Some Stop to the Gangrene of Arminianism, Sermon 2

Some Stop to the Gangrene of Arminianism · Sermon 2

p. 21THE SECOND SERMON.

ROM. 11.7.

But the Election hath obtained it, and the reſt were hardned.

Ver. 14. to the 19. followes an Objection, with the Anſwer.

THe Objection, ver. 14. the Apoſtle knowing how endleſly the fleſh will cavill againſt this truth, layes down and prevents an Objection here, What ſhall we ſay then, is there unrighteouſneſſe with God? This is the charge of mans corrupt reaſoning againſt God, ariſing from the Doctrine of Predeſtination.

The ſumme of the Objection is this: If God deal ſo unequally with them that in themſelves are equall, then is he unrighteous, but according to the Apoſtles Doctrine ſo it is; for their works good or evill come not at all into account with God as Motives to his Will one way or other for his decree; therefore he is unrighteous.

p. 22For anſwer; 1. The Apoſtle deteſts the conſequence of the propoſition. Though God deale ſo unequally (in regard of his decree) with thoſe that in themſelves are equall, yet far be that blaſphemy from any to charge him with unrighteouſneſſe.

2. He Vindicates the righteouſneſs of God: 1. In points of Election, verſ. 15.16. Verſ. 15. By that ſoveraigne liberty which God hath for willing, and decreeing mercy to whom he pleaſes, meerly becauſe he pleaſes, for which he quotes Exod. 33.19. whence verſ. 16. he laies down a generall concluſion; So then it is not, &c. the meaning; it is not by any, either good deſires in man (it is not in him that willeth) or good endeavours of man, (it is not in him that runneth) that God is prevented in his decree, but his decree is wholly of it ſelf; for mercy, becauſe he will have mercy; (But of God that ſheweth mercy.)

2. In point of reprobation, the Apoſtle ſhewes the ſame Liberty of proceeding meerly according to the will of God in the inſtance of Pharoah, for which he quotes Exod. 9.16. and thence conclude a full and equall liberty in God, both for Election and Reprobation.

1. For the inſtance of Pharoah verſ. 17. Two things are affirmed. 1. That God raiſed him up, which comprehends his bringing into the world, his preſervation, his advancement to the Throne, his ſingling out to ſtand in oppoſition againſt the Lord, his obfirmation in that wickedneſſe of his —2. The end of it, that God by powerfull deſtroying ſuch a wicked Tyrant, might glorifie his great name.

2. Now that God made uſe thereof the ſame p. 23liberty appears: Firſt by the connexive particle (for) which relating to the former verſes, where that Liberty had been aſſerted inſinuates here the like. 2. By the concluſion, verſ. 18. which avoucheth the ſame liberty here as formerly in Election; and the Apoſtle drawing this concluſion for that part of it which concerns Reprobation, from the 17. verſ. as appears by the illative particle (therefore) he gives us to underſtand, that what is ſaid of Gods raiſing up Pharoah is ſo to be conceived, as that therein that ſoveraigne liberty whereby God proceeds meerly according to his will is imported.

Obſervations.

1. From the Objection; How hardly fleſh and blood reliſheth the true Doctrin of Predeſtination, it will rather riſe up to a peremptory and blaſphemous charge of unrighteouſneſſe againſt the Lord then yield to it. The pride of man will not endure the true Doctrine of juſtification, neither the pride nor guilt of man the truth of Predeſtination; hence in all ages is found ſo much oppoſition, in St. Auſtins time by the Pelagians, after him by their ſucceſſors; ſince the time of Reformation, Stapleton, Bellarmine, and the whole Nation of the Jeſuits, with other perverſe Hereticks, as Caſtellio againſt Calvin and Beza. Arminius againſt Perkins; and now the Hereticks of our times, who have made a compound of the former Errors againſt this truth.

From the Objection and the anſwer together.

1. That the Apoſtle laid down as well the Doctrine of Reprobation as of Election, in the former verſes; becauſe this Objection thence ariſing p. 24takes in both, and the anſwer Vindicates God in both.

2. That what was formerly taught by the Apoſtle in the inſtance of Jacob and Eſau, for the dependance of their different condition originally on the decree of God, concerns not onelyonly themſelves and the Jews, but all men, becauſe here are generall concluſions laid down, verſ. 16 18. and in Pharoah an inſtance of ſuch as are out of the Church, ſo that all the world as well as they of the viſible Church, are differenced by Gods decree.

