Answer to Stillingfleets Irenicum, Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
§. 1. IN the second chapter of the first part of his Irenicum he layeth some hypotheses for a foundation of his following discourse: where I shall pass over in silence, these things that have truth in them; and these also, the examining of which is not needful to the present purpose, viz. defending Presbyterial Government to be juris divini. Only, I take notice, that here, and through his whole book, he spendeth most of his pains and learning, in proving these points, which are either digressions from the present business, or are not denied by any of his opposites: which is magno conatu nihil agere.
§. 2. In his fourth hypothesis, p. 38. some things need our remark: he setteth it down thus: In things which are determined both by the law of nature and divine positive laws, as to the substance and morality of them, but not determined as to all circumstances belonging to them, it is in the power of lawful authority in the Church of God to determine them so far as they judge them tend to the promoting of the performance of them in due manner. Two things in this hypothesis I condemn. 1. That he warranteth men to determine things undetermined in the Church, so far as they judge needful: he should have said, so far as is needful: for if we hold this his assertion in terminis, superstitious men in lawful authority may bind us in all things where Christ hath left us free; so that it shall not be lawful to speak, look or act in the Church, but as they think fit. And indeed here is a foundation for almost all the Ceremonies that either Popes or Prelates ever burthened the Church of God with: they are nothing but determinations of what is left undetermined; and they judge them to tend to promote worship: as, it is not determined, what Garment a Minister shall wear, the Church judgeth a Surplice to tend to promote worship: then by this hypothesis, the Church may determine this: which is not only against truth, as might easily be shewed, if that were now my work, but also against this Author, who declareth himself against Ceremonies of Mens appointing.
2. That he extendeth this determining power so far, that not only things undetermined, and that must be determined, otherwise the Ordinances cannot be gone about without defect or sin, may be determined by lawful authority (for this we grant, and therefore do close with his example of appointing the place▪ and hour for worship) but also things that they judge tend to promote the due manner of the Ordinances, may be thus determined; which a little after he expoundeth of the decency and solemnity of worship. This we cannot assent to: For there is no pompous Ceremony that ever man devised, but they judged it fit to promote the solemnity of worship. And indeed the Scripture condemning the pompousness and gaudiness of worship, and commending the simplicity of it, saith plainly, that it is not left to men to add their determinations to God's, to make the worship as solemn as they judge meet; but that we ought to be content with that solemnity, which is made in worship by God's Institutions, and the needful determination of circumstances. Neither can this blow to his hypothesis be evited, by saying, that he speaketh only of circumstances; which we confess may be determined by the Church. For 1. All Ceremonies are also circumstances; and he doth not here mention meer circumstances, to exclude Ceremonies from the determing power of Authority in the Church. 2. Though he should be understood of meer circumstances, viz. which are such before they be determined; as the habit in which we are to worship: yet even such, when they are determined by men without necessity, only, that they may add to the worship a decency, which is not needful by nature, civil custom, nor divine institution, they become Religious Ceremonies; their end being Religious, and they being peculiar to Religion: As I have shewn in another piece.
§. 3. It seemeth to me very strange, and not to be passed over in our Animadversions; that in the prosecuting of this his hypothesis, wherein he had ascribed a determining power to lawful Authority in the Church; he taketh notice of no power or Authority seated in Church-men; but speaketh only of the Magistrate: for p. 38. shewing why there is need to prove this hypothesis, he tells us of some that give no power, and some that give little power to the Magistrate about Religion: and then falleth upon a large debate of the Magistrate's power in Church-matters. Which is an evident supposing, that all Church-power is in the Magistrate, and in none else: otherwise this discourse should be very impertinent to his hypothesis. But this supposition is a gross falshood, as is fully proved by many worthy men against Erastus and his followers. I shall not now ingage in that large debate. If we should grant a determining power to any authority about the things in hand, it should not be to the Civil Magistrate; but to the Guides of the Chnrch met in a lawful Assembly. And it is not only contrary to truth, but a contradiction to what this Author writeth elsewhere, in his Appendix about Excommunication; where he taketh much pains to assert a power of Discipline in the Church-Guides: and if so, certainly the Magistrate is not the lawful Authority in the Church: for that implyeth Church Authority. I hope he will not say, that Ministers have lawful Authority in the State; because they have no Civil Authority: why then should we say, or suppose, that the Magistrate hath lawful Authority in the Church; except he think that the Magistrate hath Church-Authority? against which he there disputeth; especially seeing Respublica non est in Ecclesia, sed Ecclesia in Republica; he that hath only Civil power, hath no power in the Church, whatever he hath about Church-matters, and over Church-men.
