Practical Discourses Volume 2, Discourse 3
PSALM CXIX.68.
Thou art good, and thou dost good.
I Have been discoursing concerning the Necessity of our loving of God in order to our being truly Religious, and shewed you at large that this is not only the great Principle of all Religion, but that of all others it is the most fruitful and operative. And now that I may lay this Foundation of true Religion in you, I shall explain to you the infinite Cause and Reason that we have to love him; and because Goodness is the Beauty of a reasonable Nature, and Beauty is the Object of Love, I shall endeavour to demonstrate to you the infinite Goodness of God, that I may thereby affect you with his Beauty; and if possible, inflame all your Souls with the Love of him. And that I may the more fully convince you of the divine Goodness, I shall endeavour to prove it from four distinct Topicks: 1. From the Nature of God; 2ly. From the Creation of God. 3ly. From the Providence of God: And 4ly. From the Revelations he hath made to the World. And these I intend shall be the Arguments of four distinct Discourses; the three first of which lie plainly in the Text, Thou art good, and thou dost good.
Thou art good: That plainly denotes what God is in himself, that he is naturally and essentially good; that he is of a most loving, kind, and benevolent Nature, and hath a most vehement Propension to do good to others founded in his immutable Being. Thou dost good: that denotes the Exercise and Outgoing of this his essential Benevolence in the Works of his Creation and Providence; and that this his natural Propension to do good is not at all sleepy or unactive, that it is not a lazy and restive Woulding or Volition; but that it always sallies forth into Action, and doth most vigorously exercise it self either in making of Objects to imploy it self about, or in upholding and governing them when they are made. So that the Words contain these two things:
1. What God is in himself; Thou art good.
2ly. What he is in those Actions that are determined without himself; Thou dost good.
1. I begin with the first of these, What God is in himself. Thou art good, i. e. Thou art so essentially, and according to the unalterable Propension of thy Nature. And this, as I told you, I shall in the first Place endeavour to demonstrate from the Nature of God, that is, from that intire Complexion of all possible Perfections whereof his Nature is composed. For in Order to our handling of this Argument, this must be premised, that God is a Being endowed with all possible Perfections, and consequently thereunto that he is infinitely powerful and infinitely wise; and consequently to that that he is infinitely Happy; and consequently to this, that he loves himself infinitely; and that all this is so, is very evident from the Nature of the Thing. For first we must necessarily suppose one Original Cause of all Things; for else we can give no possible Account how those Things, that once were not, could ever come into Being; and we must also as necessarily suppose that this Original Cause was Self-originated, i. e. that it received its Being and Existence from none but it self; for else it cannot be the Original Cause, but must it self be the Effect of some other Cause that was in Being before it: That existing of it self without any Cause, it is infinitely removed from Not-being; for that which is without any Cause can ever be without any Cause, meerly from that exuberant Fulness of Essence that is in it self. And that which can be for ever without any Cause must necessarily be so, because this is a most necessary Act, and as such must be exerted ad extremum virium Agentis; consequently to which we must also suppose, that that which is infinitely removed from Not-being hath the utmost Perfection of Essence in it. For the Notion of Essence, nakedly considered, is to be; and therefore by how much the more remote any Essence is from Not-Being, by so much the more perfect it must necessarily be. Again, in Consequence to this we must also suppose, that that which hath in it self, without any Cause, the utmost Perfection of Essence, must have in it self also the utmost of all other Perfections that by way of Adjunct or Attribute, such an inexhaustible Essence is capable of; that is, that it must be Powerful and Wise, and whatsoever else is a possible Perfection of Essence. For Plenitude of Essence consists in being as much as it can be; and so long as any Being is capable of being any more than it is, it hath not all the possible Degrees of Essence in it; for every Perfection, that Essence by way of Attribute is capable of, is a Degree of positive Entity. Thus Wisdom and Power are not meer Privations of Weakness and Folly, but Things that have some Degree of real positive Essence in them, and consequently what Being soever hath not these, must necessarily have it in some Degrees of Not-Being; and 'tis impossible that any Essence should be infinitely removed from Not-Being, which hath any Degree of Not-Being in it. Lastly, consequently to this we must also suppose, that a Being endowed with all possible Perfections, being infinitely Powerful and infinitely Wise, must needs be infinitely Happy; for wheresoever those great Perfections are, they must necessarily supply whatsoever is necessary to an infinite Happiness: And then from hence it nessarily follows, that a Being that is thus infinitely Happy must needs infinitely love and delight in it self; because within the vast Circumference of its own Being, it hath every Thing that it needs, desires, or affects. These are all plain and easie Deductions, and seem as naturally to follow from one another, as the most immediate Consequences do from First Principles. This therefore being supposed, which you see is very reasonable, that God is infinitely Powerful, and Wise, and Happy; and that because he is so, he loves himself infinitely; I doubt not but from each of these it will naturally follow, that he is also infinitely good and benevolent.
1. He is infinitely powerful; and therefore he is good. For Power is nothing but an Ability to act; and Action is the End of all Ability for Action: So that the greater any Power is, the farther it must necessarily be removed from Inactivity; and consequently infinite Power must be so infinitely removed from it, that it cannot be supposed to exist without Exercise; or if it could, yet it cannot be imagined that any Being, in whom infinite Power exists, should determine with it self, that the best Use it could make of that Power, were to make no Use of it at all; because such a Being can with as much Ease to it self, act as not act. And therefore since every Being doth necessarily delight in the Exercise of its own Perfections, it cannot be supposed but a Being infinitely powerful should necessarily delight in the Exercise of its Power, when it can as easily exercise it as suffer it to sleep on in eternal Inactivity; and consequently when it can exercise its Power more vigorously as easily as less, and can do more Things as easily as fewer, it must necessarily chuse to do it; because, as the having of Power inclines the Agent to act, so the having of more Power inclines it to act more vigorously. Wherefore if the doing of Good to others be a much greater Exercise of Power than the doing of Evil, it will hence necessarily follow, that God being infinitely powerful must be infinitely prone to do Good; because he cannot but be delighted in that whereby this great Perfection of his Nature is most vigorously Exercised. But now for God to chuse to imploy his Power in doing Mischief to others rather than Good, would be to chuse to do less rather than to do more, when both are equally easy to him; and consequently to lay a needless Restriction upon the Exercise of his Power; and so far to render it useless and in vain. For in doing Mischief to others, he must be supposed either wholly to annihilate them, or to make them miserable, and continue them so; but by doing Good to others, he must be supposed either to uphold them in those Beings he gave them, or to perfect those Beings; and thereby to render them as happy as their Capacities will bear: And certainly to do either of the later is a much more vigorous Exercise of Power, than to do either of the former. For, for God to annihilate Beings, or reduce them to Nothing, is rather to withdraw his Power from them than to exercise it upon them; because that which is not of it self, cannot continue to be of it self, it being in the Nature of the Thing as possible for a Thing to be of it self in the first Moment of its Existence, as to be of it self in any Moment of its Duration. So that the Continuance of our Being, and the Original of it must necessarily be owing to the same Power; and consequently, as our Continuance in Not-Being must necessarily have followed upon the Non-exercise of this Power, so our Relapse into Not-being must as necessarily follow from the Discontinuance of the Exercise of this Power. So that to our Annihilation there needs no more than the bare Suspension of the Exercise of Almighty Power upon us, or a ceasing to uphold us in Being; for to the upholding us in Being, there is required a continued Exertion of that creative Power that first brought us into Being; for if we can exist of our selves this one Moment, we might as well have done so the Moment before, and may as well do so the Moment after; and so backward and forward to all Eternity. So that unless we had such an exuberant Fulness of Essence in us as to exist of our selves from all Eternity past to all Eternity to come, we cannot exist so much as one Moment without new Supplies of Being from that infinite Fountain whence we were originally derived; and that we are this Moment, is as much the Effect of God's Power, as that we were that Moment when we first came into Being. So that whereas by annihilating us God would chuse to exercise no Power at all, that is, to render his own Omnipotence useless by giving it a Quietus from Action; by upholding us in Being his Power is still as vigorously exercised about us as it was in the first Moment of our Creation; and therefore by how much more suitable it is to infinite Power to act than to be idle, by so much more suitable to it it must necessarily be to uphold us in our Beings, than to annihilate and destroy us.
