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The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion · James Stewart

The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion, Religious tract · Chapter 19

CAP. XIX.

How weakly and foolishly the Surveyer defendeth his Majeſtie's Life, is shewed.

THe surveyer, finding how poorly he had defended the cauſe now mainly controverted. viz. The unlawfulneſſe of Peoples defending themſelves, and maintaining their Religion againſt manifeſt and intolerable oppreſſion. Cap. 2. That he might do ſomething for his money, would ſtart another queſtion, wherein he thought he should do his Majſome acceptable piece of ſervicé, and ſecure his life, when all came to all: Though he could not cudgil with his railing (for he can move none with his reaſon) the People into a ſtupide, and irrational ſubjection, ſo that let the King rage worſe then ever Nero did, they should not lift a hand to reſiſt and withſtand him; He thinks he shall do the next beſt, viz. he shall fortify his Majeſtie's perſon, and ſet ſuch a guard of impregnable reaſons about him, that no man, no company of men, yea no judicatoure, shall ever approach to touch his ſacred perſon, or to ſpoile him of his life; a guard of reaſons like lyon rampants, be-like he thought them, more invincible and ſaife, then a legion of the moſt valient Champions that his Majeſtie's kingdomes can aford. But poor man, he may dreame that ſuch armes are impenetrable and proof, becauſe they are the beſt in his armory, or that his dull head could hammer out: But no man of reaſon will think ſo; yea all who know that belongeth to this controverſy, and are not profeſſed adverſaries (yea and the moſt ingenuous of them too) will upon ſecond thoughts be forced to ſay, That never any put pen to paper in the King's quarrel, who hath ſo foolishly and childishly, managed that diſput; and how little he deſerveth thanks (let be a reward) for his paines, ſuch as are ſober will judge, when they conſider how little ground, he had to move ſuch a queſtion now, ſeeing the wronging of the King's Perſon or his juſt authority, was not intended by thoſe worthies who aroſe for the maintenance of Religion; as ſuch of them who were publickly put to death, did openly upon the ſcaffold confeſſe and avow; and conſider alſo how the Author of Naphtaly hath been miſerably miſunderſtood by him.

It is not our purpoſe, nor our preſent buſineſſe, to ſpeak unto this head, and shew for what cauſes, or by whom kings are to be queſtioned, depoſed, or executed: Far leſſe is it our purpoſe to defend the taking away of the late King's life, though this railing Pamphleter thinks to faſten this upon Naphtaly. And therefore we might palse what he ſayeth to this purpoſe, Chap. 3. Yet as in the preceeding Chapter, we have shewed how ill he hath maintained the union and conjunction of his Majeſties Dominions; So in this, vve shall shovv hovv vveakly he hath guarded his life, againſt ſuch as vvould oppoſe themſelves unto him, in this queſtion.

But firſt, vve vvould take notice vvhether Napthtali hath given him ſuch ground to faſten upon him the juſtification of the murther of the late King, as he allegeth. [The matter (ſayes the Surveyer) in dealing with Magiſtrates (according to Naphtali's minde) reſts not in a meer reſiſtence of them by meer private perſons, but goes on to a retaliating and revenging upon them wrong ſuppoſed to be done—for his man againe jeers at the Soveraigne Powers Privilege, and Impunity of Divine exemption.] Anſ. Doth this man know what he writeth? Doth Naphtaly ſay, That private perſons may revenge wrongs upon the Supream Magiſtrate, becauſe he jeers at ſuch as plead for ſuch a Privilege and impunity unto Soveraigne Powers, as will exempt them from all tryal and punishment, both of God and Man? What meaneth he elſe by this impunity of divine exemption? Then he tells us, pag. 71, and 77. That Naphtaly Pag. 29. reflects not obſcurely upon the horrid murther of our late Soveraigne. Let us hear Naptaly's words, then shall we better judge, [And as theſe inferiour Princes (ſayes Naphtaly, Pag. 29.) Do often forget their ſubordination to the moſt High in their unjuſt commands, and would uſurpe his throne, by an uncontrollable Soveraignity: So the Lord by the warrand of his Word and approbation of his providence, and alſo of the People (when by them oppreſſed, but by himſelf animated & ſtrengthened) hath declared & made void this their pretended exemption & impunity, & removed the carcaſſes of ſuch Kings, and broken their ſcepter: amongst which precedents, the instance of theſe times, whereof we now ſpeak, is worthily recorded, and deſerveth better to be remembered] Now Naphtali is ſpeaking of what fell out betwixt the year 1494. and the year 1560. in that place, and makes no mention of what fell out an 1560. and afterward till he come to Pag. 31. &c. Sure then, the times he is ſpeaking of being before the year 1560. are far from the times wherein King Charles the firſt was executed. But ſayes he, there was no ſuch thing as murthering of Kings or dethroning of them, at that time, Anſw. Yet the Lord, at that time, declared and made void the pretended exemption and Impunity of Princes and Soveraigne Governours, by removing in his providence their carcaſſes, and by the approbation of the people, when by them oppreſſed, & by himſelf animated, breaking their ſcepter; as vve finde was done to the Q. Kegent anno 1559. when she was by the People, the Nobles, Barons and Burgeſſes aſſembled to deliberate upon the affaires of the commonwealth, Octob. 20. depoſed from her Regency, and upon the ninth of I…n the next yeer, God removed her carcaſse by death, ſo that the land was no more troubled with her.

Who may not now ſee what a poor ground this Railer had, to father ſuch a tenet on Naphtali, as he doth? And what advantage the King's cauſe hath gotten by this, we shall novv ſee. He tels us Pag. 72. [That moſt of the venome this man (meaning Naphtali▪) hath againſt the powers ordained of God, he hath ſucked out of the breasts of Lex Rex. It were not right to dig up all the pestilent untruths of that piece, ſet forth in moſt impertinent and ſophiſtical reaſonings, mixt with infinite humane bitterneſſe, againſt the late King: Only as it were to be wished that ſuch errours, might be buried in eternal oblivion; ſo it is to be regrated that too too many of the Ministry and others in Scotland have been poyſoned with ſuch principles, and the ſame not being very like to be ſuddenly extirpat, the more need have the powers above us to be watchful] Anſ. The author of Lex Rex and of Naphtaly alſo, aſcribe as much to the powers ordained of God, as God's word will allow; and are no way oppoſed unto them, but only unto Tyranny, which is no Ordinance of God: and this Man rather ſpitteth venome in the face of the power ordained of God, vvhen he goeth about to patronize and defend their illegal and iniquous exorbitances, as if theſe were the ordinance of God, which are rather the ordinance of Satan: Sure this is not farr from blaſphemy, to call ſuch courſes the Ordinance of God. 2. He hath taken a short cut. I confeſſe, to anſwere that unanſwerable book Lex Rex. To ſay, that it is full of peſtilent untruthes, ſet forth in moſt impertinent and ſophiſtical reaſonings. Had King Charles the firſt, when he read that book, remembered this, or thought upon it, he would not have ſaid he feared (as is reported he did) that it should not have been anſwered. But what Man, who hath not de nuded himſelf of all wit and reaſon, will take, upon this perjured Apoſtat's word, theſe Truthes which Lex Rex hath demonſtrated (& which this Man was ſo unable to anſwere, that I much queſtion if he well underſtood many of them, or if his lumpish braine could diſcerne betwixt a ſophiſtical reaſon and a true and real reaſon) to be untruthes; and theſe truthes ſo wholeſome and uſeful to all Republicks, and neceſſary to be knowne and wel digeſted by all who conſult the welfare of commonwealths, to be peſtilent untruthes, and his unanſwerable reaſons, to be impertinent and ſophiſtical? 3. I am ſure all the Cavaliers, and the Malignant ſquade would have thought him well worth his gold, if he had in a ſober rational manner diſcovered the impertinencies and ſophiſtical reaſonings in that book, which yet is like to ſpeak after it is burned, and under a legal reſtraint, though he should have ſpent the moſt part of his dayes upon it; it may be, the Royal cabal would have thought it Dignum opus, and have canonized him for it, and adviſed the King of Remember the iſſue of ſuch a worthy & ſingular pillar of the tottering throne. But the man knew how far his ſtock would reach, and that all the gold in the Kings treaſures could not make his head ſtronger then it was, how ever it might ſuperabundantly fortify his purſe; and therefore, ſeing his short horns could reach no further, his Majeſty muſt reſt ſatiſfied with this: And Lex Rex muſt be declared, as it is, to be furder unanſwereable. 4. Seing he wisheth that ſuch errours might be buryed in oblivion, why did not his vvork follovv his vvish? Why did he dig up the untruths (if ſuch) againe, when he was not able to bury them dead nor alive? Prudence (if he were not innocent of it) might have taught him ſilence, ſeing he knew he could anſwere no better. 5. Such as have received theſe principles finde them more wholeſome food then his ſoure leaven. 6. He needs not ſtirr up the Powers to more cruelty and tyranny then already they exerce, neither vvill that be a vvay to extirpate theſe principles, but rather a way to root them more deeply in the heart.