3. That neither workes good or evill, faith or unbelief, ſo much as foreſeen prevented the decree of God, but were prevented by it; for if ſo, 1. There had been no place for this objection, the Apoſtle in ſtating it, teacheth us his meaning in the 11th v. to ſhut out all reſpects in the Creature If God loved Jacob upon faith or good works foreſeen, hated Eſau upon unbelief, or evil works foreſeen, here had been no place, no not ſo much as for corrupt reaſon to queſtion Gods righteouſneſſe; for then had he dealt unequally, not with thoſe who were equall, but unequall in his ſight.

2. For the anſwer to the Objection, it Vindicates the Lord upon another ground, his ſoveraigne power of dealing with man herein meerly according to his will; how eaſily had the Objectors mouth been ſtopt by mentioning their different qualifications fore-ſeen, if that had been the truth?

4. Whatſoever the Scripture holds forth for the will of God, we are thence to conclude it juſt, or (if it ariſe above the reſpects of juſtice in the uſuall ſenſe, which ſuppoſeth an object of reward) p. 25at the leaſt not unjuſt: So the Apoſtle, becauſe it is Gods will to have mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will; that is to ordain whom he will unto mercy, and whom he will unto wrath hardning thereunto; this ordination of his ariſing above all good or evill, ſo much as fore-ſeen in the Creature, he therefore concludes it juſt; ſuppoſe we can no more comprehend the righteouſneſſe of God in ſuch away of his, then we can the myſtery of the Trinity; we muſt not therefore denie it to be his will, becauſe we cannot fathom the righteouſneſs thereof, but becauſe the Scripture affirms it his will, we muſt conclude it righteous.

5. That not onelyonly comparative Predeſtination is above all different reſpects in the creature, but ſingle above all reſpects, whether in Election or Reprobation,

Some grant that thus far it is clear in the Apoſtles diſcourſe, that Jacob and Eſau were equal, as repreſented to the decree of God; and what difference was betwixt them flowed originally from the decree, and therefor God in chuſing one, refuſing the other proceeded meerly according to his wil, that if the queſtion be, why did he chuſe Iacob rather then Eſau? or why did he refuſe Eſau rather then Iacob? no other anſwer is to be given but meerly his will: This for comparative Election and Reprobation, but then for ſingle; they think there is in all men a neceſſary qualification one and the ſame; the conſideration whereof is in order of nature, before the decree either of Election or Reprobation, and that is the corruption of nature over all men, all alike; hence they make the object of Predeſtination man fallen, p. 26not comprehending within it, the creation and the fall, but ſtating it below both.

Againſt this opinion, the three arguments formerly uſed to prove the purpoſe of God to be wholly of it ſelf, will conclude; we ſhall have further occaſion to diſcuſſe this more fully upon the next verſes; for the preſent, let us ſee how far what the Apoſtle hath here argued makes againſt it, concluding rather the decree of Predeſtination to ariſe above both the fall and the Creation, and to have for it's object, man not as yet Created, in divine conſideration.

1. From the Objection; there had been little reaſon for it, had fallen and ſinfull man been the Object; For when all had deſerved to periſh, what colour of unrighteouſneſs was there, that God ſhould decree the ſaving of ſome in mercy, leaving others to periſh according to their deſert?

2. From the anſwer; The Apoſtles anſwer is from Gods ſoveraigne liberty of diſpoſing of man according to his Will: but had fallen man been the object, an anſwer more ſatisfying the adverſary, leſſe lyable to exception had been ready at hand to this purpoſe; for as much as all men have deſerved to dye, had God ſo determined of all he had been juſt, that he ordaines ſome to life, it is his mercy.

3. From the following diſcourſe which clearly ſetteth forth man as not yet created to be the object, raiſing this decree of God above both the fall and the creation; and being the continuance of the Apoſtles former diſcourſe, concludes the Apoſtles meaning the ſame, in the former diſcourſe.

p. 27Verſe 19. Why doth he yet complaine? who hath reſiſted his will? The meaning, by what right doth God find fault with man, and puniſh him for his ſin, foraſmuch as it is his will to harden him in ſin? the former Objection chargeth God with unrighteouſneſs; this with tyranny. For anſwer.