And then for making us miserable and continuing us so, it is a much less vigorous Exercise of Power than to perfect our Beings, and thereby to render us happy. And verily should God turn the whole World into one intire Globe of unquenchable Fire, and continue its wretched Inhabitants for ever weltring in its Flames, I should not look upon this as so great an Act of Omnipotence as it is to perfect our rational Nature so as to render it immutably and eternally happy. For to the making of any Being perfect and happy, there is required many more Causes and many more Acts than there is to the making them miserable. For the greatest Part of Misery consists in the Privation of Happiness, and for God to deprive his Creatures of Happiness is not so much the Exercise as Non-exercise of his Power; for then he deprives us of it when he ceases to do any Thing for us, and refuses to produce or to contribute to the producing of what tends to our Happiness: So that this Part of Misery consisting in a mere Privation is not so properly the Effect of the Exercise of Power, as of the Suspension of the Exercise of Power. So that unless we can suppose that the Omnipotent Creator of the World chuses rather not to act than to act, we must necessarily suppose that he chuses rather to bestow Happiness on his Creatures, than to deprive them of it. And as for the positive Part of Misery which consists in Pain and Torment, I dare appeal to any Man whether it be not much more easie to vex and torment any Being than it is to render it happy. For even a Child can put a Man, yea an Elephant to Pain; but to make a sick Man well, a poor Man prosperous, a mad Man sober, or a Fool wise, are such mighty Things as do most commonly transcend all humane Power whatsoever. But then to retrieve such imperfect Beings as we from the Bondage of Sense and Sensuality, and from being almost Beasts to raise us up by Degrees to an equal Height with Angels, to fill and thereby inlarge the narrow Capacities of our Natures till by filling they are widened almost to Infinity, and yet still to supply them with new Degrees of Happiness proportionable to their vast enlargements, is a Work that highly deserves to be the eternal Exercise of Omnipotence it self.
Since therefore the End of Power to act is Action, and every Thing naturally inclines to its End, and consequently the greater the Power of any Being is, the greater is its Inclination to Activity; and since the doing of Good to others is a much greater Exercise of Power than the doing of Mischief; it hence necessarily follows, that God being Omnipotent must thereby be infinitely inclined to do Good, and that because doing Good is infinitely the largest Sphere of Activity. So that if when 'tis equally possible and easie for him to do Good, as not, he should chuse not to do it, he would chuse directly contrary to the necessary Inclination of an Omnipotent Being, which is to do that which is the greatest Exercise of Power.
2ly. God is infinitely Wise, and therefore he is Good. For the greatest Wisdom consists in proposing the worthiest Ends, and chusing the properest Means to obtain them. Wherefore if doing Good to others be the worthiest End that God can propose to himself, it will necessarily follow that by the Infinity of his Wisdom he is inclined to do Good. For as his Power inclines him to act, so his Wisdom inclines him to act for the worthiest End; but doing Good to others is evidently the worthiest End that God can be supposed to aim at; for it cannot be imagined that he can design any further Good to himself, any new Addition to the vast Treasure of his Happiness; which is so infinitely full that it can admit of no Increase: So that whatsoever he doth besides the enjoying of himself, he cannot be supposed to do for any Self-end; because he hath all that Good already within himself that he can possibly either desire or aim at. So that all those Actions of God which are terminated without himself, must have either no End at all, which cannot be supposed of the Actions of an All-wise Agent, or else they must have for their End either the Happiness or the Misery of others; but to make the Misery of others their End is by no Means consistent with his infinite Wisdom. For to make pure abstracted Evil the End of Action is so far from being infinitely wise, that 'tis impossible; because the very Notion of an End necessarily includes Good in it, either real or apparent; but God can reap no Good from the Misery of others, because he is infinitely happy already; and to be sure others can reap no Good from that which God intends to be their Misery; that that therefore should be God's End which is no End, which hath nothing of the Nature of an End in it, implies a plain Contradiction. So that to say that the End of God's Actions is the Misery of others, is all one as to say he acts for no End at all; and how an infinitely wise Agent can be said to act at Rovers, to do Things without any Level or Aim, I cannot apprehend. But supposing it were possible that pure Evil might be an End, yet it is as evident as the Sun that it cannot be the End of infinite Wisdom; for infinite Wisdom necessarily inclines to do that which is wisest; but if it were in it self indifferent to the Almighty whether he did Good or Evil to others, yet his infinite Wisdom would incline him to do Good; because in the doing of Good there is much more Wisdom exercised, than in the doing of Evil. For what great Skill doth it require in an Almighty Agent to make others miserable? If it hath a mind to turn them out of Being, 'tis but withdrawing that Almighty Arm that upholds them, and they will presently sink into Nothing of their own Accord; but what great Wisdom is there in it, thus to unravel his own Workmanship, to weave a Penelope's Web, and to do and undo eternally? And if he hath a Mind to make them miserable and continue them so, it is but suspending his own Almighty Influence, and refusing to concur to their Happiness, and they will soon be as miserable as Misery can make them. I confess to invent an acute Torture requires some Skill; but yet we plainly see that a very little Wit joyned with a great deal of Malice and Cruelty is sufficient to make an exquisite Tormentor; since even Men of very ordinary Understanding have invented as sharp Torments as Men are able to bear. So that for God to do Evil requires very little Contrivance, and consequently is so far from being an Exercise worthy of his infinite Wisdom, that not only a finite but a very shallow Understanding, armed with sufficient Power and Malice, can invent and inflict as exquisite Tortures as is possible for any Being to bear. But to the perfecting of Beings and rendring them happy, especially of free and rational Beings, there is required a long series of rare and admirable Contrivance; for to the effecting of this noble End, there are so many Impediments to be removed, so many concurrent Means to be employed, such an incomparable Skill required in the Choice of such as are most fit and effectual, and methodizing them into such a regular Connexion with, and Dependence upon one another, as that they may all successively second and promote each other, that even the Wisdom of God, how infinite so ever it be, may here find Scope and Matter enough to employ and exercise it self for ever. And I dare appeal to any reasonable Man whether in that Method of saving Souls which God hath revealed to us in his Gospel, (though yet we cannot see all, because we are not able to discern the admirable Connexion it hath with the whole series of divine Providence) there be not infinitely more Wisdom and rare Contrivance, than an Omnipotent Being need to imploy in effecting the greatest Mischief imaginable; whether in the contriving of Laws so suitable to, and perfective of our Nature, and in the composing such unanswerable Reasons and Motives to press and engage us to the Observance of them; and in all that admirable Series of Providences, by which he seconds and forces those Reasons, he hath not exercised incomparably more Wisdom than he could have done in effecting the greatest Evil in Nature. As for Example, suppose he should have designed to kindle some mighty unquenchable Flame in some dark and dismal Recess of the World, with a Resolution to hurl all reasonable Beings into it, without any Respect or Consideration; this doubtless would have been as great a Mischief as can well be imagined; but what Contrivance doth it ask for an Almighty Being to accomplish such a direful End? Could not he have roasted a little World of Worms, and tortured a Company of Beings that are not able to resist him, without imploying infinite Wisdom in the Management and Contrivance of it? Or, Which will as well serve my Argument, could there have needed as much Wisdom to design and effect this, as there did to contrive and manage the great Methods of our Salvation? Sure no man can be so senseless as to imagine it. Well then, if God be infinitely Wise, and Doing the greatest Good to others be a much higher Exercise of Wisdom than doing the greatest Evil, it will hence necessarily follow, that even his infinite Wisdom must needs incline him to do Good. For as the End of Power is to act, so the End of Wisdom is to act wisely; and every Thing, as I told you, inclines to its End, and consequently the more Wisdom it hath, the more wisely it is inclined to act: Wherefore since doing Good is the greatest Act of Wisdom, God, who is infinitely wise, must needs be infinitely inclined there unto.