But now what ſayes he to the thing. He tells us in the firſt place: That [The God of order hath in all humane political Societyes appoynted under himſelf a ſupreame power, whether ſubjected in a ſingle perſon, or in a complex company, which orders the whole body, having nothing before or above it, in the nature and order of civil authority, and governs all in the ſociety, and is governed by none therein: to ſay that a perſon is chief, and yet hath a Superiour or equal is to ſpeak contradictions: wiſe men have ſaid, that a multitude of Gods is the nullity of Gods, and multitude of infinites ſo called makes none of them infinite, ſo a multitude of ſupreame powers in one civil ſociety destroyes divine order.] Anſw. 1. It is true, God hath appoynted in all humane political ſocieties, a ſupream power. But I ſuppoſe, the Surveyer will grant, that this may as well be a Parliament, as the King, and what hath he then ſaid for ſecurity of the King's life, by this argument? 2. What ever ſupream power, whether in one or moe perſons, God hath appoynted over politick ſocieties, he hath done it by the People; and ſo the People, who make and ſet up, under God, theſe ſupreame povvers, are above theſe ſupreame powers; If he will not take my word for this, let him read and conſider how it is proved in Lex Rex, in many places, ſpecially quaes;t. XIX. And if he will not reſt ſatisfied therewith, let him try his hand, And anſwere what is there ſaid, if he can. 3. Politicians will tell him that the King's ſupremacy of power, is only in reſpect of the adminiſtration, and execution of the lawes, according to the power committed unto him, by the People: let him read and conſider well Althuſius his politicks, as to this. 4. And ſo, though in reſpect of this executive adminiſtration, he be chief, and governeth all: yet in reſpect of the royal fountaine-povver of Government, the People are above him, becauſe they give this out to him, and may, in caſes of neceſſity, recal it, and give it to another; So that ſtill they reſerve a fountaine-power over him, to be exerced in caſes of neceſſity: and therefore, there is no contradiction here, becauſe non ad idem: the father is above the ſone, and yet ſubject to him, if he be a judge. The Emperour is above the prince palatine, and yet in ſome caſes that Prince… is his judge; as the Tutor hath the ſupreame executive power, and the pupil can not act without him; Yet in caſe of male adminiſtration, the pupil hath a power to call him to a account. But finally what if his adverſaries should ſay, that the King is not that Supreame power in Scotland, but that a Parliament, as the Peoples Repreſentatives are above him? He may ſee much ſaid to prove this in Lex Rex, and in the Apologie. And how shall he be able to confute that? And if Parliaments have povver to depoſe Princes in Scotland (as hath been often practiſed) hovv hath he ſaved the King's Scepter and Perſon? But he addeth, as a short anſvvere to cut all off that is ſaid, [A chimaera of idle diſtinctions is whelped by the late Maſters of confuſion of co-ordinate and collateral Soveraignes in one Kingdome, the fountality of Royalty in the People (reſumable at their pleaſure) is talked of, alſo Kings and People there being mutual Magiſtrates to punish one another,— and courts of neceſſity and tribunals of nature, where People are judges accuſers and all, are bigly talked of; but theſe are only cloaks of fig leaves to cover horrid rebellion & diſorder.] Anſ. Every thing muſt goe for a new whelped Chimaera, which this blunt head cannot underſtand: Can he confute ſuch of theſe diſtinctions as Lex Rex maketh uſe of? Why doth he it not then? How doth this maſter of diſorder blow avvay theſe figleaves, yea or diſcover them to be such? Is this the vvay he takes to ſalve his Maſter's life? By his calling ſuch diſtinctions Chimaeraes and figleaves; he vvill not ſave a tyrannical Magiſtrate from depoſition or vvorſe, by that povver vvhichwhich is cleared by theſe diſtinctions. 2. As for theſe courts of neceſſity, &c. Royaliſts muſt grant them, vvho grant povver in ſome caſes to People to reſiſt and depoſe Kings, viz. vvhen they turne habitual tyrants, ſell the Commonvvealth and the like: and in ſuch caſes, vvhen the Prince doth ſuch horrid things, vvhichwhich himſelf Pag. 24. thinks can hardly befal a Prince in his natural and right vvits: Hovv shall theſe things be judged, if he allow no courts, but the ordinary courts of juſtice, and no court of neceſſity? Ay, but he ſayes thereafter [That it is certaine Supreame power is indiviſible and incommunicable to diſtinct ſubjects, in any one political Society.] Though the ſupreame executive power of adminiſtration be ſo, either in one, called a Monarch, or in the plurality of beſt and chiefeſt, as in Ariſtocracy, &c. yet the fountaine power of government (which Lex Rex tells him is diſtinct from the power of governing Pag. 50.) abides intire in the People, by which they may call the Governours to account, depoſe them, and ſet up others to execute the lawes▪ 2. Grotius will tell him that the King may have one half of the Soveraigne power, and the Senate or Parliament the other, and if the King aſſume that part which is not his, he may be reſiſted, where is then the indiviſibility or incommunicability of this power, which he talketh of? Thinks he that there is no mixed Monarchy? And if part of the Soveraignity belong to the Parliamet, as the Peoples Repreſentatives (as is certaine in our conſtitution) the King cannot be ſo Supreame as he would have him. Therefore he addeth. [But why should we doubt that where there is a King (one truely ſo) his Soveraignity is matchleſſe on earth, when the Scripture calls him ſupreame. 1. Pet. 2: ver. 13. is there any equal to the Supream, in order of civil government, by whom he is judgeable or punishable? if any, he is not not Supreame not the government Royal.] Anſw. This Chimaerical Man gives us a diſtinction of Kings, ſome truely ſo and ſome falſly ſo: And what, and who are theſe? It is like the King of Poland and the Emperour of Germany are not Kings truely ſo, as he ſaid, becauſe forſooth they are not abſolute above all Law and coercion. But what if more learned politicians then ever he was, ſay, that ſuch are moſt truely Kings? And what if his adverſaries ſay and prove alſo, that the King of Britane is not ſuch a King, as he accounts truly ſo? His ſaying that the King of Britane is abſolute, will note prove that he is ſo, and will be found but a weak defence for his life, if he be not able to prove him above all judgement and punishment, which we have not yet ſeen, and diſpaire to ſee, done. 2. Theſe words 1. Pet. 2: ver. 13. may be as well rendered, The King as ſupereminent, and can import no more, but one who had a ſupreme or ſupereminent place in the adminiſtration of government, notwithſtanding whereof he might be & was accountable to the Senat of Rome: for learned politicians and lawyers prove that the ſupreame power of government was in the Senate, even at this time, which clearly appeared in their judging and condemning Nero, and other impious and tyrannical Emperours. So that even hence we ſee that one may be ſupreame in order of civil government, and yet both judgeable and punishable. 3. His adverſaries will not much care how he call that government, Royal or not; and whether he call the government of Britane Royal or not. Names in theſe matters and titles, which goe much by fashion or fancy, are but weak arguments; and he will never be able to ſtop the mouth of his adverſaries, who would plead for calling King Charles to account and for judging him and punishing him, by ſaying he is a King, and the government is a Royal government, they would account theſe but thinne wals, and uſeleſſe cloaks of fig leaves to preſerve and defend intolerable tyranny. Hath this man no better arguments then thiſe wherewith to defend his Majeſtie's Royal life and perſon? Or hath the King no better advocate to defend his cauſe? But it may be this profound Statiſt will ſpeak more nervouſly in the following obſervations. Therefore,