The will of God is his Decreeing will.

The will of God is his declaring will.

His decreeing will determines what ſhall be; his declaring will ſhews, 1. What is mans duty. 2. What God accepts when it is performed; it is here the decreeing will which no man can reſiſt, his declaring will is ſo often reſiſted, as ſinne is committed; and the ſtrength of the objection is in this, that man in reſiſting his declaring will, viz. what he commands, and in the performance whereof he would be well pleaſed; doth yet not reſiſt his decreeing will, ſo the Objection clearly formed is this; If God have decreed that man ſhall ſin and be hardned in his ſins, and no man can reſiſt this decree of God; by what right can he puniſh man for his ſin? For anſwer, the Apoſtle grants what the objection alleadgeth; denyes what it would conclude, by pleading Gods abſolute ſoveraignty over man; and in his ſoveraignty, his liberty for diſpoſing of man, meerly according to his will, his will no way taking riſe from any thing in man; and this by checking the inſolency of man in thus conteſting with his Creator, forgetfull of his Dominion over him, which by compariſon is illuſtrated verſ. 20. and and this compariſon ſpecified, and further cleared by inſtance of the Potter and his clay, ver. 21.

Now let us ſee from this Objection, and the anſwer to it; whether man fallen, or man not yet created, be the Object of Predeſtination? whether the ſin of the firſt man, and in him the corruption of all men be conſidered before the decree? or whether the decree of God comprehend within it, the ſin both of the firſt man, and of all men; this by certain ſteps.

1. The objection taking for granted, that men are hardned in ſin according to the decreeing wil of God, it is not denyed by the Apoſtle, but juſtified: but whether doth the conſideration of ſin p. 29in the parties to be hardned, move God to that decree of hardning them; or doth that ſin for which they are hardned, fall within the decree of God?

Anſ. Though God fore-ſee that they ſhall fin before, he will harden them in their ſinne, their hardning being a judgement upon them for their ſin; yet doth not the fore-ſight of that ſinne go before his decree of hardning in ſin, but he decrees of his meer pleaſure. 1. To permit them to ſin, in order to hardning. 2. To harden them in ſin order in to condemnation.

1. Otherwiſe there was no place for this Objection, for it is granted on all Hands, that upon ſin committed it is juſt with God to harden, and it will follow by like reaſon, that upon the foreſight of ſin to be committed; and this without the decree of God, it may be juſt with God to decree to harden; and there is no more colour of objecting againſt God in this latter, then in the former.

2. Neither otherwiſe doth it ſuite to the Apoſtles former diſcourſe; the decree whereby God wills the hardning of the Reprobate, is the ſame with that whereby he hated Eſau, as is clear by the thread of the Apoſtles diſcourſe, from verſ. 13 to 19. but that riſeth above all reſpect of ſin to be committed, v. 11.

Hitherto we have gained this ſtep, that thoſe actuall ſins in recompence whereof, by the righteous judgement of God, the Reprobates are hardned unto death, fall within the decree of God, are not fore-ſeen without his decree, as Motives to his decree, but are by him decreed with intention of hardning for them.

p. 30But then ſecondly, Doth not the conſideration of naturall corruption by the fall, go before this decree of God, and thence the juſtice of God more clear, that though he decrees to permit to ſin in order to hardning; yet is it onelyonly ſinfull man ſo conſidered in his decree, fallen into a ſtate of ſin without his decree, that he ſo decrees to permit to ſin?

Anſwer, But then ſtill what place for the Objection?

That God may harden men for ſins committed is granted on all hands, that he is not bound to recover fallen man; but may leave him to commit thoſe ſins for which he is hardned, is likewiſe granted, that he may find fault with, & puniſh with eternal wrath hardned ſinners, is likewiſe granted, ſuppoſing then the corruption of nature in the eye of God before his decree of hardning the Reprobate; there is no place for this Objection, except we ſhall ſay that God muſt decree either not to ſuffer fallen man further to ſin, or not to harden any ſinners in ſin, or not to puniſh hardned ſinners; but this is contrary to what by all is granted.