3ly. God is infinitely happy, and therefore he is good: for God's infinite Happiness doth necessarily exclude all Want, all Desire, and all Prospect of any Degree of Happiness beyond what he enjoys; and where all these are excluded there can be no Self-end: For a Self-end is some Good desired and aimed at, which yet we are not possessed of; and if God hath no Self-end, he can have no End at all, but only to do Good to others. But perhaps you will object, how can you say that God hath no Self-end, when the Scripture so plainly tells us that his own Glory is his End, and this End he doth as well obtain by doing Hurt as by doing Good to others; by damning of some, as well as by saving of others? To which I answer, that if by the Glory of God you mean any Thing else but the free Communication of his Goodness to others, it is false to say that his Glory is his End; and if this be his Glory, then what I said is infallibly true, that the only End of God is to do Good. But if you think that his Glory consists in being praised and commended, admired and applauded by his poor impotent Creatures, you have very mean Conceptions of him, if you think that this is his last End. For what Advantage is it to God, that we applaud and commend him? Can the Praises and Panegyricks of a small Handful of Breath either make him more glorious than he is, or more glorious in his own Esteem? Alas! No; He is an infinite Stage and Theater to himself, his Prospect being every way adequate to his Glory, and his Glory as unbounded as Eternity it self: So that if all his Creation should joyn Hearts and Voices to extol and laud him, yet they could not add either one Spark to his Glory, or one Degree to that infinite Satisfaction he takes in it. So that when we have praised him as much as we are able, he is still but as glorious as he was before, and he still knows that he deserves infinitely more Praises than we are able to render him. And how can it be imagined that he who is so infinitely satisfied with himself, and hath such infinite Reason for it, should find any need of our poor Praises and Commendations? And if he finds no Need of it, how can he propose it to himself as the End of his Actions, since the End of Action is always some Good, which yet we have not, but do desire to enjoy? 'Tis true he doth command us to praise and laud and acknowledge him, but he commands us this as he doth all other Things, not for his own Good, but for ours. He bids us extol and admire his Perfections, that by that he might engage us to transcribe and imitate them, and so by glorifying him to glorify our selves; So that still the Glory that he designs and aims at consists not in receiving any Good from us, but in doing and communicating of Good to us. And therefore though it is true that God doth obtain this great End of his Glory as well in damning of some as in saving of others, it is not because he reaps any Good from it, but because he doth Good by it. For if he should damn and punish any Being without any good Reason, he could not expect so much as to be praised and commended for it; but if he doth it for good Reason, it is because it is good either for himself or others: For himself it cannot be, for how can an infitely happy Being reap any Degree of Good from anothers Misery and Punishment? And therefore it must be for the Good of others, that they by the Example of those whom he punishes may be warned from incurring those Sins for which he punishes them, and from running away from their own Duty and Happiness. So that even the End of Punishment is to do Good, and this is the great Glory that God aims at in doing it. And indeed considering that God is infinitely happy, there is no other Glory but this that he can propose as the great and ultimate End of his Actions. For all the Inclination that is in any Being either not to do Good, or to do Hurt to others, arises from Indigence and Insufficiency; either we envy or we covet the Good which another enjoys, the former of which restrains us from adding any more Good to him, as the latter excites us to deprive him of that which he is already possessed of; both which do apparently arise from the Want and Indigence of Good in our selves. But now in God there being no Want of Good, it is impossible there should be either Envy or Avarice in him; and both these being excluded, there can be no Temptation at all in his Nature either not to do Good, or to do Hurt to others. For we see among Men, the more perfect and happy they are, the less good still they desire for themselves, and the more for others. Since therefore the great God is infinitely perfect and infinitely happy, it is impossible he should desire any Good for himself; and therefore if he act for any Good at all, as he cannot but do, it must be for ours. For
4thly. And lastly, God loves himself infinitely, and therefore cannot but be good. For whatsoever Being loves it self, must necessarily love its own Resemblance and Likeness; for that which is lovely in us is lovely in another, and if there be any Reason why we should love our selves, there is the same Reason why we should love another that resembles us in those Things for which we love our selves. 'Tis true, we poor imperfect Creatures do many times love our selves without Reason, out of a meer blind Impetus and necessary Instinct of Nature. But God, being infinitely wise governs all his Motions by the wisest Rules, and doth every Thing for the best and most excellent Reasons; and consequently doth not love himself he cannot tell why, out of any blind unaccountable Instinct in his Nature; but he loves himself so far only as he hath Reason to do it, and 'tis because he hath infinite Reason for it that he loves himself infinitely: And the Reason why he loves himself to that infinite Degree that he doth, is because he is infinitely perfect, and so hath infinite Reason to be delighted and satisfied with himself; and this being the Reason, he cannot but love others that resemble him in that for which he loves himself. For though others cannot be infinitely happy as he is, yet they are happy in such a Degree as there Capacities will bear; and when they are so, he hath the same Reason, though not so much, to love them as he hath to love himself. And he that loves Happiness in another as well as in himself, will not only love it where it is already, but be very much inclined to propagate it where it is not. So that this, I think, is a most plain Case, that if Perfection and Happiness be the Reason of God's love, he cannot but love it in another as well as in himself; and if he love it in another, he cannot but be inclined to contribute to the producing it. And therefore unless we suppose God, contrary to the Genius of all other Beings, not to love his own Resemblance, nor to be at all concerned to propagate it; we must necessarily suppose him to be Good, or which is all one, inclined to make others happy. And to say that God loves Happiness in himself, but yet that he affects to make others miserable without any Prospect of Advantage to himself, is to say that he loves Contraries in different Objects, that is, Happiness in himself, and Misery in others; which is to make his Love to be guided by the extravagant Impulses of a mutable Fancy, and not by the steady Rules of Wisdom. But since it is impossible for any Being to love that which is contrary to himself, we may be sure that God cannot love Misery, whose Nature is so infinitely happy; and since I am sure that every Being must love its own Resemblance, if it love it self; I am as sure that God loves that others should be happy, as I can be that he is so himself.
