Reader
The Sovereign Power of Parliaments and Kingdoms · William Prynne

The Sovereign Power of Parliaments and Kingdoms, Appendix · Subpart 8 (3 of 3)

Finally, even the Kings Letters, unlesse they be subscribed by the Kings Secretary, and rescripts, unlesse they be signed by the Chancellour, (who hath a power of cancelling) have no authority. There are likewise Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Vicounts, Barons, Castellanes; also in Cities▪ Maiors, Deputies, Consuls, in Sindeches, Auditors, and the like, to whom some particular Region or City are severally commended, that they may defend the People so farre forth as their jurisdiction extendeth, although some of these dignities at this day are reputed Hereditary: And besides this, yearly heretofore, at leastwise as often as necessity required, there was held anvAimo i…ius. Assembly of the three Estates, wherein all the Countries and Cities of any note, did send their Deputies, namely Commons, Nobles, Ecclesiasticks in each of them apart; where they publikely determined of those things which appertained to the Republike: Now such was evermore the authority of this Assembly, that not only those things which were therein accorded, were reputed sacred and holy, & whether Peace were to be concluded, or War to be waged, or the Guardianship of the Realm to be committed to any one, or a Tax to be imposed, was there concluded; but even Kings themselves for their luxury, slothfulnes or tyrannie, were thrust into Monasteries, & by their authority, even all their Ofsprings deprived of the succession of the Kingdom, no otherwise then at first, when as they were called to the kingdom, by the peoples authority: verily those whō consent had advanced, dissent did pull down again; those whom imitation of paternall vertues had as it were called into that inheritance, a degenerate and ungratefull minde, as it had made then uncapable and unworthy, so it did make them to be disinherited: From whence verily it appears, that succession truly was tolerated to avoid competition, succession, an interregnum, and other incommodities of Election; but truely when grea…er damages would follow; where Tyranny should invade the Kingdom, where a Tyrant the Throne of a King, the lawfull Assembly of the people Perpetually reserved to themselves an Authority of expelling a Tyrant or slothfull King, and of deducing him to his Kindred, and of substituting a good King in his place. Verily peradventure the French received this from the Gauls, xCaesar, l. 5. & 7. de Bello Gallic….Caesar in the fifth Book of the Gallic War, being the Author; For Ambiorix King of the Eburoni, confessed, that all that time the Empires of the Kings of Gallia were such, that the people duely assembled, had no lesse authoritie over the King, then the King over the people; which also appears in Vercingetorix, who pleaded his cause before an assembly of the people.Note. In the Kingdoms of Spain, especially in Valentia and Catteloigne of the Arragonians it is even thus, for the Soveraignty of the Realme, is in the Justice of Aragon, as they call it; therefore the great men, who represent the people, fear not to tell the King in direct terms, both in his very Coronation it self, and likewise every third year in the generall assembly of their Estates, Tantum valemus nos, quantum vos; We are as powerfull as you, but the Iustice of Aragon is above us both, who rules more than you. Yea, oftentimes what things the King hath asked, what he hath injoyn'd, the Iustice hath prohibited; nay, he never dares to impose any tribute without the authority of that Assembly. In the Realms of England and Scotland, the Supreme power is in the Parliament, usually wont to be held almost every year. Now they call a Parliament, the Assembly of the Estates of the Realme, where the Bishops, Earls, Barons, Deputies of the Cities and Counties by common suffrage determine of the Republikes affairs, whose authority is so sacred, that what things soever it shall once establish, it is unlawfull (or a wicked act) for the king to abrogate. Likewise all the Officers of the Realme are wont to receive their Offices from that Assembly, and those who ordinarily assist the King or Quéen in Councell. In brief, other Christian Kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmarke, Sweden, and the rest, have all their Officers of the Realm, or Consuls of the Royall Empire, who by their own Authority have sometimes used even to depose their Kings themselves, as Histories teach, or fresh memory suffici…ntly manifests: Neither is there verily any cause that we should think the Royall Authority to be thereby deminished, or that Kings should hereby suffer as it were a diminution of their heads; Truly, we deem not God the lesse potent for this, because he cannot sin by himself, nor his Empire more restrained, because it cannot be ruined, nor grow worse; therefore not a King, if that he who may offend by himself, be sustained or kept from sinning by anothers help; or if peradventure he had lost any Empire by his own negligence or fault, that he may retain by anothers prudence. What? do you think any man lesse healthy, because Phisitians …it round about him, who dehort him from intemperance, who interdict him the eating of hurtfull meats, who likewise oft-times purge him against his will, and resisting? Or whether doest thou think those Phisitians who take care of his health, or flatterers who obtrude the most unwholsome things, to be more his friends? Therefore this distinction is altogether necessary to be adhibited: Some are friends of the King, others of Caesar; those are friends of Caesar, who serve Caesar; those friends of the King or Emperour, who serve the Kingdom: For since any one is called a King,Note. for the Kingdoms sake, and the Kingdom consists in the people; but the Kingdom being lost or decayed, the King must altogether cease to be a King, or, at least, be lesse a King: those verily who shall study the profit of the Kingdom, are truly the Kings friends; those who neglect, or subvert the profit of the Realm, are truly his Enemies: and as thou c…nst by no means separate the Kingdom from the people, nor the King from the Kingdom; so neither the friends of the King from the friends of the Kingdom or people; yea verily, as those who truely love Caesar would rather have him to be a King then a private man, nor can they have him a King without a Kingdom, in good …ooth those shall be the Kingdoms friends who are Caesars; and those who would seem to be more the friends of Caesar, then of the Kingdom or people, are truly to be reputed Flatterers and most pernicious enemies. But and if they bee truely friends, is it not manifest, that the King will become more powerfull and stable, (as Theopompus said of the Ephori when instituted) by how much those shall be more, and more powerfull, to whom the profit of the people or Realm shall be commanded and committed?

