Lex Rex, Question 29

Lex Rex · Question 29

p. 265QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place?

BEfore I can proceed to other Scripture-proofes for the lawfulnesse of Resistance; this Distinction, rejected by Royalists,The Kings person as a man, in concret… and as a King and his office, in abstracto, are very different in this dispute. must be cleered. This is an evident and sensible distinction: The King in concreto, the Man who is King; And the King in abstracto, the Royall office of the King. The ground of this distinction we desire to be considered from, Rom. 13. we affirme with Buchanan, that Paul, Rom. 13, speaketh of the office and duty of good Magistrates, and that the text speaketh nothing of an absolute King, nothing of a Tyrant; and the Royalists distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not, against the Law, l. pret. 10. gl. Bart. de pub. in Rem. and therefore we move the question here, Whether or no to resist the illegall and Tyrannicall will of the man, who is King, be to resist the King, and the ordinance of God, we say no: Nor doe we deny the King, abusing his power in unjust acts, to remaine King, and the Minister of God, whose person for his royall office, and his Royall Office both are to be honoured, reverenced and obeyed. God forbid that we should doe so as the sonnes of Belial, imputing to us the doctrine of Anabaptists, and the doctrine falsely imputed to Wicliffe, That Dominion is founded upon supernaturall grace, and that a Magistrate being in the state of mortall sin, cannot be a lawfull Magistrate; we teach no such thing. The P. Prelate sheweth us his sympathy with Papists, and that he buildeth the Monuments and Sepulchres of the slaine and murthered Prophets, when he refusing to open his mouth in the Gates for the righteous, professeth he will not purge the Witnesses of Christ, the Waldenses and Wicliffe, S…cr. sanc. Reg. Mai. c. 1. pag. 2.and Husse of these notes of disloyalty, but that these acts proceeding from this roote of bitternesse, the abused power of a King should be acknowledged with obedience active or passive, in these unjust acts, we deny.

1. Assert. It is evident from Rom. 13. That all subjection and p. 266obedience to higher powers commanded there is subjection to the power and office of the Magistrate in abstracto, or (which is all one) to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any Word of God, to the abused and Tyrannicall power of the King, which I evince from the Text, and from other Scriptures. 1. Because the Text saith, Let every soule be subject to the higher powers. But no powers commanding things unlawfull, and killing the innocent people of God, can be foreign higher powers, but in that lower powers. 1. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God is personally and immediatly present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed as a superiour power, though in habit he may remaine a superiour power, for all habituall, all actuall superiority is a formall participation of the power of the most high.Arnisae. de authoritat. Princip. c. 4. n. n. pag. 96. Every one that commandeth obedience active or passive unjustly, is …enus, no higher power. 2. Arnisaeus well saith, That of Aristotle must be true, It is against nature, that better and worthier men should be in subjection to unworthier, and more wicked men: but in this when Magistrates command wickednesse, and killeth the innocent, the non-obeyers eatenus in so far, are worthier the commanders (whatever they be in habite and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferiour, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to Gods Command, and not to mans will. I desire not to be mistaken, if we speake of habituall excellency, godly and holy men as the Witnesses of Christ in things lawfull, are to obey wicked and Infidell Kings and Emperours, but in that these wicked Kings have an excellency in respect of office above them;Arnisaeus 16. Laertius, l. 3. in Plato. but when they command things unlawfull, and kill the innocent, They doe it not by vertue of any office, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who defineth a Tyrant by this,The person or the man who is the Magistrate, may lawfully be resisted, and the man as using the power lawfully, or the office can not be resisted. That he commandeth his subjects by violence, and Arnisaeus condemneth Laertius for this, Because one Tyrannicall action doth no more constitute a Tyrant, then one unjust action doth constitute an unjust man. But he may condemne (as he doth indeed) for this also Covarruvias pract. quest. c. 1. and Vasquez Illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 47. n…. 1.12. for this is essentiall to a Tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawfull Prince doe one, or more acts of a Tyrant, he is not a Tyrant for that, yet his action in that is Tyrannicall, and he doth not that as a King, but in that act as a sinfull man, having something p. 267of Tyrannie in him. 2. The Powers, Rom. 13.1. that are, are ordained of God, as their author and efficient; But Kings commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts, are but men, and sinfull men; and the power by which they doe these acts, a sinfull and an usurped power, and so far they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed Will, which must rule us. Now the authoritie and officiall power, in abstracto, is ordained of God, as the Text saith, and other Scriptures doe evidence. And this Polititians doe cleare, while they distinguish betwixt jus Personae, and jus Coronae, the power of the Person, and the power of the Crown and Royall office. They must then be two different things. 3. He that resisteth the power, that is, the officiall power, and the King, as King, and commanding in the Lord, resisteth the Ordinance of God, and Gods lawfull constitution, v. 2. But he who resisteth the Man, who is the King, commanding that which is against God, and killing the innocent; resisteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of Sin and Sathan: for a man commanding unjustly, and ruling Tyrannically, hath, in that, no power from God. 4. They that resist the power and Royall office of the King in things just and right, shall receive to themselves damnation, ver. 3. but they that resist, that is, refuse, for Conscience, to obey the man who is the King, and choose to obey God rather then men, as all the Martyrs did, shall receive to themselves salvation. And the 80 valiant men, the Priests, who used bodily violence against King Vzzahs person, and thrust him out of the house of the Lord, from offering incense to the Lord, which belonged to the Priest only: received not damnation to themselves, but salvation in doing Gods will, and in resisting the Kings wicked will.

