The Lightless Star, Chapter 3
CHAP. III.
Goodwin.
COncerning the Word of God, it is to be acknowledged, that this is to be in speciall manner interessed in all our dijudications between Doctrine and Doctrine, Opinion and Opinion, in matter of Religion.
Resbury.
Why doe you not acknowledge it the perfect rule?
Goodwin.
And that this is the fire which must try every mans worke of what sort it is, and must separate the vil… from the precious.
Resbury.
Doe not you sit then as a Refiner by fire, of this fire it selfe, by your reason, so as to reject any thing that may be found in the Scripture, or regularly deduced there-from?
Goodwin.
But as the Plummet and Rule doe not measure the worke of the Architect, or discover whether it be true and square, or otherwise of, and by themselves, but as they are regularly applyed hereunto, either by the Workman himselfe, or some other, capable of making such an application; however true it may be that a sufficient test or proofe of the worke cannot be made without the use of the Plummet and Rule about it. In like manner, though the Word of God be of soveraigne use and necessity for the measuring of Opinions and Doctrines, and for the discovery of what is straight, and what crooked in them, yet he that desires to reap the Spirituall benefit, and advantage of the usefulnesse of it in this kind; must first understand the minde and sence of God in it aright; and secondly, Be dextrous, and expert in making a due application of it, being rightly understood, to the Doctrines, or Opinions, the soundnesse or unsoundnesse whereof he desires to understand by it.
Resbury.
To what end are these waste words? 1. The Scripture is the rule, and reason is the eye; but as the Scripture is the rule, so is it the light too, by which this eye must be enlightened, otherwise it is too darke to apply this rule. It is by the Scriptures that a right understanding is had of them, and a dextrous faculty for applying them, they being the meanes by the Holy Ghost appointed, and sanctified, for enlightening and sanctifying the reason of man. The Scripture is not only a rule for tryall, a… is that of the Architect, but for instructing too; it is such a rule, as gives rules for instructing and directing in all matters of Religion, and even for the use of it selfe, as a rule; and indeed that you may the lesse wonder hereat, all Arts are such rules, as give rules for understanding themselves.
Suppose this Geometricall question was to be debated', whither in a right angled Triangle the square of the Hypolemise be equall to the square of the sides? I thinke you will grant, that we must fetch the demonstration from Geometry it selfe, and the demonstration must conclude us; we must not say, though this proposition be demonstratively concluded in Geometry, yet we will question it, only indeed here is the difference; A Geometricall demonstration renders the conclusion not only agreeable to Principles, and former propositions in Geometry, by which it is demonstrated, but withall cleare to reason; but the conclusion of a Divine truth by Scripture is many times obscure to reason, though clearly agreeable to Principles, and other Doctrines in Scripture, because even those Principles and Doctrines proving it, are to mans reason▪ not for want of light in them, but through the blindnesse of it obscure. Yet shall reason see the legitimacy of the proofe, from Principles and Doctrines, in Scripture laid downe, when it hath very obscure apprehensions, both of the thing contained in the conclusion, and the things contained in the Principles and Doctrines proving it; these things faith beleeving upon the authority of the word affirming. 2. You deale with the Scriptures, as he, that because the rule and plummet doth not verifie the judgement, which he made by his eye at a guesse, he will therefore by his eye question the rule and plummet themselves; whilst you take liberty to question the authority of the Scriptures, and whether they be from God or not, upon supposall of something found in them, or regularly deduced from them, which relisheth not with your reason.
Goodwin.
For first, it is not the letter, or forme of words, as separated, or considered apart from the spirit, notion, or sence of them, that is the touch-stone, or rule of triall for Doctrines, yea, the letter and words are only servants to the sence and notion, which they containe and exhibit, and were principally, if not only, delivered by the Holy Ghost unto men for this end, that by them the sence, minde, and Counsell of God in all the particulari…ies of them, which are held forth in the Scriptures, might be communicated and conveyed to the reasons and understandings of men; so that in case a man had the sence and minde of God upon the same termes of certainty & of knowledge, without the letter on which he hath it, or may have it by meanes of the letter, he should be as richly, as compleatly qualified, hereby to discerne between Doctrines, as he now can be by the opportunity and advantage of the letter.
