Scripture and Reason Pleased for Defensive Arms, Section 2

Scripture and Reason Pleased for Defensive Arms · Section 2

p. 6SECT. II. Having clearely ſtated the Queſtion, I proceed with the Doctor to his ſecond Section, To examine how he maintaines his Negative, That a Magiſtrate may in no caſe be reſisted; or as he expreſſeth himſelfe, That Conſcience cannot find cleare ground to reſt upon for making reſiſtance.

HIs principall place of ſtrength whereon he truſts, is Rom. 13.2. Whoſoever reſiſts ſhall receive to themſelves damnation. To which he doth every where referre.

Though (which I wonder at in a Scholler of his acuteneſſe) without ever offering to Analyſe the Verſe, or thoſe before and after; which would have afforded ſtrength and cleareneſſe to his cauſe, if there be any to be found for it there.

Therefore my firſt worke muſt be to doe that, namely to expound Analytically (but as briefly as may be) ſo much of the Chapter as concernes ſubjection to Magiſtrates; and then Conſcience ſhall judge, whether he hath urged it rightly to the Apoſtles ſcope.

The ſcope of the Apoſtle (I make bold to ſay) is properly and meerely in this place to urge Chriſtians to be obedient to the Civill Lawes of the Roman Empire and ſo of p. 7other States, between man and man, and to the Magiſtrates that had authority and ruled according to thoſe Lawes of what degree ſoever their authority was.

To this end, 1. He delivers the precept generally in the former part of the 1. Verſe, in which are three things.

1. The duty, Subjection, which is either Active obedience, or Paſſive ſubmiſſion in caſe of not obeying.

2. The Subject, Every ſoule, All Chriſtians of what Ranke, Sex, Age, Condition, &c.

3. The Object, in the Abſtract, which notes the Legall authority, the higher powers, in the plurall number, which our Doctor is pleaſed to take no notice at all of, but only and every where reads it, the higher power, as if it only pointed to the Roman Emperour, and ſo now to our King.

2. He produces a reaſon for the precept, from Gods authorizing Magiſtrates and their Lawes, and this is delivered in a double expreſſion.

1. By way of Negation, that any Magiſtrate can be Named which is not of Gods authorizing, There is no power but of God, which undeniably confirmes my expoſition of the Plurall number, powers, to note all ſorts and degrees of Magiſtrates, as doth alſo, that he repeates it.

2. By way of Affirmation, the powers that be are ordained of God, or under God; foreign, (as the Dr. notes) which as it ſpeakes of all ſorts of Powers, ſo it adds both a further Amplification and urging Reaſon, and a tacite limitation of the ſubjection. The Reaſon is, they are Gods vicegerents, and Deputies; by him, ordered to governe under him, and therefore to be ſubmitted unto by vertue of his Soveraigne authority, who is abſolutely and undeniably the higheſt power, and Lord over all.

The Limitation is, that it muſt be only in thoſe things wherein thoſe powers oppoſe not him, under whom they are and from whom they have their authority, and it is certaine he gives them none to oppoſe him.

Ver. 2. Thirdly, He urges the precept, by an Applicatory inference, from the Reaſon premiſed, denoting the ſinne of denying ſubjection; Whoſoever therefore reſiſts the power reſiſts the Ordinance of God.]

Wherein note, the Apoſtle hath altered his firſt word; and inſtead of a Negative, which one might have expected, puts now in an Affirmitive (Not whoſoever is not ſubject, but whoſoever reſiſts) wherein he ſeemes to favour (at leaſt in ſome caſes) the Expoſition noted before of ſubjection, and the diſtinction of Active and Paſſive Obedience to humane Lawes; and ſo will not alwayes charge diſobedience upon the conſcience or ſoule of a Chriſtian, for the omiſſion, or doing contrary to a humane Law; But only in caſe of reſiſtance, (that he will neither doe nor ſuffer) for then he is guilty of reſiſtance of the Ordinance of the authority of God, by and under which theſe Lawes were made and are urged.

Fourthly, He urges it againe by a threatning of Gods diſpleaſure againſt ſuch, inferred from the ſinne of their reſiſtance. And they that reſiſt ſhall receive to themſelves damnation.

The word is foreign, which properly ſignifies Judgement, foreign, is properly Damnation.

But if the reſiſtance be obſtinate, and a wilfull perſiſting in it, I doubt not, but the full ſenſe of foreign Damnation, belongs to ſuch reſiſting, and reſiſters of Lawes even humane (which are not oppoſite to Gods) and reſiſters of Magiſtrates urging obedience according to thoſe Lawes.

Ver. 3. Fiftly, By the preſent and continued benefit of ſuch authority and Magiſtracy p. 8and Lawes. Which is delivered againe both negatively and affirmitively. For Rulers are not a terrour to good works but to evill.] wherin he both prevents an Objection, and aſſerts an advantage.

He prevents the Objection (that this authority was a wrong to our liberty) which he denies, ſo long as our liberty is only uſed to doe well, and practice good works.

And on the other ſide, there was an advantage to thoſe that did well; becauſe evill works were terrified by Rulers.

Where alſo note, that he hath changed the Abſtract, Powers, into the Concret, Rulers, to imply, that ſubjection is due and reſiſtance forbidden, no farther to Rulers (or no longer for the foreign, then they exerciſe their lawfull power, and are not a terrour to good works but to evill; For their power makes them not (nor allowes them) to be a terrour to good works.

Sixtly, He urges it by a ſecond Application of the benefit, and ſecuring from feare of danger if men will obey.— Wilt not thou then be afraid of the power? Doe well and thou ſhalt have praiſe, &c.]

Where againe he repeats the word Power (as preventing an Objection, That Rulers might abuſe their power.) Noting, that he ſtill meanes of the power rightly uſed, according to the nature of it; whence will come praiſe to them that doe well, according to the Lawes.

Ver. 4. Seventhly, By a Confirmation of the Application: From Gods end in authorizing Lawes and Magiſtrates, He is the Miniſter of God to thee for good.]

It is for thy benefit, that God hath deputed Magiſtrates; where his authority is the fourth time mentioned, and thou art both againſt God and thy own good, if thou yeild not obedience Active, or at leaſt Paſſive.

Eightly, By a third Application of threatning againſt diſobedience, either Negative, or eſpecially Poſitive, which is reſiſting. He beares not the Sword in vaine, &c.] Where is intimated, that he may puniſh even capitally ſome diſobediences and reſiſtance. And againe the fift time Gods authorizing him is aſſerted and applied, to this power of puniſhment. That he executes Gods wrath temporally; God is angry with diſobedience, and requires his Vicegerents to puniſh them, even by the Sword, if the offences merit it according to the Lawes, and ſo with other puniſhment.

Ver. 4, 5. Ninethly, By a reinforcement of the Precept, under the terme of Neceſſity of Conſcience, which is but an Explication of the not reſiſting the Ordinance of God. Where alſo the Apoſtle prevents an Objection, as if he only had before adviſed them to obey or not reſiſt, to ſave themſelves from the Magiſtrates wrath; For it is Gods wrath alſo upon the Conſcience, and ſo the Conſcience is bound, though you could find a way to eſcape temporall wrath.

V. 6. Tenthly, It is urged by a Parallel of reſpect uſually paid to Magiſtrates, Tributes, the due whereof is alſo urged, becauſe Magiſtrates devote themſelves to the publick good, and ſo muſt be maintained upon the publick ſtock, and if maintained, then much more obeyed and ſubjection yeilded to them.

Ver. 7.11. Finally by an univerſall requiring, to yeeld to all their dues, where he aſſerts, that he requires no other ſubjection, and ſo forbids no other reſiſtance, then what the Law requires as due, or forbids as undue: becauſe obedience Active or Paſſive was due by the Laws.

This is in ſumme the Apoſtles ſcope and Argumentation.

And now let us more particularly conſider whither the clauſe, threatning reſiſtance with damnation (or ought elſe in the whole context) doe fight againſt ſuch reſiſtance p. 9as the Doctor oppugnes? or rather of the two may ſeeme to fight againſt him, and juſtifie ſuch reſiſtance if not otherwiſe vitiated.

To which purpoſe let us proceed by theſe Conſiderations.

Firſt, That whatſoever reſiſtance is here forbidden and threatned, relates to inferiour Magiſtrates as farre as their authority reaches according to laws, as well as ſupreame Magiſtrates.

I may no more reſiſt a Conſtable commanding me, or arreſting me, or diſtraining my goods according to Law, then I may doe the King commanding me, &c.

Yet the Doctor takes no notice of this at all. But as if it were, not only the higher power, in the ſingular number, but the Higheſt in the Superlative degree; He reſtraines all to the King, which is a dangerous fallacy, not only in the preſent Queſtion, but againſt all government.

To which I adde, to refuſe to be ſubject to the Parliament according to Lawes, and to reſiſt is much more (by this Scripture) undeniably a reſiſting the ordinance of God, and brings damnation.

And what then will he ſay to thoſe that have done ſo too, and againſt the Parliament, and thoſe ſent by their authority unqueſtionable.

