Scripture and Reason Pleased for Defensive Arms, Section 4
SECT. IV.
IN this Section the Doctor undertakes to treat of the Forfeiture of the Power▪ and ſo of the Re-aſſuming of it by the Parliament or People, for the Kings not diſcharging his truſt. And denies this Forfeiture, and this power of Reaſſuming that Power. But this (he ſaith) they that plead for it offer to prove by two or three things laid together. Firſt, that the power is derived from the People by way of Election. Secondly, that there is a Covenant betweene the King and the People. Thirdly, that it is neceſſary for a State have a meanes within it ſelfe to preſerve it ſelfe. Againſt all thoſe the Dr. argues and I follow him. OnelyOnly remembring him that by Forfeiture is not underſtood Forfeiture of all Kingly Authority; nor by Reaſſuming (as I ſaid before) a taking of the whole power from him to themſelves, but onelyonly for the particular Caſe in hazard, and for the preſent necesſity.
And now to begin with what he firſt mentions the Derivation of power; I muſt tell him that he forges what he before complained of in others; that they confounded the power it ſelfe with the perſon and the Qualification▪ I am ſure he doth ſo here, if ever man did. Hee before granted the Perſon and Qualification from men and then they approved of God; and more then that, no man pleads to be derived nor more to be forfeited, plead not for ſo much, nor he Pa…liament neither. But only the Qualification for he particular Caſe of danger, and till that danger may be ſuffici…ntly ſecured.
Yet here now at firſt, to oppoſe the Forfeiture (but of this particular which is only in queſtion now before us) he denies the power to be from the People, and appeales to what he hath cleared, which is onelyonly (by his owne ſaying▪ but not altogether as hath beene ſhewed) that the Power it ſelfe is from God. But for all that, if no more can be ſaid againſt the perſons forfeiting his reigning Power, and ſpecially in the Qualifications of it, even for ever, it may undoubtedly be forfeited and ſo re-aſſumed all of it: which is more then I ſay.
Secondly, but he will prove, that though the People have this Power abſolutely (which himſelfe hath more then once granted, of the Deſignation of the Perſon and Qualification) yet could they not have right to take it away.
REPL. The King will have no cauſe to thank him for his undertaking, as well becauſe he doth it not with any great ſtrength; as alſo becauſe hee hath hereby provoked men to diſpute even this Caſe; which no way needed, ſince the Parliament never pretended to this Right in generall, but rather diſclaimed it.
Firſt, he ſaith▪ [Many things which are altogether in our diſpoſing before we part with them, are not afterward in our power to recall.]
REPL. True; but ſome things are, and that both, if conditions be not obſerved, and even at our owne pleaſure.
A King makes ſome Officers for terme of life; others, quamdin ſe bene geſſerint; others, a… ante bene placite. To the latter hee may ſend a Writ of Eaſe at his pleaſure; and every day its in his power to recall their Authority. To the ſecond their offices are ſure without power of recalling till they are legally convicted of miſbehaviour. To the third, as long as they live, their Authority is firme, and no power of recalling it wholly. Yet even ſuch may bee hindred from ſome Adminiſtrations, by Accuſations by and apparency of Crimes, making it unfit for them to be truſted in the particular.
We imagine not the People to have power to recall that Regall Authority at their pleaſure: we argue not that they have power to recall it wholly, upon any Caſe of Mal-adminiſtration. All that we plead for is power to adminiſter a part of it upon neceſsity, which he will not adminiſter for good, but rather for evill. And there are not many things that were altogether ours, and in our diſpoſing before we part with them▪ but are ſtill ſo farre ours, as to uſe them againe in our neceſsity for that turne at leaſt, though there are ſome.
Secondly But he will prove this to be one of thoſe that are not after in our power to recall [eſpecially, ſaith he, ſuch; in which there redounds to God an intereſt by the Donation, as in things devoted, though after they come to be abuſed.]
REPL. 1. Grant this true, in referrence to the Power of recalling them wholly, (which yet is not univerſally true as will appeare ſtraight) yet may there be power enough to adminiſter ſo much as is of neceſsity.
A Wife is tyed to her Husband by the Covenant of God. (ſo called Prov. 2.) by the Ordinance of God, more ancient, and no leſſe ſtrong then that of Politick Government. She cannot recall wholly her Husbands Authority over her, though ſhee was once altogether at her diſpoſing▪ to chooſe or another or none to be her head. All the goods of the Family are his in Law, and not here but by his leave and order: Yet for her necesſity, ſhe may by the Law of God and conſcience adminiſter ſo much of the goods as is fit, and ſecure her Perſon from his violence by abſence (though that ordinarily be againſt the Law of Marriage, and the end of it,) or any other meanes of ncceſſary defence.
But ſecondly, it is not altogether true, that there is no power or recalling any thing devoted to God. Hezekiah took off the gold from the Doores of the Temple and the Pillars which he had overlaid, and all the ſilver in the houſe of the Lord, to pay the King of Aſſyria his demanded Ranſome, 2. Kings 18.14, 15, 16.
