The Doctrine of the Sabbath, Thesis 122 – Thesis 131
Thesis 122.
For clearing up of this difficulty therefore, and leaving the dispute of the change of the Sabbath to it's p…per place, it may be made good, that not that seventh day from the creation, so much as a seventh day which God shall determine (and therefore called the seventh day) is primarily morall, and therefore enjoyned in this Commandment, for which end let these things be considered and laid together.
1. Because the expresse words of the Commandment do not run thus, viz. Remember to keep holy That seventh day, but more generally, the Sabbath day; 'tis in the beginning and so 'tis in the end of this Commandment, where it is not said that God blessed That Seventh day, but The Sabbath day, by which expression the wisdom of God, as it points to that particular seventh day that it should be sanctified: so it also opens a door of liberty for change, if God shall see meet, because the substance of the Commandment doth not only contain That seventh day, but The Sabbath day, which may be upon another seventh, as well as upon that which God appointed first: and that the substance of the command is contained in those first words, Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy, may appeare from the repetition of the same Commandment, Deut. 5.12. where these words, As the Lord thy God commanded thee, are immediately inserted before the rest of the words of the Commandement be set down, to shew thus much: that therein is contained the substance of the fourth command: the words following being added only to presse to the duty, and to point out the particular day, which at that time God would have them to observe.
2. Because in the explication of those words [the Sabbath] it is not called That seventh, but The seventh, for so the words runne, Six daies shalt thou labour, but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God, the meaning of which is thus much, to wit, that man taking six daies to himself for labour, that he leave the seventh to be the Lords: now unlesse any can shew that no other day but that Seventh could be the seventh for rest, nor no other six daies but those six daies going before tha… seventh could be the six daies for labour, they can never prove that this fourth Commandment hath only a respect to That particular Seventh, and it is no small boldnesse necessarily to limit where God hath left free: for we know that if God will, man may take other six daies for labour, and leave another Seventh for God, then those six daies and that Seventh day only.
3. The change of the Sabbath undeniably proves thus much (if it can be proved) that the morality of this command did not lie in that particular day only: for if that only was morall, how could it be changed? and if it did not lie only in that Seventh, wherein then did it more generally lie? was it in a day more largely or in a Seventh day more narrowly? now let any indifferent conscience be herein judge, who they be that come nearest to the truth, whether they that fly so far from the name Seventh, which is expresly mentioned in the Commandment, or they that come as near it as may be? whether they that plead for a Seventh of Gods appointing, or they that plead for a day (but God knowes when) of humane institution? and it's worth considering why any should be offended at the placing of the morality of the command in a Seventh, more then at their own placing of it in a day; for in urging the letter of the Commandment to that particular Seventh, to abolish thereby the morality of a Seventh day, they do withall therein utterly abandon the morality of a day; for if That Seventh only be enjoyned in the letter of the Commandment▪ and they will thence inferre, that a Seventh therefore cannot be required, how can they upon this ground draw out the morality of a day?
4. Because (we know) that ratio legis est anima legis, i. the reason of a law is the soul and life of the law: now let it be considered, why God should appoint the Seventh rather then the ninth or tenth or twentieth-day, for spirituall rest? and the reason will appear not to be Gods absolute will meerly, but because divine wisdom having just measures and ballances in its hand, in proportioning time between God and man, it saw a seventh part of time (rather then a tenth of twentieth) to be most equall for himself to take, and for man to give: and thus much the words of the Commandment imply, viz. that it is most equall if man hath six, that God should have the seventh: now if this be the reason of the law, this must needs be the soul and substance of the morality of the law, viz. That a Seventh day be given to God, man having six, and therefore it consists not in That Seventh day only: for the primary reason, why God appointed this or that Seventh, was not because it was that seventh, but because a Seventh was now equall in the eye of God for God to take to himself, man having the full and fittest proportion of six daies together for himself; and because a seventh was the fittest proportion of time for God, hence this or that individual and particular seventh in the second place fall out to be morall, because they contain the most equall and fittest proportion of a Seventh day in them; there was also another reason why That Seventh was sanctified, viz. Gods rest in it, but this reason is not primary as hath been said, and of which now we speak.
5. Because if no other Commandment be in the Decalogue, but it is comprehensive, and looking many waies at once, why should we then pinion and gird up this only to the narrow compasse of that Seventh day only?
