call the Sacraments, but more abstruse Points of Faith by the name of Mysteries; so S. Chrysostom calls the Resurrection, a great and ineffable Mystery. Chrys. Hom. de Resurrect.And Isidore Pelusiota in his Epistle to Lampetius saith,Isidor. Pelus. l. 2. Ep. 192. That S. Paul, when he speaks of the great Mystery of Godliness, doth not mean that it is wholly unknown to us, but that it is impossible to Comprehend it. Theophylact saith, it is therefore called the great Mystery of Godliness; because although it be now revealed to all, yet the manner of it is hidden from us, foreign, for this Reason it is called a Mystery.

But this is in the way of Reading; let us now come to deep Reasoning; and see how strongly he argues against this Sense of the Word Mysteries: his Words are these; They trifle then exceedingly, and p. 271discover a mighty Scarcity of better Arguments, who defend their Mysteries, Christianity not Myst. p. 80, 81.by this pitiful shift of drawing Inferences from what is unknown to what is known, or of insisting upon adequate Ideas; except they will agree as some do, to call every Spire of Grass, sitting and standing, fish and flesh to be Mysteries. And if out of a pertinacious or worse humour, they will be still fooling, and call these things Mysteries, I'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion, if they will allow me likewise to make mine as intelligible to others, as these are to me.

It is easie to guess whom these kind Words were intended for: And are not these very modest and civil Expressions? Trifling, Fooling; out of a pertinacious, or worse Humour; but why, Fooling about Mysteries, to call such things by that Name, which are in some measure known, but in a greater measure unknown to us? and if these are real Mysteries in Nature, why may not the same term be used for Matters of Faith?

And I think in so plain a Case, no great store of Arguments need to be used. But in these natural things, he saith,P. 84. we have distinct Ideas of the Properties which make the Nominal Essence, but we are absolutely ignorant of the Real Essence, or intrinsick p. 272Constitution of a thing, which is the ground or support of all its Properties. Are not then (without Trifling and Fooling) these Real Essences Mysteries to them? They know there are such by the Ideas of their Properties, but know nothing of their Real Essence; and yet they will not allow them to be Mysteries? If they do understand them, why do they say, They do not, nor cannot? And if this be true, let them call them what they please, they must be inexplicable Mysteries to them. So that all this is mere quarrelling about a Word, which they would fain be rid of, if they knew how; but they involve and perplex themselves more by their own deep Reasonings against the Trifling and Fooling of others.

But he saith, That some would have the most palpable Absurdities and gross Contradictions to go down, or words that signifie nothing, because men cannot comprehend the Essence of their own Souls, nor the Essence of God, and other Spiritual Substances. We utterly deny, that any Article of our Faith contains in it any palpable Absurdities, or gross Contradictions (as I hope hath been proved already as to the Doctrine of the Trinity which is chiefly struck at) but surely your deep Reasoners may find p. 273a difference between gross Contradictions to our Reason, and barely being above it, or not having any distinct Conception of the Nature of it. And that is all that we assert, and which they grant as to all Substances.

If this be their Way of arguing, they may even return to Transubstantiation again, without any great lessening of their Understandings. But none are so bold in attacking the Mysteries of the Christian Faith; as the Smatterers in Ideas, and new Terms of Philosophy, without any true Understanding of them. For these Ideas are become but another sort of Canting with such men; and they would reason as well upon Genus and Species, or upon Occult Qualities, and Substantial Forms, but only that they are Terms out of Fashion.

But we find that the change of Terms doth neither improve nor alter mens Understandings; but only their Ways of speaking; and ill Gamesters will not manage their Game one jot the better, for having new Cards in their hands. However, we must see what Work they make of it.

p. 274P. 86.Although we do not know the Nature of the Soul, yet we know as much of it, as we do of any thing else, if not more, i. e. we really know nothing by any adequate Idea of it, but we must believe nothing, but what we have a clear distinct Idea of. Is not this a rare way of fixing the Boundaries of Faith and Reason? As to God and his Attributes, P. 81.it is said, That they are not Mysteries to us for want of an adequate Idea; no not Eternity. And in another place, As to God, P. 88.we comprehend nothing better than his Attributes.