§. 4. In asserting the Magistrates power in these things, he professeth, that he will not so much make his way through any party, as strive to beget a right understanding among them that differ: how well he keepeth his promise may be seen, by examining what he saith; on which I will not much insist, (intending to meet with this his Doctrine elsewhere) but only mark what is amiss, with a short ground of our censure of it: for this debate is somewhat extrinsecal to the indifferency of Church-Government: it rather supposeth it, than asserteth or proveth it. In explicating his second distinction about the Magistrate's power, p. 41. The internal, formal, elicitive power of order, saith he, lies in the Authoritative exercise of the Ministerial function, in Preaching of the word, and Administration of the Sacraments; but the external, objective, imperative power of jurisdiction lies in a due care and provision for the defence, protection, and propagation of Religion. The former is only proper to the Ministry, the later to the Supream Magistracy. Here several things are to be noted. 1. That he maketh the power of Order to be all one with internal, formal, elicitive power about Church affairs; and the power of Jurisdiction the same with external, objective and imperative power about them. This is instead of distinguishing to confound things most different: for, I hope, he is not Ignorant that all the Assertors of Church-power against the Erastians, do distinguish Church-power, or the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven (for so is this power designed by Christ) in the power or Key of Order; and the power or Key of Jurisdiction. Let the Author shew us one (not Erastian) who before himself did ever make the power of Order in the Church to comprehend all formal and elicitive Church-power. Yea, he doth by this most evidently contradict himself (which I wonder to meet with so often in such a learned man) for in his Appendix he maketh the power of Discipline to be in the Church; and so to be formal, internal and elicitive Church-power: and sure the power of Discipline is the power of Jurisdiction, not of Order: not only because all that speak of this distinction do so understand it: but also our Author doth here make the power of Order to respect only the word and Sacraments; and so the power of Discipline must belong to Jurisdiction, according to him: now whereas he maketh the power of Jurisdiction there to be internal only in the Church: and here to be external in the Magistrate only; if this be not a contradiction, let any man judge. 2. Another thing, that here I take notice of, is, that the power which he ascribeth to the Ministry is only Administration of the Word and Sacraments. Then they have no power of Discipline, for every one knoweth that that is some other thing than the Word and Sacraments. Now this is contradictory to the whole of his own Appendix: and also to Scripture, which giveth to Church-Officers power of binding and loosing, Mat. 18. 18. Jo. 20. 23. and of ruling the Lord's People, 1 Thes. 5. 12. Heb. 13. 17. But I insist not on this, it having been made evident by so many against the Erastians. 3. He ascribed all power about Church affairs to the Magistrate, except that of Administring the Word and Sacraments; and so to the Magistrate as it is only belonging to him: for he giveth him that which he called the power of Jurisdiction, and that is to him all power but that of Word and Sacraments. Now there was never any Erastian that gave more to the Magistrate than this: for by this means, he hath all the power of deciding controversies in Synods (for that is not preaching of the Word) of Ordination, the exercise of Discipline, &c. and none but he hath any share in it. Behold unto what absurdities this man runneth unawares, while he maketh it his business to unhinge that Government which Christ hath setled in his Church. And indeed I cannot but take notice of a necessary connexion between this putting all Church-power in the hands of the Magistrate, and denying it to be juris divini. For he knew well, that if it had been left to be decided by Church-men among themselves; it had not been easily determined amidst the interest of men clashing one with another; the more conscientious and self-denied sort being ever the fewest.
