Friendly Debate with Non-Conformist Part 3 Appendix, Postscript
A Postſcript.
I Had no ſooner run over this Apologetical Catechiſm, and made a few Reflections on it, but I received a Caſe of Conſcience from you, wherein I am alſo concern'd. A very weighty one it is, and as weightily and ſolidly reſolved, if the Caſuiſt may be his own Judge; who ſeems to have no low opinion of his own performance, but rather thinks we may chance to be beholden to him for a new invention. Here, ſaith he, p. 6. is that very MEAN indeed, for ought I know, which is wanting. A great Diſcovery! And for ought I know, may any body reply, that which is not wanting, but is the very dangerous Extream into which the people are as apt to run, as he is to follow thoſe with whom I have already had to deal. It would be no great matter indeed if he imitated them onelyonly in their phraſe, and not in their weak reaſonings and frivolous obſervations; but he is too forward to that alſo: and is a notable inſtance of the truth of my Lord Bacon's obſervation, that there is little dry light aLetter to Mr. Mathews, p. 69.in the world; but it is all moiſt, being infuſed and ſteeped in affections, bloud and humours. The Reaſon of men is made to ſtoop to their intereſt, and they judge according to the current of their inclinations and deſires.
I had ſome hopes that ſober men would have conſented to that which I ſaid in the Continuation bPag. 128, 129. edit. 1of our Debate, and judged it very unbecoming ſuch frail underſtandings as ours, to go about to unfold the ſecrets of high Providence, and aſſigne the cauſes and reaſons of thoſe particular calamities which befal their neighbours. Nay, common prudence I thought would have taught any conſidering man to forbear the making ſuch obſervations, as may be employed to any purpoſe, even againſt thoſe that make them: inſomuch that they who have ſerved themſelves by ſuch arguments, when it comes to their own turn to ſuffer▪ can by no means endure to hear of them. And yet, behold, a grave Caſuiſt come forth, who not onelyonly ſpells, but thinks he can read the meaning of Divine Providence toward the late Lord Chancellor of England, who is not ſuffered now to live in it. He hath pickt it out of his own Letter left at his departure out of the Realm, in which he acknowledges that his Credit had been very little ſince that Seſſion of Parliament which was at Oxford. What of all that? Why, he was the Contriver of that Act, ſays the interpreter of Providence, which baniſhed Others from their houſes; after which his Authority dwindled ſo much, that at laſt he was forced to leave his own houſe. As much as to ſay, if you will have the ſenſe of this Privie Counſellor of Heaven in plain words, God puniſhes him now for all that he did againſt them. No, perpaps you will ſay, againſt God: for ſo the words run in his Prayer for him which immediately follows, Do not thou, O God, for all he hath done againſt thee, &c. But I ſuppoſe you underſtand the meaning of their words, and their opinion of themſelves better, then not to know that what is done againſt them, is, as they conſtrue it, done againſt God: and ſo whatever Calamity befalls any man after he hath oppoſed them, it is the hand of God avenging the quarrel of his people. Thus Mr. Baily, I remember, in that Book which I have oft had occaſion to mention, talks of ſtrange puniſhments which God from heaven viſibly inflicted cReview, chap. 1. p. 2….upon Mr. Corbet, the Author of a Book called Lyſimachus Nicanor, and Mr. Maxwel who wrote another called Iſſachar's burden: both againſt them, their Diſcipline and proceedings. And what were thoſe viſible Judgements? Nothing but this; the Former, as I learn from the Second Fair Warning, was murdered by the Iriſh; and the Later (being Archbiſhop of Towmond) was ſtript ſtark naked, and left deſperately wounded, but by Gods mercy recovered, and afterwards died a natural death. Had the like befaln any couple of his Brethren, (as that learned Writer adds) he would have been forward to write with their bloud ſome red letters in the Calendar, and made them paſs currantly for two Martyrs of the Diſcipline. But theſe things befalling two perſons who expoſed their evil principles and practices to the view of the world, they were black marks of Gods diſpleaſure, brands of infamy wherewith they were ſtigmatized from heaven for writing againſt his choſen. So we muſt believe, if we did not know very well, that the hand of heaven (to uſe his words once more) is not guided by the mouth, nor Gods judgments diſcerned alway by the eye of the Diſciplinarian Brethren: who we have little reaſon to think are well ſeen in the Myſteries of Providence, when we finde them ſtone-blinde in the moſt common and ordinary matters. For who is there that ſees not, how by this wretched way of diſcourſing the worſt Cauſe may be juſtified, and the beſt that is may be condemned? If all things that fall out one after the other, muſt be thought to have the ſame connexion, which the effect hath with the cauſe; Popery will prove it ſelf the true Chriſtianity, unleſs you can ſhow that you have the ſole priviledge to expound Gods Providence, and that no-body elſe may intermeddle in it. The Tenth Argument of Bellarmine dTom. 2. l. de Reliquit. & Imag. cap. 12.for Image-Worſhip is drawn meerly from the unfortunate ends and ill ſucceſſes of the Iconomachi, (thoſe that ſet themſelves againſt Images) and the felicity of thoſe who defended them. Firſt of all, in the time of Leo Iſaurus, after the Images of the Saints were burnt in Conſtantinople, there enſued a Peſtilence in which died three hundred thouſand people. The ſame Emperour and his Succeſſors loſt Italy, and could never recover it. In the times alſo of Conſtantinus Copronymus, another enemy of Images, entire Cities were overthrown by Earthquakes; a grievous Peſtilence raged, ſo that there was ſcarce room to bury the dead. And that there might be no doubt, ſaith the Cardinal, for what cauſe theſe things happened, there were at the ſame time little Croſſes to be ſeen on the garments of men, and the Prieſts veſtments, as if they had been drawn with oyl. There was ſuch an horrible Cold alſo, that the Pontick Sea was frozen for an hundred miles together, and the Ice was thirty Cubits thick; upon which a Snow fell twenty Cubits in depth: and when a Thaw came, great pieces