Let us hear what he ſayes in the 2 place, [It is certane (ſayes he) no man can be judged or punished but by his owne judge, who is above him, and hath authority over him, by lawful commiſſion from God; or from men authorized by God to give ſuch commiſſion, now who shall be judge to theſe inveſted with Soveraigne Majesty, ſeing Every ſoul under them is commanded to be ſubject to them▪ Rom. 13: ver. 1. and ſeing the Supreame Power of the ſword is committed unto them, and not to others, but by deputation and in dependence upon them—in a true Monarchy there muſt be an exemption and impunity (as to ſubjects) of the perſon inveſted with Soveraignity and Majeſty: God's Law, Natures Light, and ſound reaſon, are all for this, that ſuch as are inveſted with Soveraigne Majeſty, having the legislative power; the juriſdictional power, the coërcive and punitive power originally in himſelf, muſt enjoy exemption and impunity (as to ſubjects actings againſt them) the contrary tenet overthrowes the order of God And Nature, and precipitates humane ſocieties in a gulf of endleſſe confuſions.] Anſw. 1. Here is enough to ſatisfy his adverſaries: For 1. They will tell him, that he hath not yet proved the government of Britane a true Monarchy, in his ſenſe; and ſo he but begs the thing in queſtion here. 2. They will tell him, that the King hath not the ſole legislative power, nor ſole juriſdictional power, nor ſole cöercive and punitive power; far leſſe, all theſe ſolely and originally in himſelf: And it is but to ſuch Soveraignes that he pleads for this exemption & impunity. Doth not his Advocat deſerve a ſingular reward; who pleadeth his Maſter's cauſe ſo dexterouſly, by proving an uncertanty, by that which is more uncertane, & founding all upon his bare word? A noble champion forſooth, or rather a Monſter, whoſe word muſt be a law, & an irrefragable reaſon too. Thus it ſeems, what ever power he give to the King there is the Dictators power that the thinks is ſolely in himſelf, and that originally: but for all this he hath one diſadvantage, that he is of little authority and of as little credite, with ſober rational perſons. 2. He will grant that ſuch Monarchies, as he accounts only true, are not every where, no not where there are perſons called Kings and Emperours: How cometh it then that the order of God and nature is not overthrowne in theſe Dominions and Republicks, and that their Societyes are not precipitated into a gulf of endleſſe confuſions? Shall nothing preſerve the order of God and nature, but that which is the moſt ready mean to deſtroy it, viz. an uncontrollable power in one Tyrant, to deſtroy all his Kingdome, Man, Wife and Childe. 3. Politicians will tell him, that the Ephori, the Parliament are his judges; and that the People who by a lawful commiſſion from God made him King and authorized him, are above him and have authority over him, in caſe he turne a Tyrant and pervert the ends of government. 4. Though it be requiſite there be an ordinary ſtanding judge to cognoſce of controverſies which fall out betwixt one private perſon and another; yet it is not alwayes neceſſary there be one condeſcended on, to judge betvvixt the Soveraigne and the People, vvhen the controverſy falleth out betvvixt them, more then that there should be a ſtanding ordinary judge to decide controverſies falling out betvvixt tvvo diſtinct and independent Kingdomes. 5. What commiſſion from Man authorized by God had the high Prieſt, and ſuch as joyned vvith him, vvhen they depoſed and killed Athaliah? if he ſay, she was an uſurper True, yet she poſſeſſed the place ſix years peacably without moleſtation; and who was judge, whether she was an uſurper or not? Had the matter been referred to her, she would have been as far from calling herſelfe an uſurper, as a Tyrant now will be from judging himſelf a Tyrant: And ſo as in this caſe, the Tyrant ſine titulo had a judge above her, though she was inveſted with Soveraigne Majeſty, ſo in the other caſe, The Tyrant exercitio, though inveſted with Soveraigne Majeſty, hath a judge above him. 6. The place Rom. 13. is to be underſtood (as was shewed above) of inferiour Magiſtrates as well as of the ſupreame: And it ſayes of all in authority, that ſuch as are under them should be ſubject unto them, In ſo far as they are ſubjects unto them: ſo in poynt of adminiſtration of juſtice according to equity, all are ſubject to the ſupreame or ſupereminent governour; but when he becometh a Tyrant, he becometh ſubject unto them, who gave him that power, and ſet him up, under God. 7. He inſinuats that inferiour Magiſtrates are not eſſential Magiſtrates, but deputation from and in dependence upon the King. But Lex Rex, Queſt. 20. hath by many cleare and unanſwereable arguments evinced the contrary.

In the third place he citeth ſome ſentences of Tertullian, calling the Emperours ſecond unto God, and above all men, and only ſubject unto God: Of Optatus ſaying, that none are above them but God. And of Ierom ſpeaking of Pſal. 51. againſt thee thee only have I ſinned, ſaying that David ſpoke ſo becauſe he feared none; And of Ambroſe, on the ſame words ſaying, that he was King, and under no Law—and therefore he did not ſin againſt man.] But all this is no purpoſe: For 1. himſelf will grant that all Kings are not thus exempted, and his adverſaries will prove the King of Britane one of theſe limited, and reſtricked Kings, that are obnoxious to examination, and punishment; and theſe ſayings cannot prove that all Kings are ſo, yea or ought to be ſo. 2. Tertullian, to vindicate the Chriſtians who would not acknowledge the Emperour to be God, and to shew how notwitſtanding they reſpected him according to his place, would give him as high titles as he could, though not out of flattery, and ſo make him the higheſt perſon in the Empire, and above the heathen Gods; yet he did not ſet him above all the People in their Repreſentative the Senate, or if the did, the Senate proved him to be in a miſtake, by taking courſe with ſeveral of theſe leud and wicked Tyrants. 3. David's ſingle act of adultery and murther were no ſuch acts of Tyranny, as are cenſurable with depoſition, and ſo it ſpeaketh not to the caſe. 4. It might be that de facto he did not fear another, as Ierome ſayes. But that will not ſay, that David might have deſtroyed the inheritance of the Lord without controlle, or that other Princes are, or should be, exempted from reſtraint and punishment, if they turne ingrained and habituated Tyrants. 5. Himſelf will not ſtand to what Ambroſe ſayes, for he addeth immediatly, [There is no doubt but David was ſenſible both of the horrid injury he had done to Uriah (the occaſion of that Pſalm) and of the ſcandal he had given to God's People, in which ſenſe, he might be well ſaid to ſin against both.] 6. The words of the text vvill not beare that vveight. viz. That he had no other judge but God, or that (as Deodate ſayeth) he was exempted from all punishment of men, & was obnoxious to no humane tribunals; but as other commentators ſay, the words are to be taken in a comparative ſenſe, that this was the greateſt aggravation of his guilt, that it was ſuch a hainous traſgreſſion, in his ſight who was privy to it, however he did conceale it from all others, ſo far as he could: ſee the Dutch Annot. on the palce: and therefore to expreſſe his ſpiritual ſenſe of the ſin commited againſt God (againſt whom properly ſin as ſin is commited) he uſeth this rhetorical ingemination: And if the words should have imported what the Surveyer would have them to import, they had not been appoſite to expreſſe his ſpiritual grief & ſenſe of the hainouſneſſe of the crime commited. Then he tels us what excellent Mr Calvin ſayeth Inſtit. Lib. 4. cap. 20. § 27. and 31. and then ſayes [It is a wonder how many who pretend reſpect to Calvin should dar to violate the ſacroſanct Majeſty of Kings, if they will but read over that chapter.] But is it not a wonder, how this man who ſeemeth to have read over that chapter and particularly §. 31, should paſſe by what worthy Calvin ſayeth in the end of that ſection, or should have ſo little reſpect unto that worthy man (whom he himſelf accounts to be worthy of reſpect, and but deſervedly) as to plead for an incontrollable power in Kings, When yet famous Calvin tels us there that if the Ephori or States of Parliament, connive at the King's tyranny, and ſuffer him to oppreſſe and inſult over the poor People, they are wickedly perfidious, and palpably betraying their truſt.

