The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion, Religious tract · Chapter 13
CAP. XIII.
The Surveyer's grounds taken from Scripture, for abſolute Submiſſion to Suffering, examined.
HAving thus proved the lawfulneſſe of private perſones reſiſting, in caſes of neceſſity, the unjuſt violence of Superiour powers, by many arguments; and having vindicated the ſame from what this Surveyer had to ſay againſt them, We come now to examine his grounds for the contrary aſſertion. Out of Scripture he adduceth Three grounds Pag. 28. &c.
The firſt is taken from the duty of Children toward Paents unjuſtly afflicting them Heb. 12: ver. 9, 10. where, their reverend ſubjection under unreaſonable and unjuſt dealing is commended: and from the duty of Servants to ſuffer at the hands of unjuſt and froward Maſters 1 Pet. 2: 18, 19, 20. To which we anſwere,
1. That theſe examples are ſo far from making againſt us, that they fully comfirme our poynt, as we have shewed above: For, notwithſtanding of what is ſaid in theſe places, he cannot deny, but Parents may be reſiſted by their Children, in ſeveral caſes, and Maſters by their Servants. It would be ſtrange, if he should preſſe this ſubjection ſo cloſe home, that now no Servant might lawfully reſiſt and withſtand the fury of his Maſter; nor no Childe might hold his furious Father's hands, and defend himſelf againſt his unjuſt acts of cruelty. And Althuſius Pol. c. 38. n. 88, 89. tels us that in ſeveral caſes, the father lòſeth the right of his fatherly power over Children; & maſters power, from the law Tit. luſt quib. mod. jus Pat. Pot. amit. § Domin, luſt .de his qui ſunt ſui vel alieni juris l. 5. § ſivel Par. de agant. vel alend. lib. L. necfilium Cap. de Patr. potcst. L. 2. L. 3. Cap. de Inf. expoſ. Novel 115. Cap. 3.
2. If theſe ſimititudes be hardly preſſed, it shall not now be lawful for Subjects to reſiſt ſo much as by flying; for the reverence and ſubjection required of Children unto their parents, will not ſuffer that to evite every ſmal injurie from their parents, they should ran away from under their power and ſubjection; nor might ſervants in thoſe dayes run away from their Maſters, who had another dominion over them, then Maſters now have over their Servants, who are free to goe off when they will; himſelf acknowledgeth this Pag. 31.
3. We have shewed above what a vaſt difference there is, betwixt the power of Parents over their Children; and the power of Magiſtrates over their Subjects: And he himſelf doth confeſſe there is a difference; yet ſayes he, Pag. 29. There is a full parity and agreement in this, that in the inflicting of evils upon theſe who are under them (ſuch as are competent to them to inflict within their ſphaere) a patient reverent ſubjection is due from their inferiours, even when they abuſe their power.] Anſ. This is the queſtion, if the parity hold even here in all poynts; for ſeing theſe Relations are different one from another, even in their nature and ground, it is but rational to think, that there muſt alſo be ſome difference betwixt them, as to the conſequent or reſult that floweth from that relation, elſe it would follow that as Children are ſo Subject, as that they can never but be ſubject, to their Parents; ſo Subjects could never be free of their Superiours; and yet himſelf tells us, that they may, by going under another government, or removing to other dominions. 2. Who shall be judge, whether the Superior keepeth within his ſpaere, yea or not? If the Superiour, then there is no remedy at all; for when he doth moſt exceed his bounds, he may judge that he keepeth within bounds, and ſo whether he keep within his ſphaere or not, there muſt no reſiſtence be uſed, but a ſtupide ſubjection. 3. Whether may the Superiour be reſiſted by the inferiour, when he doth what is not incumbent to him to do within his ſphaere, or not? If he may not, then why is this parentheſis added, As a reſtriction or limitation of the Subjection required? If he may be reſiſted when he really goeth without his ſphaere, then this makes for us; for he muſt grant that the Magiſtrate doth nor preſcribe the limites of his owne povver, but God and nature, and the conſtitution of the Realme. Novv God hath never put it in the povver of Princes to preſſe their ſubjects to perjury, or to a complyance with a ſinful abhominable and abjured courſe; ſo that vvhn he doth thus, he goeth beyond his ſphaere: His ſphaere is to rule for God and the good of the land, and not to deſtroy the intereſt of Chriſt, and the Commongood: and if he may be reſiſted, vvhen he goeth beyond this ſphaere, then vve have all vve aske. It vvas never vvithin his ſphaere, to break his compact vvith his People: and vvhen he doth ſo, he is vvithout his ſphaere and may be reſiſted, and this is alſo for us. Againe he tells us in the 2 place. That though Kings are not fathers by generation; yet as Kings and Magiſtrats should have fatherly hearts to their ſubjects, (they being a ſort of official fathers to them, to procure their good, and defend them from evil) ſo ſubjects ought to have ſuch hearts to their King, as Children have to their fathers, giving them ſpeical reverence, ſubjection and obedience, from their very ſoul and inward affection.] Anſw. All this ſayes that as Kings are metaphorical Fathers, ſo Subjects, are metaphorical Children. But as it doth not ſay, that Kings should become Tyrants, & not carry fatherly affection tovvards their Subjects; ſo it doth not ſay, that Subejcts may not reſiſt their tyrannical rage and fury, vvherein they acte not as fathers, but as Tygers. 2. It is true, ſpecial reverence ſubjection & obedience is due to Magiſtrats, but alvvayes in the Lord; The relation is mutual, if they carry not as official fathers ſeeking the good of the ſubjects and defending them, but as devouring Lyons ſeeking the deſtruction of their Subjects both in ſoul and body, they cannot expect, according to vvhat he ſayeth, that hearty ſubjection and obedience, vvhichwhich othervviſe they might have. 3. Being but official fathers appoynted by the ſubjects, and ſet over them by their vvill and conſent, they muſt have leſſe povver to vvronge the Subjects, then Parents have to vvronge their Children, vvho have not that relation by vertue of any formal compact with, or conſent of their Children. So that when they do injuries, Subjects are in a greater capacity to help themſelves, then Children are; vvhen their Parents to injure them. He addeth [Although ſome times they are not ſuch as they ought to be, yet they ought to account their perſons (ſealed with Gods ordinance, and the image of of his Soveraignity) ſacred and inviolable, reſolving to ſuffer any thing of them rather then be guilty of parricide (although under the colour of ſelf defence) Gods law in the fift command hath injoyned reverence & ſubjection to Princes under the title of Parents Calv. Iuſtit. Lib. 4. Cap. 8. &c. [Anſw. We are not ſpeaking of doing violence unto the perſons of Soveraignes, or of committing parricide, but only of the matter of reſiſtance, and of natural ſinleſſe ſelfe defence, vvhichwhich is far different from Killing of Kings: If he think the one of the ſame nature vvith the other, he vvrongeth the King's life, more then he is avvare of. Though Children as Children may not Kill their parents, yet they may defend themſelves from their unjuſt violence. 2. We grant Kings are comprehended in the fift commandement under the title of parents, as Calvin doth; and not only Kings, but all Superiours: & yet he will not ſay, I ſuppoſe, that we are not to reſiſt the unjuſt violence of any ſuperiour, but that they are all ſo ſacred and inviolable, as that in all things, they muſt be ſubjected unto, without the leaſt reſiſtence: and therefore what he addeth is not to the poynt.
