The Council of Trent Examined and Disproved, Part 4
IV. Of the Merit of Good Works.
The Council of Trent Sess. 6. c. 16. declares, That the Good Works of justified Persons do truly deserve Eternal Life; and Can. 3…. an Anathema is denounced against him that denies them to be meritorious, or that a justified Person by them doth not truly merit Increase of Grace, and Happiness, and Eternal Life.
The Council hath not thought fit to declare what it means by truly meriting; but certainly it must be opposed to an improper kind of Meriting, and what that is we must learn from the Divines of the Church of Rome.
1. Some say, That some of the Fathers speak of an improper kind of Merit, which is no more than the due Means for the attaining of Happiness as the End. So Vega confesses they often use the word Merit, where Vega de Justif. l. 8. c. 8.there is no Reason for Merit, either by way of Congruity or Condignity. Therefore, where there is true Merit there must be a proper Reason for it. And the Council of Trent being designed to condemn some prevailing Opinions at that time, among those they called Hereticks, this Assertion of true Merit must be levelled against some Doctrine of theirs; but they held Good Works to be necessary as Means to an end, and therefore this could not be the meaning of the Council.
Suarez saith, the words of the Council ought to be specially Suarez de Grat. l. 12. c. 1 n. 8.observed, which are, that there is nothing wanting in the good works of justified Persons, ut vere promeruisse censeantur; and therefore no Metaphorical or improper, but that which by the Sense of the Church of Rome was accounted true Merit in opposition to what was said by those accounted Hereticks must be understood thereby.
2. Others say, that a meer Congruity arising from the Promise and Favour of God in rewarding the acts of his Grace in justified Persons cannot be the proper Merit intended by the Council. And that for these Reasons.
1. Suarez observes that although the Council avoids Suarez de G…t. l. 12. c. 1. …. 12.the Terms ex Condigno, yet because it still uses the words vere mereri, it implies something more than mere Congruity; and because it speaks of meriting the Increase of Grace, and not the first Grace; now a Congruity is allowed for the first Grace, which it excludes by mentioning the Increase. And withal, it brings places to prove that the giving the Reward must be a Retribution of Justice, and if so, the merit must be more than that of Congruity.
2. Because God's Promise doth not give any Intrinsick value to the Nature of the Act; no more than his threatning doth increase the Nature of Guilt. If the King of Persia had promised a Province to him that gave him a draught of Water, the Act it self had been no more meritorious; but it only shewed the Munificence of the Prince; no more do God's Promises of Eternal Life add any merit to the Acts of Grace, but onelyonly set forth the Infinite Bounty of the Promiser.
3. In the Conference at Ratisbon (the year this Decree passed) by the Emperour's Order the Protestant Party did yield, that by virtue of God's Promise the Reward of Eternal Life was due to justified Persons; as a Father Disputat. Ratisbonae An. 1546. p. 568.promising a great Reward to his Son for his pains in studying, makes it become due to him, although there be no proportion between them. And if no more were meant by Merit of Congruity, than that it was very agreeable to the Divine Nature to reward the Acts of his own Grace with an infinite Reward, they would yield this too.
4. Cardinal Pallavicini gives us the plain and true Hist. Conc. Trid. l. 8. c. 4. n. 4.meaning of the Council, viz. that a Merit de Congruo was allowed for Works before Justification; but for Works after, they all agreed, he saith, that there was a Merit de condigno in them both for increase of Grace and Eternal Glory. By Merit de condigno is meant such an intrinsick value in the nature of the Act as makes the Reward in Justice to be due to it.
Some call one of these, Meritum secundum quid; which Rich. de Media. Vill. in l. 2. sent. dist. 17. art. 2. q. 1. Nich. de Orbellis in 3. sent. dist. 27.is the same with de congruo; which really deserves no reward, but receives it onelyonly from the liberality of the Giver; and this hath not truly, say they, the notion of Merit; but that which makes the reward due is simple and true Merit, when it doth not come merely from the Kindness of the Giver, but from Respect to the worthiness of the Action and the Doer, and this is de condigno.
Let us now see what Catholick Tradition there was for this Doctrine, and whether this were taught them by their Fathers in a continued succession down from the Apostles times.
But that there was a change as to the sense of the Church in this matter, I shall prove in the first place from an Office which was allow'd in the Church before, and forbidden after. It was an Office with respect to dying Persons, wherein are these Questions.