Arg. 5. The lawfull Ruler, as a Ruler, and in respect of his office, is not to be resisted, because he is not a terrour to good workes, Arg. 5.but to evill; and no man who doth Good, is to be afraid of the Office, or the Power, but to expect praise, and a reward of the same, v. 3. But the man who is a King, may command an idolatrous and superstitious Worship, send an Army of Cut-throats against them, because they refuse that Worship: and may reward Papists, Prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of State and Honour, because they kneele to a Tree-Altar, pray to the East, adore the letters and sound of the word [Jesus] teach and write Arminianisme: And may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the eares, and p. 268rip the noses, and burne the faces of those who speake, and preach, and write the truth of God: and may send Armies of Cut-throats, Irish Rebels, and other Papists, and malignant Atheists, to destroy and murther the Iudges of the Land, and innocent defenders of the Reformed Religion, &c. The Man (I say) in these acts, is a terrour to Good workes, an incouragement to Evill: And those that doe Good, are to be afraid of the King, and to expect no praise, but punishment and vexation from him; Ergo, this reason in the Text will prove that the Man, who is the King, in so far as he doth these things that are against his offi…e, may be resisted; and that in these we are not to be subject, but only we are to be subject to his power and Royall authori…ie, in abstracto, in so farre as according to his office, he is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 6. The lawfull Ruler is the minister of God, or the servant of God, for Good to the Commonwealth: And to resist the servant in that wherein he is a servant, and using the power that he hath from his Master, is to resist the Lord his Master, v. 4. But the man who is the King, commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent; in these acts▪ is not the minister of God, for the Good of the Commonwealth: he serveth himselfe, and Papists and Prelates, for the destruction of Religion, Lawes and Commonwealth: therefore the Man may be resisted, by this Text, when the office and power cannot be resisted. 7. The Ruler, as the Ruler, and the nature and intrinsecall end of the office is, that he beare Gods sword, as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evill, v. 4. and so cannot be resisted without sinne. But the man who is the Ruler, and commandeth things unlawfull, and killeth the innocent; carieth the Papists and Prelates sword, to execute, not the righteous judgement of the Lord, upon the ill-doer; but his own private revenge, upon him that doth well: Ergo, the Man may be resisted, the Office may not be resisted: and they must be two different things. 8. We must needs be subject to the Royall office, for …onscience, v. 5. by reason of the fifth Commandement. But we must not needs be subject to the man who is King, if he command things unlawfull: for D. Ferne warranteth us to resist, if the Ruler invade us sodainly; 2. Without colour of Law or Reason; 3. Vnavoydably. And Winzetus, and Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to resist a King, turning a cruell Tyrant. But Paul, Rom. 13. forbiddeth us to resist the Power, in Abstracto; Ergo, it must be the Man, in concreto, that we must resist. 9. Those p. 269we may not resist, to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the onerous worke, on which they, as Ministers of God, doe attend continually. But we owe not tribute to the King as a man; for then should we be addebted tribute to all men: but as a King, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a Princely workman, a King as a King: ergo, the Man and the King are different. 10. We owe fear and honour as due, to be rendred to the man who is King, because he is a King, not because he is a man; for it is the highest feare and honour due to any mortall man, which is due to the King, as King. 11. The Man, and the inferiour Judge are different: and we cannot, by this Text, resist the inferiour Iudge, as a Iudge, but we resist the ordinance of God, as the Text proveth. But Cavaliers resist the inferior Iudges as men, and have killed divers members of both Houses of Parliament: but they will not say, that they killed them as Judges, but as Rebels. If therefore to be a Rebell, as a wicked Man, and to be a Iudge, are differenced thus: then, to be a Man, and to commit some acts of Tyrannie; and to be the supreme Iudge and King, are two different things. 12. Mr. Knox, Hist. of Scotland, l. 2. The Congregation, in a letter to the Nobilitie, say:Pag. 141. There is great difference betwixt the Authoritie, which is Gods Ordinance, and the Persons of those who are placed in authoritie. The Authoritie, and Gods ordinances can never doe wrong; for it commandeth that Vice and wicked men be punished, and Vertue, with vertuous men and just. be maintained: But the corrupt Person placed in this Authoritie, may offend, and most commonly doe contrary to this Authoritie: and is then the corruption of Man to be followed, by reason that it is clothed with the name of Authoritie? And they give instance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawfall Kings, and yet corrupt Men. And certainly, the Man, and the Divine authoritie, differ as the Subject and the Accident; as that which is under a Law, and can offend God; and that which is neither capable of Law, nor sinne. 13. The King, as King, is a j…st creature, and by office a living and breathing Law: His Will, as he is King, is nothing but a just Law: But the King, as a sinfull man, is not a just creature, but one who can sinne, and play the Tyrant: and his Will, as a private sinfull man, is a private Will, and may be resisted. So the Law saith, The King, as King, can doe no wrong: but the King, as a Man, may doe a wrong. While as then the Parliaments of both Kingdomes resist the Kings private will, as a Man, and fight against his illegall Cut-throats, sent out by him, p. 270to d…stroy his native subjects, they fight for him as a King, and obey his publick Legall will, which is his Royall will, de jure, and while he is absent from his Parliaments as a man, he is Legally and in his Law-Power present, and so the Parliaments are as Legall, as if he were personally present with them.