If the Doctor will not owne this Act of Hezekiah; I am ſure he will that of David, taking the hallowed Bread, which was not for any, by Gods Law to eate, but onelyonly the Prieſts. This was devoted to God, (and not ſo much as abuſed) and by him asſigned to a ſpeciall uſe: yet from that diverted, and lawfully without queſtion.
And now I appeale to all Conſciences, Whether the necesſity of ſaving a Kingdome from the ſubverſion of Religion, Lawes and Liberties, be not greater then Davids necesſitie was? And if [I will have mercy and not ſacrifice] did juſtifie Davids act, will it not theirs, who in a necesſity uſe or adminiſter the power of the Militia or Armes, which ordinarily is only to be admieiſtred by the King? Neither will Abimelech the Prieſts conſenting to David alter the Caſe: for it was devoted to God, and but in necesſity he might not have conſented, nor David accepted. Necesſity then recalled that particular Bread, through devoted. So necesſity may recall this parcell of power in queſtion.
Thus the Doctors ground failes him for our Caſe; yet 3. ſee what he adds, [ſo although it were as they would have it that they give the power, and God approves (himſelfe oft hath ſaid, and cannot deny, but they give the Perſon his power and if they take it from his perſon, yet they may leave it to his Heire but wee argue not for ſo much) yet becauſe the Lords hand and his oyle alſo is upon the Perſon elected to the Crowne, and then he is the Lords Annointed, and the Miniſter of God, thoſe hands of the People which were uſed in lifting him up to the Crowne, may not againe be lift up againſt him, either to take the Crowne from his head, or the Sword out of his hand; this true inform'd Conſcience will not dare to doe.
REPL. 1. Is not Gods hand upon a Judge? Is not hee the Miniſter of God? Is not a King bound to God and to his People to appoint Judges, who may leſſe be ſpared in their Power, then the Monarch himſelfe (for what is his Power when an Infant? Is not the Kingdome then adminiſtred Ariſtocratically? But there muſt alwayes be Judges and inferiour officers in a large Dominion, or all government is loſt.)
Will the Doctor ſay that the hands that have lift up the Judge or Officer to his ſeat (that is the Kings hands) may not bee lift up againſt him to pull him downe and pull off his Robes, or take the Sword out of his hand? The intereſt that God hath in him, ſhall it preſerve him in his Office, in caſe eſpecially of Mal-Adminiſtration? But ſhall it (or hath it done) even ſo long as no offence is proved againſt him? The Parliament hath indeed deſired it for Judges and great Officers; but hath it been granted? Or what meanes the putting out of ſo many old Juſtices of Peace lately, without any Crime alleadged againſt them at all; of which more Countreys then one have at the Asſiſes complained as a great grievance?
What will the Doctor ſay to this? Yet they were Gods Miniſters and had the Sword committed to them. If hee ſay the King was their Superiour, and ſo might take their Authoritie away, but the people is not Superiour to the King.
REPLY. This ſatisfies not, becauſe notwithſtanding, here is a Perſon, in whom GOD hath an intereſt, and who is his Miniſter, deprived of his Authoritie: not only when he abuſes it, but meerely at pleaſure. The Drs. Reaſon then hath no ſtrength in it thus faare, or this done to inferiour Magiſtrates is not lawfull.
2. But ſecondly, what ſtrength is in his Argument, lies in the Kings being GODS anointed, and therefore the Crowne may not be taken from his Head by Men, this I have granted him before, and am ſo farre from recalling or diſputing againſt, that I will adde this word of confirmation to it. Suppoſing wee ſpeake of ſuch a Prince or Monarch, (call him King or Emperour, or Duke, or what you will) that is not depoſeable by the expreſſe Lawes of that Common-Wealth, as the Duke of Brabant was, and the Duke of Venice is, (for ſuch as thoſe Dukes were not properly ſupreame, nor GODS immediate Vicegerents, as Saul, and David, and the like) I ſay then, that though in caſe of Mal-Adminiſtration, an inferiour Magiſtrate may be Lawfull and moſt juſtly, and neceſſarily depoſed by the Kings Authoritie; I will not ſay the like ſo long as they carry themſelves well, and are not meerely Annuall Officers, who alſo are glad uſually when their yeare is out, becauſe their Office is a burthen and charge) yet a Supreame may not by the people, becauſe hee is GODS immediate Vicegerent, and ſo ſpecially owned by Him, and have none upon Earth, unto whom GOD by any expreſſion in his Word, hath given Authoritie over them, to take their Crownes from their Heads. I ſay againe, as a Wife cannot take away her Husbands Authority, becauſe ſhe is in no ſence above him. So unleſſe the Law of that State, name a Superiour to him that is in Tittle, the Prince to take his Crowne from him, in ſuch a caſe he cannot be depoſed by the Law of GOD, which appoints no perſons to do ſuch a thing, to illuſtrate which, Let me adde that in thoſe times, when GOD allowed by the Judiciall Law, a Man to put away his Wife, It did not allow a Woman to put away, or forſake her Husband, though I know about our Saviours Time Ioſephus relates of Women having gotten that, among the Iewes, at leaſt ſome of them, as hee inſtances in Salome ſiſter to Herod the Great, who put away her Husband. But GOD allowed it not. And ſo that may bee lawfull for a Prince who is Superiour to doe to an Inferiour Magiſtrate, which is not lawfull for the people to doe to the Prince who is Supreme, no not in a like caſe of Mal-Adminiſtration. I could inſtance in ſundry other Prerogatives, in GODS Word to Superiours, which hold not (no not in like caſes) to Inferiours, but it needs not with the Parliament, as hath been oft ſaid.