§. 5. Page 42. Speaking of the Subordination or Co-ordination of the Magistracy and Ministry, there be some mistakes worthy of our notice. Though he acknowledgeth the person of the Magistrate to be subject to the word of God, yet he denieth it to be subject to the power of the Ministers. This is the Doctrine of Court-preachers, who love to flatter rather than speak truth. But consider. 1 It is to me an inconsistency, that Ministers have power or authority of Preaching the Word; and the Magistrate's person is subject to this Word, and yet he is not subject to the power of Ministers. When they teach, rebuke, exhort with all authority and command in the name of the Lord; doth not this reach Magistrates as well as others, if they be subject to the word of God? I see not how they are subject to it, if they be not subject to it as declared by Christ's Embassadors, which is the ordinary way of dispensing it: and if so, then are they subject to the Preaching power of Ministers at least. 2. Magistrates are also subject to the ruling power of Ministers: for they rule over Christ's Flock; the Members of the Church, of which number, if the Magistrate be, I see no ground in Scripture for exempting him from the power of their Jurisdiction. When Christ said, Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained; he did not add, except the supream Magistrates. May not, I pray, the Pastors of the Church debar him, if he be a flagitious man, from the Lord's Table, as Ambrose did to Theodosius? and if they may, certainly the Magistrate personally considered is subject to the ruling power of Pastors in spiritual things; as they are subject to him in civil things. And to deny this, what is it, but to make the supream Magistrate head of the Church and not a Member of it? Much more worthy to be received is the opinion of Crysostome, who speaketh thus to Ecclesiastical persons, in reference to abstention from the Lord's Supper; Si dux igitur quispiam, si Consul ipse, si, qui diademate ornatur, indigne adeat, cohibe ac coerce; majorem …u illo habes authoritatem.
§. 6. He cometh afterward, p. 43. to ascribe to the Magistrate not only a political power, which he maketh to lie in the Execution and Administration of laws for the common good: but also an Architectonical and Nomothetical power (though not absolute and independent) whereby he may make laws in things that belong to the Church. His meaning in this he expresseth more fully in the end of p. 44. In matters, saith he, undetermined by the word of God concerning the external policy of the Church of God, the Magistrate hath the power of determining things, so they be agreeable to the word of God. And because he knew that the Church-Guides would put in for this Power, that here he giveth to the Magistrate, therefore, p. 45. he laboureth to reconcile these parties, by a distinction or two, viz. between declaring Christ's Laws, and making new Laws: and between advising what is fit, and determining what shall be done. The declaring and advising Power is given by him to the Church; the Authoritative determining power to the Magistrate. For p. 46. The great use, saith he, of Synods and Assemblies of Pastors of the Church is, to be as the Council of the Church unto the King; as the Parliament is for matters of Civil Government. And p. 47. but yet, saith he, When such men thus assembled have gravely and maturally advised and deliberated what is fittest to be done; the force, strength, and obligation of the thing so determined doth depend on the Power and Authority of the Civil Magistrate. Against this Doctrine (before I come to examine the Reasons that he bringeth for it) I have these things to say. 1. It must be noted (by passing over which in silence our Author hath confounded the matter) that we are not here speaking of things that are properly Civil, though belonging to the Church, viz. as it is a Society, and in the Common-Wealth; such as Church-rents, Meeting-places, liberty of the use of them, &c. but of the Government of the Church, as it is a Church, of its Discipline; which things are properly the external policy of that Church, as our Author termeth that which he speaketh of. Now the Question is, whether the Power of determining these, be in the Church-Guides or the Magistrate. 