6. Because our adversaries in this point are forced sometime to acknowledge this morality of a Seventh with us: we have heard the judgement of Gomaras herein, Thesis 44. and M. Primrose who speaks with most weight and spirit in this controversie, professeth plainly, That if God give us six daies for our own affairs, there is then good reason to consecrate a Seventh to his service, and that in this reason there is manifest justice and equity which abideth for ever, to dedicate to God precisely a seventh day after we have bestowed six daies upon our selves: it cannot be denied (saith he) but that it is most just; Now if it be by his confession, 1. just, 2. most just. 3. manifestly just. 4. perpetually just, to give God precisely one day in seven: the cause is then yeelded: the only evasion he makes is this, viz. that though it be most just to give God one day in seven, yet it's not more just, then to give God one in six, or five, or four, there being no naturall justice in the number of seven more then in the number of six or four: but the answer is easie, that if man may give unto God superstitiously too many, or prophanely too few: and if the appointment of God hath declared it self for a seventh, and that the giving of this seventh be most just and equall, then let it be considered, whether it be not most satisfactory to a scrupling conscience, to allow God a seventh day which he hath appointed, which is confessed to be most just and perpetually equall, and consequently morall: and if there be a morall and perpetuall equity to give God one day in seven, then 'tis no matter whether there be any more naturall equity therein, then in one in five or six: the disputers of this worl… may please themselves with such speculations and shifts, but the wisdom of God, which hath already appointed one day in seven rather then in six or ten, should be adored herein, by humble mindes, in cutting out this proportion of time, with far greater equity then man can now readily see.
7. Because deep corruption is the ground of this opinion, the plucking up of Gods bounds and land-marks of a seventh, is to put the stakes into the Churches hands, to set them where she pleaseth; or if she set them at a seventh, where God would have them, yet that this may be submitted to, not because God pleaseth, but because the Church so pleaseth; not because of Gods will and determination, but because of the Churches will and determination, that so it being once granted, that the Church hath liberty to determine of such a day, she may not be denied liberty of making any other holidaies, or holy things in the worship and service of God; and that this is the main scope and root of this opinion is palpably evident from most of the writings of our English adversaries in this controversie.
Thesis 123.
A seventh day therefore is primarily morall, yet (as was formerly said Thesis. 48.) there is something else in this commandment which is secundarily morall, viz. This or that particular seventh day, I will not say that it is accidentally morall (as some do) but rather secundarily, and consequently morall: for it is not morall firstly, because it is this particular seventh, but because it hath a seventh part of time, divinely proportioned and appointed for rest, falling into it, and of which it participates: to give almes to the needy is a morall duty, and primarily morall; but to give this or that quantity may be morall also, but it is secundarily morall, because it flowes ex consequenti, onelyonly from the first; for if we are to give almes according to our ability and others necessity, then this or that particular quantity thus suting their necessity must be given: which is also a morall duty, so 'tis in this point of the Sabbath.
Thesis 224.
Hence it follows, that this Commandment enjoynes two things: 1. More generally a seventh. 2 More particularly this or that seventh, and in speciall that seventh from the Creation, this or that seventh are to be kept holy, because of a seventh part of time appointed falling into them: A seventh day also is to be kept holy by vertue of the Commandement; yet not in generall, but with speciall eye and respect to that particular seventh, wherein this generall is involved and preserved. That seventh from the Creation is commanded, because of a seventh falling into it; and a seventh also is commanded, yet with a speciall eye to that seventh wherein it is involved: And therefore 'tis a vaine objection to affirm, that if a seventh be commanded, that then …o particular seventh is; or if any particular seventh be so, that then a seventh is not; for the Commandement we see hath respect to both; for what is there more frequent in Scripture then for generall duties to be wrapt up and set forth in some particular things, instances and examples, and consequently both commanded together? and after narrow search into this Commandement we shall finde both the generall and particular seventh, not onelyonly inferring one the other, but both of them in a manner expresly mentioned.
Thesis 125.
When those that plead for the morality of the fourth Command, in respect of a seventh day, would prove it to be morall, because it is part of the Decalogue and set in the heart of it, with a speciall note of remembrance affixed to it, &c. Mr. Ironside and others doe usually dash all such reasonings out of countenance, with this answer, viz. That by this argument, That particular seventh from the creation is morall, which we see is changed; for (say they) that also is set in the heart of the Decalogue, with a speciall note of remembrance also. But the reply from what hath ben said is easie, viz. That that also is indeed morall; only 'tis secondarily morall, not primarily; and therefore (as we have shewn) was mutable and changeable, the primary morality in a seventh immutably remaining; the morall duty of observing a seventh day is not changed, but only the day. If Mr. Primrose could prove that there is nothing else commanded in this fourth command, but only that particular seventh from the creation, he had then enough to shew that (this day being justly changed) the Commandment is not morall of perpetuall,Prim. part. 2. cap. 6. S. 24. but out or this particular seventh which now is changed; himself acknowledgeth that out of it may be gathered the morality of a day, and why not of a seventh day also as well as of a day? He saith that it is a bold assertion to say that this genus of a seventh is herein commanded: But why is it not as bold to affirm the same of a day? for out of that particular seventh whence he would raise the genus of a day, we may as easily, and far more rationally collect the genus of a seventh day.
