Some Stop to the Gangrene of Arminianism, Sermon 6 – Imprimatur

Some Stop to the Gangrene of Arminianism · Sermon 6 – Imprimatur

p. 100THE SIXTH SERMON.

ROM. 11.7.

The Election hath obtained it, and the reſt were hardned.

WE come now to other their maine Objections, which tend upon ſuppoſall of the former Doctrine, either to accuſe God, or excuſe Man

Object. 1. Say they, according to this Doctrine of Reprobation, God muſt be the Author of ſin, and ſo be guilty of ſin, and this they urge upon three grounds eſpecially: 1. In that he decrees it, thence there is a neceſſity of mans ſinning. 2. In that he acts in it, producing as the firſt cauſe thoſe acts in and by man, to which ſinne cleaves inſeparably. 3. That unto Adam he denied that grace, without which it could not be, that as to the event be ſhould perſevere in working righteouſneſſe.

Anſw. What is here alledged as the grounds of this Objection, is owned by this Doctrine, but p. 101the charge of the Objection is denied, as having here no footing.

1. For the decree;—1. That God decrees that ſin ſhould be, hath formerly been proved, but that hence he cannot be concluded the Author of ſin is evident, becauſe the decree, as ſuch, is an act immanent in himſelfe, not immanent upon the creature, it being the property of immanent acts to put nothing in the object.— 2. There is upon the decree of God a neceſſity of mans ſin, as **Lib. 6 de Geneſ. ad literam. c. 15.Auſtin ſaith well, The Will of God is the neceſſity of things: But, 1. It is a neceſſity not abſolute, but upon ſuppoſall, or conditionall, not of compulſion, but of conſecution, for as much as God hath ſo decreed, it cannot otherwiſe come to paſſe but man ſhall ſin, yet doth he ſin freely, chuſing ſo to do, acting neither by conſtraint, nor from a principle of naturall neceſſity; but of this we ſhall ſpeake more in anſwer to the third Objection, which chargeth this neceſſity as inconſiſtent with the eſſentiall liberty of mans will. 2. There is a neceſſity of the ſame kind for mans ſinning, if we grant that God fore-knowes his ſinne, if God fore-knowes that man ſhall ſinne, then muſt it needs ſo come to paſſe, otherwiſe God fore-knowes that ſhall be, which ſhall not be, but this clearly involves a contradiction: We muſt then either grant a conditionall neceſſity of mans ſinning, or deny Gods preſcience. 3. Upon ſuppoſall that man ſhall ſin without the decree of God, God himſelfe ſtands under the like neceſſity, a neceſſity upon ſuppoſall, or of conſecution, for as much as man ſhall ſinne, p. 102and is ſo fore-knowne of God, or whether ſo fore-knowne or not, there is now no liberty left to God for preventing mans ſinne, ſo that whileſt we feare to leſſen mans liberty, by allowing him to ſtand under a conditionall neceſſity ariſing from God, we feare not to leſſen Gods liberty ſubjecting him to the like neceſſity ariſing from man.

2. For Gods acting in the ſins of men.

Anſw. 1. That the great Creator as the firſt cauſe produceth all motion in all creatures, ſeems not obſcurely to be taught by the Apoſtle, Acts 17.28. as he is ſet forth the Author of life, in him we live, of being, in him we have our being; ſo of motion, in him we move, and as the Apoſtle quotes there Aratus one of the Heathen Poets, ſo ſutably another of the Poets ſings, Eſt Deus in nobis, agitante caleſcimus illo; God is in us, he moving we wax warm.

To me it ſeems one of the foure letters of his Name Jehovah, to be the Author of all being, and therefore of all operations, in all creatures their operations, not being nothing, and to aſcribe to any creature onelyonly upheld, not moved by God, to produce its own motion ſeems to transfer Divinity to the creature, and derogate from it in God. I ſhould thinke the motion of the creature, in dependance upon the Creators moving, to be like that Engine, Ezek. 1.—16. a wheel in the middeſt of a wheel, the motion of God incompaſsing the creatures motion, and moving it within it ſelfe: And I would further make this Quaere, Doth God uphold all and every being? I do not know that p. 103this is by any denied, divine conſervation and ſuſtentation of whatſoever is; but if motion be upheld by him, it is produced by him; for it being a ſucceſsive entity or being, how is it otherwiſe upheld then by Production? and if life be upheld, motion is; this terme, life, including this terme, motion, life being in the living creature, the ſupreme and univerſall principle and power of operation actually in operation. But to inſiſt no longer upon this; we affirme clearely, as that which comes cloſer to the preſent queſtion and concludes it, whatſoever becomes of this diſcourſe, for all creatures in all their motions depending upon God.

2. That God as the ſupreme and univerſall Governor acts the wills of men, turning them which way he pleaſeth in their motions, is clearly expreſſed in Scripture, and there is not a little depending upon this truth both for our duty and comfort.

1. For Scripture-teſtimony, Prov. 16.1. What are the preparations of the heart there, but the thoughts, deſires, and inward workings of it? Theſe are from the Lord, Prov. 21.1. What is there ſaid of the Kings heart is as clearely to be affirmed of the hearts of other men: What more expreſſe? It is in the Lords hand, like the rivers of water, he turneth it which way ſoever he will; Is any thing more eaſily turned this way or that way, then a water-courſe? So eaſily doth the Lord turne the hearts of men, how are they turned but by their owne motions? They ſo move then by their own principles, as the Lord is the firſt and ſupreme mover, Pſal. 106.46. He p. 104turned the Enemies hearts to pitty his people, and he gave them favour in the ſight of the Egyptians, Exod. 11.3. So he likewiſe had before turned their hearts to hate his people, and to deale ſubtilly with his ſervants, Pſal. 105.25. further teſtimonies (though theſe might well ſuffice) will come in as we ſhall ſhew the duties hereon depending, which we now come to in ſome few inſtances.