But perchance thou wilt say, You tell me of the Senators, Peers, and Officers of the Realm, but I, on the contrary, see nothing but Ghosts, and as it were ancient Cote-Arms in Tragedies, but I scarce any where discern any foot-steps of ancient libertie and authoritie. Finally, you may see most men every where to look to their own affairs, to flatter kings, to cheat the people; scarce any where maist thou finde one who takes pity of the mascerated people, much lesse who will give help to the miserable; but if there be any who are truely of that minde, or thought to be so, they are judged Rebels, or Traitors, they are banished, and they are compelled to begge even their very food. What? the thing is thus: It seems almost alwayes and in every place the audacitie of Kings,Note. or partly the prevarication, partly the slothfulnesse of the Nobility hath been such, that kings may seem to have usurped that licentiousnesse wherewith most of them at this day seem to wax insolent, by a long prescription of time, but the people may seem to have determined their Authority, or to have lost it by not using it: For so it happens for the most part, that no man takes care for that which all are bound to take care of, that which is committed to all, no man thinks it is commended to him. Yet notwithstanding, against the people, neither this prescription nor prevarication doth any thing. It is a vulgar saying, that no prescription can hurt the king, or Exchequer, much lesse all the people, who are potenter then the King, and for whose sake the Prince hath this priviledge; for why else is the Prince only the administrator of the Exchequer, but for the people, the true proprietors as shalbe after proved? Furthermore, is not this a known truth, that no violence, no not in the longest lasting servitude,L. proponebatur, 76. D. de Iud…ciis, l. quires suas 98. parag…. ult. de solation l…inter stipul. 93. parag. Sacram. D. de Verbor▪ oblig. V…pian. de Reg. Iuris, l. 54. can be prescribed against liberty? But and if thou objectest, that Kings were constituted by the people, who perchance lived above five hundred yeer since, not by the people extant at this day; I answer, that although kings doe die, the people in the mean time (as neither any other Universitie) never dyeth; for as flowing waters make a perpetuall river, so also the vicissitude of birth and death an immortall people: Therefore as the Rheine, Seine, Tyber, is now the same as it was above a thousand years agoe, so likewise the Germane, French, Roman people are the same, (unlesse Colonies shall have casually intervened) neither can their right be any wayes changed, either by the flux of water, or change of individuals. Besides, if they attribute the Kingdom received, not to their people, but to their Father▪ & he to his Grandfather, and so upwards, could he transfer more right to another then himself first had? But and if he could not, (as it is certain he could not) is it not manifest, whatsoever he shall arrogate to himself besides, that he cannot any more usurp it then any theef? But on the contrary the people have a right of perpetuall eviction. Therefore that the Nobles have been for a long space oppressed in any Kingdom, can no way prejudice the people; but rather, as the servant should not be heard, who in that he hath a very long time detained his Lord captive, should boast, that he was not onelyonly a Free-man, but would likewise arrogate to himself a power of life and death over his Lord: nor yet a Theefe, who because he hath robbed 30. yeers, or is the sonne of a Theefe, should think himselfe to be without fault, yea rather, by how much the longer he hath been such a one, the more severely should he be punished: So likewise a Prince is not to be heard or endured, who because he hath succeeded to a Tyrant, or hath for a long time used the people like a bondslave, from whom he hath received his kingdome, or hath offered violence to the Nobles, should think that what ever he lusted should be lawfull to him, and ought to be granted of right. Neither doe yeers substract any thing from the peoples right, but adde to the injury of the King. But what, if the Nobles themselves have colluded with the King? what, if in betraying the cause, they have betrayed the people as it were bound, into the hands of a Tyrant? shall the authority of the people by this prevarication or treason seem to be plainly transferred upon the King? whether I say, by this fact is any thing taken away from the liberty of the people, or adjoyned to the licentiousnesse of the Prince? You will say, they may impute it to themselves, who made choise of such men of perfidious faith. But yet these are as patrons to patronize the publike profit, and the peoples safety and liberty: Therfore as when an Advocate shall make a compact with the adversary of his Client, concerning the value of the suit as they speake, if he had betrayed his cause, he should not hurt him at all; so this conspiracie of the Nobles, as it were made to the dammage and destruction of the people, cannot verily detract any thing from their right; but even they themselves shall fall into the penalty of the Law, which is promulged against prevaricators, and the Law permits the people to chuse another patron, and to prosecute their right againe: For if the Roman people condemned their Emperors to punishment, who at the Caudine Gallowes had dishonourably contracted with the enemies, although by compulsion, and reduced to greatest straits; and judged that they were no wayes obliged by that paction; shall not the people be much lesse bound to suffer that yoke, which not by force, but willingly; not for feare of death, but out of desire of gain, hath been thus treacherously put upon them? Or if those who ought to shake it off shall impose it, or those who might doe it, shall tolerate it? Observ. 3.He hath many other pertinent passages to the same effect, which brevity enjoynes me to omit; those that please may read them at their leisure in the Author himselfe; whose opinion is fortified by Alphonsus Menesius his poems, annexed to his Treatise.

Thirdly, it is abundantly manifest from all the premises; That Kings and Emperours alwayes have been, are, and ought to be subject to the Lawes and Customes of their Kingdomes, not above them, to violate, breake, or alter them at their pleasures, they being obliged by their very Coronation Oathes in all ages and Kingdomes inviolably to observe them. This verily is confessed aIn his speech in Parl, in his works, p 531 c 9by K. Iames, by our bA Collection, &c. p. 320, 321, and elsewhere.K. Charls himself in his la…e Declarations to al his Subjects; resolved by el. 1 c. 8. l. 3. c. 9.Bractonfl. 1. c. 17. Fleta,gc. 9. to 15. Fortescue, our hSee Cooks Epist. to the 5. Report. & Calvins case.Common and Statute Lawsipar. 1. & 2. forecited; by the Year Book of 19. H. 6. 63. a. where Fray saith, That the Parliament is the highest Court which the King hath, and the Law is the highest inheritance which the King hath, for by the Law he himselfe and all his Subjects are ruled; and if the Law were not, there could be no King nor inheritance; This is proued by kFox Act▪ & Mon. Edit. 1. in one Vol. p. 741.Stephen Gardiner Bp. of Winchester in his Letter to the Lord Protector; where he writes, That when he was Embassadour in the Emperours Court he was faine there, and with the Emperours Embassadour to defend and maintain, by Commandment*From Henry the eight and his Councell. in a case of Iewels, That the Kings of this Realme were not above the Order of their Laws, and therefore the Ieweller although he had the kings Bill signed, yet it would not be allowed in the Kings Court, because it was not obtained according to the Law; and generally granted by all our own gPonet. P…lit. Government. p. 22. Dolman. p. 72. and others.English Writers, is copiously asserted, and professedly averred by Aristotle, Polit. l. 3. c. 11. 13 Marius Salomonius de Principatu. in sixe speciall Books to this purpose, by Iustus Eccardus de Lege Regia, Thomas Garzonius Emporii,hPlinius 2. Panegyr. Traiano, dict Eccardus, de Lege Regia. Emporiorum, Pars 1. Discursus 1. de Dominiis sect. 6. p. 9, 10. Ioannis Carnotensis Episc. lib. 4. Policrat. c. 1. Bochellus Decreta, Eccles. Gal. l. 5. Tit. 1. Cap. 6. 15, 16. Haenon. Disput. Polit. p. 428. to 442. Fenestella de Magistratu, p. 149. Ioannis Mariana de Rege & Regis Instit. l. 1. c. 9. (an excellent discourse to this purpose) Petrus Rebuffus, Pr…fat. ad Rubr. de Collationibus, p. 583, 584. Sebastianus Foxius de Rege, &c. part. 1 p. 108, 109 part. 2. 192 &c. Buchanon de Iure Regni apud Scotos passim, Iunius Brutus Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, quaest. 3. p. 116. to 139. (an accurate discouse to this effect) Grimalius de Optimo Senatore, p. 33. 201, 205. Vasquius contr. Illustr. 16. n. 15. 19. 21. 17. n. 1. 23. 20. n. 3. 44. n. 3. 73. n. 12. 13. 15. 72. n. 7. and elswhere. De Iure Magistratus in subditos, passim, Polanus, in Ezech p. 824. 854. Pareus in Rom. 13. p. 138. Francis. Hotomani, Franco Gallia▪ c. 6. to the end of Cap. 20. Sparsim, Governado Christiano, p. 108. Cunaeus de Republ. Hebr. l. 1. c. 1. 14. Schickardus Ius Regium Hebrae p. 54. Hugo Grotius de Iure Billi, l. 1. c. 4. s. 7. l. 2. c. 14. and elsewhere thorowout his second Book, with infinite others of all sorts: This all good Emperours and Kings in all ages have prof…ssed, as these Authors prove. Thus the good Emperour Trajan practised and professed; That the Prince was not above the Laws; Hence iIn Philos…rato, l. S & Eccardus de L…ge Regia.Apollonius Thyanaeus writing to the Emperor Domitian, saith, These things have I spoken concerning Lawes, which if thou shalt not think to reignover thee, then thy self shalt not reign: Hence kDionys. Hall car. l. 1▪ Eccardus de Lege Regia▪ Iunius Brutus p. 122.Antiochus the third, King of Asia is commended, that he writ to all the Cities of his Kingdom, if there should be any thing in his Letters he should write, which should seem contrary to the Laws, they should not obey them. And Anastatius the Emperour made this wholesome sanction, admonishing all the Iudges of his whole Republike, that they should suffer no Rescript▪ no pragmaticall sanction, no sacred adnotation which should seem repugnant to the generall Law or the publike profit, to be produced in the pleading of any suite or controversie; enough eternally to shame and silence those flattering Courtiers, Lawyers, Divines, who dare impudently, yea, impiously suggest the contrary into Princes Ears, to excite them to Tyrannize and oppresse their subjects against their expresse Oathes (inviolably to observe and keep the Laws) their Duties, the very Lawes of God and man; of which more in the seventh and eight Observation.