Then in the 4 place he tels us [That it is not denyed, that the King is bound before God to rule his People according to the Law of God; and that it is groſſe to ſay, Regi quicquid libet licet.] This is good, but what then? What if he deviate? [We maintai… (ſayes he) that as ſure truth That impunity (as from ſubjects) neceſſarily attends Soveraignity by the Law of God, reaſon, and nature: For no man can be judged or punished but by a judge above him; and the Supreame hath none ſuch, &c. Anſw. But Mr Prelate, your adverſaries will maintaine the contrare, as a ſure truth: We looked for a fourth proof and not for the thing in queſtion, or a repetition of what is ſaid: The ſame thing repeated ſix times will not make ſix arguments; Mr Bishope give a new proof, if you can, of this firme truth which you maintaine? We maintaine, by the Law of God, Nature, and Reaſon, No man hath an uncontrollable power to deſtroy millions, to cut off the heretage of the Lord, to deſtroy his Intereſt: And we have shewed our grounds for this. 2. How was Athaltah judged? And what a judge was Iehu? 3. It hath been told him, that the ſupreame governour hath a ſupreame power above him: The power of the People that made him Supreame governour, is above him, and can depoſe him, and put another in his place. He may be a Supreame governour & diſpenſator, and yet their ſervant, accountable unto them, and cenſurable by them, when he deviates and turnes a Tyrant, and a Wolfe, and a Tyger. When one King wrongeth another, that other will both judge and punish him, if he be able, and yet is not properly a judge above him. Much more may the Repreſentative of the People; who ſet him up and impowered him, both judge him and punish him.

But the good man thereafter would adviſe Kings not to abuſe this inviolableneſſe, but ſo much the more to fear ſadder punishments from God; and for this cauſe would have them reading the 6 chapter of Apocryphal Book of Wiſdome. But was there no texts in all the divine Word of God, that he would put into the King's hand to read, that he muſt ſend him to the Apocrypha? It is true Kings would do well to remember that they have a God above them, who will not be mocked, but will bring them to an account of their doings, though they should eſcape Mens hands: and to the end they may be put in remembrance of this, they ſtand in need of other monitors, then the Men who have forgote it, and ſend them to Apocrypha to finde it: And this should keep them within the boundaries of God's Law. But as the fear of punishment from Man, will reſtraine ſome from ſtealing, whom the fear of God would little overawe; So it may be the feare of punishment from Men, would have no ſmall influence to make ſome Kings walk by a rule. And Sub…rdi…a…a non pugnant▪ He would do well to minde them of both, and it is like he would finde that more effectual to ſuppreſſe Tyranny, then to tell them, that their ſacred perſones are inviolable as to Men, but yet they would do well to read the 6 chapter of Wiſdome.

He cometh Pag. 77. to ſpeak particularly to what Naphtaly said, and alledgeth that [It is most falſly and wickedly ſaid, that God's providence or God's Word approves the murdering or depoſing of Princes by Subjects, who are not his judges: And what his word approves not, his providence doth not approve: To ſay that God animates his People to ſuch actions, is blaſphemy, albeit he extraordinarly may ſtir up the ſpirits of ſome to actions not according to the ordinary rule (as in the times of the judges) but they were ſure of their warrand from him, the like whereof none have ground to waite for now▪] Anſwer. Certainely God's Word declareth that the perſons of Kings (how ſacred ſoever he account them) are not inviolable, when it threateneth deſtruction unto them, whether by their owne Subjects or by ſtrangers; and when theſe ſame judgements are executed, his providence declares that they are not uncontrollable or inviolable. 2. His adverſaryes vvill tell him, that the depoſeing of Tyrants, or the executing of juſtice on them, is no ſinful Murther nor ſinful depoſeing of Princes. 3. If he had once proved that ſuch actions as theſe, vvere horrid and ſinful, then he might ſay that it vvere blaſphemy to ſay, that God animates People unto them. 4. How did God animate Ieh… jada and theſe vvith him, to depoſe and kill Athaliah? To ſay she vvas an uſurpers, vvill not help the cauſe: for he vvill not have uſurpers killed by the Subjects novv, ſeing vve have no ground to expect ſuch an expreſſe vvarrand to riſe againſt them, as the judges had; and yet certanely theſe againſt vvhom the judges vvere animated, vvere Tyrants vvithout title. And thus we ſee this Surveyer out ſtripeth all the Royaliſts, that ever wrote before him, and not only will have the perſons of lawful princes, though flagitious and tyrannous, ſacred and inviolable; but alſo the perſones of the moſt manifeſt uſurpers; for he ſayes, that it was not according to any ordinary rule, that God ſtirred up the ſpirits of ſome, to make head againſt theſe Tyrants that oppreſſed the people of God, in the dayes of the judges, but extraordinare, which motions we have no ground to waite for now. And ſo this advocate cometh at laſt, to plead as much for the exemption of Cromwel, as of the King: And if this be a faithful advocat let all the world judge, and let the author of the pamphlet intituled Killing no Murther rebuke him, for his impertinency and ignorance.

He tels us thereafter how [The Apologiſt labours to produce many inſtances of the Parliaments of Scotland punishing Princes for their enormities, all which he ſetteth forth as laudable and imitable preſidents and examples.] Anſw. The author of that Apologetical relation driveth at no ſuch deſigne there, but only cleareth thereby, that the Kings of Scotland have not a ſupremacy above Parliaments; but that rather Parliaments are above them; for they have punished them. He addeth [The moſt that all of them amount to is nothing, but the inſurrection of Nobles (Proceres as Buchanan calleth them) againſt the Kings, and violent oppreſſions of ſuch of them, as have been flagitious and tyrannous-but neither Buchanan, Nor this Apolog▪ can produce any one inſtance of our lawful Parliaments or Peoples, taking on them in a judicial way, in cold blood, aud under formes of proceſse, to punish or destroy their Kings.] Anſw. What if his adverſaries shall be contented with a shorter proceſſe, & shall ſupercede many formes of legality, which uſe to be followed with other notorious Malefactors? Is not this a brave Goliah that cometh out to defend the King's ſacred perſon, when all which he at length can do, is to defend him, from being adjudged in a formal mode, to loſſe his head and his Crowne; that he shall not be called publickly (as other Malefactors are) to the judges barr, and there be impannelled as a Tyrant and Traitor to God and the Countrey? If this man deſerve his wages, let wiſe Men judge; ſeing all know that there is greater difficulty in taking away Tyrants, then in taking away other Malefactors: And that hardly can ſuch a legal way with all its formalities be followed with them, which is followed with others: And that ſometimes, ſome Malefactors, though they were never Princes, muſt be ſentenced in a more brief manner and privately alſo, and yet it is all one upon the matter, if the man be guilty and really condemned by his judges. And ſo it is all one, if a Tyrant be adjudged worthy of death or depoſition, by a Parliament the Repreſentatives of the People, and accordingly cut off from government, or out of the land of the living, whether it be done by a publick Meſſenger, with ſound of Trumpet, and by the hand of a publick lictor and executioner, on a publick ſcaffold; or by force of armes, vvhen the former meanes cannot be ſaifly uſed, nor ſo ſecurely. And it vvas not the inſurrection of nobles as ſuch, but as proceres and primores Regni that were inſtanced, and of lawful Parliaments (ſuch as were uſed in theſe dayes) ſentenceing and condemning Kings for tyranny, and other miſdemeanours. Let him read the Hiſtory of theſe times written by Buchannan and Grafton, and he will finde it ſo; particularly, let him ſee and conſider how Ferlegus was adjudged worthy of death, but for Ferguſius his Father's ſake, was only impriſoned; and thereafter with the unanimous conſent of all, being ſuſpected guilty of the death of Feritharis, put from the Crowne: ſee why Therëus, when he had filled the land with robberies, fled to the Britones? Was it not becauſe the Governours had a minde to punish him? Was not Even the 3. put in priſon? Was not Dardan, for his wickedneſſe and blood, purſued by nobles and People, his head cut off, his corps throwne into a jacks? Luctatus at length was apprehenped and executed. His ſone Conarus in face of Parliment accuſed, apprehended, and shut up into a hall, with ſome few attendants, his ill counſellers executed and a Viceroy choſen till the People should meet to make a new King? Were not the Prim…res Regni about to have depoſed Conſtantine the firſt, for his vices, had not Douglaſſe diſſwaded them, becauſe of their warres with the Britons and Saxons? Was not Ferquard the 52 King ſummoned to compear before the Parliament, and becauſe he refuſed was he not brought to judgment againſt his will, and accuſed of many crimes, and not being able to purge himſelf was he not caſt into priſon? This looks like an act and execution of juſtice done in cold blood under forme of proceſſe, So did the Primores Regni intend to have punished Ferquard the ſecond, had not Bishop Colman diſſwaded them. Was not Eugenius the VIII. for his filthy luſts and vices, covetouſneſſe and cruelty, ſlaine by the general conſent of his Lords aſſembled? By whom, and for what was Donald the 70. King caſt into priſon? Who forced Ethus brother to Conſtantine the II. (and for what) to renunce the Kingdome, and shut him up in priſon? Was not Culenus ſummoned to compeare before a Parliament at Scone?

Now the Surveyer is in his ſtrength, and diſdaining to meddle with the libeller (as he calleth him) he will goe and reflect upon the magazine, (as he ſpeaketh) to Lex Rex, who Quaest. 26. proveth by unanſwerable arguments, that the King is not above the Law; but this Surveyer for all his big words dar not meddle with that debate; but quarrelleth with a word Pag. 241. where that worthy Author is anſwering the objection of that Apoſtate Prelate Maxwel the Author of Sacroſancta Regum Majeſtas, ſtollen from Arniſaeus; which was this, [Why might not the People of Iſraël, Peers or Sanhedrin, have conveened before them, judged or punished David, for his Adultery and Murther.] Unto which he anſwered thus, [He taketh it for confeſſed, that it had been treaſon in the Sanhedrin and States of Iſraël to have taken on them to judge and puniſh David, for his Adultery and Murther; but he giveth no reaſon for this, nor any Word of God; and truely though I will not preſume to goe before others in this, God's Law, Gen. 9: ver. 6. compared with, Numb. 35: ver. 30, 31. ſeemeth to ſay againſt them. Nor can I think that God's Law, or his Deputy the judges are to accept the perſons of the great, becauſe they are great, Deut. 1: ver. 17. 2 Chron, 19: ver. 6, 7. aud we ſay we cannot diſtinguish, where the Law diſtinguisheth not. The Lord ſpeaketh to under judges, Levit. 19: ver. 15. Thou shalt not reſpect the perſon of the poor, nor honour the perſon of the mighty, or of the Prince, for we know what theſe names foreign and foreign meaneth. I grant it is not God's meaning, that the King should draw the ſword against himſelf; but yet, it followeth not, that if we ſpeak of the demerite of blood, that the Law of God accepteth any judge, great or ſmall. And if the Estates be above the King▪ as I conceive they are, though it be a humane politick conſtitution that the King be free of all coaction of Law, becauſe it conduceth for the peace of the commonwealth; yet if we make it a matter of conſcience, for my part, I ſee no exception, that God maketh; if men make, I crave leave to ſay à facto adjus non ſequitur.] Thus that worthy Author; and could he have uttered his judgment more ſpareingly and ſoberly, in a matter that was not of great Moment to the queſtion in hand, ſo that though he had forborne to have ſpoken any thing to this at all, his cauſe had not been, in the leaſt, weakened; and though we should grant that the Sanhedrin could not have judged David for theſe facts (which yet we can cannot do) what loſſe shall we have? Seing we may eaſily grant and Lex Rex with us Pag. 243. that Tyranny only muſt unking a Prince; and theſe acts were not acts of Tyranny, and what shall this vaine Surveyer gaine then? Why would he not examine other things which that worthy Author ſayd, more appoſite to the cauſe? Will not wiſe men laugh at this dealing, and account him a fool in the firſt magnitude, in handleing ſuch a cauſe, which ſo nearly concerneth his Majeſties life, after ſuch a manner, that a very ſchool-boy may ſmile at? Then he addeth, [So Pag. 348, and 428, and 238. and often elſewhere, he (that is Lex Rex) will have the Eſtates executing the moral Law (as he calls it) on the King, and punishing him, and why? becauſe he ſayes moſt thraſonically, Pag. 460. I have unanſwerably proved that the Kingdome is ſuperior to the King, and the People may be their owne judge in the tribunal of neceſſity.] Anſw. Lex Rex in two at leaſt of theſe pages cited, ſpeaketh no ſuch thing, and if this Surveyer were not more windy and vaine then ever Thraſo was, he would not ſpeak ſo of that Author, till firſt he had diſcovered the anſwereableneſſe of theſe arguments, which neither he nor any of his complices shall ever be able to do. But this, Epicompothraſibombomachides will force a beliefe upon the world, that with this very adverb thraſonical, diffavit omnes in Castris Gurguſtodianis, and cry to his enchanted fraternity to ſing Jo pan at his invention. But what ſayes he to all this? [1 (ſayes he) what should he meane to make it conduceable to the peace of the comm…nwealth, that the King be free of the coaction of Law; and yet not ſo, if it be made a matter of conſcience; is the preſervation of the peace of the commonwealth, no matter of conſcience to him? Or is not the constitution freeing the King from coaction of Law (for that end) warrantable?] Anſ. Doth not this ignoramus know that a queſtion of this nature may be conſidered and anſwered politically and theologically: And that many things may be tolerated or forborne in poynt of policy, upon politick grounds and ends, which, if conſidered ſtricto Iure, according to conſcience, should not be forborne, nor tolerated. David in point of policy, did forbear to execute the Law upon the Murtherer Joab, whom yet in poynt of conſcience, he accounted a man of death, and therefore recommended the execution of the Law of God, unto his Son Solomon: and this toleration or forbearance may be lawfull or unlawful, according to the weight of the matter tolerated, or forborne, and the nature and weight of the grounds in policy, upon which this forbearance is determined. So that though we should ſuppone it lawful for a Commonwealth to enact and determine in Law, that their King should not be queſtioned for one ſingle act of Murther or Adultery, as other perſones are: Yet in poynt of conſcience, if the queſtion be ſtated in theſi, whether a King may be queſtioned for one ſingle act of Murther and Adultery, as another private perſon, it may be anſwered affirmatively, becauſe the Law of God, makes no exception of perſones. 2. It may be made a matter of conſcience, to make the King free of the coaction of Law, in ſome ſmall and inconſiderable particulars, becauſe of the probable hazard into which the Commonwealth may be brought by coërcing of him, which all the value of the particular anent which the coaction is exerced, will not countervaile. But it will never be allowed, in poynt of conſcience, to make him free of all coaction of Law, ſo as he may without control, murther millions, deſtroy and waſte Religion: For that were not conduceable to the peace of the Commonwealth, but a ready way to deſtroy all: So that a conſtitution freeing the King from all coaction of Law, how ever pretended for the preſervation of the peace of the Commonwealth, can never be warrandable. For that were to make him actu primo, and in actu ſignato a Tyger, a Lyon, & a waſter of the Commonvvealth; & if his good Nature should incline him to good & peaceable things; yet no thanks to the conſtitution. Whereas he would make his reader beleeve that the Kings of the jewes were under no coërtion let, him conſider what Zuinglius ſayeth explan. art. 42. Tom. 1. oper. where he expreſly ſayeth. [That the Kings of the jewes and others, when they dealt perfidiouſly, contrare to the law of God, might be lawfully depoſed by the people.] Yea he tells us, that whiles wicked princes and Kings were not removed, all the people were punished of God, which he proveth by Ier. 15: 1. to ver. 6. and a little thereafter, tels us that [if the children of Iſrael had thus depoſed Manaſſeh, they had not been ſo grievouſly punished with him.] Yea Schikcardus in his jus regium hebraorum. Cap. 2. Theor. 7. tells us Pag. 56. 57. out of the Rabbines, that the Kings of the jewes might have been called to an account, & punished for tranſgreſſing of the law, by the Sanhedrin, eſpecially if they took moe wives, and moe horſes then vvere allowed, and heaped up riches; for theſe cauſes, he proveth Pag. 60. out of Hal. melach. c. 3. §. 4. Halach. Sanhedr. cap. 19. Talmud cap. Kohen gadol. Siphri parſ: ſchoph. That they were to be ſcourged. And hiſtories show us, How this Sanhedrin, even in their weak and declineing times, were loth to quite with this power, and therefore did queſtion Herod, who was ſet over Galilee by the Romans, for ſome murther committed by him, ſee the hiſtory ſet forth by Ioſephus Antiq. lib. 14. c. 17. And if any should object that Caſaubon ad. annal Eccleſ. exerc. 13. n. 5. hath proved the contrary out of the Talmud. The forecited learned Shikchardus. Pag. 63. 64. sheweth out of the very places cited by Caſaubon, how he was miſtaken, and how the Kings of David's line both did judge, and were judged.