4. We have shewed above, that there is a vaſte diſparity betvvixt Maſters and Kings, in reference to their ſlaves and ſubjects; He himſelf acknovvledgeth this, Pag. 31. [Yet (ſayes he) though there be theſe differences betwixt the dominative or maſterly, and the Royal or Magistratical power, the inferiours ſubjection in ſuffering (even wrongfully, if God permit in his providence the power to be abuſed) is no leſse under the one power, then under the other, by vertue of Divine Law. Subjects ſerve the Soveraigne, (though they be not ſlaves:) and not only conquered people are called Servants, 2 Sam. 8: v. 14. but alſo ordinary ſubjects, 2 Sam. 11: V. 24. 1 King. 12: V. 4.—Though he alſo be in a ſenſe their ſervant (not in relation of an inferiour to a ſuperiour, for ſo the Magiſtrate is only the Miniſter of God for the Peoples good, and never called their Miniſter) but in relation of the meanes to the end—as Angles are ministring ſpirits for the heires of ſalvation, and Miniſters are Servants to the People, &c.] Anſw. That the ſubjection is alike in both theſe relations, can with no colour of reaſon be aſſerted; for it is abſurd to ſay, that Subjects who ſet up the Magiſtrate, who limite his power, who binde him by Covenants, and deſigne their owne good in ſetting him up, & do it in a voluntary way, are the ſame way ſubject to their Princes,; as ſlaves, who are as other goods for the profite of the Maſter, & are, both in bodyes & goods, otherwiſe ſubject unto their Maſters, and that in a manner againſt their will, either being ſold, or redeeming their life in war, by giving themſelves up as ſlaves. 2. As there are various Kindes of Superiours, ſo the relation varyeth, and is more or leſſe cloſſe and efficacious, and the ſubjection muſt accordingly vary: I am not alike ſubjected to every one that is over me, as I am ſubjected to my Soveraigne; nor am I ſo ſubjected to him, as to my natural parents, or as a wife is to her husband. 3. Though the Subejcts in ſome ſenſe call themſelves ſervants to the ſoveraigne, (which yet is often a tearme of civil reſpect; for Naaman called himſelf Elisha's ſervant 2 King. 5: 15. and Obadiah ſaid the like to Elijah 1 King. 18: 9.) yet if they be not ſlaves; they muſt have more allowance then ſlaves have, and ſo have more povver to reſiſt unjuſt violence then they had. 4. If the Magiſtrate be the peoples ſervant in relation of the meanes to the end; then the relation betvvixt him and his Subejcts, is not ſuch a relation as is betvvixt Parents and Children, or betwixt Maſters and Slaves; for the end of theſe relations, is not the good of Children and ſlaves: And next, Subejcts muſt have more power allowed them to ſee to the end, which is their owne good, and to ſee that the means prove not deſtructive of the end: and if the meanes prove no meanes, the relation falleth, and he is no more a ſervant ſeeking their good, but a Tyrant ſeeking his owne. 5. It is ſooner ſaid then proved, that the People who ſet up the King are not ſuperiour to the King: He should have aſwered Lex Rex as to this: but it is like, he thinketh that his ſaying thus, is more firme and irrefragable, then Lex Rex reaſonings to the contrary: But I know not who will think ſo with him. 6. There is a great difference betwixt Angels ſerving the ſaints, or rather ſerving God that way; and the King ſerving his People: The ſaints have no hand in ſetting up angels to protect them, as People have in ſetting up Magiſtrates. 7. If they be ſervants as miniſters are, then, though in regard of their official power they should not be ſubject to the People, yet they may be reſiſted, as was shevved above: and this is all vve preſſe for.
5. There is a great difference betwixt ſuffering of Buffettings, and correction, and ſuch like petty, private, perſonal injuries, at the hands of Parents or Maſters; and the ſuffering of loſſe of Liberties, Life, Lands, Religion, and ſuch like, which tend to the ruine of the Commonwealth. To this our Surveyer replyeth two things Pag. 32. as, 1. [The grounds that ſuch men goe upon for private perſones violent reſiſting the Magiſtrate (viz. the abuſe of his power) if they hold good, will as effectually evince a non-ſubjection & violent reſiſtence to Parents and Maſters in abuſing their power.] Anſw. We ſay not that the Magiſtrate's abuſe of his power is the only ground of reſiſtance; this should have been shewed, and not ſaid barely, as it is here: But when other things give ground of reſiſtence, yea and a call thereunto, it is enough for us to ſay, that we reſiſt not the power, but the abuſe of the power. 2. Though we walked upon no other ground (which is falſe, as is cleare from what is ſaid) yet his conſequence would be null, unleſſe he should affirme, which yet he dar not, That the Magiſtrate is under no other obligation to his Subjects, then Parents are to their Children, and Maſters to their Slaves. But what ſayes he? 2. [as death is not, ſo no punishment unjuſtly inflicted is eligible, where lawfully it can be warded off. But this is the ſtate of the queſtion, if private perſones may lawfully violente the Magiſtrate abuſeing his power: if in greater evils unjuſtly inflicted, there is alwayes a liberty for inferiours violently to re-offend the powers above them? Why not in leſſe evils too? Theſe gradual differences of inflicted evils cannot make ſuch variation, in the poynt of duty, ſeing the grounds hold equally ſtrong; if a man may reſiſt the Magiſtrate for abuſe of his power, he may do ſo alſo againſt his father, or Maſter on the ſame grounds, and if he may not ſo deal with them, he may not deal ſo with the Magiſtrate neither] Anſw. It is true that no punishment unjuſtly inflicted is eligible where lawfully it can be warded off; but there may be more ſaid, for the lawfulneſſe of warding off of death, then for warding off a little blow. And 2 there may be more ſaid for warding off a blow, then for warding it off by violenting the Superiour: We ſpeak not of violenting the Superiour, but of warding off the blae and bitter blowes, and ſuch other iujuries equivalent to death, done by his bloody emiſſaries, which may be done without violent re-offending the powers above us. 3. When the injuries are great and grievous, and not eaſily reparable, God and nature will allow, a warding of theſe off, even by violence, when they can no otherwiſe be shuned. Though a Childe may willingly Subject himſelf unto correction, though he do not really deſerve it, yet if his father in ſtead of taking a whipe to chaſtiſe him, shall take a ſword to hew him in pieces, or a knife to cut his throate. I ſuppoſe in that caſe, the Childe may refuſe hearty ſubjection, and either flee away, or if he cannot, ſave his life ſo long as he can, either by calling for help, or with his owne hands if he be able. And here he will grant, I ſuppoſe, that the gradual difference of inflicted evills will make a variation in poynt of this duty of reſiſtence. So in ſmaller injuries ſubjects may be patient, and beare a little, for redeeming more, and rather ſuffer the loſſe of little then hazard all, but when it comes to an extremity; and Life, and Religion and Liberty, and all that is dear to them as men as Chriſtians, is in eminent and unavoydable hazard, then they may lawfully ſtand to their defence, and reſiſt that abuſed power, not meerly, nor only, nor formally, becauſe it is an abuſed power, but becauſe it is ſo abuſed, as that it deſtroyeth the ends for which it was appoynted, and deſtroyeth all that is deare unto them, and which they are bound to defend, upon any hazard, if it be in their power; becauſe the loſſe is irreparable. Though a gradual difference of evil inflicted do not vary the ſpece of evil inflicted, the leaſt evil inflicted being an evil eſſentially as well as the greateſt, to him who doth inflict it; yet it may alter the ground of reſiſtence, not only of ſuperiours, but alſo of equals and inferiours; for I may beare with a ſmal injury at the hand of mine equal and inferiour, and not ſo much as ſeek reparation by law, when I ſee that either the matter is not tanti, or that I shall expend more in regaining my owne, then all my loſſe was: But will he think that upon this ground it will follow, that if mine equal or inferiour shall endeavour by fraud or falsehood, to take from me my whole eſtate, I may not then ſue him at the law, and vindicate my owne? Sure it were irrational to ſay ſo.