2. Secondly, That Prohibition of Reſiſtance cannot be meant here, which is wholly contrary to the Apoſtles reaſons following, which perſwade to Subjection and not Reſiſtance. Or that Aſſertion, or Interpretation, is not according to the Apoſtles ſcope, which is formally oppoſite to his Arguments afterward.

But ſuch is the Doctors Interpretation and Aſſertion, Ergo, His Aſſertion and Interpretation is, that Subjects may not reſiſt a Prince, who is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties.

The Apoſtles Reaſons againſt Reſiſters are.

1. For Rulers are not a terrour to good workes, but to evill.

Now is this a reaſon why I may not reſiſt ſuch a Tyrant?

Who can be more a terrour to good workes, and not to evill then he that is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties? Ergo of ſuch a Reſiſtance of a tyrant the Apoſtle ſpeakes not. But of Reſiſtance of that Ruler, who go's altogether according to Lawes and Liberties, which is juſtly puniſhable with Damnation without Gainſaying.

2. A ſecond Reaſon or enforcement of the Apoſtles argument againſt Reſiſtance is, Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power. Doe that which is good and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame. Now doth this argue a Tyrant is not to be reſiſted? Is there no cauſe of feare of him (while a man do's that which is good) that is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties? Or ſhall a man have praiſe in doing good, of ſuch a Tyrant.

Therefore is not a Tyrant that power which may not be reſiſted. But he that ſtands to the Lawes, and Rules according to them, Damnation is juſt againſt thoſe that reſiſt him without queſtion.

3. Thirdly, The Apoſtle proceeds, verſ. 4. For he is the Miniſter of God to thee for good (and ſo not to be reſiſted without reſiſting the Ordinance of God, and ſo incurring damnation) But is this true of a Tyrant bent to ſubvert Religion, Laws, and Liberties? Is he the Miniſter of God to thee for good? Or the Miniſter of his owne luſts rather, for evill? Reſiſtance of ſuch an one then, is not the Reſiſtance the Apoſtle forbids, but of one who is the conſervatour of Religion, for he, and he only is the Miniſter of God to thee for good, and worthy is he of Damnation that reſiſts ſuch an one.

p. 104. The Apoſtle adds, If thou doe that which is evill feare, for he beareth not the Sword in vaine: For he is the Miniſter of God, a Revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill.

Is this man a Tyrant, bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties, or moſt directly oppoſite to Tyranny.

A Tyrant ſecures thoſe that do evil (ſo they will joyn with him and ſerve him in his Tyranny) from feare. And he beares the Sword, not only in vaine, in reference to any good end intended by Gods ordinance, but altogether contrary to it; and is ſo farr from being the Miniſter of God, that he is (as before) a Miniſter of his owne luſts, to ſhelter thoſe that doe evill, and to purſue with all wrath, and revenge him that doth good, and will not be a ſlave to his lawles deſignes and deſires. Still then of ſuch a Tyrant S. Paul argues, not that he may not be reſiſted: but him that he deſcribes, which is a juſt Governour, and ſo upon no terms to be reſiſted.

5. Upon all this the Apoſtle reſumes: Wherefore you must of neceſſity be ſubject, not only for wrath, but alſo for Conſcience ſake.

What rules of conſcience (before laid, inferr'd now by the word, wherefore) urge ſuch an Aſinine or ſtupid ſu…ject, as to be ſubject even paſſively, and not to reſiſt one that is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties, when all that went before ſpeake expreſly of another power and Rulers of another temper?

A man then for feare of wrath, not being able to make good his Reſiſtance, may yeeld ſuch paſſive ſubjection, but ſure conſcience (at leaſt not in this place) urges him not to it.

6. Yet the Apoſtle goes-on: For this cauſe alſo pay you Tribute, for they are Gods Miniſters continually attending on this very thing.

For what cauſe? Becauſe they may attempt to ſubvert Religion, Laws and Liberties? Doe we pay Tribute for this cauſe, that they plunder and change Lawes, &c. Or that they may defend them? Alſo upon what thing are they thus Gods Miniſters to attend continually? Is it to ſubvert Lawes, &c. Or to preſerve them? The Apoſtle then ſpeakes not of a Tyrant, but a juſt ruling Prince, and pitty but he ſhould be damn'd that reſiſts him.

7. Finally, he concludes this matter with ſaying, Render to all their due. By what Law of God or man may a Tyrant ſubvert Religion, Laws and Liberties, or even be let alone in ſo doing.

I am ſure the Apoſtle hath not expreſt any ſuch thing hitherto. It is Ergo, but the Doctours miſtake, though I confeſſe it hath beene many wiſe and good mens before him, that the Apoſtle forbids reſiſting ſuch a Tyrant, which as I ſaid above, all his Reaſons go rather quite contrary unto, as deſcribing the Power and Ruler that is to be ſubjected to, and not reſiſted, altogether croſſe to Tyranny, and his Interpretation and Aſſertion is altogether croſſe to the Apoſtles.

Having ſet the underſtanding of the maine Text right, I come now to thoſe examples that are alleadged to proove, That it is lawfull to reſiſt in ſome caſes.

1. The example of the peoples reſiſting Sauls illegall and tyrannicall attempt to have put Jonathan to death without cauſe.

If this were lawfull in them in a particular mans caſe (againſt whom alſo there was ſome ſeemig cauſe) How much more to reſiſt one that is bent to ſubvert Religion, Laws and Liberties, and ſo to take away the life of many at his own pleaſure.

p. 11To this is anſwered, not, that it was unlawfull in the people to make this reſiſtance (which yet if he deny not, he plainly yeelds his cauſe in his firſt Propoſition, and Rom. 13.2. forbids not all Reſiſtance) but only that the people drew not into Armes themſelves, but being there at Sauls command did by a loving violence and importunity hinder the execution of a particular and paſſionate unlawfull command.

To this I reply.

1. If it were lawfull now; what hinders but they might have come together to prevent ſuch a miſchiefe as Jonathans unjuſt Death? Sure Saul called them not together to reſiſt himſelfe in any thing. Neither did his calling them together to fight againſt the Philiſtines authorize them to fight againſt him, if it were not lawfull of it ſelfe.

Our King call'd the Parliament together, yet he allowes not them to reſiſt upon that pretence, though they are undeniably, not the great Councell only, but the great Court of Judicature in the Kingdome.

This peece then of his Anſwer is nothing but words and pretence.

2. As for his loving violence and importunity wherewith he would blanch their Reſiſtance.

Grant they ſhewed a love to Saul, becauſe Jonathan was Sauls ſonne. But had Saul counted him his Enemy, (as he did David afterward) It would have ſounded harſh violence, and out-ragious enough, and it was plainly a great deale beyond a loving violence. For Saul ſwore his death, and they ſwore his life, that not a haire of him ſhould, &c.

This was Reſiſtance then with an Oath, as it were, to make Saul forſworne.

After this Example then our people may ſweare an Aſſociation, that not one of the Parliament ſhall be put to death (unleſſe prooved guilty according to Law) notwithſtanding any Proclamation of them to be Traitors, or condemning them to death illegally.

3. And thirdly, as it cannot be thought, but if Saul had further attempted by himſelfe, or any of his followers to aſſault Jonathan, the people would have actively reſiſted him and them even with armes in Jonathans defence.

The ſecond Example is Davids reſiſting of Saul, ſc. by gathering a band of 600. men, and offering to have kept Keilah againſt Saul, but that God told him the Keilites would have betrayed him.

That he ſin'd not in it appeares.

1. By his owne pleading his innocence even to God in his Prayers and Pſalmes, as farr as concern'd the buſines between him and Saul.

2. Himſelf after this pleades it to Saul, 1 Sam. 24 & 26. and cals God to witnes that he had not tranſgreſt at all againſt him.

3. God himſelfe diſcharged David from all notorious ſinne, excepting the matter of Ʋrijah, 1 Kin. 1.5.

Now had not his Reſiſtance been lawfull, it had been moſt notorious Rebellion and Treaſon.

4. Fourthly, even our Doctor condemns it not, and therfore, all reſiſtance is not unlawfull, much leſſe damnable, as he often thunders.

But this Example ſticks with him, and therfore he makes a four-fold anſwer.

1. Davids guard that he had about him was only to ſecure his perſon againſt the cut-throats of Saul, if ſent to take away his life.

p. 12Reply. But this could not have bin done without killing divers of them, if they had aſſaulted him, which had then bin no murther, but a juſt defence and execution of Juſtice. So farr himſelf grants lawfull.

2. But he ſayes it was a meer defence without any violence offer'd to Saul. Therfore he ſtill gave place as Saul purſued, and did no act of hoſtility to him, or any of his Army, when they were in his power, 1 Sam. 26.

Reply. He was not ſtrong enough to encounter Saul in the field, who had divers thouſands (3000 mentioned 1 Sam. …1.) againſt his 600. Wiſdom bids him fly as long as he could, rather then fight.

2. Conſcience forbids him to kill Saul: ſo I grant it doth any Subject, though having the King at any ſuch advantage. But that he hurt none of his followers, 1 Sam. 26. was again an act of wiſdome, and we need not goe to conſcience for a reaſon of it. He had only one man with him, Abiſhai, and had he offered to kill any of the Army, how ſoone might this in all likelihood have wakened the reſt, and ſo he had endangered his own life to little purpoſe. For he could not in probability have killed many, and what had that done to his cauſe and defence afterward.

Yet alſo, I hold not that in cold blood, one or many that are upon the defenſive, may lawfully kill ſleeping enemies, or ſuch waking farther then appears, at leaſt in ſome ſort neceſſary, or much advantagious to the defence, and prejudiciall to the oppoſites. But if killing, as many as David could have kill'd that night, himſelfe and Abiſhai would have given hopes of ending Sauls purſuit of him, and have made peace; I doubt not, but he would and might have done it, as well as keep Keilah againſt him.

But this intent of Davids is denied; For,

3. The Doctor ſaith, It is only an uncertaine ſuppoſition, not fit to ground conſcience in this great point of reſiſtance.

Repl: The Text declares it as certainly as may be, unleſſe it had ſaid ſo in undeniable termes.

For, 1. David contents not himſelfe to aske God whether Saul would come down, but what the Keilites would doe.

To what end that, but that he meant to ſtay, if they would ſtand to him.

2. When God anſwers him only about Sauls comming, he askes the ſecond time, which ſhewes clearly his mind ran upon ſtaying there.

3. When God told him they would betray him, the Text then ſaith, he and his men went whether they could goe, which ſhewes they were now diſappointed of their purpoſes and hopes of ſtaying there, and muſt now ſhift for themſelves where they could.

When none of this will elude this example of Davids reſiſtance, the Dr. adds a fourth Anſwer which will ſtrike it dead.

4. To this and all other demeanours of David in his ſtanding out againſt Saul. We ſay his example was extraordinary; for he was deſigned and annointed by the Lord to ſucceed Saul: therfore he might uſe an extraordinary way for ſafe-guarding his perſon.

Repl: But in theſe few words there ſeeme to be many errours and inconvenient expreſſions.

Doth he not▪ imitate thoſe that to illude Davids reaſon, why he durſt not kill Saul, Say Saul was extraordinarily annointed and deſigned King by God, and ſo upon him violent hands might not be laid, but this holds not for other Kings elective or ſucceſſive by humane Laws.

I do not for my part thinke their ſhift ſufficient, but beleeve it utterly unlawfull, even p. 13becauſe this is aſſerted by David (in reference to the office of Saul, as I believe) being written for our learning, to teach us how to carry our ſelvs towards all ſoveraign Princes.

But I ſay if he wil elude Davids act of reſiſtance, he encourages them including his forbearance. Let him conſider it.

2. Is not what he ſpeaks of a ſucceſſour dangerous to his own Poſition? for if Davids right of ſucceſſion authorized him at all to reſiſt, may not a ſucceſſor plead the like authority, if in danger, which yet he will not grant, unles he mean to overthrow his own aſſertion.

3. It ſeemes to me a ſtrange way of anſwering Scripture examples (unles upon ſtronger neceſſity then any thing the Doctor hath alleadged, as will appeare by the ſcanning of all his Arguments and Texts againſt reſiſtance) that ſuch a thing was extraordinary, when no ſuch thing can be gathered out of the Text.

I know many men have this faculty of interpreting, who yet will not ſuffer it againſt their owne aſſertions; but with me (except in undoubted failings or duties) The ancient Rule holds good, Praxi… ſanctorum eſt interpres Praeceptorum. David did thus againſt Sauls violence, therfore this is not contrary to▪ but an Interpretation of the honour due by the 5 t. Commandement.

4. It is ſo farr from being good which the Doctor ſaith, that contrarily Davids Unction, ought rather to have ſtrengthned his faith; not to have uſed a way of defence; which in another had been (by the Doctors ſaying) rebellious and damnable.

What a diſparagement is this to Faith, and even to Gods Honour, that his annointed ſhall be ſafeguarded for ſo long together only by a way, which in all others is abominable? Credat Judaeus non ego. Davids Faith then and Gods Honour in his preſervation, proves the meanes both lawfull and ordinary.

And if ſo, then much more is it lawfull for many perſons, and moſt of all for a State-Repreſentative in this manner to defend themſelves and reſiſt.

A third Example alleadged by the Doctor, is the Priests reſiſting the Kings attempt upon their office and Gods worſhip, 2 Chron. 26. And after thruſting him out of the Temple, when God had ſmitten him with Leproſie for it.

I for my part put no great weight on the former. But their thruſting him out of the Temple is ſomewhat towards a hinderance even by force, of a Prince if he perſiſt to violate Gods undoubted ordinances, as it had been to have ſtaid in the Temple being leprous, added to the ſinne of his going in at all, and preſumption to offer Incenſe. But ſuch a caſe is hardly ſuppoſable among us.

Only I adde, that I wonder the Doctor offers to ſay; God by ſmiting him with Leproſie, diſcharged him of his Kingdome.

The Story implyes no ſuch thing, but only that he dwelt in a ſeverall houſe, and Jotham his ſonne judged the people of the Land. The Law allowed not any to come neare to ſuch or touch them, and what they touched, without being uncleane, therfore he could not ſit in publike Judicature, but his ſonne did it for him, yet for all that he remained King till his death, and probably did give out divers Orders, which might be done by means of thoſe that muſt needs miniſter to him.

But if the Doctor ſay right, may not an untoward Inference be made, that if a King ſhould attempt to violate Gods ordinance and worſhip in any thing, and God ſhould viſibly ſtrike him with ſome loathſome Judgement, this ſhould diſcharge him of his Kingdome, which is more then ever the Parliament ſaid, or ſo much as thought, as they call God to witneſſe.

A fourth Example is Eliſha's ſhutting the doore againſt the Kings Meſſenger that p. 14came to take away his head. This example the Doctor ſaith ſpeakes little.

Reply. But as little as it ſpeakes it forces him to ſpeake that, which if he will ſtand to, I doe not much doubt, but I ſhall make any unpartiall man (perhaps even the Doctor himſelfe) to ſay his cauſe is loſt in reference to his firſt Propoſition.

Heare his own words,

Let us thence take occaſion to ſay, that perſonall defence is lawfull againſt the ſudden and illegall attempts of ſuch, even of the King himſelfe, thus farre to ward his blows, to hold his hands, and the like.

I Reply 1. Then is not all reſiſtance unlawfull and damnable, if againſt ſuddain, he may much more againſt deliberate intended illegall violence.

And his diſtinction of perſonall defence, &c. will not ſatisfie conſcience by his owne words in the beginning of this Section. If Ro. 13.2. be to be interpreted his way, becauſe every diſtinction and limit of any place in Scripture muſt have it's ground in Scripture. What ground hath this in Scripture in his way, either here or elſwhere, ſpecially when he will not allow the Parliament to beleeve any intention to take away any of their heads, notwithſtanding all words and preparations againſt them without the ſpirit of Eliſha.

But heare him further,

"Not to endanger his Perſon this, nor return blows; this is not lawfull he ſaith.

Reply. I am not willing to oppoſe him in theſe Aſſertions, though the caſe may be ſo hard, as a man muſt looſe his life, if he will meerly defend himſelfe, and in no ſort offend.

But ſpecially a woman muſt looſe her chaſtity (in which caſe, and principally the latter) let the Doctor anſwer what is to be done, and whether no blows may be returned.

But that the Princes perſon may not be willingly aſſaulted, the ſpeech of David forenoted is that which concludes me, and not at all the D…argument. He ſaith the whole common-wealth is concern'd in his perſon, and that a particular nature will yeeld to the univerſall.

Rep. But he argues fallaciouſly, the whole is concern'd ſomewhat in the Princes perſon, but not ſo as that it periſhes, if he die or be kil'd. Which is often, and no harme, no viſible chang, but that he is miſſing. Wheras the yeelding of a particular nature to the univerſal, is to keep that from diſſolution & periſhing, as the Naturaliſts ſay, & no otherwiſe.

But that which follows is yet better. Thus he objects for us againſt himſelf [if this be drawn from perſonall Defence to the publike reſiſtance now uſed, as they uſually make the Argument thus: If the body naturall, then the body politicke may defend it ſelfe: If a private perſon, much more the whole State may, and they do but ſhut up the way againſt the King, that comes to deſtroy his Parliament, and take away their heads] then he anſwers two things.

1. As the naturall body defends it ſelf againſt an outward force; but ſtrives not by a ſchiſme or contention within it ſelf. So may the body politick againſt an outward power, but not (as now) by one part of it ſet againſt the head, and another part of the ſame body, for that tends to the diſſolution of the Whole.

Rep: But by his leave he abuſes the ſimilitude between a naturall and a politick body; and perverts the ſtate both of the Queſtion and the example in hand, and withall runs into more abſurdities then one in his own way, as I ſhall now ſhew him.

1. The naturall body can do nothing but by the guidance of the head, that is of the ſoul reſiding in the head, and imploying the ſences and faculties placed in the head to that purpoſe. But a body politicke, is a company of reaſonable men, whoſe actions may p. 15be divided from their politick head, and yet be rationall and regular, and when the particular politicke head is diſtracted, or while an Infant, it can and doth order it ſelf within him, and ſo it doth and muſt doe, when the politick head is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties, becauſe the ſubverſion of theſe, (and not the oppoſition or reſiſting of thoſe that would ſubvert them) would be the diſſolution of the whole. But ſo would not be the very death of the politicke head, (though, as I ſaid before, it is unlawfull to attempt it) Whereas the death of the naturall head, is certainly the diſſolution of the whole naturall body.

2. As the naturall body may defend it ſelfe againſt outward force, ſo againſt the malignity of any diſeaſe, or paine in any member of the body, even reſient in the very head, and ſo the hand may pull out a tooth, even for the painfullneſſe of it, though ſeated in the head, and perhaps one eye for ſome diſeaſe, thereby to ſave the other; and lance and cut the fleſh, and even cut-off a limme, legg and arme, to ſtopp a Gangrene; yet is this no making of a ſchiſme, or unnaturall contention within it ſelfe.

3. He hath granted it to ſingle perſons; but denies it to the whole body, or a conſiderable part together.

Reply: Then belike if ſix or twenty or a hundred ſingle perſons be aſſaulted illegally, by a like number of ſingle perſons (ſuppoſe in their ſeverall houſes in the ſame Towne) they may ſhut the doores and defend themſelves, and even any of them hold the very Kings hand and ward his blowes. But if they happen to be all in a body together in the market place, and be aſſaulted by ſuch a number, or a quarter ſo many, they muſt not offer to reſiſt, but let them cut all their throates, becauſe forſooth in the body politicke, one part muſt not be ſet againſt the head, and another part of the Whole.

4. He grants the body politicke may defend it ſelf againſt an outward force, but not (as now) one part, &c.

Reply: Then belike if the King imploy Danes or Iriſh againſt the Parliament and Kingdome, they may reſiſt them (and is not the caſe ſo now, at leaſt in part) but not if he imploy only Engliſh-Cavaleers. Surely the mighty wits of the Earle of Strafford, who was condemned mainly for counſelling to bring in nine thouſand Iriſh to reduce this Kingdome, wanted our Doctor to have adviſed him to forbeare that deſigne, and only Arme Engliſh, and then the peoples hands and conſciences ſhould have been tyed from reſiſting by the Doctors and his fellow-Chaplaines Divinity, and muſt have yeelded Religion, Lawes and Liberties, and neckes too, for feare of diſſolving the whole politick body, by defence.

5. When the ſtate of the Queſtion by himſelfe ſet, is, when a Prince is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes, and Liberties. What diſſolution of the Whole can bee feared by defence and reſiſtance againſt ſuch intentions, worſe then that or ſo bad? While therefore he talkes of ſuch defence, tending to the diſſolution of the Whole, he perverts the Queſtion, or elſe forgets, that the ſubverting of Religion, Laws, and Liberties, cannot be accounted leſſe then a diſſolution of the whole politicke body.

6. I ſay therefore by an Argument à f…rti…ri (retorting his words upon himſelf) If a private perſon may defend himſelfe a gainſt illegall Aſſaults of the Kings Meſſenger (or even of himſelfe, as before) then much more the repreſentative Body of a State, and even any conſiderable part of the Body (with them, or) even without them, to ſave Religion, Lawes and Liberties againſt an intent to ſubvert them. And if againſt outward forraigne Force, then much more againſt homebred, unnaturall p. 16Members, who exceed (rather then come ſhort of) any outward Force in rage and c…uel…y, tending to the ſubverſion of the Whole, and all ſuch unnaturall and gangren'd members are juſtly and neceſſarily cut-off for the ſafety of the whole, though their cutting o… cannot be without a maime and lameneſſe, at leaſt for the preſent. I ſay for the preſent, for new members will grow up in the politicke body in time, though never in the body naturall.

2. He hath yet another Anſwer for us in theſe words, [Perſonall Defence may be without all offence, doth not ſtrike at the order and power that is over us, as generall reſiſtance by Armes doth, which cannot be without many unjuſt violences, and doth immediately ſtrike at that order which is the life of the Common-wealth. And this makes a large difference 'twixt Eliſha's ſhutting the doore againſt this Meſſenger, and their ſhutting-up the way againſt the King by armed men.]

Repl: 1. If ſome perſonall defence may be without all offence, yet not all. And he at leaſt ſeems to have yeelded all perſonall defence lawfull, ſo the Kings perſon may not be violated.

2. Whoſe fault it is originally, that generall reſiſtance by Armes, cannot be without offence? Are the Plunderers not in fault; but the defenders muſt be counted guilty? And whoſe hand is it that ſtrikes immediately at the order, which is the life (as he ſaith) of the Common-wealth? The defendants of Religion, Laws, and Liberties? Or theirs who intend and attempt to ſubvert them all?

3. How doth perſonall Defence, if offenſive to the Meſſengers aſſaulting, ſtrike leſſe at the power over us, then generall or common defence doth? Or rather neither doth, ſince the power over us (as intended and ordained both by God and man) is for the preſerving and defending, not ſubverting Religion, Laws and Liberties; and ſo defends the true power, ſtrikes not at it.

4. If generall Defence cannot be without many unjuſt violences, no more is any warre at all, in a forraigne Country (de facto.) But as the impoſſibility to reſtrain theſe wholly, do's not make all warrs unlawfull, ſo much leſſe doth it a neceſſary defence, in caſe of ſuch danger to Religion, Laws and Liberties.

5. Whoſe fault is it, that theſe unjuſt violences cannot be avoided, the Aſſaylants or the defendants? Let God (and conſcience) be Judge. To Him we feare not to appeale; and while the conſcientious Defendants labour as much as morally they can to prevent and rectifie all ſuch unjuſt violences, whether the danger of ſome acting them, who muſt be imployed in the defence; altogether forbids the generall defence, to the utter ſubverſion of Religion, Laws and Liberties.

6. And this indeed makes a large difference betwen Eliſha's caſe and ours. He defended but one againſt a ſudden paſſionate command. He pleades againſt malicious deliberate intents for defence of many, the generall, of all faithfull Prophets, Magiſtrates, Princes and all, with Laws and Liberties for all poſterity. Let Heaven and Earth judge, who is the wrong-doer, and whether the defendants may not as Innocents call for juſtice, as well as David againſt Saul, 1 Sam. 24. & 26. (vide locum.)

As for the Parliaments power to conclude of the Kings intentions without the Spirit (Prophetick) of Eliſha (I wonder we had not here alſo, that Eliſha defended himſelf by an extraordinary way, being an extraordinary perſon, as well as David before) that belongs to the third Propoſition, handled in his third Section, thither I refer it. Only ſaying that ſince the printing of the Doctors book ſome bloud hath bin ſhed by the Kings Counſell of war at Reading in a pretended legality: So at Oxford ſome others have lately been condemned with pretence of Law, and what ſhall become of them, who knows p. 17whether they will put them to death, in terrorem to others? Or reſerve them for feare ſome of their party ſhould be ſerved with the ſame ſawce?

Finally, whereas he ſaith, the King deſires not any puniſhment ſhould be inflicted on any that oppoſe him, then what a legall tryall ſhall adjudge them to, which no good Subject ought to decline.

Reply. This were credible, if we were aſſured what is meant by a legall tryall, and that it did ſignifie, not a tryall by ſuch Judges and Juries, as are apparantly partiall: or if we could forget that the ſix Members accuſed of High-Treaſon in January laſt, offered themſelves to be tryed, and the Parliament offered to try them in Parliament, according to their Priviledges, being Members of their Houſes, and from thence forth the Accuſation was laid a ſleepe (till of late) notwithſtanding the reiterated importunities of both Houſes of Parliament, who alſo in one of their Declarations or Petitions to the King, urged a Statutes, how ſuch accuſations ought to be managed and conclude to this effect, that by Law and Juſtice this ought not to be denyed.

And thus I have vindicated the Examples of Scripture by the Doctor alleadged for us, and from thence, and from his owne words partly, the Queſtion in hand between us, as farre as concernes the firſt Propoſition. I am now to proceed to his owne allegations againſt us: In which he is ſo confident, as he promiſes, [That Scripture excludes this and all other exceptions, giving no allowance to reſiſtance, in regard of perſons or cauſes, or other pretences (how true this is, let what hath been ſaid already be judge) and this not only by Examples, but by Precepts, Concluſions, Reſolutions, which are more ſafe. Theſe we are now to examine.

Firſt, his Allegation of the 250 Princes, gathering the people againſt Moſes and Aaron; Himſelf ſatisfies, that there was no cauſe for it, Moſes and Aaron did not deſerve it. [I add, they had done nothing, but what appeared to be the formall will of God, whoſe cloud and pillar was by day and night over their heads, and whoſe many miracles had continually ratified the authority of Moſes and Aaron, Moſes his very face by a continued miracle was ſufficient to have dazeled them, if he had pul'd off his vaile.] But to this he anſwers, The Princes ſuppoſed they did deſerve it, and that is now enough it ſeemes, to make people, not only ſay to their Princes, Yee take too much upon you, but therefore to riſe in Armes alſo. Which I hope will appeare to be without cauſe too in the end of this Treatiſe.