2. (Sayes he) It is good that this Metaphiſical Statist was no Chief Priest or member of the Sanhedrin in Davids time; for he would have afforded a corrupt expoſition of the Law to cut off the King. What ſots were the Priests & Prophets at that time that did not inſtigate the Sanhedrin? This man could have told them that they were above him, and they were bound to execute the Law upon him.] Anſw. It was good that this ſuperlatively irrational paraſite., and infraphyſical fooll was not breathing in theſe dayes; for he would have told Kings, you may Kill, murther, maſſacre, deſtroy all the land, Man, Wife and Childe, without the leaſt fear of reſiſtance; and have told the People, the Sanhedrin, and all the Elders of Iſrael, though your Kings turn butchers and deſtroyers of the People of God, worſe then ever Nimrod or any that ever breathed ſince his dayes, you have no more to do, but hold up your throats, or flee to the uncircumciſed out of the inheritance of the Lord. But what ſayes all this to the thing? Doth this pove that David or any King was excepted in the Law of God? Where, In what chapter, or what verſe shall we finde this? Good Maſter prelate tell us, or where we shall finde it in your book of wiſdome? 2. We finde not that any of the Prieſts or Prophets reproved David for ſpareing Ioab that murtherer, who shed the blood of war in peace, 2 King. 2: ver. 5. was it therefore right in David to have ſpared him? Sure they might well have told David, that though Ioab was a great man, yet he was above him, to punish him as well as another Man, for his ſin; and in poynt of conſcience, and by God's Law he was bound to do it. Theſe ſinful acts of Ioab were more notoure then what David had done in ſecret: And becauſe we finde not that he vvas reproved upon this account, shall vve therefore uſe this Man's dialect; and ſay, What's ſots or coldrife ſenſeleſſe Men were the Prieſts and the Prophets of that time, who did not inſtigate David to execute the Moral Law on Ioab, that wrath might be turned away from the Land?

3. He tels us, that the author of Lex Rex [Vtterly miſtakes the meaning of the Word of God, Gen. 9: 6. (as for the other texts they clearly concerne Magiſtrats only toward ſuch over whom they have power, but does neither instigate the inferiour Magistrates against the Superiour, nor the People against any of them) where it is ſaid, he that sheds mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed.] Anſ. 1. The author of Lex Rex doth not ſay that theſe places do inſtigate the inferiour Magiſtrats againſt the ſuperiour, nor the people againſt both; but that they poynt forth the Magiſtrate's duty to judge righteous judgment, and to accept no Mans perſon, be he a Prince, or be he a poor Man. And if they concerne Magiſtrates toward ſuch over whom they have power, The author of Lex Rex ſeeketh no more; for he had proved, (and this vaine windy man hath not the head, though he want not a heart and good will to it, to anſvvere his arguments) that the Eſtates and Repreſentative of the People, have power over the Prince. 2. It is a hard cenſure to ſay that he hath utterly miſtaken the meaning of Gen. 9: ver. 6. Let us hear how? [Concluding hence, (ſayes he) that there is here a precept that the blood of every man (though he be in the ſupreame power) should be shed by his inferiours, if he shed blood innocently and without cauſe.] Anſw. But this is not the concluſion that Lex Rex draweth from the place, He only ſayeth. That in this place there is no exception made of the Prince, though he be the Supreme power: And can this Man for all his skill demonſtrate the exception? Lex Rex ſaid not that his blood should be shed by his inferiours, but by the Eſtates of the land, who are his ſuperiours, what way then hath he miſtaken the meaning of this word? What furder [Suppoſeing (ſays he) this word not only to be predictional—but alſo diatactick and perceptive, there must be meet limitations of the ſentence, both in the ſubject and attribute] Grants all, what limitations will he have in the ſubject, that sheds mans blood? [It is to be underſtood (ſays he) only of ſuch as have no authority, and do it out of private revenge; for we muſt not owne the fancies of Photinians and Anabaptiſts that condemne lawful warres, and capital punishments.] Anſw. This is good and granted, for we ſay that even the King, when murthering unjuſtly, acteth as a private perſon, and is prompted by his revenge: did he ſuppoſe that Lex Rex was a Photinian or Anabaptiſt? If not, why did he trouble himſelf with this? But what ſayes he to that which he cals the attribute? [Certanely (ſayes he) taking the word as a precept, It is not meant that it is the duty of every man or any man indifferently, to shed the blood of the perſon who sheds innocent blood; but of the Magiſtrate who is judge above him. All interpreters are agreed, that here is (if not the inſtitution yet) the approbation of the office of the civil magiſtrate.] Anſw. Did the author of Lex Rex ſay that it was the duty of any man indifferently, to punish capitally shedders of innocent blood? ſaid he any thing againſt agreement of interpreters concerning the inſtitution or approbation of the office of the civil Magiſtrates? Sure when he ſaid, and elſwhere proved, that the Eſtates of the Realme were above the King, he fully agreed with theſe authors, touching the meaning of that place; ſo that that Surveyer might have ſpared his paines in reciteing their words, for he ſayes nothing againſt what either Pareus, Pet. Martyr, Muſculus, Bezelius, Diodate, or the Chaldee Paraphraſe ſay. Let us hear how he applyeth this to the purpoſe? [But (ſayes he) if the perſons inveſted with Supreme power of the ſword, abuſeing their power become guilty of shedding innocent hlood, who (in that ſociety where of they are heads) shall judge or punish them? who is ſuperiour over the ſupreme to punish him?—It is inexplicable how any in whom the Soveraigne Majeſty, & Magiſtratical power reſides, should, according to order, be punished by ſubjects.] Anſw. This is the knot of all, but it is nothing elſe than what we have heard againe and againe, and hath been ſpoken to already. But yet, becauſe it is to him inexplicable, and a Gordian Knot, let us ſee if we can looſe it without Alexander's ſword. He will grant (or if he will not, but retract what he hath elswhere granted, ſpeaking of a legal reſiſtence, all the lawyers in Scotland will grant it) that if any in the King's name shall ſeek to diſpoſſeſſe a Man of his inheritance, the man may defend his right by law, and the King by his advocate muſt pleade his cauſe before the ordinary judges; and theſe ordinary judges, muſt judge righteous judgment according to law, and give out a decreet in favours of the ſubject againſt the King, and ſo condemne the King of injury and oppreſſion intended againſt the ſubject: Now who but the ordinary judges, in civil Matters, are judge here to the Supreme? & yet theſe judges, in another reſpect, are but ſubjects: doth he not now ſee how ſuch as are meer ſubjects in one reſpect, may judge and punish him who is inveſted with Soveraigne Majeſty and Magiſtratical power, and ſo in another reſpect are above him. And what if I ſay, that as, in civil Matters, the ordinary judges may judge the King, ſo the juſtice general or his deputy conſtitute ordinare judges in criminals or capitals, may iudge him when he committeth a capital crime? let him or any Man elſe shew me a reaſon, why the one should be, and the other may not be, in poynt of conſcience. But if we ſpeak of a Parliament the Repreſentatives of the People, the caſe is ſo cleare that there is no difficulty; for that is a judge alwayes above him, and ſo even according to his limitations, if the King shed innocent blood, by them may his blood be shed.