Thus far the Objection makes for man, conſidered as not yet created, to be the Object of Predeſtination.

Now for the Anſwer: It will make it yet more clear. Where 1. The Apoſtle pleads Gods abſolute power over man, by right of Creation, verſ. 20.21. 2. Expoſtulates for further clearing, 1. The ſpeciall end. 2. The righteous execution of his decree, v. 22.23.

1. He pleads his abſolute power and ſoveraignty or dominion, verſ. 20. who art thou that anſwereſt p. 31again, by way of conteſtation with God: God is ſo far above thee, and hath that Dominion over thee, that he is not lyable to give an account of what he doth concerning thee.

2. This power over man, not as created (much leſs fallen) but as to be created: ſhall the thing formed, fay to him that formed it, why haſt thou mademe thus? We here ſee by the Apoſtles anſwer, the mind of the Objection, which was to charge God with Tyranny: that he decrees to harden the Reprobate in ſin, upon ſuppoſall that this decree of his riſeth above the conſideration of man as created; and in his decree of Creation, he hath this intention: Why haſt thon made me thus? which is yet more expreſly in the next words, what power the Potter hath to make Veſſels for different uſe, honourable or diſhonourable: the ſame power hath God to Create men, ſome for ſalvation, others for deſtruction, Prov. 16.4.

Now ſuppoſe man fallen had been the Object, a ready and ſatisfying anſwer had been rather from Gods righteouſneſs then dominion: to this effect, that though God decrees to harden to Reprobate in ſin, yet he ſees them firſt as ſinners, and that without his decrees.

2. He decrees to harden them in a certain order. 1. Not to recover them from their ſinfull ſtate, but ſuffer them to multiply their tranſgreſſions. 2. To harden them by way of righteous judgement for thoſe tranſgreſſions of theirs, according to this order of the decree; that it takes it uſe from the ſin of man antecedently to his decree; the plea of Gods righteouſneſs muſt clearly have ſatisfied even a cavilling adverſary,: for who can doubt but when man hath fallen without p. 32his decree, God is not bound to recover him from ſin; or that when his tranſgreſſions are multiplied, the Lord may not harden him, that is, with-hold ſuch workes of his Spirit as he formerly afforded him, after ſinfull mans manifold abuſe of them, and deliver him up fully to his own heart and Satan. That alone which requires the plea of Gods power is, that the firſt ſtep here is according to Gods decree, and his decree of Creation is accompanied with this intention: It is well obſerved by learned Camero, that for the properties of God, ſome of them are converſant about the object already conſtituted, ſuch are his mercy and juſtice, ſome about the conſtitution of the object, ſuch are his wiſdome and power, the power of God is here ſo pleaded, not as ſuppoſing man created and fallen in the knowledge of God, but to be created and to fall by the decree of God; the apprehenſion then of man conſidered as ſinfull, to be the object of this decree, it is firſt againſt the nature of the Apoſtles argument here, which is power, or dominion, not juſtice.

1. It is againſt the proſecution of it; 1. Shall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? according to that conception it ſhould have been thus rather, Shall the thing deformed ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou marred me thus? 2. Hath not the Potter power of the ſame lump, &c.?

1. They who will have the difference to ariſe from faith or workes fore-ſeen, ſuppoſe here not one and the ſame lump, but two, and thoſe very different lumps.

2. They that will have man as fallen, the object p. 33of Predeſtination, will not allow the Potter power to make veſſells for diſhonour of any other lump then that which is firſt corrupt and marred, juſt contrary to the purport of the Argument; Where is the Potters power then over his clay?

Thus we have ſeen from this Objection and Anſwer to it, man conſidered as not yet created, the object of Predeſtination: Let us now adde another Argument from the Angells.

The purpoſe of Election and Reprobation for the Angells hath them for the object as not created, or it is of workes; one of theſe two muſt needs be, becauſe there is not in any one Angell fallen the corruption and fall of the reſt, as in man; but that it ſhould be of workes is to be denied upon the ſame grounds that it is denied for man, they that grant that in man it is not of workes, yet will have man conſidered as fallen the object, are here troubled to extricate themſelves; for if it carry with it many abſurdities, that mans Election or Reprobation ſhould be of Workes or Faith ſo much as fore-ſeen, as they grant it doth, the ſame muſt likewiſe be granted in caſe of the Angels for works.