of this Ice like Mountains or Iſlands ſwam up and down with great violence; and ſome daſhing againſt the walls of Conſtantinople, broke down a part of them, and overturn'd the adjoyning houſes. And yet the calamities were not compleated, but a great Drought followed all this, ſo that Fountains, Wells and Rivers were dryed up. Whereby all might underſtand, ſaith this Roman Diviner, that God was angry at their impiety againſt him and againſt his Saints. For laſtly Conſtantine himſelf, that obſtinate Emperour, died wretchedly; when on the contrary, they that with the Pope of Rome ſtood up for Images and defended them, were promoted to Kingdom and Empire, lived proſperouſly and reigned happily. What an heap of Obſervations are here to countenance that which you ſo much abhor? Who can chuſe but take notice how God declared himſelf from heaven by all theſe Prodigies to be an enemy of thoſe who were enemies of Images? When do you read of ſo many and ſo great misfortunes and dreadful Calamities in any age, as theſe upon the haters of Images; which point, as it were with the finger, to you that they ought to be worſhipped? If you like not this kinde of arguing, I pray let it alone your ſelves. Let us not hear any more of the ſad things which befal any particular men, as if they were upon the ſcore of oppoſing or puniſhing Nonconformiſts. Nor tell us of any more Prodigies and Signes of Gods diſpleaſure againſt the Realm, which have appeared ſince you were pulled down, like to thoſe Images; much leſs expound thoſe terrible Judgements which have juſtly befaln us (though not equal to thoſe now mentioned) to be puniſhments for any thing done againſt you, and arguments that you are approved by heaven, and we rejected. After this manner the very Heathens defended their Idols, as the Papiſts do their Images. All things went ill with thoſe who deſpiſed them; Auguſtus, Veſpaſian, Titus had proſperous Succeſſes & fortunate Reigns; but the poor Chriſtians, the great enemies of their Gods, were dragged continually by the Hang-man to be butchered, ſuffered the moſt exquiſite torments, and for three hundred years together were moſt miſerably haraſed, and barbarouſly uſed. And thus Parſons I remember diſputes againſt all the Proteſtants from the unhappie ſucceſs of thoſe Princes which have in any ſort oppoſed themſelves to the See of Rome, as you may read at large in his Apologetical Epiſtle eAn. 1601 ſect. 7.; none of which I ſhall now ſtand to tranſcribe.
This is ſufficient to ſhew what may be expected from this New Undertaker: who will appear, I doubt not, as lame in his other reaſonings as he doth in this; and prove as unfit to determine Caſes of Conſcience, as to make Obſervations upon Providence. For firſt, he doth not fairly and candidly repreſent that which I ſaid, but accuſes me of ſuch Reſolutions in matters of Conſcience, as never came into my thoughts. I am beholden to him, I confeſs, for ſome good words, and for his favourable opinion of me; but I could have been well content to have wanted them, on condition he would not have ſaid, that I am ſo unkind, and ſo unconſcionably untender, as to account that no man who tranſgreſſes an Act of Parliament can be a good Chriſtian fIn the later end of the firſt page.; nor askt, Whether indeed I think that every tranſgreſſion of a Realm is no leſs then a deadly ſin? There was no occaſion for this Queſtion, or for that Cenſure: unleſs he be of the opinion that all ſins are equal, ſo that what a man ſaith concerning the open breach, and contempt of one Law, is to be applied to all tranſgreſſions whatſoever of any Law. I never ſaid that no man can be a good Chriſtian that tranſgreſſes an Act of Parliament, nor that every tranſgreſſion of a Statute is a deadly ſin. Theſe are inventions of his own, upon occaſion onelyonly of a ſingle inſtance which I gave of Defiance to a Law wherein ſome men live (mark my wordsgFriendly Debate, p. 3. Edit. 1.. From whence he draws an univerſal propoſition, that he might the better conclude me to be a man of no great depth hP. 3 of his Caſe., that looks not to the bottom of a buſineſs which lies before him. That may very well be true; for it is no eaſie matter: But I will try a little how far I can ſee into this Caſe concerning the tranſgreſſion of humane Laws: which, as I take it, depends upon this ſingle point, Whether humane Laws binde the Conſcience? that is, whether we ſin, if we be not obedient to them? In the reſolving of which he that findes no di…ficulty, may well ſuſpect that he doth not fully underſtand it. For if, on the one ſide, we ſay that Conſcience is not concerned; I beſeech you what is? Nothing but our common diſcretion to keep our ſelves out of the reach of the Princes Sword; whoſe anger and power we may dread, but whoſe commands we need not care a ſtraw for. And if on the other ſide, we ſay that Conſcience is concerned and obliged by their Laws, then there may follow great perplexities, when any thing is commanded that proves a common and an intolerable grievance. More difficulties I need not mention of this nature; there being no diſpute about commands to do ſinful things: but immediately apply my diſcourſe to the Queſtion. And for all that which was laſt ſaid, ſince there is no greater miſchief then diſobedience to Laws, and nothing can ſo certainly ſecure obedience, as a ſenſe of duty; we muſt determine that a man is bound to make a conſcience of obſerving the Laws of his Governours, which are not contrary to the Laws of God. So the holy Scripture it ſelf teaches us to ſpeak, when it requires us, and makes it neceſſary, to be ſubject for conſcience ſake, and not onelyonly for wrath, Rom. 13.5. that is, out of a ſenſe that we cannot be innocent, and preſerve a good conſcience before God, unleſs we be obſervant of their Laws, where we are not pre-ingaged by a higher Authority then theirs. The very ſame is included in thoſe words, which require our ſubmiſſion to every ordinance of man for the Lords ſake, 1 Pet. 2.13. which if we do not yield, it is manifeſt, the diſobedience is a violation of a General precept of God exacting our obedience to them. Inſomuch that to ſet a mans ſelf in oppoſition to their Laws, is by interpretation to oppoſe the Almighty: according to that of the Apoſtle, Whoſoever reſiſteth the Power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God.