Let me answer Royalists. The P. Prelate saith it is Solomons word,Sac. sarc. mac. 2 pag 28. pag. 30.31. By me Kings raign. Kings in concreto, with their Soveraignty, he saith not, By me Royalty or Soveraignty raigneth. And elsewhere he saith, that Barclay saith, Paul writing to the Romans, keepeth the Roman usuall diction in this, who expresse by Powers in abstracto, the persons authorized by Power, and it is the scriptures Dialect; By him were created thrones, Dominions, Principalities, that is Angels, to say Angels, in abstracto, were created, 2 Pet. 2.10. They speak ill of dignities, Arnis…n de potest. prin. c. 2.11.17.Iud. 8. dispise dominion. That is, they speak ill of Cajus, Caligula, Nero; our Levites rail against the Lords Anoynted, the best of Kings in the world. Nero, Rom. 13.4. in concreto beareth not the sword in vain. Arnisaeus saith it better th…n the Prelate, (he is a witlesse theef. Rom. 13.4. the Royall Power in abstracto, doth not bear the sword, but the Person, not the Power but the Prince himself beareth the sword. And the Prelate poor man following Doctor Fern saith,pag. 3. sec. 5. pag. 30. Royalists reasons th…t to resist the man or person is to resist the King, office or ordinance of God. Its absurd to pursue the Kings Person with a canon-bullet at Edge-hill, and preserve his authority at London, or elsewhere. So saith Fern 16. sect. 10. pag. 64. The concret Powers here are purposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed, but upon power in some person, for it is said foreign, the Powers that are, are of God, now Power cannot be foreign existent, but in some person; and Pag. 69. saith Fern, can Power in the abstract have praise? Or is tribute payed to the Power in the abstract. Yea the Power is the reason why we yeeld obedience to the person, &c. and the Prelate hath as much learning as to coppy out of Fern, and Barclay, Arniseus, and others these words and the like, but hath not wit to adde the sinewes of these Authors reason, and with all this he can in his Preface call it his own, and provoke any to answer him if they dare, whereas while I answer this excommunicated Pamphletter.