2. But whereas the Dr. addes [Nor to take the Sword out of his hand] This is inconſequent divers wayes. Firſt, himſelfe in the former SECTION, in the caſe of Eliſha, granted a private man, might reſiſt the Kings Meſſenger, and even hold the Kings owne hands, ſure he may (he doth that while equivalently) take the Sword out of his hand. Secondly, the people tooke it out of Sauls hand when he would have put Ionathan illegally to death. Thirdly. If hee would kill himſelfe, it may be taken out of his hand. 4. Since out of all queſtion GOD never put it into his hands, to kill the Innocent, nor much leſſe to ſubvert Religion Lawes, and Liberties, he being GODS anointed and GODS Miniſter for good, &c. hinders not the taking the Sword ſo long out of his hand, till it hath beene ſufficiently imployed, to puniſh thoſe Malefactors and delinquents which he ſhould, but will not ſtrike with it, or rather will defend and imploy, S. Yet I ſay further, to doe that which the Parliament hath done (ſuppoſing the neceſſity, of which hereafter,) is not to take the Sword out of his hand himſelfe grants (as was noted before in his Anſwer to the 19. Propoſitions) that the two Houſes have a legall power to puniſh, even ſuch as doe violence being his followers or Favourites, though countenanced with ſome ſurr…ptiouſly gotten Command from the King: and moreover, that they have power more than ſufficient to prevent and reſtraine Tyrannie. Their ſetling the M…litia in ſafe hands, and the Navy ▪ and ſecuring Hull is by them declared to be for no other end, nor their raiſing an Army ſince. If then thoſe that they would puniſh bee Delinquents, and if in them whom the King truſts there bee (though not at all in the King) an intention to bring in a Tyranny, even with Armes, and to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties (which is the ſtate of the preſent Queſtion) then by the Kings owne grants, as aforeſaid, they may Legally and Lawfully take the Sword into their hands; and doe not take it out of Kings, but his wicked Followers. 6. But becauſe the Dr. cloſes his Aſſertion, with, ſaying This will not a a true informed Conſcience dare to doe.
REPLY. I will be bold to try, whether Conſcience many not ſay, It dares doe no other then than this latter; (ſo farre to take the Sword into their hands,) whether even his Tower of Battery. Rom. 13.21. not by what hath beene ſaid formerly, and even now ſo wonne from him, as it is become ours to beat down his Principle in this firſt Queſtion, to the very duſt.
Secondly, I ſay the Parliament is a Power ordained of God, it is the Miniſter of God, It is to be a Terrour to evill Workes, It is to be a Revenger to execute Wrath on them that doe evill, It is to watch continually (as GODS Miniſter) in th…s very thing, and ſo fo… the prayſe of them that doe well (and ſo the ſecu…i…g of Religion, Lawes, and Liberties) it is not to beare the Sword in vaine. And a ſword it hath, by the Kings owne ſentence to the purpoſes aforeſa…d And this Parliament (what ever o…her migh… bee) is not depoſeable (diſſoluble) but by themſelves. The Sword cannot be Legally taken from them till they give it up. It remaines then that they are bound in Conſcience to GOD, and to the People, and King too, that have entruſted them with this Power to uſe it to theſe ends, to puniſh Delinquents and tempters (though under Colour of ſurreptiouſly gotten Commands from the King) to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties; and to prevent Tyranny, and preſerve themſelves, and Religion, Lawes and Liberties. They may not onelyonly Lawfully doe this, upon theſe Premiſes and ſuppoſitions, but they are by all Obligations to GOD and Man neceſſitated to doe ſo, and even to take away the wicked from before the King, that ſo his Throne may bee eſtabliſht in Righteouſneſſe. This is clearely the… the Parliaments not onelyonly Power, but duty. I… they m…ſtake in the preſent caſe (of which anon) yet the generall caſe ſtands good, they may and ought to doe ſo, to take Armes when ſuch a caſe comes.