If it may without abſurdity be granted for the Angells, that they are to be conſidered in the purpoſe of God as to be created, then may it likewiſe in man, and if it may it muſt, for the Scriptures ſound cleare enough that way, onelyonly they, for avoyding as they thinke, ſome abſurdities, interpret them another way.

p. 34Let us adde another Argument to clear the Doctrine of abſolute power in this point.

If in another caſe of equall concernment the Lord proceeds according to his abſolute power, then without all abſurdity is it to be granted here; but ſo it is: For inſtance.

1. The imputation of Adams ſinne to all his Poſterity; By what rule of regulated juſtice am I (conceived in the womb five or ſix thouſand years after Adams ſin) charged with that ſin of his? Would this be warrantable betwixt man and man, that by the Fathers offence againſt his Prince, all his ſucceeding Poſterity throughout all generations ſhould be liable to death? Or indeed any of them who were not ſo much as borne or conceived when the Father committed his treſpaſſe? Will it be ſaid in caſe ſuch a Covenant be made, it is warrantable? But by what rule may ſuch a Covenant be made? or if made, how not more warrantably broken then kept?

2. Imputation of mans ſin to Chriſt, and in him puniſhing the ſinnes of all the Elect: Might any Prince hang, draw, and quarter the moſt innocent and noble Peere in the Kingdom, and even the Kingdomes heire, and the ſonne of his loynes, thereby to acquit a company of wretched Traytors? Yet all this moſt juſt in God, becauſe he hath this abſolute power over man, and even over the humane nature of Chriſt, that Chriſt was willing to undergo this, alters not the caſe in point of juſtice, for hereunto he as man, was appointed and created by the Father, and if it had been poſſible that Chriſt, as man, could have p. 35refuſed it, he had therein ſinned.

What is it then that carries ſo many to pitch upon the corrupt Maſſe?

1. A meer fallacy, for as much as Election is a decree of mercy, Reprobation of juſtice; the one for ſaving, the other for condemning fallen and ſinfull man; therefore here is ſinne conſidered before the decree, ſparing mercy, and condemning juſtice, neceſſarily ſuppoſing finne.

Anſw. 1. All that can hence be concluded is, that the decree determines that ſin ſhall be before either the ſalvation of the Elect, or the condemnation of the Reprobate; but not that the conſideration of ſinne as that which ſhall be, is before the decree, or the fore-ſight of it a motive to the Decree it ſelfe; ſee a cleare inſtance: The decree of Election is a decree of ſaving all and onelyonly perſevering believers, (for thoſe of years;) of Reprobation for condemning all and onelyonly impenitent ſinners; therefore ſalvation ſuppoſeth finall perſeverance in faith, and condemnation finall impenitency in ſin, and that according to the decree, yet the decree it ſelfe doth not ſuppoſe them, and take its riſe from them, but comprehends them, and ordaines them, otherwiſe it was of works, (faith in this conſideration putting on the nature of works, as making the purpoſe to be of the called rather then of the caller) contrary to the Apoſtle, Rom. 9. v. 11. This miſtake ſuppoſeth whatſoever is required to the execution of the decree in the laſt act of it, muſt before-ſeen without and before the decree as a motive to it, whereas the decree it ſelfe ordaines whatſoever makes for the execution of it in the p. 36laſt act. Another familiar inſtance: A man purpoſeth to leave his name behinde him when he dies in a legitimate off-ſpring, this cannot be without a wife; now according to that miſtake he muſt fore-ſee that he ſhall have a wife before he purpoſeth any ſuch thing, and the fore-ſight hereof muſt be a motive to him for purpoſing ſo to leave his name in his Poſterity; whereas it is clear in true conſideration, that becauſe he purpoſeth ſo to leave his name, he therefore purpoſeth to take a wife, nor doth he any other way ſee before-hand that he ſhall have a wife then in his owne purpoſe: That decree which determines the end, comprehends likewiſe the meanes to that end, otherwiſe it would be a decree to no end, a purpoſe to no purpoſe.