Fourthly,Observ. 4. That Kings and Emperours can neither anull, nor change the Laws of their Realms, nor yet impose any new Laws, Taxes or Impositions on them, without the consent of their People, and Parliamets: This I have largely manifested in the first Part of this Discourse, and the premised Histories, with the Authors here quoted in the three precedent Observations, attest and prove it fully; for if the whole Kingdom, Parliament, and Laws themselves be above the King or Emperour, and they receivelIoannis Maior Distinct. 24. qu. 3. Lau. Bochellus Decreta Eccles. Gall. l 5 Tit. 4. c. 3. p. 728▪ their Soveraign Authority from the …eople, as their publike servants: It thence infallibly follows, that they cannot alter the old Laws which are above them, nor impose new Lawes or Taxes to binde the whole Kingdom, people, without their assents, they being the Soveraigne Power. This point being so clear in it self, so plentifully proved in the premises, I shall onelyonly adde this passage out ofmVindicae contra Tyrannos▪ qu 3. p. 12… ▪ 125, 126. Iunius Brutus, to ratifie it; If Kings cannot by Law change or extenuate Laws once approved without the consent of the Republike,Innoc…ntius ad Regen. Tarrat. in c. quando de Iure Iurando. much lesse can they make and create new Laws; therefore in the German Empire, if the Emperour think any Law necessary, he first desires it in the generall assemblies; if it be approved, the Princes, Barons, and Deputies of Cities subsigne it, and then it is wont to be a firme Law: Yea, he swears, that he will keep the Laws Enacted, and that he will make no news Laws but by common consent. In the Kingdom of Poland there is a Law, (renewed, An. 1454, and 1538.) That no new Laws or Constitutions shall be made, but onelyonly by publike consent, or in any place but in Parliament. In the Realm of France, where yet commonly the authority of Kings is thought most ample, Laws were heretofore enacted in the Assembly of the three Estates, or in the Kings ambulatory Councell; but since there hath been a standing Parliament, all the Kings Edicts are void, unlesse the Senate approve them; when as yet the Arrests of that Senate of Parliament, if the law be wanting, even obtain the force of a Law: So in the Kingdoms of England, Spain, Hungarie, and the rest, there is, and of old hath been the same Law: For if Kingdoms depend upon the conservation of their Laws, and the Laws themselves should depend upon the lust of one Homuncio, would it not be certain, that the Estate of no Kingdom should ever be stable? Would not the Kingdom necessarily stumble, and fall to ruine presently, or in a short space? But if as we have shewed, the Lawes be better and greater than Kings, if Kings be bound to obey the Laws, as servants are to obey their Lords▪ who would not obey the Law rather then the King? who would obey the King violating the Law? who will or can refuse to give any to the Law thus infringed?

Fiftly,Observ. 5. that all publike great Officers, Judges, Magistrates, and Ministers of all Realms, are more the Officers and Ministers of the Kingdom than the Kings, and anciently were, and now ought to be of right elected onelyonly by the Kingdom, Parliament, people, and not removable but by them: which is largely proved by Iunius Brutus Vindiciae contr. Tyrannos, qu. 1, 2, …. De Iure Mag…stratus in Subditos, qu. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. with others, the Histories forecited, and Hotomani Francogallia, c. 6, 11, 12, 13, 14.

6.Observ. 6. That Kings and Emperors have no absolute power over the lives,See H…nricus Bocerus lib. 2. De Duello, c. 4. 5. that the Civill Law concerning Iusts, is contrary, yet the Ca… Law prohibiting Iusts, upon… pain of excommunication, accords with the common▪ Law. liberties, goods, estates of their subjects, to dispose of them, murther, imprison, or strip them of their possessions at their pleasure; but ought to proceed against them in case of Delinquency according to the known Lawes and Statutes of their Realmes: This truth is abundantly evidenced by all the premises; by Magna Charta, c. 29. and all Statutes, Law-Books in affirmance of it; by resolution of the Judges in Henry 8. his reigne, Brook, Corone 29. That it is Felony to slay a man in justing, and the like, notwithstanding it be done By command of the King, for the command is against the Law and of Judge Fortescue, 19. H. 6. 63. That if the King grant to me, that if I kill such a man, I shall not be impeached for it, this grant is void and against Law. By Iunius Brutus, Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, Quaest. 3. p. 1…6, to 137. and the Treatise De Iure Magistratus in subditos in sundry places, where this undeniable verity is largely proved, confirmed, and by others forecited.