The Dr. hath ſomewhat more to ſay againſt the Peoples power, applicable to our Kingdome. Let us heare it alſo. [How ſhall Conſcience be ſatisfied, concerning the Peoples power, derived from their Election, when our Kings are ſuch by Inheritance, and claime not by Election, and the Crowne hath been oft ſetled by Conqueſt.]
REPLY. Neither is Conqueſt any thing of it ſelfe to power, or Lawfull Authority, of which onelyonly we argue; but only as it obtaines conſent by agreement, which is all one in Sence, and Effect with Election. Only Election ſounds more Freedome of will, Conqueſt Imports a Force occaſioning that will. But it is evident in Reaſon, that he that is free (as all men are by Nature, (as was ſaid before) except their bond to Parents) becomes not ſubject, de jure, till his Conſent, Agreement, or Election makes him ſo, and to no more then his Conſent reaches, explicitely or implicitely: and ſo for many men, they can no other way be ſubject to one, to a Prince or Monarch, but by their Agreement, whether for feare of his Force, or hopes of his vertue, he is not their King or Lord, till he be made ſo by their Conſent, I meane at firſt, and Originally. But what need I ſtand to prov… this largely, when our Dr. hath confeſt it (in ſence) before, in ſaying the deſigning the perſon and Qualification of the Power is from Men, Mans invitation what is this? put mans choyce Agreement, Conſent together. And if there be 100. Conqueſts, the Conqueror hath not the qualification of his power one whit enlarged, by Right, untill the People have conſented and yielded up their former Rights, and when they have, then his Right is ſetled accordingly, and to his ſ…cceſſours, if ſo conſented to, elſe not; and to h…s …e…res, if conſented to, elſe not; and to Heires male onelyonly, as in France, or Fema…e alſo as in England according to the conſent. Or if the Conquerour to obtaine the Peoples … his poſterity, will offer to have le…t power then his Predeceſſour bed, …e… upon ſuch conſ…t, the q…alification of his power is leſſened for ever after to h…m and his. Conqueſt th…n firſt or laſt, one or many, are no more to right o… power, then an occaſion or Motive to conſent; conſent Choiſe Agreement are all in all. Secondly, as for Inheritance, it is nothing but a ſucceſſion of conſent. Indeed poſteritie are bound to the conſent of their Parents for the Perſon, Family, qualification, but to no more. In all other Caſes and reſpects they are as free, as their Parents at firſt were. A Prince then onelyonly inherites, what was given the firſt of the Nation, or others ſince by conſent of the people; and by written Law or cuſtome, he muſt claime any power he will exerciſe; or elſe he cannot plead any right title to it. And his qualification of power admits of encreaſe or decreaſe, as he and the People agree and conſent. His power is altogether derived by Election and conſent, firſt and laſt whence I will inferre no more, but as before, that therefore in caſe of neceſſity, the people may uſe ſo much of it as may ſuffice to ſave themſelves from Ruine; and that may be inferred from it, by what went before. As for his Repetition of Rom. 13. and the Roman Emperours being Monarchs abſolute, I need ſay nothing to now, I have ſaid enough before.
After this he comes to the Covenant, and Oath, which the Prince takes to confirm what he promiſed, which he denies to make the Kings Admitttance to the Kingdome altogether conditionall, as is the meerely Elective Kingdomes of Polonia, Swethland &c. and that it is nothing to allow reſiſtance, unleſſe in the Covenant could be ſhewed, that in caſe he will not diſcharge the truſt, it ſhall be Lawfull for the States to reſiſt,
REPLY. The Oath is onelyonly urged, to ſhew that the Kings Conſcience is bound more firmely then what he is ſworne to, and as a Teſtification of the C…venant: The matt…r ſworne to, is the maine; nor that urged for an abſolute forfeiture, but for the caſe of neceſſitie.
Secondly, in more Elective Kingdomes, the conditions of the Covenant are more largely perhaps and more ſolemnely explicite then in ſucceſſive, and the Power is mor… Reſtrained then in ſome ſucceſſive: yet conſent b…ing the foundation of ſucceſſion, as was ſaid before, a King that enters upon the ſucceſſion, doth by that ver…ually, before his Oath o… Coronation conſent to the firſt Conditions or Covenant, thoſe that have been made conſequently, and in that ſence his Admittance is altogether conditionall: not that the people may refuſe him at their will, without new Conditions, but that he may not refuſe the former Covenant, and Conditions by offering to take more power then thoſe gave him (or his Anceſtors which is all one) And if he doe, the people are not bound to obey thoſe Commands (the Dr, confeſſes before) and I adde as before, they may reſiſt his illegal Violences.
3. For now the caſe is all one, as if the choyce or agreement, Covenant, o… conſent were originally made but yeſterday. And then conſider it. We are a multitude of Free-men, and whereas we might have agreed on an Ariſtocracy, We agreed on a King on ſuch and ſuch Covenants or Conditions, without mention that wee will reſiſt if he break them. But ſimply promiſe Obedience on thoſe Conditions, and he on thoſe accepts the Crowne. But next day breakes all, and ſhewes hee is bent to ſubvert all Religion, Lawes, and Liberties. How now in Reaſon (for of Scripture we ſpake enough before) can it be ſuppoſed, that ſuch a choyce or agreement, hath turned us into ſuch Slaves, as we muſt onelyonly ſuffer, and not at all reſiſt, (or rather is not all reaſon plaine, that I have given away no more of my naturall freedome (which is to reſiſt all violence and wrong) then I meant and expreſt to give away. I ſay then, that unleſſe a Nation have covenanted not to reſiſt in ſuch and ſuch caſes, they have power to reſiſt, becauſe it is a naturall right each hath againſt all (except Parents) ſo farre is it from my being bound not to reſiſt, unleſſe I have expresſly covenanted that I may. Though withall I doe not ſay, that I may covenant at all to reſiſt in no caſe, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew anon.
Fourthly, in the meane time, if the Doctor grant that in caſe the agreement be, that if the Prince diſcharge not his truſt, the ſtates may take Armes and reſiſt, as in effect he ſeemes to doe, when he ſaith, That were ſomething, (for if he doe no ſuch agreement;) Then is not all Reſiſtance damnable, nor Rom 13.2. Rightly interpreted by him. For this and more the Brabancons had in their Agreement with their Duke, even to chooſe another, as the Doctor himſelfe tells us afterward. So ever now and then he muſt contradict his maine Propoſition by the force of truth.
But he ſaith after, that [The ſlender Plea… Election, is thought to have a Covenant in it, but uſually the higher wee riſe in all Empires the freer Kings were, and ſtill downward the People gained on them.] And by this he would imply that ſpecially in ſuccesſive Kingdomes (as this) what ever may be ſaid of merely elective States, there can be no forfeiture of power by breach of Covenant made in after Ages by ſucceeding Princes.
REPLY. In the firſt times, there was a great ſimplicity in all covenants, in ſale of Lands, and letting of Lands, and the like; yet no man ever ſold, or gave away, or lent more then hee meant; though the force and fraud of ill men, forced after Ages to more expreſs Covenants. In like ſort Ex malis moribus bon… Leges, (as well between Prince and people, as between common men) the tyranny of Princes forced People to require them to ſundry neceſſary expreſſe Lawes▪ Yet theſe Lawes now for Phraſe or expresſion, will not in reaſon, be thought more then was intended in the firſt ſimple Covenant, how briefe ſoever it were; for certainly free people, and in their right wits, never meant to enſlave themſelves to the wills and luſts of thoſe they choſe their Princes. But to be ſubject to them for their generall good; which when they found by experience to be violated, or in danger to be ſo for want of expreſſe Lawes (ſpecifications of the Generall Law of Nature, the generall good of the ſociety) they were forced by necesſity to require them to make ſuch Lawes, for their generall ſafety, and particularly alſo to prevent inferiour officers from tyranny under the name of the ſuperiour: and ſo to prevent all necesſity of Armes within themſelves. And ſome good Princes for their peoples comfort have even been forward of themſelves to make ſuch Lawes, which yet without our making, they were bound for the moſt part to have done accordingly for the welfare of their Dominions. The People then have gained nothing for the great part of Lawes for their Liberties, but ability to claime them as undoubted more then before; nor have Princes loſt any thing almoſt, but a power of impoverſhing & ruining their Subjects ſo much as before they ſeemed to have for the ſatisfying of their owne Prodigalities and Luſts. Still then it remaines that the People had a right to all fitting Liberties, even after they ſubmitted to a King: unleſſe they expresſly gave them away; as unto ſome C…nq…erours, the conquered Party were ſometimes forced to doe. But yet (N. B.) even then the Conquerours followers, who were part of his ſubjects at that time, and by who…e hands he conquered the reſt, (whether more or fewer) did conſent and agree to the Peoples, and ſo their owne Poſterities, having but ſuch and ſuch Liberties, and yeelding to the new Conquerour and his Poſterity ſuch and ſuch Power and Authority. So ſtill conſent gave whatſoever a Prince could or can challenge. I ſay then once more unleſſe in the firſt foundation of a State, Kingdome or Empire (and this Kingdome particularly) the People did make their King ſo abſolute, as to give away all power of reſiſtance from themſelves in any caſe; (which the Doctor I beleeve will never be able to prove of this, or any other Civill State) though they made no expreſſe conditions or Covenant, much leſſe any mention of reſerving a power of reſiſtance; yet the Law of Nature allowed them ſtill ſome Liberties; (what they were we ſhall have occaſion to ſcan in the next Section:) and amongſt them this for one, to reſiſt any violence againſt themſelves, in any thing that the Law of Nature did undoubtedly make them ſtill Maſters of, and was not ſubjected to their Princes power.