Yes, ſaith this Caſuiſt; but will you pronounce thus without any diſtinction? Doth a man commit a deadly ſin every time that he tranſgreſſes an Act of Parliament? I anſwer, That's without the limits of the Queſtion. We are not ſpeaking of the degrees of ſin, which are of more or leſs guilt according as the Law is of greater or leſſer concernment, and as a mans tranſgreſſion of it, is with modeſtie, or with a high hand: nor are we conſidering when, and in what caſes, a Law may ceaſe to oblige, and quite alters its nature: but whether while it doth oblige, and is in force, it lays a tye on the Conſcience or no, and whether all Laws do ſo or no. And to this we ſay, Yes; [Laws while they are obligatory do binde the Conſcience] becauſe the Scripture ſaith ſo: and we ſay ſo indefinitely, becauſe that's the Scripture-language alſo. But ſtay a little; this Gentleman cannot believe that. The Scripture ſaith the Magiſtrate is Gods miniſter to us for good, Rom. 13.4. Very true; and the Apoſtle makes that an argument why we ſhould be obedient to him, becauſe it is much for our profit and benefit. But this Caſuiſt turns the words quite another way, and makes them an outlet to diſobedience: by taking that to include an Exception to the General precept of ſubjection, which is in truth Nothing but a Reaſon to inforce it. To countenance which interpretation, he tears a little patch out of Biſhop Taylor's Rule of Conſcience, and would draw him into confederacie with him: who accommodates indeed thoſe words of the Apoſtle to the illuſtration of a particular caſe, but never intended any ſuch uſe of them as this man makes; as is apparent from the entire Body of his diſcourſe, and ſhall be touched afterward. Now let us hear this mans Exception. If the Magiſtrate, ſaith he, command that which is for the peoples Good and welfare, they are bound in conſcience to obey him: otherwiſe they are not bound in conſcience, but for wrath ſake; that is, becauſe they dare not do as they would and as they may. Very well: But who ſhall judge of that; I mean, whether a Law be for the Publike good, or no? His Anſwer is ready at his tongues end, (for he need not go deep for it) The Magiſtrate muſt judge what is for the Publick good as to the MAKING of the Law: and we muſt judge as to our OBEDIENCE to it. Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconſiderate or dangerous, and it declares to me, that he did not underſtand or minde the meaning of the words which he wrote. For what do we mean by a Law? Doth not the very form or eſſence of it (as the Caſuiſts ſpeak) conſiſt in the Precept or the Command of the Law-giver? If ſo; then that which we call a Law is not meerly the ſignification of his minde and judgement, that he thinks ſuch a thing to be good or bad for us: but a declaration of his will and pleaſure that we ſhould do that good or avoid that evil which he commands us to do or avoid: And, God having given him this authority to command us, this declaration carries with it an obligatory vertue to bind us to the execution of his will, under the pain of ſin. Nor is it of any moment, as to the obligation, whether there be a puniſhment threatned or not by him to the diſobedient. For the puniſhment is neceſſary onelyonly by conſequence, and upon ſuppoſition that the people may be negligent and refractory to the will of the Law-giver, unleſs they be moved to comply with that which he thinks neceſſary to be obſerved, by fear of puniſhment. To make a Law then is to declare to us his will to lay ſuch an obligation upon us. When this is done, we are no longer free whether we will do accordingly or no. If we be, the very nature of a Law is taken away, and every man is left to his own will. That which we call a Law, is but onelyonly the Princes opinion concerning that which he judges to be for the Publike good; and ſo he is turned into a private perſon, and made like one of his ſubjects; for they obey not his judgement and pleaſure, but their own. And if he puniſh them for diſobeying his, that is onelyonly a ſigne that he is ſtronger then they, who ſuffer unjuſtly for doing well, not for doing ill.
But let us hear his reaſon for this wonderful deciſion; which he hath as ready as he had his Anſwer. Becauſe, ſaith he, God hath made every man judge of his own actions. What then? That you muſt ſeek by looking back, if perchance you may finde ſome Conſequent of which this is the cauſe. The Queſtion, you remember, was, Who ſhall judge what Laws are for the Peoples Weal, i. e. the Common Good of them all? Why, the Magiſtrate may judge thus far, as to make Laws; but the People themſelves muſt judge, as to their obedience, i. e. they are not bound to do any thing he bids them, unleſs they think it is for their welfare. Why ſo? Becauſe, ſaith he, every man is made by God the Judge of his own Actions. I cannot for my life ſee how that follows from this, though I have put his reaſoning into the plaineſt form that ever I could. Which is this: God hath made every man judge of his own Actions, therefore he hath made him judge what Laws are for the Peoples Weal, before he obey them. If he can ſhew me the neceſſary connexion of theſe two, and that the former infers the latter, I ſhall acknowledge that he is a deep man, and much beyond my reach. But they ſeem to me ſo widely diſtant, that one can never paſs from the one to the other by the longeſt train of Conſequences. That you may think indeed is the fault of the ſhortneſs of my Diſcourſe, which will not bring me within view of this Truth: For he reckons me to be ſuch a pitiful Gameſter, that I am not reflective (as he ſpeaksiPag. 3.) upon more removes than one of thoſe many I ought to ſee. It may be ſo, and I am not unſenſible of my own weakneſs; yet I have done my endeavour to comprehend him, and to fathom the bottom of his deep Diſcourſe, which ſeems to me ſhorter and more imperfect than he thinks mine. For he doth not reflect on that which is juſt next to what he hath ſaid and lies cloſe to it; whilſt he rambles to that which lies ſo far off that no removes will bring him to it. Let him try, if he pleaſe: And begin with this Principle, God hath made every man judge of his own Actions; which may be put into theſe more intelligible words, God hath made every man to determine whether that which he doth be conformable to his Rule, which is the Law or Will of his Creator. Now what is next to this? Therefore, according to this Caſuiſt, He hath made every man to determine what Laws are for the Publick Good before he obey them. Doth this follow the other? No ſuch matter. The immediate Conſequent of that Principle is this, therefore he hath made him to determine, whether that which Humane Laws enjoyn be not croſs to his Rule, the Law of God. Now whither will this carry us, or what lies next to it? This; I take it, That if what Humane Laws enjoyn be not controlled by that higher Law, he is determined by his very Rule of life to be obedient in that Point. Whether it be for the Publick Good or no that he ſhould do it, is another thing, out of the compaſs of his Judgment; God having made another Judge of that, viz. his Prince, the Governour and Ruler of all. Who by the vety making a Law determines what is for the Publick Good, and obliges us, as hath been ſaid already, to comply with it by virtue of Gods Law which requires our ſubjection to him. This is implied in the very term of making a Law: And therefore it is not ſenſe to ſay, He ſhall judge what is good as to the making a Law, and we as to obedience; for he doth not only judge, but enjoyn when he makes a Law. Which leaves us no liberty but that which he cannot take away (becauſe given us by him, that gave him his Authority) to judge whether his Will and Gods do not claſh together. When this is known and determined, we have no more to do, unleſs we will place our ſelves in the Throne, and become Sovereigns, by determining otherwiſe concerning the Publick Welfare than the Proper Judge of it doth. Which in this Nation would be the more inſolent and unſufferable, Becauſe there is nothing determined here to be for the Peoples good, and paſſes into a Law for them, but by the advice, deſire, and conſent of thoſe whom the People themſelves chuſe to repreſent them, and to conſider and judge what is moſt conducing to their Welfare. This is plain reaſon; and whatſoever inconveniences may enſue from hence, they ſhall be conſidered afterward: And ſhould there be no way found to avoid them, they will appear not to be ſo great, as to reſolve in general terms, as this man doth, that they who are to obey, and to follow Publick Orders and Decrees, are to judge themſelves what is for the Publick Good. Mark I pray you, whither theſe Caſuiſts drive. Other Non-conformiſts have abſolved the People from all Laws about Church matters: And here now is one ſtarted up to teach them how to free themſelves, if they pleaſe, from all Civil Laws and Statutes of the Realm. None ſhall bind but ſuch as they think good: That is, every man is made a King and Governour himſelf. The danger of which determination I ſhall a little lay before you.
