Concerning the Doctrine of Christs Satisfaction, Discourse · Chapter 3

Concerning the Doctrine of Christs Satisfaction · Discourse · Chapter 3

p. 127CHAP. III.

I. The words of Scripture being at last acknowledged by our Adversaries to make for us, the only pretence remaining is, that our Doctrine is repugnant to reason. The debate managed upon point of reason. The grand difficulty enquired into, and manifested by our Adversaries concessions, not to lie in the greatness of Christ's sufferings, or that our sins were the impulsive cause of them, or that it is impossible that one should be punished for anothers faults: or in all cases unjust. II. The cases wherein Crellius allows it, instanced. From whence it is proved that he yields the main cause. III. The arguments propounded whereby he attempts to prove it unjust for Christ to be punished for our sins. Crellius his principles of the justice of punishments examined. Of the relation between desert and punishment. IV. That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions. V. An answer to Crellius his Objections. What it is to suffer undeservedly. Crellius his mistake in the state p. 128of the question. VI. The instances of Scripture considered. In what sense Children are punished for their Parents sins. VII. Ezek. 18.20. explained at large. VIII. Whether the guilty being freed from the sufferings of an innocent person makes that punishment unjust or no? Crellius his shifts and evasions in this matter discovered. Why among men the offenders are not freed in criminal matters though the sureties be punished. The release of the party depends on the terms of the sureties suffering, therefore deliverance not ipso facto. No necessity of such a translation in criminal, as is in pecuniary matters.

I. HAving gained so considerable concessions from our Adversaries concerning the places of Scripture, The matter debated in point of reason.we come now to debate the matter in point of reason. And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the nature of the thing, or to the justice of God, then all their loud clamours will come to nothing; for on that they fix, when they talk the most of our Doctrine being contrary to reason. This therefore we now come more closely to examine, in order p. 129to which we must carefully enquire what it is they lay the charge of injustice in God upon, according to our belief of Christ's sufferings being a punishment for our sins.

1. It is not, That the offenders themselves do not undergo the full punishment of their sins. For they assert, that there is no necessity at all that the offenders should be punished from any punitive justice in God: for they eagerly contend that God may freely pardon the sins of men: if so, then it can be no injustice in God not to punish the offenders according to the full desert of their sins.

2. It is not, That God upon the sufferings of Christ doth pardon the sins of men: for they yield that God may do this without any charge of injustice, and with the greatest demonstration of his kindness. For they acknowledge, that the sufferings of Christ are not to be considered as a bare antecedent condition to pardon, but that they were a moving cause as far as the obedience of Christ in suffering was very acceptable to God.

p. 1303. It is not, in the greatness or matter of the sufferings of Christ. For they assert the same which we do.C…rtum est Christum innocentissimum a Deogravissim…s cruciatibus, ipsaque morte fuisse affectum; cum non in materiâ poenae absolute & per se consideratâ, adeoque etiam in e… afflictione à quà poenae forma abest, injuria residere à nobis dicatur. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. Potuit autem id Deus fa…ere, atque adeo fecit, jure dominii, quod in Christi vitam a… corpus habebat; accedente praesertim ipsius Christi consensu. Id. … Sect 4. And therefore I cannot but wonder to meet sometimes with those strange out-crys of our making God cruel in the punishing of his Son for us: for what do we assert that Christ suffered, which they do not assert too? Nay, doth it not look much more like cruelty in God to lay those sufferings upon him without any consideration of sin? as upon their hypothesis he doth; than to do it supposing he bears the punishment of our iniquities, which is the thing we plead for. They assert all those sufferings to be lawful on the account of God…s dominion, which according to them must cease to be so on the supposition of a meritorious cause. But however from this it appears, that it was not unjust that Christ should suffer those things which he did for us: the question then is, whether it were unjust that he should suffer the same things, which he might lawfully do on the account of dominion with a respect to our sins as the cause of them.

p. 1314. As to this, they acknowledge, that it is not, that the sufferings of Christ were occasioned by our sins, or that our sins were the bare impulsive cause of those sufferings. For they both confess in general, that one mans sins may be the occasion of anothers punishment, so far that he might have escaped punishment, if the others sins had not been the impulsive cause of it. And therefore Crellius in the general state of this question,Quod si ex thesi speciale facere velis generalem, ea haec erit, injustum esse punire innocentem, quacunque tandem de causâ id fiat; non vero simpliciter, punire quempiam ob aliena delicta; id enim concedi potest non semper esse injustum. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. would not have it, whether it be unjust to punish one for anothers sins; for that he acknowledges it is not, but whether, for any cause whatsoever it be just to punish an innocent person? And likewise in particular of Christ, they confess, that our sins were the impulsive cause, and the occasion of his sufferings.