But the Doctor concludes his reaſoning againſt ſuch power of reſiſtance to be in our Parliament with that which indeed hath leaſt ſhew of ſtrength of any thing he hath ſaid yet.
Thus he writes, [where the King as it is ſaid, never dies, where he is King before Oath or Coronation, where hee is not admitted upon any ſuch Capitulation as gives any power to the People, or the repreſentative Body as is pretended to; nay, where the Body cannot meet but by the will of the Prince, and is diſſoluble at his pleaſure, that therein ſuch a State, ſuch a Pow…r ſhould be pretended to, and uſed againſt the Prince, as at this day, and that according to the Fundamentals of ſuch a State, can never appeare reaſonable to any indifferent judgement, much leſſe ſatisfie Conſcience in the reſiſtance that is now made by ſuch a pretended Power.]
REPL. This is the moſt plauſible Plea he hath or any can bring, ſpecially the latter part of it, about the calling and diſſolving the Parliament at the Kings will and pleaſure. But to this alſo as well as all the reſt ſufficient ſatiſfaction I doubt not may be given before indifferent judgements and unpartiall Conſciences, in the manner following. Firſt, as the King never dies; ſo he never growes, he never hath more authority (unleſſe by a new grant from the people) then his firſt Predeceſſor had; unleſſe it can be proved, that the people then gave away their liberty of defence from outragious violence, which all are naturally inveſted with; it is free for them now as well as it was the ſecond day or houre after they choſe or conſented to their firſt King as was implyed before.
Secondly, as he is King before Oath or Coronation. So he gives away none of his Rights in his Oath, nor doe the People when they crowne him. But he there profeſſes himſelfe bound by his Kingly Office to rule ſo and ſo, for the common good, and they yeeld no more to him, then they did to his firſt Predeceſſor, as before.
Thirdly, as he is not admitted upon any ſuch capitulation in expreſſe terms, as mention this power of reſiſtance in the people, or repreſentative body, in caſe of Tyranny. So nor doe the people at his admittance expreſſe a yeelding to him ſuch abſolute power, as they may not, or will not in any caſe reſiſt, I ſay againe and againe, it can never be rationally conceived the people have given away ſuch a naturall liberty, ſuch a neceſſary power for their common ſafety: Unleſſe it can be proved that they have done ſo. The proofe then before the Barre of indifferency of judgement, and unpartiall conſcience will lie on the Doctors part not ours.
Fourthly, But he ſaith, the repreſentative Body cannot meet but by the will of the Prince, and is diſſoluble at his pleaſure.
REPL. 2. It hath been ſo de facto multo, but whether it bee altogether ſo de jure, may juſtly be queſtioned upon theſe grounds. Firſt, for their meeting, when the Prince is an Infant, or if a priſoner in enemies hands, and ſo cannot give out a legall Warrant for their meeting; or if diſtracted, hath not the State power to meet in Parliament for their common ſafety, and the Princes too? They have met in the infancy or minority of Kings, and made Lawes, as in Edw. the 6. time, and not by the meere power of the Protectour, for the Nobility after put him out (his head was cut off afterward by a Law made while he was Protectour.) It was then, (and could be nothing elſe but) the inherent power of State, to meet ſo, in caſes of necesſity. Yet I beleeve there is no written Law for this; but the generall Maxim of Salus Populi ſuprema lex. And this will extend to the caſe of Tyranny, as fully as any of the former, if not more. Withall, did not the Lords in Richard the 2nds. time, call a Parliament without the King, wherein they had their grievances redreſſed; and this afterward was confirmed in the firſt of Hen. the 4th.
Secondly, then for their diſſolving; It hath indeed beene very much practiſed by our two laſt Kings.
But our Hiſtories (ſo farre as I remember) quare whether Hen. 3. did not diſſolve ſome Parliaments in diſcontent? mention not any ſuch thing as a Parliament diſſolved in diſpleaſure, or againſt the deſire of the Houſes. But as they meet very frequently, oft-times every yeare, ſomtimes oftner; (ſo that in the ſpace of a hundred yeares there are counted above a 100. Parliaments) So they ſate till they had ended the Princes and their owne buſineſſes, which went much together; and ſo it never came to a matter of examination or diſcontent, the delay of calling them to meet, or the too timely diſſolution of Parliaments. Parliaments were not wont to bee ſo odious or dreadfull to Princes as within theſe forty yeares they have been. By whoſe default they have been ſo ſince, let the encrochments upon Magna Charta and the Subjects liberties direct any to judge.
2. But further, for both theſe. Firſt, the Parliament averres that there are Lawes that there ſhould be a Parliament every yeare, and ſo they have abated of their Right, rather then gained upon the King by the Act of the Trienniall Parliament.