6. This will ſpeak as much againſt reſiſting of the inferiour powers, as reſiſting of the Supreame: For they are metaphorical Fathers too, and ſuperiours over us, as well as the Soveraigne, and the compariſon will hold in the one, as well as in the other. Now if he think that the concurrence or command of the Inferiour Magiſtrate, will not warrand Subjects to reſiſt the Supreame; He muſt alſo ſay that the concurrence or command of the Superiour, will not warrand a reſiſting of the inferour; and ſo it shall be alike unlawful to reſiſt any, if this compariſon hold, according to his urging of it: For it was not lawful for the Childe to reſiſt the Mother, but to ſuffer patiently her chaſtiſment, though the Father should have been indulgent, and would have pardoned the Childe, or extenuated and excuſed the Childe as not guilty of the fault alledged. So was the childe alſo obliged to be Subject unto his Father's corrections, though the indulgent Mother would have taken the Childe's part againſt the Father.
7. The Servant was to bear buffets patiently 1 Pet. 2. & after Chriſt's example was not to buffet againe; for Chriſt being reviled did not revile againe, and ſo the place ſpeaketh not againſt reſiſtence for ſelf defence; but againſt buffeting againe, which is no formal warding off of blowes, & floweth not from ſinleſſe nature ſeeking to defend it ſelf; but rather from a ſpirit of revenge: So that, for all this, the Servant might have warded off blowes, and ſaved his head with his armes, when his cruel Maſter was ſeeking to break his head.
8. It is one thing to ſpeak of what a Childe may do, who hath no power to reſiſt his father, or what a ſlave is called to, who hath no power or probable way to reſiſt his Maſter; & another thing to ſpeak of what a Nation, or a Conſiderable part of a Nation may do againſt a few, whoſe unjuſt violence they are able to reſiſt.
9. The maine ground of this argument is a miſtake; for he thinketh that patient ſuffering is inconſiſtent with reſiſting. But Lex Rex quaeſt 30. Pag. 281. hath shewed a conſiſtencie, (but it is his beſt, according to his uſual cuſtome, to paſſe over ſuch things as he cannot anſwere.) So that the conſequence is a meer nullity: for becauſe servants are to ſuffer unjuſt buffetings, at the hands of their wicked Maſters, It will not follow, That therefore they are obliged in conſcience to non-reſiſtence: for as Lex Rex sheweth, The Church of God was to bear with all patience the indignation of the Lord becauſe she had ſinned Micah. 9 10, 11, 12. and yet she was not obliged to non-reſiſtence; but rather obliged to fight againſt here Enemies. David beare patiently the wrong that this Sone abſolome did to him, as is clear by 2 Sam. 25: ver. 25, 26. and Cap. 16: v. 10, 11, 12. Pſal. 3: v 1, 2, 3. Yet did he lawfully reſiſt him and his forces. So we are to beare ſickneſſe, paines, and torments, which the Lord ſendeth on us; and yet very lawfully may we labour and uſe all lawful meanes to be freed from them.
10. Chriſt's Rule to us; Math. 5: v. 39. is, that whoſoever shall ſmile us on the right cheek, we should turne the other to him alſo, and what more patient ſubjection can be required by a Magiſtrate of his ſubjects? and yet this will not make it altogether unlawful for private perſones to defend themſelves from unjuſt violence offered them, by their equalls or inferiours. No more will it follow from that patient ſubjection that we owe to Rulers, that in no caſe we may reſiſt their unjuſt violence, and defend ourſelves there from.
11. I hope notwithſtanding of any thing, that is ſpoken in theſe paſſages, he will allow children when wronged by their Parents, and Servants when iniured by their Maſters, liberty to complaine to Magiſtrates who are over both, and yet this is the uſeing of a legal reſiſtence, and as much oppoſite (if at all oppoſite) to the patience and ſubjection injoyned, as is violent reſiſtence, when that legal reſiſtence cannot be had; as ſuppoſe, when Father and Son, and Maſter and Servant are living in no Community, where there are Rulers and Judges over them: and if this be lawful in this caſe (as it cannot be denyed) then muſt it alſo be lawfull for ſubjects to repel the unjuſt violence of Princes with violence: Becauſe there is no political Rulers over both King & People. But People muſt make uſe of that Court and tribunal of neceſſity, which nature hath allowed, and by innocent violence, repel the unjuſt violence of Princes, ſeing there is no other remedy.
His ſecond ground out of Scripture is taken from Mat. 5: ver. 10. 1 Pet. 4: ver. 14, 17. and the like places; [Where there is a commended ſuffering for Chriſt and Righteouſneſſe ſake, and conſequently a ſort of commanded ſuffering: a ſuffering contradiſtinct from ſuffering for evil doing, even a cleanly ſubmiſſion to ſuffer in and for well doing (when God in his providence permits Rulers ſo to abuſe their power) which paſſive ſubjection or ſubmiſsion is not grounded on the Rulers abuſe of his power through his corrupt will, but upon the peculiar command of God enjoyning ſubmiſſion in ſuch caſes.]
Anſw. 1. Theſe & the like ſpeak nothing at all to the poynt: For, as we may be perſecuted for righteouſneſſe ſake by equalls, Yea and by inferiours; ſo we are to ſuffer that perſecution, when God in his providence calleth us thereunto, with patience and humble ſubmiſſion of Spirit. But is this a good argument, to prove that it is unlawful for us to reſiſt and repel injuries offered to us by equals or inferiours? And if it will not prove it unlawful for us to reſiſt our equals or inferiours, neither can it hence be inferred that it is unlawful for us to reſiſt Superiours. 2. By this ſame reaſon the King if a Chriſtian, is bound to ſubmit as well to his ſubjects, as they to him; at leaſt, he is not bound to reſiſt a foraigne King invading him for Religion, which I know not who will grant. 3. That God alwayes calleth us to ſubmiſſio nor paſſive ſubjection, when in his providence he permits Rulers to abuſe their power, is the thing in queſtion, and this argument doth no way prove it. 4. We grant, that God calleth us to ſuffer for righteouſneſſe ſake, patiently and Chriſtianly, whether at the hands of Superiours, or at the hands of equals or inferiours, when in his providence we are ſo ſtated, as that we muſt either ſuffer, or ſin by denying a teſtimony for his truth and cauſe: But that, when a door is opened for eshewing ſuffering, and God in his providence ſeemeth not to call us thereunto (as he never doth, when he giveth a faire way of preventing it) we are called to ſuffer, and bound to chooſe ſuffering at the hands of any, is denyed and not proved by him.