2. Hereupon therefore it is our duty.

1. To ſeek after the Lord that we may know him, and give up our ſelves to him; it is further manifeſt by theſe teſtimonies, how we are to underſtand that of the Apoſtle, In him we move, the Apoſtle thence requires this as the duty of all men living, having theſe experimental witneſſes within them of their great Creator, in their life, being, motion, they are not, they ſtir not without him.

2. To glorifie God with all humble adoration, as the great Lord in whoſe hands is our breath, and whoſe are all our wayes, Dan. 5.23. all our wayes, even to the preparations of the heart, and all the motions and iſſues thereof, as we have ſeen.

3. To take heed with ſear and trembling to the motions of Gods ſpirit in us, in the things that concern ſalvation, that we neglect them not Phil. 2.12.13. for as much as we cannot act but as acted by God, and he acts us by our own wills; firſt principled by his grace, then moved by his grace, then moved by his ſpirit; take heed we be not wanting to ſecond theſe motions of his in us.

p. 1054. To pray unto God that he would incline our hearts to himſelf, and to his waies, Cant. 1.4. Pſal. 119.35.36. Jer. 31.18.

5. To praiſe God for whatſoever good inclinations and operations we have found in our hearts, 1 Chron 29.14. for two things doth David there bleſs God. 1. That they had what to offer. 2. They had hearts wherewith to offer; the willingneſſe of their hearts was from the Lord, as well as all that ſtore they had to offer, and this he further acknowledgeth in prayer, verſ. 18.19.

Other duties we might inſtance in, as humility; as in the laſt example, verſ. 14. What am I, and what is my people? In giving the moſt to God, they received the moſt, in that they received hearts to give, &c. But I forbear inſtances, onelyonly one ſpeciall caſe making for our no little comfort, in times of greateſt temptation, by the prevailing of wicked men againſt us.

The Lord hath as well their hearts as hands in his power, to make them pitty us, favour us, as we have ſeen; he hath made promiſes to this purpoſe, Prov. 3.4. So when any mans wayes pleaſe the Lord, he will make even his enemies to be at peace with him; and it muſt not now remain in the hand of man, whether the Lord ſhall be true in his promiſes or no, which it muſt do, if he doe not act and turn the hearts of men as he pleaſeth; Jacob truſted to this when he made that prayer, Gen. 43.14. ſuppoſing Joſeph to be ſome godleſs-Egyptian. Now let any man judge whether theſe teſtimonies, and duties thereupon depending, import no more but this; p. 106that God conſerves man, and upholds his faculties, propounds objects, and perſwades, then ſtands a looker on, leaves it meerly in mans power to act, or not to act; this way, or that way; ſo as for the event, it may or may not not be, this or that, nothing certain or determin'd.

Hence then we affirm, that God as the great Creator and univerſall Ruler, produceth all operations, and motions in the heart of man, even thoſe to which in man ſinne cleaveth unavoidably **Much more to this purpoſe, ſee lib. 5. contra. Julia. c. 3.God workes in the heats of men to incline their wills whitherſoever he will; whether to that which is good for his own mercy, or to that which is evill for their merits, St. Auſtin. But now to anſwer the Objection, How then is he himſelfe free from ſin?

1. God works as the ſupream mover, man as the proper ſubject; that is, in whom is the principle of the ſinfull action: this is one ſtep clearing God in the caſe in hand, to make it plain by inſtances; The Sun ſhining upon a Dunghill, raiſeth a ſtink; the Sun ſtinks not, but the dung-hill in which is the principle of the ſtink, and it is by the operation of the Sun that it ſtinks: ſinfull man is as the dung-hill, God as the Sun. A Clock falſe made, moved by the poiſe ſtriks falſe; the poiſe moves true, though the clock ſtrike falſe. By the ſhining of the Sun upon a falſe Dyall, the hours of the day are falſly given, the Sun is true in his courſe, yet without his motion the Dyall would not lye. A skilfull writer uſing a pen with an hair in it, for fair letters, blots are made; yet he writes according p. 107to as exact art with that, as with the cleaneſt pen, the fault is only in the pen. A skilfull Muſician playes upon an Inſtrument out of tune, the muſick jarres, the inſtument ſounds amiſſe; yet he ſhews no leſſe skill, neither tranſgreſſeth the lawes of Muſick any more, then if he plai'd upon a well tun'd inſtrument. Sinfull man is the falſe Clock, the falſe Dyall, the blotting Pen, the jarring inſtrument; God in his motion is the Poyſe, the Sun, the Writer, the Muſician; from God is the motion, in man is the principle of the evill in the action.

2. God works as the Author of nature, man as a morall Agent: that is, as ſtanding under a law, which whilſt he obſerves, or violates, his action is free from fin, or ſinfull, ſin being the tranſgreſſion of the Saw of God: now thoſe actions are the ſame conſidered as naturall, which as morall differ extreamly, and God works uniformely in thoſe actions which are naturally the ſame, though morally very different, and in point of good and evill, contrary. Inſtance, Adam eating the forbidden fruit, doth the ſame thing in naturall conſideration, which he had done in eating the ſame, had it not been forbidden him; yet then had his eating been a lawfull and blameleſſe action, whereas now it was moſt ſinfull: nor onelyonly the outward action of eating, but his will and deſire of eating (ſuppoſing him to have will'd, and deſired it not forbidden) hath been the ſame in nature that it was when he deſired it forbidden; yet in one caſe free from ſin, in the other deeply guilty. Whence riſeth this difference; not from the p. 108different exertion of natural power, or a difference in the operation of his will as naturall, but from his different condition; becauſe he is in one caſe under a law forbidding, from which in the other he was free: Now God here works as the Author of nature, and uniformely; the difference of mans condition varies not his operation: as the Sun ſhines uniformely upon a Dung-hill, and upon a Garden, though the effect be contrary; the weights move uniformely the true, and the falſe clock, &c.