Q. Dost thou believe that thou shalt Credis non pr…priis meritis, sed pass… Domini nostri Jesu Christi virtute & merito ad gloriam pervenire?come to Heaven, not by thy own Merits, but by the virtue and Merit of Christ's Passion?
A. I do believe it.Credo.
Q. Dost thou believe that Christ died Credis quod Dominus no…er Jes…s Christus pro Salute nost… m…r…us sit; & quo… …x propriis meri…is, vel al…o in … …ull…s … salvari nis… in merito p…ss…nis ejus?for our Salvation, and that none can be saved by their own Merits, or any other way but by the Merits of his Passion?
A. I do believe it.Credo.
Now when the Indices Expurgatorii were made in pursuance to the Order of the Council of Trent, this passage was no longer endured. For, in the Roman Index the Ordo baptizandi, wherein this Question was, is forbidden till it were Corrected. But the Spanish Indices explain the mystery; that of Cardinal Quiroga saith expresly, those Questions and Answers must be blotted out; and the like we find in the Index of Soto major and San…oval. What now is the Reason, that such Questions and Answers were no longer permitted, if the Churches Tradition continued still the same? Was not this a way to know the Tradition of the Church by the Offices used in it? This was no private Office then first used, but although the prohibition mentions one Impression at Venice (as though there had been no more) I have one before me, Printed by Gryphius at Venice two years before that; and long before with the Praeceptorium of Lyra, A. D. 1495. where the Question to the dying Person is in these words, Si credit se Merito Passionis Christi & non propriis ad gloriam pervenire? Et respondeat, Credo. And the same Questions and Answers I have in a Sacerdotale Romanum Printed by Nicolinus at Venice 1585. Cardinal Hosius says that he had seen these Questions and H…. Conf…ss. Petricovi, c. 73. p. 144.Answers in the Sacerdotale Romanum and in the Hortulus Animae; and that they were believed to be first prescribed by Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury. On what account now, come these things to be prohibited and expunged, if the Churches Doctrine and Tradition about this matter, be still the very same? No doubt it was believed that the Council of Trent had now so far declared the Sense of the Church another way, that such Questions and A…s…rs were no longer to be endured.
But before the Council of Trent the Canons of Colen against … …. 16. 2.Hermannus their Bishop, when he published his Reformation, declare, that God's giving Eternal Life up on good Works is ex gratuita dignatione suae clementiae, from the Favour which God vouchsafes to them. Which to my apprehension is inconsistent with the Notion of true Merit in the Works themselves; for if there be any Condignity in them, it cannot be mere Grace and Favour in God to reward them.
The same Canons in their Enchiridion some years before, Enchirid Colon. f. 176. 2.when they joyned with their Bishop, call it stupidity to think that good Works are rewarded with Eternal Life for any Dignity in the Works themselves. And if there be no dignity in them, there can be no true Merit; as the Council of Trent determines with an Anathema.
Pope Adrian VI. gives such an account of the Merit Adrian. de Sacr. Eucbar. f. 61.of our Works, that he could never imagine any condignity in them to Eternal Life. For, saith he, our Merits are a broken reed, which pierce the hand of him that leans upon them; they are a menstruous Cloth, and our best Actions mixt with impurities; and when we have done all that we can, we are unprofitable Servants.
Petrus de Alliaco Cardinal of Cambray attributes no Pet de Alliaco, in 4. l. Sent. q. 1. art. 1. f. 225. ….other effect to good Works than of Causa sine qua non; and saith that the Reward is not to be attributed to any Virtue in them, but to the Will of the Giver. Which I think overthrows any true Merit.
Gabriel Biel attributes the Merit of Good Works not to Bicl in l. 2. sent. dis…. 27. art. 1. …o…. 3.any intrinsecal Goodness in them, but to God's acceptation. Which is in words to assert Merit, and in truth to deny it; for, how can there be true Merit in the Works, if all their value depends upon divine Acceptance?
Thomas Walden charges Wickliff with asserting the Walden. de Sacram. Ti…. …. c 7.Doctrine of Merit and incouraging men to trust in their own Righteousness, and he quotes Scripture and Fathers against it; and he blames the use of the term of Merit either ex congruo or ex condigno: which he saith was an Invention of some late Schoolmen, and was contrary to the ancient Doctrine of the Church. As he proves, not only from Scripture and Fathers, but from the ancient Offices too: as in the Canon of the Mass, Non aestimator meriti, seá veni… quaesumus largitor, &c. Fer. 4. Pass. Ut qui de meritorum qualitate diffidimus, non judicium tuum sed miseric…rdiam cons…quamur. Dom. 2. Adv. Ubi nulla suppetunt sufsragia meritorum, tuae nobis indulgentiae succurre praesidtis. How comes the Doctrine condemned in Wickliff to be established in the Council of Trent? For he was blamed for asserting true Merit, and the Council asserts it with an Anathema to those that deny it. And yet we must believe the very same Tradition to have been in the Church all this while.
Vega saith, that Walden speaks against Merits without Grace; but any one that reads him will find it otherwise, Vega i…Opu…c. Qu. 4.For he produces those passages out of the Fathers against Merits which do suppose Divine Grace, as it were easie to shew; but Friar Walden thought the notion of Merit inconsistent with the Power and Influence of Divine Grace necessary to our best Actions. God, saith he, doth not regard Merit either as to Congruity or Condignity, but his own Grace, and Will, and Mercy.
Marsilius de Ingen who lived before Walden reckons Marfil. in l. 2. …. …. 1….up three Opinions about Merit; the first of those who denied it, and of this, saith he, Durandus seems to be, and one Job. de Everbaco. The second of those who said that our Works have no merit of themselves, but as informed by d…ine Grace, and from the Assistance of the Holy Ghost, so they do t…uly merit Eternal Life, and of this Opinion he saith was Thomas de Argentina. The third was, of those who granted that true Merit doth imply an Equality, but then they distinguish Equality, as to Quantity and as to Proportion, and in this latter sense they asserted an Equality. And of this Opinion he saith was Petrus de Tarantasia. But he delivers his own Judgment in these Conclusions.
1. That our Works either considered in themselves or with Divine Grace are not meritorious of Eternal Life ex condigno, which he proves both from Scripture and Reason, viz. because 1. No Man can make God a Debtor to him; for the more Grace he hath the more he is a Debtor to God. Ana 2. He cannot merit of another by what he receives from him. And 3. No man can pay what he owes to God, and therefore can never merit at his hands. 4. No man can merit here so much Grace as to keep him from falling away from Grace; much less then Eternal Life.
2. These works may be said to be meritorious of Eternal Life ex condigno by divine acceptation originally proceeding from the Merit of Christ's Passion, because that makes them worthy. But this is Christ's Merit and not the true Merit of our Works.
3. Works done by Grace do merit Eternal Life de congruo from God's liberal disposition, whereby he hath appointed so to reward them. It beeing agreeable to him to give Glory to them that love him. But this is an improper kind of Merit, and can by no means support the Tradition of true Merit.
Durandus utterly denies any true Merit of Man towards God; he doth not deny it in a large improper sense Durand. in sent. l. 2. di…. 27. q. 2.for such a Condignity in our actions as God hath appointed in order to a Reward; which is by the Grace of God in us; but as it is taken for a free Action to which a Reward is in Justice due; because whatever we doe is more owing to the Grace of God than to our selves; but to make a Debtor to us, we must not only pay an equivalent to what we owe, but we must go beyond it; but to God and our Parents we can never pay an equivalent, much less exceed it. And we can never merit by what God gives us, because the Gift lays a greater Obligation upon us. And n. 14.he saith, the holding the contrary is temerarious and blasphemous.
The two grounds of holding Merit were, the supposing a Proportion between Grace and Glory, and an Equality between Divine Grace and Glory in Vertue, Grace being as the Seed of Glory; and to both these he answers.
To the first, That the giving a Reward upon Merit is no part of distributive, but commutative Justice, because it respects the relation of one thing to another, and not the mere quality of the Person.
To the second, That the Value of an Act is not considered with respect to the first Mover, but to the immediate Agent: and as to Grace being the seed of Glory, it is but a metaphorical expression, and nothing can be drawn from it. So that Durandus concludes true Merit with respect to God to be temerarious, blasphemous and impossible.
Ockam declares, That after all our good Works God may Ockam in 4. s…nt. q. 3. ad secundum. In. l. 1. dist. 17. q. 1. in l. 1. dist. 17. q. 2.without Injustice deny Eternal Life to them who do them; because God can be Debtor to none; and therefore whatever he doth to us, it is out of mere Grace. And that there can be nothing meritorious in any act of ours, but from the Grace of God freely accepting it. And therefore he must deny any true Merit.
Gregorius Ariminensis saith, That no Act of ours though Greg. Arim. in l. 1. sent. dist. 17. art. 2.coming from Grace to never so great a degree, is meritorious with God ex condigno of any Reward either Temporal or Eternal; because every such Act is a Gift of God; and if it were at all meritorious, yet not as to Eternal Life, because there is no equivalency between them, and therefore it cannot in Justice be due to it; and consequently if God gives it, he must do it freely. But, saith he, God is said to be just, when he gives bona pro bonis, and merciful, when he gives bona pro malis; not but that he is merciful in both, but because his mercy appears more in the latter; and in the other, it seems like justice in a general sense from the conformity of the Merit and the Reward; but in this particular retribution it is mere Mercy.
Scotus affirms, that all the meritoriousness of our Acts Scot. in l. 1. sent. dist. 17. q 3. n 24.depends on divine Acceptation in order to a Reward; and if it did depend on the intrinsick worth of the Acts, God could not in justice deny the Reward; which is false; and therefore it wholly depends on the good will and favour of God.
Bellarmin is aware of this, and he confesses this to be Bell. de Just. l. 5. c. 17.the Opinion of Scotus and of other old Schoolmen. But how then do they hold the Doctrine and Tradition of true Merit? He holds that good Works are properly and truly good. So do we, and yet deny Merit. But he grants, that he denies that they bear any proportion to Eternal Life, and therefore they cannot be truly meritorious of it. Bellarmin himself asserts that without the divine Promise good Works have a proportion to Eternal Life, and this he saw was necessary to defend the Doctrine of the Council of Trent; but then he adds, that there is no obligation on God's part to reward in such a manner without a Promise. Now here are two hard Points, 1. To make it appear that there is such a meritoriousness in good Works without a Divine Promise. 2. That if there were so, there is no Obligation on God to reward such Acts in point of Justice. The former is so much harder to do from what he had proved before, c. 14. Viz. that they are not meritorious without a Promise; and here he proves that they have no proportion to the Reward, from Scripture, Fathers and Reason; because there is no Obligation on God to do it, either from commutative or distributive justice; and because we are God's Servants. These are good Arguments against himself for how can such Acts then become meritorious without a Promise? If there be no proportion or equality on Man's part, no Justice on God's part to reward, how can they possibly be meritorious? But this is too deep for me to comprehend. My business is Tradition, and I have evidently proved that there was no Tradition even in the Church of Rome for the true Merit defined by the Council of Trent. It were easie to carry this point higher, by she wing that the Fathers knew nothing of this Doctrine, but that hath been done by many already, and it is needless in so plain a case.
But I am now to give an account by what Steps and Occasions this Doctrine came to be established.
1. From the common Use of the word Merit with the Fathers and others, in another sense than it signified at first. The original signification of it is Wages Jos. Scalig. in Varr. de L. L. p. 172. bud. in Pandect. pag. 362. Plir…. ep. l. 1. 8.paid in consideration of Service; and from thence Souldiers were said merere (as Budaeus observes, and thence came the word merces) who truly deserved their pay by their labour and hazard; but by degrees it came to signifie no more than merely to attain a thing; which is sometimes used by good Authors; but in the declension of the Latin Tongue no sense of this word was more common than this, especially among Ecclesiastical Writers. Who frequently used it in a sense wherein it was impossible to understand it in its original signification; and it cannot imply so much as digne consequi, as in the instance brought by Cassander; when St. Cyprian renders Cassand. in Hymn. Eccl. p. 179.those words of St. Paul, Misericordiam merui, which we render, I obtained Mercy; but the Council of Trent allows there could be no true Merit here. And St. Augustin Aug. in Joh. Tr. 31. n. 9.saith of those who murdered the Son of God, Illi veniam meruerunt qui Christum occiderunt. And so the vulgar Latin often uses it, Gen. 4. 13. major est iniquitas mea quam ut veniam merear. Jos. 11. 20. & non mererentur ullam Clementiam. And in that sense it hath been used in the Hymns and other Offices of the Church, as in that expression, O felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! where it cannot be denied that the word is used in an improper Sense.