Seventhly,Observ. 7. That Emperours, Kings, Princes are not the true Proprietory Lords or Owners of the Lands, Revenues, Forts, Castles, Shipps, Iewels, Ammunition, Treasure of their Empires, Kingdoms, to alienate or dispose of them at their pleasures; But onelyonly the Guardians, Trustees, …Stewards, or Supervisors of them for their Kingdoms use and benefit, from whom they cannot alien them, nor may without their consents or privities lawfully dispose of them or any of them, to the publike prjudice; which if they doe their grants are void and revocable. This propositionnPart. 1. p. …02. part. 2. p. 1…. to 17. formerly ratified by many reasons, authorities, & sundry Historicall Passages in this Appendix, is not only evident by the M… tropolitans usuall speech to all elected Kings, (prescribed by the Roman Pontificall, ratified by the Bull of Pope Clement the eight, oRom. 1611. f. 162. …03. and trans…i…in M. Seldens Titles of Honour, first Part. Chap. 8. p. 197, 198.where the Metropolitan, when any King is presented to him to be Crowned, first demands of the Bishops, who present him; Do you know him to be worthy of and profitable to this dignitie? to which they answer, We know and beleeve him to be worthy and profitable to the Churth of God, and for the Government of this Realme: After which the Metropolitan among other things, useth this Speech unto him, Thou shalt undeniably administer Iustice, without which no society can continue towards all men, by rendring rewards to the good, punishment to the evill, &c▪ and shalt so carry thy self that thou maist be seen to reign… not to thine own, but to all the peoples profit, and to expect a reward of thy good deeds, not in earth but in heaven; which he immediately professeth with a solemn Oath, to perform to the uttermost of his power and knowledge;) but likewise professedly maintained by Iustus Eccardus de Lege Regia, Marius Salamonius de Principatu, Hugo Grotius de Iure Belli, & Pacis, l. 1. c. 4 sect. 10. Lib. 2 c. 13. 14. Hotomani Franco-Gallia, c. 6. 10. 14. Ruibingius, l. 2. Class. 11. c. 8. n. 26. Ioannis Mariana, Hist. l. 10 c. 16. l. 27. c. 11 l. 35. c 16. Albericus Gentilis, de Iure Belli, l. 3. c. 15. Cuiacius, c 33. de Iure Iurando, Decius, Cons. 564. 689. Cephalus, Concil. 618. Alciatus, l. 3. de v. s. l 15. C. de pact. Baldus Proaem. Digest. and by Iunius Brutus Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, qu. 3. p. 136. to 256. who handles this question professedly, Whether that the King be the proprietory Lord of the publike Royall Patrimany of his Kingdom, or the Vsufractuary of it? determining cleerly that he is not. I shall transcribe the most of his Dicourse;

This Head we must handle a little more accurately. This is first to be observed, that the Patrimony of the Exchequer is one thing, of the Prince another thing; I say, the things of the Emperour, King, Prince are one thing, the things of Antonine, pL…bene a Zenone c. de…quad. praest. l. vivis, de quaest. Mag. l. 12 c. l. fiscus D. de Iure fisci.Henry, Philip another: The things of the King are those, which he as king possesseth; the things of Antonine, those which he hath as Antonine, and those verily he received from the people, the other from his Parents. This distinction is frequent in the Civill Law, wherein the patrimonie of the Empire is said to be one thing, of Caesar another, the Exchequer of Caesar one thing, the Treasury of the Republike another, the Treasurer of Caesar one person, of the Emperiall Exchequer another, the Courts of sacred donations, others from those of private things; so that he who as Emperour is preferred before a private man in a pledge, may sometimes be placed after him as Antonine. Likewise in the German Empire, things of Marimilian of Austria are one kinde of things, of Maximilian the Emperour another; the Treasurers of the Empire others, and of himself other from them; Likewise by another Law, the hereditaty possession of Princes are different, from those which are annexed to the dignities of the Electorship. Yea, even among the Turks the Patrimoniall Grounds or Gardens of Selymus are one thing, the fiscall Ground another; and those verily are spent on the Princes Table, these onelyonly in sustentation of the Empire. Yet there are Kingdoms, as the French, English, and the like, wherein Kings have no private Patrimonie, but onelyonly the Republike received from the people, in which therefore this distinction is not used. Now as for the private goods of Princes, if there be any, there is no doubt but they are the proprietors of them, no otherwise then private Citizens; and by the civill Law they may sell and divide them at their pleasure;L. Cum servis 39. to …lt. D. de Leg. …. l. Vniversi 9 x. l. seq. C de fundo pa…rimon. But verily of the Exchequer, Kingdom, Royall Patrimony, which is usually called Demesnes, they can with no reason be cal…ed the proprietory Lords. For what? whether because one hath made thee a Shepheard for his Flocks sake, hath he delivered it thee to fley, divide, doe with it, and strike it at thy pleasure? whether because the people have constituted thee a Captain or Judge of some Citie or County, have they given thee power of alienating, selling destroying that Citie or County? And surely there is made an alienation of the people together with the Region or Countie, have they therefore given thee authority of severing, prostituting, enslaving them to whom thou wilt? Furthermore, is the Royall dignitie a possession, or rather a function? If a function, what community hath it with a propriety? If a possession, whether not at least such an one, that the same people by whom it is delivered, may perpetually retain the propriety to it self? Finally, if the patrimonie of the Eschequer, or demaines of the Republike, be truely called a Dower, and truely such a Dower, by whose alienation or delapidation both the Republike it self and Kingdom, and king himself finally perisheth; by what law at last, shall it be lawfull to alienate this Dower? Therefore let Wenceslaus the Emperour be infatuated, let Charles the sixth king of France be distracted, and give or sell the kingdom or a part thereof to the English; let Malchom king of Scotland prodigally spend the Crown land, and royall Treasure, what will follow? Those who have chosen a king against the invasions of Forraigners, by the folly or madnesse of the king shall be made the servants of Forraigners; those who by this means would severally desire to secure their Estates, shall all of them together be exposed to a prey; those things which every one shall take from himself or from his pupils, as in Scotland, that he might endow the Commonwealth, some Bawd shall riotously consume. But if, as we have already often said, kings be created for the peoples use, what use at all shall there be, if not onelyonly the use, but even the abuse be granted? To whose good are so many evils? to whose benefit so many losses, so many perils? If, I say, whiles I desire to look after my liberty or safetie, I make my selfe a slave, I expose my selfe to the lust of one man, I put my self into Fetters and Stocks? Therefore we see this Law, as it is infused by nature, so likewise it is approved by use almost among all Nations, that it is not lawfull for the king to diminish the Commonwealth at his pleasure; and he who doth contrary, is censured to play not the king, but Tyrant. Certainly where kings were created, there was a necessity to give them some Revenues, by which they might both support their Royall State, but most principally sustain the Royall burthens, for so both honesty and profit seemed to require. It pertained to the Royall Office to see Judges placed every where, who should not take gifts, and who should not prostitute the Law to …ale; Moreover, to provide a force ready at hand which should assist the Law when ever there should be need; to preserve the wayes safe, Commerce safe, &c. but if warre were feared; to fortifie Cities with a Garrison, to inviron them with a Trench against enemies, to maintain an Army, to furnish Armories▪ Now this is a know proverb, that peace cannot consist without warre, nor war without souldiers, nor souldiers without wages, nor wages without tribute: Therefore to sustaine the burthens of Peace, the demesne was instituted, (which among the Lawyers is called Canon) to defray the charges of warre, tribute; yet so, as if some more heavy charge should accrue, an extraordinary ayde given by Parliament should supply; the end of all which verily, is the good of the Commonwealth, so as he that converts it to his private use,Rom. 13. is plainly unworthy the name of a king. For a Prince, saith Paul, is the Minister of God for the peoples good, and Tributes and Customes are paid to him, that he may continually attend thereto; And truely heretofore almost all Customs of the Romanes seem to have had this Originall, that the precious Merchandize used to be brought out of India, Pliny, l. 19. c. 4.Arabia, Aethiopia might be secured against piraticall invasions, for which cause a Navie was furnished; of which kinde was the tribute of the Red-sea,Archid. in Can. si quis Romipetas & peregr. 24. qu. 3. Baldus in c. 1. sect. Commen. de paceiure infir. l. 2. D. ne quid in loco pub. Viarum l. magis puto D. de rebus eorum. Pedatica, Navigia, Portoria, and the rest; that the publike wayes, (which were therefore called Pretorian, Consular, Royall) should be rendred safe from theeves, plain and easie; which charge even now lieth upon the kings Attorny; that the publike Bridges should be repaired, as appears out of the Constitution of Lewes the godly; twelve over Seyne; that Ships should be ready at hand to transport men over Rivers, &c. There were no Tributes of Saltpits, yea, most of them were in the Dominion of private men; because what things nature did voluntarily give, they thought ought no more to be sold, then Light, Ayre, water. And whereas a certain King named Lycurgus, had begun to impose a Tax on Salt pits, as if nature would not suffer her liberality to be restrained, they are said to have been presently dried up; although at this day,