Another inſtance; ſuppoſe one man in heat of affection ſlay his adverſary juſtly, another unjuſtly his friend; here is innatural conſideration, one and the ſame action in both, the ſame exertion of naturall ſtrength outwardly in the motion of the Arme, the ſame animoſity inwardly ſtirred up in the motion of the will; therefore the operation of God, who works as the Author of nature one and the ſame for kind in both; the difference in morall conſideration is found onelyonly in the men, the one acting according to the law of God, the other contrary to it.

3. God works according to a pure rule, man contrary to a pure rule, Gods rule is the dictate of his own wiſdom, for his own glory; whatſoever the wiſdom of God repreſents as making for his glory, that God wills and acts accordingly: now it is plain by the iſſue, and by Scripture teſtimony, that the wiſdom of God hath ſuggeſted the way for his finall glory, in mans finall ſtate, ſuch as ſuppoſeth the ſinne of man, making way for that glory; God therefore p. 109according to this rule, both determines that man ſhall ſin, and acts ſinfull man in thoſe actions of his, to which as in, and from man, ſin cleaves unavoidably. Mans rule is the Law of God, man in ſinning, though he fulfils Gods intention (for who hath reſiſted his will? the Jews in crucifying Chriſt, did whatſoever the hand and counſell of God had before determined to be done) which is not his rule; yet he acts againſt his law, which is his rule; and therefore God acting according to his pure rule is blameleſſe, man working contrary to his pure rule, guilty.

The third ground whereupon they will have the Doctrine of Predeſtination formerly aſſerted to charge God as the Author of ſin, is, That unto Adam wa denyed that grace, without which it could not be, as to the event, that he ſhould actually perſevere in his righteouſneſs.

Anſ. To affirm that God is the Author of ſin, is granted on both hands blaſphemy, and therefore whatſoever the Scripture teacheth concerning Gods diſpenſations to man about the firſt ſin, or fall of Adam: this concluſion cannot thence be infer'd that God is the Author of ſin. Now all the queſtion is, what the Scripture here teacheth: This ſay we, That unto Adam was denyed that grace, without which it could not be, as to the event, that he ſhould ſtand, and this we clear by theſe following ſteps.

1. Adam was created in the Image of God, Gen. 1.26. that is [whatſoever more is comprehended] in righteouſneſs and true holineſs Ephe. 4.24. herein was that ſtate of habituall righteouſneſs, p. 110whereby he was able to do whatſoever good he ſhould will to do: all the faculties of his ſoul were fitted to work according to the rule of righteouſneſs without any interruption; it was not then with him, as it is now with the regenerate, Rom. 7.18. with whom to will is preſent, but how to perform that which is good they find not; he had withall by that habituall righteouſneſſe a power to will that which was good, even all that good which God according to his law engraven on his heart might require at his hands, free from any principle byaſſing him to evill: and this power, and this righteouſneſſe, had all his poſterity in him.

2. That he was denyed the grace whereby he ſhould actually ſtand, is manifeſt by the event; fallen he is, but God was able to have afforded him that effectuall grace, whereby his fall had been prevented, as he hath dealt with the Angels, who keep, and for ever ſhall keep their firſt ſtanding; and had that grace been afforded him, he had ſtood, for it is a contradiction to ſay he had that grace, whereby he ſhould not onelyonly be able to ſtand, but ſhould actually ſtand; and yet grant that he ſtood not, he had then both a power to wil all that was good and to do all that good which he ſhould will; but to will, and to do that for which he had a power, was not given unto him. A ſound eye hath the faculty of ſeeing, there is the power; but that it may actually ſee the object before it, it muſt have light: An Inſtrument truly made and tuned, hath in it the power and principle of ſounding harmoniouſly; but that it may yield it's p. 111harmony, the skilfull touch of the Muſicians hand is neceſſary: Hence St. Auſtin, **Lib. de correptione & grat. c. 11.The firſt man had not that grace by which he never could be evill; but that grace he had in which if he would abide, he never ſhould be evill. Such an aid of grace he had, as which he might forſake if he would, and in which he might abide if he would: not ſuch as whereby it might come to paſſe, that he ſhould will to abide. Then comparing it with that aid which beleevers receive in Chriſt; ſo much greater is that aid which is given by Jeſus Chriſt our Lord, unto whom it ſeemes good to God to give it, that not onelyonly we have that, without which we cannot perſevere, although we ſhould will; but ſo great, and ſuch that we ſhall will: for there is in us by this grace of God, both in the receiving and holding with perſeverance that which is good, not onelyonly to be able to do that which we will, but alſo to will that for which we are able.

**Cap. 12.Again, To the firſt man, who in that goodneſſe wherein he had been made upright, had received to be able not to ſinne, to be able not to dye, to be able not to forſake that goodneſſe; was given an aid of perſeverance, not by which it might come to paſſe that he ſhould perſevere, but without which he could not be able by his free will to perſevere: but now to the Saints predeſtinated unto the Kingdome of God, by the grace of God not onelyonly ſuch an aid of perſeverance is given; but ſuch an one, as that to them perſeverance it ſelfe is given; not onelyonly ſo, as that without that gift they cannot perſevere; but ſo, as that by this gift they may not but perſevere. Much more to the ſame purpoſe frequently in him.