Let us try this, by the Attribute pitched on by himself; viz. Eternity. We see he pretends to comprehend nothing better than the Divine Attributes; and Eternity as well as any; (which I am very apt to believe) but how doth he Comprehend Eternity? Even by finding, That it cannot be Comprehended. P. 82.Is not this Subtle and deep Reasoning? But Reason he saith, performs its part in finding out the true Nature of Things; and if such be the Nature of the thing, that it cannot be Comprehended, then Reason can do no more, and so it is not above Reason. Was there ever such Trifling that pretended to Reason; and that about the highest Matters, and twith Scorn and Contempt of p. 275others whom he calls Mysterious Wits? The Question is, whether any thing ought to be rejected as an Article of Faith, because we cannot comprehend it, or have a clear and distinct Perception of it? He concludes it must be so, or else we overthrow Religion, and the Nature of Man, and the Wisdom and Goodness of God. Here is an Essential Attribute of God, viz. his Eternity. Am I bound to believe it or not? Yes, doubtless. But how can I comprehend this Attribute of Eternity? Very easily. How so? Do not you comprehend that it is incomprehensible? What then? Doth this reach the Nature of the thing, or only the manner of our Conception? If the Nature of the thing be, that it cannot be comprehended, then you rightly understand the Nature of the thing, and so it is not above your Reason. Let the Case be now put as to the Trinity; do you believe the Doctrine of it, as of Divine Revelation? No, God hath given me the Nature, and Faculties of a Man; and I can believe nothing, which I cannot have a distinct and clear Idea of; otherwise I must have new Faculties. Will you hold to this Principle? Then you must believe nothing, which you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of. Very true: p. 276But can you have a clear and distinct Idea of what you cannot comprehend? A clear Idea, is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident Perception. A distinct Idea, is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others. Is this right? Yes. But can you have a full and evident Perception of a thing, so as to difference it from all others, when you grant it to be Incomprehensible? If you have a full Perception of it, you comprehend its Nature, and especially if you can difference it from all other things; but when you say, its Nature is Incomprehensible, and yet believe it, you must deny it to be necessary to Faith, to have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing proposed. And if it be repugnant to your Faculties to reject the Trinity, because you cannot have a clear and distinct Idea of it, for the same Reason, you must unavoidably reject his Eternity, and all other Attributes which have Infinity joyned with them.

But we must stop here, because this admirable Undertaker hath said, That he despairs not of rendring Eternity, and Infinity as little Mysterious, P. 8….as that three and two make five. And till then I take my leave of him.

p. 277And so I return to our professed Vnitarians, who in answer to my Sermon fell upon the same Subject, and it is necessary that I consider so much, as tends to the clearing of it. In my Sermon I had urged this Argument to prove, that we may be bound to believe some things that are Incomprehensible to us, because the Divine Nature, and Attributes are acknowledged to be so; and I had said,

(1.) That there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the Trinity, and Incarnation, than there is of Eternity. Not but that there is great Reason to believe it, but from hence it appears, that our Reason may oblige us to believe some things, which it is not possible for us to comprehend.

And what say our Vnitarians to this?

They Charge my Notion of Eternity (as they call it) with a Contradiction.

The best way of proceeding will be to set down my own Words which are these. We know that either God must have been for ever,Answer 1… Serm. p. 5. or it is impossible he ever should be, for if he should come into being when he was not, he must have some Cause of his Being, and that which was the first Cause would be p. 278God. But if he was for ever, he must be from himself, and what Notion, or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it?

To this say they, To say a Person, or Thing is from it self is a Contradiction; it implies this Contradiction, it was before it was. And they are sorry an Eternal God must be a Contradiction. What a false and spiteful Inference is this?

But it had look'd like very deep Reasoning, if I had said, That God was the cause of himself. For, that would have implied the Contradiction he had charged it with: but I had expressly excluded his being from any Cause; and the thing I urged was only the Impossibility, of our having a clear and distinct Conception of Eternity. For, if he could have no Cause, what could we think of his being Eternal? If to be from himself as a Cause, be unconceivable, (as I grant it is) then it proves what I designed, that we cannot have any distinct Idea of Eternity. But to be from himself in the Sense generally understood, is a meer Negative Expression; for no Men were such Fools to imagine any thing could be before it self, and in this Sense only, Learned Men have told us, that it is to be understood by those ancient and modern p. 279Writers, who have used that Expression.Possevin. Appar. in Genebrard. As when S. Ierom saith, That God is self Originated; and S. Augustin, that God is the Cause of his own Wisdom; and Lactantius, that God made himself; all these and such like Expressions are only to be Negatively understood.