But furder he tells us. That [Lex Rexquaest. 30. Leers at paſſive obedience, as a chymaera, as a dreame, and as involving a contradiction: And he thinks (ſayes he) he speaketh acutely, in ſaying, God never gave to any a command to ſuffer for well doing, nor at all to ſuffer (ſuffering depending on the free will of another without us, and not on our owne free will; and ſo not falling under any command of God to us,) but he reaſones (ſayes he) very ſophistically, inferring that becauſe meer ſuffering, which neceſſarily depends on the action of another, is not commanded to us, therefore ſubjection to ſuffering, or paſſive obedience is not commanded, when the Magistrate inflicts ſuffering.] Anſ. The worthy Author of Lex Rex was there anſwering the objection of Royalists, who alledged ſuch places, where, they ſuppoſed, we were commanded to ſuffer, and among ſeveral aſſertions, which he laid down to ſolve this, he had this aſſertions, That ſuffering formally as ſuffering, nor non-reſiſting paſſive, could fall under no formal law of God, except in two caſes, 1. in the poynt of Chriſt's paſſive obedience, and 2. indirectly and comparatively, when it cometh to the election of the witneſſe of Ieſus, whether he will ſuffer or deny the truth of Chriſt, ſo that this alternative muſt be unavoydable, otherwayes (ſayd he) no man is to expect the reward of a witneſſe of Ieſus, who having a lavvful poſſible meane of eshevving ſuffering, doth yet caſt himſelf into ſuffering needleſly. Novv vvhat a meer vvrangler muſt this be, vvho ſayeth, that that vvorthy Author did reaſon ſophiſtically in ſo inferring, vvhileas he is only anſvvering the objection: and hereby he doth it ſufficiently; for if it be evinced (as he hath unanſvverably evinced it) that paſſive obedience or paſſive ſubjection is not formally commanded; then their arguments proving this paſſive ſubjection to be our duty, are null; and ſo they cannot hence inferre, that non-ſubjection paſſive is forbidden. And vvhat have they gained then out of theſe places? Can this Surveyer affirme that paſſion as paſſion, or ſuffering formally as ſuch, cometh under a command of God? no, he dar not, but muſt vvith Lex Rex ſay, that it is impoſſible that meer paſſion, (as to be whipped, to be hanged, to be beheaded should be the object of an affirmative or perceptive command of God. Why then is he offended vvith Lex Rex? Why jeers he at that worthy Author, ſaying he thinks he ſpeaks acutely? is this to anſwere Lex Rex to jeer at what is there ſayd, aud then be forced (or ſpeak non-ſenſe) to affirme the ſame thing that is there aſſerted? But ſayes he, Pag. 34. [Subjection to the paſſion may fall under a command, and this is called paſſive obedience, which implyes more then meer paſſion or ſuffering; even a diſpoſition and motion of the heart to lye under that lot with an eye to God, whoſe ordinance is uſed upon the ſufferer; only it is called paſſive obedience, becauſe as to the preciſe ſuffering the punishment, there is no external action done, enjoyned by the law or command of the Magistrate, as there is in active obedience, although there be ſome diſpoſitive or preparatory actions in order to ſuffering (not inferring a direct preparation to a mans owne ſuffering) which he may and ought to do, as going to a gallowes on his owne feet, or up a ladder, or laying down his head on a block, that it may be ſtrucken off.] Anſw. That ſubjection to the paſſion might fall under a command was granted in ſome caſes by Lex Rex, as was ſaid; but that it falleth under a command when God openeth a faire door to eshew it, he is not able to prove. 2. Hovv proper it is to call that ſubmiſſion paſſive obedience, is not worth the while to enquire, Lex Rex tolde us (and he cannot confute it) that it was repugnantia in adjecto to call it obedience, ſince obedience properly ſo called, is relative eſſentially to a law: Now there is no moral law enjoyning this, for no man is formally a ſinner againſt a moral law, becauſe he ſuffereth not the evil of punishment, nor are theſe in hell formally obedient to a law, becauſe they ſuffer againſt their will. 3. As for that diſpoſition and motion of heart, which he ſpeaketh of, that is nothing but what Lex Rex ſaid viz. That modus rei the manner of ſuffering, was under a command, and indeed obedience to that was and is obedience to a moral law. But the Surveyer called it an errour to ſay that only the modus rei is commanded or forbidden, and why? becauſe (ſayes he,) That ſame command that forbids reſiſting the Magiſtrate in doing his duty, enjoyneth ſubmiſſion and paſsive obedience to him, although we were able by force to deliver ourſelves, out of his hand.] Anſw. Then by him, there is no medium betwixt this ſubmiſſion to paſſive obedience, and poſitive reſiſtence: And ſo, either he muſt ſay that flying is reſiſting, (which yet Pag. 41. he calleth a monſter of a Stoical paradox) or he muſt ſay, that flying and refuſeing to ſubmit to this paſſive obedience, is a ſubmitting to this paſſive obedience: And whether this will not rather look like a monſter of a Stöical paradox, let all men of common ſenſe judge. 2. Is the guilty perſon bound by any moral law, to ſuffer death or whipping, if the Magiſtrate will not execute the ſentence upon him? Or is every one in that caſe bound to deliver up himſelf to the Magiſtrate, & accuſe himſelf, and purſue the accuſation until the ſentence be executed? If not, how doth this paſſive ſubmiſſion fall under a moral law? If he ſay, when he is apprehended or in hands, he is not to reſiſt, but ſubmit to the ſtroke. Anſwer. 1. Will not any ſee, that then the res ipſa is not commanded, but the modus rei, and ſo Lex Rex ſaid true, Pag. 318. That paſſive obedience to wicked Rulers was enjoyed Rom. 13. only in the manner, and upon ſuppoſition that we muſt be ſubject to them, and muſt ſuffer againſt our wills all the evil of punishment that they can inflict, Then we muſt ſuffer patiently. But 2. Though we be bound to ſubmit to the Magiſtrate doing his duty, and inflicting juſt puniſhment, will it follow that therefore we are bound to ſubmit to the Magiſtrate doing not his duty, but inflicting unjuſt punishment? Or doth the ſame paſſive obedience to powers punishing unjuſtly fall under the moral law? How doth he prove either the conſequence or the conſequent? [We aſſert (ſayes he Pag. 53.) That a private perſon though wrongfully afflicted by the lawful Magiſtrate proceeding according to law, (let it be ſo that it is lex malè poſita or an evil law) is hound not only to Chriſtian patience in ſuffering—but unto a ſubmiſſion without repelling of violence by violence; and that in conſcientious reſpect to the ordinance of God, wherewith the lawful Magiſtrate is inveſted (although abuſeing it in this particular) and with a tender regard to the prevention of ſeditions and confuſions in humane ſocieties.] Anſ. 1. This is dictator-like to prove the concluſion, by aſſerting it; what a ridiculous fool is he to come with his aſſertions, and yet give us nothing but the very thing controverted? Is not this a very hungry empty man, to beg (when he cannot better do) the very thing in quaeſtion? 