3. It could not be that he ſhould have that grace, whereby as to the event he might ſtand, p. 112as to his own fitneſſe he had by his habituall righteouſneſſe a power of ſtanding, he was habitually fitted for it; but that it might ſtand, as to the event, there muſt be further a vigorous influx from God, of light upon his mind, of holineſſe upon his will actuating his habituall power; Now that this ſhould be afforded him, it could not be, that being ſuppoſed for which the Scripture is clear.

1. That God knew certainly that he ſhould fall; that man is put to a very hard ſhift, who ſhall deny Gods certaine knowledge from all eternity of Adams fall, or of any event whatſoever; and the free confeſsion hereof would be refutation enough to moſt mens appreheſions (the impreſſion of Gods perfection, as for other Attributes, ſo for knowledge, deing deeper ſet upon the heart of man, then by a little miſerable Sophiſtry to be wiped out) of that unlucky opinion, which can be no otherwiſe ſupported then by deſpoiling God of his eſſentiall properties. Now if God knew certainly that Adam ſhould fall, then it cannot be that he ſhould have that aid of grace whereby he might as to the event ſtand; for then God ſhould know certainly that that ſhould be, which yet certainly might not be, namely, Adams fall, whereas for as much as God knowes certainly that it ſhall be, it may not for the event, but be.

2. That God hath decreed his fall; If God had decreed that Adam ſhould fall by his permiſſion, (and in that decree of his own permiſſion it was that he knew certainly that Adam ſhould fall) then could it not be that Adam p. 113ſhould have that grace whereby as to the event he might ſtand; for then Gods Adminiſtrations to man might make void his owne decree, but that God had ſo decreed we have formerly proved: Let us gather up a brief diſcourſe about it.

1. That God decreed the making and ordering all the workes of his hands for his owne glory, as the end of all, is moſt unqueſtionable.

2. That he decreed particularly that glory which comes to paſſe from his creature; either that particularly, or another particularly, or laſtly, none particularly, but his glory generally, and indefinitely; not another particularly, it is too abſurd to ſay that he decreed what comes not to paſs, and decreed not what comes to paſs, ſuch an apprehenſion doth at once utterly overthrow his wiſdome and power; neither did he decree his glory only generally and indefinitely, that apprehenſion neceſſarily ſuppoſeth a defect in his wiſdome for dictating diſtinctly and particularly the way of his glory, and aſcribes unto God the weakneſs of man diſcourſing from generals to particulars, which is alwayes accompanied with, and ſuppoſeth imperfect knowledge and power.

3. That he decreed his owne glory comprehenſively, to wit, all that glory in every particular which ariſeth to him from the creature, this is cleare (to wave other Arguments) from the two former particulars, becauſe his glory is the end of all his workes, as his glory particularly as it comes to paſſe.

4. That glory of his in the final ſtate of man being ſuch as ſuppoſeth ſinne, (for how ſhall p. 114ſome be ſaved in mercy, others in juſtice condemned without ſin?) and particularly Adams fall, and in him all his poſterity, it muſt needs be that God decreed that glory of his, and that way of his glory.

Object. But why doth God give a righteous law in charge to Adam, inables him with habitual righteouſneſs for the fulfilling of that law, and yet determines that he ſhould not fulfil it.

Anſw. We have from cleare and unſhaken principles but now proved that God hath decreed that way of his glory, or the glory of thoſe Attributes in mans final ſtate which neceſſarily ſuppoſeth ſin, not to the decree, but to his glory; but if God had not made man righteous, and given him a righteous law in charge, and left him to the violation of that law, there could have been no ſin in man; herein is ſinne, man tranſgreſſeth that law which he is commanded to obſerve, and for fulfilling whereof he had a power, Adam in himſelfe, and we in him

Object. By what right doth God condemne may for ſinning, when he hath firſt decreed, and then his diſpenſation towards man is according, that he ſhall not have that grace without which it cannot otherwiſe come to paſſe but he ſhall ſin?

Anſw. But by what right doth duſt and aſhes lift up its head againſt the great Creator in theſe bold enquiries?

1. Whatſoever appears by the Word of God to be his Will, there is no place for this enquiry; By what right? The VVill of God being the rule of righteouſneſs; Nay, ††Lib. 1. de Gen. Contra. Manich c. 3.ſo the higheſt rule of righteouſneſs, that whatſoever he wills, in as much as p. 115he wils it, it is to be accounted righteous: whereever therefore this queſtion is asked, Why hath the Lord done thus? the anſwer muſt be, becauſe he would: but if thou ſhalt goe on in asking, but why would he? Thou now ſeekeſt ſomething greater and higher then the wil of God, which cannot be found Auguſtin.

2. The Lord here ſtands upon his dominion over man as his Creator, and thereupon checks the inſolency of this enquiry: Nay but O man who art thou that replieſt againſt God? Shall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? or hath not the Potter power over his Clay? &c. It is too high a pitch for man to ſoar, to call his Creator to the Bar, and there implead him face to face.

3. The Lords proceeding here by vertue of his Dominion, is a depth that muſt with trembling be admired, cannot be ſounded. O the depth! Rom. 11.33. Wilt thou acknowledge no more in the moſt myſterious wayes of God, then what thy reaſon can graſpe?