Firſt, it is certainly no eaſie thing to judge what is beſt for the Peoples good: But Kings themſelves find it neceſſary to have their Council to deliberate and adviſe them to that which will promote it, which they declare to their People by their Laws. And if they did not, the Publick Welfare would be but little regarded, though we ſuppoſed every man better able to anderſtand it than he is.
For (ſecondly) when men do know what is conducing to it, they will not preſently do it, if their preſent private Intereſt incline them otherways. From which two grounds Plato I remember derives the neceſſity of Laws. There are few private perſons that know what is moſt profitable for Common Life, and of thoſe that know, fewer can or will do it, unleſs the will of a Superiour Power be ſignified to them and oblige them to it. It is not hard indeed to know what will pleaſe themſelves, and may make for their own private utility: But what will make for the General Good, that is difficult for them to comprehend, and more difficult to bring them to do it, becauſe they are not inclined to prefer the good of all before that of their own Private Perſons. No, Mortal Nature kPlato L. 9. de Legibus, p. 875, 880. foreign, &c.hath a violent Propenſion to covet and draw all to its particular ſelf; always flying, after a brutiſh manner, that which it feels grievous, and purſuing that which is pleaſant and delightful. For which reaſon Law is needful to bound, direct, and govern him; ſince of himſelf he will not mind the Publick Good. If indeed men were of ſuch a nature, ſaith he, that they underſtood the Common Good, and had ſuch a portion of Divinity in them, that they would alway follow it, they would ſtand in need of no Law: For that would be better than any Law or Order whatſoever. But ſince it is rare to find ſuch men; we muſt make the World as good as we can, by making them ſubject to a better and more diſintereſſed reaſon than their own, which is the Publick Order and Law lforeign.. And whoſoever he be that makes every man judge of what is for the Peoples Weal, that man takes away the principal Power of the Magiſtrate. For he ſuppoſes the People able to judge of that; and if they be, there is no need of any Law; and conſequently of no Law-giver.
But thirdly, they are ſo far from being able to judge what is for the Publick good, that the wiſeſt and beſt Princes with their Councils find it very difficult; and in many Caſes are a long time conſidering about it before they come to a reſolution. And that, though they have the help of thoſe who have been long verſed in affairs of this nature, and it is their buſineſs on which they attend; they have nothing elſe to mind unleſs they pleaſe, and information comes to them from all parts, which every private man cannot have; but as he hath ſomething elſe to do, ſo he can know but a few of thoſe things which are to be conſidered in the caſe. Good and evil, gain and loſs, advantage and diſadvantage (as that excellent BiſhopmReplic. to Biſh. of Chalcedon. p. 235, 236 I have ſo often cited may teach him) ought not to be weighed or eſteemed from the conſideration of one or two Circumſtances or Emergents. All Charges, Damages, and Repriſes muſt firſt be caſt up and deducted before one can give a right eſtimate of benefit or loſs. If a Merchant reckon only the Price which his Commodity coſt him beyond the Sea, without accounting Cuſtomes, Freight, and other Charges, he will impoveriſh himſelf, when he thinks he hath ſold it to good profit. If the benefit alſo be only Temporal, and the loſs Spiritual (which few think of) as to gain Gold and loſe Faith, which is more pretious than Gold that periſheth, it is no benefit, whatever a man imagines, but loſs and damage. The Engliſh Church and the Engliſh Kingdom are one and the ſame Society of men, differing not Really, but Rationally one from another, in reſpect of ſome diſtinct Relations. And that which is truly good for the Kingdom of England cannot be ill for the Church of England▪ nor that which is truly good for the Engliſh Church be ill for the Engliſh Kingdom. But yet, alaſs! how hard is it to comprehend what is good for both, and how few can attain it? When ſo many men are to be conſidered in different relations, and there are ſo many things and circumſtances that muſt be conſidered to make them happy in both thoſe relations; and when their good and happineſs depend not upon what is done for them in one, but in both, nor in a reſpect to a few Circumſtances, but to all: any of which if they be wanting, it is not good, but evil. I need not mention the Rule for this, which is commonly known: but ask now, what ſhall be done when there are ſo many things to be conſidered, which will coſt ſo much time and pains to weigh, before we can know what will make for the Publick Good? Shall a Private man (whom we now ſuppoſe to have the liberty which this Caſuiſt gives) judge without conſidering or attending to all thoſe things which the Supreme Magiſtrate had a regard to in making his Law? This is very hard, that a Publick Decree, ſtanding on ſuch good grounds, ſhould be thrown down by one that knows them not. And how ill will the Publick Good be provided for at this rate, by thoſe that know little what belongs to it? Or ſhall we ſuppoſe every Private man to be of quicker diſpatch than their Governours, able to run over all things that are to be conſidered with more ſpeed than they can do? That's very unlikely, if you reflect upon all that hath been ſaid; and that they have not thoſe advantages of knowing neither what is to be conſidered, as Publick perſons have. Or, in concluſion, muſt the Prince be content to wait till his Subjects have found means to know all that he doth, and till they have conſidered it, and till they be ſatisfied that his Law is for the Publick Good, before he expect any obedience from them? What then ſhall become of the Publick Good all that time which they take to think of the buſineſs? And who knows how long it will be before they are informed and have conſidered all things? And what if they be ſo ſcrupulous as never to be ſatisfied, becauſe for any thing they know there is more to be conſidered than they have yet heard of? Beſides; there are ſome Laws which require ſpeed and Expedition in the execution: Muſt all theſe ſtand ſuſpended, no body knows how long, till the Subjects be agreed they are for the Publick Good? Muſt the Equity, Fitneſs, and Profitableneſs be ſifted by every man if he pleaſe; and after all, if he do not like it, may it be rejected? The Prince is in an ill caſe who hath ſuch Subjects; and he is not in very good whoſe Divines begin but to inſtill ſuch Doctrine into them.