Then Pag. 81. he ſayes [When the Apoſtle Rom. 13. ſayes let every ſoul be ſubject to Superiour powers, that (every ſoul) doth not comprehend the ſupreme power it ſelf (for how can the Man inveſted with it, be ſubject to a ſuperiour power?) but it is meant that every ſoul under the ſuperiour power or ſupreme, should be ſubject to it.] Anſw. Yet againe the ſame thing which we heard before. Is he not able to underſtand this, how one who is ſupreme, in one reſpect, may be inferiour, in another reſpect? The father hath a Supreme paternal power over the Son, yet the ſone, being a judge or Prince, may be over him, as David was over Ieſſe, and Saul over Kish. But (ſayes he) Let men (as they will) indulge themſelves in their ſeditious Notions, they muſt at laſt ſiſt in ſome ſupreame power on Earth which is not judge able or punishable by any.] Anſw. Be it ſo, what hath he gained for the King his Maſter? Muſt either he be the ſupreme power on earth which is not judgeable or punishable by any, or muſt there be none? His adverſaries will ſoon deny the conſequence: And he, let him indulge himſelf in his Tyrannical Notions, as much as he will, shall never be able to confirme it. How then shall he defend the ſacred perſon and life of the King? What ſayeth he further? [If ſoveraigne Majeſty be placed in Parliament or People (who may be guilty of shedding innocent blood, as well as the King) who shall shed their blood when they tranſgreſſe? Shall this be reſerved to the ſounder and ſmaller part of the People (as this Man ſpeaks Pag. 240.] then there is ground enough laid for Eternal confuſion] Anſw. The Surveyer either ſubtilly or ignorantly confounds things here, which should be conſidered diſtinctly, and leadeth his unwarry reader off the way: Wherefore we would have the Reader (though all this is nothing to the purpoſe in hand to prove the King uncontrollable, or unpunishable and unjudgeable for any of his acts) take notice of theſe few things which will help to cleare the matter. 1. That there is a not-judgeableneſſe (to ſpeakſo) and not-punisheableneſſe de facto, which may be ſaid of ſome notorious rebels and out-Lawes, whom neither Law nor power of authority can cöerce, and there is a non-punishableneſſe and non-judgeableneſſe de …ure, when one is exeemed from Law-judgment and Law-ſentence, ſo that he is above all tryal and ſentence of Magiſtrates: Caſes may fall out wherein ſuch as are punishable & judgeable de Iure, according to an ordinary way laid downe or allowed by God, may notwithſtanding be unpunishable and not-judgeable de facto, either through corruption prevailing over all, or prevalency of power in the punishable perſon or perſons: And this, though in an ordinary way irremediable, yet ſpeaks not againſt the Ordinance and appoyntment of God and Nature. 2. That there is a difference betwixt perſonal faults of Governours, or ſuch as are inveſted with authority and power, as was that act of Murther and Adultery in David; and publick miſcarriages in poynt of governm. & in exerceing the power wherewith they are inveſted: of perſonal faults, ſpeaketh Lex Rex in the place now under conſideration; and upon this, have we vindicated that worthy Author, from vvhat this perverter of all things hath ſaid. But here he mixeth theſe, and confoundeth them, that according to his vvay, he may pervert the truth. 3. There is a difference betvvixt ſimple acts of male-adminiſtration in leſſer matters; and betvvixt ſuch acts of male-adminiſtration, as pervert the ends of government. 4. There is a difference betwixt palpable, cleare, and undenyable miſcarriages; and betvvixt ſuch as are not ſo cleare nor unqueſtionable. 5. There is a difference to be made betvvixt ordinary ſtanding caſes; and an extraordinary emergent: in an extraordinary caſe, vvhile the diſeaſe is deſperate, a deſperat-like and extraordinary remedy may be uſed without overturning the ordinary way, which is to be uſed in ordinary caſes, Theſe things will help us to nnravel his confuſed diſcourſe. And ſo we Anſwere. 1. If Parliament-members or privat perſons among the People shed innocent blood it is no difficulty to know who should judge them. 2. If a Parliament as the Peoples Repreſentatives Murder the innocent, I ſee not why they may not be called to an account by a poſterior Parliament, as when a beanch of judges in civil matters, conſpire together to oppreſſe, by their unlavvful and unjuſt decreets, palpably ſuch and not our to all; vvhen they are depoſed and others put in their places, the oppreſſed may get his cauſe righted, and reparation of dammage of them: Or vvhen a juſtice generall manifeſtly & palpably murdereth the innocent, he may be made to anſvvere before another put in his place: if this may be done (as I judge in poynt of conſcience it may) ſo may the other be done with Parliaments. 3. If Parliaments conſpire to overturne Religion, Lavves, Liberties, and thus deſtroy the Republick, I judge vvith L. R. Pag. 240. that the ſounder part, if they be able, may reſiſt and hinder, ſo far as they can, that deſtruction and ruine of the Republick. Neither ever shall he prove that this is a ground for Eternal confuſion: O ſayes he, [Any leſſer part, when they have or think they have will and ſ…rengh enough to through their buſineſse, will undoubtedly call themſelves the ſounder part, and labour to beare downe the corrupt plurality.] Anſw. This remedy to prevent deſtruction and ruine to the Commonwealth, may be of the Lord, though it should be abuſed by ſinful men; for the beſt thing may be abuſed: And it is not the meane allowed by God and Nature which layeth a ground for eternal confuſion; but the abuſe of the meane maintained, whereof we are not guilty. But we have had abundance of ſuch rotten conſequences from him, who knoweth better what it is to deceive the ſimple with ſophiſtications, then to ſatisfy the judicious with ſolid reaſons. Then he addeth, [But the Chriſtian Reader may eaſily ſee how hard this Author is put to it; and for all his ſaying that according to God's Law, Kings muſt be punished as well as others, yet is he forced to acknowledg a Supremacy of power in ſome, not punishable by any but by God.] Anſ: This is but what we heard juſt now, and whether true or falſe, it helpeth him nothing: Have that Supremacy of power, which is not punishable by any but by God, who will, if the King have it not, the King's life is not ſecured: And if he ſay, if any have it the King muſt have it. True, if this rotten malignant and paraſitical ignoramus can make no bad inferences; but he hath already ſo often diſcovered vanity in this way of argueing, that we cannot account him infallible: And therefore let him prove his conſequence; for we know him better then to take any thing from him upon truſt. Well, what way doth he clear this, of Lex Rex? [For (ſayes he) Pag. 389. when he hath given all power to the Parliament over the King, he objecteth to himſelf; who shall punish and coërce the Parliament, in caſe of exorbitance: He anſweres, poſterior Parliaments, and Pag. 211. he ſayeth, by the people and conſcience of the people are they to be judged, let all our Nobles and Parliaments hearken to this.] Anſw. In the firſt place cited, Lex Rex is not ſpeaking of Parliaments power over the King (as this ſquint-eyed Surveyer thinketh,) but is handling that queſtion whether or not Monarcy is the beſt of governments? And is shevving in vvhat reſpects it is beſt, and in vvhat reſpects it is vvorſte; and shevveth hovv a mixt Monarchy is beſt; and then anſvvereth ſome objections: And to that vvhichwhich ſome might object, That Parliaments might exceed their bounds, and who should coërce them? He anſvvered, That poſteriour Parliaments might do it; and ſo there vvas a ſalvo in that mixture of governmemt 2. In the other place he is shevving vvhat relation the King hath to the Lavv, and that he is not the ſole Lavv maker, nor ſole ſupreme judge: And anſvvereth that objection, That the three Eſtates as men and looking to their owne ends, not to Law and the publick good, are not fundamentalls, & are to be judged by the King. viz. That they are to be judged by the people and the conſcience of the people. Why calleth …e the Nobles and Parliaments to hearken to this? What abſ…dity inn reaſon is here? [Who ever head of this (ſayes he) that one Parliament poſteriour should punish the prior? Their acts they may retract indeed, but to punish them for their acts, is moſt abſurd, becauſe the prior Parliament in the capacity of that judicatory, had as much povver as the poſterior. States men vvill vvonder at this doctrine, that Members of a Parliament should be punished for their free votes, by a ſucceeding Parliament, and far more at the ſubjecting them to the conſcience of the People.] Anſw. 1. It is no ſmall punishment and cöercion to a Parliament, to have all their deſignes, conſultations, and concluſions overturned, which may be done by poſteriour Parliaments 2. If Parliaments, by their free votes, ſell Religion, and the Liberties of the land unto the Turk, and ſo deſtroy the ſame, and betray their Truſt, I ſee not vvhy they ought not be punished for their paines. If they should enact and put to execution the act, vvhen made; That all vvho vvill not bovv and burn incenſe to an idol should be brunt quick, I ſee not, vvhy they may not by a poſteriour Parliament be queſtioned and punished for that innocent blood vvhichwhich they have shed. 3. His reaſon to the contrary, is not good; for they never had povver or commiſſion for overturning the ends of government, and deſtroying the Commonvvealth: if the Magiſtrates of a Brugh betray their truſt, dilapidate the rents and revenues of the city, ſell and diſpone the rights and privileges thereof, may not the ſucceeding Magiſtrates call them to an account for that, notvvithſtanding that in the capacity of that judicatory, they had as much povver (if any) as the poſteriour 4. Wonder at it vvho vvil, that vvhichwhich is right is right: and it is conſonant to equity, that the conſciences of the People be ſo far judges of vvhat is done by their Repreſentatives, as not to ſuffer them, in their name, and by any povver borrovved from them, to deſtory the Commonwealth and to overturne the fundations of Religion and Liberty, &c. [But then (ſayes he) another objection he makes poſteriour Parliaments and People both may erre. He anſvveres, All that is true: God only muſt remede that. ] What can he make of this? [Well then (ſayes he) if Parliaments or People deſtroy or murther perſons innocently, God only muſt remeed that; there is no povver on Earth to call them to an account: Who ſees not that at length the author is driven to acknowledge a power, which if it deviate cannot be judged by any on earth.] Anſw. Lex Rex is not there ſpeaking of particular acts of injuſtice Or iniquity; but of the whole ends of government: And ſo if Parliaments and People concurre and joyne together to overturne all, the world ſees that there is no remedy on Earth: Neither needed he to ſay that he was driven to this, ſeing it was ſo obvious to all who have eyes in their head. Though God hath appoynted meanes & ordinary rules to help abuſes that are ordinary; yet when corruption is univerſal the ordinary meanes cannot availe, God himſelf muſt helpe that: & who knoweth not that extraordinary ſuppoſeable caſes cannot infringe, or invalidate the ordinary rules for ordinary caſes. Now all this is but vaine idle worke, and of no advantage to his cauſe; for he shall never hence prove though he should argue till his eyeſtrings break, that this Soveraigne uncontrolable power, which is not cenſureable nor punishable, is only in the King: And if he do not this, how ſtops he the Mouth of his adverſaries? Hovv ſalves he his Majeſtie's life, or the King from all hazard of cenſure? But then he adds to as little purpoſe, That [It may be ſeen that his principles lead him to owne a meer democracy (which is the worst of governments) as the only lawful government: he placeth and fixeth the unpunishable ſoveraignity there.] Anſw. This is a groſſe miſtake: For this Man underſtands not what a democracy is. He takes democracy to be where all governe: But that is no government, where there is none to be governed, but all are governours. Democracy is where ſome are choſen out of all the People by turnes, without reſpect had to birth, meanes or other privileges, to governe the reſt. And Lex Rex will not ſay that theſe governours have an uncontrollable ſoveveraignity, but may be oppoſed & reſiſted, by the body of the People who chooſe them, as well as the King in a Monarchy, or the Primores Regni in an Ariſtocracy; becauſe under all ſpeces of governments, the fountaine power and Majeſty abides in the People, and is reſumeable, in caſes of neceſſity.

Thus we have ſeen how poorly and weakly this vaine man hath maintained the King's life and ſacred perſon, and how by his foolish ſophiſtications, and his weake and impertinent anſwers and aſſertions, he hath put the King's life in greater hazard then it was; for theſe poor people never had a thought of wronging his Majeſtie's perſon, or of ſpoyling him of his life, but now vvhen he hath ſtarted the queſtion without any provocation or juſt ground and occaſion given; and can ſay no more then he here hath ſayd for that cauſe, hath he not invited people to think of what they might do? And I am ſure if they have no other reſtraint to binde up their hands, all which he hath ſaid, will be but like the new ropes to Sampſon. That which followeth in his third Chapter touching the Covenants betwixt King and People, is impertinent to his preſent purpoſe: For Naphtaly maketh uſe of theſe to prove the lawfulneſſe of reſiſtence, as may be ſeen Pag. 19, and 30. and for that end, we have vindicated them in our former diſcourſe from all his corrupt gloſſes and evaſions. And wiſe Men will think him ſo far from deſerving a reward, for what he hath done, that they will think he rather deſerveth to be whipped, for his miſmanageing this queſtion of ſo great conſequence, which he undertook to defend; and particularly for bringing the arguments, which are adduced to evince the lawfulneſſe of reſiſtence, as if they did with equal force ſtrick againſt his Majeſtie's life and perſon; whereas many will be cleare for reſiſting, that will not be ſo cleare for punishing or executing the Prince: and ſince by his folly, and imprudent impertinency, making the ſame arguments prove both, people shall ſee that by what right they may reſiſt, by the ſame right they may capitally punish the Prince, they will be ſo far from being ſcarred form reſiſtence, which natures light doth ſo evidentlly demonſtrate to be lawful and neceſſary; that they will be more emboldened thereunto, perceiving how they may do more, which poſſibly would never elſe have come into their minde: and ſure all which Naphtaly hath ſaid, could not have ſuggeſted ſuch a thing unto them, or occaſioned their thoughts thereabout, as impartial Readers will judge.

If any aske what he hath left undone for ſecueing his Majestie's perſon and life? I am ſure to name no moe he hath forgotten one thing, and that is, the preſſing of the Solemne League and Covenant on the People; but knowing what he hath both ſaid and done againſt this, he thought he could not fairely retract and condemne his owne tongue and actions; yet if he think himſelf obliged to venture his life for the life of his Majeſty, he might have alſo thought it his duty, to take shame to himſelf, to repent of what he had done, and recant what he had ſaid, for the ſecureing of his Majeſtie's life and perſon. Now that the preſſing of this Covenant upon the People, would be a ſoveraigne remedy to preſerve his Majeſtie's life, his Majeſtie's Royal father knew it, when being in the iſle of Wight, & fearing that violence should have been done unto him by theſe in whoſe cuſtody he was, he ſent for Mr. Ieremiah French miniſter of that place to which Carisbrook caſtle belonged, and deſired him to preach the Covenant and preſſe it upon the People, that thereby they might be engaged to reſcue him, in caſe any ſuch thing should be attempted by that part of the army: See for this the poſtſcript to the Covenanters Plea. And ſure I am, if his Majeſty would (as I ſaid before) faithfully minde this Covenant, and cauſe the People ſtand to it, form the higheſt to the loweſt, he would finde, that there could not be a more effectual meane imagined, for ſecureing his perſon, then that would be. If he would faithfully owne, and according to his power lay out himſelf, for ſetling and ſecureing the maine things contained in that Covenant, and walk in that due ſubordination unto the Supreame governour of heaven and earth; The very conſcience of theſe great and maine things, would preſſe a conſcientious reſpect to, and a faithfull care of his Majeſtie's perſon, in reference to theſe great Ends. Which would prove more effectual for this end, then volumes of railing ſophiſtications, which this perjured, Prophane and malignant Prelate and anticovenanter could write and ſend abroad.