1. See the refutation of thy pride in the moſt common things of natures courſe every day before thine eyes, Ioh. 38 give a clear anſwer to, and make a clear demonſtration of thoſe Geomerrical, Phyſicall, and optick Problems there; here let me make the challenge to thee, which ſometimes learned **Lib. 1. c. 1. Corolari parte 32. vertus principium.Bradwardine, that great Aſſerter of the cauſe of God, againſt thy fore-father Pelagius made to the prond Philoſoper deriding Chriſtians, becauſe they beleeved what the Scripture affirmed, though they could not make it good by reaſon: Tell me thou Philoſopher (ſaith he) what it is that thou knoweſt thoroughly? not theleaſt mote in the Sun beames, p. 116nor the leaſt grain of duſt of the earth, nor the leaſt drop of water; in the leaſt materiall quantity, infinite lines, figures, ſuperficiall, corporcall, divers in quantity, quality and kinde are contained; and therefore anſwerably infinite concluſions Geometricall, orderly ſucceeding, ſo as that the latter cannot be known but by the former; infinite Arithmeticall concluſions, in orderly dependance likewiſe: of theſe, many concluſions in themſelves demonſtrable, how many knoweſt thou? Nay, let all the Philoſophers be joyn'd together, how many of theſe infinite concluſions know they? a very few; there remaines therefore very many, not one whereof for their difficulty, and your meanneſs doth any of you, or all of you together know: A little after, the leaſt ſpark of fire, doth it not by enlightning and warming make infinite or numberleſs circles of light, and ſpheres containing and contained, as likewiſe croſſing one another; numberleſſe lightſome Pyramids likewiſe, and Pyramids viſuall, and thoſe very different one from another; numberleſs likewiſe lightſome and viſuall beames incident, reflex, refract, in which are contained infinite cencluſions, Geometrical, Arithmeticall, and perſpective; and who can fully know all theſe? In the ſame place he argues, how much leſſe can thy finite little ſoule comprehend the great God, who is every way infinite? Nay, bluſh thou Philoſopher, and be aſhamed to own ſo ſmall a God, as that thou ſo ſmall, by thy minde ſo ſmall, ſhouldeſt ſearch him out quite through, ſhould'st ranſack all his ſecrets, ſhould have a comprehenſive knowledge of him. Thus he.

2. Becauſe thou art a chriſtian, let us go one ſtep higher. Canſt thou comprehend by reaſon all the myſteries of faith? what? that of the three perſons in the one God-head? the generation p. 117of the Son? the proceſſion of the ſpirit? what of thy ſaviours Incarnation? the diſtinction of the two natures united into one perſon? As for thoſe, who, becauſe they cannot by reaſon comprehend, do therefore deny theſe main Articles of our Faith; my charity is not eaſie enough to call them Chriſtians. I will conclude with St. Auſtine, Thou a man requireſt of me an anſwer; why, but I am a man too, De verbis Apoſtol. Serm. 20.let us therefore … beare him who ſaith, Nay but O man who art thou? thou askeſt a reaſon, a will tremble at the depth: thou argueſt, I will wonder: diſpute thou, i'le beleeve; I ſee the depth, the bottom I cannot reach: S. Paul reſted, becauſe he found where to ſhut up with wondring; be calls them the unſearchable judgements of God, and doſt thou come to ſearch them? He calls them thoſe wayes of his which cannot be traced, and wilt thou needs trace them? How much better, and more Chriſtian was it, to captive our reaſon to faith, beleeving what the Scripture ſaith, even then when our reaſonleſſe reaſon replies, How ſhould theſe things be?

Object. Is not this great Cruelty in God to appoint his Creature by his decree to deſtruction? and here they are wont to raiſe a mighty out-cry, and by odious compariſons to aggravate this Charge; Tygers (ſay they) and Bears, and all the moſt ſavage Creatures, are kinder to their young then ſo.

Anſ. To clear the queſtion. 1. God appoints not the innocent, but the guilty creature to deſtruction; though the fore-ſight of ſin be not before his decree for ſin, and deſtruction: yet his decree appoints that ſin ſhall be before deſtruction, and deſtruction ſhall be for, and by ſinne.

p. 1182. To refute the Objection.

1. Muſt they not acknowledge that by Gods permiſſion man ſins? that by Gods appointment the ſin of one man hath caſt the whole world into a ſtate of condemnation? that in the iſſue, the greateſt part of man-kind is deſtroy'd? that ſometime the whole world was given up to raigning ſin, and periſhed generally in their … eight perſons excepted? that for many ages the Lord ſuffered all Nations to walk in the wa…es of their owne hearts, without God, without hope in the world? that to this day he … many Nations to periſh without he knowledge of Chriſt, there being no other name amongſt men whereby ſalvation is had? that many to whom the Goſpel is ſent, are hardned by it? when as yet it was in the power of the Almighty to have prevented all this, and that without any the leaſt trouble to himſelf. Now if Gods dominion over his Creature, doth not abſolve him of tryal at the Bar of natures Law in the Creature (as this objection would bear in hand) how will they avoid this charge of cruelty againſt him granting what they muſt grant? would … not be cruelty in the Creature, and againſt the law of nature, to ſee their young ones torn in peices before their eies, in caſe they could prevent it; eſpecially without any hazard or trouble?

After the ſame manner they argue, in charging God as the Author of ſin; it is ſin in man to wi… that another ſhould ſin; therefore to ſuppoſe of God, that he wils that man ſhall ſin makes his the Author of ſin; ſo they conclude, if this be juſt arguing, there is no ſinne in the world, but God muſt be the Author of it, whether he will p. 119it or not (if we can imagine that God permits ſin beſides his will) for it is ſin in man to permit another to ſin, when he hath power in his hand, (and that without the leaſt trouble to himſelf) to prevent it.