2. That which is the foreign, and the ground of most of this Author's mistakes, is, he supposeth that some things of this Church-policy are so left undetermined by the word, that they are capable of a determination by men's Legislative power, and that new Laws may be made about them. This is not truth; for, if we speak of the Substantials of Church-Government, even of a particular Form, it is determined in the word, and so not subject to men's Nomothetical Determinations; if of the Circumstances of it, neither are these left for men to make Laws about them, but they are determined by the Lord, in the general Rules that are in the word, and the Dictates of right reason compared with them; and the Obligation, that lyeth on our Consciences in these things, is not from the Magistrates Law (though we do not deny but he may add his Sanction to both sorts of things, and make them the Law of the Nation, as Dr. Stillingsleet saith well, that he may with any thing in Religion) but from the will of God, which ought to be searched out, and held forth Authoritatively by the Guides of the Church, that are acting in the name of Christ. 3. It is false then that the Magistrate hath Power in determining what of the External Policy of the Church is undetermined in the word. For if we speak of that which is not determined at all, neither by particular Praecepts, or Examples, or otherwise, signifying particularly the mind of Christ about such a thing, viz. by the general rules of the word compared with right reason, is not held forth to be the mind of Christ; such things ought not to be determined by any man or men, but are left to Christian Liberty; for such things must be determined meerly by mans will, but the Lord hath not left the matters of his Church to that crooked rule. But if we speak of things not determined by particular praecepts, &c. yet in which the mind of Christ is deducible by general rules: Neither here hath the Magistrate the determining Power, but they, whom the Lord hath made the Guides and Eyes of his Church; they must declare what is the will of Christ, not impose what is their own Will or Law. And here the Obligation is from the will of Christ, not the Authority of the Church, nor the Magistrate neither; the declaration of it from them, whom Christ hath made his Embassadors. For what I have said, I give this brief reason, The Affairs of the Church are to be managed by a Ministerial Power, the farthest extent of which is to declare Christ's Laws, and apply them; as is generally confessed by Protestants against Papists: but the Magistrate's Power is not Ministerial, but Magisterial: Ergo, it is not his part to manage or determine the Affairs of the Church, of which doubtless her external Policy is no small part, which may be further enforced thus; Church-Determinations must be the Declarations of the will of Christ, but not the Magistrate, but the Pastors are the Embassadors of Christ, whose it is to decalre his will: ergo, it is not his, but their part to make such Determinations. We speak not of the Judgment of Discretion, which the Magistrate hath in these things, in order to the adding his Sanction to them; and that not only as others have, theirs being private, and his publick and with Authority: Bnt we speak of that determination of things, which is the ordinary means of promulgating to us the mind of Christ in Church-matters. 4. It is most false that the great use of Synods is to be the King's Church-Council, as the Parliament is his Civil Council▪ for, 1. himself acknowledgeth another use of them, while he ascribeth to the Church, a power of declaring Christ's Laws; is not this of great use? but Contradictions are no rarity in this Author. 2. Hence it followeth, that as Parliamentary Acts have no force without the King's Sanction, so likewise Church-Determinations have none without it; and if the Church Excommunicate any person, it is not valid, nor his sins bound in Heaven, till the King put his Seal to it; for that such a person be Excommunicated, is not determined in Scripture. 3. The Council at Jerusalem, Act. 15. and all the Councils before Constantine's time, were of no great use; for they had not this use, there being no Magistrate to own them as his Council. 4. This destroys that received Axiom among all them, who are not the avowed Followers of Erastus, viz. that the Magistrate's power is cumulative to the Church, not privative; for it maketh his to swallow it up, there being no Authority, nor great use of Synods, without the Magistrate. 5. This taketh away from the Church entireness of power in her self, in things that do concern her as such a Society, and a Capacity to subsist without the Magistrate; which I hope this Author, when better advised, will not own. 5. It is also false, that when Church-Guides Assembled, have deliberated and determined, the force, strength, and obligation of the things of determined, doth depend on the Magistrate; for it dependeth on the reason of them containing the Will of Christ, and not on the Authority of men.