If we beleeve Palphur or Armilot,Iuvenal.

Whatever good, or faire thing can be got

Out of the Whole Sea, in each Realme it flowes,

Some custome to the Kings Exchequer owes.

He who first instituted this custome at Rome, was Livius Censor, whence he obtained the surname of Salinator, which he did for the most present necessity of the Commonwealth. For that very cause truly, King Philip obtained it onelyonly for five yeares, whose continuation what commotions it hath produced, every man knoweth▪ Finally, that tributes were instituted to pay Souldiers wages in warres, appeares even from this, that to make a Province stipendary or tributary, is the selfe-same thing indeed.2 King. 9. & 12. Postellus l, 3. de Rep. T…r. Thus Solomon imposed Tributes to fortifie Cities, and to furnish a publike Armory, which because they were finished, the people under Rehoboam desired to be eased thereof: Yea, the Turkes themselves call the Tribute of Princes, The sacred blood of the People, which profusely to spend, or to convert to any other use, but to defend the people, is a cursed act. Therefore what things soever a King acquires in warres in every Nation, because he gaines it by the common treasure, …e acquires it to the people, not to himselfe, as a factor doth to his Master: Moreover if perchance he gaine any thing by marriage (which I say, is pure and simply his wives) he is thought to acquire it to the Kingdome, because he was presumed to marry that wife, not as he is Philip or Charles, but as he is King. On the contrary, as Queenes have part of those things which their husbands not yet co-opted into the Kingdome have gained during the marriage; so plainly they have no part of those things they get after they have obtained the Kingdome, because they are reputed gained to the publike Treasures, not to the private meanes of the King, which was judged in the Realme of France, between Philip Valoyes and Ioan of Burgundy his wife. Now, lest the monies should be extorted to some other use, the Emperour sweares, that he will impose no customes, nor enjoyne no taxes, but by the Authority of a publike Assembly. The Kings of Poland, Hungary, Denmarke, England doe the like out of the Lawes of Edward the first. The French Kings heretofore demanded Tributes in the Assemblies of the three Estates; Hence also is that Law of Philip Valoyes; That impositions should not be imposed but upon great and urgent necessity, and that by the consent of the Three Estates: Moreover in times past those taxes were laid up in Castles throughout every Diocesse, and delivered to selected men (they even now call them Elected) to be kept, by whose hand the Soldiers enrolled in every Town, should receive their wages, which was also usually done in other Countries, as in the Belgick; At this day at least, whatsoever things are commanded, are not confirmed, unlesse the Parliament consent. Now there are some Provinces, which are not bound by covenant, but by the consent of the Estates, as Languedoc, Britain, Province, Dolphenie, and some others; and in the Netherlands clearly all. Finally, lest the Eschequer, swelling like the spleen, whereby all the other Members do pine away, should draw all things to it self, every where a due proportion is allotted to the Eschequer. Since therefore at last it appeares, that the tributes, customes, demesall, that which they call demesnes, (under which names Portages, Imposts, Exposts, Royalties, wr…cks, forfeitures, and such like are comprehended) which are ordinarily or extraordinarily given to Kings, were conferred on them for the benefit of the people, and supportation of the kingdome, and so verily; that if these nerves should be cut in sunder the people would fall to decay, these …oundation being under-mined, the Kingdome must needs fall to the ground; it truely followes, that he who to the prejudice of the people burthens the people, who reaps a gain out of the publike losse, and so cuts their throat with their own sword, is not a King, but a Tyrant: contrarily, that a true King, as he is a survey or of the publike affaires, so likewise an Administrator of the publike riches, but not a proprietary Lord, who can no more alienate or dissipate the Royall Demesnes, then the kingdome it selfe; but if he shall demene himselfe otherwise; verily as it is behoovefull to the Republike, that every one should use his own proper goods well, much more is it beneficiall for the Commonweal, that every one should use the publike estate well. And therefore if a Lord who prodigally spends his Estate, is by publike authority deduced to the Wardship of his kinsmen, and Family and compelled to abstaine from his possessions; then truly much more justly, the Gardian of the Republike, who converts the publike Administration of all wealth into the publike destruction, or utterly subverts it, may justly be spoiled, by those whom it concernes, and to whom it belongeth out of Office, unlesse he desists upon admonition. Now that a King in all lawfull Empires is not a proprietary Lord of the Royall patrimony, is easie to be manifested. That we may not have recourse to those most ancient ages, whose Image we have in the person of Ephron king of the Hittites,Gen. 23. who durst not verily fell his field to Abraham, without the peoples consent; that very law is at this day used in all Empires. The Emperour of Germany before he is Crowned,Sleiden▪ l. 1. & Bulla aurea. sacredly swears, That he will alienate, distract, or morgage nothing of those things which appert un to the Empire, and the patrimony of the Empire; but if he recovers or acquires any thing by the publike Forces, that it shall come to the Empire, not to himself. Therefore when Charles the fourth, that Wenceslaus his sonne might be designed Emperor, had promised an 100000 Crowns to every one of the Electors, and because he had no ready monies, had obliged to them by way of pawne to this end, the Imperiall Customs, Tributes, Townes, Proprieties and Rights; there arose a most sharp dispute about it, and the most judged the morgage to be void; which verily had not availed, unlesse that morgage had been