For (fourthly) grant the Subjects ſuch power, and in a little time no Law ſhall be obſerved, unleſs it be by the duller ſort of People: The ſubtil, the fine, and the Conceited will be under no Obligation. Such as the Lacedaemonians, who could not tell to twentynforeign, &c. Plato in Hippia Majori. as we ſay, may prove much addicted to Laws (as Plato tells us they were above all the Graecians) but they who have more skill, and eſpecially ſuch as can tell how numerous their Party is, will eaſily abſolve themſelves, if it be againſt their private intereſt to obey them. For ſuch is the paſſionate love men bear to their own private Concerns, that they will be very prone to conclude a thing to be a publick miſchief, which is only a particular burden to their dear ſelves. Let the Parliament, for inſtance, grant his Majeſty a Tax, and it will be poorly paid at this race, and many times not without force: He muſt take it from his Subjects by violence, and be accounted an Oppreſſour, if they judge it not to be for the Common Good. And it will be very hard for thoſe that love money not to be of that judgment. Their Covetouſneſs will ſuggeſt to them, that he ſtands in no need of it, having a great Revenue; or that it is not for a good End; or that the Proportion is too great for thoſe ends that are pretended; and an hundred ſuch like things too long to remember. Nay, what ſhould hinder if he exact it of a poor people, as they may vote themſelves, but that they take Arms alſo for the Publick Good, and the eaſe of the Subjects, as they did in Richard the Second's time? The Parliament at Northampton granted the King a great Subſidy of Head-money, at which ſome of the Rabble took great diſtaſte, and ſaid it was an Oppreſſion, and tended to their utter undoing. Preſently the reſt prick'd up their ears at the new truth, and the glorious diſcovery which was made of the peoples right to preſerve themſelves. They were aſhamed of their old ignorance, and reſolved to prove good Scholars of thoſe Maſters who taught them not to ſuffer any thing to be done to the Peoples hurt. Their Lords and the Lawyers they learnt were Tyrants who muſt not be endured: And therefore to their Arms they betook themſelves to root them out. And who could blame them, ſince they were Judges of their own Actions, and muſt determine what is for the Peoples Weal? Thus they did alſo in after times, when Henry the Seventh had an aid granted him by Parliament, in the beginning of his third year, toward the Relief of the Duke of Brittain, aſſaulted by the French King. And although the King did not enter into the War but by the advice of the Three Eſtates, who willingly contributed to it, yet the Northern men raiſed a Rebellion under colour of the money impoſed, and murthered the Earl of Northumberland, whom the King had imployed in that Collection: As you may find in our Hiſtorians, and in a Dialogue oPrinted at Middleburgh, 1628.between a Councellour of State and a Juſtice of Peace, ſaid to be writ by Sir Walter Rawleigh. In his thirteenth year alſo, as you may there find (p. 50.) a new Subſidy being granted, the Corniſh men took Arms, as the Northern men of the Biſhoprick had done before. And indeed, thus the Tumults in Scotland began: They muſt take care of the peoples good, whatſoever became of the Laws. And though the Law conſtrue all Levying of War (as that Dialogue obſerves, p. 36) without the Kings Commiſſion, and all Forces raiſed to be intended for the death and deſtruction of the King, not attending the ſequel; and it is judged ſo upon reaſon (ſaith he) for every unlawful and ill action is ſuppoſed to be accompanied with an ill intent: Yet the Publick Security was pretended, and upon this ſcore a new Government by Tables (as they called them) erected expreſly againſt the Kings Commandment, a Covenant entred into, and a ſeditious Band annexed to it, ſeveral Troops raiſed, and at laſt an Army formed, for the peace and comfort of all the people pThey were their own words. By all which you ſee plainly that this Principle leads to downright Rebellion, if the Subjects think good to follow it; they being Judges as well of that which they are to do, as of that which they are not to do. But let us, if you pleaſe, content our ſelves with ſome leſſer inſtances of its miſchievous conſequence. A Prieſt of the Roman Church thinks, notwithſtanding the Laws which prohibit him, that it is for the Peoples Weal for him to come hither and draw the Kings Subjects to a dependence on the Pope. Doth he ſin in this, or doth he not? If he do, then this Principle is naught: For he is Judge of his own Actions as well as you. Why ſhould he not? Since every man is made by God the Judge of them. From whence he may conclude, with this Caſuiſt, that he is not tied to obey any Law which he thinks is not for the Peoples good. The very ſame Pretenſe the People will have, ſhould they moleſt or drive away thoſe ſtrangers that live among them, though the Law ſhould not only permit, but invite them to tranſplant themſelves hither, becauſe they eat the bread out of the Natives mouths. And this was the very caſe in 9th year of Hen. 8. 