§. 7. I come now to see what Arguments he bringeth for what he hath asserted. 1. Saith he, Taking the Church as incorporated into the Civil State, though the Object of these things, the matter of them, and persons determining them be ecclesiastical, yet the force and ground of the Obligation of them is wholly Civil. Ans. That the Church is in the Republick we do not deny: yet that must not be so understood as if either these two were not distinct Corporations, or the Power of the one were subordinate to, or swallowed up the other. The saying of Optat Milev: (which he citeth) that Ecclesia est in Republica, non Respublica in Ecclesia; will not bear that: but the meaning is, that either the Church is in the Rep. as the lesser society in the greater, as a few Parishes are in a County; so the Primitive Churches were in Rome, Corinth, &c. or when the Church is ae que late patens with the Nation, that the Church is in Protection of the Civil State, not e contra; seeing Kings must be Nursing Fathers to her, and as it were keep house for her to be nursed in. Or speaking of a National Church, that it's being a nation is Prior in order of Nature than it's being a Church; because it might be a Nation, and not a Church; but it cannot be a Church and not a Nation. Now, none of these do infer that the Obligation of determinations made by Church men, about Church affairs is civil; but it may be and is Ecclesiastical, viz. from the will of Christ, which the Church holdeth forth as his Embassadors. Wherefore this Ratiocination is altogether inconsequent. But he cometh to Authority, to see if that will help him. He citeth P. Martyr. lo. com. clas: fig. 4. c. 5. s. 11. and in 1 Sam. 8. Nam quod ad potestatem ecclesiasticam attinet, satis est civilis Magistratus: is enim curare debet ut omnes officium faciant. What he meaneth for citing both these places for these words, I know not, unless it be that they are to be found in them both. But I am sure neither they, nor any thing like them is in the former place (for the later I have not that part of his works) but the contrary of what this Author intendeth, is there clearly and fully taught, viz. he is refuting them who would have the Power of discipline in the Church to cease, now when the Magistrate is Christian, and he asserteth Ecclesiastical Power and Civil as distinct: and only says that the Magistrate should correct ministers if they do not carry as they ought: but this is far from that, quod ad potestatem Ecclesiae attinet, satis est civilis Magistratus. He refers, for the judgment of the reformed Divines in this to Vedel. de Episc. Const. Mag. et Offic. Magistratus, annexed to Grot. de Imper. sum. pot. circa sacra. But it is well known that Vedelius was an Erastian and (as this Author doth) did fowly abuse the reformed Divines making them speak what they never thought; wherefore I refer to Apol. Triglandius, Revius; who have refuted that seducing Pamphlet of Vedelius. For the other Author, let his Citations be weighed, they will never prove that any of the Reformers gave the Power of determining Church-Affairs to the Magistrate. He addeth three reasons of his Allegation, yet they are but two, for the two former do coincide, and the strength of them is; that it is from the Authority of the Magistrate, that obligation to obedience or penalty is; or (which is the same) it is from him that the sanction, or annexing of Penalties to the constitutions, is; that it is from him only that the force of obligation is in matters determined by advice of the Church and which do concern the Church. Ans. All this is easily taken away by a well known distinction in things that are commanded by Christ, and by his Church declared to be such; and also, are ratified by the sanction of the Magistrate, there is a twofold Obligation: one Spiritual; this is from Christ as Law-giver; and is laid on by the Instrumental intervention of the Church as his Herald Proclaiming his will: Another civil, whereby we are bound to external Punnishment if we contravene such a constitution; this is from the Magistrate: of this, not of the former the Author's Assertion is to be understood; otherwise it is false: For that Obligation is no way from the Magistrate. His third reason is, the Magistrate can null any Obligation laid on by the Church representative: as if they do prescribe some indifferent rites and ceremonies to be observed by all; he forbidding them the former supposed Obligation is null; otherwise these absurdities would follow. 1. That there are two Supream Powers in a Nation at once. 2. That a man lyeth under different Obligations to the same thing. 