2. Becauſe the ſinne of man is in order of time before either his ſalvation, or condemnation, that God might be glorified in his ſparing mercy upon ſome, in his revenging juſtice upon others; therefore muſt that intention of his ſinne be in order of nature after Gods intention of ſo glorifying himſelfe, for whatſoever makes for the accompliſhment of the end, as the meanes thereto, is appointed in order to, and by vertue of the end it ſelfe fore-appointed. Hence that well knowne rule, What is firſt in intention, is laſt in execution; Inſtance, A man builds an houſe in ſuch a place, of ſuch a forme, of ſo many roomes for himſelfe to dwell in, the laſt thing here in execution is his dwelling in the houſe, but it was the firſt in his intention, and therefore for the conveniency of his dwelling did he provide materials, build it in ſuch a place, in ſuch a forme, &c. Hence if God fore-ſee the ſinne of p. 37man, as that which ſhould be, before he decreed the glorifying himſelfe in the ſalvation or condemnation of ſinfull man, then did he intend to permit ſin (without which permiſſion it could not be, and therefore without the intention to permit it, could not be fore-ſeen) before he intended ſo to glorifie himſelfe, but the permiſſion of ſin being firſt in intention, muſt be laſt in execution; therefore man muſt firſt be condemned or ſaved, and then permitted to ſinne: So great an abſurdity doth that miſtake run upon.

Therefore to conclude; 1. Election is a decree for ſparing niercy, Reprobation for revenging juſtice, rather then of them, each of them being an act of abſolute and arbitrary power, favouring or refuſing to favour, meerly at pleaſure.

2. Yet there is a twofold juſtice in God.

1. Towards himſelfe, whereby he doth for himſelfe whatſoever his wiſdome dictates to be for his owne glory.

2. Towards the creature, whereby he diſpoſeth good or evill to it upon certaine conditions.

In the former ſenſe Election and reprobation both are acts of juſtice, God is to be juſtified in whatſoever he doth beſeeming his wiſdome for his glory.

In the latter ſenſe they are for juſtice and mercy, rather then of them. This for the firſt ground of that miſtake.

2. A needleſſe feare; they are afraid to affirm that God decreed and willed the fall of Adam, leſt they ſhould thereby make him the Author of ſinne.

p. 38Anſw. 1. To be the Author of ſinne is ſo to act as to ſtand under the guilt of ſinne, to be under the guilt of ſinne ſuppoſeth ſubjection to a law againſt which we act: Now let ſuch a law be ſhewed againſt which God offends in … ing that man (take it of the firſt man, and his firſt ſin) ſhall ſin.

2. Doth not God will the fall of Adam? How then?

1. Is it againſt his Will? But he is Omnipotent.

2. Is it without his Knowledge? But he is Omniſcient.

3. Is it beſide his Will? But 1. Not one hair from the head, nor a ſparrow to the ground, nor the iſſue of the lot in the lap without his diſpoſing. 2. Then did he not determine what ſhould be the end of man, when he intended to create him, nor what his courſe; by the ſame reaſon the ſame is to be ſaid for the Angells, nor how he would be glorified in the ſmall ſtate of men and Angells, nor the giving of Chriſt, nor the Goſpell in the world, the whole Oeconomy of mans ſalvation and condemnation, of the Kingdome of God here, and in heaven, of redemption by Chriſt, and thereupon his glory, all originally beſide the will of God ordered occaſionally: I had as lieve ſubſcribe to that wilde Philoſophie which teacheth the world to be made of the caſuall concourſe of Atomes, as to this more wild Theologie, which teacheth the whole adminiſtration of this world, and that to come, to come about meerly caſually and occaſionally.

We have formerly upon Rom. 9. v. 11. in the p. 39firſt Sermon laid down three arguments, proving the purpoſe of God to be meerly of it ſelfe, which will here fully conclude that both the ſin of the firſt man, and all ſins whatſoever are decreed by God, let us forme them to this particular.

1. He decrees to permit ſinne, (otherwiſe he could not ſo much as fore-ſee it, as was there manifeſted; againe, whereas he in time permits it, if he did not before all time will to permit it, it is with him according to mans weakneſſe, counſells ariſe in his breſt a new) therefore he decrees that ſin ſhall be upon his permiſſion, the permiſſion of ſinne cannot be conceived to have no further end, but that it ſhould reſt meerly in the act of permiſſion, and indeed the permiſſion of ſin doth involve the being of it upon permiſſion.