Thesis 126.
Nor will it follow that because a seventh is morall, that therefore any one of the seven daies in a week may be made a Christian Sabbath: For 1. We do not say that it is any seventh, but A seventh determined and appointed of God for holy rest, which is herein commanded. 2. The Lord hath in wisdom appointed such a seventh as that man may have six whole daies together to labour in: and hence it follows that divine determination without crossing that wisdom, could not possibly fall upon any other daies in the Cycle of seven, but either upon the last of seven which was the Jewish, or the first of seven which now is (as shall be shewn) the Christian Sabbath. 3. As God hath appointed one day in seven for mans rest, so in his wisdom he so orders it, as that it shall be also a day of Gods rest, and that is not to be found in any day of the week, but either in the last of seven, wherein the Father rested, or in the first of seven wherein the Son rested from his work also.
Thesis 127.
'Tis true that the Sabbath day and that seventh day from the creation, are indifferently taken sometimes the one for the other, the one being the exegesis or the explication of the other, as Gen. 2, 2, 3. Exod. 16.29. and elsewhere; but that it should be only so understood in this commandment, Creda… Iudaeus Apella—non ego, as he said in another case; I see no convicting argument to clip the wings of the Scripture so short, and to make the Sabbath day and that seventh day of equall dimensions: Although it cannot be denied, but that in some sense the Sabbath day is exegeticall of the seventh day, because the commandment hath a speciall eye to that seventh from the creation, which is secundarily morall, yet not excluding that which is more generally contained in that particular, and consequently commanded, viz. a seventh day or The Sabbath day.
Thesis 128.
Prim. part. 2. cap. …. S. 24.M. Primrose would prove the exegesis, That by the Sabbath day is meant that seventh day only from the creation, because God actually blessed and sanctified that Sabbath day, because God cannot actually blesse a seventh, being an unlimited, indefinite and uncertain indetermined time: The time (saith he) only wherein he rested, he only actually blessed, which was not in a seventh day indetermined, but in that determined seventh day: But all this may be readily acknowledged and yet the truth remain firm; for that particular seventh being secundarily morall, hence as it was expressely commanded, so it was actually and particularly blessed; but as in this seventh a generall of a seventh is included, so a seventh is also generally blessed and sanctified. Otherwise how will M. Primrose maintain the morality of a day of worship out of this commandment? for the same objection may be made against a day, which himself acknowledgeth, as against a seventh day which we maintain; for it may be said, that That day is here only morall wherein God actually rested, but he did not rest in a day indefinitely, and therefore a day is not morall; let him unloose this knot, and his answer in defence of the morality of a day will help him to see the morality of a seventh day also: That particular day indeed wherein God actually and particularly rested, he particularly blessed, but there was a seventh day also more generall which he generally blessed also; he generally blest the Sabbath day, he particularly blest that Sabbath day, and in blessing of that he did virtually and by Analogy blesse our particular Christian Sabbath also, which was to come: As Moses in his actuall blessing of the tribe of Levi, Deut. 23.7, 10. he did virtually and by Analogy blesse all the Ministers of the Gospel not then in being: And look as when God commanded them to keep holy the Sabbath in ceremoniall duties, he did therein virtually command us to keep it holy in Evangelicall duties; so when he commanded them to observe that day because it was actually appointed and sanctified and blessed of God, he commanded us virtually and analogically therein to observe our seventh day also if ever he should actually appoint and blesse this other.
Thesis 129.