3. The same action may be a duty and a sin, viz. Being forbidden by the one Power and commanded by the other. Ans. 1. He supposeth (which we will never yield to him) that ceremonies may be indifferent and imposeable by men. Nay, all the Ceremonies of God's worship, being worship themselves, are Christ's institution; otherwise but will-worship: And so himself understandeth Ceremonies p. 68. It is like forgetting what he here said. 2. It concerneth the Author as much as it doth us to answer his own Objection, for he ascribeth to the Church an intrinsecal power of Discipline: Now suppose one be excommunicated; the Church commandeth it, the Magistrate forbiddeth it; if his prohibition doth not null the former Obligation, the same absurdities follow, that are mentioned in his reason; if it doth, then this doth as much destroy the power of Discipline in that Church, which he asserteth; as it destroyeth the Power of determining about other Church-matters, which we assert. 3. We deny that the Magistrate by his power can destroy the obligation to any Church-Act (being otherwise warrantable) laid on by the Church, or rather by Christ, the Church declaring his will (for so the Church only commandeth) otherwise we might as well say (and it must needs be this Man's Opinion, if he believe what here he writeth) that when the Church ordaineth a Minister and commandeth him to preach Christ, the Magistrate by forbidding him to speak any more in that name, maketh null the former Obligation. 'Tis true the Magistrate may, in some cases, restrain the outward exercise of what we are so obliged to, and also when he doth injuriously forbid such exercise, we may be, in some cases, obliged to cede to this violence: but neither of these destroyeth our Obligation to our duty; neither the power by which it is laid on; more than the Magistrate doth destroy my Obligation to obey my Father, or his power over me, when he putteth me in Prison, and so I cannot do what my Father commandeth. The Absurdities that he would fright us with, do not follow from our opinion, but from his own false supposition. For the first, it is not absurd that there should be two Supream Powers about things so different that one Power cannot have them both for it's formal Object. Will not the Author grant that Ministers have the Supream preaching power, that is not subordinate to the Magistrate: and the Magistrate the Supream civil Power? Why not then, that they have the Supream ruling Power in Church affairs? These Powers need not clash, though they be not subordinate, being about things so different as are this world and that which is to come, the Soul and the Body: But this man feareth that Caesar be dethroned, if we confess Christ to be a King; and so would have Christ's Kingdome subordinate to Caesar's. For the second, there cannot be two Obligations here; for if the Church keep within her Limits, her command is Christ's. And so any contrary obligation must be null: if not, her Authority layeth on no Obligation. For the Third, it is the same Argument, and it admitteth of the same Answer.
§. 8. Having made the Magistrate the sole Judge and determiner in the matters of the Church even Ceremonies themselves: our Author proceedeth p. 49. to examine the extent of his Power, asserted in his former Hypothesis, and here he proceedeth by three steps. 1. That there are some things left undetermined by the Word. This we assent to, as it is here set down; but cannot understand it (as he doth, which appeareth a little after) of Ceremonies: but rather of bare Circumstances of the worship of God (if he take these for one, he is very ignorant of the Nature of both) neither of the species of Church-Government, for which this indifferency of things is here asserted. What he discourseth here of the Nature of indifferency, I shall not insist upon, intending to meet with it elsewhere. Only I take notice of his concession p 53. that in things wholly indifferent both in respect of their common nature and their use and end; that are neither commanded nor tend to the peace and order of the Church, there can be no reason why the Nature of these things should be altered by humane Laws: wherefore matters that are indifferent as to a command, but are much conducing to the peace and order of the Church are the proper matter of humane constitutions concerning the Churches Policy. Let it be here considered that these things are not properly indifferent, but commanded, viz. where the peace and order of the Church is injoyned: and if it be so, it is the part of the Church representative, not of the Magistrate, to Judge what things are thus conducible to peace and order; and to hold forth the doing of these, as the Laws of Christ.