gainfull to those very men, who ought to defend the Empire,L. 1. & passim, c▪ de Com. Rev. alienat. Nauclerus in Chron. Gen. 46. C. int…ll…cto de I…reiurando in Decret. Polydor Virgil. In Cod Hispan. par. 5 1. Consent▪ 9. and principally to oppose that morgage: Yea, therefore Wenceslaus himself was compelled, as incapable, to deprive himself of the Empire, because he had suffered the Royall Rights, especially the Dukedome of Millain to be taken from him. In the Polish kingdom there is an ancient Law, of not alienating the Lands of the Kingdom of Poland, renewed An. M. CCCLXV by king Lewes: There is the same Law in the Realm of Hungary, where we reade, that Andrew king of Poland, about the year M. CCXXI. was accused before Pope Honorius the third, that neglecting his Oath, he had alienated the Crown Lands. The like in England in the Law of K. Edward, An. M. CCXCVIII. Likewise in Spain by the Constitution made under Alphonso, renewed again MDLX in the Assembly at Toledo; which Lawes verily were enacted, when as custome for a long time before had obtained the force of a Law. But verily in the kingdome of France, wherein, as in the pattern of the rest, I shall longer insist, this Law was ever sacrosanct: It is the most ancientest Law of the Realme, I say, the Law born with the Kingdom it self, Of not alienating the Crown (or demesne) Lands, Papon Ar…stor. l. 5. Tit. 20. art. 4.renewed in the year M, D, 66. although it be ill observed. Two cases onelyonly are excepted, Panage or Apennage (aliments) to be exhibited to his children or brethren, yet so as the clientelary right be alwayes retained; again, if warlike necessitie require it, yet with a pact of reddition, Yet in the interim both of them were heretofore reputed void,Paragr. 11. & 16. Legis Regiae Latae. 15…6. unlesse the Assembly of the three Estates had commanded it; but at this day, since a standing Parliament was erected, it is likewise void, unlesse the Parliament of Paris, which is the Senate of Peers, and the Chamber of publike accounts shall approve it, and the Presidents of the Eschequer also by the Edict of Charles the 6 and 9. And this is so farre forth true,Aimoi &c. Aimoi. l. 4. …. 4…. that if the ancient Kings of France would endow any Church, although that cause then seemed most favourable, they were bound to obtain the consent of the Nobles; as king Childebert may be for an example, who without the consent of the French and Normans, durst not endow the Monastery of S. Vincents in Paris, as neither Clodovess the second, and the rest. Moreover, they cannot release the Royalties, or the right of nominating Prelates to any Church; but if any have done it, as Lewes the eleventh in favour of the Church of Sennes, and Philip the fourth of Augiers, Philip Augustus of Naverne, the Parliament hath pronounced it void. The king of France, when he is to be Crowned at Rheimes, sweares to this law, which if he shall violate, it avails as much as if he contracted concerning the Turkish or Persian Empire.L. Petr. 69. parag. praedsumi. D. de Oy. 2. Hence the Constitutions, or as they call it, the Statutes of Philip the sixt, Iohn the 2d, Charles the fift, sixt, eight, of resuming those things which were alienated by their Ancesto… (of which resumptions there are many instances cited by Hugo Grotius de Iure … & Pacis, l. 2. c. 14. n. 12. 13. & Adnotata Ibid.) Hence in the Assembly of the three Estates at Towres (An. 1323. 1360. 1374. 1401. 1483.) in which Charles the eight was present,An. 1483. 1522. 1…31. Arestis…Curiae. 1…6…. many Towns of the alienation of Lewes the eleventh his Father, which he had by his own Authoritie given to Tancred Castellan, who demerited well of him, were taken from his Heirs; which even in the last assembly of the three Estates held at Orange, was again decreed. Thus concerning publike Lands. But that it may the more evidently appeare, that the kingdome is preferred before the king, that he cannot by his private Authoritie diminish the Majestie which he hath received from the people,Paulus Aemil. l. 3. nor exempt any one from his Empire, nor grant the right of the Soveraign Dominion in any part of the Realm; Charles the great once endeavoured to subject the Realm of France to the German Empire; but the French vehemently withstood it,An. 1195, 1200, 1269, 1297, 1303. 1325, 1330. a certain Vascon Prince making the Oration: The matter had proceeded to Arms, if Charles had proceeded further. Likewise, when some part of the Realm of France was delivered to the English, the supreme right was almost perpetually excepted;An 1360. but if Force extorted it at any time, as in the Brittish League,An. 1465. & 1525. wherein king Iohn released his Soveraign Right in Gascoigne and Poytiers, the king neither kept his Contract, neither could or ought he more to keep it, then a Captain, Tutor or Guardian, as then he was; who that he might redeem himselfe, would oblige the goods of his Pupils. By the same Law the Parliament of Paris rescinded the agreement of the Flusheners, wherein Charles of Burgundy extorted Ambian, An 1420. Monstr…let c. 225.and the neighbour Cities from the king; and in our time the agreement of of Madrit, between Francis the first a Captive, and Charles the fift the Emperour, concerning the Dukedome of Burgundy was held void; and the Donation of Charles the sixt of the kingdom of France by reason of death, conferred on Henry king of England, may be one apt argument of his extreme madnesse, if others be wanting. But that I may omit other things which might be said to this purpose, by what right at last can a king give or sell his kingdom or any part thereof,L. Liber homo 103. D. de verbo. obligat. l si Emp. 34. § 1▪ D. de contra. Emp. l pe…C▪ de oper…libert. seeing they consist in the people, not in the walls? now there is no …ale of free men, when as Land-Lords cannot so much as constrain their free Tenants, that they should settle their Houshold in any other place then where they please; especially seeing they are not servants, but Brethren; neither onelyonly are all kings Brethren, but even all within the Royall Dominion ought to be so called.