I answer these learned Authors, from which he stealeth all he hath, and yet he must perswade the King, he is the onelyonly man can defend his Majesties Cause, and the importunity, forsooth, of friends extorted this peece, as if it were a fault, that this Delphick Oracle (giving out railings, and lies for responses) should be silent. 2. Not p. 271we onelyonly, but the Holy Ghost, in terminis, hath this distinction, Act. 4.19. and 5.29. We ought to obey God rather then men. Them Rulers (for of Rulers sitting in judgement is that speech uttered) commanding and tyrannizing over the Apostles, are men contradistinguished from God; and as they command and punish unjustly, they are but men, otherwise commanding for God, they are Gods, and more then men. 2. From Theophylact also, or from Chrysostome, on Rom. 13. we have this; The Apostle speaketh not (say they) foreign. 3. Soveraigntie or Royaltie, doth not properly reign or bear the sword, or receive praise, and this accident doth not bear a sword; nor do we think, or Paul speak, Rom. 13. of the abstracted Jew of power and Royaltie, subsisting out of its subject; nor dream we, that the naked accident of Royall Authority, is to be feared and honoured as the Lords anointed; the person or man who is the King, and beareth the Crown on his head, and holdeth the scepter in his hand, is to be obeyed; accidentes are not persons, but they speak non-sense, and like brute beasts, who deny that all the kingly honour due to the King, must be due to him as a King, and because of the Royall dignity that God hath given to him, and not because he is a man; for a Pursevants son is a man, and if a Pursevants son would usurpe the throne, and take the Crown on his head, and the scepter in his hand, and command that all souls be subject to such a superior Power, because he is a man, the Lawes of Scotland would hang a man for a lesse fault, we know: and the P. Prelate was wont to edifie women, and converted souls to Christ, with such a distinction as objectum quod, and objectum quo, in the Pulpits of Edenburgh, and it hath good use here, we never took abstract Royalty to be the King. The Kings of Scotland of old were not second notions, and we exclude not the person of the King, yet we distinguish with leave of the P. Prelate betwixt the person in linea physica, we must take (physica) largly heer and in linea morali, obedience, fear, tribute, honour is due to the person of the King, and to the man who is King, not because of his person, or because he is a man (the P. Prelate may know in what notion, we take the name (Person) but because God by the peoples election, hath exalted him to Royall dignity, and for this cause illdoers are to subject their throats and necks to the sword of the Lords Annoynteds executioner or hangman with patience, and willingly, because in taking away the head of ill doers, for ill doing, p. 272he is acting the Office of the Lord, by whom he Raigneth; but if he take away their heads, and send out the long-tusked Vultures and Boares of Babylon, the Irish Rebells to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a mis-informed man, and wanteth the authority of Gods Law, or mans Law, he may be resisted with Armes. For 1. If Royalists say against this, then if a King turne an habituall Tyrant, and conduce an hundred thousand Turkes to destroy his subjects upon meere desire of revenge, they are not to resist, but to be subject,Grot. de iur. belli & pacis. l. 1. c. 4. n. 7. Winzetus V…l… tat. ad…er. Buchanan. Barclay, adv. Monarchom. l. 3. c. 8. and suffer for conscience. I am sure Grotius saith, If a King sell his subjects, he loseth all title to the Crowne, and so may be resisted, and Winzetus saith, A Tyrant may be resisted, and Barclay, It is lawfull for the people in case of Tyranny to defend themselves Adversus immanem saevetiam, against extreame cruelty: and I desire the Prelate to answer how people are subject in suffering such cruelty of the higher power, because he is Gods ordinance, and a power from God, except he say, as he selleth his people, and barbarously destroyeth by Cut-throat Irishes, his whole subjects refusing to worship Idolls, he is a man and a sinfull man, eatenus, and an inferiour power inspired by wicked counsell, not a King, eatenus, not a higher power, and that in resisting him thus, the subjects resist not the ordinance of God. Also suppone King David defend his Kingdome and people against Iesse his naturall father, who we suppose cometh in against his sonne and Prince, King David, with a huge army of the Philistimes, to destroy him and his Kingdome, if he shall kill his owne native father, in that warr at some Edge-hill, how shall he preserve at Ierusalem that honour, & love that he oweth to his father, by vertue of the fifth Commandement, Honour thy father and thy mother, &c. Let them answer this, except King David consider Iesse in one relation, in abstracto, as his father, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious subject, in another relation, and except King David say, he is to subject himselfe to his father as a father, according to the fifth Commandement,We may kill a person as a man, and love him as a sonne, a father, a wife, according to Gods Word. and that in the act of his fathers violent invasion, he is not to subject himselfe to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the Royalist see how he can answer the Argument, and how Levie is not to know his father and mother as they are sinfull men, Deut. 33.9. and yet to know and honour them as Parents; and how an Israelite is not to pitty the wife that lyeth in his bosome, when she inticeth him to goe a whooring after strange Gods, but is to kill her, Deut. 13.6, 7, 8. and yet the husband p. 273is to love the wife as Christ loved his Church, Eph. 5.25. If the husband take away his wives life in some mountaine in the holy Land, as Gods Law commandeth, let the Royalists answer us, where is then the maritall love he owes to her, and that respect due to her as she is a wife and a helper. But let not the Royalist infer, that I am from these examples pleading for the killing of Kings, for lawfull resistance is one thing, and killing of Kings is another; the one defensive and lawfull, the other offensive and unlawfull, so long as he remaineth a King, and the Lords Anoynted: But if he be a murtherer of his father, who doth counsell his father to come to a place of danger, where he may be killed, and where the King ought not to be, as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully King Saul, but slept when David came to his bed side, and had opportunity to kill the King, they are Traitors and murtherers of the King, who either counselled his Majesty to come to Edge-hill, where the danger was so grett, or did not violently restraine him from comming thither, seeing Kings safety and lives are as much, yea more in the disposing of the people then in their owne private will, 2 Sam. 18.2, 3. for certainly the people might have violently restrained King Saul from killing himselfe, and the King was guilty of his own death, and sinneth against his Office and subjects, who commeth out in person to any such battles where he may be killed, and the contrary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he see not the cleare difference between the Kings Person, and the Office as he is King, and between his private Will, and his publicke and Royall Will. 3. The Angels may be named Thrones and Dominions in abstracto, and yet created, in concreto, and we may say the Angell and his power are both created at once; but David was not both borne the Son of Iesse, and a King at once: and the P. Prelate, by this may prove it is not lawfull to resist the Divell (for he is of the number of these created Angells, Col. 1.) as he is a Divell, because in resisting the Divell as a Divell, we must resist an Angell of God, and a Principality. 4. To speake ill of dignities, 2 Pet. 2. and Iud. 8. Piscator insinuateth is, to speake evill of the very Office of Rulers, as well as of their manners▪ and Theodat. saith, on 2 Pet. 2. that these Raylers spake evill of the place of Governours and Masters, as unbeseeming beleevers. All our Interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus from the place saith, It is a speciall reproofe of Anabaptists and Libertines, who in that time maintained, that we are all free men in Christ, and that there should not be Kings, Masters, nor any Magistrates; however the abstract is put for the concrete, p. 274its true, and it saith we are not to raile upon Nero, but to say Nero was a persecutor of Christians, and yet obey him commanding what is just, are very consistent. 5. The persons are proposed, Rom. 13. to be the object of our obedience, saith D. Ferne, it is very true; but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the word Person: we never meant that feare, honour, royalty, tribute, must be due to the abstracted accident of Kingly Authority, and not to the man who is King. Nor is it our meaning that Royalty in abstracto is Crowned King, and is anoynted, but that the Person is crowned and anoynted. But againe by a person we meane nothing lesse then the man Nero wasting Rome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Christians, and that we owe subjection to Nero, and to his person in concreto as to Gods ordinance, Gods Minister, Gods sword-bearer in that notion of a Person; is that only that we deny. Nay in that Nero in concreto to us, is no Power ordained of God, no Minister of God, but a Minister of the Divell, and Sathans armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not feare,How the person and office …f the Ruler are both the object of our subiection. honour, subjection, and tribute to the Person of Nero. But the Person thus far is the object of our obedience; that feare, honour, subjection, and tribute must be due to the man in concreto, to his Person who is Prince; but not because he is a man, or a person simply, or a sword-bearer of Papists, but for his office, for that eminent place of royall dignity that God hath conferred on his Person. We know the light of the Sun, the heate of fire, in abstracto, doe not properly give light and heat, but the Sun and fire, in concreto; yet the principium quo, ratio qua, the principles of these operations in Sun and fire be light & heate, and we ascribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies to Sun and fire in concreto, yet not to the subjects simply, but to them as affected with such accidents: so here we honour and submit to the man who is King, not because he is a man, that were treason; not because he useth his sword against the Church, that were impiety: but because of his Royall Dignity, and because he useth it for the Lord. It is true, Arnisaeus, Barclay, Ferne, say, That Kings leave not off to be Kings, when they use their power and sword against the Church and Religion. And also it is considerable, that when the worst of Emperors bloody Nero did raigne, the Apostle presseth the duty of subjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth the resisting of Nero, as the resisting of an ordinance of God. And certainely if the cause and reason in point of duty-Morall, and of conscience before God remaine in Kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and persecutors as Nero was▪ their Royall Dignity given them of God p. 275remaineth, then subjection upon that ground is lawfull, and resistance unlawfull. Ans. It is true so long as Kings remaine Kings, subjection is due to them because Kings, but that is not the question. But the question is, if subjection be due to them,The question of subjection toucheth the persons as abusing their power. when they use their power unlawfully and Tyrannically. What ever David did, though he was a King, he did it not as King, he deflowred not Bathsheba as King, and Bathsheba might with bodily resistance and violence lawfully have resisted King David, though Kingly Power, remained in him, while he should thus attempt to commit Adultery; else David might have said to Bathshba, Because I am the Lords Anoynted, it is rebellion in thee a subject to oppose any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee, it is unlawfull to thee to cry for helpe, for if any shall offer violently to rescue thee from me, he resisteth the ordinance of God. Subjection is due to Nero as an Emperour, but not any subjection is due to him in the burning of Rome, and torturing of Christians, except you say that Nero's power abused in these acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordinance of God. 3. That in these, he was the Minister of God for the good of the Common-wealth. Because some beleeved Christians were free from the yoake of Magistracy, and that the dignity it selfe was unlawfull. And 2. because, ch. 12. he had set downe the lawfull Church Rulers, and in this and the following chapter the duties of brotherly love of one toward another. So here ch. 13. he teacheth that all Magistrates, suppose Heathen, are to be obeyed and submitted unto in all things, so far as they are Ministers of God. Arnisaeus objecteth to Buchan. If we are by this place to subject our selves to every power in abstracto, then also to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a King exceeding the limits of a King, for such a power is a power, De Authorit. princ. c. 2. n. 18.and we are not to distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not.

Ans. The Law clearely distinguisheth we are to obey Parents in the Lord, and if Nero command Idolatry, this is an excessive power; are we obliged to obey, because the Law distinguisheth not? 2. The text saith, we are to obey every power, 1. from God, 2. That is Gods ordinance, 3. by which the man is a Minister of God for good; but an unjust and excessive power is none of these three. 3. The text in words distinguisheth not obedience active in things wicked, and lawfull: yet we are to distinguish.

Mr. Symmons. Is authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person, though put upon him both by God and Man? Loyall Subiects beliefe. pag. 49.Or, is Authoritie only the subject; and the Person exercising the Authoritie, p. 276a bare accident to that, being in it only more separably, as pride and folly are in a man: Then if one in Authoritie command, out of his own Will, and not by Law: if I neithr actively, nor passively obey, J doe not so much as resist abused Authoritie: and then must the Prince by his disorderly Will have quite lost his authoritie, and become like another man; and yet his Authoritie has not fled from him.

Ans. If we speake acurately, neither the Man solely, nor his Power only is resisted: but the Man clothed with lawfull habituall power, is resisted, in such and such acts flowing from an abused power. 2. It is an ignorant speech, to ask, Is Authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person? for the Authoritie hath all its power by Law, not from the Mans person; The Authoritie hath nothing from the Person, but a naked inherencie in the Person, as in the subject: and the Person is to be honored for the Authoritie, not the Authoritie for the Person. 3. Authoritie is not so separable from the person, as that for every act of lawlesse Will, the King loseth his Royall authoritie, and ceaseth to be King: no, but every act of a King, in so far can claime subjection of the inferiour, as the act of commanding and ruling, hath law for it; and in so far as it is lawlesse, the Person in that act repugnant to Law, loseth all due claime of actuall subjection in that act, and in that act, power actuall is losed, as is cleare, Act. 4.19. & 5.29. The Apostles say to Rulers, It is safer to obey God than Men. What? were not these Rulers lawfull Magistrates, armed with power from God? I answer, habitually they were Rulers, and more then men, and to obey them in things lawfull, is to obey God: But actually in these unlawfull commandements, especially being commanded to speake no more in the name of Iesus; the Apostles doe acknowledge them to be no more but Men: and so their actuall authoritie is as separable from the person, as pride and folly from men.

Symmons. The distinction holdeth good of inferior Magistrates, That they may be considered as Magistrates, … pag. 9.and as Men: because their authoritie is only sacred, and addeth veneration to their persons; and is separable from the person; The Man may live, when his Authoritie is extinguished: but it holdeth not in Kings. King Sauls person is venerable as his authoritie, and his authoritie commeth by inheritance, and dyeth, and liveth inseparably with his person: and Authoritie and Person adde honour each one to another.

Ans. 1. If this be true, Manasseh, a King, did not shed innocent blood, and use …orcerie▪ he did not these great wickednesses as a man, p. 277but as a King. Salomon played the Apostate as a King, not as a man: if so, the man must make the King more infallible then the Pope; for the Pope, as a man, can erre; as a Pope he cannot erre, say Papists. But Prophets, in their persons, were anoynted of God, as Saul and David were: then must we say, Nathan and Samuel erred not as men, because their persons were sacred and anointed: and they erred not as Prophets, sure; Ergo, they erred not all. A King, as a King, is an holy Ordinance of God, and so cannot doe injustice, Ergo, they must doe acts of Iustice, as men. 2. The inferior Iudge is a Power from God. 2. To resist him, is to resist an ordinance of God. 3. He is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. He is the minister of God for good. 5. He is Gods Sword-bearer; his officiall power to rule, may by as good right come by birth, as the Crown: and the Kings person is sacred only for his office, and is annointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans dishonored not inferior Iudges, Lam. 5.12. when they hanged the Prince, & honored not the faces of Elders. It is in questiō, if the Kings actual authority be not as separable frō him, as the actuall authority of the Iudge.

Symmons, p. 24. The King himselfe may use this distinction. As a Christian, he may forgive any that offendeth against his person: but as a Iudge, he must punish, in regard of his office. Ans. Well then, Flatterers will grant the distinction, when the King doth good, and pardoneth the blood of Protestants, shed by bloody Rebels: But when the King doth acts of injustice, he is neither man, nor King, but some independent absolute God.

Symmons, p. 27. Gods Word tyeth me to every one of his personall commandements, as well as his legall commandements: nor doe I obey the Kings law, because it is established, or because of its known penaltie; nor yet the King himselfe, because he ruleth according to Law. But I obey the Kings law, because I obey the King: and I obey the King, because I obey God: I obey the King, and his Law▪ because I obey God and his Law. Better obey the Command, for a reverent regard to the Prince, then for a penaltie. Ans. It is hard to answer a sick man. It is blasphemie, to seek this distinction of Person and Office, in the King of Kings; because by (Person) in a mortall King, we understand a Man that can sinne. 1. I am not obliged to obey his personall commandement, except I were his domestick: nor his unlawfull personall commandements, because they are sinfull. 2. It is false that you obey the Kings Law, because you obey the King: for then you say but this, I obey the King, because I obey the King. The truth is, p. 278Obedience is not formally terminated on the person of the King; Obedience is relative to a precept: and it is Men-service, to obey a Law, not because it is good and just; but upon this formall motive, because it is the will of a mortall man to command it. And Reverence, Love, Feare, being acts of the Affection, are not terminated on a Law, but properly on the Person of the Iudge: and they are modifications, or laudable qualifications of acts of obedience; not motives, not the formall reason why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the Apostle maketh expresly, Rom. 13▪4. feare of punishment, a motive of obedience, while he saith, He beareth not the sword in vaine; Ergo, Be subject to the King. And this hindreth not personall resistance to unjust commandements.

Symmons, p. 27, 28, 29. You say, To obey the Princes Personall commandement against his Legall will, is to obey himselfe against himselfe. So say I, To obey his Legall will against his Personall will, is to obey himselfe against himselfe: for I take his Person to be himselfe

Ans. To obey the Kings personall will, when it is sinfull, (as we now suppose) against his legall will, is a sinne, and a disobedience to God, and the King also, seeing the Law is the Kings will, as King: but to obey his Legall will against his sinfull personall will (as it must be sinfull, if contrary to a just Law) is obedience to the King as King, and so obedience to God. 2. You take the Kings person to be himself; but you take quid pro quo, for his person here, you must take not Physically for his suppost of soul and body; but morally, it is the King, as a sinning man doing his worst will, against the Law which is his just and best will, and the rule of the Subjects: and the Kings personall will is so far just, and to regulate the Subjects, in so far, as it agreeth with his legall Will, or his Law, and this will can sinne, and therefore may be crossed without breach of the fifth Commandement: but his Legall Will cannot be crossed without disobedience both to God and the King.