2. Then it ſeemeth, he will grant that a privat perſon may reſiſt the lawful Magiſtrate, when proceeding contrary to law; where is then the conſcientious reſpect to the Ordinance of God, wherewith the lawful Magiſtrate is inveſted; and that tender regaird to prevent ſedition, &c. which he talketh of? Sure in the one caſe, the Ordinance is but abuſed, as it is in the other. 3. Let me ask, if there were a juſt judge ſitting, who would execute juſtice and judgement for God, and were ſummoning him to anſwere for his perjury, apoſtaſy, and other villannies which he is conſcious to himſelf of, and ſome others are privie to, and could witneſſe againſt him; would he compeare, or rather would he not run from under the reach of juſtice, and ſecure himſelf? or if apprehended, would he not labour an eſcape to ſave his neck from the rope? If ſo (as all who know him will veryly belveeve he would) where would then this ſubmiſſion be which is due unto the Magiſtrate? And where would his conſcientious reſpect to the Ordinance of God not abuſed, but very rightly uſed in that particular, be? 4. If a Magiſtrate abuſeing his power to the deſtruction of the Subjects, should be reſiſted, what inconvenience would follow thereupon? [Seditions (ſayes he) and confuſions would be unavoydable, if every one, as he thinks himſelf wronged, shall be allowed to uſe force upon the lawful Magiſtrate proceeding by law; the greatest Malefactors being ready to juſtify themſelves, and to violate the juſteſt Megiſtrates in their just proceedings.] Auſw. This is but the old ſong chanted over and over againe to us, and may therefore be diſmiſſed with a word: viz. That as the Magiſtrat's abuſe of his power in a particular, will not make the power it ſelf unlawful (as he will grant,) ſo nor will the abuſe of this reſiſtence in a particular, make reſiſtence it ſelf unlawful. 2. We plead not for reſiſtence by every one who thinketh himſelf wronged, but for reſiſtence when the wrongs are manifeſt, notour, undenyable, … grievous and intolerable, and done to a whole land, to God's glory, to Chriſt's intereſt, to a Covenant ſworne and ſubſcribed by all, to the Fundamental lawes of the land, to the compact betwixt King and Subject, to Religion, Lawes, Libertyes, Lives, and all which is dear to People. Theſe wrongs as they are no petty injuries, ſo nor are they quaeſtionable or uncertane, but as manifeſt as the ſun at the nonetide of the day. 3. What if the Magiſtrate or his Emiſſaryes proceed not according to law? And what if the law, which they pretend, be no law de jure, or a law made a non habente poteſtatem (as shall be manifeſt to be our caſe) should there no reſiſtence then be uſed but a ſtupid ſubmiſſion, out of a pretended and ſuppoſed regaird to the prevention of ſeditions and confuſions? 4. Since he thinks that ſo much regaird is to be had to the prevention of ſeditions and confuſions in ſocieties, ſure he should think that as much regaird is to be had unto the prevention of the utter ruine & deſtruction of ſocieties. Now, if magiſtrates abuſeing their power to the deſtruction of Societyes, might not be reſiſted; hovv shall they be preſerved from utter ruine, vvhichwhich is much more carefully to be prevented, then ſeditions and confuſions in ſocieties: And ſince he thinks, vvithout ground, that our doctrine is ſo evil and ſcandalous, and openeth a vvide gap for all vvicked ſeditious perſones to vvork confuſion in the Commonvvealth, and to overthrovv the beſt and juſteſt Magiſtrates; vve have juſt ground to think that his doctrine is not only evil and ſcandalous, but moſt perverſe, vvicked and adhominable, opening a vvide door to all tyranny, oppreſſion, cruelty; and an encouraging of all vvicked Tyrants to deal vvith their Subjects as ſo many Brutes or vvorſe, vvithout all fear of oppoſition; and to deſtroy utterly all Commonvvealths, or make them meer priſon-houſes for ſlaves, &c. And, if this doctrine of his tend not more to libertiniſme, then ours, let all judge.
His laſt ground out of ſcripture is that knovvn paſſage Rom. 13: ver. 1, 2. vvith 1 Per. 2: Ver. 11. (I think it should have been ver. 13.) Concerning vvhichwhich, he ſayes, [Such ſubjection is there commanded to the Powers then exiſting or in being foreign (ſuch as were Caligulae. Nero, Domitian, monſtrou Tyrants. enemies aud perſecuters of God's People) as is oppoſed to foreign, to ſtand in order againſt them (the word is from foreign, a military tearme) every ſoul is commanded to be ſubject or to ſtand in order under them foreign and for bidden to be foreign to ſtand in military order againſt them either defenſive or offenſive: By powers which are not to be reſiſted are clearly meant the perſons in power, as the Apoſtle afterward extones himſelf v. 3, 4. calling them Rulers, and Ministers of God, he meanes undoubtedly certane ſuppoſita and her ſonſ invested with power, and cannot meane the abstract ordinance of God, &c.]
Anſw. 1. That ſubjection here required is a ſtanding in order under them, and is oppoſite to the reſiſting or contra-ordinatneſſe here meaned, is granted; For 1. vve do not ſay, that Chriſtianity deſtroyeth Magiſtracy, or exempteth Chriſtians from ſubjection unto Magiſtracy and Magiſtrates: As ſome Hereticks then did, abuſeing their Chriſtian liberty, to deſtroy Magiſtracy; & as Heathens objected unto Chriſtians 'as Gerhard de Magiſt. Polit. n. 34. thinketh, vvhichwhich (as ſome think) vvas the occaſion of Paul's aſſerting the ordinance of Magiſtracy. Nor 2. do vve ſay, That it is unlavvful for Chriſtians to be ſubjects unto Heathen Magiſtrates, vvhichwhich, becauſe Chriſtian Gentiles might have drunk in from ſome jevves, particularly the Gaulonites, vvho held it unlavvful to yeeld any ſubjection unto Roman Emperours, or to ſtrangers, might have been the occaſion of Paul's diſcourſe of this Ordinance. And therefore to confute theſe miſtakes, The Apoſtle ſayes Let every ſoul be ſubject unto higher powers, &c. that is, acknowledge even ſuch lavvful Magiſtrates, though they be heathens, and yee chriſtians, vvhether jevves or gentiles, and think nor yourſelf exeemed from the duty of ſubjects tovvards ſuch. So that this makes nothing againſt us, and the ſubjection here required, upon this account, is not the ſubjection novv in quaeſtion; for a reſiſting of open and notour tyranny, othervviſe unavoidable, doth vvell conſiſt vvith this ſubjection, viz. an acknovvledgment of Magiſtrats as lavvful powers ordained of God, for the good of the Subjects.
2. The vvord ſubjection being thus taken in a general comprehenſive ſenſe, as containing in it all that duty which is required of Subjects tovvard their Superiours, The oppoſite tearme reſistence, or counter-orderedneſſe muſt alſo be taken in a general comprehenſive ſenſe, as including all the contrary evils. Now, as obedience is a ſpecial poynt of ſubjection unto Superiours, So diſobedience is a ſpecial poynt of contra ordinatneſſe. But, as an univerſal and unlimited obedience, in all poynts, is not here required, ſo neither can an univerſal and unlimited ſubjection to ſuffering be here required: for as it can not be proved, that every act of diſobedience is a reſiſtence here condemned; & that every act of obedience, is a part of the ſubjection here required; So nor can it be proved, that every act of reſiſting or refuſeing paſſive obedience is here condemned, and that every act of ſubmitting to paſſive obedience is here commanded. But only that that obedience is commanded, which is due to Magiſtrates; and that reſiſtence vvhichwhich is unlawful, & is oppoſite unto that ſubjection required, is prohibited. So that this place cannot prove that all reſiſtence is unlawful; becauſe non-obedience is reſiſtence, or a contraordinatneſſe; and yet all non-obedience is not here prohibited. Againe, the ſubjection comprehends that honour and reſpect, which is due unto Superiours, and which is both inward in the heart, minde and thought, and outwardly expreſſed in words, geſtures, carriage, &c. So muſt the word reſiſtence comprehend within it ſelf, all that is oppoſite there unto. Now, as by this place, it cannot be evinced that it is unlawful to reſiſt abuſed power, or perſons abuſeing their power to tyranny and oppreſſion, in our thoughts, and by our words: for then it should be unlawful to abhore, & deteſt the oppreſſion and tyranny of cruel tyrants; or for the Mesſengers of the Lord to rebuke them for the ſame; or for People to pray & ſupplicat to God againſt them, which is utterly abſurd and falſe: So nor can it be evinced by this place, that it is unlavvful to reſiſt ſuch abuſeing their povver, by bodyly force; for the text ſpeaketh no more againſt this, then againſt the other; and yet the other is lavvful; and therefore ſo may this be, for any thing that is here ſaid: The one is reſiſtence as vvel as the other, though not ſo great, but majus & minus non variant ſpeciem. And therefore, if this text to not condemne all reſiſtence, it cannot be evinced that it condemneth the reſiſtence vveſpeak of.
3. Not withſtanding of the Reſiſtence that here ſeemeth to be prohibited; yet we know that the Senate not only reſiſted Nero, but proceeded againſt him by way of open juſtice, depoſed him, and condemned him for tyranny, adjudging him to have his head faſtned to a forke & ſo to be publickely whipped to death, and then precipitated from a rock, but he eſcaped & killed himſelf (as hiſtorians ſay:) and in this fact they are approved by learned politicians, and lawyers. See Bod in de Repub. lib. 2: c. 5. So that either he muſt ſay that Nero was not the higher power, who might not be reſiſted, but that the Senate was above him; or that ſuch as juſtify the Senate are in an errour, and ſo he muſt condemne them for what they did, without any colour of reaſon.
4, This text will no more plead againſt reſiſting of Superious powers, then againſt reſiſting of inferiour Magiſtrates: For the text ſpeaks of all in any ſupereminency: It ſpeaketh of powers in the plural number: ſee the dutch annot on the place: & Peter mentioneth inferiours as well as the Supreame. Now will the Surveyer ſay, that in no caſe, it is lawful to reſiſt even by force, the inferiour Magiſtrates? will he ſay that we may not oppoſe them when abuſeing their power: And if he grant that in ſome caſes, inferiour Magiſtrates may be reſiſted, he muſt alſo grant that this text doth not forbid or condemne all reſiſtence to he higher power; but only a reſiſting of legal and lavvful commands, whether by diſobedience or by armes.
5. Though we cannot ſay, that the Apoſtle is ſpeaking here always of the ordinance of Magiſtracy in the abſtract, ſo as altogether to exclude the perſons inveſted there with; yet we think it hardly ſaife to ſay, that there is nothing here to be underſtood of the abſtract office; as when he ſpeaketh of the original and riſe of the office, and of the end and proper native effect thereof, it is more proper to underſtand that of the office in abſtracto, then of the Suppoſita ſo inveſted. Next whatever is required here as due to the Suppoſita, it is upon the account of the office, with which they are inveſted, and in ſo far, aud no furder: And therefore though the office and ordinance cannot be reſiſted, yet the perſon who is there vvith inveſted, may be reſiſted, not as he is inveſted, but as he abuſeth the povver, and ſo deveſteth himſelf: for as he abuſeth the power he cannot be looked on as inveſted there vvith, in ſo far; eſpecially if he abuſe it in the maine and principal ends for vvhichwhich it vvas appoynted: for then he is de jure and upon the matter utterly deveſted thereof. Furder whatever ſubjection is due to the perſon, it is upon the account of the office, which he beareth; and no more ſubjection is due to him upon that account, then is due unto the office it ſelf, or to the civil legal authority which is imported by the abſtract word (if ſo much, ſeing, a quo quidquam eſt tale, id ipſum eſt magis tale.) Therefore the ſubjection vvhichwhich is not due to the office, cannot be due to him: Novv ſubjection is due to the office as it is the office: And an abuſed office is not the office, Ergo that ſubjection is not required to the abuſed office which is due to the office. Ergo nor is it due to him vvho abuſeth the office. The office vvill not vvarrand a ſubjection to that vvhichwhich is not the office; and an abuſed office is not the office.