Repl. 1. I have ſhewed there was not the leaſt ground for them to ſuppoſe ill of Moſes, but all contrary.

2. Becauſe a falſe ſuppoſall allowes not a man to doe ſuch or ſuch a thing, ſhall this forbid that action, where the ſuppoſall is true and certaine? By this all warre ſhould be unlawfull, for upon a falſe ſuppoſall it is. Alſo all Juſtice ſhould be injuſtice and unlawfull: for upon a falſe ſuppoſall it is ſo. We never ſaid nor thought, That uncertain ſuppoſals ſuffice to arme againſt a Prince; but at leaſt ſuch as rules of reaſon and prudence allow in all caſes of importance. And whether there be now any ſuch; As he referrs, ſo doe I to the end of the Treatiſe.

Secondly, he urges, 1 Sam. 8.11. Namely, that God by Samuell tels Iſrael, that if they would needs have a King, he ſhould take away their goods, and make their children ſervants, and then they ſhould cry to God, becauſe of their King, but he would not heare them, which implyes they ſhould be left without all remedy againſt his oppreſſion, but only crying to the Lord.

To this divers Anſwers may and muſt be given. Anſw. 1. Though this be further urged by ſome to authorize Kings to take their Subjects goods at their pleaſure, yet p. 18leſſe the Kings of Iſrael never tooke it ſo; For Ahab and Jezabel were not ſo unskillfull in the right of Kings, that they would have had Naboth put to death by falſe witneſſes for blaſphemy, that ſo his vineyard might come to the King by confiſcation; if by a plaine Law of God at the founding of the Monarchy, he might have taken the vineyard at his will, as the Text 1 Sam. 8.13. mentions his taking of vineyards even to give to his ſervants, and much more for his own uſe. But Ahab and Jezabel both, though they wanted neither wit nor ſtomack to advance that Prerogative, were it ſeemes novices in both to our Moderne Advocates for Monarchy; or rather it is certain Samuell tells them what their King would do, and not what he ſhould do by right. His words are Propheſies not Laws.

2. Neither are the latter words of their crying to God, and his not hearing them, in forme of a Law and Prohibition (or at the moſt but a Prohibition of attempting or thinking to have the government altered againe from Kings to Judges) but a prediction by way of puniſhment, what ſhould befall them for their ſinfully impetucus affecting and asking a King, that they ſhould feele him oppreſſing them, and that God would never remove the burden, as long as that King (whom they ſhould firſt have) ſhould live, Nor yet alter the government againe from Kings to Judges, though they ſhould be never ſo weary of the one or other; and pray never ſo much to him for either or both. And indeed the event verifies this interpretation, in both reſpects. For Saul proved tyrant enough; and particularly in taking their ſons from them, as it is threatned, 1 Sam. 8.11, 12. &c. ſo recorded Cap. 14.51. But ſpecially his tyranny was moſt prodigious in the Maſſacre of the Prieſts fore-mentioned: And ſo did many of his ſucceſſours; after they had a King once, they never were under any other government altogether. For though they had no Kings of their owne from the Babyloniſh Captivity, till the Maccabees time, yet were they under ſtrange Kings (which was worſe) the Babylonians and Perſians (of which after their returne from captivity, ſee their heavy complaint, Neh. 9.) and after them the Grecians and the Kings of Syria and Aegypt, and then a while the Maccabees race poſſeſt the Kingdome till the Romans ſubdued them, and ſet up Harod and his race under the Emperour, who was indeed their King from thence forth (the high Prieſt cals Caeſar their King, Joh. 19.15. and ſo doth the Prophet. Zach. 11.6.) till Vespaſian and Titus deſtroyed their Common-wealth.

3. This Prediction then of ſuch puniſhment to them by their Kings oppreſſing of them, cannot be a Law or puniſhment intended to other Nations being under a King, who have not provoked God in ſeeking a King as Iſrael had▪ God threatned and impoſed on the Jews and other Nations in Nebuchadnezzars time their putting their necke under his yoake,Ier. 27.3. &c.Jer 27:3 though he was not their hereditary Prince, but an invading enemy. From whence no man will gather (I hope) that any Nation are bound to yeeld to a forraigne Enemy invading them. Alſo God threatned that the Jewes ſhould be carried captives into other Countries, and there they ſhould ſerve other gods, wood and ſtone, &c. where he would not ſhew them any favour; I am ſure no man will argue from hence, that this is a law for other captives to ſubmit to (or was any excuſe to them, much leſſe a law) but a meere puniſhment to them,Ier. 16.1…Jer 16:1 and warning …o other, leaſt in them alſo ſin be puniſhed with ſin, which is the foreſt puniſhment of all.

4. This place then being ſuch a prediction of puniſhment doth not prove ſo much, as that to them it was unlawfull to defend their very goods againſt their Kings tyranny, but that (at the moſt) it ſhould be vaine to them; becauſe if God would not heare their cry, their defence would be to little purpoſe, and what they might ſave at one time would begotten from them at another, when their King ſhould liſt to attempt it.

p. 195. After all, this Text (let the utmoſt be made of it that can be) reaches not to the firſt and maine Propoſition of defending life. Or the ſecond of chaſtity: but ſtill the defence of thoſe remaine lawfull and warrantable, though alſo ſo doth the defence of goods (as may appeare by what hath bin ſaid) whereas the King is not an abſolute Monarch. The abſoluteneſſe whereof is indeed (as hath bin fore-noted) in power over goods, but not at all over the chaſtity of any, nor ſo much as over their lives, further then they offend known Laws.

Thirdly, He ſays, we have not only example, but reſolution and concluſion out of Scripture, That the people might not be gathered together, either for civill Aſſemblies, or for warr, but by his command that had the power of the Trumpet, that is the ſupreame, as Moſes was, Num. 10.

Rep. The Text puts in no ſuch reſtraint, no reſtraint at all, but only that the Trumpet ſhould blow for ſuch and ſuch occaſions, and where it did blow, they ſhould aſſemble. I grant, while the ſupreame (and thoſe under him) do their duties, there may be no Aſſemblies, but by their Authority, Laws and commands; but when they neglect it, and will not diſcharge their truſt; much more when they abuſe it, to deſtroy thoſe, by and for whom they are truſted; This Text hath neither word nor intimation, forbidding the people to aſſemble, even for warr. Himſelfe granted not long ſince, That the body politicke might defend it ſelfe againſt an outward force. Suppoſe a Fleet of Spaniards, or Danes or Iriſh, invaded our Coaſt: The Prince and all his Officers, are ignorant or neglectfull, or even conſenting. Shall the people not aſſemble for defence, becauſe the Prince blows not the Trumpet? Or a band of high-way-robbers ſet upon a village, and the Conſtable and Officers are ſecretly confederate with them: May not the village without their officers, and the neighbour villages alſo run together, as to quench a common fire? We uſe to ſay, Neceſſity hath no Law, or knows no Law. The meaning is good, That ordinary laws for ſetled times, give way to preſent preſſing neceſſities, not only before men, but God too, who in ſaying, I will have mercy and not Sacrifice; directs to prefer neceſſities of mercy and ſafety, before all ordinary Formalities, either of Religion, or of civill Juſtice. How els might a private man kill one that aſſaults him? And if one may defend himſelf, I ſay again (as before) much more many; and to that end Aſſemble even for war, and make Trumpets of their own, when they that have the ordinary Trumpets, will not uſe them at all, or againſt the common good. And Num. 10. hath not the leaſt ſhadow to the contrary. Alſo without the Trumpet may not the Church aſſemble?

Fourthly, For Davids carriage towards Saul and his Army, 1 Sam. 26. it is partly anſwered before. But he urges, That though it be ſaid, they intend not hurt to the Kings Perſon, yet might they not as well have hurt his perſon in the day of battell, as any of them that were ſwept away from about him by the fury of the Ordnance, which put no difference 'twixt King and common Souldiers.

Rep. Indeed this is the hardeſt caſe can be put againſt defence by Arms. But ſuppoſing (as hath bin partly proved already, and will be more, the further we proceed) that againſt his meſſengers and inſtruments, arms may be taken, & battles fought to prevent the ſubverſion of Religion, Laws and Liberties, upon which they are bent: I only ask 2 or 3 Queſtions.

1. By what rule of conſcience or God, is a State bound to ſacrifice Religion, Laws and Liberties (the conſervation of which is the end of all governments, and ſo of all Princes Authorities) rather then endure that the Princes life ſhould come into any poſſibilities of hazard, by defending them againſt thoſe, that in his name are bent to ſubvert them.