2. Is there the ſame kindred and Conſanguinity betwixt God, and all the ſons and daughters of men without exception, that there is betwixt the living Creatures, and their young ones? it is true we are his off-ſpring, or of his kind, Act. 17.29. inaſmuch as we have our life and being in him, and were created in his image; but to be his ſons and daughters, depends upon his Covenant in the hand of Chriſt, made on the behalf of the peculiar and choſen ſeed; now for them let the whole world periſh, not one of them ſhall miſcarry, Rom. 4.16. Ioh. 8.35. Ioh. 11.52. 2 Tim. 2.19. Eſay 53.10.

3. Their own objection falls in full weight upon their own heads, who teach that ruinous Doctrine of final apoſtacy; that they who are truly the children of God, having embraced his Covenant by true faith, may yet fall from the ſtate of life totally and finally, and ſo periſh for ever.

4. Wherein doth this cruelty appear? that God ſhould condemne hardned ſinners, is that cruelty? no; that he ſhould harden wilful ſinners, viz. give them up to hardnes of heart as a puniſhment of their former ſins, is that cruelty? no; that he ſhould not recover from ſin; all the Sons and Daughters of Adam without exception, is that cruelty? no; that he ſuffered Adam to ſin, and imputed his ſin to his poſterity, is that cruelty? no; All theſe things they grant, Scripture-evidence being ſo clear for them; though ſome of them, true ſons of their Father Pelagius, would gladly, if for ſhame they durſt; p. 120and ſome have put ſhame here) deny the imputation of Adams ſin, and ſo originall ſin; in one of theſe two then, or in both together, muſt be the cruelty, that unto Adam was denyed that aid of grace, without which it could not be, as to the event that he ſhould ſtand; that God decreed antecedently to the fore-ſight of ſin, the ſins of men; but it hath been proved already that this is no cruelty in God, but the charge of cruelty hereupon is blaſphemy in man. Inſtance; But at the leaſt God is not ſo mercifull, according to this Doctrine, as the Scripture ſets him forth. Reply 1. And how is he ſo powerfull, and ſo perfect as the Scripture repreſents him, if any thing fall out beſide his decree and the full purpoſe of his will? 2. The Scriptures which ſpeak moſt this way have been cleared already, and therein we have diſcovered how inconſiſtent it is with the nature and happineſſe of God, that in any thing his will ſhould be fruſtrate. 3. There are two ſorts of mercies, 1. Common, in the bleſſings of this life; theſe are to all the children of men, Acts 14.16.17. 2 Peculiar in the bleſſings of eternall life, thoſe which ſhall ſurely make for it; here the Apoſtle avoucheth a difference, Rom. 9.18. and this founded meerly in the will of God, verſ. 11.13. theſe are onelyonly to the Elect, Ephe. 1.3.4 and how clear the current of Scripture is for this, hath formerly been abundantly made good the greatneſs of the Lords mercy is declared extenſively in the former, that they are to all, even to thoſe who live and dye his enemies, intenſively in the latter. 1. That they are ſo excellent in their nature. 2. That they are ſo peculiar; as we have formerly ſeen at the end of the third Sermon. So that if the Holy Ghoſt knowes p. 121by what argument to commend the mercies of God to man; he that denies the former mercies to belong to all, or affirmes the latter to belong to all, derogates from the mercies of God indeed.

Theſe are the two main Objections made againſt the former Doctrin, accuſing God: a third now followes tending to excuſe man.

Object. 3. The former Doctrine takes away the liberty of mans will, and ſo quits him of all ſin; liberty of wil being neceſſary to every ſinfull action.

Upon two grounds do they conceive the liberty of mans will overthrown. 1. In that God hath decreed his ſin. 2. In that God moves his will, when he wills ſinfully, the motion that is from God upon the wil of man, determining it in its operation: whence man muſt ſin of neceſſity, and therefore not freely, and ſo his ſin is no ſin; the objection againſt the liberty of mans will is the ſame, in actions not ſinfull.

Anſ. 1. For the decree.

1. It is moſt clear by Scripture, and hath been formerly proved, that the actions of mans will both good and evill, are decreed by the Lord. Let us here onelyonly give ſome ſpeciall and remarkable inſtances. 1. For good actions, embracing the call of God in the converſion of a ſinner is decreed, Rom. 9.11. Rom. 8.28 30. Acts 13.48. the faith and obedience of converted ſinners, in an holy courſe is decreed, Ephe. 1.4. 2 Theſ. 2.13. The obedience of Chriſt fulfilling the will of God in performing the great work of mans Redemption, was decreed, 1 Pet. 1.20. Heb. 10.7. for evill actions: The crucifying Chriſt by the Jews and Romans was decreed Acts. 4.27. Abſoloms inceſt was decreed, as is manifeſt p. 122in that it was fore-told by God, 2 Sam. 12.11. and generally whatſoever was fore-told, as that which ſhould certainly come to paſs, and not conditionally (as Nineve his deſtruction) muſt needs be decreed, for if God have not determined, that either by his works or permiſſion, whatſoever he hath fore-told ſhall come to paſſe, then may his word be falſified: hence then the bitter perſecutions of the Church by her wickedeſt adverſaries, the faith and patience of the Martyrs, in all ages is decreed. To inſtance in the rage of myſtical Babylon; the faithfulneſſe of the Virgin-company, the true Church of Chriſt, overcoming her temptations: to inſtance further, in the Kings of the Earth, firſt ſubjecting themſelves unto that whore, afterwards hating and deſtroying her, in the converſion of the Jewes, and with them the fulneſſe of the Gentiles; theſe are all foretold as thoſe things which ſhould certainly be, and therefore were they all decreed; and how much of the will of man, and the workings thereof, is in all theſe things who can but ſee?