And thus I have endeavoured from the very Nature of God to demonstrate this great Truth to you, That he is good; and plainly proved to you that by all those infinite Perfections which are the necessary Results of his Self-existence he is most strongly and vehemently inclined to do good to others. And now to conclude all, we will briefly consider what Use may be made of this Discourse for the Guidance and Conduct of our Lives and Actions.
1. Then, if God be good, this may serve to support us under all the sad Events that befall us in this World. For what greater Satisfaction than this can any reasonable Man desire, to be under the Government of, and to have all his Affairs disposed by a God that cannot but be good? For now all Events and Accidents that befall us must be what God intends and designs them, because he hath the Management and Disposal of them all; and to be sure a good God can never have an ill Design upon his Creatures. 'Tis true, when his Creatures prove Malefactors, he may and doth chastise and punish them; but even in doing thus he hath a most gracious and merciful Design, namely, to reform the Offender himself; or to make him a publick Example to all the rational World, that they may take warning by his Ruin, and not run upon the Rock that dashed him in pieces. And to punish Offenders is as great an act of Mercy to the Publick, as it is to reward the Loyal and Obedient; for if out of a fond Indulgence to insolent Rebels he should let them go on in a State of Impunity, the Publick would suffer a great deal more by it than those Rebels can do by a just and deserved Punishment; for their Impunity would embolden others to take the same Courses, and so the Contagion would run on without any stop from one to another, till the Whole were infected, and the Plague of Wickedness became Epidemical to all the reasonable Creation; and so by sparing a few he would destroy a great many, and his Mercy to Particulars would be Cruelty to the Whole. But so long as we are honest and sincere in our Obedience to God, we may be sure that whatsoever befalls us in particular is intended for our good; for he cannot intend Hurt to an honest Soul without doing open Violence to his own Goodness; because the Hurt of such an one is a pure Mischief; it can serve no good End, but is likely to prove a greater Prejudice to the Publick, than it can be to the Person that endures it: For as the Impunity of great Offenders will imbolden others to offend, so the ruining of obedient Subjects will discourage others from obeying. So that to design Hurt or Damage to a sincerely good Man is to do Mischief for its own sake, and this can proceed from nothing but pure abstracted Malice, which is the very Quintessence of a Devil; but I am sure can have no Room in the Breast of our good God and merciful Father. I confess in this Life all Things do fall out so alike to all, that 'tis impossible for us to judge of God's particular Design and Intention towards us by the Nature of the Things that we suffer; and therefore in this Case the only infallible Course we can take is throughly and impartially to examine our selves, and if upon a serious Review of our own Hearts and Ways we can truly say that we have been honest and sincere to God and our Duty, we may be as sure that he designs good to us in all those Afflictions that he lays upon us, as we can be that there is such a Being as God in the World. And if for the Time past we should find that we have been bad and false and hypocritical; yet since God still continues us in this Life of Tryal, and permits us the Priviledge of being Candidates and Probationers for the Heavenly Preferments, we may safely conclude from the Goodness of his Nature that whatsoever he doth to us he designs as no Harm; for how can it be imagined that the good God should design our Misery at that very time, while he continues us in a Probation for Happiness? Wherefore let us chearfully undergo whatsoever he lays upon us, concluding that there is nothing but Good can come from a good God; that even his Punishments are cordial, and all his Rods dip'd in Love; and though they may smart severely, and fetch Blood from our very Hearts; yet let us determine with our selves that they must be good or bad according as God intends them, and that the good God must needs intend them for good.
2ly. Is God thus naturally and essentially good? Then this may serve for an excellent Standard whereby to judge of our Opinions in Religion. For most Opinions in Religion have either a near or remote Tendency to the Honour and Dishonour of God's Goodness; and though I will not say that every Opinion is true that seems to extol and advance the Goodness of God, yet I am sure that every Opinion must be false that doth either directly or by true Consequence deny or disgrace it. For let our Opinions be true or false, yet this I am sure is eternally true, that God is good; and while I am sure of this, I can never believe any Doctrin true that thwarts and contradicts it; because I am sure that from Truth there is nothing but Truth can be inferred throughout the longest Train of Deductions. This therefore we ought to be infinitely cautious of, how we entertain any Opinion whatsoever, that seems but to clash with the Goodness of God; for if it but seem to do so, we are bound by all the Zeal we owe to the divine Goodness to suspect it of Fashood, or at least not to be over-confident of its Truth till we see it fairly acquitted of that foul Imputation. For to preserve in our Minds consistent Opinions of the Goodness of God is a thing that we ought to be as careful of, as of the Apple of our own Eyes; because an ill Opinon of God is a Flaw in the very Foundation of our Religion and our Comfort; and it will be impossible for us to serve him long, either with Sincerity or with Pleasure, if we do not firmly believe him to be a good Master.
3dly. Is God thus naturally and essentially good? Then this may serve to hearten and encourage us in his Service. For to be sure so good a Master will never prove unkind to any faithful Servant; that he will not burthen us above our strength, but most freely contribute to us all the Assistance that is necessary to inable us to our Duty; that he will not be angry with us for Trifles and Punctilio's, but consider our Weakness, and pity our Follies, and make the most candid Interpretation of our Actions, and finally judge us by the Measures of a Friend; that when we wilfully miscarry, he will not presently cast us off for ever, but will be intreated by our Repentance, and appeased by our Amendment, and graciously receive us again into his Mercy and Favour; that he will not be narrow and stingy in the Recompence of our Duty to him, but reward us a Thousand-fold with such immense Glories and Beatitudes, as shall make us for ever bless the Moment we entred into his Service: All these things we may confidently conclude and build upon from the transcending Goodness of his Nature. And what greater Encouragement can we expect, or desire? Why then are we afraid, O foolish Souls, that we are! Why are we afraid to engage in his Service? Where can we hope to find a more gracious, compassionate, and bountiful Master; one that will be more ready to help and to pity, to pardon and reward us? If there be any equal Rival to God in all the World, any in whose Service you can ingage your selves with equal Hopes and Incouragements; go on and prosper in the Service of that great Rival. But if God be infinitely the best Master in the World, as doubtless he is, Why do we stand Debating the Case any longer? Why do we not run at least as chearfully to his Service, as we would to the greatest Advancement that any Mortal Prince can tender us? In the name of God, Sirs, be once so Wise as to consult your own Interest, and do not stand any longer in your own Light. Behold the great and good God stands ready to entertain you, and condescends to invite you to the most glorious Service that ever was; a Service that is most easie and reasonable, that is intermixt with infinite Pleasure and Sweetness, and crowned with the Reward of all that an everlasting Heaven means. Wherefore as you love your selves, and value your own Welfare, resolve once for all with those in the Prophet; Other Lords besides thee have had dominion over us, but thee only, Our good God, will we now serve.