2. When the School Divines set themselves to explain the Mysteries of Theology, this plain and easie, but improper sense of Merit, would not go down with som of them; but they endeavoured to make out the notion of Merit with respect to God, in its proper and original Sense. The last considerable Writer before the Scholastick Age, was St. Bernard, and he pretended not to find out any such proportion between the best Works and Eternal Life, that God should be bound in Neque enim talia sunt hominion merita, ut propter ea vita aeterna deberetur ex jure, aut Deus injuriam aliquam faceret, nisi eam donaret. Nam ut taceam quod merita …mnia Dona Dei sunt, & ita bomo m…gis propter ipsa Deo debitor est, qu…m Deus bomini, quid sunt merita omnia ad tantam gloriam? Bernard Se…m. 1. de Aunur. Bellarm. de Justis. l. 5. c. 6.justice to bestow it as a Recompence for them; and the Reason he gives is plain and strong, because those things men pretend to merit by, are themselves the Gifts of God's Grace, and so by them they are more bound to God, than God to them; but besides, what are all mens merits to Eternal Glory? St. Bernard doth not speak of Merits without Grace, but with the supposition of it; and Bellarmin wisely left out the latter part, that he might seem to answer the former.
Hugo de Sancto Victore lived in the same Age, who first shewed the way to School Divinity, and upon the Hugo de S. …ict. Annot. Elucidator in Rom.same place which St. Bernard speaks of, Non sunt condig nae, &c. he puts the Question, how any temporal Acts can merit that which is eternal? And he denies any Condignity, because there is more in the Reward than there was in the Merit; but then he adds, that there may be a threefold comparison of things; either as to themselves, as a Horse for a Horse, Money for Money; or according to equity, either in punishments or rewards; or by Pact or Agreement, as when a good summ is promised for a little work; and this, saith he, God hath made known to Mankind as to future rewards and punishments. Which plainly shews, he understood nothing of the proportion between Acts of Grace, and an Eternal Happiness; but resolved all into the Favour and Mercy of God.
Peter Lombard, called the Master of the Sentences, Lomb. Sent. l. 2. dist. 27.saith, Nothing of any Condignity or Proportion in our works to the Reward; but, he saith, they are themselves God's Gifts, and that the Reward it self is from the Grace of God, and quotes the noted Saying of St. Augustin, Cum coronat Deus merita nostra, nihil aliud coronat quam dona sua. But still this is nothing but Grace and Favour in God, first in enabling us to do good Works, and then in rewarding them.
Bandinus wrote a Book of the Sentences much about the time P. Lombard did, with so much agreement of Method and Expressions, that it is not known which took from the other. Genebrard hath produced this passage Genebrard. de Trinit. l. 3. p. 312.out of him, Debet, inciviliter de Deo dicitur, quia nihil omnino nobis debet, nisi ex promisso. If it be so rude to say God owes any thing to his Creatures but by promise, he could not imagine any Condignity in good Works, to which a Reward is due in Justice. And Genebrard thinks he had reason to deny, that God can be made a Debtor to us by any of our Works.
Robertus Pullus, who wrote another Book of the Sentences Pull. Sentent. Part. 1. c. 13.about the same time, mentioning that place, Non sunt condignae, &c. he saith, because our Works are not sufficient, being small and temporal, God by his Mercy makes it up; which not onelyonly shews that God doth reward beyond our merit, but that there is no proportion between the best Works and Eternal Glory.
But by the time of Gulielmus Antissiodorensis, there were two Parties in the Church about this point; some, Guliel. Antis. l. 3. tr. 12. q. 2. de m… rito virt.he saith, denied any Merit of Eternal Life, ex condigno, and others asserted it; and after laying down the Arguments on both sides, he concludes for the Affirmative; but in Answer to the place, Non sunt condignae, &c. he saith they are not ad proportionaliter merendum, but they are ad simpliciter merendum; so that still he denied any Proportion, though he held simple Merit.
But Thomas Aquinas coming after him, denies that 1. 2. q. 114. art. 1.there can be any simple Merit with respect to God, because that cannot be where there is so great inequality; and so there can be no equal Justice between them, but ac…ording to a proportion; which he afterwards explains, viz. as to the substance and Freedom of our good Works there is onelyonly art. 3.a Congruity; but as they proceed from Divine Grace, so they are meritorious of Eternal Life, ex condigno.