5. It is not, that there is so necessary a relation between guilt and punishment, that it cannot be called a punishment which is inflicted on an innocent person. For Crellius, after a long discourse of the difference of afflictions and punishments, doth acknowledge, That it is not of p. 132the nature of punishment,Cum ne illud quidem ad naturam poenae requiratur, ut is ipse, qui puniendus est poenam reverà fuerit commeritus, Id. Sect 5. that the person who is to be punished, should really deserve the punishment; and afterwards when Grotius urgeth, that though it be essential to punishment, that it be inflicted for sin, yet it is not, that it be inflicted upon him who hath himself sinned, which he shews, by the similitude of rewards, which though necessary to be given in consideration of service, may yet be given to others besides the person himself upon his account. All this Crellius acknowledgeth; who saith, They do not make it necessary to the nature, but to the justice of punishment, that it be inflicted upon none but the person who hath offended. So by his own Confession, it is not against the nature of punishment,Poenae quidem simpliciter in innocentem cadit, justa non cadit, Crell. c. 4. Sect. 28. that no one man suffer for anothers faults. From whence it follows, that all Socinus his arguments signifie nothing, which are drawn from the impossibility of the thing, that one man should be punished for anothers faults; for Crellius grants the thing to be possible, but denies it to be just; yet not absolutely neither, but with some restrictions and limitations. For,

p. 133II. 6. It is not,In what cases Crellius grants some may be lawfully punished for the sins of others. but that there may be sufficient causes assigned in some particular cases; wherein it may be just for God to punish some for the sins of others. For Crellius himself hath assigned divers. When there is such a near conjunction between them, that one may be said to be punished in the punishment of another:Quia Deus hunc puniendo illum quoque alterum ob cujus peccati eum dicitur punire, simul punire possit, ob arctiorem quae inter illos intercedat conjunctionem. Crell. ib. Sect. 5. Crell. p. 242. as Parents in their Children and Posterity, Kings in their Subjects, or the body of a State in its Members, either in the most, or the most principal, though the fewest: but we are to consider how far he doth extend this way of punishment of some in others. 1. At the greatest distance of time, if they have been of the same Nation; for he extends it to the utmost degree of God's patience towards a people; For, saith he, God doth not presently punish as soon as they have sinned; but spares for a great while, and forbears, in expectation of their repentance, in the mean while a great many guilty persons die, and seem to have escaped punishment. But at last the time of God…s patience being past, he punisheth their Posterity by exacting the full punishment of their sins upon them, and by this means punisheth their Ancestors p. 134too, and punisheth their sins in their punishment; for, saith he, all that people are reckoned for one man of several Ages, and that punishment which is taken of the last, may be for the sins of the first, for the conjunction and succession of them: of which we have an example, saith he, in the destruction of Ierusalem. By which we see a very remote conjunction, and a mere similitude in comparing a succession of Ages in a people with those in a man, may (when occasion serves) be made use of to justifie God's punishing one Generation of men for the sins of others that have been long before. 2. When sins are more secret or less remarkable which God might not punish, unless an occasion were given from others sins impelling him to it; but because God would punish one very near them, he therefore punisheth them, that in their punishment he might punish the other. Or in case sins spread through a Family or a people, or they are committed by divers persons at sundry times, which God doth not severely punish, but sometimes then, when the Head of a People or Family hath done something which remarkably deserves punishment, whom he will punish p. 135in those he is related to, and therefore generally punisheth the whole Family or People. 3. That which may be a meer exercise of dominion as to some, may be a proper punishment to others; as in the case of Infants, being taken away for their Parents sins; For God, as to the Children, he saith, useth only an act of dominion, but the punishment only redounds to the Parents, who lose them; and though this be done for the very end of punishment, yet he denies, that it hath the nature of Punishment in any but the Parents. Crell. ib. sect. 11. sect. 19.4. That punishment may be intended for those who can have no sense at all of it; as Crellius asserts in the case of Saul's sons, 2 Sam. 21.8, 14. that the punishment was mainly intended for Saul, who was already dead. From these concessions of Crellius in this case, we may take notice, 1. That a remote conjunction may be sufficient for a translation of penalty, viz. from one Generation to another. 2. That sins may be truly said to be punished in others, when the offenders themselves may escape punishment, thus the sins of Parents in their Children, and Princes in their Subjects. 3. That an act of dominion in some may be designed as a proper punishment to others. p. 1364. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it. Now upon these concessions, though our Adversaries will not grant, that Christ was properly punished for our sins, yet they cannot deny but that we may very properly be said to be punished for our sins in Christ, and if they will yield us this, the other may be a strife about words. For surely there may be easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us, as between the several Generations of the Iews, and that last which was punished in the destruction of Ierusalem: and though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo, yet we might have our sins punished in him, as well as Princes theirs in their Subjects, when they escape themselves; or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince, who may suffer for the faults of his people; if it be said, that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one, that nothing hinders but granting it, yet our sins may be said to be punished in him; as well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of dominion upon their Children; if it be said, that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it, that is fully taken off by Crellius; for p. 137surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ, as the first Generation of the Iews had of the sufferings of the last, before the fatal destruction of the City, or as Saul had of the punishment of his Sons after his death. So that from Crellius his own concessions, we have proved, that our sins may very properly be said to be punished in Christ, although he will not say, that Christ could be properly punished for our sins; nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it, but earnestly contend, that it is very unjust to suppose it, and repugnant to the rectitude of God's nature to do it.