Further, foraſmuch as there is no evill but in good, and in every ſinfull act we have to conſider the act, and the ſin cleaving to the act, the act and that which is good he works, who is the firſt cauſe, the fountaine of being and goodneſſe, in whom we move, the ſin cleaving to the act he permits: Hence in Joſephs ſale by his brethren, the crucifying of Chriſt, the deſpoiling Job of all he had, &c. the will and the hand of God are owned; If God had not willed the crucifying of Chriſt, (and what greater ſinne?) how had he willed the ſalvation of man by Chriſt? which yet he willed from all eternity, Epheſ. 1.4. Again, if God willed not the fall of Adam, (and it the mother ſinne) how did he will the ſalvation of man by Chriſt? it being the firſt ſtep making way thereto; this leads to the

2. He that from all eternity wills that end p. 40which cannot be brought to paſſe without the being of ſinne, he wills that ſinne ſhall be, but God wills that end, the glorifying his ſparing mercy tempered with his juſtice in Chriſt, in the ſalvation of ſome, his revenging juſtice in the condemnation of others; and this way of glorifying himſelfe neceſſarily ſuppoſeth ſinne, there being no place for that kind either of mercy or juſtice without ſinne; therefore he wills that ſin ſhall be, and the firſt ſinne as well as any other, without which the other had not been: Hence

3. Though ſin be not good but evill, yet that ſinne ſhould be it is good, good foraſmuch as it is neceſſarily conducible to his glory, he having ſet downe in the counſell of his Will in ſuch a way to be glorified, but God wills all good, therefore he wills that ſinne ſhall be: Sin is evil, therefore it falls not under the Will of God to approve it, that ſin ſhould be is good, therefore it falls under the Will of God to decree it. Hence **Enchirid. c. 69.S. Auſtin, It is not to be doubted but God doth well, even in ſuffering to be done whatſoever things are evilly done; for this he ſuffers not but by a righteous judgement, and truly whatſoever is righteous is good, although therefore thoſe things which are evill, in as much as they are evill are not good; yet that not only thoſe things which are good, but which are evill too, ſhould be, is good: **Enchirid. c. 100.Whence after a wonderfull and unſpeakable manner, it is not brought to paſſe beſide his Will, that even againſt his Will is brought to paſſe not beſide his Will decreeing, which is againſt his Will approving.

4. For that Argument taken from the liberty p. 41of God both in and for his decree, apply it here to his Will, when he permits ſinne, whether the firſt ſin, or any other, and it will conclude his will neceſſarily determined beforehand by the creature, except we will grant, that he freely of himſelfe decreed thoſe ſins to be; many other Arguments might be added. As,

5. Otherwiſe the Will of God is not the firſt in the order of cauſes, is capable of motives from without, both which are clearly againſt the perfection of the Divine Nature, otherwiſe God is not ſo perfectly happy, but there is a happineſſe imaginable beyond his happineſſe: It is greater happineſſe that all things whatſoever be fully according to his Will, then that any thing be beſide it; and therefore foraſmuch as God is perfectly happy to the greateſt perfection imaginable, it muſt needs be his Will that thoſe things ſhould be, which yet he approves not as good, but approves as good, that they though not good, but evill, be.

Another Objection yet againſt this abſolute power in God: Did God make man to damne him, and to this end decree that he ſhould ſin?

Anſw. The Scripture doth not much abhorre from ſuch like expreſſions, He made the wicked for the day of evill, veſſells of wrath fitted for deſtruction, &c. but not according to the meaning of this Objection doth it uſe them, which holds forth thus much, as if the torments of periſhing ſinners ſhould be the Terminus acquieſcentiae in the breaſt of God, that wherein he reſts, as wherein he hath obtained his end, as willing their condemnation for it ſelfe.