2. If he will needs thruſt himſelf upon the hazard, when he needs not, whoſe fault is that? Is it theirs that deſire not to have him hurt in the leaſt, and reſolve not to hurt him p. 20wittingly or willingly, but meerly to defend themſelves upon neceſſity; and offend others that are his ſeducers, or inſtruments, or both? And to this purpoſe, let it be remembred that I have proved, that David would have kept Keilah againſt Saul, and then if Saul would have bin obſtinate to aſſault it in his own perſon; how could David have helped it, if an arrow or a ſtone from the wall had hit him and killed him? And then withall, whether there be not ſomewhat this way, in that of David; Either the Lord ſhall ſmite him, or his day ſhall come that he muſt die, or he ſhall goe into the battle and periſh. If he might fight with Sauls Army, as in Keilah he would, and Saul would goe downe into the battell, his bloud would have bin upon his own head. As if a King diſguiſed ſhould offer any private violence, a watchman that would not (or even might not) hurt him being knowne, were without blame, if he knock't him down, or even killed him, as he might in like caſe a diſorderly private perſon. Now in battell, to many or moſt (and eſpecially to the Gunners that give fire to great Ordnance) he is altogether diſguiſed, and ſo they are blameleſſe, in reference to his perſonall hurt. The fault is wholly his owne and thoſe wicked Councellors that have thruſt him upon the fury of the battell.

3. For alſo, why ſhould not all that truly wiſh well to the King, of all other times keep him out of the battell, when it is againſt Rebels? I am ſure Davids men would not let him hazard himſelf, 2 Sam. 18. (though he offred it) and ſaid he was worth 10000 of them. They then that put him upon ſuch deſperate dangers, againſt ſuppoſed Rebels ſhew they love their owne rapine (for which they fight, and to ſubvert Religion, Laws and Liberties) above his perſon and life. And then let God be Judge who ſtretcheth out the hand againſt him unlawfully? They, or others?

Fifthly, He obſerves two things more concerning the point of reſiſtance.

1. That all the ſeeming inſtances for it, are out of the old Teſtament.

Rep. 1. Why ſhould he inſinuate this to be inſufficient? Is not the old Teſtament Gods word, and a direction for our lives, as well as the new? Was not, Honour thy Father and Mother (under which himſelfe compriſes obedience to Princes) a law of the old Teſtament? And if it were lawfull (as the inſtances have bin juſtified againſt all that he hath ſaid) to reſiſt then; how comes it to be unlawfull now? Did Chriſt come to make Tyrants ſecure from reſiſtance, who were not before.

2. I would intreat him, if he be at leaſure to rejoyne to this reply, to tell us the intent of Chriſt in the new Teſtament; bidding his Diſciples, rather ſell their garments, then want a Sword. I am perſwaded for my part, that he thereby directs them to a juſt and neceſſary defence, againſt any out-ragious attempts of violence illegall. Though he afterwards blames Peter for uſing the Sword without warrant. The new Teſtament then hath ſomewhat alſo toward Reſiſtance.

But 2. He ſaith, It is a marvellous thing, That among ſo many Prophets reprehending the Kings of Iſrael and Judah for their Idolatry, cruelty and oppreſſion, none ſhould call upon the Elders of the people, for this duty of reſiſtance.

Rep. To this marvell, there may be a ready ſatisfaction, if we remember, That even in the reigne of the beſt Kings, not only the peoples hearts were uſually unprepared, and in their greateſt ſeemings hypocriticall and treacherous, as appeares by the Story and the Prophets. But alſo the Princes, Elders and Nobles were exceedingly corrupt. In Joaſh his time, as ſoone as Jehojada was dead, the Princes came and corrupted the King; and in the beginning of Eſay's Propheſie in Ʋzziah's time (who was among the better Kings) he calls them Princes of Sodom, and ſo even in Hezekiah's time, how doth Micah complaine of them. (Ch, 3. & Jer. 26.) and Jeremy in Joſiahs time after the Reformation begun. Now if they were ſo bad in good times, who can marvell, if they were p. 21ſtarke nought, where the King was rought, and helpers forward of his Idolatries, cruelties and oppreſſions. And why ſhould it then be expected, that the Prophets ſhould call upon them to reſiſt, the King being on their ſide, and they on his.

Sixthly, At laſt the Doctor comes to his maine ſtrength of all, namely, Roman. 13.2.

In the improvement of which Text to his purpoſe, he layes downe four Poſitions, and then makes a five-fold Objection, and ſhapes Anſwers to them; all which muſt come under examination.

1. He ſayes [I may ſuppoſe that the King is ſupreame, as St. Peter calls him, or the higher Power, as St. Paul here, though it be by ſome now put to the Queſtion, as one abſurdity commonly begets another to defend it.]

Rep. But by his leave hee runnes away too faſt with his ſuppoſition in a double reſpect.

1. That S^t. Paul here, Rom. 13.2. ſpeakes only of reſiſting the ſupreame power, the King, or Emperour or Monarch, whereas the word in this ſecond verſe is indefinite, the power foreign, which extends to all in authority in either ranke or degree, as well as the ſupreame, as was noted before. If he (or any for him) ſay that the power, v. 2. muſt ſignifie no more then the higher power, v. 1. which he interprets only of the ſupreame.

Repl. Here againe I muſt tell him, he abuſes his Readers (careleſly at leaſt, I will not ſay wittingly, let his conſcience looke to that) for he alwayes reades higher power in the ſingular, whereas it is Powers in the plurall, and the next words, There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God, ſhews the Apoſtle ſpeakes of all ſorts and rankes of Powers. Therefore he muſt take in the other, Powers, as well as the ſupreame in both verſes, and that will be nothing for his benefit, as will appeare by this briefe reaſon. If the Powers that are under the Supreame may not be reſiſted by this, Rom. 13.2. Then either the reſiſtance forbidden extends not to reſiſting (though with Armes) out-ragious and tyrannicall aſſaults of illegall violence offered by thoſe officers, as ſuppoſe a Major, Juſtice, or even a Conſtable, or elſe even one of thoſe officers, even a petty Conſtable is as abſolutely over thoſe that are under his office as any Monarch, and they ſlaves to his luſts, as well as to an Emperours, becauſe the one ought not to tyrannize (by the Doctors Confeſſion § 1.) no more then the other, and the one ought not to be reſiſted no more then the other by this argument and Text.

Now which part of diſtinction will the Doctor chuſe, if the former, he deſerts his cauſe plainly. If the latter, then beſides the apparant abſurdity of it; I urge, that all men will grant, That a Conſtable and ſuch like officers (betweene the people and the ſupreame) are lyable to be themſelves puniſhed by Lawes, if they offer any out-ragious and illegall violence, which cannot poſſibly be, unleſſe they may be reſiſted even with Armes in caſe any arme themſelves to practiſe violence, Alſo elſe a few of them, as the Major or Aldermen of a Towne, joyning together, might goe through all the City and robbe, and kill as many as they would by force of Armes, and no man might offer to reſiſt them by taking Armes againſt them. It remaines therefore that all Magiſtrates (except the ſupreame to begin with) may be reſiſted even with Armes, if offering violence and tyranny; And yet St. Paul forbids to reſiſt the Powers without diſtinction of ſupreame or other. Therefore S^t. Paul m…anes not to forbid reſiſting Tyranny with Armes: But reſiſting legall and lawfull commands, even other wayes, as well as with Armes, p. 22though this be the worſt kind of reſiſtance, where obedience is due.

But ſecondly, It muſt not be granted him (for all his bigg words of Abſurdity, imputed to thoſe that deny it) That the King of England is in all conſiderations the ſupreame (or the higheſt Power (if S^t. Pauls words were in the ſuperlative.) This belongs to Politicks, and the Doctors Divinity will not reach it, himſelfe cannot deny it, That the King is not ſupreame in the legiſlative power. Though hee have a negative voyce in Lawes, ſo have either of the Houſes diſtinct. Hee can then neither make new Lawes alone, nor abrogate old ones: Nor violate (without injuſtice) the goods, much leſſe the lives or chaſtities of any of his meaneſt Subjects, and leaſt of all authorize any of his followers by his warrant or preſence to doe ſo. His Supremacy then is bounded by Lawes, and is given him (be it more or leſſe) ad ſalutem non ad deſtructionem. Which yet were not, if no Tyranny of his might be reſiſted. But of that more anon.

But the Doctor will prove the King ſupreame 3 wayes.

1. S^t. Peters diſtinction comprehends all that are in authority. The King as ſupreame, and thoſe that are ſent by him: In which latter ranke are the two Houſes of Parliament, being ſent by him, or ſent for by him, and by his Writ ſitting there.

Repl. 1. Why did the Doctor leave out the word Governours? Is he afraid to grant the Houſes of Parliament any power of Government?

2. What if ſent by him, referrs not to the King, but to the Lord, for whoſe ſake, all both King and Governours are to be obeyed, and by whom both are ſent? (but of this alſo more anon.)

3. But grant him his way, I aske how it ſhall appeare, that the name of King extends as farre every where as S. Peters foreign. The Spartans had two Kings, and yet neither of them ſo ſupreame, but under the controll of the Ephori, There are alſo Monarches as ſupreame as any that have the Title of King. The Great Duke of Florence, The Great Duke of Muſcovy, and others. Alſo the Romans in S. Peters time cal'd not their Emperours King Rex, Which yet is the ordinary Latine of foreign. In a word, he only is ſupreame, whom the Law cals ſupreame, and no further then the Law makes him.