2. And for the diſſolution I have heard ſome wiſemen affirme, that by Law it cannot be diſſolved, while there are any Petitions of grievances, or ſuch matters of importance, depending and unfiniſhed. Whereunto may be added moſt juſtly, that in ordinary times Countrey Gentlemen and Noblemen, and in a manner the whole body of the Parliament, would be as ſick of a long Parliament and continuall attendance as the King could wiſh, and would petition (rather then be tyed ſo by the legge) for a diſſolution, or at leaſt a Prorogation. And it's well enough knowne, that even this Parliament after the Act of Continuation paſt, were as weary of ſitting, as need to be deſired, till the Rebellion in Ireland, ſeconded by the growing evills at home, put new ſpirits into them, and forced them to that diligence of attendance and unwearied labours (ſo many as have taken the common good to heart) as no Age or Story can parallel here, or in any other Kingdome or Nation.
Thirdly, beyond all this I appeale againe to the Kings Anſwer to the 19. Prepoſitions formerly mention'd; and aske whether if the King have abſolute power to forbeare calling them, at his will; and to diſſolve them at his pleaſure; it be not a meere nothing that hee ſaith the Houſe of Commons have power to impeach his owne Followers and Favorites, who have broken the Lawes, even by ſurreptitiouſly gotten commands from the King: and that the Lords have power to judge and puniſh, and are an excellent skreene between the King and the people, to asſiſt each againſt any incroachings of the other, and by juſt Iudgements to preſerve the Law, which ought to be the rule of every one of the three: and that the Power legally placed in both Houſes is more then ſufficient to prevent and reſtraine the power of Tyranny.
What ſerves all this for, when his Favourites will keepe him from calling a Parliament, perhaps all his dayes, unleſſe unlook'd for nece…ſity force him to it? We haoe …eene our ſelves about 13. yeares without one; and had there not beene conceived hopes that there would have beene Money given againſt the Scots, it had not been then called as it was.
Againe, what ſerves the calling them, when the ſame Favourites being queſtioned, ſhall counſell a diſſolution? We have knowne that too, even three times in this Kings Reigne, and no other diſſolution but on theſe grounds. And the laſt was within three weekes becauſe they would not in all haſt (and contrary to all former Preſidents and Priviledges) give mony againſt the Scots, and embroyle the two Kingdomes in a perpetuall Warre, not having had one grievance redreſſed. And in the caſe of a Prince, bent or ſeduced to ſubvert Religion Lawes and Liberties (which is the Doctors Caſe propounded.) It is undoubted, he will if he can diſſolve them, as ſoone as they offer but to puniſh any of his Favourites▪ and ſo to croſſe the deſigne (unleſſe he dare not, of which anon) becauſe therefore I believe the King in that Anſwer, hath not aſcribed more then right to the Parliament. It will follow, that in right (ſpecially in ſuch caſe) they ought not to be diſſolved. And that if by force they ſhould be, (or ſhould not have been called at all) the People have right to meet together, when and where they can, in a Parliamentary manner or otherwiſe: to ſuch end as to defend themſelves and one another from tyranny and the deſigned ſubverſion of Religion, Lawes and Liberties, as hath beene often ſaid.
Fourthly, but for the preſent condition of our Kingdome and Parliament, I muſt profeſſe, that as I admire the providence of God, in the Act paſſed for the continuation of this Parliament; ſo I doe for the forementioned expreſſions of the King in that anſwer. Which laid together, may to any underſtanding men, wholly decide this firſt Queſtion betweene the Doctor and us in point of Legality in our Kingdome (if there were nothing elſe ſaid or to be ſaid) that ſuppoſing ſuch a deſigne to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties. This Parliament hath (if no other had or could have, being diſſoluble at pleaſure) compleat power and Authority to doe all they doe, that ſo they may prevent and reſtraine the deſigned tyranny.
Fiftly, Yet I have one thing more to alleadge, ſuppoſing the power of calling and diſſolving wholly in the King ordinarily; yet there may be ſuch power in them ſo long as they doe ſit to command Armes to bee rais'd for the ſuppresſing of any Delinquents, maintaining themſelves with Armes, even under the colour of the Kings Authority, which I thus make good. (If there be any ſuch kind of Power in the very Judges in their Courts at Weſtminſter, for the whole Kingdome; and in their ſeverall Circuits for the Shires they ſit in; although themſelves are made Judges at the Kings will meerly, and put out ordinarily at his pleaſure, and they can neither keepe Asſizes at any time, nor keep any Terme any where, but when and ſo long as the King pleaſes to give Commisſion: if (I ſay) there be ſuch a power in the Judges, and even in one of them; then much more in the whole Parliament, which is unqueſtionably and undoubtedly the higheſt Judicature in the Kingdome, and hath moſt power during their ſitting. Now that ſuch a kinde of power is in the Judges, I appeale to experience, in the caſe following
A private man hath a ſuite with the King about Land or Houſe and the like. The King hath poſſesſion and ſome Officer or Tenant of his holds it for the King. The Judges having heard the Cauſe▪ give Sentence for the Subject, adjudge him to have the poſſesſion delivered him by the Kings Tenant or Officer; he refuſes and armes himſelfe to keep poſſesſion ſtill Upon this, after due ſummons and proceſſe of law, a Writ of Rebelli…n ſhall goe out againſt the Officer of the Kings, (even though he ſhould pretend to keepe poſſesſion ſtill by a command and warrant from the King and the Sheriffe ſhall be commanded to raiſe Armes even the whole poſſe Comitatus, if need be, to expell this Officer of the Kings, and bring him to condigne puniſhment from reſiſting the Kings au…hority in his Lawes.