III. And so we come to consider the mighty arguments that are insisted on for the proof of this,Crellius his arguments propounded. which may be reduced to these three; viz. 1. That there can be no punishment but what is deserved, but no man can deserve that another should be punished. 2. That punishment flows from revenge, but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault. 3. That the punishment of one, cannot any ways be made the punishment of another; and in case it be supposed possible, then those in whose stead the other is punished, must be actually delivered upon the p. 138payment of that Debt which was owing to God.

1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment, and therefore one cannot be punished for another; for there is no just punishment, but what is deserved. This being the main Argument insisted on by Crellius, must be more carefully considered; but before an answer be made to it, it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it, which will be best done, by laying down his principles, as to the justice of punishments, in a more distinct method than himself hath done; which are these following: 1. That no person can be justly punished, either for his own or anothers faults, but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own: For he still asserts,Crell. c. 4. sect. 3. p. 239, 240. That the justice of punishment ariseth from a mans own fault, though the actual punishment may be from anothers: But he that is punished without respect to his own guilt, is punished undeservedly; and he that is punished undeservedly, is punished unjustly. 2. That personal guilt being supposed one man's sin may be the impulsive cause of another's punishment, but they cannot be the meritorious. p. 139The difference between them he thus explains, The cause is that which makes a thing to be; the impulsive, that which moves one to do a thing, without any consideration of right that one hath to do it: Merit, is that which makes a man worthy of a thing, either good or bad, and so gives a right to it; if it be good, to himself; if bad, to him at whose hands he hath deserved it. Now he tells us, that it is impossible. That one mans sins should make any other deserve punishment, but the person who committed them; but they may impell one to punish another, and that justly, if the person hath otherwise deserved to be punished, unjustly if he hath not. The reason he gives of it is, That the vitiosity of the act, which is the proper cause of punishment, cannot go beyond the person of the offender; and therefore can oblige none to punishment, but him that hath committed the fault. And therefore he asserts, That no man can be justly punished beyond the desert of his own sins, but there may sometimes be a double impulsive cause of that punishment; viz. His own and other mens,Crell. ib. sect. 18. whereof one made that p. 140they might be justly punished, the other that they should be actually: but the latter, he saith, always supposeth the former, as the foundation of just punishment; so that no part of punishment could be executed upon him, wherein his own sins were not supposed as the meritorious cause of it. These are his two main principles which we must now throughly examine, the main force of his Book lying in them. But if we can prove that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind, that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions; if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others, and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for another, then these principles of Crellius will be found not so firm as he imagines them.

IV. 1. That it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind,That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions. Grot. de Satisf. c. 4. that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions. For which purpose Grotius objected against Socinus (who appealed to the consent of Nations, about one being punished for anothers fault) That the Heathens did agree, that Children might be punished for p. 141their Parents faults, and People for their Princes, and that corporal punishment might be born by one for another, did appear by the Persians punishing the whole family for the fault of one. The Macedonians the near kindred in the case of Treason; some Cities of Greece, destroying the Children of Tyrants together with them; in all which, the mere conjunction was supposed a sufficient reason without consent; but in case of consent, he saith, They all agreed in the Justice of some being punished for the faults of others. Thence the right of killing hostages among the most civilized nations; and of sureties being punished in capital matters, if the guilty appear not, who were thence called foreign, who were bound to answer body for body. In which cases, the punishment did extend beyond the desert of the person who suffered it; for no other reason is assigned of these sufferings, besides the conjunction of the person, or his consent; but no antecedent guilt is supposed as necessary, to make the punishment just. We are now to consider what Crellius doth answer to this: 1. As to their acknowledgments p. 142of God's punishing Children for their Parents faults, he gives the same answer which he doth to the examples recorded in Scripture to that purpose, That either they were punished for the sins of others, but their own sins deserved the punishment; or that the Parents were punished in the Children, but the Children were not properly punished. 2. As to punishments among men, he answers two things;Crell c 4. sect. 5. p. 244. 1. That such persons were truly punished, but not justly: for he acknowledges, That in such a case it is a proper punishment, and that it is enough in order to that, that any fault be charged upon a person, whether his own or anothers, whether true or false, on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished: And that such a conjunction is sufficient for cruel, angry, or imprudent men: for where-ever there is a place, saith he, for anger, there is likewise for punishment. So that he confesseth, there may be a true punishment, and that which answers all the reason and ends of punishment assigned by him where there is no desert at all of it in the person who undergoes it. But then he adds, that this is an unjust punishment, to which I reply, p. 143That then the reason of punishment assigned by Crellius before is insufficient; for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him, and yet be unjust, then it necessarily follows, that those ends of punishment are consistent with the greatest injustice. For he before made punishment to have a natural respect to anger, and makes the ordinary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of revenge in men, yet now grants, that these may be in an unjust punishment. Neither can it be said, that he considered punishment only naturally, and not morally; for he tells us, that this is the nature of divine punishments, which are therefore just, because designed for these ends; but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all, then he denies that it is a punishment, but only an affliction, and an exercise of dominion. So that according to him, where-ever there is a proper punishment, it must be just, when ever God doth punish men: and the only difference between God and man supposable in this case is, that we have assurance God will never use his dominion unjustly; but that men do so when they make one to suffer for anothers fault, notwithstanding a consent and conjunction p. 144between the man that committed the fault, and the person that suffers for him. But this is begging the thing in question, for we are debating, whether it be an unlawful exercise of power or no? for we have this presumption, that it is not unlawful, because it may answer all the ends of punishments, and what way can we better judge, whether a punishment be just or no, than by that?