But I confess I aimed at shewing, that it was impossible for us to have any clear and distinct Idea of Eternity, and therefore I took in all possible ways of conceiing it, either by Gods being from himself, or his Co-existing with all differences of Time, without any Succession in his own Being; or his having a successive Duration. From all which I argued the Impossibility of a clear Notion of Eternity. And now what do these Men do? They dispute against one of these Notions, and very triumphantly expose, as they think, the Absurdities of it. And what then? Why then this Notion will not do. But I say none will do.

I prove there can be no successive Duration in a Being of necessary Existence; and that it is not to be conceived, how without Succession God should be present with the Being, and not Being, the Promise and Performance of the same thing; and yet one of these ways we must make p. 280use of. From whence I concluded, That all we can attain to is, a full Satisfaction of our Reason concerning God's Eternity, although we can form no distinct Conception of it in our Minds. But when these Men instead of answering the Argument from all the Notions of Eternity, only dispute against one Notion of it, they apparently shew the weakness of their Cause, if it will bear no other Defences, but such as this. For I take it, that the main Debate in point of Reason depends upon this, whether we can be certain of the Being of a Thing, of which we can have no clear and distinct Idea? If we may, then it can be no Objection in point of Revelation, that we can have no clear and distinct Idea of the Matter revealed; since there can be no Reason to tie us up stricter in Point of Revelation, than we are without it. If we can be certain in Reason of many things, we can have no such Ideas of, what imaginable Reason can there be, that a Point of Faith should be rejected on that account.

2. I urged another Attribute of God, viz. his Spirituality for the same Reason; viz. that we are satisfied in point of Reason that God must be a Spirit; and yet we cannot have a clear distinct positive Notion of a Spirit.

p. 281And what answer do they give to this? As wise as the former. Why truly, I had no cause to object this against them, P. 6.because they own the Spirituality of God's Nature, and none since Biddle have denied it.

Very well! but doth my argument proceed upon that, or upon the not having a distinct and clear Idea of a Spirit? It was hardly possible for men so to mistake my meaning, unless they did it, because they had no other answer to give.

3. I argued from God's Prescience, which I do expresly assert, and prove that they cannot have a distinct Notion of it, nay that Socinus denied it, because he could not understand it.

… they tell me,P. 7. I cannot defend our … against theirs without finding Contra…tions in God…s Eternity and Foreknowledge. If this be the Ingenuity and Justice and Charity of the Vnitarians; commend me to the honest-hearted Deists, if there be any such, as they assure us there are. One had better be charged with Trifling and Fooling with Mysteries, than with undermining the main foundations of Religion, by charging them with Contradictions.

But nothing could be farther from my Thoughts, than any thing tending that p. 282way. And such a base Calumny is too much honoured with a Confutation. But do they offer to clear the difficulty and give us a clear and distinct Idea of God…s fore-knowing future Events without a certain Cause to make them future. Nothing like it. For the question is not, Whether a thing be necessary because God foresees it as certain, (as they suppose.) But how of a thing merely possible it comes to be certain without a certain Cause; and how a thing which hath no certain Cause can be certainly foreknown, and what clear and distinct Notion we can have of this in our Minds. If they had answer'd this, they had said something to the purpose. To resolve all into God's infinite Wisdom is a good answer from us, but not from them. For we think it our Duty to satisfie our selves with what God hath revealed, without prying into the manner of things above our Comprehension; but these Men who will receive nothing but what they have clear and distinct Ideas of, ought to shew the manner of this, or else we must be excused on the same reason, if we allow the manner of the divine Subsistences in the same Essence to be above our Comprehension.

p. 2834. I shew'd how unreasonable their demands were, when the Nature of God is owned to be incomprehensible, and his Perfections infinite.

And now of a sudden they are quite turned about; for before they were only for fencing and warding off Blows, but at last they come to the point, and own the being of God to be comprehensible by them; and that they have clear and distinct Ideas of God's infinite Attributes. This is indeed to the purpose, if they can make these things out. But Fencers have many tricks, and I wish we find none here. I had said, That in consequence to the Assertion, that nothing is to be believ'd, but what may be comprehended, the very Being of God must be rejected too, because his Being is incomprehensible, and so they must reject one God as well three Persons.