The distribution of equity and justice consists not alway, in puncto indivisibili, i. in an indivisible point, and a set measure; so as that if more or lesse be done or given in way of justice, that then the rule of justice is thereby broken, ex. gr. it's just to give alms and pay tribute; yet not so just, as that if men give more or lesse, that then they break a rule of justice; so 'tis in this point of the Sabbath, a seventh part of time is morall, because it is just and equall for all men to give unto God, who have six for one given them to serve their own turn, and do their own work in, yet it is not so just but that if God had required the tribute of a third or fourth part of our time, but it might have been just also to have given him one day in three or two or four, for in this case positive determination doth not so much make as declare only that which is morall: And therefore if Mr Primrose thinks, that a seventh part of time is not morall, upon this ground, viz. because it is as equall and just to dedicate more time to God, and that a third or fourth day is as equall as a seventh, it is doubtlesse an ungrounded assertion; for so he affirms, That although it be most just to give God one day in seven, Part. 2. cap. 7. S. 4.yet no mo…e just then to ded…cate to him one day in three or six: And suppose it be so, yet this doth not prove that a seventh day is not morall, because it is as equall to give six as seven, no more then that it is no morall duty to give an alms, because it may be as equall to give twenty pence as thirty pence to a man in want: If furthermore he think that it is as equall and just to give God more daies for his service, as one in seven, out of humane wisdom and by humane consecration, not divine dedication, then it may be doubted whether one day in two or three or six is as equall as one day in seven; for as humane wisdom, if lest to it self, may readily give too few, so it may superstitiously give too many (as hath been said:) But if four or three or six be alike equall in themselves to give to God, as one in seven, then if he thinks it a morall duty to observe any such day in case it should be imposed and consecrated by humane determination, I hope he will not be offended at us if we think it a morall duty also to observe a seventh day, which we are certain divine wisdom hath judged most equall, and which is imposed on us by divine determination: we may be uncertain whether the one is as equall, as we are certain that a seventh day is.
Thesis 130.
Actions of worship can no more be imagined to be done without some time, then a body be without some place, and therefore in the three first Commandments, where Gods worship is enjoined, some time together with it is necessarily commanded; if therefore any time for worship be required in the fourth command (which none can deny) it must not be such a time as is connaturall & which is necessarily tyed to the action; but it must be some solemne and speciall time, which depends upon some speciall determination, not which nature, but which Counsel determines; Determination therefore by Counsel of that time which is required in this command doth not abolish the morality of it, but rather declares and establisheth it. God therefore who is Lord of time, may justly challenge the determination of this time into his own hand, and not infringe the morality of this command, considering also that he is more able and fit then men or Angels to see, and so cut out the most equall proportion of time between man and himself; God therefore hath sequestred a seventh part of time to be sanctified, rather then a fifth, a fourth, or a ninth, not simply because it was this seventh, or a seventh, but because in his wise determination thereof, he knew it to be the most just and equall division of time between man and himself; and therefore I know no incongruity to affirm, that if God had seen one day in three or four, or nine, to be as equall a proportion of time as one day in seven, that he would then have left it free to man to take and consecrate either the one or the other (the Spirit of God not usually restraining where there is a liberty) and on the other side, if he had seen a third or fifth or ninth or twentieth part of time more equal then a seventh, he would have fixed the bounds of labour and rest out of a seventh; but having now fixed them to a seventh, a seventh day is therefore morall, rather then a fourth or sixt or ninth day, because it is the most equall and fittest proportion of time (all things considered) between God and man; the appointment therefore of a seventh rather then a sixt or fourth▪ is not an act of Gods meer will only (as our adversaries affirm, and therefore they think it not morall) but it was and is an act of his wisdom also according to a morall rule of justice, viz. to give unto God that which is most fit, most just and most equall; and therefore although there is no naturall justice (as Mr Primrose cals it) in a seventh simply and abstractly considered, rather then in a sixth or tenth, yet if the most equall proportion of time for God be lotted out in a seventh, there is then something naturall and morall in it rather then in any other partition of time, viz. to give God that proportion of time which is most just and most equall; and in this respect a seventh part of time is commanded because it is good (according to the description of a morall law) and not only good because it is commanded.
Thesis 131.
'Tis true, that in private duties of worship, as to reade the Scriptures, meditate, pray, &c. the time for these and the like duties is left to the will and determination of man according to generall rules of conveniency and seasonablenesse set down in the word; mans will (in this sence) is the measure of such times of worship, but there is not the like reason here, in determining time for a Sabbath, as if that should be left to mans liberty also; because those private duties are to be done in that time, which is necessarily annexed to the duties themselves, which time is therefore there commanded, where and when the duty is commanded: but the time for a Sabbath is not such a time as naturally will and must attend the action, but it's such a time as Counsell (not nature) sees most meet, and especially That counsell which is most able to make the most equall proportions of time, which we know is not in the liberty or ability of men or Angels, but of God himself, for do but once imagine a time required out of the limits of what naturally attends the action, and it will be found necessarily to be a time determined by counsell: and therefore our adversaries should not think it as free for man to change the Sabbath seasons, from the seventh to the fifth or fourth or tenth day, &c. as to alter and pick our times for p…ivate duties.