1517. when there was a great heart-burning againſt Aliens in the City, eſpecially among the Artificers, who were much grieved that ſo many ſtrangers were permitted to reſort hither. And one John Lincoln, a Broker, buſied himſelf ſo far in the matter (which afterward brought him to the Gallows) that about Palm-Sunday he came to Dr. Standiſh, who was to preach at the Spittle on Monday in Eaſter Week, and deſired him he would declare the great miſchief that was like to come to the Realm by the liberty which Strangers enjoyed: and he offered him a Bill to read, which he refuſed. But he prevailed with him that was to preach on the Tueſday to accept it, and publiſh it: The Contents of which was, the grief which many found by Strangers who took away the living from Artificers, &c. When he had read it, he began his Sermon with this Sentence, The Heaven is the Lords, but the Earth he hath given to the Children of men. From whence he ſhewed by as plain conſequence as this in our Caſuiſt, that this Land is given to Engliſh men, and therefore as Birds defend their Neſts, ſo ought Engliſhmen to cheriſh and maintain themſelves in their Land, and to grieve and hurt Aliens, for reſpect of their Common-wealth. I will not trouble you with the reſt of the StoryqWhich you may find in the Survey of Lond… by J. Stow, p. 152, &c. nor with the Uſes or Application which the People made of this goodly Sermon: Only this you may know in general, that they beſtirred themſelves luſtily for reſpect of their Common-wealth. That was the word then, as now it is in this Caſuiſt, the Peoples Weal: of which he teaches them to take a tender care. And it will be no hard matter to improve their underſtanding of their own good, and their affection to it ſo far, as to make them digeſt this new truth: mentioned by his late Majeſty in his Large DeclarationrPa. 407. out of the Proteſtation. 22. Sept. 1638 That what Subjects do of their own heads is much better than what they do in obedience to Authority; the one ſavouring of conſtraint, but the other being voluntary and chearful obedience. Why not? Since at the ſame time they may be taught that all power is originally in them, and came from them: who intruſted particular perſons with it. Which is the ſureſt proof (they will eaſily believe) that it is to be imployed for their good (for they would not have intruſted it with any body to other purpoſes) and conſequently they muſt retain the power ſtill to hinder thoſe perſons from doing otherwiſe; and in order to that muſt judge whether they do ſo or no. This indeed is for the People to command the Magiſtrate, not to obey him: But it is that Authority which they may fairly aſſume to themſelves from this mans dangerous Maxime. For if People are to ſubmit in all things that are for their good, and no further; then they appeal back to themſelves. And this appeal, they may well think, ſuppoſes power originally in themſelves; ſome of which they have reſerved, as ſupreme and above all Laws; and why they ſhould not take all back when they judge it is not imployed for their good, who can tell? For they are to obey no Laws but thoſe which are for their good, unleſs it be for fear of wrath; and when they combine together they need not fear that, but can make themſelves dreadful, and give what Laws they pleaſe to their Governours.
No, ſaith this Caſuiſt, a man muſt not reſiſt; that is expreſs, and rather than reſiſt he muſt ſuffer, p. 4. But this is to ſteal a Gooſe, and ſtick a Feather. Why muſt he, when he is already perſwaded that he need not unleſs he be forced? It is reſolved juſt before, that if the Magiſtrate command any thing for the Peoples hurt, there lies no Obligation upon Conſcience to be obedient, and they are made judges of what is for their hurt. If then he require them not to reſiſt, and they find this is to their hurt, they are not bound in Conſcience not to reſiſt, but only for wrath. And that is not to be feared when the multitude is agreed not to ſuffer themſelves to be injured. But they muſt avoid contempt and ſcandal. And ſo they will in their own opinion, even when they are contemptuous and ſcandalous. They are Judges of all their own actions for the publick good; and they may reſolve that which we call contempt and ſcandal, to be for the honour of the Nation, for the making their Prince glorious, by reſcuing him out of the hands of thoſe evil Councellors, who procure Laws for their own private intereſt, and not the peoples good. In ſhort, this Principle, if it be purſued, will prove the very ſame with that (in the perverſe meaning of it) ſo much cryed up when all our miſchiefs began, The welfare of the people is the Supreme Law: for the right underſtanding of which Maxime, I refer you to the laſt Lecture of Dr. Sanderſon, about the Obligation of Conſcience. Who hath uprightly determined elſewheretPralect. 9. N. 9., that we ought to obey a Law, made by a juſt Authority, not onelyonly when it may be ſuppoſed to be made with an ill intention, but when it is unprofitable for the Publick, nay, ſomething noxious and hurtful: provided the thing it commands may be done without ſin. The Reaſon is, becauſe every man ought to minde what belongs to his part and duty, and not trouble himſelf about other mens: and our duty is to obey, not to command and ordain. Beſides, I may add, though the Magiſtrate ought not to ordain any thing but what is for the peoples good, yet when he doth otherwiſe, it will be more for their good to obey him, then to refuſe obedience. They ought ſtill to look upon him as Gods Miniſter for their good, becauſe they receive a great many benefits by Government and Order, be it what it will) though in that particular he do amiſs; and ſo to ſubmit to his command. For the miſchief of not obeying, is greater then the hurt that is done the people by obedience. It is in effect to turn all things upſide down; to reduce the King to the condition of a private man, by making every body a Judge of his Laws whether they ſhall be obeyed or no. The very truth is, ſuch Caſuiſts as theſe have quite unhinged the people from their dependance on their Governours, and ſubjection to them: And I may ſay of them, as the ſecular Prieſts did of the Jeſuits in another mattertDialogue between Secular Prieſts & L…y Gentlemen, 1601. pag. 67.: They have not onelyonly much impeached the due eſtimation, honour and reverent reſpect which the people carried toward their Superiours, but they have exceedingly impaired (by their tricks, ſhifts and evaſions) the natural ſincere condition of our people: which is there moſt decayed, where they have had converſation and dealing. Many of modeſt and temperate conſtitution, are become imperious, brazen-fac'd and furious: They that were lowly and humble, are become peremptory, raſh in their judgement, and diſdainful. The ſimple and ſincere are grown cunning and double dealers, full of equivocation in their words, and diſſembling in their behaviour.