Symmons, p. 28. The Kings Personall will doth not alwayes presuppone passion: and if it be attended with passion, yet we must beare it for conscience sake. Ans. We are to obey the Kings Personall will, when the thing commanded, is not sinne; but his Subjects as Subjects, have little to do with his personall will in that notion. It concerneth his domestick servant, and is the Kings will as he is the master of servants, not as he is King in relation to Subjects; but we speak of the Kings personall will, as repugnant to Law, and contrary to the Kings will as King, and so contrary to the fifth p. 279Commandment; and this is attended often, not onelyonly with Passion, but also with prejudice; and we owe no subjection to prejudice, and Passions, or to Actions commanded, by these misordered powers, because they are not from God, nor his Ordinances, but from men, and the flesh, and we owe no subjection to the flesh.

Doct. Ferne, Sect. 9. pag. 58. The distinction of personall and legall will, hath place in evill actions, but not in resistance, where we cannot sever the person, and the dignitie, or authority, because we cannot resist the power, but we must resist the person who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of Arms, but that power he useth unjustly, against innocent David. I ask when these Emperours took away lives and goods at their pleasure; was that a power ordained of God? No, but an Illegall will, a Tyranny, but they might not resist: nay, but they cannot resist: for that power and soveraigntie imployed to compasse these illegall commandments, was ordained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegall will, ye… our Saviour acknowledgeth in it Pilates power, that was given him from above. Answ. 1. Here we have the distinction, denyed by Royalists, granted by D. Fern; but if when the King commands us to do wickednesse, we may resist that personall will, and when he commandeth us to suffer unjustly we cannot resist his will, but we must resist also his Royall person. What? Is it not still the King, and his person sacred, as his power is sacred, when he commandeth the subjects to do unjustly, as when he commandeth them to suffer unjustly? It were fearfull to say, when Kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer Kings; if for conscience I am to suffer unjustly, when Nero commandeth unjust punishment, because Nero commanding so, remaineth Gods Minister. Why? But when Nero commandeth me to worship an Heathen God, I am upon the same ground to obey that unjust will in doing ill: For Nero in commanding Idolatry, remaineth the Lords Minister, his person is sacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of punishment. And do I not resist his person in the one, as in the other? His power and his person are unseparably conjoyned by God in the one, as in the other, 2. In bodily thrusting out of Vzzah from the Temple, these fourscore valiant men did resist the Kings person, by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the Martyrs in Nero, was no power ordained of God, then the resisting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the Martyrs, was but the resisting of Tyranny: And certainly, if that p. 280power in Nero was foreign a power ordained of God, and not to be resisted, as the place, Rom. 13. is alleaged by Royalists, then it must be a lawfull power, and no Tyranny; and if it cannot be resisted, because it was a power ordained and settled in him, it is either setled by God, and so not Tyranny; except God be the Author of Tyranny, or then settled by the devill, and so may well be resisted; but the Text speaketh of no power, but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be subject to all powers in concreto, by the Text; for we are not to be subject to powers lawfull, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawfull. Now subjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tribute, and therefore of need force, some powers must be excepted. 5. Pilates power is meerly a power by divine permission, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers spoken of Rom. 13. Gregori. mor. l. 3. c. 11. expresly saith, This was Satans power given to Pilate, against Christ. Manibus Satanae pro nostra redemptione se traddit. Lyra. A Principibus Romanorum & ulterius permissum a Deo, qui est potestas, superior. Calvin, B…za, Diod…tus, saith the same, and that he cannot mean of Legall power from Gods regulating will is evident; 1. Because Christ is answering Pilate, Pilates power to crucifie Christ, was no Law-power given by God to Pilate as a Iudge.John 19.10. Knowest thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee? This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worship him, and beleeve in him; and whereas Ferne saith, Sect. 9. pag. 59. Pilate had power to judge any accused before him: It is true, but he being obliged to beleeve in Christ, he was obliged to be perswaded of Christs innocency; and so neither to judge, nor receive accusation against him: and the power he saith, he had to crucifie, was a Law-power in Pilates meaning, but not in very deed any Law-power; because a Law-power is from Gods regulating will in the fifth Commandment; but no creature hath a lawfull or a Law-power to crucifie Christ. 2. A Law-power is for good, Rom. 13.4. A power to crucifie Christ, is for ill. 3. A Law-power is a terrour to ill works, and a praise to good. Pilates power to crucifie Christ, was the contrary. 4. A Law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucifie Christ is no such. 5. A Law-power conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration to the person of the Judge, a power to crucifie Christ, conciliateth no such thing, but a disgrace to Pilate. 6. The Genuine Acts of a lawfull power, are lawfull Acts; for such as is the Fountain-power, such are the Acts flowing therefrom; good Acts slow not from bad powers, neither hath God given a power to sin, except by way of permission.