2. He ſaith alſo, by the Oath of Supremacy it is acknowledged, That there is no power above him without or within this Realm, and that he is in all cauſes and over all perſons ſupreame.

Repl. But ſome Lawyers will tell him, That the Oath of Supremacy is either only againſt forraigne powers (and namely the Pope) having to doe here; or againſt all particular perſons having authority above the King within the Realme. But that with all Law-books intimate a ſuperiority, in curia Comitum Baronum, &c. which is the two Houſes of Parliament.

And ſecondly, That he is ſupreame not to judge all perſons and cauſes at his pleaſure, but as aſſiſted according to Lawes with his Counſell and Judges, and ſpecially his great Councell, and chiefe Judicature (during their ſitting) the two Houſes of Parliament. His Supremacy then, ſtill appeares limited by, and according to Law.

3 But hee adds, This is alſo acknowledgedged by the Petition of the two Houſes addreſſed unto his Majeſty, wherein they ſtile themſelves, his Loyall Subjects.

Repl. True and right; but ſtill this is to be underſtood, to be Subject according p. 23to Lawes, and for the good of King and Kingdome, neither of which is promoted or preſerved by a reſtraint of a defenſive Reſiſtance of tyranny, which reſtraint, the Doctor ſo contends for. Adde here, what muſt elſewhere be further urged, That the King himſelfe in his anſwer to the 19 Propoſitions, acknowledges that the two Houſes have legall power, more then ſufficient to prevent or reſtraine Tyranny. Which I would faine have any man ſhew me, how it can bee done, but by taking up Armes, and then I will yeeld him the cauſe, That all Armes taken up are unlawfull. But till then the King hath granted the cauſe, legall and juſt againſt the Doctors firſt maine Propoſition, and all his Arguments.

His next ground is, That in the Text of the Apoſtle, all perſons under the higher Power are expreſſely forbidden to reſiſt, for Whoſoever, in the ſecond verſe, muſt be as large, as every ſoule in the firſt verſe, and the reſiſtance forbidden here concrnes all upon whom the ſubjection is injoyned there, or elſe we could not make theſe univerſals good againſt the Papiſts, exempting the Pope and Clergy from ſubjection.

Repl. 1. He ſtill runnes on in his errour to limit the higher power to the ſupreame.

But ſecondly, I grant him that all other powers under the ſupreame are forbidden to reſiſt in the Apoſtles ſence. A Conſtable, Juſtice, Major, Sheriffe, Judge of Aſſize, nor the very Houſes of Parliament may not reſiſt the authority of the King commanding according to Lawes. But yet it remaines to be prooved, that they may not reſiſt his violence, when he is bent to ſubvert Lawes and Liberties, and Religion and all: Or the violence of his followers, even though doing it by his warrant or in his preſence. Alſo, becauſe he doth ſo much inſiſt upon the phraſe of higher power, let me put him a caſe. A wicked Robber that hath committed twenty moſt bloudy murthers one after another, in cold bloud is led away after legall condemnation by the Sheriffe to be put to death: Suppoſe a King would come with armed ſouldiers, and offer to take him violently and by force out of the hand of Juſtice. Who reſiſts damnably now that power which is the Ordinance of God, and to whom the Sword is committed? The Sheriffe and his men that reſiſt the violence, or the Kings followers (or even himſelfe) that reſiſt the due Execution of Juſtice? Let him ſtudy on it and give an Anſwer at his leiſure.

3. He proceeds, In thoſe dayes there was a ſtanding and continuall great Senate, which not long before had the ſupreme power in the Roman State, and might challenge more by the fundamentals of that State, then our great Councell (I thinke) will or can. But now the Emperour being ſupreame, as S. Peter cals him, or the higher power, as S. Paul here, there is no power of reſiſtance left to any that are under him by the Apoſtle. Thus for the perſons that ſhould reſiſt, all are forbidden. Now conſider the cauſe.

Rep. 1. Doubtleſſe Saint Paul wrote not to the Roman Senate, nor Saint Peter neither. And if the Doctor will proove it unlawfull for them to reſiſt, he muſt proove it from the Law of nature, or at leaſt from ſome ancient Law of the old Teſtament, given to the Anceſtours of the Roman Senate. Or elſe ſhew how this could concerne them, who never heard any thing of it. For any thing then …e ſaith, it was lawfull for the Roman Senate and the Heathen Subjects to reſiſt, though not for Christians.

2. If he or any for him ſhall ſay that it ſuffices for his cauſe that it was forbidden to Chriſtians and accordingly is now.

p. 24Rep. 2. If you reply that ſuppoſing it not forbidden to Heathens; No more was it to Chriſtians, before S. Paul (and S. Peter) wrote. And if ſo, then belike (as was formerly toucht) the Apoſtles laid a yoake upon the necks of Chriſtians, worſe then all the Jewiſh ceremonies, which the Gentiles were ever freed from: For whereas before the Romans might reſiſt their tyrannous Emperours, now by becoming Chriſtians their hands muſt be tyed to have all their throats cut, (even though the whole Senate were Chriſtians) at one Neroes pleaſure. He that wiſht that all Rome had but one neck that he might ſtrike it off at a blow, had done wiſely to have endeavoured to have made them all Chriſtians, and then he and his Guard with him, or his Army might by this Doctrine have ſtruck off all their heads, or runne them all through one after another as faſt as they could deale blowes, and ſo he ſhould have his will in their deſtruction, though there muſt have beene a little more paines taken about it. Surely Chriſt who came to purchaſe liberty to his people never meant to enſlave them to tyrants above all others of Man-kind. The Doctor muſt goe prove reſiſtance unlawfull from ſome other grounds of natures law or the ancient lawes of Scripture, or elſe this Text of S. Paul will appeare to have another interpretation, even that which hath beene given before in the explication of the Text, and inference from it.

Thirdly, I will not therefore trouble my ſelfe to compare the Authority of the Roman Senate with our Parliament, much leſſe argue for that power which they had loſt about a 100 Yeares before S. Paul writ; It ſuffices he hath not diſproved at all their preſent power of reſiſting tyranny, when S. Paul wrote, and that by the ſame argument I have diſproved, that S. Paul forbids Chriſtians to take any ſuch power to themſelves.

4. But he adds [was there ever more cauſe of reſiſtance then in thoſe dayes? Were not the Kings then not only conceived to be enclined ſo and ſo, but even actually were enemies to Religion, had overthrown Laws and liberties?] Rep. If it had been before demonſtratively proved that reſiſting the power (or higher power) did properly ſignifie, taking Armes againſt the Supreame, when he plays the tyrant: This fourth ſtep were a juſt illuſtration, and confirmation of it. But now he only beggs the Queſtion (whether deceitfully or being himſelfe deceived by his own ſtrength of fancy againſt reſiſtance) and builds without a foundation. For will it prove that S. Paul forbids reſiſting by Armes a tyrant; Becauſe Nero was then a tyrant. Unleſſe there were nothing elſe that could be cold reſiſting the higher power, but reſiſting by Armes? He that ſhould have wilfully and obſtinately refuſed the juſt Laws of the Roman State, had reſiſted the higher powers in S. Pauls meaning (as the whole context, and all interpreters ſhew) What is this then to inferre a prohibition of reſiſting tyranny by Armes? It inferres indeed, or includes principally reſiſtance of lawfull commands by Armes. But how comes tyranny in? becauſe forſooth Nero was a tyrant. Rep. But his authority according to the Laws of which alone the Apoſtle ſpeakes was not tyrannous. The Argument therefore is wholy inconſequent, and fallacious from legall commands to tyrannous violence. And that the Apoſtles context proves abundantly, notwithſtanding his pretended anſwers of Objections. But heare him.

1. Therefore, If any ſhould from the Apoſtles reaſons that he gives againſt reſiſtance in the 3, 4, and 5, verſes, For Rulers are not a terrour to good works, but to evill, and he is the Miniſter of God to thee for good.

p. 25REPLY. That Rulers ſo long as they are not a terror to the good, but miniſter for our good are not to be reſiſted. The conſideration of thoſe times leaves no place for ſuch exception, becauſe the powers then which the Apoſtle forbids to reſiſt, were nothing ſo, but ſubverters of that which was good, juſt &c.

REPLY. This ſtill labours of the fallacie, that Rulers and Powers ſignifie the perſonall commands of the ſupreame; onelyonly once here ere he is aware he names powers in the plurall, which the Apoſtle forbids to reſiſt. But I ſay as often, It onelyonly ſignifies the legall commands of Authority, whether ſupreame or ſubordinate. Secondly, though Nero was a Tyrant, yet were not all his Magiſtrates and Officers ſo; nor hee himſelfe in all matters (perhaps not at all when S. Paul writ this he had his Quinquiennius, and it may poſſibly fall within the Quare) unto thoſe which were legall, which were the greater part that concern'd Chriſtians, It was forbidden to make reſiſtance, and the Dr. hath ſaid no word to prove yet, that the prohibition extends further.

2. Hee makes a Second Objection that ſome ſay, that prohibition was temporay and fit for thoſe times. To which he makes 2 Anſwers. 1. That this is a new exc…ption never heard of I thinke but theſe times.