Well; perhaps you will ſay we are all had enough; but when the Doctor now named (Biſhop Sanderſon) determines that we ſhould be obedient, though the thing required of us be ſomething hurtful to the Publick, doth he not imply that, if it be extremely hurtful, we are not obliged? To this I will anſwer before I end; when I have firſt told you, that it doth not follow from what hath been ſaid concerning an obligation upon Conſcience to yeild obedience to Laws, that every tranſgreſſion of a Law is of ſo deep a dye as ſome is. He asks my opinion, you know, about this, in the beginning of his Caſe: And therefore I think good briefly to direct him to a better medium then any that he hath propounded to finde out the ſeveral degrees of ſin againſt Humane Laws; and what Laws are of ſuch moment, that a man cannot be accounted a good Chriſtian, or a good Subject that lives in defiance of them. For this end, look back to what was ſaid concerning the nature of a Law, which will lead you to a right underſtanding in this matter. It is a Declaration of the will of a Prince concerning thoſe things which he judges needful to be done, or avoided by his Subjects. The more needful then he judges any thing to be done or avoided, for the Publick good and ſafety, &c. and the more it appears his will is ſet upon it; the more his Law is to be reverenced, and the greater the offence is, if it be broken, eſpecially openly, and with an high hand. Now you may know this, partly by the matter it ſelf, as all wiſe men have determined; if it be a matter of Juſtice, Charity, Piety, Religion or Peace. Partly, by the manner and form of commanding and forbidding; partly by the greatneſs of the penalty threatned in caſe of diſobedience, and (laſtly) very much by the Preface to his Law: in which, if he be pleaſed to expound the reaſons and the neceſſity of it, and they appear to be great and weighty, his minde and will is thereby, without all doubt declared, that a more then ordinary regard be had to that Law of his. Apply now all this, if you pleaſe, to the Law which hath moved this diſpute, and you will finde that I had reaſon to ſay what I did, and that they have no reaſon to equal the breach of other Laws (which they mention) with the breach of that. An Act of the ſeventeenth of our preſent Soveraign made at Oxford, required ſuch perſons as had not, and ſhould not perform ſome things therein named, not to come within five Miles of any Corporation, &c. The breach of which Law I hold to be a grievous ſin; and when a man lives in it, and in defiance of it keeps Conventicles, I ſaid his piety and honeſty might juſtly be called in queſtion. My Reaſon is, becauſe it is plain to me by thoſe indications now named, that the Law-giver judges it to be a matter of great conſequence, and that he is much concerned it ſhould be obſerved. For firſt the Preface to it is ſolemn, and lets us know that both Religion, and the Civil Peace and tranquillity depends upon it; and that they are removed from Corporations, becauſe if they were there, they might take an opportunity the better to diſtil the Poyſonous Principles of Schiſm and Rebellion into the hearts of his Majeſties Subjects, to the great danger of the Church and Kingdom. This is the reaſon and ground of the Act, which is as great as well can be; and therefore the penalty is great; forty pound for every offence: and (as I remember) impriſonment for ſix months, without Bail or Mainprize (if two Juſtices of Peace pleaſe) unleſs upon or before ſuch commitment they ſhall ſwear and ſubſcribe the Oath and Declaration mentioned in the Act. Compare now this with the other about burying in Linnen, and about Waggons which they make ſuch a talk of, and you will finde neither the Penalties (five pound in one Act, and forty ſhillings in the other) nor the Reaſons given in the Prefaces any thing near ſo conſiderable as thoſe now mentioned. Which is a ſigne that the Law-giver doth not judge them of equal moment and neceſſity; and conſequently that the tranſgreſſion of theſe Laws is not ſo heinous, nor ſo much againſt his will, as the tranſgreſſion of the other. The Penalties alſo for offences againſt theſe are ordered to be ſo imployed, that they may do as much good to the Publick, as the offences do hurt, ſetting aſide contempt of Authority, which I cannot excuſe.
But may not a Law-giver, you will ſay, be miſtaken in his judgement, as ſome think there was an error in that which was enacted about Waggons? And if he be, why ſhould we obſerve ſuch a Law? I Anſwer, I am not bound abſolutely to be of the Law-giver's opinion, that all ſuch things are for the Publick good which he decrees: I am onelyonly to follow his will, and do what he enjoyns when I can without ſin. And this I take my ſelf bound to, even when I conceive it were better for the Publick, if it were otherwiſe ordained. What? will you ſay again, when there is an intolerable inconvenience, and a very grievous evil to the ſubjects by obeying? That's the thing I know you would be reſolved in. And truely the Moral Divines and Lawyers ſay no. It is to be ſuppoſed, when that caſe happens, that it not being the intention of a Prince to make his Subjects miſerable, he would not have made that Law, if he could have foreſeen ſuch a miſchief. And therefore it ceaſes of it ſelf to be a Law, and looſes its Obligation. But then in the reducing this to practice, they tell you there are theſe cautions to be obſerved. Firſt, Obedience is never to be denyed, but when the Law is againſt the Publick good. If it be ſtill conſiſtent with the Publick intereſt, though it be to the damage of ſome particular perſons, they may not break the Law. Again, it muſt be practiſed then onelyonly when the Miſchief to the Publick is not ſmall, but ſo great, that in the judgement of the beſt and moſt prudent perſons, it be a ſufficient cauſe of diſannulling a Law: and doth out-weigh the evil of material diſobedience. And (thirdly) this miſchief likewiſe muſt be certain and notorious, not onelyonly in our fancy. The ſecurity of which is, when it is declared ſo by the voice of all men (at leaſt of all the wiſe and good) and not onelyonly by a party, whoſe particular intereſt is concerned to vote it to be unſupportable. And yet in caſe the truely wiſe and good on all ſides think it ſo, they ought not (fourthly) to diſobey the Law with the ſcandal and offence of other men. It muſt be done ſo modeſtly, humbly, and with fear, that the reſt of Mankind be not taught hereby to ſlight all Laws upon little pretences, and trifling regards. And (laſtly) to ſecure all, we muſt, if we have time and opportunity, ask leave of the Law-giver, whoſe leave is to be preſumed in ſuch caſes, onelyonly in time of a ſudden danger. And having done thus; if we ſhould be miſtaken, and judge that a publick miſchief which is not, yet the guilt of our diſobedience will not be deadly, but ſuch as will eaſily finde pardon both with God and man. To this purpoſe you may read more in that Doctor (Biſhop Taylor) out of whom this Caſuiſt quotes a line or two, relating to this matter onelyonly, ſeparated from all the reſt of his diſcourſe. Which gives me occaſion to note his diſingenuity; for beſides all the Cautions which the BiſhoprRule of Conſcience, Book 3. R. 3. N. 10. &c. there gives, I obſerve (ſince I writ all this) that he expreſly determines point-blank againſt this mans deciſion of his Caſe. For this is his Maxime, Rule 7. That a Law ſhould oblige the Conſcience, does not depend upon the acceptation of the Law by the people. Which, ſuppoſing that which hath been already ſaid, is a certain Rule he tells you, and there is no doubt in it.