Here now is raiſing Armes by the Kings legall Authority againſt the Kings Title and the Kings Officer notwithſtanding any pretended authority from the Kings perſonall command; and that Officer ha…h a Writ of Rebellion ſent againſt him, and ſhall bee puniſht by Law▪ for offering to reſiſt the Law upon any pretence. (A…ke the Lawyers whether in ſenſe …his be not the Law, and ordinarily practiſed▪ ſave that the King doth not command the contrary; but whether that would hinder Law or not?) The Parliament then may in the caſe of necesſity raiſe Armes againſt the Kings perſonall Command, for the generall ſafety, and keeping poſſesſion (which is more neceſſary then the hope of regaining) of the Houſes, Lands, Goods, Liberties, Lives, Religion and all.
And this by the Kings legall Authority, and the reſiſters of this are the Rebells in the Lawes account, and not the Inſtruments ſo imployed Legally, though with Armes by the Parliament.
If the Doctor now (or any for him) will retort upon me, as he thinks, what I ſaid before, that if this be granted, a King intending Tyranny, will not call a Parliament; or if he have called it, he will ſtraight diſſolve it, as ſoone as they attempt any thing againſt his mind.
REPL. I reply, he will doe ſo indeed▪ if hee can perſwade the people, by the Doctors Divinity or Law, to endure him and his followers to take away their Goods, and doe what elſe he liſt; and they for want of a Parliament called or ſitting, dare not defend themſelves at all. But if hee find, that they believe no ſuch Doctrine; but without diſpute of Law or Conſciences reſolve ruſtically not to be robbed of their goods at pleaſure, or uſed like meere ſlaves; but that they will defend themſelves and ſomwhat they begin to doe, and beat away or kill ſome that come to take their goods away in ſuch ill…gall manner; he may then be glad to call a Parliament to quiet the People, who perhaps alſo may begin to mutiny by troopes; and be willing to ſacrifice perhaps ſome of his Followers unto them (as …mp…o… and Dudley were in the beginning of H. the 8. though they proceeded with colour of the penall Lawes) and even to provide for his owne Maintenance, as …. …. In ſuch a caſe ſome againſt his will cal'd a Parliament, Anno of his Reigne. And that it may be, he will, not he dares not hearken to thoſe that would perſwade him to diſſolve it, becauſe then hee ſhould bring all confuſion (beſides want) upon himſelfe againe, which was Hen. the Thirds Caſe, Anno.
Therefore I conclude, that the Parliament (as I ſaid before) may have this power and upon advantage of the Kings necesſities, and Peoples not enduring oppresſion, be able to exerciſe it, even though they meet not but at the Kings will, and are diſſoluble at his pleaſure.
And ſo I have ſaid enough of this Section, except onelyonly that I muſt note, that in the cloſe of it, he either thinks thoſe he hath to doe with (Parliament and all) groſſe fooles, or elſe he ſhewes himſelfe extreamly ſimple in reckoning up the remedies of Tyrranny (though he love not to uſe ſo harſh a word; but we muſt when hee hath ſtated the Caſe for us of a Prince bent or ſeduced to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties;) The denying of ſubſidies and ayd, &c. If hee meane in Parliament, ſuch a Prince never meanes to call any. If out of Parliament, this is the grievance, that he takes it againſt Law, by Ship-moneys and Monopolies, and Impoſts and any way: and if they deny it, themſelves are fetcht up by the Purſevants, and put in priſon: and for not executing ſuch illegall commands; Fined at pleaſure halfe, or all their Eſtates; and perhaps ſtarved in priſon, or little better: Kept ſo cloſe, that they fall ſicke and dye Nay if the Prince proceed to command his Souldiers or Officers to kill without delay any …hat ſhall deny Subſidie or Ayd, though never ſo illegall.
Hath not then the Doctor propounded a goodly remedy of Tyranny, to deny him Subſidy and Ayd? As if to quench a houſe a fire, hee ſhould ſend for a paire of Bellowes to blow a coole breath.
Let him now conſider whether hee uttered thoſe words in ſcorne or in policie? and with what ſcience or skill in common Reaſon (not to ſay in Politicks) and ſo with how truely an informed conſcience he deales juſtly between the King and the People. We have yet ſome further ſtrength of his reaſon to examine in the next Section. Of which now.