The Doctrine of the Sabbath, Thesis 21 – Thesis 23
Thesis 21.
If it be demanded therefore, What is that goodnesse in a morall law for which it is therefore commanded? The Answer is given by Vasques, Suarez, Smifinga, and most of the Schoolemen, and sundry of our owne Writers, that it is nothing else, but That comely sutablenesse and meetnesse in the thing commanded unto humane nature as rationall, or unto man as rationall, and consequently unto every man. When I say,Irons Q 2. cap. 8. as Rationall, I understand as Master Ironside doth, viz. as right reason neither blinded nor corrupted doth require. When I say as sutable to man, and consequently to every man, I hereby exclude all lawes meerely Judiciall and Evangelicall from being morall, the first of which are sutable to some men onelyonly, the other are not sutable to men as men, but to man as corrupt and fallen; and therefore binde not all men, but onelyonly those among whom they are sufficiently and actually promulgated, as is evident, Rom. 10.14 Iohn. 15.22. But morall lawes are sutable to all men, and have an inward meetnesse and congruity to be observed of all men: For look as when the Lord gives Laws to any particular nation, whether immediately by himself, or mediately by man, he ever makes them sutable to the peoples peace and good of that nation; so when he makes lawes binding all mankinde in all Nations, he makes them sutable to humane nature or all mankinde therein. And look as nationall Lawes binde not meerly by the meere will of the Law-giver, but from the *Driedo de lib. Christ. lib. 3. cap. 3. Vasquez. To. 2. Dis. 12.goodnesse and sutablenesse in the thing unto their common good; so here morall lawes which concerne all Nations, bind not meerly because of the will of God (which of it selfe is sufficient to binde all men, if he had pleased to put no more in morall lawes) but also because of some goodnesse in the things commanded, which is nothing else but such sutablenes as is mentioned unto the common good of man. What this sutablenesse to humane nature is, we shall shew, in due place; meane while, I doe not understand by sutablenesse to humane nature, the inclination of humane nature now corrupted by sinne; for infused and supernaturall vertues and graces (to which therefore humane nature is not inclined) are (as Vasquez truly and strongly maintaines) in some sense naturall and good in themselves, not because humane nature is inclined to them, but because they are very congruous and consentaneous thereunto, and perfecting humane nature, as such, and consequently sutable thereunto: A good is said to be utile & delectabile in respect of some profit or delight which comes to man by it,Suarez metaph. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. Surifing…. de Deo. Tract. 3. Disp. 1. Sect. 32. but bonum honestum in genere moris (as Suarez and his fellowes call it) consists in a kinde of decency, comlinesse and sweet proportion between such an act, and such a nature as acts by right reason; to which nature it is exceeding comely and suitable, whether any profit or delight come thereby yea or no. As now in the divine nature, it's exceeding beautifull and comely for it (and therefore good in it selfe) to bee bountifull and mercifull, and to doe good unto the creature, although no profit could come to him thereby: It is Gods nature, as I may so say, so to doe; so 'tis in humane nature, it's a comely thing to honour parents, reverence Gods Name, to bee loving and mercifull to all men, in heart, word and deed; to give God a fit and the most meet proportion of time for solemne service of him, who allowes us many dayes to serve our owne good; this is good nature, and being thus seemly and suitable to it, this and such like things are therefore good in themselves, though perhaps neither profit or pleasure should come unto man hereby: And hence it's well observed by some of the Schoolemen, that right reason doth not make a thing morall, but only judgeth and discerneth what is morall; for right reason doth not make a thing suitable, but onelyonly seeth whether it be so or no, a thing may bee suitable before right reason see it, yet when 'tis presented to reason it sees it suitable, as the wall is white before the eye see it, yet when the eye doth see it, it appeares white also: It may bee a meet and comely thing to give God a seventh part of our time, though no mans reason can of it selfe find out such a meet proportion, yet when reason sees it, it's forced to acknowledge a comlinesse of equity, and suitablenesse therein, as shall hereafter appeare.
Thesis 22.
But here let it bee observed, that although all morall lawes are thus suitable to mans nature, yet they are not all alike suitable thereunto, and consequently not equally good in themselves; for some lawes are more immediately suitable and good, others mediately: And as Wallaeus well observes out of Scotus, Wal. disser… de 4. prac. ca. 3.that there is a double morality, the first is de lege naturae strictè sumpta, i. e. such laws as are so deeply engraven upon nature, as that these principles cannot bee blotted out, but by abolishing of nature. The second is, de lege naturae latè sumpta, and these lawes doe much depend upon the will of the Law-giver, but yet they are very congruous and suitable to humane nature, even from the light of those principles of nature. And hence I suppose it will follow, that the law for a seventh part of time to be dedicated to God, may well bee a morall law, although it depends much upon the will of the Law-giver, and is not so immediately written upon mans heart, nor so equally suitable to humane nature, as the law of love and thankfulnesse to God our Creator is:Came…. pra… ▪ in Mat. ca. 16. For (as Cameron well observes) that some things which are good in themselves have more of Gods Image stamped upon them, some have lesse of it: and hence it is that though all morall lawes are good in themselves, yet not equally so▪ there is more unsuitablenesse to hate and curse God, than to lust after another mans house or servant, and yet both are evill in themselves and breaches of morall rules.
Thesis 23.
Hence therefore it followes, that because morall precepts are of such things as are good in themselves, they are therefore perpetuall and unchangeable, and because they are in this respect good in themselves, to wit, because they are suitable and comely to mans nature as rationall; hence also they are universall: so that perpetuity and universality seem to be the inseperable adjuncts, rather than the essence of a morall law: yet when they are called perpetuall and unchangeable, wee must understand them in respect of Gods ordinary dispensation; for hee who is the great Law-giver, may and doth sometime extraordinarily dispense with morall lawes. Abraham might have kill'd his Sonne by extraordinary dispensation: Adams Sonnes and Daughters did marry one another by speciall Commission, which now to doe ordinarily would bee incestuous, and consequently against a m…ll Law, as is evident, Leviticus 18. OnelyOnly let it bee here remembred that when I call morall Lawes perpetuall and universall, that I speake of such lawes as are primarily morall, which doe firstly and originally suit with humane nature: for lawes as are at second hand morall and as it were accidentally so, may be changeable as hereafter shall appeare.