§. 9. His second step is, that matters of this Nature may be determined and restrained; and that it is not to the wronging of Christians liberty, so to do: And this he doth very largely prove against some as he pretendeth of great note and learning; I wonder who they are: For I never met with any who do deny what he asserteth: It is true that many do, and that warrantably, maintain; that where Christ hath left us free, man hath no Power by his meer will to restrain us; especially in things that belong to the worship of God: but all do acknowledge so far as I know, that in things (though not expresly commanded) which by their nature or circumstances are made conducible to the ends that Christ hath enjoyned us to endeavour, the Church may enjoyn us; and that without making any new Laws; but by declaring the will of God. This and no more do all the arguments, which the Author with much pains hath set down, conclude. And indeed, if our author had once proved the Species of Church Government to be indifferent, we should not deny it to be determinable and imposeable (not by the Magistrate, but) by the Church. In the prosecution of his Arguments, there occur several things that I cannot assent to; but they not being to the Question in hand, and intending to touch some of them in a Treatise else-where, I pass them here; he hath some greedy hints after obeying whatever is commanded, though unlawful; the non-obligation of the Covenant, &c. which do discover his spirit. Though the Author doth state the Question as hath been said, yet all his reasons whereby, from p. 56. he proveth the determination of indifferent things, not to take away our liberty, doth prove as much, that determination grounded on mans meer will doth not take it away; for in that case there may be left a liberty of judgment; and there may be no necessity antecedent to the command; as he saith in his first Argument; also in that case, the determining of the things supposeth them to be matters of liberty, which is a second medium, and the obligation in that case, is only in respect of contempt and scandal, which is his third Argument; and the repealing of the law or ceasing of the authority commanding, may free us of impositions made by meer will, which is his fourth Argument. Wherefore these Arguments prove that which the Author doth not own, if they prove any thing, which is a token that they prove nothing at all. But that I may shortly answer them. The first Argument is inconcludent; for though radical liberty, (i. e. a right to do or not do) be consistent with such commands, as men, without warrant from God, lay on us, (their authority never being able to destroy that right given to us which is founded on the will of God) yet these commands are an unlawful taking away of the exercise of our liberty: for where neither Scripture nor Reason (which are Gods law) do bind, mans will ought not to bind; especially in the things of Religion. He hath here, p. 57. a gird by the way at them who hold one posture of receiving the Lords Supper to be necessary, as more destroying liberty, than doth the command of the Magistrate imposing one posture. Answ. If they hold this without warrant from the word of the Lord; I yield to what he saith; but if they can prove that we ought in this to imitate Christ, and keep a table-gesture as he did; it is no destroying our liberty, unless he think it less liberty to be bound to the will of Christ, declared by his example, than it is to be bound to the will of men. Other falshoods I pass over (it not being my intention to touch every thing) but I wonder at a gross aspersion that he layeth on the Apostle Paul, viz. that he did use the Jewish Ceremonies, (as that he circumcised Timothy) when they were not only mortuae but mortiferae, and that, where there was no opinion of their necessity. What is it I pray to say they were mortiferae, but that it was sin to use them? (for when they were mortuae, they were indifferent, not as to the opinion of their necessity, but as to their use) then Paul used them when it was sin to use them. I hope the Author will not own this when he is better advised: but we see whither zeal for an errour will lead men. His other Arguments run on the same mistake, viz. they prove that radical liberty is not taken away whatever be commanded: but they prove not that when men command without warrant from the Lord, they hinder that exercise of liberty that the Lord alloweth us. Wherefore I need not insist on any further Answer to them. p. 59. He maketh this difference between laws concerning Ecclesiastical and Civil things; that these bind extra casum scandali & contemptus, those not so; whether this doth consist with his opinion that both these Laws are from the Magistrate, let it be considered. I thought that the different way of obligation had been from the different Authorities, not from the things about which the Laws do converse: and that violation of all the Magistrates Laws, had been alike opposite to his Authority. I mean, where the things are of equal moment, as certainly may be in things Civil, and Ecclesiastical. The wise advice of Ambrose to Augustine (which he citeth p. 60, 61.) I do with Augustine reverence as coeleste graculum: so it be understood of Customes truly indifferent: but that the things we plead about, and that the Author would permit to the will of the Magistrate; are such, we cannot yield: Wherefore all this his pains about indifferent things, is to small purpose. what he saith, p. 62. of superstition in the imagined necessity of things really indifferent, I will elsewhere examine; and what others also have alledged to that purpose.