Resbury.
Words to no purpose still; 1. If the Letter and words of the Scripture be servants to the Sence and Notion, and so forth, as you declare, then is not that sence, which the letter and words exhibit (that is, the Grammar of the Scripture) in conjunction with the scope, context, and concordance thereof, that is, with the Logick of the Scripture, by mans reason to be questioned, but reason is to be captivate to the authority thereof. 2. I hope you doe not thinke of any way for obtaining the sence and minde of God, otherwise then by the letter; if an Angel from Heaven should preach any other Doctrine, let him be accurst.
Goodwin.
Now if the Scriptures themselves be upon no other termes, nor in any other case serviceable, or usefull unto men, for the tryall of Doctrines and Opinions, but only as and when they are clearly understood by them, it clearly followes, that whatsoever is requisite and necessary to bring men to a true understanding of the Scriptures, is of equall necessity for the distinguishing of Doctrines, and to interpose, or be made use of in all affaires and concernments in Religion; if then the reasons, judgements, and understandings of men must of necessity interpose, act, argue, debate, and consider before the true sence and minde of God in any Scripture can be duly apprehended, understood, and beleeved by men, it is a plaine case that these are to be used, and to be interessed in whatsoever is of any religious consequence, or concernment to us. That the minde of God in the Scriptures cannot be duly apprehended, received, or beleeved by men, but by the acting and working of their reasons, mindes, and understandings, in order hereunto, is evident from hence, viz. because the minde of God cannot be thus apprehended, or beleeved by men, but by meanes of an intellectuall or rationall difference tasted, or resented by them, between this minde of his, and all other mindes, meanings, or sences whatsoever, that may be supposed to reside, or be in the words.
Resbury.
If you was not a man, whose eare is chain'd to the musicke of his owne Tongue, you might spare the greatest part of your words, and yet speake as much as you doe. In what sence Reason is to be used, in what sence to be laid aside, we have seene already, as likewise the use and necessity of the Word of God, for begetting in mans understanding that intellectuall, or rationall difference tasted, or resented by him which you speake of, the Word being the rule and light to the understanding, as to matters of religion.
Goodwin.
For example, If there be another sence to be given of such, or such a passage of Scripture, either contrary unto, or differing from that, which I conceive to be the minde of God here, which hath the same rationall, or intellectuall savour and taste with this, that is, which as well suits with the words, agrees with the Context, falls in with the scope and subject matter in hand, is as accordable with Scripture-assertion elsewhere, co…ports as clearly with the unquestionable Principles of reason, and the like; how is it possible for me in this case to conceive or beleeve, especially with the certainty of faith, that my sence is the minde of God, and consequently the true sence of that place, rather then that other, which hath all the same Characters, Symptomes, and Arguments of being the minde of God, which none hath, therefore it must needs be by the exercise and acting of my reason and understanding, and by the report which they make of their discoveries in their enquiries, that I come regularly to conclude, and to be satisfied, that this is the minde of God in such or such a Scripture, and none other.
Resbury.
1 In our enquiries into the true meaning of any text of Scripture, the word it selfe by the formes of expression, scope, context, and agreement with Scripture-assertion elsewhere, is our Card, and compasse, by which reason is to steere her enquiry, not reason the Judge above, or against the word.
2 Such an example doe you here give, and so doe you state it, as it labours of a most evident contradiction. For how is it possible that two different, much lesse contrary sences, should have▪ the same intellectuall taste, or savour, should as well suit with the words, agree with the context, and have those other Characters, which you name, one as another? Secondly, suppose such a thing possible, how is it yet possible that reason should determine which is the true sence? If both sences have both Scripture and reason equally for them, as is here supposed, whence shall reason frame a judgement for this rather then that, or for that rather then this? I beleeve you made great haste, when you made so little speed. One thing further let me minde you of, that wheras you begin with intellectual savour and taste, and conclude with the unquestionable principles of reason, you might in both have spared your paines, for where the other Characters are found, they will conclude the sence, and if reason shall discerne them, she must needs see there is reason to conclude with them.