Of this minde were the firſt Chriſtians (as I ſhall not now ſtand to ſhow you) and our firſt Reformers of Chriſtianity in this Kingdom. Who, I muſt let you know, uſed no ſuch diſtinctions, as theſe men do now; but ſaid expreſly the ſame that I do. That we muſt ſubmit to all manner of Ordinaunces of men for the Lords ſake, ſo long as they ordeyne nothing contrary to the expreſs Woord of God. And be that reſyſteth ſhall receyve to hymſelf dampnation; for as moche as he reſyſteth the Ordinaunce of God. They are the words of a Book called, the Deſtruction of ſmall Vices, written in Edward the Sixth's days, as far as I can gueſs. Tyndal alſo taught the people thusxObedience of a Chriſtian man, fol. 26: Whoſoever keeps the Law of the Prince, whether it be for fear or vain-glory, or profit, though no man reward him, God will bleſs him abundantly, and ſend him worldly proſperity; as thou readeſt, Deut. 28. what good bleſſings accompanied the keeping of the Law,… and as we ſee the Turks far exceed us Chriſtian men in worldly proſperity, for their juſt keeping of their temporal Laws. And in another nameleſs Book, called the ſum of the Holy ScriptureyPrinted by John Day with priviledge 1547. chap. 26., I find this Declaration, That the very Chriſten yeldeth hymſelf willingly under the Governaunce of the Swerd, and Temporal Juſtice; he payeth tailles, he honoureth the Puiſſaunce and worldly highneſs; he ſerveth, he healpeth; he doth all that ever he may do, to thintent that the ſame Puiſſaunce may proſper, and be kepte in honour and feared: albeit, that the ſame Puiſſaunce to him is neither nedeful nor profitable. …And if he ſhould not do ſo, be were no Chriſten, but ſhould ſin againſt the Rule of Charity. For he ſhould give evil enſample to other, that they ſhould not honour the Temporal Puiſſaunce, but deſpiſe it. And this deſpiſing of the Temporal Puiſſaunce, bringeth diſſention, and (mark this) maketh ſenſual perſons profitable unto nothing.
It would be too tedious to add the words of other good men, and therefore I ſhall onelyonly deſire you to ponder the counſel and direction of the famous Amyraldus, late Profeſſor at Saumur. For you are much concerned in it, being given with a particular reſpect to our affairs, in an addreſs to our preſent SoveraignzParaphr. in Pſalm Epiſt. Dedic. 1662. pag. 1.. There are three things, ſaith he, by which the courſe of our life is governed, and, as we may ſay, ſteered in this Sea of worldly affairs. By the Law of Nature; by the Laws of our Country; and by the Study of propagating Religion. To this laſt we ſhould yeild all, if the other two do not openly gain-ſay it. Where either the Law of Nature, or the Political Laws do command any thing, which is inconſiſtent with our Study of promoting Religion; we muſt diligently conſider, what God commands us in that matter, that ſo we may exactly diſtinguiſh between his Will and our own; between what he requires, and what we are moved unto onelyonly by our own zeal. What God commands is to be done, though our Parents or Magiſtrates command the contrary. But whatſoever is commanded by them, which is not contrary to the expreſs Precepts of Religion aDiſertis Religionis praceptis non adverſum., that we are to look upon as commanded and given us in charge by God himſelf (becauſe God is the Author of their Power, as he is the Author of Nature) whoſe Commands, and not our own voluntary Zeal, we are to make the Rule of our life. And therefore we are not here to have more regard, either to the danger which we may fancy the Church is in, …or to the hope which we have conceived to our ſelves of advancing the Glory of God, then to that Will of the moſt high God, which is manifeſted to us either in Nature, or in Civil Laws. For God hath affection enough to his own Glory, and kindneſs enough to his Church, and Power and Wiſdom ſufficient, notwithſtanding all the dangers that I ſee, to advance his Kingdom, and ſupport his Church: although I contain my ſelf within the bounds and limits which Nature and Civil Government preſcribes.
This is the reſolution of that excellent perſon, by whoſe Principles I wiſh heartily you would all govern your ſelves: otherwiſe the moſt glorious profeſſion that you can make, will not perſwade us you have the ſame ſpirit of Chriſtian Piety. You have read perhaps, or heard how the Devil one day appeared to St. Martin, as he was at prayer; all glittering and ſhining in a moſt Majeſtick ſtate: telling him that he was Chriſt, who being ſhortly to come down upon Earth, gave him a viſit firſt. This he repeated again, ſaith the ſtory,Sulpitius Severus in vita ejus, cap. 25. and bid him not be faithleſs, but believe. So I will, replyed the good man, but not till I ſee him in that habit and form wherein he ſuffered, bearing the Marks of his Croſs. The Application is eaſie; and in ſhort but this. If you would be acknowledged for the faithful Diſciple of the Lord Jeſus, let us ſee you in that garb wherein they alway appeared; taking up the Croſs patiently, humbly and lowly, meek and gentle, quiet and peaceable; ſubmiſſive to Government, and obedient to Laws: Till then, we ſuſpend our belief. Farewel.
FINIS.
Books printed for Henry Everſden, under the Crown-Tavern in Weſt-Smithfield.
THe Divine Hiſtory of the Geneſis of the World, explicated and illuſtrated; or a Philoſophical Comment on the firſt Chapter of Geneſis, and tryal of Philoſophy both Ancient and Modern by that moſt infallible Rule. Anonymus, in quarto.
2. foreign: Or, a Being filled with the Spirit: As alſo the Divinity or God-head of the Holy Ghoſt aſſerted, and the Arguments brought againſt it throughly examined and anſwered, &c. By John Goodwin late of Coleman-ſtreet, London, quarto.
3. Theodulia: Or, a Juſt defence of Hearing the Sermons and other teaching of the preſent Miniſters of England: By John Tombes B.D.
4. A ſerious examination of the Independants Catechiſm, and therein of the chief Principles of Nonconformity to, and ſeparation from the Church of England, in two Parts. To which is added, an Appendix of the Authority of Kings, and obedience of Subjects: By Benj. Camfield, Rector of Whitwell in Derbyſhire.
5. The Pen's Dexterity Compleated: Or Mr. Rich's Short-hand perfectly taught, which in his life-time was never done by any thing in Print: Allowed by both Univerſities Oxford and Cambridge.
FINIS.
End of the text · Simon Patrick, Friendly Debate with Non-Conformist Part 3 Appendix (1670)