Objections answered.V. But we are to consider, that we do not here take the person we speak of, abstractly as an innocent person, for then there is no question, but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust; but of an innocent person as supposed under an obligation by his own consent to suffer for another. And in this case we assert, since according to Crellius the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained, and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings, so far as he hath power over himself, that such a punishment is not unjust. For if it be, it must suppose some injury to be done; but in this case let them assign where the injury lies; it cannot be to the publick, if the ends of punishments may be obtained p. 145by such a suffering of one for another by a valid consent of the suffering party, it cannot be to the person in whose room the other suffers, for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering; it cannot be to the suffering person, supposing that to be true, which the Heathens still supposed,Immerito quenquam punire est injustè punire. Crell. p. 240. viz. that every man had a power over his own life. If it be said still, that the injustice lies in this; that such a one suffers undeservedly, and therefore unjustly. I answer; if be meant by undeservedly without sufficient cause or reason of punishment, then we deny that such a one doth suffer undeservedly. Immerito in the Greek Glosses is rendred by foreign, and Merito by foreign and foreign, and in Cicero, jure & merito are most commonly joyned together. So that where there is a right to punish, and sufficient reason for it, such a one doth not suffer immerito, i. e. undeservedly. If it be said, that such a one is not dignus poena, that implies no more than the other, for dignus, or as the Ancients writ it dicnus, comes from the Greek foreign jus, as Vossius tells us, ut dignus sit cui tribui aliquid aequum est: so that where there is an equity in the thing, there is a dignity in the person, or he p. 146may be said to be worthy to undergo it. But doth not this lay open the greatest innocency to as great a desert of sufferings, as the highest guilt? By no means. For we make a lyableness to punishment, the natural consequent of guilt: and he that hath committed a fault, cannot but deserve to be punished, so that no sufferings of others can take away the natural consequence of a bad action, which is a desert of punishment; So that as we say, a wicked action cannot but deserve to be punished, i. e. there is an agreeableness in reason and nature, that he who hath done ill, should suffer ill; so we say likewise there is necessity in nature and reason, that he that hath thus deserved it, must unavoidably suffer it. And on the other side, we say, no man by his innocency can deserve to be punished, i. e. no man's innocency makes him by vertue of that obnoxious to punishment; but yet we add, that notwithstanding his innocency, the circumstances may be such that he may be justly punished, and in that sense deservedly. So that the Question is strangely mistaken, when it is thus put, Whether an innocent person considered as such, may be justly punished; for no one asserts that, or is bound to do p. 147it; but the true question is, whether a person notwithstanding his innocency may not by some act of his own will oblige himself to undergo that punishment which otherwise he did not deserve? which punishment, in that case is just and agreeable to reason. And this is that which we assert and plead for. So that innocency here is not considered any other ways, than whether that alone makes it an unlawfull punishment, which otherwise would be lawfull, i. e. whether the Magistrate in such cases, where substitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations (as in the cases we are now upon) be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to punishment now lies upon the person who by his own act hath substituted himself in the others room; and if he proceeds upon this, his action is justifiable and agreeable to reason. If it be said, that the substitution is unjust, unless the substituted person hath beforehand deserved to be punished; it is easily answered, that this makes not the matter at all clearer; for either the person is punished for the former fault, and then there is no substitution; or if he be punished by way of substitution; then there is no regard at all had to his former p. 148fault, and so it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent.

The instances of Scripture considered.VI. And by this Crellius his answer to the instances both in Scripture and elsewhere concerning Childrens being punished for their Parents faults, will appear to be insufficient, viz. That God doth never punish them for their Parents faults beyond the desert of their own sins, and therefore no argument can be drawn from thence, that God may punish an innocent person for the sins of others, because he hath punished some for what they were innocent: For the force of the argument doth not lie in the supposition of their innocency, as to the ground of punishment in general, for we do not deny, but that they may deserve to be punished for their own faults: but the argument lies in this, whether their own guilt were then considered as the reason of punishment, when God did punish them for their fathers faults? And whether they by their own sins did deserve to be punished not only with the punishment due to their own miscarriages, but with the punishment due to their fathers too? If not, then some persons are justly punished, who have not deserved p. 149that punishment they undergo; if they did deserve it, then one person may deserve to be punished for anothers sins. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, that his own sins make him capable of punishment, and God by occasion of others sins doth execute that punishment, which he might not have done for his own. I answer, we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of punishing, but into the reason of it: was the reason of punishment his own or his fathers sins? If his own, then he was punished only for his own sins? if his fathers, then the punishment may be just which is inflicted without consideration of proper desert of it; for no man (say they) can deserve to be punished, but for his own sins. But it's said, that the sins of Fathers are only an impulsive cause for God to punish the Children according to the desert of their own sins which he might otherwise have forborn to punish. Then, the sins of the Fathers are no reason why the Children should be punished; but their own sins are the reason, and their Fathers the bare occasion of being punished for them. But in Scripture, the reason of punishment is drawn from the Fathers sins, and not from the Childrens: For then the words would have p. 150run thus, if the Children sin, and deserve punishment by their own iniquities, then I will take occasion from their Fathers sins, to visit their own iniquities upon them: Whereas the words referr to the Fathers sins as the reason of the Childrens punishment. So in the words of the Law, wherein the reason of punishment ought to be most expresly assigned, it is not, I will certainly punish the Children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers; but, I will visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children, Exod. 20.3.Exod 20:3unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me. If it were only because of imitation of the Fathers sins by the Children, there could be no reason for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation; for then the reason of punishment would be as long as the imitation continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation: And as Alphonsus à Castro observes,Alph à Castro de justâ haeret. punit. l. 2. c. 10. If the reason of punishment were the imitation of their Fathers sins, then the Children were not punished for their Fathers sins, but for their own; for that imitation was a sin of their own, and not of their Fathers. Besides, if the proper reason of punishment were the sins of the Children, and the Fathers p. 151sins only the occasion of it, then where it is mentioned that Children are punished for their Parents sins, the Childrens sins should have been particularly expressed, as the proper cause of the punishment: But no other reason is assigned in the Law, but the sins of the Fathers, no other cause mentioned of Canaan's punishment, but his Father's sin;Gen 9 25.Gen 9:25 nor of the punishment of the people in David's time, but his own sin; Lo, 2 Sam. 24.17.2 Sam 24:17I have sinned, and I have done wickedly, but these sheep, what have they done? Which is no hyperbolical expression, but the assigning the proper cause of that judgment to have been his own sin, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor,2 Sam. 21.5.2 Sam 21:5 of the hanging up of Saul's sons by the Gibeonites, but, that Saul their Father had plotted their destruction. And in an instance more remarkable than any of those which Crellius answers; viz. the punishment of the people of Iudah, for the sins of Manasses in the time of Iosias; when a through Reformation was designed among them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry destroyed, such a Passover kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in Israel, yet it then follows, Notwithstanding the Lord p. 150duplicate page p. 151duplicate page p. 152turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, 2 Kin. 23. v. 4 to v. 21.2 Kgs 23:4wherewith his anger was kindled against Iudah, because of all the provocations wherewith Manasses had provoked him withal. Who can say here, that the sins of Manasseh were only the occasion of God punishing the people in the time of Iosias for their own sins,Vers. 22. Vers. 26.when their sins were much less in the time of Iosias, than in any time mentioned before, after their lapse into Idolatry? Nay, it is expresly said,2 Chron. …4.33.2 Chr 4:33 That Iosiah took away all the abominations out of all the countries that pertained to the Children of Israel, and made all that were present in Israel to serve, even to serve the Lord their God. And all his days they departed not from following the Lord God of their Fathers: To say, that th…s was done in hypocrisie, and bare outward compliance, is to speak without book; and if the reason of so severe punishments had been their hypocrisie, that ought to have been mentioned; but not only here, but afterwards it is said, that the reason of God's destroying Iudah, was for the sins of Manasseh; viz. his Idolatries and Murther,2 Sam. 24.3, 4.2 Sam 24:32 Sam 24:4 which it is said, the Lord will not pardon. And if he would not pardon, then he did punish for those sins, not p. 153barely as the occasion, but as the meritorious cause of that punishment. What shall we say then? Did the people in Iosiah's time, deserve to be punished for the sins of Manasseh, Grandfather to Iosiah? Or was God so highly provoked with those sins, that although he did not punish Manasseh himself upon his repentance, yet he would let the world see how much he abh…rred them, by punishing those sins upon the people afterwards; although according to the usual proportion of sins and punishments, the sins of the people in that age did not exceed the sins of other ages, as much as the punishments they suffered, did exceed the punishments of other ages: which is necessary according to Crellius his Doctrine; for if God never punisheth by occasion of their Fathers sins, the Children beyond the desert of their own sins; then it is necessary, that where judgments are remarkably greater, the sins must be so too; the contrary to which is plain in this instance. By which we see, that it is not contrary to the Justice of God in punishing, to make the punishment of some on the account of others sins, to exceed the desert of their own; measuring that desert, not in a way common p. 154to all sin, but when the desert, of some sins is compared with the desert of others: For it is of this latter we speak of, and of the method which God useth in punishing sin here, for the demonstration of his hatred of it, according to which the greatest punishments must suppose the greatest sins, either of their own, or others which they suffer for.

Ezek. 18.20. explained. Ezek. 18.4.20.Ezek 18:20Ezek 18:4VII. But hath not God declared, That he will never punish the Children for the Fathers sins? for the soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father, &c. To which I answer, These words are to be considered, as an answer to a complaint made by the Iews, soon after their going into Captivity, which they imputed to God's severity in punishing them for their Fathers sins. Now the complaint was either true or false; if it were true, then though this was looked upon as great severity in God, yet it was no injustice in him; for though God may act severely, he cannot act unjustly: If it was false, then the answer had been an absolute denial of it, as a thing repugnant to the Justice of God. Which we do not find here, but that p. 155God saith unto them, v. 3. Ye shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverb in Israel: if the thing had been plainly unjust, which they complained of, he would have told them, they never had occasion to use it. But we find the Prophets telling them before-hand, that they should suffer for their Fathers sins, Ier. 15.3, 4. where he threatens them with destruction and banishment, because of the sins of Manasseh in Ierusalem; and in the beginning of the captivity they complain of this, Lam. 5.7. Our Fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities. And Ier. 31.28. God saith by the Prophet, that he had watched over them to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to afflict: but that he would watch over them to build, and to plant, Jer. 31.29, 30.Jer 31:29Jer 31:30and in those days they shall say no more, the Fathers have eaten sowre grapes and the Childrens teeth are set on edge; but every one shall die for his own iniquity. Which place is exactly parallel with this in Ezekiel, and gives us a clear account of it, which is, that now indeed God had dealt very severely with them, by making them suffer beyond what in the ordinary course of his providence their sins had deserved; but he punished them p. 156not only for their own sins, but the sins of their Fathers: But lest they should think, they should be utterly consumed for their iniquities, and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which God had promised them, he tells them by the Prophets, though they had smarted so much, by reason of their Fathers sins, this severity should not always continue upon them; but that God would visit them with his kindness again, and would plant them in their own Land, then they should see no reason to continue this Proverb among them, for they would then find, Though their Fathers had eaten sowre grapes, their teeth should not be always set on edge with it. And if we observe it, the occasion of the Proverb, was concerning the Land of Israel, foreign supra terra Israel, as the Chaldee Paraphrast renders it more agreeable to the Hebrew, Ezek. 18.2.Ezek 18:2than the other Versions do. So that the Land of Israel was the occasion of the Proverb, by their being banished out of it for their Fathers sins. Now God tells them, they should have no more occasion to use this Proverb concerning the Land of Israel; for they, notwithstanding their Fathers sins, should return into their own Land. And even during p. 157the continuance of their captivity, they should not undergo such great severities for the future, but they should find their condition much more tolerable than they imagined; only, if any were guilty of greater sins than others, they should themselves suffer for their own faults, but he would not punish the whole Nation for them or their own Posterity. This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place; and I the rather embrace it, because I find such insuperable difficulties in other interpretations that are given of it: For to say as our Adversaries do, That what God saith, should not be for the future, was repugnant to his nature and justice ever to do, is to charge God plainly with injustice in what he had done: For the Prophets told them they should suffer for the sins of their Fathers: Which sufferings were the ground of their complaint now, and the answer here given must relate to the occasion of the complaint; for God saith, They should not have occasion to use that Proverb: Wherein is implyed, they should not have the same reason to complain which they had then. I demand then, Do not these words imply, That God would not do for the future with them, what he had done before; p. 158if not, the proper answer had been a plain denial, and not a promise for the future he would not; if they do, then either God properly punished them for the sins of their Fathers, and then God must be unjust in doing so, or it was just with God to do it, and so this place instead of overthrowing will prove, that some may be justly punished, beyond the desert of their own sins: or else, God did only take occasion by their Fathers sins, to punish them according to the desert of their own iniquities: But then they had no cause to complain, that they were punished for any more than their own iniquities; and withal, then God doth oblige himself by his promise here, never to punish men for the future by the occasion of others sins: which is not only contrary to their own Doctrine, but to what is plainly seen afterwards in the punishment of the Iews for their Fathers sins, mentioned by our Saviour after this:Matt. 23.35.Matt 23:35 And if this be a certain rule of equity which God here saith, that he would never vary from, then the punishing of some on the occasion of others sins, would be as unjust, as our Adversaries suppose the punishing any beyond the desert of their own sins to be. But is it not p. 159implyed, that Gods ways would be unequal, Ezek. 18.25.Ezek 18:25if he ever did otherwise than he there said he would do? No, it is not, if by equal he meant just, for his ways never were, or can be so unequal; but here if it be taken with a respect to the main dispute of the Chapter, no more is implied in them, but that they judged amiss concerning God's actions, and that they were just, when they thought them not to be so: or if at least they thought his ways very severe, though just, God by remitting of this severity, would shew that he was not only just, but kind; and so they would find his ways equal, that is, always agreeable to themselves, and ending in kindness to them, though they hitherto were so severe towards them in their banishment and captivity. Or if they be taken with a respect to the immediate occasion of them both, Ezek. 18.—33. They do not relate to this dispute about Childrens suffering for their Fathers sins;Ezek. 33.20.Ezek 33:20 but to another, which was concerning a righteous mans sinning and dying in his sins, and a wicked mans repenting, and living in his righteousness; which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the Iews to this day, which is, that God will judge men according p. 160to the greatest number of their actions good or bad: as appears by Maimonides and others. Now they thought it a very hard case, for a man who had been righteous the far greatest part of his time, if he did at last commit iniquity, that his former righteousness should signifie nothing, but he must die in his iniquity. To this therefore God answers, that it was only the inequality of their own ways, which made them think God's ways in doing so unequal. This then doth not make it unequal, for God either to punish men, upon the occasion, or by the desert of other mens sins, supposing such a conjunction between them, as there is in the same body of people, to those who went before them. And Crellius himself grants,Crell. c 4. sect. 15. That Socinus never intended to prove, that one mans suffering for anothers sins was unjust in it self,The deliverance of the guilty by the sufferings of an innocent person by his own consent, makes not the punishment unjust. from this place: no, not though we take it in the strictest sense, for one suffering in the stead of another.

VIII. Having thus far declared, how far it is agreeable to God's Justice, to punish any persons either by reason of his dominion, or the conjunction of persons, for the sins of others, and consequently whether any punishment may be undergone p. 161justly beyond the proper desert of their own sins, I now return to the consent of Mankind in it, on supposition either of a near conjunction, or a valid consent which must make up the want of dominion in men without it. And the question still proceeds upon the supposition of those things, that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others sakes, and that they do it by their free consent; and then we justifie it not to be repugnant to the principles of Reason and Justice, for any to suffer beyond the desert of their own actions. And Crellius his saying, that such a punishment is true punishment, but not just, is no answer at all to the consent of Nations that it is so. And therefore finding this answer insufficient; he relies upon another,Crell. c. 4. sect. 30, 32, 34, &c. viz. That it was never received by the consent of Nations, that one man should suffer in the stead of another, so as the guilty should be freed by the others suffering. For, he saith, neither Socinus nor he do deny that one man may be punished for anothers sins; but that which they deny is, that ever the innocent were punished so as the guilty were freed by it; and so he answers, in the p. 162case of Hostages and Sureties, their punishment did never excuse the offenders themselves. And to this purpose he saith, Socinus his argument doth hold good, that tho' one mans money may become anothers, yet one mans sufferings cannot become anothers: For, saith he, if it could, then it would be all one who suffered, as it is who pays the money due: And then the offender must be presently released, as the Debtor is upon payment of the debt. This is the substance of what is said by him upon this Argument. To which I reply; 1. That this gives up the matter in dispute at present between us; for the present question is, Whether it be unjust for any one to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions? Yes, saith Crellius, it is, in case he suffers so, as that the guilty be freed by his sufferings. But we are not enquiring, Whether it be just for another person to be freed for a mans suffering for him? but whether it be just for that man to suffer by his own consent, more than his own actions, without that consent, deserved? The release of another person by vertue of his sufferings, is a matter of another consideration. Doth the freeing or not freeing of another by suffering, add any thing to the desert of p. 163suffering? He that being wholly innocent, and doth suffer on the account of anothers fault, doth he not suffer as undeservedly, though another be not freed, as if he were? As in the case of Hostages or Sureties, doth it make them at all the more guilty, because the persons they are concerned for, will be punished notwithstanding, if they come under the power of those who exacted the punishment upon them, who suffered for them? Nay, is not their desert of punishment so much the less, in as much as the guilty are still bound to answer for their own offences? If we could suppose the guilty to be freed by the others sufferings, it would be by supposing their guilt more fully translated upon those who suffer, and consequently, a greater obligation to punishment following that guilt. From whence it follows, that if it be just to punish, when the person is not deliver'd from whom the other suffers, it is more just when he is; for the translation of the penalty is much less in the former case, than in the latter; and what is just upon less grounds of punishment, must be more just upon greater. I look on this therefore but as a shift of Crellius, hoping thereby to avoid the consent p. 164of mankind in one mans suffering for another, without attending to the main argument he was upon; viz. The justice of one person suffering for another. 2. It is a very unreasonable thing, to make an action unjust for that, which of it self is acknowledged by our Adversaries to be very just; viz. The pardoning the offenders themselves. If it were just to suffer, if the other were not pardoned, and it were just to pardon, whether the other were punished or no, how comes this suffering to be unjust, merely by the others being pardoned by it: nay, is it not rather an argument, that those sufferings are the most just, which do so fully answer all the ends of punishments; that there is then no necessity that the offender should suffer; but that the Supreme Governour having obtained the ends of Government, by the suffering of one for the rest, declares himself so well pleased with it, that he is willing to pardon the offenders themselves. 3. Many of those persons who have had their sins punished in others, have themselves escaped the punishment due to the desert of their sins: As is plain in the case of Ahab, whose punishment was not so great as his sins deserved, because the full punishment p. 165of them was reserved to his posterity. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, That Ahab was not wholly freed, Crell. c. 4. sect. 25. 1 Kin. 21.19.1 Kgs 21:19his life being taken away for his own sins: That gives no sufficient answer; for if some part of the punishment was deferred, that part he was delivered from; and the same reason in this case will hold for the whole as the part. As is plain in the case of Manasseh, and several others, the guilt of whose sins were punished on their posterity, themselves escaping it. 4 Our Adversaries confess, that in some cases it is lawful and just for some to suffer, with a design that others may be freed by their suffering for them. Thus they assert, That one Christian, not only may, but ought to lay down his life for another, if there be any danger of his denying the truth, or he judges him far more usefull and considerable than himself: so likewise a Son for his Father, one Brother for another, or a Friend, or any, Crell cap. 6. sect. 39.whose life he thinks more usefull than his own. Now I ask, whether a man can be bound to a thing that is in its one nature unjust? if not, as it is plain he cannot, then such an obligation of one man to suffer for the delivery of another cannot be unjust, and consequently the suffering it p. 166self cannot be so. But Crellius saith, The injustice in this case lies wholly upon the Magistrate who admits it: but I ask, wherefore is it unjust in the Magistrate to admit it? it is because the thing is in it self unjust? if so, there can be no obligation to do it; and it would be as great a sin to undergo it, as in the Magistrate to permit it; but if it be just in it self, we have obtained what we contend for, viz. that it may be just for a man to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions; for he that lays down his life for his Brethren, doth not deserve by his own actions that very punishment which he undergoes. And if the thing be in it self just, how comes it to be unjust in him that permits it? 5. The reason why among men the offenders themselves are punished, is because those were not the terms, upon which the persons suffered. For if they had suffered upon these terms that the other might be freed, and their suffering was admitted of by the Magistrate on that consideration, then in all reason and justice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others suffering for them. But among men the chief reason of the obligation to punishment of one man for another, is not, that the other p. 167might be freed, but that there may be security given by the publick, that the offenders shall be punished: and the reason of the Sureties suffering is not to deliver the offender, but to satisfie the Law, by declaring that all care is taken that the offender should be punished, when in case of escape, the Surety suffers for him. But it is quite another thing when the person suffers purposely that others might be freed by his suffering, for then in case the suffering be admitted, the release of the other is not only not unjust, but becomes due to him that suffered, on his own terms. Not as though it followed ipso facto as Crellius fansies, but the manner of release doth depend upon the terms which he who suffered for them, shall make in order to it. For upon this suffering of one for another upon such terms, the immediate consequent of the suffering is not the actual discharge but the right to it which he hath purchased; and which he may dispense upon what terms he shall judge most for his honour. 6. Although one persons sufferings cannot become anothers so as one mans Money may; yet one mans sufferings may be a sufficient consideration on which a benefit may accrue to another. For to p. 168that end a Donation, or such a transferring right from one to another as is in Money, is not necessary, but the acceptation which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon. If he declare that he is so well pleased with the sufferings of one for another, that in consideration of them, he will pardon those from whom he suffered; where lies the impossibility or unreasonableness of the thing? For Crellius g…ants,Crell. ib. sect. 28. that rewards may be given to others than the persons who did the actions in consideration of those actions; and why may not the sufferings of one for others, being purposely undertaken for this end, be available for the pardon of those whom he suffered for? For a man can no more transfer the right of his good actions, than of his sufferings. From all which it follows, that one person may by his own consent, and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of punishing belongs, suffer justly; tho' it be beyond the desert of his own actions; and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his sufferings. Which was the first thing we designed to prove from Crellius, in order to the overthrowing his own hypothesis. For it being confessed by him that such sufferings have p. 169all that belongs to the nature of punishments, and since God hath justly punished some for the sins which they have not committed; since all Nations have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another; since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings, if he were admitted to suffer for that end, it evidently follows, contrary to Crellius his main Principle, that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions: And so that first argument of Crellius cannot hold, that one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another, because no man can deserve anothers punishment, and no punishment is just but what is deserved. His second argument from the nature of anger and revenge hath been already answered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments, and his third argument, that one mans punishment cannot become anothers, immediately before. And so we have finished our first consideration of the sufferings of Christ in general, as a punishment of our sins, which we have shewed to be agreeable both to Scripture and Reason.