2. Yet hence is no infringement of the liberty of mans will, becauſe the decree as ſuch, is an action in the breaſt of God, makes no change in man, or in his condition, till it come to excution.

3. The decree eſtabliſheth mans liberty, foraſmuch as God hath decreed that man ſhall wil, it is now beyond all peradventures that he ſhall wil, for the counſels of God ſhall ſtand; but how certain ſoever it is that he ſhall wil, ſo certain it is that he ſhall worke freely; for to will, is in the motion of the will to work freely; to will, and not to act with liberty of will, is a contradiction: not only all things and operations, but their different kinds p. 123and manner alſo fall under the decree of God; who as he hath fitted neceſſary cauſes to work neceſſarily: as the fire burns neceſſarily, ſo hath he likewiſe fitted voluntary, and contigent cauſes to work voluntarily (that is freely) and contingently.

Object. But what God hath decreed uniſt neceſſarily come to paſſe, other wiſe his decree might be fruſtrate.

Anſw. It muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, that is, it muſt of neceſſity come to paſs, yet not neceſſarily, that is by neceſſary operation, but on the contrary, if it depend upon a free and contingent cauſe, it muſt of neceſſity come to paſs, freely and contingently, here is onelyonly a neceſſity of the event, not of the manner of production, and therefore a neceſſity of conſequence, not of the cauſe, a neceſſity neither naturall nor violent, and the neceſſity of conſequence we have formerly ſeen muſt be granted, or we muſt both deny Gods foreknowledge, and make him ſtand under that kind of neceſſity, which we think it an unworthy thing that man ſhould ſtand under.

Object. But may one and the ſame effect, both neceſſarily and contingently come to paſſe?

Anſw. It may, the neceſſity being rightly underſtood, viz. not ſimple, or abſolute, but reſpective or conditionall: Inſtance, 1. In the actions of God, he creates the world freely, it was in his liberty whether he would create a world or no, whether this world or no; yet upon ſuppoſition that he hath decreed it, it is now neceſſary that it be in time created, neither can it otherwiſe come to paſſe but this world muſt be created. 2. In the actions of man; when Chriſt was crucified, his legs were not broken, that the Scripture might be fulfilled which had formerly affirmed, that not a bone of p. 124him ſhould be broken, God having ſo determined as by his Word was declared, it could not be that they ſhould be broken, yet did the ſoldiers forbear to break them voluntarily and contingently, they were neither naturally nor violently neceſſitated to forbear. Another inſtance, whether in the actions of God or the creature, what is done, muſt of neceſſity be done, it is impoſſible that a thing ſhould be done, and not done at once; yet if there be any free or contingent act in the world, which is granted on all hands, liberty and contingency muſt be granted to ſtand with that neceſſity. This Objection is yet further cleared by theſe two following Rules.

1. All effects produced by the creature are neceſſary or contingent, according as the creature it ſelf, the next cauſe is in its manner of operation: Natural agents are neceſſary cauſes, as fire, the Sun, they worke neceſſarily, the fire in burning, the Sun in ſhining, producing alwayes the ſame action for kind, heating, inlightning, working to the utmoſt of their power, therefore their effects are neceſſary. Voluntary agents are free and contingent cauſes, they work freely and contingently, they ſo act one way, as that they have an intrinſical power to act another way, ſo wil, as that they have a power to nil, ſo nil, as that they have a power to wil the ſame thing as they ſhal like or diſlike; and therefore their effects are free and contingent.

2. In regard of God, the firſt cauſe, all effects in the world are both neceſſary, and contingent, or free; in regard of his intrinſicall liberty, whereby he may chuſe whether he wil produce them or not they are free, or contingent; ſo for the ſhining of the Sun, and the burning of the fire, though they p. 125be neceſſary effects in regard of the Sun and fire, their next cauſes, yet are they contingent in regard of God, in whoſe liberty it is to afford or with-hold his influx for their production: So the Creation of the world, all effects depending immediately upon the Wil of God, Angels, or Men, are in regard of their immediate cauſes free and contingent; all the moſt caſuallevents, as the lot in the lap, in the ſame regard contingent; yet all theſe upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, are neceſſary. Thus much for the decree, and the neceſſity thence ariſing.

2. That the wil of man is moved by God, and by that motion of his determined in its operation, doth not take away the liberty of mans will.

For clearing this, we muſt take notice of a twofold liberty; there is the liberty of

1. Independence

2. Choice.

1. The liberty of Independence, where the will ſo acts, as it is not acted by any higher cauſe; this is peculiar to the will of God, he onelyonly is independent, upon any other in the motion of his wil; the wills of all men and Angels are ſo under his dominion, as that they are moved by him; this hath formerly been proved, as to men, that God as the great Creator and univerſall Ruler, moves the wills of men which way ſoever he pleaſeth: many more arguments might be brought to demonſtrate that the liberty of mans will muſt admit the effectuall motion of God upon it; ſo acting it as acted, may act, eſpecially is this cleared in the Doctrine of Converſion and Perſeverance; but to inſiſt upon theſe would be an unſeaſonable digreſſion, eſpecially the thing in hand having been already proved.