4thly. And lastly, From hence I infer, that it is an unreasonable Thing for Men to suspect the Goodness of God, because of some uncertain Appearances in the World to the contrary. For from the very Principles of God's Nature we are certainly assured that he must be good, which is the highest Demonstration that Things are capable of; and therefore to suspect his Goodness upon the Account of some little Appearances to the contrary, is to confront Demonstrations with slender Probabilities, and over-rule a Certainty with a doubtful Guess. And yet how common is it for Men to arraign the Goodness of God meerly upon the Account of some visible Effects of his Power, which to their narrow Apprehensions seem hurtful and mischievous; as if we had such an intire Prospect of all the Relations and Tendencies of God's Actions, as that none could possibly appear either good or evil to us, but what is really so. Whereas, God knows, we are a company of miserable short-sighted Creatures, and are not able to see from the Beginning to the End of any one Action in all the Train of God's Providence; so that though this or that Action may appear evil to us, considered singly and in the present Effects of it, yet in it self it may be highly good, considering what a Dependence it hath upon what went before, and what a Tendency it hath to what is to follow after. For God by his infinite Comprehension having all Things present and before him, hath so ranked and disposed them, that from first to last they are all but one complicated and orderly united Means to bring about those great Ends which he first designed and intended; and consequently all the Passages in the World in his providential Dominion over them have a strict and mutual Dependence on each other, and so cannot be judged of singly and apart from one another, there being no one Action but relates to Millions of others, yea to all others from the first to the last Link of Action in the whole Chain of Providence. And therefore for us to measure the Goodness of God's Providence in general by those particular Parts of it that lie before us, is just as if a Man should judge of a whole Consort of Musick only by hearing three or four Notes of a well-composed Lesson, whereas the whole Harmony consists in a well-composed Mixture of a thousand Notes and Discords, wherein all the particulars are so interwoven as that the several Notes united in one Lesson have a most excellent Symetry and Proportion to one another. For in the whole Consort of the divine Providence there are a thousand Discords, which, to us who hear them singly and apart from the rest, do many times yield a very ungrateful Sound; whereas could we discern but the whole Composure, and hear how elegantly all thole Discords are mingled into one entire Harmony, we should never be able to forbear admiring the Skill, and adoring the Wisdom and Goodness of the great Harmostes. But since 'tis so impossible for us to discern all the Connections and Tendencies of God's Actions, how unreasonable is it for us to censure the Goodness of his Nature, because there are some Actions of his, and some Effects of those Actions, whose Goodness at present we are not able to discover. Wherefore, if we have either Reason or Modesty in us, we ought to be satisfied with those Arguments of his Goodness that are drawn from the Principles of his Nature, and though we cannot account for the Goodness of all his Actions in particular, yet firmly to resolve that nothing but Good can come from a good God.
PSALM CXIX.68.
Thou art good, and thou dost good.
I Proceed to the second Part of the Text, viz. the Operations of God that flow from the immutable Goodness of his Nature; Thou dost good: And these as they flow from the Goodness of God's Nature, so they are plain Proofs and Indications of it. For as the Nature of Things is demonstrable by their Effects as well as their Causes, so the Goodness of God may be as well demonstrated by the Operations it exerts, and the Effects it produces in the World, as by those Principles and Perfections of his Nature from whence it necessarily arises. And it is as certain that that Being must be good that hath all the necessary Causes and Principles of Goodness in it; for if it were indifferent to the Almighty whether he did Good or Evil, he would doubtless either retire from Action and do neither, or else he would do as much Mischief as Good; or if he were inclined to do ill he would do it, and not force himself to act contrary to his own Inclinations. Wherefore since he doth Good so constantly and so universally, he can neither be supposed to be averse nor indifferent to it; and if he be neither of these, his doing Good must necessarily proceed from the immutable Inclination of his Nature thereunto. If therefore we can prove from the whole Course and Series of God's Operations that he doth Good, it will be an infallible Argument that he is so. Now all those Operations of God that pass out of himself, and terminate upon others are reducible to Creation and Providence; both which will afford us abundant Instances of the Truth of the Text, that God doth Good.
I. I begin with the first, viz. Creation; in which it is apparent that God hath done an infinite deal of Good. And hence the Psalmist tells us that the whole earth is full of the goodness of the Lord, Psalm xxxiii.5. so also Psalm civ.24. O Lord how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy Riches, [i. e. the Riches of his Goodness] and so is the great and wide Sea. And God himself after his great Work of Creation, upon a general Survey of the whole Fabrick of Beings, pronounces all to be very good, Gen. i.31. But to demonstrate more particularly the great Goodness that God hath expressed in his Creation, I shall briefly give you these four Instances of it.
1. That whatsoever Beings are incapable of Happiness in themselves, he hath made them so far as they can be, subservient to the Happiness of others.
2. That he hath given actual Existence to all kinds of Beings that are capable of any Degree of Happiness.
3. That he hath furnished them with all the sufficient Means and Abilities to obtain the utmost Happiness that they are capable of.
4. That in all those Beings that are capable of Happiness, he hath implanted a natural Disposition of Doing Good to others.