But whether if the king be not the proprietorie of the Realme,An lex sit Regni usis fructuarius? may he not at least be called the usufructuary, or receiver of the profits of the Crown Lands? Truely, not so much as an usufructuary. A usufructuary can Pawn his lands, but we have proved, that kings cānot morgage the Patrimony of the Crown. A fructuary can dispose or give the profits at his pleasure; contrarily, the great gifts of the king are judged void, His unnecessary expences are rescinded, his superfluous cut off; what ever he shall convert into any other but the Publike use, he is thought to have violently usurped. Neither verily is he lesse obliged by the Cincian Law, then any private Citizen among the Romanes, especially in France where no gifts are of force without the consent of the Auditors of the Accounts. Hence the ordinary Annotations of the Chamber under prodigall kings; This Donation is too great, and therefore let it be revoked. Now this Chamber solemnly swears, that whatsoever rescript they shall at any time receive from the king, that they will admit nothing which may be hurtfull to the kingdom and Commonweale. Finally, the Law cares not how a Fructuary useth and enjoyeth his profits; contrarily, the Law prescribes the king in what manner, and unto what use he ought to put them. Therefore the ancient kings of France were bound to divide the Rents into four parts▪ one part was spent in sustaining the Ministers of the Church, and the poor, another upon the kings Table, the third on the Wages of his houshold servants, the last in the repaire of royall Castles, Bridges, Houses;Monstretus in Carolo 6. the residue, if there were any, was laid up in the Treasury. Verily what stirs there were about the year 1412 in the Assembly of the three Estates at Paris, because Charles the sixt had converted all things into his and his Officers lusts, and that the Domestick accounts, which before had not exceeded 94 thousand French Crowns in such a miserable estate of the republike, had increased to the sum of five hundred and forty thousand Crowns, is sufficiently evident out of Histories: Now as the rents of the Crown were thus lessened, so also the oblations and subsidies were spent upon the Warre, as the taxes and tallages were onelyonly destinated to the stipends of Souldiers. In other Realms the King verily hath not any more Authority, yea, in most he hath lesse, as in the Germane and Polish Empire: But we would therefore prove this to be so in the Realm of France, lest by how much any man dares to doe more injury,Ex Concil. Valent. in c. de his quae sinit. a Prelatis absque conscapit. by so much also he might be thought to have more right. In summe, what we have said before, the name of a King sounds not an inheritance, not a propriety, not a perception of profits, but a function, a procuration. As a Bishop is instituted for the cure and salvation of the soul, so the King of the body, in those things which pertain to the publike goods; as he is the dispenser of sacred goods, so the King of prophane, and what power he hath in his Episcopall, the same, and no greater hath the King in his dominicall Lands; the alienation of the Episcopall Lands without the consent of the Chapter, is of no validitie, so neither of the Crown Land without a publike Parliament or Senate of the Estates; Of sacred revenews one part is designed to aedifices, another to the poor, a third to Companions, a fourth to the Bishop himself; the same verily almost we see the King ought to do in dispensing the revenewes of the Kingdom. It hinders not, that the contrary every where is at this day usurped: For the duty of Bishops is not any way changed, because many Bishops sell those things from the poor, which they spend upon Bawds, or wast all their Mannors and Woods; nor yet that some Emperours have attributed all kinde of power to themselves, for neither can any one be judge in his own Cause. But if any Cararalla hath said, That so long as his sword remains, he would want no money; Adrianus Caesar will also be p…esent, who shall say, That he would manage the Principality, so as all should know, Florus l. 2. … l. 70. Tacitus l, 14.that it was the peoples goods, or inheritance, not his own; which one thing almost distinguisheth a King from a Tyrant: Not, that Attalus King of Pergameni, ordained the people of Rome …eirs of his Realme; that Alexander bequeathed the kingdom of Aegypt, …tolomie of the Cyrenians, to the people of Rome, or Prasutagus of the …ceni to Caesar▪ verily this great power cannot debilitate the force of the Law, yea, by how much the greater it is, by so much the lesse it hurts our law; for what things the Romanes seized upon by pretext of law, they wou… notwithstanding have seized on by force, if that pretext had been wanting: Yea, we see almost in our …imes, the Venetians, by pretext of a certain imaginary adoption, which without force had been plainly ridiculous,Volater…m, … Greg. 3. to have taken the Kingdom of Cyprus. Nor yet doth the Donation of …onstantine to Pope Sylvester hinder, for this Chaffe seemed absolete long since to Gratian, and is damned to the fire. Not the donation of Lewes the godly to Pas…hall, to wit, of Rome, with part of Italy because Pius gave that which he possessed not, and no man resisted; But Charles, his Father, willing to subject the Realm of France to the German Empire, the French resisted him by law;1 King c. 9. and if he had gone further, they prepared to resi… by force Not, that Solomon as we read,Chron. 6. 8. delivered twenty cities to Hiram King of Tyre, for he did not give them, but pawned them as a Creditor till he paid him, and within a short time recovered them, which appears out of the Text; Moreover also they were barren grounds, tilled by Reliques of the Heathens, which he receiving again from Hiram, gave them at last to the Israelites to be tilled and inherited. Neither can this more hinder, that in certain Kingdoms this condition perchance doth not so expresly intervene betweene the King and his people;L. 2. paragr. ius rei. D. de administ. rer. ad cui. part. T. Luter 27. D. de admin. tutor. l. si Fundum. parag. fi tutor D. depositi & express. Extrauag, dere Iudicat c. intellecto, l. 2. & passim. C. de interdict. Com. rer. alien. for albeit it were not at all, yet it appears by the law of Nations, that Kings are not subverters, but Moderators of the Republike, that they cannot change the right of the Commonwealth by their pactions; that they are Lords onelyonly when they take care of their Pupils, that they are to be accounted no other then Guardians; and that he is not to be esteemed a Lord, who spoils the City with liberty, and selleth it like a slave. Not finally, that certain Kingdoms are gained by Kings themselves, for they acquired not Kingdoms by their owne, but by publike hands, forces, treasures; now nothing is more consonant to reason, then that those things which are gotten by the publike riches, and common dangers of the Citizens, should not be alienated without common consent, which holds place even amongst Theeves themselves; he destroyeth humane society, who doth the contrary: Therefore though the French have by force seized on the German Empire, and they also on the Realm of France, yet the same law holds in both. In sum, at last we ought to determine, that Kings are not Proprietors, nor Fructuaries, but onelyonly Administratours; and since it is so, that verily they can much lesse attribute to themselves the propriety and profits of every mans private Estate, or of the publike wealth which belongeth to every Town.