p. 1262. The liberty of choice; where the wil in its operation doth what it likes in the light, and upon the ſentence of the practical underſtanding, there are two acts of the will, to will and to nill, to chuſe, to refuſe: Now herein is the liberty of the will expreſt: 1. That in theſe operations it doth what it likes, it wills with liking, it nills with liking; yea with liking doth it nill even the object which it diſlikes, and therefore it ſo wills or nills the preſent object, as that it hath power at the preſent to will what it nills, or to nill what it wills; was there an impreſſion of liking upon it contrary to what is, yet though it have this oppoſite power at the ſame time, it hath not a power to produce oppoſite acts at the ſame time, it being impoſſible that a prevailing liking, and diſliking of the ſame thing ſhould ſtand together at once. 2. That it act in the light and upon the ſentence of the practicall underſtanding, that is, the underſtanding as it ſhewes and determines wherein is our happineſſe or good for the preſent moſt deſirable, and what makes neceſſarily or mainly for it; this muſt needs be required to the liberty of the will, becauſe the will is a rationall appetite, and therefore cannot otherwiſe will or nill, then as the underſtanding repreſents the object good or evill; and therefore whatſoever it wills it wills as good, cannot will any thing as evill, for then it ſhould act not as a rational appetite that is, not as the wil; it is true, that the underſtanding miſtakes many times good for evill, and evill for good, whence good is either true or apparent, but whatſoever it is that the will chooſeth, it is that which the underſtanding repreſents as good, and therefore though the will have a power when it wills p. 127the preſent object to nill it, if it ſhould like ſo to do, yet ſo long as the underſtanding repreſents it good to will it, and evill to nill it, it cannot like to nill it.

Hence it is manifeſt, how man in the operation of his wil, differs from neceſſary Agents, whether natural Agents, as the fire, or ſenſitive as the bruit beaſt; they are determined by the force and inſtinct of nature: naturall Agents without either apprehenſion or choice, or any ſhadow of either; ſenſitive Agents have onelyonly the light of ſenſe according to which they like or diſlike, and therefore not ſo much a true choice as a ſhadow of it; man in the operation of his wil, doth what he likes or diſlikes in the light of the underſtanding. Now to apply this to anſwer the objection, the liberty of Independence being peculiar to God, where this liberty of choice is, there is all that liberty of will which is found in the Creature, Angell, or man.

Object. But how doth determination to one part ſtand with this liberty of choice?

Anſ. There is a double determination 1. To one of the contrary objects, good or evill, morally underſtood; that this may ſtand with the liberty of the will is clear: On the one hand, God himſelfe, Chriſt, the Angels, the glorified Saints, can will onelyonly that which is good; neither have they power to will what is evill; yet in them is the higheſt liberty of will, without which there is no holineſſe. On the other hand, the Devill, the damned, the hardned, we may add all the unregenerate, can onelyonly will that which is evill yet in all theſe the will is free, (naturally free, though morally enſlaved) without which there was no ſin; determination then to one of theſe contrary objects, p. 128takes not away the liberty of the will. 2. There is a determination to one of the contrary acts, to will or to nill; neither doth this take away the liberty of the will, for then the exerciſe of its liberty ſhould take away its liberty, when ever it either wills or nills, it is for the preſent not indifferent about the object, but determined; now as the Adverſaries ſuppoſe the will to determine it ſelf unto, and in its owne operation, thereby not deſtroying, but exerciſing its liberty, ſo wee affirme that God by his motion determines it, moving it by its owne principle, and according to its owne nature, that is, by the underſtanding determining it to its operation, and ſo moving it, as in the vertue, and by the efficacy of his motion it doth whatſoever it likes in the light of the underſtanding, with a power to the contrary if it ſhould like; ſo that whatſoever is required to its liberty, ſtands faire with the motion of God determining it; and the more firmely it is in its operation fixed to the object, the more fully doth it exerciſe its liberty, as liking more vehemently what it doth, but ſtill in the light of the underſtanding.

Theſe are the main Objections, where the Anſwers to theſe ſhall ſatisfie; what Objections remain, will prove but waſh way, where ſatisfaction is not received about theſe, it will be but loſt labour to proceed to others.

FINIS.

June 5. 1648.

Imprimatur

John Downame.

ERRATA,

Page 1. line 18. for onelyonly of life, read onelyonly way of life, p. 4. l. 7. for … degree r. decree, p. 5. l. 30. for into this maze, r. in this maze, p. 7. l. 12. for the Scripture, r. that Scripture, p. 12. l. 30. for Law, r. love, p. 15. l. 26. for fore-light, r. fore-ſight, l. 33. for in the firſt ground, r. is the firſt ground, p. 19. l. 13. for it peradventures, r. it, at peradventures, p. 31. l. 23. for harden to Reprobate, r. harden the Reprobate, l. 32. for it uſe, r. its riſe, p. 32. l. 24. for 1. r. 2. p. 50. l. 29. for apart together, r. apart, and altogether, p. 52. l. 10. for line of whom, r. line excepted of whom, p. 56. l. 2. and 3. for glorfying, r. glorying, p. 57. l. 21. for whereby Chriſt, r. whereof Chriſt, p. 59. l. 17 for two John, r. 6. John, p. 65. l. 9.10. for to the praiſe, r. 10. To the praiſe, p. 70. l. 24. for underſtand, r. underſtood, l. 33. for when, r. whom, p. 75. l. 20. for, makes for his glory, r. makes for glory, p. 80. l. 8. for urge an edge, r urge and edge, p. 89. l. 3. for 1. r. 2. p. 90. l. 8. for he that wills, r. he wills, p. 93. l. 10. and 13. for acts r. arts, p. 94. l. 27, for is the gift, r. is his gift, p. 95. l. 17. for by hardning others, r. by; hardning others. p. 106. l. 12. for heat, r. heart, p. 107. l. 17. for Saw r. Law.

Some other ſmall ſlips there are, and divers miſ-pointings which I omit.

End of the text · Richard Resbury, Some Stop to the Gangrene of Arminianism (1651)