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The Freedom of the Will · Peter Sterry

The Freedom of the Will, Part 1 · Subpart 1 · Argument 3

3. Argument.

The Wisdom of God comes in the third place, to oppose this Liberty of the Will in question.

The Divine Wisdom thus expresseth it self by the mouth of Solomon in his Proverbs, I Wisdom dwell with Prudence, and find out witty inventions. The Philosopher seemeth to furnish us with a fair Comment upon this Text, when he divideth the intellectual habits or perfections of the mind into these five, foreign. The first is the eternal truth of things in their immediate Principles and Springs, as they lie in the eternal mind, and thence shine forth in the Understandings (the superior parts of the inferior and created Spirits.) The second comprehends all forms of Knowledge, as streams flowing from these springs running along together in the mind, representing in one view, in one entire Image, the whole nature of things, as a Copy of the Divine Nature, and of the Original Image in the Divine mind. The third Perfection, in the account of the Philosopher, is Wisdom, which he describeth to be the union of both these foregoing Perfections in the same mind or spirit. Prudence in the fourth place, is the lustre or brightness of this Wisdom shining forth in our Manners, in our moral Actions and Conversations. This is the light of Wisdom flowing forth upon all the motions of our Will, of our sensitive Appetite and Passions, with their proper effects, forming and figuring them according to (in an harmony with) the Divine Image, in the universal nature of things, and in its Original, the Divine Nature it self, as this Image shines forth in the mind. Lastly, That Art which compriseth all witty Inventions, is composed of the emanations of this Wisdom, as beams from the Sun, by which Inferiour Spirits bring forth external effects, works without themselves, in the similitude and imitation of the Divine Work in the Divine Nature, for the use of life in its necessities, conveniencies and delights.

Thus Wisdom above and below dwells with Prudence, and finds out knowledge of witty Inventions. Agreeable to this is that Doctrine of another sort of Philosophers that, as Wisdom is the perfection of the Understanding, so the Understanding in its perfect state is the first seat and spring of Order. Therefore they say, where-ever there is Order, where-ever there is Harmony or Beauty which consists in Order, there is an Understanding. The Understanding, say they, in its proper and native state, is the immediate Son and Image of God beneath God himself, the first and fullest effulgency of the God-head in its essential Image, so it becomes Omniform, being all forms in one, with a richly heighthned Light, and a Divine Order. Here Order hath all its Springs and Measures, here Judgment hath its Throne and Scepter, comparing and measuring all forms of things according to the Order in which they lie here, accordingly determining order and disorder in things below.

Moses in that sweet and dying Song of his, where he representeth the Order and Beauty of the whole Work of God in the Nation of the Jews (as a principal part of that Work, and as a mysterious figure of the whole Work) expresseth the whole force and form of the Divine Wisdom, as the ground of his Song, in the beginning of it: He is the Rock, his work is perfect, for all his wayes are judgment, Deut. 32. 4. Behold here the three parts of Wisdom; the Rock, the Judgment, the perfection of the Work.

1. The eternal truths of things in the Divine Mind (the first principle and spring) where they shine immediately immutably; These are the Rock.

2. The universal Image of things in all variety of Forms, with a beautiful Order drawn forth from these springs, joyned immediately to them, exactly and most agreeably suited to them, most harmoniously answering them, in all mutual Comparisons and Relations within the Divine mind: This is the Judgment.

3. The production of the whole work in an apt correspondency with this inward Image, that the whole answer the whole, part answer part, universally through the whole. This is the perfection of the Work, the perfection of Wisdom and Judgment in the work. Thus the wayes of the Work-man in his work are Judgment.

If now any part of the work of God, if a principal part of his work, the will of intellectual Spirits, in those motions, in those moments, which are as the hinge upon which the whole Work of God chiefly turneth about, in respect to its Beauty and Deformity, its Misery and Felicity, its Eternity, have no Connexion with or Dependance upon the other parts of the work, the Image or Original Model in the Divine mind; Can there be an Order here in the whole, Can all the parts in the whole have an harmonious proportion to each other? Can the Work outward agree with the inward Model, the whole agreeing with the whole, and each part answering each part? Can this work be perfect? Can it be wrought in Judgment? Is the whole way of this work the way of Judgment? Is there in each step of it, the foot-step of a Divine Understanding, the impression of a Divine Wisdom, which is an entire uninterrupted Order? Do all the parts in this Work, according to the Model or Image in the mind of the Work-man, lie together in one whole piece, in one beautiful body, knit together by fit joynts and bands, ministring to each other by these joynts and bands mutual strength, beauties, and perfections, from the same Head, whose Unity runneth through, shineth in the whole, and all its several parts, thus uniting them as one body to each other, and to its self?

Doth not this supposition of such an independent Liberty in the Will to Contrarieties and Contradictions, naturally lead us to an imagination of two Gods, one Good, the other Evil, striving together in the composure of the same work, bringing in consusion upon it by crossing and interrupting each other, according to the sense of the Manichees? Or doth it not favour that Opinion of some Platonists, of a matter, the subject of the Divine Work, co-eternal with the Divine Spirit, the Work-man, which being in some parts of it altogether intractable, resisting the skill and power of the Archytect or working Spirit, receiveth not the Divine form which that would introduce, could not be made beautiful, and so brought Confusion, War, all Evil into the Work? Or (if that seem more probable) would it not incline us to the belief of fortuitous motions, of numberless Particles confusedly concurring, which have neither beginning, rule, nor end of themselves, their shapes or motions?

What skilful Poet makes his Poem so, that the great Chain, and final Catastrophe, in the conduct and government of which the chief beauty of the whole Work is plac'd (from which arise the greatest Consequences, together with the perfection and praise of the whole piece) should be derived from a meer Contingency, which hath no coherence with any antecedent part, which receiveth no force from any thing of any reason, proportion, or order in the whole, which hath no place nor form in the design of the Poet?

Would any wise Work-man, who had an absolute power over his work, who brought forth from himself entirely both the matter and form of it according to his will, frame a work, in which the great end of the principal parts and of the whole, should be undetermined, by being dependant upon the great and chief motion of the work, which can have no complete Idea in the mind of the Worker from which it may receive its form, which is uncapable of having any certain conformity to the will of the Workman, to derive from thence an agreeable sweetness and goodness through the veins of the whole and of all the parts, that the spirit which hath wrought it may have rest and complacency in the work it self, in the harmony of the work within it self, and in the harmony of it with the Model in its own Understanding? Would he frame a work which in this its principal motion should be altogether out of its own power, should have no natural, no moral necessity or certainty from any antecedent causality and reason, which should be altogether fortuitous, which should be thus rendred altogether uncapable of being one entire piece, where all the parts first contained in the Potentiality and Unity of the whole, flowing forth from it by virtue of that Unity, are united among themselves by their mutual Relations and Proportions, making up a beautiful harmony in the whole?

This in all learning and observation hath been esteemed the first and chief part of wisdom, to fix determinately, with full strength of inclination, thought and contrivance, the end of every work. This the second part next to it, particularly stiled Prudence, to dispose and direct all the means efficaciously and infallibly to those ends.

Object. 1. Perhaps some one will say, That the parts of the Divine Work have their coherence, connexion, and proportion, while this grand motion of which wespeak, the determination of the Will, flows from the power of the Will, which flows from God, the Fountain of causality, in the centinued stream of second causes.

Answ. This indeed is often spoken of, Let us see if it be well understood, if there be no fallacy or ambiguity latent or manifest in this Assertion: If the power of the Will be the cause of its determination, if God in the order of second causes be the Author of this Power, then also is the determination of the Will from Him; after the same manner, by the force of that Rule, Quicquid est causa causae, est causa causati: The cause of any cause, is also the cause of the effect produced by that cause. Now is the Will no more free, with an undetermined freedome or liberty, being thus predetermined in its superior causes, from which it receives both the power of determining, and the determination of its power. Now is the power of its Will in its state of acting, not undetermined, or indifferent to contradictory and contrary terms or bounds of its motion.

If it be replyed, that the power of the Will, in determining it self, is from God in the natural course of things; but the act of that power in the determination of it self, from the power of the Will alone, with an absolute and universal independancy upon all things antecedent to it, either natural or moral: Although this be very difficult to be understood, yet I shall not at present make any other opposition to it than this, that it leaves my present Argument untoucht in its full strength and vigour.

Object. 2. There is something of greater moment, which perhaps may seem to shake the structure and strength of this Reason. The great and Ultimate ends of God in his Work, are the glories of his Goodness and his Justice. In this the Divine Wisdom shines out with a lustre, dazling the eyes of our Reason (of every created Understanding) in finding out this the most proper and effectual way to these ends, viz. The setting up of intellectual Spirits, free in the determination of themselves to good or evil, and compensating this good and this evil with suitable torments, suitable triumphs.

Answ. Three Answers offer themselves to this Objection.

1. Answ. This also yieldeth that on which the whole weight of the Argument against Free-will lieth, the righteousness and wickedness of intellectual Spirits; that is, the highest Beauty, the foulest Deformity upon the principal parts of the Divine Work, to which all the other parts serve. The great and Ultimate ends of these intellectual Spirits, unexpressible eternal joys or miseries, hang all upon a meer contingency, upon the motion of the Will, which hath no place, no part in the Divine Design, which receives no form, no measure from any model in the Workman, or any part of the work. Thus are the great consequences, the great ends of the work, in the great, the principal parts and passages of it, altogether undetermined and uncertain, in the nature of the work, and in the continuance of the Worker.

2. Answ. Doth not this seem much rather a reflection upon, than an exaltation of the Divine Goodness, Justice, and Wisdom; that the righteousness and wickedness of intell…ctual Creatures, the highest good and evil in the whole work, the eternal blessedness and misery of its own so great, so glorious Births and Images, should be of so little moment to the Divine Nature, to the Divine Goodness, Justice, and Wisdom, that they should be left entirely out of the Divine contrivance and conduct, without the compass of all reason and proportion, to an uncertainty, an indeterminateness of which no account can be given, as effects of the blindest chance which was ever entertained into the most blind and confused imagination of the most vulgar Spirits? But this subject of the Divine Goodness and Justice, and the Argument taken from them to justifie this freedom of the Will, belongs properly to the second Book, where the Reader may meet with a large discourse upon it. I shall therefore thus lightly pass over it here.

3. Answ. The inconsistency of the setting up intellectual Spirits, in this freedome, by the Divine Power and Wisdom, with the very essences of all Power and wisdom, with the whole nature of things created or uncreated, will also find its proper place in other following Arguments, which is therefore only toucht here.