§. 10. His third step is to set bounds to the restraint of Christian liberty, where his first rule is, that nothing be imposed as necessary, but what is clearly revealed in the word of God. But what if it be revealed, so as it is visible to them who read and search attentively; though it be not clearly revealed? must such things be slighted, as no part of Gods will? but of this we have said enough before. The second rule is, that nothing be determined but what is sufficiently known to be indifferent in its own nature. The way to know what is such, he maketh to be, by taking the primitive Church, and the reformed Churches to be Judges in this. I confess, their decision should have much weight; but we dare make none Judge, but God speaking in the Scriptures. What if Christ hath in Scripture signified his will in a point, and yet these Churches looked on it, and used it as a thing indifferent? must we then think it indifferent? I hope not. This is to lay too much weight on men: especially considering that the mystery of iniquity (which did prostitute all or most of Christs Institutions to mens will; as if they had been indifferent things) began early to work in the primitive Church, 2 Thes. 2. 2. and few reformed Churches want their own Lees; from which the Lord is yet daily purging them. Wherefore I think (with submission to better judgments) a surer standard, to know what is indifferent, to be this; what cannot be proved to be determined by the Lord in Scripture, and is not of the Law of nature, neither primarily nor secondarily; that is to be thought indifferent. Passing his other rules; in prosecuting the last, he openeth a door to humane ceremonies, (though he seem to speak against them) by approving the Feast of Dedication, the Jewish Ceremonies in the Passover: sure these were some more than ordinary decency; neither were to be esteemed of the same rank (as he doth) with building of Synagogues, hours of prayer, which are meer order: the continuation of the Passover by Hezekiah which was transient; no recurrent fast; and had a reason then urgent; and the feast of Purim which was a Civil solemnity: and the fasts of the 4th, 5th, and 10th Months; which were occasional for the captivity, and expired with it. But of this matter I treat at large elsewhere.
§. 11. In his 5th Hypothesis, there is an unwary expression, viz. that things determined, as aforesaid, by lawful authority in the Church (which to him is the Magistrate) do bind the conscience. I suppose he meaneth, that we are bound to obey for conscience sake; and not that Civil Authority by it self doth reach the Conscience, which Protestants with good reason deny against the Papists.
The rest of his first part needeth not our Animadversions, seeing it containeth nothing contrary to Presbyterial Government; but rather asserteth several parts of it: wherefore I shall only set down briefly his Assertions, many of which are so many Concessions to us. He Asserteth, (cap. 3.) that the law of Nature dictates that there must be a society of men for the worship of God; that is a Church. And (cap. 4.) that there must be a government in this society. Where he maketh 6 things in this Government to be juris naturalis; 1. That there be a distinction of persons, and a superiority both of power and order in some over the rest. 2. That the persons so above others have respect paid them sutable to the nature of their imployment. (cap. 5.) The third thing is, that all things either pertaining to the immediate worship of God, or belonging to the Government of the Church be performed with the greatest solemnity and decency that may be, (cap. 6.) Fourthly, that there be a way agreed upon to determine and decide all the controversies arising in the Church, which immediately tend to the breaking of the peace and unity of it. Where he pleadeth for the definitive sentence in the major part, where power is equal; and for liberty of appeals, where there is subordination; as being of natural right: and that this subordination must be in a Society consisting of many Companies or Congregations. (cap. 7.) Fifthly, that all who are are admitted unto this Society, must consent to be governed by the laws of that Society. (cap. 8.) Sixthly, that in a well-ordered Society, (and so in the Church) every offender against the rules of that Society, must give an account of his actions to the Governours of that Society; and submit to the censures of it, according to the Judgment of the Officers of it.
All this we accept of as truth, but how this last doth consist with his putting all power of jurisdiction in the hand of the Magistrate, and leaving the Church-Officers only power of Preaching and Administring the Sacraments, (of which before) I cannot understand. So much for the first part of his Irenicum.