1. That whatsoever Beings are incapable of Happiness in themselves, he hath made them so far as they can be, subservient to the Happiness of others. For it is impossible that all Beings that are capable of Happiness could ever have been actually happy, had not God created some Beings that are utterly incapable of it. For thus all the Heavenly Bodies, the Air, and Earth, and Fire and Water are Beings utterly incapable of Happiness, they being all inanimate, and consequently void of all Sense and Perception either of Happiness or Misery; but yet it cannot be denied but they are indispensably necessary to the Happiness of a World of animated Beings that are capable of some Degrees of Happiness. Thus, for instance, the Happiness of all sublunary Things, of Men and Beasts, of the Fowls of the Air and the Fishes of the Sea, depends in a great Measure on those dead inanimated Elements; and therefore if God had not created some Beings incapable of Happiness, there are many Beings that are capable of it must either have not been, or have been miserable. And therefore God hath not only created these, but out of his great Goodness to his living Creatures he hath created them in such an Order as renders them as subservient as they can be to their Welfare and Happiness. Thus the Sun, whom God hath ordained the universal Foster-father of all sublunary Beings, though he feels no Happiness himself, is created by our great Benefactor in such a Form and put in such a Course of Motion, as renders him most serviceable to all those animated Beings, that are capable of Happiness. For first he is created of a fiery Substance, by which he not only enlightens this lower World, but warms and cherishes it with a fruitful and vigorous Heat. And then God hath cast all its mighty Substance into the Figure of a perfect Globe, that so if the Earth moves round it, it might be able to communicate the comfort of its Light and Heat to it throughout all the Circle of its Motion; or that if it moves round the Earth, it may by its Figure, which is most apt for Motion, be the better enabled to walk his Rounds about the World, and so visit all his Foster-Children, and refresh them with his Light and Warmth as oft as their Necessities require. And then for his Situation in the World, what an exact Care hath the good Father of Beings taken to place him in such a convenient Distance as that he might neither be too near us, nor too far from us; both which would have been equally mischievous. For had he been advanced higher in the Heavens, he would have left us continually frozen and benighted; had he been thrust lower, he would have perpetually scorched us with the too near Neighbourhood of his Flames. But from that Orb wherein he is placed all his Aspects on us are benigne; and Thanks be to a good God we neither want his Heat or Light, nor are we scorched and dazled by it. For if God had not been very careful of the Publick Good he might as well have fixed the Sun in the Orb of the Moon as where it now is, and then as its Nearness to us would have turned the World into a Torrid Zone, so it would have run through the whole Zodiack in the space of a Month, and consequently the four Seasons, viz. Winter and Summer, and Spring and Autumn which do now fill up the Circle of the Year, would have been all thrust together in four Weeks; by means whereof as all living Creatures would have been very much prejudiced by the frequent Changes of the Air, so all Vegetation must have necessarily ceased. For the Winter Frost must have Killed the Fruits of the Earth before ever the Summers Heat could have ripened them; and the Fruits of the Earth being destroyed all living Creatures must have perished with Famine. Since then there are an infinite Number of other Places in the Heavens wherein God could have fixed the Sun if he had pleased, but none so commodious for the World as that where it is, what could move him to choose this above all others but only his great Care of the Welfare of his Creatures? Once more, If we consider the Course of its Motion, how could it have been more exactly ordered than it is for the publick Benefit of the Inhabitants of the World? For whereas in it self 'twas as apt to move in a direct Line as in a Circle, which if it had done, only one half of the Earth could have been warmed and enlightened by it, whilst the other had been covered with eternal Frost and Darkness; the good God hath appointed him to run about the Globe, and that with so much Swiftness, notwithstanding he is so vast a Body, that once in Twenty four Hours he brings Day into both the Hemispheres; and whereas had he always moved round in the same middle Circle without ever swerving either Southward or Northward, all those vast Tracts of Earth that lie beyond the Polar Circles would have been well nigh lost in an everlasting Winter, and consequently their wretched Inhabitants condemned to Famine and Cold; the good God hath chalked him out those oblique Paths of the Zodiack, in which in the Summer he travels towards the Northern, and in the Winter towards the Southern Hemisphere, and so once a Year brings a warm Summer to them both. Thus God hath placed the Sun in the Heaven as his Almoner, and furnished him with all the Advantages he is capable of to relieve the Necessities of his Creatures; and every Morning he visits us from his bountiful Master, and with his kindly Influence ripens the Fruits of the Earth for us, and comforts us with the Warmth and Brightness of his Rays. And though he receives no Happiness himself, yet is so framed, and placed, and moved by the Father of Lights, that he abundantly administers to the Happiness of others.
And the same may be said of the Moon, which is a kind of Deputy-Sun to supply his Place in the Night, and by the moist Warmth it diffuses to promote the Generation and Growth of all vegetable Beings. And that it may do this the more effectually its Motions are not confined, like the Sun's, within the Tropicks; but in pity to those poor Animals that dwell nearer towards the Poles the good God hath sent her some degrees farther to visit them in their long uncomfortable Nights and supply the Suns absence from them, and temperate the Cold and Darkness that covers them, with the Warmth and Brightness of her Beams. And accordingly when the Sun goes Southward she draws nearer towards the Northern, when Northward, towards the Southern Pole, as if she pitied those poor Regions that are thus forsaken of the Sun, and so went in pure Charity to those fatherless and bewidowed Animals that inhabit them, to supply his Absence with her own vicarious Light. But 'twould be endless to recite the vast Commodities we receive from the other heavenly Bodies, and what infinite Care the good God hath taken so to order and direct the Course of their Motion, as that those Beings that are capable of Happiness might be most benefited by them.
But then if from hence we descend into the Air, how proper a Medium is this fluid and transparent Element to convey to us the Light and Influences of the heavenly Bodies? What a convenient Volary is it for feathered Animals? For being the most fluid of all Bodies it easily gives Way to the Vibration of their Wings, and so, that as that Air that is under them bears them up; so that which is before them is no Hindrance to their Motion. In a word, how necessary is it to supply and refresh the Spirits of all Animals in general, which if they did not suck in new Air almost every Moment would immediately be suffocated.
Again, if from the Air we descend to the Earth, how liberally hath the good God impregnated its vast Womb with the Seeds and Principles of all those Herbs, and Flowers, and Plants, and Minerals that can be any ways Subservient to the Happiness of those numerous Animals wherewithall it is peopled; insomuch that it is become a general Magazine of Provisions not only for the Necessities, but for the Delights of its Inhabitants.
Thus also the Sea, that vast Continent of Water, is so contrived by the Almighty Creator, that it not only administers to the Sustenance and Delight of its own Inhabitants, but also to the Happiness of all other Animals. For from its vast Treasury of Waters it sends forth fruitful Streams into all Parts of the Earth through divers Holes that are bored at convenient Distances, and forces them to climb up to the Tops of Mountains, not only that they may be able to run down again with Ease, but also to carry themselves to such Heights afterwards as the Necessities of Men and Beasts do require; so that even the most In-land Parts of the Earth are made fruitful by their Moistures, and all their thirsty Inhabitants are watered and refreshed by them. Besides which it is also most highly useful for Navigation, whereby the remotest Parts of the World maintain an easie Correspondence, and do mutually change the Commodities of Life with one onother. Lastly, if we consider the Fire, what a most useful Servant hath the great Creator rendred it to Mankind? For by this we do not only supply the Absence of Summer, but do also prepare all our Food, and render it wholsome and pleasant, and most successfully serve our selves in all Arts and Manufactures.
Thus I have briefly touched upon all the visible Creation of inanimate Beings, and shewn you how careful the great and good Creator hath been to improve them all to the utmost to the Happiness of his animated Creatures, that so there might no necessary Supply be wanting to compleat those several Degrees of Happiness for all Beings in the World, and none might be miserable but such as choose to be so. What a noble Instance is this therefore of the immense Goodness of God in this Work of Creation, that he hath made all Beings that are incapable of Happiness to minister as much as they are able to those that are capable of it, and thereby spread his Table with an infinite variety not only of Necessaries, but of Delicacies to treat and entertain all his sensitive Creation? Who can suspect his Goodness, when the Heavens and all the Elements do so loudly proclaim it, by their being so contrived and ordered by his Wisdom, as to do the utmost Good they are able to those Things that have any Capacity of Happiness?
2ly, Another Instance of his doing good in this great Work of his Creation is his giving actual Existence to such innumerable Kinds of Being that are capable of Happiness. Were we but able to survey the whole Scale of Beings from the lowest of sensitive to the highest of rational, we should doubtless find in it such an innumerable Company of Rounds as all our Arithmetick could never be able to compute, For we see that even this Earth, which is but a very little Spot of the World, contains in it such a prodigious Army of distinct Kinds of sensitive Beings as all the Histories of Animals were never able to muster; and could we but reckon down from Man, to the lowest Mite of animated Matter that the Earth and Sea contains, we should find that even here there are so many Kinds of Beings as are capable at least of some Degrees of Happiness, as would give us Cause enough to admire and adore the infinite Fecundity of the divine Goodness. And is it likely that this Earth, which is but the Sink of the World, should be the only inhabitable Part of it? That since the Almighty hath so well stocked this little Inclosure, he should for ever leave desolate of Inhabitants all those immense Tracts of pure Aether in which the Planets and Fixed Stars do swim? That when he hath so thronged this dark Cellar with living Creatures, he should make no Use at all of those vast and glorious Rooms, but let them stand empty for ever, as if he had erected them only for Pomp and Shew, without any Design to people them with such noble Inhabitants as they are capable to receive? Well then, let us but suppose, as we may very fairly do, that the other Parts of the World are stock'd with living Creatures but in the same proportion with this, and then what an innumerable Drove of distinct kinds of Bings will the Whole consist of? And indeed considering what infinite Degrees of Being are within the Sphere of God's Omnipotence, and how suitable it is to his Goodness in his Productions to reach the utmost Limits of Possibility, it seems no way unreasonable to believe that he hath given actual Existence to all possible Kinds of Beings that are capable of Life and Happiness, and can without any Prejudice either to themselves or Neighbours be contained within the Compass and immensity of the World; and consequently that he hath not only filled with living Creatures the Earth and Air and Sea, but, if it be possible, all the Capacities of an immense and infinite Space. But whether this be so or no, it is an abundant Evidence of the Goodness of God, that he hath created such innumerable Kinds of living Creatures, the meanest of which are capable of some Degree of Happiness. For unless we will assert one of the greatest Absurdities in our modern Philosophy, That all sensitive Animals are nothing but meer Machins, and consequently have no Sense or Perception in them; we must allow them all, even to the smallest Insect, a Capacity of some Degree of Happiness. For whatsoever hath Sense is sensible of Pleasure, and whatsoever is sensible of Pleasure is capable of Happiness; and he that made so many Beings capable of Happiness, to be sure never intended that their Capacities should be in vain. Behold then the vast Design and Project of the divine Goodness that would let nothing lie buried in the Abyss of Non-entity, whose Idea included but a Possibility of being happy, and hath given actual Existence unto all kinds of Beings, even the most inconsiderable Animals, for which it was better to be than not to be; that at least hath raised up an innumerable Company of Beings into a Capacity of being happy, and made such ample Provision to supply their Natures with all the Degrees of Happiness that they are capable of! For
3dly, Another Instance of his doing good in this great Work of Creation is his furnishing all these Beings with sufficient Means and Abilities to obtain the utmost Happiness that they are capable of. For I have already shewn you, that God hath so made and ordered the inanimate World that it administers sufficient Matter of Happiness unto all sensitive Beings; that the Heavens and the Elements by the Ordination of God do all conspire together to contribute to our Happiness, to warm and refresh us, to feed and cloath us, and to render our Lives, not only supportable, but pleasant and delightful. And of this vast Contribution every Animal, even the most minute, hath its Share; so that now they can want nothing that is necessary to their Happiness, but only an Ability to use and apply the liberal Provisions that God hath made for them; and this he hath also most graciously furnished them with, For in all Brute Creatures God hath implanted a natural Instinct by which they are strongly inclined to that which is good for them, and as strongly averse to what is hurtful and injurious; so that by their very Natures he hath impelled them to make Use of those Provisions which he hath made for their Happiness; and he hath also furnished them with a natural Sagacity to provide against Want, and with fitting Instruments of Sense to relish and enjoy the several Pleasures which he hath prepared to entertain them: All which he hath done to that vast Advantage, that 'tis impossible for humane Wisdom to say how any one Kind of Animals could have been more exactly framed for the enjoyment of such a Happiness, as is proper to its Nature. But then for us Men that are capable of much more than a meer sensitive Happiness, he hath not only prepared such a Happiness as is proportionable to our Capacities, but hath also implanted in our Natures a full Ability to obtain it. For as for our sensitive Happiness, there is sufficient Provision made for it in the common Store-house of Nature, and by the Industry and the good Use of our Reason we may ordinarily secure our selves, if we please, from the Want of whatsoever is necessary thereunto; for a very little of these sensitive Enjoyments is enough to make a wise Man happy, and we want no bodily Organs or Sensories to relish any of those Pleasures of which our sensitive Happiness is composed. And then for our supreme Happiness, as we are reasonable Beings, God by giving us Reason, and Vnderstanding, and Freedom of Choice, hath furnished us with sufficient Ability to obtain it. For our Happiness, as we are reasonable Creatures, consists in the most perfect Exercise of our noblest Faculties, viz. our Vnderstanding and our Will; and there is no Object in Nature about which these Faculties can be perfectly exercised but only God, who is the Fountain of all Truth and Goodness; and consequently our Happiness as Men must consist in the Enjoyment of God, that is, in knowing, and loving, and resembling him for ever. And in order to our obtaining of this, God hath furnished us with Vnderstanding, by the good Improvement of which we may easily arrive to the Knowledge of him; for he hath placed us so advantagiously in Being, that, as from a convenient Station in a noble Theater, we are able to contemplate the admirable Schemes of those magnificent Works which God hath set round about us; and from the Vastness of the whole Structure, the Variety of its Parts, and the beautiful Order which appears in their admirable Connection, we can easily infer, that such a noble Production must needs be owing to an Almighty Skill and Goodness. And then such is the Frame of our Natures, that we easily love that which we know to be lovely, and consequently if we are not prejudiced by preternatural Lusts, that which we behold of God in his Works will imprint such an amiable Notion of him in our Minds, as will almost necessarily engage us to love him; and then our Love will provoke us to imitate those Beauties for which we love him, we being naturally ambitious of transcribing those Perfections into our selves which we love and admire in another; and then by imitating him, we shall by Degrees be moulded into his Likeness and Resemblance; for Acts will beget Inclinations, Inclinations will grow into Habits, and Habits will become our Nature. So that you see God hath implanted an Ability of knowing and loving and resembling himself in the very Frame and Structure of our Natures; these Things we are as capable of as of any Thing whatsoever that is rational and manly; we are as capable of knowing God, as of knowing any Thing that is knowable; as capable of loving him, as of loving any Thing that is amiable; as capable of resembling him, as of imitating any Thing that is imitable; and these are the noblest and most essential Parts of the Happiness of a rational Nature. Now what an undeniable Instance is this of the Goodness of God, that he hath not only made so many Kinds of Beings capable of so many different Degrees of Happiness, but that he hath furnished them all with such abundant Means and Abilities to obtain it? O blessed God, what Heart can be so stupid and insensible as not to admire and adore thy exuberant Goodness, which hath thus extended it self to the utmost Borders of Entity, and blessed with its overflowing Streams such an infinite Number of Beings! What Tongue is able sufficiently to praise and extol thy Benignity, that out of thine own immense Fulness hast supplied such a vast Creation with such Capacities, and such Means, and such Abilities of being happy!
4thly. And Lastly, Another Instance of his doing good in this great Work of Creation, is his implanting a natural Inclination of doing good to others in all those Beings that are capable of Happiness. For it being his Design to propagate this Sort of Beings by way of Generation to the End of the World, he hath implanted in all Parents, as well sensitive as rational, a natural Love and Good-will to their Off-spring, and that to such a Degree as we see the most timorous and helpless Creatures are not only very industrious to nurse and cherish them, but very couragious in their Defence and Preservation, which is a great Instance of the indulgent Care which the great Father of Beings hath of all his Children, that he hath commited them in their Infancy to such tender Nurses that will be sure to take Care to make Provision for them when they are not able to provide for themselves; that he hath not trusted them to the Compassion and good Nature of other Beings to be maintained by the Alms, and free Benevolence of their fellow Creatures, but hath taken Security for their liberal Nurture and Education from the very Nature and inmost Bowels of their Parents; who were so framed that they cannot choose but make Provision for them if they are able, without doing the greatest Outrage to themselves, and stifling one of the strongest Inclinations of their Natures; which inclination of natural Parents doth therefore loudly proclaim the infinite Goodness of the great Parent of all Things to his Children; because there can be no other Reason assigned why he should implant this Inclination in our Natures, but because he loved us, and was therefore resolved to take the most effectual Course that Care might be taken of us, when we were not capable to take Care for our selves. And can we think that the supreme Father, who hath implanted in all natural Parents such a necessary Inclination to do good to their Children, should be forgetful and regardless of his own Off-spring? He that planted the Eye, shall not he see? And he that gave the Ear, shall not he hear? And by the same Reason, he that hath so strongly inclined our Natures to the Love of our Off-spring, shall not he love his own? Shall not his Nature be as strongly inclined to do good to them? For the whole Creation being nothing else but the Expansion or Spreading forth of the divine Simplicity and Perfection, all Creatures do more properly belong to God than Families or Actions do to the Principles from whence they flow; so that we are as it were Flesh of his Flesh, and Bone of his Bone; and no Man, saith the Apostle, hateth his own Flesh, but rather nourishes and cherishes it: And if Man doth not, can we imagin that God doth? For as for Man, we see the more perfect he is, and the more suitable to his Nature he acts, the more he is inclined to do good, and that not only to his own but to all others that are within the Sphere of his Beneficence. He finds in himself such a diffusive and all-spreading Principle of Love as renders him an universal Friend and Benefactor to the World, and makes him sympathize in the Happiness and Misery of all Beings; and this brave Temper of Mind is doubtless one of the highest Perfections that the Soul of Man is capable of. Since therefore originally we came no otherwise to the Knowledge of God's Perfections than as we found them copyed out and transcribed into our own Natures, how can we imagin that God should not be inclined to universal Love and Beneficence, when we acknowledge it a Perfection in our selves to be so? Can there be any Perfection in us that is not in God in the utmost Degree of Possibility? And therefore if the Inclination to do good be a Perfection in us, it must needs be in God in all the possible Degrees that an infinite Nature is capable of; and since he hath so framed all reasonable Natures, that universal Love and Proneness to do good is one of their greatest Perfections and Accomplishments, we may be sure that his own, which is the great Standard and Pattern of all reasonable Natures, is infinitely loving and prone to do good. And thus you see what mighty unanswerable Instances there are of the Goodness of God in the Works of his Creation.
Wherefore to conclude this Argument; From hence we see what mighty Obligations we are under to serve and obey, so far as we are able, the great and good Author of our Beings, who hath not only created us, but created us in a vast Capacity of Happiness, and furnished us with sufficient Means and Abilities to attain it. Wherefore since, all our Powers and Abilities are from him, we are bound in Justice to imploy them in his Service; and since by giving us those Abilities he hath done us so much good, and rendred us capable of such immense degrees of Happiness, we are obliged in Gratitude not to imploy them in doing any Thing that is any ways displeasing or dishonourable to him. For what can be more just or reasonable than that God should have the Use of those Powers which he gave us, and in which he still retains an unalienable Right and Property? That the Temples which he hath built should be forever dedicated to his Service, and not turned into Dens of Thievs, or made Stables of Filth and Vncleanness. So that for us to withdraw our selves from his Service, or to imploy our Powers to any wicked Purposes, is to commit a Robbery upon the Author of our Beings, and most unjustly to desseise him of his own Goods, wherein he hath a far more absolute Propriety than we pretend to have in the Cloths on our Backs: And in every bad Action we do, steal Gods own Powers and Faculties from him, and with extreme Injustice imploy them against himself. Now what a monstrous Thing is it that we, who think our selves so highly affronted, when any one charges us with Robbery and Injustice, should make no more Conscience of robbing God, and alienating from him those Faculties and Powers of Action, in which he hath a far more undoubted Propriety than any Creature can have in any Good it enjoys; but when he hath been so good a Creator to us as to create in us such an ample Capacity of being happy, and furnished us with such abundant Means and Abilities of attaining thereunto, then to eloigne our selves from his Service, and to pervert those Powers of Action to sinful Purposes by which he hath enabled us to be happy; is not only unjust, but barbarously ungrateful. For now in sinning against God we fight against him with his own Mercies, and arm the Effects of his Bounty against his Sovereignty; and as if we were resolved to revenge our selves upon him for making us so good, and raising us up into such an excellent State of Nature, we shamefully dishonour him with his own Blessings, and take all Advantages we can to grieve and offend him from the very Means and Abilities which he hath given us to be happy. He gave us Reason and Vnderstanding to discern what is good for our selves, and Liberty of Will to choose and imbrace it; and we like ungrateful Wretches imploy that Reason and Liberty in contriving and choosing the highest Treason against him. He gave us Powers and Abilities of Action, that so we might not only discern and choose what is best for us, but might also pursue and obtain it; but we like base Caitiffs exert those Abilities in grieving and offending our most gracious Benefactor. Wherefore be astonished O ye Heavens, and be horribly affraid O all ye Works of God! For whilst you are all obedient to the Laws of your Maker, and never swerve from those Lines of Motion he hath prescribed you; we, whom he hath advanced into the highest Class of Beings, and endowed with the largest Capacities and Abilities of being happy, are become so base and so shameless as to injure him with his own Gifts, and to convert his very Blessings into Weapons of Rebellion against him. Wherefore unless we are ambitious of rendring our selves the most absolute Monsters both of Injustice and Ingratitude, unless we have a Fancy to aspire to a Perfection in Baseness, and to rival the Devils themselves in the most infamous and ignominious Degrees of Wickedness; let us imploy all our Faculties and Abilities for Action in the Service of him from whom we received them, and exercise his Gifts in a perpetual Acknowledgment of his Goodness.