This Doctrine had some followers in the Schools, but not many in comparison of those who opposed it, as appears by what is said already.
Richardus de Mediavilla, though a Franciscan, follows Richard. in Sent. l. 2. dist. 27. art. 2. Q. 3.herein the Doctrine of Aquinas, and asserts, that by Acts of Free Will, informed by Grace, a man may merit Eternal Life, ex condigno, and he adds somewhat more, potest certissime; and he uses the same Answers to the Objections which the other did.
And Nich. de Orbellis follows Richardus, so that Aquinas Nich. deOrb. in Sent. l. 2. dist. 27.his Doctrine had prevailed beyond his own School.
But it was as vehemently opposed by others of that Fraternity, among whom Cardinal Hosius mentions Stephanus Brulifer, who maintained, that no Act of Grace, Hos. Confess. Petrico c. 73. p. 141.how good soever, was worthy of Eternal Life.
Paulus Burgensis, though he is said to have been converted from being a Jew, by reading Aquinas, yet utterly P. Burg. addit. ad Lyram in Ps. 35.dissented from him in this matter: For he saith, that no man can by the Ordinary assistance of Grace Merit Eternal Life ex condigno, and therefore the Mercy of God is most seen in Heaven.
However the Reputation of Aquinas might gain upon some, yet this was very far then from being a Catholick Tradition.
But no Council ever interposed its Authority in this matter, till the Council of Trent, which resolved to carry the Points in difference to the height, and to establish every thing that was questioned. Nothing had been more easie than to have given satisfaction in this matter, considering what Pighius and Contarenus, and even Genebrard, had yielded in it; but there the Rule was, that every thing that was disputed, must be determined first, and then defended.
And so it hath happened with this Decree, which, lest we should think the matter capable of softening, hath been since asserted in the highest manner. Bellarmin asserts Good Works of themselves, and not merely by compact, Bell. de justif. l. 5. c. 17.to be meritorious of Eternal Life, so that in them there is a certain Proportion and Equality to Eternal Life.
Costerus saith, that in Works of Grace, there is an equality Coster. En…rid. p. 294.between the Work and the Reward.
Suarez, that they have an intrinsecal Dignity, whereby Suarez. de Grat. l. 12. c. 1. n. 18. Vasquez in 1. 2. Disp. 213. c. 5.they become worthy of Eternal Life.
Vasquez, that there is an Equality of Dignity between Good Works and Eternal Life, without which a Promise could not make true Merit.
The Rhemists say, that good Works are truly and properly Bhemists on 2 Tim. 4. 8.meritorious, and justly worthy of Everlasting Life; and that thereupon Heaven is the just Due, and just Stipend, Crown or Recompence, which God by his Justice oweth to the Persons so doing by his Grace.
And again, that Good Works are meritorious, and the very cause of Salvation. so far that God should be unjust, On Heb. 6. 8.if he rendred not Heaven for the same.
Phil. Gamachaeus, a late Professour of Divinity in the Sorbon, speaks it roundly, Gamach. in 1. 2. Th. Q. 114. c. 2. Concil. 2. Omnes Catholici fatentur justos suis bonis operibus mereri gloriam de Condigno.that the Council of Trent did plainly mean to establish Merit ex condigno, and that all Catholicks are agreed in it.
The last Defender of the Council of Trent within these Aug. Reding Defens. Conc. Trident. Tr. 4. se…t. 2. ad sess. 6. c. 1.few years, saith, That there is an intrinsecal Condignity in good Works, whereby they bear a proportion commensurate with the Glory of Heaven. And without such Doctrine as this, he doth not think the Council of Trent can be defended in this matter.
If after all it be said, that this is a mere subtilty concerning the proportion an Act of Grace bears to the state of Glory; I answer, the more to blame they, who have made and imposed it as a matter of Faith, as the Council of Trent hath done with an Anathema, and that without any pretence from Catholick Tradition.
But what made the Council of Trent so much concerned for a Scholastick Subtilty? There was a deep Mystery lay in this, They were wise enough to frame the Decree so, as to avoid Offence, and to make it appear plausible, but it was enough to the People to understand that the Merit of Good Works was allowed, and they were to believe the Priests, both as to the Good Works they were to do, and as to the putting them into a state of Grace, to make them capable of meriting. And this was the true Reason of the Anathema, against those who should deny the true Merit of Good Works.