God wills the condemnation of the Reprobate p. 42from himſelfe, and for himſelfe, not for it ſelfe; for it ſelfe, he neither wills the condemnation of the Reprobate, nor the ſalvation of the Elect, but he wills all things, and hath made all things that are made for his owne glory; therefore he hath not made man either to damne him, or to ſave him, in that ſenſe, but having determined to glorifie on the one hand his mercy tempered with his juſtice; on the other, his revenging juſtice in mans finall condition, he muſt needs determine thereupon, as the entire meanes without which that end could not be brought to paſſe, both to make man, and to permit him to linne, and to recover ſome from ſinne, and ſave them, to harden others in ſinne, and condemne them; ſo that the condemnation of the Reprobate is not the end of Gods decree, but part of that meanes whereby the end, the glory of his revenging juſtice is accompliſh't; therefore when it is ſaid, he made the wicked for the day of evill, it is ſaid withall, he made all things for himſelfe, veſſells of wrath fitted for deſtruction, withall that he might ſhew forth his wrath, and make his power knowne. And now we are come to the ſecond part of the Apoſtles anſwer, where he expoſtulates firſt, the ſupreme end: 2. The righteous execution of Gods decree.

1. The ſupreme ends: What if God willing to ſhew forth his wrath, and make his power known, v. 22. and that he might make known the riches of his glory, &c.? v. 23.

We have have ſeen formerly that which occaſions the Objection, v. 19. muſt needs be the decree of God, in that it ariſeth above the fall and creation of man: To this therefore the Apoſtle hath p. 43reſpect; Which, firſt, he juſtifies by the ends God propounded to himſelfe, The glorifying his juſtice and mercy. The glory of God is the end of all, Rom. 11.36. as all things from him, ſo all things to him; and as God is to be glorified of all, ſo is he all manner of wayes to be glorified, in all his Attributes diſplayed, his Wiſdome, Power, Holineſſe, Mercy, Juſtice, &c. this is by Divines called the good of the Univerſe, by Univerſe underſtanding all things created as one entire frame, ſo making (as it were) a clear Looking-Glaſſe, wherein the Majeſty of God ſhines forth, the good of the Univerſe that reſplendency and luſtre of the Divine Majeſty, in the manifeſtation of his perfections in all things: The wiſdom of God therefore dictating this way for the glory of his Mercy and Juſtice, (thoſe attributes into the glory whereof all the works of his hands are finally reſolved) God is hereby juſtified in his decree; and indeed this is the onelyonly Juſtice which can have place in the decrees of God, that he decree nothing but what is beſeeming his own wiſdom for his own glory, (Juſtitia condecentiae) and therefore the propoſal of ſuch an end as his wiſdome ſuggeſts to be for his glory, doth alone juſtifie God. Yet ſo doth he decree to glorifie his Juſtice, as withall his Power, or his dominion over his creature, which referrs ſtill to the liberty of his decree; ſo that whereas it is affirmed, that they are veſſells of wrath fitted for deſtruction, this hath reſpect to Gods intention, ordaining them to be ſuch as the Potter makes at his pleaſure his veſſels, ſome for honor, others for diſhonor; in vaine is that objection, that they are fitted of themſelves, which is ſo far true that they p. 44corrupt themſelves, and are ſo fitted for condemnation, but withall here is reference to Gods intention, becauſe his power or dominion is thus ſhewn over man to be created, as the Potters over his clay, according to Prov. 16.4.

2. The righteous execution, God condemns not till they have ſinned, nay, he indures them ſinning againſt him with much long-ſuffering, nay, we may adde that which other Texts of Scripture hold forth, he condemns none, but withall they condemn themſelves, in the midſt of all their queſtioning the juſtice of God, and cavilling againſt it, their owne conſcience gives teſtimony to the righteouſneſſe of God in condemning them. Here then we are to diſtinguiſh betwixt the decree and the execution of it; In the decree the Soveraignty, and therein the liberty of God hath place, and only that righteouſneſs whereby he is juſt to himſelfe, in being true to his own glory; In the execution of his decree, his righteouſneſs towards his creature hath place, in his decree he is not moved by any reſpect of ſin, in the execution of his decree he puniſheth not but for ſin; his decree therefore is ſo abſolute as withall regular: abſolute in it ſelfe, regular for execution, as above ſin, and all reſpects of ſin, ſo much as fore-ſeen as a motive to his will: So it is his will that for ſin, and for ſin onelyonly ſhall the reprobate be condemned, and the end of his decree being the glory of his uſtice, he can no other way condemn then for ſin.

Thus have we ſeen the Apoſtles diſcourſe of this great Myſtery, which being opened we ſhall be the clearer and briefer in the reſt.