6. The ſubmiſſion or ſubjection here required, is not unto Tyranny, or Tyrants vvho abuſe their povver unto the deſtruction of the Commonvvealth, and to the ruine of the Subjects as ſuch: For, ſuch are not the ordinance of God (nor ordained under God, but oppoſite to God) unto which alone, the ſubjection here ſpoken of, is due. Gerhard de magiſt. polit. n. 54. Tels us that the apoſtle doth acurately diſtinguish betvvixt the povver, and the abuſe of the povver; and ſayes the povver itſelf, and not the abuſe of the povver is of God; and alſo, that he diſtinguisheth betvvixt the office it ſelf, & the perſon in office: the perſon oft by fraud, violence & falshood and other evil meanes, by cruelty & tyranny, both aſſumeth the place, & exerceth the office, & in this reſpect is not of God Hoſ. 8: 4. 2. The reſiſting of Tyrants cannot procure damnation unto the reſiſters, becauſe they have violated no command. 3. Such are not a terrour to evil works, therefore ſubmiſſion is not due unto them as ſuch. 4. Such will not give praiſe to ſuch as do vvell; but that is the power vvhichwhich is not to be reſiſted, of vvhichwhich vve are to be afrayed, and of which vve shall have praiſe vvhile vve do that vvhichwhich is good. 5. He is not to be reſiſted vvho is the Miniſter of God for good. But Tyrants, Neroes who vvished that all the Romans had but one Neck, that he might cut them all off at one blow, are not miniſters of God, in ſo far, but miniſters of Satan. 6. Such are not the revenger vvho beareth the ſword to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, but rather imployeth the ſvvord to deſtroy ſuch as do vvell, to ſubvert Lawes, Religion and all that is good: Therefore it is not of ſuch as ſuch, that the text ſpeaketh, when it ſayes we muſt yeeld Submiſſion. 7. As it is not upon the account of their playing the tyrant, aud overturning Religion, Liberties & Subjects, that tribute is to be payed to them, ſo nor is ſubjection to be yeelded unto them, in all poynts, but as they are God's Miniſters attending continually upon this very thing, to ſuppreſſe wickedneſſe, & promove godlineſſe. 8. Nor is it upon any other account, that fear, honour, and cuſtome is to be given unto them. And ſo the text conſiders theſe povvers, to vvhom ſubjeciton is due, not as Tyrants, or as abuſeing their power to the ruine and deſtruction of all; but as carrying themſelves as the Miniſters of God, for the ends appoynted, aud not as the Miniſters and ordinance of Satan. Therefore not vvithſtanding of any thing in this Text, ſuch may be reſiſted, or rather their Tyranny may be reſiſted, which is not, nor never vvas ordained of God, and vvhichwhich is diretly oppoſite unto, and no part of that povver ordained of God. And though Nero and ſome others vvere real Tyrants, yet neither doth the text name him, nor doth it preſſe ſubjection to tyranny in any, for leſſe to his Tyranny; but only ſubjection to the powers that are of God, & ordained of him, of which there might have been ſome vvho were not Tyrants, even when Nero was playing the Tyrant; And it is as rational to underſtand the text of thoſe, as of Nero or ſuch like. However vve finde ſubjection is preſſed to the povver vvhichwhich is ordained of God, and that is not the power as it is abuſed. From all which it is cleare, that it is not the ſuppoſita, but ſuppoſita as ſuch, which are not to be reſiſted, or ſuch as carry in a due ſubordination unto God, ſeing all the Apoſtles arguments preſſe only ſubjection unto ſuch, and not unto Tyrants, who are a terrour to good works, and a praiſe to ſuch as do evil and not the miniſters of God, nor revengers to execute wrath upon ſuch as do evil, but rather on ſuch as do good neither do they attend upon this thing whereof the Apoſtle ſpeaketh, and are ſo far from being the ordinance of God, that they are reſiſters Themſelves of Gods ordinance, by making lawes contrary to God's lavv, and punishing ſuch as obſerve God's lavv. It cannot therefore be more ſinful to reſiſt ſuch, then to reſiſt a deputy perſecuting ſuch as keep the King's lavves, and making lavves of his owne directly contrarie to the King's lavves; for he is the Rebel and the reſiſter of God's ordinance, and not they vvho are faithful to their Soveraigne.
To this he maketh ſome reply Pag. 37. and [(ſayes) It hath been often granted, and ſtill is, that no man or Magiſtrate on earth, hath a moral power, commiſſion or command from God to do evil, or to afflict any unjuſtly, 2. The queſtion is not concerning the Magiſtrat's duty, but anent the Subject's duty, in caſe through the permiſſion of divine providence, the Magiſtrate abuſe his place and power, in unjuſt afflicting the innocent; whether the private Subject may uſe violence againſt, or upon the Magiſtrate, or should rather ſubmit to ſuffering, (though unjuſtly) not for reverence to the abuſe of the power, but in reverence to God, whoſe ordinance the power (which he abuſeth) is] Anſw. 1. If Magiſtrates have no moral power, commiſſion, or command to do evil, The reſiſting of that evil is no reſiſting of any moral power from, or commiſſion given by God; as, if they have no power to command evil or ſin, reſiſting of that command by nonobedience, is no reſiſting of their power or commiſſion. 2. Though the queſtion should not be concerning the Magiſtrate's duty, yet we are to enquire, what that power is, againſt which, Subjects may uſe no violence. 3. If Subjects be bound not to uſe violence, but rather ſubmit to ſuffering when the power is abuſed, not for reverence to the abuſe of the power, but in reverence to God, whoſe power it is: Why shall they not alſo be bound, rather to yeeld obedience to, then to reſiſt by non-obedience, unlavvful commands, though not for reverence to the abuſe of the power, yet in reverence to God, whoſe ordinance the power which is abuſed, is; as he ſayes? Sure the text here maketh no difference, and if there be any difference he muſt prove it from ſome other text, which we have not yet ſeen, nor expect to ſee in haſte. 4. We have shewed already, that, he ſayes without ground, that the abuſed power is of God, or his ordinance. But there after, ſayes he, [And although the ſpirit of God in deſcribing the Magiſtrate ſayes, he is the miniſter of God &c. It is not meant that that is the formal reaſon of ſubjection to him, (in the full latitude of ſubjection) nor that the Magiſtrates then exiſting and in being, to whom the people are commanded to be ſubject, and forbidden to reſiſt, were ſuch de facto in all their actings—but what the Magiſtrate is ex officio, and what he should be de jure.] Anſw. 1. He ſeemeth to diſtinguish here betwixt a ſubjection in it's full latitude, and a ſubjection not in it's full latitude; but how doth he explaine this diſtinction, that we may know what to make of it? He ſeemeth alſo to grant that ſome ſubjection, though not ſubjection in its full latitude, hath that deſcription of the power, for it's formalis ratio, formal reaſon: But what can his meaning be, ſeing the text maketh no difference? Is this his meaning, that ſubjection active, or active obedience hath that for it's formal reaſon, ſo that the ſubject is to obey no power, but that which is for a praiſe of the good, and a terrour to the evil &c. But ſubjection paſſive or paſſive obedience goeth upon another ground, and muſt be yeelded to a Magiſtrate even when he is not a miniſter of God for good? If this be his meaning; it is but a shameful begging of the queſtion: and if he grant, that any ſubjection is due to the Magiſtrate, only as he is a miniſter of God, we are gainers; for he can never prove the other from this text; and ſubjection here is conſidered & preſſed in its full latitude; and theſe are laid dovvne as the grounds thereof. This vve may ſaifly averre, until he demonſtrate the contrare, which we deſpaire to ſee done; eſpecially ſeing the text fully cleareth the ſame: For as ſubjection in its full latitude is preſſed, ſo all the Apoſtle's arguments, & motives, ſpeak to it in its full latitude: There is no power but from God, preſſeth whole ſubjection; becauſe the whole power is from God, & not a part of it alone: & therefore it muſt ſpeak to all the relative parts of ſubjection. So the other argument. v. 3; taken from the end of Magiſtracy, ſpeaketh to the whole of ſubmiſſion in its full latitude: & alſo the other argument take from the nature of his office: and ſo the reſt. So that all the motives or grounds of ſubjection, which are here made uſe of, ſpeak to all the parts of ſubjection: And therefore if they be the formal reaſon of one part thereof, they muſt be the formal reaſon of the whole. 