To this they reply,P. 7. That to comprehend the Being or Existence of God, is only this, to comprehend that God is, and if we cannot comprehend that, all Religion ceases. Is not this a fine turn? What I said of God as to the Perfections of his Nature, they will have it understood of his bare Existence, which I do not mention. When God is said to be an incomprehensible Being; p. 284who before them did understand the meaning to be, That we cannot comprehend that there is a God? This is not mere trifling, for it looks like something worse; and yet they presently after say, That to comprehend a thing is to have a clear adequate Conception of it. And will they pretend to have such a one of the divine Essence, when they confess but a little before, That we converse every day with very many things, P. 5.none of which we comprehend, and that I might have spared my pains in proving it? But what can be the meaning of these sayings, They cannot comprehend the common Natures of things, nor have a clear and distinct Idea of them, but they can comprehend an infinite Being, whom all Mankind own to be incomprehensible. But as to divine Attributes, they say, They have clear distinct and adequate Conceptions of them; and instance in Eternity, Power, Wisdom and Iustice. We do not deny that in such Attributes which we apply to God, because we find them to be Perfections in us, we have a distinct and clear Perception of them, as they are consider'd in themselves, for that is the reason why we attribute them to God. But for such as peculiarly belong to God as Eternity doth; and for the degrees p. 285of other Attributes as they belong to him, as they are infinite, so they are above our Comprehension. (1.) As to Eternity, say they, it is a clear and distinct Notion of Eternity, to say, it is a duration without beginning and without end.

But we can have no clear and distinct Notion of Duration, when applied to a Being that hath necessary Existence. For Duration, they say, consists in a Succession. And what Succession can there be in a Being which always is the same, if there were no difference of times, i. e. God was the same Being before time was, and is the very same Being under all the differences of times; he hath not any other Duration now than he had before, and what Succession could there be where there was no time? But we make use of Duration with respect to things done in time, and for the help of our und…standings apply the measure of time to divine Acts. But in a necessary Existence, there can be no past, present, or to come; and in a successive Duration, there must be conceived a longer continuance from time to time; which is repugnant to the Notion of a Being, which always is. So that, if we cannot conceive Eternity wi…hout Duration, nor Duration without Succession; p. 286nor can apply Succession to a Being which hath necessary Existence, then we can have no clear and distinct Notion of God's Eternity. (2.) As to the Infiniteness of God's Perfections, they say, That although the Mind be in it self finite, P. 8.yet it hath an infinite Comprehension, for what is finite with respect to its Extension of parts may be infinite in other respects, and with respect to some of its Powers. But how doth it appear that we have any Power to comprehend what is infinite? All the Power we have extends only to adding and enlarging our Ideas without bounds, i. e. we can put no stop to our apprehensions, but still they may go farther than we can possibly think, but is this an infinite Comprehension? So far from it, that this shews our Capacities to be finite, because our Ideas cannot go so far as our Reason. For our Reason tells us, we can never go so far, but we may still go farther: but it is impossible for our understanding to have distinct Ideas of the infinite moments in an eternal Succession of the utmost Bounds of Immensity, or of the extent of infinite Power and Knowledge, since the very Notion of Infinite implies, that we can set no bounds to our Thoughts; and therefore although p. 287the Infinity of the divine Attributes be evident to our Reason, yet it is likewise evident to our Reason, that what is infinite must be above our Comprehension.

II. I come now to the last enquiry which is that if we allow things above our Reason, what stop can be put to any absurd Doctrine, which we may be required to believe?

And this is that which our Vnitarians object in all their late Pamphlets. In answer to my Sermon they say, That on our principles, our Reason would be in vain, Answer to the Archbishop, &c. p. 4.and all Science and Certainty would be destroy'd, which they repeat several times. And from hence they do so frequently insist on the Parallel between the Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation: They say,P. 17. P. 67. That all the defence we have made for one will serve for the other, Letter of Resolut p. 3.or any other absurd and impossible Doctrine. That what we say, will equally serve all the Nonsense, Considerat. on the Explication, &c. by Dr. W. p. 30.and impossible Doctrines that are to be found among Men; and they particularly instance in Transubstantiation. I need mention no more. But I did not expect to have found this Parallel so often insisted upon, without an answer to two Dialogues purposely written on that Subject, at a time when the p. 286duplicate page p. 287duplicate page p. 288Doctrine of the Trinity was used as an argument to bring in Transubstantiation, as that is now alledged for casting off the other.