REPLY. I have not in my Reading obſerv'd any to make ſuch an exception, and doe readily yeeld to him that ſo to put of the Apoſtles prohibition is a ſenceleſſe, and preſumptuous ſhift. But I muſt encounter his ſecond Anſwer. Which is▪

That the Reaſons of the Prohibition (in his ſenſe of reſiſting Tyranny by armes) are perpetuall, verſe 3.4 5.6.

REPLY. I have formerly ſhewed the contrary, and that all the reaſons fight againſt his ſence. But he will prove it.

From that order that good, for which the powers are ordained of God, which will be of force as long as there is Government, and will be alwayes, reaſons againſt reſiſtance, becauſe reſiſtance (though it be made againſt abuſed powers (as then they were) doth tend to the diſſolution of that Order, for which the power it ſelfe is ſet up by God; by which alſo the other diſtinction of theirs is made void when as they reply they think acutely, That they reſiſt not the power, but the abuſe of the power.

REPL It is granted by him that the ſtate of the Queſt. is, when a Prince is bent to ſubvert Religion, Lawes and Liberties. I would then faine know what order or good will then be in force, when theſe are ſubverted? And whether this Tyrant that attempts to ſubvert theſe, intends not to diſſolve that Order, for which his power and himſelfe were ſet up of God? And how then the Apoſtles reaſons can posſibly reach to forbid reſiſtance to ſuch attempts or practiſes; I will inſtance in foure Commandements of the ſecond Table which the Roman Lawes in thoſe times were conſervators of as much as any Nations in the world (except Gods people of Iſrael) the 5, 6, 7, 8. Com Suppoſe Nero gathers together a Company of diſſolute young men▪ and with this guard or band enters into ſeverall houſes, encourages thoſe children that were willing to be ſo wicked▪ to abuſe Father and mother: from thence they goe to the Market-place, and kill any they meet, and have quarrell with; then they catch mens Wives and raviſh them before their Husbands faces▪ and after that rob the rich mens houſes at their pleaſure: I demand now, what greater (or p. 26equall) diſſolution of that Order, for which the power is ſet up of God can be imagined? Or how the not reſiſting ſuch a Tyrant can with common ſenſe be inferred from thoſe ſentences, Rulers are not a terror to good workes, but to evill, and he is the miniſter of God to thee for good? What is this, but to call good evill, and evill good? Which the woe againſt which our Doctor would ſcarre men from reſiſting tyrranny in his title Page: reſiſtance of ſuch an one then is ſo farre from diſſolving of order, as there is no meanes under heaven to keep order from being diſſolved in ſuch caſe, but reſiſtance.

Secondly, whereby it will appeare alſo how void his confidence is, that by his former words he hath made void the diſtinction betweene the power and the abuſe of the power himſelfe hath granted (and cannot in conſcience deny) that though the Prince is to be actively obeyed when he commands lawfull things; yet not when hee commands againſt the Lawes of GOD, or even the eſtabliſht Lawes of the Land: hee then diſtinguiſhes acutely hee thinks, betweene the power and the abuſe of the power. Why is it not as lawfull for us in the ſecond verſe ſo to diſtinguiſh upon foreign as well as for him in the firſt verſe upon foreign? Or if it be not, he muſt give us a better reaſon then he hath yet. And till then I againe make bold to tell him that all the Apoſtles Argument, v. 3, 4▪ 5, 6, 7. juſtifies our diſtinction, and refuſe his interpretation.

Another Objection he makes againſt hmſelfe, is, That ſome ſay the Emperours then were abſolute Monarks and therfore not to be reſiſted; he anſwers. They did indeed rule abſolutely and arbitrarily, which ſhould have according to the principles of thoſe dayes beene a ſtronger motive to reſiſt. But how did they make themſelves of Subjects ſuch abſolute Monarks, was it not by force and change of Government? And was not the right of the Senate and people good againſt them with as much, or more reaſon, then the right of the people of this Land is againſt the ſuccesſion of this Crowne, deſcending by three Conqueſts?

REPL. 1. This Objection is needleſſe, and ſo ſhall be none of mine. Alſo it is a nicety to averre, and very hard to prove that the Emperours were (or any other Princes are) abſolute Monarks, under whom there is a government by written Lawes, as among the Romans were the 12. Tables, and many other Lawes. But I adde, that no Prince can be an abſolute Monarch to have power over mens lives at his pleaſure (or over the chaſtity of any at all) He can have no power but according to the Ordinance of God. Now it is certaine God never ordaines any ſuch Arbitrary, or iniurious power. Therfore no Monarch hath any ſuch de jure. As for that, any hath de facto, as he ſpeakes of the Emperours ruling abſolutely or arbitrarily. If they did ſo (as they oft did) for evill, I have formerly ſhewed, and he hath not refelled it, that they might have been reſiſted 2. What he ſpeakes of their becomeing Monarchs touches not our caſe at all. For however he inſinuates, Who ever hath ſoberly written for defence and reſiſtance againſt Tyrranny doth not plead any right in the people of this Land againſt the ſuccesſion of this Crown: But though the King and his rightfull ſucccesſions ought ſtill to hold the Crown; This forbids not a neceſſary defence againſt their unjuſt violences when ever they ſhall uſe them. 3. Yet withall I add, that though ſo long as there was any in the Roman State who had not by Oath or the like expreſt their conſent to the uſurpation p. 27of the Roman Emperours, they were free to have thruſt them out againe, or rather bound to have done it, and reſtore the Senate to their loſt authority: yet when any have with the generality yeelded to the change of an Ariſtocracy (wherein no man hath perſonall right of ſuccesſion) into a Monarchy; they▪ and ſpecially the poſterity of thoſe that have ſo yeelded, are from thenceforth for ever bound to that government, according to juſt and equall Lawes already in being or to be made hereafter, even by the Monarke alone, if they have truſted him with it alone; But never can they loſe their right (no, not by their owne conſent) of juſt defence of Chaſtities, or of their lives, untill they forfeit them by their misbehaviour againſt ſome juſt Lawes or other. 4. As therefore the Doctor diſclaimes the pleading for an arbitrary power) (ſuch as Conquerours uſe) in this crowne, ſo if he can plead no better againſt reſiſting our Kings then he hath in the caſe of the Roman Emperours he will merit but ſmall reward for his paines. But for that, viderit ipſe.

5. I come to his laſt objection, That Chriſtian Religion was then enacted againſt by Law; but the Religion contended, is eſtabliſht by Law. Hee anſwers two things.

Firſt, Is the Religion eſtabliſht denyed to any that now fight for it? &c.

REPL. This with the reſt belongs to matter of fact in the third Propoſition, and ſeventh Propoſition. Thither, I referre it that I may not ſay over needleſly the ſame things, or ſay but a little here or that which hee will needs make neceſſary to ſay a great deale more then I deſire.

Secondly, the prohibition (ſaith hee) not only concernes Chriſtians, but all the people under thoſe Emperors; and not only Religion was perſecuted, but liberties alſo loſt the people and Senate were enſlaved by edicts▪ and Lawes, then inforced upon them and they (according to the principles of theſe dayes) might reſiſt notwithſtanding the Apoſtles prohibition, and the Laws then forced upon them, or elſe the State, as they uſually ſay had not means to provide for its ſafety. Thus one fancy of theirs thwarts another becauſe both are groundleſſe

REPL. 1. Whe…her the Chriſtian Religion being condemned by law then, did deny them reſiſtance in its ſelfe, I ſhall perhaps give him account in another place. Meane time he cannot deny but the difference is very great betweene a Right to defend that which the Law defends, and that which the Law puniſhes.

Secondly, I have proved that the prohibition of reſiſting Tyranny by armes, did not concerne the Heathen Romanes (and therefore not the Chriſtians neither.)

Thirdly, what ever liberties were loſt, and new Lawes enforced, yet ſo long and ſo farre as the Emperours ruled by the Lawes, the people and Senate were in no ſuch ſlavery, that they needed reſiſt to ſave the State. But when they uſed lawleſſe violences according to their luſts, neither the Lawes nor the Apoſtle prohibited a defenſive reſiſtance. So that although Chriſtians might not defend their Religion againſt Law, yet he hath brought nothing to ſhew, they may not defend it, when the Law hath eſtabliſht it.

But of the meanes of ſafety in ſtate, he will ſpeake more anon, and ſo will I. And now I ſhall oppoſe his concluſion wi…h a little change of his words. Hitherto of Scripture, which how ſtrong ſo ever it ſeems againſt reſiſting tyranny p. 28by Armes, yet ſaith nothing at all to prohibit it, rather the Reaſons forbidding reſiſtance of juſt power legally adminiſtred, favour this reſiſtance of Tyranny as hath bin ſhewed. By which conſcience will clearely ſee, that according to the examples of David, and Eliſha, and the reſt that have been juſtified; it hath cleare warrant for ſuch reſiſtance of Tyranny, notwithſtanding all the Dr. hath alleadged to the contrary. Now let us ſee what Reaſon can enforce.