2. We do not ſay, that all the Magiſtrates then exiſting were de facto ſuch as they were bound to be de jure (nor can we ſay that they were all like Nero or Caligula) nor dar he ſay that ſubjection in its full latitude, as comprehending as well active as paſſive obedience, commonly ſo called, was to be given to Nero and his like, or was here commanded to be given: and what hath he then gained? But it is like all alongs he taketh ſubjection for paſſive obedience. But 1. can that be ſubjection in its full latitude? 2. Was that the maine thing controverted then? 3. Doth the motives ſpeak to that alone? 4. How will he prove that paſſive obedience is here ſpoken to at all; ſince all the particulars mentioned are actions, and dutyes of action? What ſayes he further? Pag. 32. [The Apoſtle ſpeaking of the perſon inveſted with power, calling him the Miniſter of God for good, no terrour to good works, but to evil, a praiſer of good, &c. shews only what a Magiſtrate should be ex officio and is de jure; but layes not this as the ground of ſubjection and non-reſiſtence to him but this, that he is a ſuperiour power ordained of God: if he abuſe his place, he is to anſwere to God for it, but the abuſe of the power in a particular, doth not nullify the power, or make it no power—he abides inveſted with authority—ſubjection of one ſort or another is due to him, becauſe he is in officio, not becauſe he abuſeth his office.] Anſw. The Surveyer giveth us here a new Analyſis of the text, that no commentator hath hither to thought upon: no motive, according to him, is here made uſe of, except one, and yet none can reade the place, but they will finde it otherwayes: Sure the cauſal for, ver. 3, and 4. is as clear a ground of a motive as the for v. 1, 2. By his way all the reſt of the arguments uſed ver. 3, 4. have no influence on the ſubjection and non-reſiſtence preſſed; and yet the text giveth this reaſon why ſuch as reſiſt the power receive to themſelves damnation viz. for Rulers are not a terrour to good works but to the evil, &c. and this, with what followeth hath no ſmall force to preſſe ſubmiſſion, and non-reſiſtence. 3. It is true if he abuſe his place, he muſt anſwere to God for it, but that will no more prove that paſſive ſubjection, or obedience (as he calleth it) is alwayes due to him, then it will prove that active obedience is alwayes due unto him. 4. We grant that the abuſe of the power in a particular doth not nullifie the power; Yet, when the abuſe is ſuch, as deſtroyes the maine ends of the power, ſure if it be not wholly, it is in a great part, nullified de lure. But whether the power be nullified or not wholly, it may be reſiſted in caſe of neceſſity, when it is palpably abuſed: For then the power which is of God, is not reſiſted: But only the abuſe of the power, or that which is not the power ordained of God. 5. Subjection, it is true, of one ſort or another is due to him becauſe he is in officio, and therefore ſo long as he is in officio, he is to be acknowledge to be in officio, and to be obeyed in things lawful: Honour, reverence, tribute, and cuſtome is due to him, and, in matters of smaller moment, his penaltyes are to be endured, when there is no faire way to shun them: But hence it will not follovv, that he muſt never be reſiſted, even when he intends nothing but the deſtruction of Libertyes and Religion; and overturneth the ends of government, and croſſeth the maine and principal ends of his office and power. Then he tells us ibid. [That among many things wrong Lex Rex hath that true word Pag. 325. We are to ſuffer evil of punishment of Tyrants, ſome other way, and in ſome other notion, then we are to ſuffer evil of equals; for we are to ſuffer evil of equals, not for any paternal authority they have over us, as certanely we are to ſuffer evil of Superiours Thus he. And this is all we require to ſuffer evil of the Magiſtrate or ſuperiour, without violating his perſon, upon the account of his paternal authority, which (though in a particular abuſed hic & nunc) remaines the ordinance of God: and in a reſpective reverence to that ordinance wherewith they are invested, we are humbly to ſuffer wrong from them (if we cannot by petitions move their for bearance) neither juſtifying in our conſciences the wrong which they do to us, nor judging them to have a commiſſion from God, as to this wrong doing, but regarding both God's providence, and God's ordinance in their perſones which ceaſeth not to be his, although abuſed in a particular act towards us.] Anſw. 1. It is ſtrange hovv this corrupt fountaine, as he calleth it elſe vvhere, Lex Rex can ſend out good and ſvveet vvaters? 2. Lex Rex is there anſvvering this quaeſtion: whether any paſſive ſubjection at all be commanded as due to ſuperiours, Rom. 13. And anſvvereth. [1. None properly ſo called, that is purely paſſive, only we are for fear of the ſword, to do our duty. 2. We are to ſuffer ill of punishment of Tyrants, ex Hypotheſi that they inflict that ill on us, ſome other way, &c.] Novv vvhat it there here that makes for him? Sayeth Lex Rex that vve are to ſuffer abſolutely all the evil of punishment, vvhichwhich they vvould inflict upon us? No ſuch thing ſayeth he. 3. If he ſeek no more then vvhat Lex Rex ſayeth here, vve are agreed; but ſure he muſt then recal vvhat he hath formerly ſaid. 4. Ay, but ſayeth he, this is all we require, to ſuffer evil of the Magiſtrate, without violating his perſon, upon the account of his paternal authority: But 1. there is a difference betwixt ſuffering evil indefinitly and abſolutely, and ſuffering evil ex Hypotheſi that it be inflicted: Lex Rex ſaid this laſt, and not the former. 2. We may refuſe to ſuffer evil of the Magiſtrate without violating his perſon: every reſiſtance of unjuſt violence offered by Magiſtrates, is not a violating of his perſon, nor neceſſarily accompanyed therewith; for the violence reſiſted, may be, and oft is, committed by his Emiſſaries. 3. Though we are bound to ſuffer (ex Hypotheſi that we do ſuffer) of Tytants upon the account of a paternal authority; yet it will not follow that ſuch may not be reſiſted; for though the Son is to ſuffer evils at the hands of his father, when he inflicts theſe, upon a paternal account; yet in ſome caſes, the parent may be reſiſted, even by the Children, as is ſaid. 4. No reſpective reverence to the ordinance doth abſolutely bind us to ſuffer; for he will grant we may flee; and here he ſayeth, we may by petitions move a forbearance. 5. What if the evil be great and imminent, and flying is not practicable, and not only there is no moving of forbearance by petitions, but very ſupplicating is diſcharged under higheſt paine? Are we then humbly to ſuffer that wrong, and ſo give up all our Necks, our Liberties, and our Religion to the luſt of a Tyrant, without any reſiſtance? This is the quaeſtion, and we are waiting for proof of it. 6. It is true when providence ſo ordereth matters, that we cannot shun ſuffering, then we are to regaird both God's providence, and reſpect that ordinance which is abuſed, and ſo ſuffer ſuch evils of theſe, under another notion, then of equals; and yet it will not hence follow that we are abſolutely bound to ſuffer, and never allowed to reſiſt.
Thus we ſee in end, (which I would have the reader ſpecially to notice) that he cannot urge this place againſt us; but he muſt the ſame way hence enforce an abſolute and univerſal obedience in all things whatſomever; and alſo condemne other Royaliſts, and it may be himſelf alſo; Who, as we heard above, did grant it lawful, in ſeveral caſes, to reſiſt Tyrants. Yea and condemne that which formerly he durſt not poſitively condemne, viz. reſiſtence by the Parliaments and primores Regni, and thus alſo condemne Calvin, and other divines, granting, and poſitively affirming this: all which, though we had ſaid no more, is enough to cut the ſinew of any argument which he hath adduced, or yet can adduce from this paſſage; and ſo we paſſe to examine his other grounds for abſolute ſubmiſſion.