But I must do them that right to tell the World, that at that time a Socinian Answer was written to those Dialogues, which I saw, and wish'd might be Printed, that the World might be satisfied about it and them. But they thought fit to forbear; and in all their late Pamphlets where this Parallel is so often repeated, there is but once, that I can find, any notice taken of those Dialogues, and that in a very superficial manner. For the main Design and Scope of them is past over, and only one particular mention'd, which shall be answer'd in its due order.

But in answer to the general Enquiry, I shall endeavour to state the due Bounds between Faith and Reason, and thereby to shew, that by those grounds on which we receive the Doctrine of the Trinity, we do not give way to the Entertainment of any absurd Opinion, nor overthrow the Certainty of Reason.

1. We have no difference with them about the Vse of our Reason as to the Certainty of a Revelation. For in this case, we are as much as they, for searching p. 289into the grounds of our Faith; for we look on it as a reasonable Act of our Minds, and if we did not allow this, we must declare our selves to believe without grounds. And if we have grounds for our Faith, we can express them in Words that are intelligible; and if we can give an account of our Faith in an intelligible manner, and with a design to give others satisfaction about it, I think this is making use of our Reason in matters of Faith.

2. We have no difference with them about the use of our Reason, as to the true Sense of Revelation. We never say, that Men are bound to believe upon the bare sound of Words without examining the Sense of them. We allow all the best and most reasonable ways of attaining to it, by Copies, Languages, Versions, comparing of Places, and especially the Sense of the Christian Church in the best and purest Ages, nearest the Apostolical Times and express'd in solemn and publick Acts.

By these Rules of Reason we are willing to proceed, and not by any late and uncertain methods of interpreting Scripture.

3. We differ not with them about the right use of the Faculties which God hath given us, of right Vnderstanding such p. 290matters as are offer'd to our Assent. For it is to no purpose to require them to believe, who cannot use the Faculties which are necessary in order to it. Which would be like giving the Benefit of the Clergy to a Man with a Cataract in both his Eyes. And it would be very unreasonable to put his Life upon that Issue, whether he could read or not, because he had the same Organs of Seeing that other Men had; for in this case the whole matter depended not on the Organ but the Vse of it: This needs no Application.

4. We differ not with them about rejecting some Matters proposed to our Belief which are contradictory to the Principles of Sense and Reason. It is no great argument of some Mens Reason, whatever they pretend to talk against admitting seeming Contradictions in Religion; for who can hinder seeming Contradictions? Which arise from the shallowness of Mens Capacities, and not from the repugnancy of Things: and who can help Mens Understandings? But where there is evident proof of a Contradiction to the Principles of Sense and Reason; we are very far from owning any such thing to be an Article of Faith, as in the case of Transubstantiation. Which we reject, not only, p. 291as having no foundation in Scripture, but as repugnant to the common Principles of Sense and Reason; as is made to appear in the two Dialogues before-mention'd.

But our Vnitarians find fault with the Author of them, for laying the force of his argument upon this,Considerat. on the Explication by Dr. W. p. 30. That there are a great many more Texts for the Trinity than are pretended for Transubstantiation; whereas many other arguments are insisted on, and particularly the great Absurdity of it in point of Reason, Dial. 2. from p. 33. to the end. And it is not the bare number of Texts, which he relies upon, but upon the greater Evidence and Clearness of the Tex…s on one side than on the other, which depends upon figurative Words, not capable of a literal Sense without overthrowing the Doctrine designed to be proved by it. See with what Ingenuity these Men treat the Defenders of the Trinity, and the Enemies to Transubstantiation, which they call only a Philosophical Error or Folly; Answer to the Archbishop, p. 21.but the Doctrine of the Trinity is charged with Nonsense, Contradiction, and Impossibilities.

But wherein then lies the difference in point of Reason? For thus far I have shew'd, that we are far from overthrowing Reason, p. 292or giving way to any absurd Doctrines. It comes at last to the point already treated of in this Chapter, how far we may be obliged to believe a Doctrine which carries in it something above our Reason; or of which we cannot have any clear and distinct Ideas. And of this I hope I have given a sufficient Account in the foregoing Discourse.

FINIS.

End of the text · Edward Stillingfleet, Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1697)