Goodwin.
If it be here objected, and demanded; But is it meet, or tolerable, that the reason of man should judge in the things of God? or that the understandings of men should umpire, and determine in his affaires? I answer;
1 If God pleaseth to impart his minde, and Counsels in his Word and writing unto men, with an injunction, and charge, that they receive and owne them, as from him, and that they take heed they doe not mistake him, or embrace either their owne conceits, or the mindes of others, in stead of his, in this case for men to put a difference by way of judging and discerning between the minde of God, and that which is not his minde, is so farre from being an act of Authority, Presumption, or unseemly Vsurpation in men, that it is a fruit of their deep loyalty, submission, and obedience unto God. When Christ enjoyned the Disciples of the Pharisees, and the Herodians, to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesars, and unto God the things which are Gods; he did not only give them a warrant, and Commission to judge and determine what, and which were the things of God, as well as which were the things of Caesar, but laid a charge upon them also, to put this warrant in execution; and this not only by judging actually which were the things of God, but by practising and acting also, upon and according to this judgement.
2 To judge of God, and of the things of God, in the sence we now speake, is but to acknowledge, owne, and receive God, and the things of God, in their transcendent excellency, goodnesse, and truth, and as differenced in their perfections respectively, from all other beings and things; the poorest and meanest subject that is may lawfully, and without any just offence, judge his Prince, yea, or him that is made a lawfull Iudge over him, to be wise, just, bountifull, &c. at lest when there is sufficient ground for it.
Resbury.
Here according to your manner, you spin out your discourse by triviall Objections, and Answers; for your answer it is true, allowing the Scripture the honour to guide and rectifie reason by her assertions, and by her authority to conclude it: but both the Objection and Answer tedious, because impertinent.
Goodwin.
If it be yet further demanded; But is the reason or understanding of man competent to judge the things of God, as (for example) to determine, and conclude what is the minde of God in such or such a passage of Scripture, or in such and such a case? Doth not the Scripture speake of men in their naturall condition, calling them darknesse? affirming likewise, That the light shineth in darknesse, and the darknesse comprehendeth it not? and elsewhere doth it not informe us, that the naturall man perceiveth (or receiveth) not the things of the Spirit of God, because they are foolishnesse unto him? neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned? And how many Heathen Philosophers, Hereticks, and others undertaking to judge of the things of God in the Gospell, by the light and strength of their owne reasons, and understandings, have miscarried, to the everlasting perdition of their owne soules, and as is much to be feared, of many others also? to all this I answer by degrees.
Resbury.
More spinning still; He that hath an opinion to broach that may not abide the light, must not presently lay it downe in termes, but by winding discourses and fetches about usher it in. Master Goodwin is no Novice at this Artifice. Hence we had before such a long and plausible discourse against Errour in generall, wherein were couched many insinuations against the darknesse and impotency of the naturall mans understanding; then a confused and cl…morous Discourse about the necessity, interest, and use of reason in matters of Religion, and of a Spirituall or supernaturall concernment, till at last he came boldly up to vent his Socinian Errour. After which againe, no little impertinent objecting and answering, and having by this time, as he hopes, discomposed the judgement, and scattered the intention of his Reader, he is now hastening to speak out, what he durst but mutter all this while, and make for at a distance, by way of glancing, rather then asserting his Pelagian Doctrine, for which even his Socinian Doctrine hath been making way, and must still be employed in this service. And now good Reader, we are approaching that corrupt Tenet of his, which we gave notice of at the end of his Discourse against Errour, and which we then promised to call to account in its proper place.