Thus and much more this accute learned Lawyer, to the conviction and refutation of all opposite Ignoramusses in this case of grand concernment, which will put a period to our unhappy controversies concerning the Militia, (*Part. 2. p. 1. 10 41. formerly discussed) without further debate.

Eighthly, Observ. 8.That Emperours and Kings are most solemnly obliged by a Covenant and Oath, usually made to, and before all the people at their Coronations, to preserve their peoples lawes, liberties, lives, estates; by breach whereof in a wilfull excessive manner, they become perjured Tyrants, and the people and Magistrates are in some sort thereby absolved from their Allegiance, and all obedience to them.

This is evidently and plentifully confirmed by theqPart. 1. p. 51. to. 78. forecited Coronation Oathes, and Covenants of our own English Kings to their subjects, by De Iure Magistratus in Subdit…s, q…aest. 10. p. 321. 322. and quaest 6. p. 260. to 300. Andrew Favine his Theatre of Honour, lib. 2. c. 11. 24. Francisci Hotomani Franco-gallia, cap. 6. 10. &c. Hugo Grotius de Iure Belli & Pacis, 1. 2. c. 13. 14. Pontifi…ale Romanum, Rome 1611. fol. 162. 163. Descriptio Coronationis Maximiliani Imperatoris, Anno 1486. inter rerum German Scriptores, Tom. 3. p. 32. Olaus Magnus de Gent. Septentrionalibus Hist. l. 14. c. 6. Laur, Bochellus decreta Ecclesiae Gallicanae, l. 5. Tit. 2. c. 1. p. 703. M. Iohn Seldens Titles of Honour part. 1. ch. 8. sect. 5. p. 198. 214. 225. 226. (where the Coronation, Oathes of the Emperour, French King, of all the Northern Kings, and of most Elective and Successive Kings and Queens to their Subjects, are at large recorded:) Alhusius Polit. c. 4. Iustus Eccardus de Lege Regia; Thomas Aquinas de Reg. Principis, c. 6. & 2. qu. 2ae. 12. art. 2. Iohn Ponet Bishop of Winchester in his Politicall Government. Arnisaeus de Authoritate Principum, p. 50. to 123. Sparsim. Vesquius contro. Illustr. passim. Ioannis Mariana de Rege & Regis Instit. l. 1. c. 6. 7. 9. Georg. Bnchanon de lure Regni apud Scotos. Simancha Pacensis de Catholica. Instit. Tit. 23. n. 11 p. 98. Franciscus Tolletus in summa l. 5 c. 6. Huldericus Zuinglius; Explan. Artic. 40. 41. 42. And, to omitall others, Iunius Brutus in his Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, quaest. 3. p. 156. to 167. with whose words I shall fortifie and irradiate this position: We have said, that in constituting a King a double Covenant is entred into; the first between God, the King and people, of which before; the second, between the king and the people, of which we are now to treat. Saul being ordained king, the royall law was delivered to him, according to which he should rule.Deut 17. l Sa. 10. 25. 2 Sam. 5. 3. 1 Chron. 11. 3. 2 King. 11. 17. & 12. David made a Covenant before the Lord in Hebron; that is,2 Chron. 23. 3. 2 King. 23. 3. calling God to Witnesse, with all the Elders of Israel, who represented all the people, and then at last he was annointed king. Ioas also made a Covenant with all the people of the land in the house of the Lord, Iehoiada the high Priest going before them in words: Yea, the testimony is said to be imposed on him together with the Crown; which most interpret the Law of God, which every where is called by that name. Likewise Iosiah promised, that he would observe the Precepts, Testimonies and Statutes comprized in the book of the Covenant; by which names we understand the Lawes which appertained as well to piety as to justice. In all which places of Scripture, a Covenant is said to bee made with all the people, the whole multitude, all the Elders, all the m…n of Iudah; that we may understand, which is likewise severally expressed, not onelyonly the Princes of the Tribes, but likewise all the Chiliarkes, Centurions, and inferior Magistrates were present, in the Name of the Cities, which every one a part by themselves made a Covenant with the king. In that Covenant they consulted of creating the king, for the people did make the king, not the king the people. Therefore there is no doubt, but the people made the Covenant, and the King promised to perform it. Now the part of him that makes the Covenant is reputed the better Law: The people demanded of the King, whether he would not rule justly and according to the Lawes? Hee promised that he would doe so: wherupon the people answered, That hee reigning justly, they would faithfully obey him. Therefore the King promised obsolutely; the people, but upon condition; which if it were not fulfilled, the people by the Law it selfe should bee reputed absolved from all obligation. In the first covenant or Pact, Pietie comes into the obligation, in the second, Iustice: In that, the king promiseth, that he will seriously obey God; in this, that he will justly rule the people: in that, that he will take care of the glory of God; in this, of the benefit of the people; in that there is this condition, If thou shalt observe my Law; in this, If thou shalt render Iustice to every one: Of that, if it be not fulfilled, God properly is the avenger; of this, lawfully all the people, or the Peers of the Realm, who have taken upon them to defend all the people. Now in all just Empires, this hath been perpetually observed. The Persians having duely finished their sacrifices,Xenoph. lib. …. made this agreement with Cyrus, Thou first, O Cyrus, if any make warre with the Persians or violate the Lawes, doest thou promise to ayde thy Countrey with all thy might? And as soon as he had promised, We Persians, say they, will be aiding to thee, if any will not obey thee, defending they Countrey: Xenophon Xenophon. de Repub. Lacedaem.calls this agreement foreign that is, a Confederation, as Socrates an Oration of the duty of Subjects towards their Prince foreign: Between the kings of Sparta and the Ephori, a Covenant was renewed every month; and as the kings did swear,Dionys. Ha…car lib. 1. That they would reign according to the Laws of the Countrey; so the Ephori, If they did so, that they would establish the Kingdom in their hand. Likewise in the kingdom of the Romanes, Romulus made this contract with the Senate and people, That the People should make Lawes, that the king himself would keepe the Lawes made; That the People should decrée Warre, himself wage it. And although many Emperours obtained the Empire of the Romans rather by force and ambition, then by any right, and by the Royall Law, as they call it, arrogated all kinds of power to themselves; yet the*See Eccardus de Lege Regia & Marius Salamonius de Principatu l. 6. where this Law is recorded. fragments of that Law, which are extant as well in Books as in Roman inscriptions, sufficiently reach; that a power was granted them, of caring for and administring, not of subverting the Common-weal and oppressing it by tyranny. Moreover, even good Emperours professed, that they were bound by the Lawes, and acknowledged their Empire received from the Senate, and referred all the weigh…iest affaires to the Senate, and they judged it unlawfull to determine any thing of great publike concernment without their aduice. But if wee behold the present Empires, there is not one of them which may be thought worthy of that name, wherein there is not some such Covenant intervening between the Prince and Subiects. In the German Empire, not long since, the King of Romanes being to be crowned Emperour, was wont To make Fealty and Homage to the Empire, no otherwise then a vassall (or tenant) to his Lord, when he received investiture of his Lands. And although the conceived words, to which he sware, be a little changed by Popes, yet the same thing remains perpetually. Therefore we know that Charles the 5. of Austria was created Emperour upon certain Lawes and conditions,Speculum Saxon, l. 1. art. 54. See Descript. Coronations Maximiliani lmper An. 1486. in Rerum Germ. scrip. Tom. 3 p. 31. as likewise others, who have succeeded him; of which the summe was; That he would keep the Lawes enacted; That he would make no new Lawes, without the Electors consents; that he would determine publike affaires in a publike Counsell; that he would altenate or pervert none of these things which pertained to the Empire; with other things which are severally recited by Historiagraphers: And when as the Emperour is crowned at Achen, the Archbishop of Colen first demands of him; Whether he will not defend the Church, administer justice, preserve the Empire, protect Widowes, Orphans, and all worthy of pitty? which when he hath solemnly sworn to perform before the Altar, the Princes and those who represent the Empire, are demanded, whether they will promise to fealty him? Neither yet is he first annointed, or receives a sword, (of purpose to defend the Republike) or other Ensignes of the Empire, before that he shall have taken that Oath. From whence verily it is manifest, that the Emperour is purely obliged, the Princes of the Empire upon condition onelyonly. No man will doubt but that the same is observed in the kingdom of Poland, sSee Po…ti…ical Romanum Rome 1611. f. 161. 162. Mr. S…dens Titles of Hon. par. 1. c. 8. p. 1…6. to 106.who shall understand the ceremonies very lately observed in the Election and Coronation of Henry of Angiers: especially, the condition propounded to him of conserving both Religions, as well the Evangelicall as Roman, which the Nobles thrice demanding of him in set forme of words, he thrice promised to perform. In the Hungarian, Bohemian, and other kingdomes, which would be over-long to recite, the very same is done. Neither onelyonly, where the right of Election hath continued yet entire hitherto, but likewise where meer succession is commonly thought to take place, the very same stipulation is wont to intervene. When thetSe… Bochellus. Decreta Eccles. Gallicanae l. 5. tit. 2. c. 1. & Mr. Seldens Titles of Hon. par. 1. …b. 8. p. …1▪ …256. King of France is crowned, the Bishops of Laudune and Belvace ecclesiasticall Peers, first demand of all the people that are present, Whether they desire and command him to be King? Whence even in the very forme it self of inauguration, he is said To be elected by the People. When the people Seem to have consented, he sweares: That he will universally defend all the Lawes, Priviledges, and Rights of France, that he will not alienate his demesnes, and the like (I shall here insert the Oath out of Bochellus, Mr. Selden, and others intirely, thus: