The Christian Life Part 3 Volume 4, Part 1 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II. Of Justice in preserving the Rights of Men, consider'd as Rational Creatures.
II. I Proceed in the second place to observe, That there are other Rights accruing to Men, as they are Rational Creatures: for it is this indeed that giveth a Right to common Justice, to be governed by Laws, and by Rewards and Punishments, that we are free and Rational Agents who can chuse or refuse, and determine our selves which way soever we think fit or reasonable. For without Reason, and Free Will, we could no more be capable of Laws, nor subject to Rewards and Punishments than Stones or Trees are: For no Law can oblige a Being that hath no Power over his own Actions; nor can he deserve to be rewarded when he doth well, nor punished when he doth evil, if it be not in his Power to do otherwise: and therefore Beasts cannot be said to do either justly, or unjustly towards one another; because whatsoever good, or evil they do one another, they do it necessarily, and it was not in their power to do otherwise. But because Men are free Agents, and have power to determine themselves either to do good or evil to one another; therefore of right they claim of each other the mutual Performance of such Goods, and Forbearance of such Evils as agree or disagree with the State, and Condition of their Natures. And hence every Rational Creature hath a Right to be used and treated by those of his own Kind, agreeably to the state of his Rational Nature; and for one Man to treat another otherwise, is not only hurtful, but also injurious. Now the Rights which one Rational Creature may by the condition of his Nature claim of another, may be reduced to these four particulars;
First, Every Man has a Right to an equitable Treatment from every man.
Secondly, Every Man hath a Right to judge for himself so far as he is capable.
Thirdly, Every Man hath a Right not to be forced, or impelled to act contrary to the Judgment of right Reason.
Fourthly, Every Man hath a Right to be respected by every man according to the dignity of his Nature.
I. EVERY Man hath a Right to an equitable Treatment from every man, that is, to be treated according to the measures of that Golden Rule of Equity prescribed by our Saviour, Matth. vii. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets, i. e. in all your Intercourses with men, suppose you had exchanged conditions with them, and that you were in theirs, and they in yours; and be sure you do them all that good, which upon a due consideration of the case, you could reasonably expect, or desire of them, if you were in their persons and circumstances. And this Right of being treated by others, as they would expect to be treated by us, supposing they were in our Circumstances, ariseth from that equality of Nature that is between us, which giveth every one a right to be equally treated by every one, and to claim all those good Offices from others which they might reasonably claim of him, if they were in his state and circumstances. For we being all propagated from the same Loins, and partakers of the same Nature, every Man in the world is by cognation of blood, and agreement of nature every man's Brother, and Kinsman. We are all but so many several Streams issuing from one common Source, but so many several Twigs sprouting from the same Stock; we are all of us but one Blood derived through several Channels; but one Substance multiplyed, and dilated into several Times and Places, by the miraculous Efficacy of the divine Benediction. We are all fashioned according to the same Original Idea, resembling God our common Father: we are all endowed with the same Faculties, Inclinations, and Affections; and do all conspire in the same essential Ingredients of our Nature: and there is nothing doth distinguish, or diversifie us, but what is accidental to our Being; such as Age and Place, Figure, and Stature, Colour and Garb; so that every man is not only our most lively Image, but in a manner our very Substance, or another Our Self, under a small Variation of present Circumstances; which Circumstances are to be considered in every application of the above-named Rule of Equality to our Actions. If I am superior to another, either in my place, or Relation, or in the Goods of my Mind, or Fortune; I am only obliged by this Rule, to do that by him which I might reasonably desire he should do by me, were he as much my Superior, as I am his. But when all Men naturally as such are equal, and do stand upon even terms and level ground, there ought to be no other Inequality in their mutual Treatment of one another, but what is owing to the Inequality of their Circumstances: and he who doth that to another man, which upon good Reason he would not have another do to him in the same Circumstances, doth unjustly usurp a Superiority over him, which neither Nature, nor Providence alloweth of. For there is no Proposition in the Mathematicks more self-evident than this, Paria paribus conveniunt, equal Things agree to equal Persons; and therefore since we are all equal by Nature, whatsoever things are due to me, must by the same reason be due to another in the same Circumstances; and therefore he that denieth to another Man that which he conceiveth he might justly claim of him in the same condition, unjustly with-holds from him a Right that is due to him as he is his Equal in Nature.
II. EVERY Man hath a Right to judge for himself so far as he is capable: for we must either suppose that every Being hath a Right to use its own Faculties, or else that it hath its Faculties in vain: for to what purpose serve its Faculties, if it hath no Right to make use of them? And to what purpose serveth our Faculty of Reason, but only to judge for our selves in all such matters as fall within the Sphere of our Cognizance? Which if our Reason be debarred of, it standeth for a lonely Cypher in our Natures and is altogether useless and insignificant? And if in any thing our Reason hath a Right to judge for us, then much more in matters of Religion, in which our highest and most important Interest is concerned. So that to deny it the Right of judging for us here, is to render it useless in our greatest Importance, and to disable our best Faculty from being serviceable to our best Interest. 'Tis true, there are sundry Controversies about religious Matters, which every Man's Reason cannot judge of; the Arguments pro and con depending either upon Criticisms of Language, or Metaphysical Niceties, or ancient Histories; which are all beyond the Comprehension of persons of mean and vulgar Understandings: who are therefore obliged in all such matters as these to submit to the Determination of their lawful Guides and Governours. But as for the great and necessary matters of Religion, they are plain and obvious to the meanest Understanding; and consequently herein every man ought to exercise his natural Right of judging for himself, and not swallow his Religion blindfold, without trying it by the Test of his Reason. And certainly they who remove the Cognizance of Religion out of the Court of Reason, take away that which doth most properly and naturally fall under its Determination. For Religion is the Chief End of Man's Creation, as he is a reasonable Being, and thereby capable of Religion: and to be sure where the End is natural, the Means must be so too. And therefore as Horses that were made for Burthen, have a natural Ability to bear; and as Birds that were made to fly, have a faculty and Wings for that purpose; so rational Souls that were made for Religion, must needs be supposed to have some Power naturally placed in them, for the Exercise, and Iudgment, and Choice of it. And what else can that be but their Reason? So that to deny Men the Liberty to judge for themselves in that which is their natural End and highest Interest, is as great a piece of Violence and Injustice as can be offered to humane Nature. And of this very matter the Church of Rome is highly guilty; for it commandeth Assent without Evidence, and imperiously requireth Men to believe her Doctrines without examination; to rely implicitly upon her Authority and swallow down her Faith by the lump, without ever inquiring whether it be Physick, or Poyson. For the leading Principle of the Romish Religion is this, that the Churches Authority is the Reason of our Faith, and that Men are bound to believe what she believeth without any further proof or evidence; by which tyrannical Proceedure She useth her wretched Children, as the Philistins did Sampson, first putteth out their Eyes, and recreateth herself with their Blindness and Ignorance. For unless they wink hard, and believe at a venture whatsoever she proposeth, they are sure to feel the Edges both of her spiritual and temporal Swords; and though they are never so modest, peaceable and humble in their dissents, to incur her Anathemas, which have always the sting of Fire and Faggot in the tayl of them. Now what is this but to force the Opinions of Men, and drive their Reason from its Throne of Judicature? For he that punisheth a man barely for his Opinion, doth in so doing endeavour to rob him of his natural Right of judging for himself: which is the greatest Tyranny in the World, it being an exercise of Dominion over the minds of men, which are subject only to the Empire of God. 'Tis true, if in judging for themselves Men take up Opinions that are vicious, or destructive to Government, their wicked Practice is justly punishable according to the proportion of its Malignity; for otherwise Men's right of judging for themselves will soon be made a Sanctuary for all the Villanies in the World. And though no Man ought to be punished barely for his Opinion, yet he may be justly punished for practising his Opinion, though his practice be indifferent in its own Nature. For indifferent Things which God hath neither commanded, nor forbidden; are the proper matter of all humane Laws; and therefore if upon a false Opinion that what the Law enjoyns is not indifferent, but sinful. I practise contrary to the Law, I am justly punishable; because my Mistake altereth not the nature of the thing. If it be indifferent, it is a proper object of humane Laws, whether I think it so or no; and as such may justly be imposed; and the Imposition being just in it self, our not complying with it is justly punishable. Once more; though no Man ought to be punished for his Opinion, yet he may be justly punishable for making a publick Profession of it; for there is no doubt but Men may be restrained by Laws from propagating their little Opinions into Factions, and dividing themselves upon every different persuasion into opposite Parties. Otherwise it will be impossible, considering the Passions of Men, to maintain any Unity, or Concord in civil, or sacred Societies. And therefore where such Restriction is, Men ought to be satisfied with this, that they freely enjoy their liberty of Opining, and are not deprived of their natural Right to judge for themselves; and so they ought either to keep their little Opinions to themselves, or at least not to vex and disturb the Publick by a fierce Endeavour to propagate them to others. And this due Deference to Men's natural Right of judging for themselves, hath been always punctually observed in the Church of England; for it neither damneth, nor censureth, persecuteth, nor destroyeth Men upon the score of difference in Opinion; provided their Opinion doth not lead them to wicked, or seditious practices; but hopeth well of all that live well, and receiveth all into its Communion, that desire it; provided they believe but the Apostles Creed and the Doctrine of the four first General Councils. 'Tis true, it forbideth Men so to profess their Dissents to the Articles of its Doctrine and Discipline, as to seduce her Children from her Communion and list them into Factions against her; and this every Church must necessarily do, that valueth its own Peace and Preservation: but it pretendeth not to invade the Liberty of their Thoughts, or to lay rigid Restraints on their Opinions; and so long as they dissent from us modestly and peaceably, they may enjoy their own Opinions, and our Communion too. And as for those Forein Communities of Christians that differ from us, we pass no severe Sentences against them; but do believe, and hope, and earnestly pray that the God of all mercies will pity their Errors, and connive at their Defects, and finally unite them to us for ever in the blissful Communion of the Church Triumphant. Nor doth our Religion obtrude it self upon the minds of Men, by the bare Warrant of an imperious Authority; but fairly appealeth to our Understandings, and casteth it self upon the tryal of our Reason; exacting of us no further Assent, than what the evidence claimeth upon which it is founded; and is so far from exacting of us a blind-fold Assent to it without Examination, that it readily exposeth it self to the severest Enquiry, and asketh no other favour but to stand, or fall by the impartial Sentence of our Reason. It telleth us both what we are to believe, and why; and not only alloweth, but requireth us to examine the grounds and reasons of it; in all which there is not the least Shadow of imposing on Men's minds, or usurping on their Rights of judging for themselves. But alas! 'Tis not only the Church of Rome that is guilty of this unnatural Tyranny: for how many are there of all Parties among our selves, that cannot endure the least Contradiction, but expect all Judgments should bow to theirs, and receive their imperious Dictates for Oracles; and are ready to censure all that dissent from them as Men of Reprobate Minds, and to hate and persecute them, because they cannot believe as fast as they? As if no Man had a Right to carry his Eyes in his own Head, but They; and their Understandings were to be a Rule, and Standard to the whole World. If another Man differeth from me, do not I differ as much from him? And hath not He as much Right to judge for himself as I? But He is mistaken, you will say, and I am not; and possibly He is as confident that I am mistaken and not he; and if I think I cannot be mistaken, I am more mistaken than He: but certainly it is neither Presumption for him to know more than I, nor Sin to know less. What then is to be done, but to leave one another in the quiet Possession of each others Right; and not to hector and swagger upon every difference in Opinion; because he that differeth from me, hath as much Right to judge for himself as I, though he refuseth to prostrate his Understanding to mine; which for any Man to expect, is a most unjust Invasion of the common Rights of Humane Nature.
III. EVERY Man hath a Right not to be forced, or impelled to act contrary to the Judgment of right Reason. For right Reason is the natural Guide of all reasonable Creatures; 'tis the Light of their feet and the Lanthorn of their paths, and the Star by which they ought to direct their courses. And what can be more unjust, than to force any Man to act against that which is the Law of his Nature? For if He who gave me my Nature, gave me right Reason for the Law and Guide of it, I must necessarily have an undoubted Right to a full and free permission to follow it; otherwise he hath given me a Law in vain. And if I have Right to a full permission to follow the Law of right Reason, then for any man to impel me to act counter to it either by hope, or fear, or any other motive, is a high Injustice to my Nature. For he who induceth me to do any wicked, or unreasonable Action, which I should not have done, had not he induced me to it, doth in so doing so far as in him lyeth, not permit me to follow the eternal Laws of right Reason. As for instance, the Law of right Reason requireth me, when I pretend to give Evidence to any matter of Fact, to testifie nothing but the Truth to the best of my Knowledge; he therefore who endeavoureth either by promises, or threats to suborn me to testifie falsely, doth thereby hinder me, so far as in him lyeth, from hearkning to the call of right Reason. Again, right Reason requireth me to make good my Promises, whether they be to my Superiors, Inferiours, or Equals; and much more when I confirm them with an Oath; he therefore who by any means endeavoureth to persuade me to falsifie my Word, or Oath, doth in so doing, so far as in him lyeth, not permit me to follow what right Reason prescribeth. Once more, right Reason commandeth me to bridle my Appetite with Temperance and Sobriety; he therefore that by force, or persuasion endeavoureth to make me drunk, doth to the utmost of his power with-hold and restrain me from following that which is the Law of my Nature. In a word, he who by command or threat, promise or persuasion putteth me upon any sinful Action, is not only guilty in the fight of God of the Sin which I commit by his inducement; but also of doing a high Injustice to my Nature, of putting it out of its true biass, and not permitting it to move and act according to the Laws of Reason; which is a piece of the most outragious Violence that can be offered to a rational Creature. Besides that by inducing another Man to sin, I do, as far as in me lyeth, betray him to eternal Punishment; which is as barbarous an Injustice to his Soul, as the Devil himself can be guilty of. For should I not call that Man a treacherous Villain, who while he pretendeth to embrace his Friend, should secretly stab him to the heart? And is it not a much more bloody Villany, under a specious pretence of kindness and good fellowship, to stab my Brother to the Soul, and wound him to eternal Death? But whilst like a heedless Wrastler, I thus eagerly endeavour to give my Brother a fall, it is a thousand to one but I fall with him, and bear him company to eternal Torment.
IV. Fourthly and Lastly, EVERY Man hath a Right, as he is a reasonable Creature, to be respected by every Man, according to the dignity of his Nature. For as in particular Kingdoms the King is the fountain of honour, and every Man under him ought to be respected according to that Rank and Degree of dignity, which the royal Stamp hath imprinted on him; so in the universal Kingdom of the World, God is the fountain of honour, and every Being under him ought to be treated and respected, according to the dignity of its Rank, and suitably to that Character of Perfection which God hath imprinted on its Nature. Since therefore Man is so highly advanced by God in the Scale of Beings, as being not only a sensitive but a rational and immortal Creature, he hath a Right to be treated as such by all that are of his Class and Order. And for a Man to treat a Man otherwise, is wrongfully to depose and degrade him from that noble Rank of Being wherein the God of Nature hath placed him. For whatsoever his outward Condition may be, I ought to consider him as a Man, as One that is placed in the same rank of Being with my self; though he be my Slave, or Vassal, I ought to respect him as an Individual of my own Kind, and not use him rudely, harshly or contemptuously like a Dog; though he be poor and mean in his outward Circumstances, yet I ought to regard him as a Branch that is sprung out of my own Stock, and not to contemn and despise him as if he were a Creature of an inferior Species: though he should be a Fool, or a Mad Man, yet I ought to respect him as my Brother Man, i. e. endowed with the same Faculties with my self, though through the unhappy defect of his bodily Organs he cannot exert and exercise them; and not to scorn and deride him, as if he were an Ape, or a Baboon that seemed to be made on purpose to be laughed at: yea though (which is worst of all) he should be a lewd, or wicked Man, yet I ought to consider him as a Stem of my own Root; and not abuse, disdain or vilifie him, as if he were only a two-legged Brute, or an upright Animal. So that there is a respect that is eternally due to Humane Nature, whereever it is, or whatever disadvantages it is attended with, it is stamped with the Image of God, and that ought to be reverenced by the whole Creation. And therefore whoever useth a Man inhumanly, affronteth both God and his own Kind, and violateth the most sacred Rights of Humane Nature. If therefore we would render to Men their Natural Right and Due, we must take care not to behave our selves rudely and insolently, superciliously or contemptuously towards them; and we must endeavour, as much as in us lyeth, to accommodate our selves to their particular Tempers, and not be froward and untractable, or tenacious of our own Humour, especially when it lyeth in another Man's way; but be apt to recede and give place, that there may be room for other Men's humours, as well as ours. For what reason is there, that our particular humour should take up all the World? We have no more Right to be morose, or inflexible, than other Men; and should they be as unyielding as we, we must either stand at a perpetual Bay, or resolve to justle with every one we meet, till we have forced all to give way, or they have forced us. For whilst we want this Complaisance towards others, we are in Society like irregular Stones in a Building, which are full of roughness and corners, that take up more room than they fill; and till they are polished, and made even, will not permit others to lye near them. This respect therefore we owe to the humane Nature, which is common to all men, to file off that unmanly sharpness and ruggedness of humour, which renders us perverse and untractable in our Conversation; that so we may be able to compose our selves into such respectful, courteous and obliging Deportment towards all Men, as is due to the essential Dignity of humane Nature. And thus you see what Rights are accruing to Men as they are Rational Creatures, and consequently what Acts of Iustice, as such, they owe to one another.