Defense of the Minister of Pensherst, Defense
'ΑΝΤΙΠΡΟΒΑΑΗ, OR A DEFENCE OF THE Miniſter OF PENSHERST, In a Caſe between him and the Earl of Leyceſter in Michaelmas Term, 1657.
LONDON, Printed by T. R. for the Author, 1660.
foreign. OR A DEFENCE OF THE Miniſter of Penſherſt in a caſe between him and the Earl of Leyceſter in Michaelmas Term, 1657.
THE Miniſter of Penſherſt being ſetled in that Rectory by the Authority of the Committee of Parliament, April 5. 1650. endeavoured in much faithfulneſs a holy Reformation there, that he might prepare a people for the Lord; in which work he found no encouragement from the Earl of Leyceſter, but was put to much grief of heart by the Earls oppoſition: who began a quarrel upon the Miniſters denyal of letting his Lordſhip the Gleab land, (as ſometime Ahab fell out with Naboth about the Vineyard) taking occaſion thereupon many wayes to oppreſs him and his afflicted family. The Lord giving the Miniſter patience to bear much hard uſage, he made many Chriſtian private Addreſſes to his Lord-ſhip to give his Lordſhip a right underſtanding of the wayes of God he proceeded in in his Miniſtrations, and likewiſe entreating him to be ſenſible of his many great ſurferings; but no redreſs being given, and the cauſe of God ſuffering much by his Lordſhips conteſts, and doing year after year worſe and worſe, the Miniſter was preſt in conſcience, at length to apply the Word of God againſt the Earl by name for many publick offences in the publick congregation, praying alſo for him that God would reduce him from the evil of his wayes, whereby he had offended him and his choſen ones. This the Miniſter did upon conſcience of duty, reſpecting that of Saint Paul, Thoſe that ſin reprove before all, 1 Tim 5.2that others may fear. And duplicate page duplicate page wholeſome pious rule of holy Auguſtine, Si quid vitii in amico deprehender is (ſaith that Father) corripe occulte, ſi te non audierit, corripe palam, ſunt enimbonae correptiones & plerunque meliores quam tacita amicitia: & ſi laedi ſe putet amicus, tu tamen corripe; tollerabiliora emm ſunt amici vulnera quam adulantium oſcula. If thou find (ſaith that Father) any fault in thy friend, blame him ſecretly, if he will not hear thee, blame him openly; for reproofes are good, and for the moſt part better then friendſhip that holds its peace; If thy friend complains thou wrongeſt him, yet notwithſtanding reprove him ſtill, for more tolerable are the wounds of a friend then the kiſſes of a flatterer.
Indeed it fell out ſo, according to that word the Earl thinks himſelf wronged in his honour by the Miniſter, who by a chriſtian admonition endeavoured to repair it; for what could make more truly for his honour then to turn him from ſin to God, and to waſh away that ſtain which was a blot, no badge of honour. The Earl therefore commences a ſuit againſt the Miniſter, and being ſubtile in Law-ſuits ſurpriſes the Miniſter at a time when he expected no trouble, and eaſily runs him down becauſe he made little or no reſiſtance, but commended himſelf to him that judgeth righteouſly, the Lord knowing both his work, and the integrity of his heart therein.
The words the Earl lay to the Miniſters charge, were theſe, that he ſhould ſay of the ſaid Earl, That he was a wicked man, a cruel Oppreſſor, and an enemie to Reformation.
If the Miniſt had ſpoke theſe very words, might he not ſufficiently have proved the crime? let us ſcan the words, A cruel Oppreſſor; does his Lordſhip call theſe a horrid ſcandal, let it be a ſcandal worthy to be puniſhed by the Judges, and let my Lord for ever be guiltleſs of ſo horrid a crime; but what then dorh he ſay for himſelf for keeping back the Miniſters dues more or leſs from year to year for eight years together? For a year or two his Lordſhip allows a ſmall part for tithes, for other years nothing: if tithes were not the Miniſters right, why did his Lordſhip pay any? if they were his right, why did he not pay all? Is it not oppreſſion to withhold 12 li. per an. for eight or ten years together from a Miniſter.
Again, Is it not oppreſſion to plant a Warren next to a Miniſters Gleab-land, and fence it on every ſide but where it lies to the gleab, whereby the Miniſter was damaged for eight years together by the gain of his Lordſhips Warren ten pound a year without any ſatisfaction or commiſeration. This was the way indeed to have the Vineyard when it was denyed, and rent free too.
Again, Was it not oppreſſion to ſeize upon part of the Miniſters Gleab, to dig up and carry away trees from the Gleab at his Lordſhips pleaſure, contrary to all right and common juſtice, to arreſt the Miniſter and his ſervants cauſleſly (unleſs it were becauſe the Miniſter had too much patience, and would not be provoked to begin Law with the Oppreſſor) to vex, and worrie, and diſquiet him in the work of the Miniſtry. If the common Law of England (alas to much corrupted) will not account this Oppreſſion, will not God declare againſt it as horrible oppreſſion and violence? yea, and will not all good mens conſciences condemn and deteſt it, if the like were done to themſelves? What is this mans conſcience made of, if it ſleep and acquit him as righteous after all this?
And for an enemy to Reformation.
If the Earl of Leyceſtor were not an enemy to the good work of Reformation endeavoured by the Miniſter, why drew he off, ſeeing that our Lord Chriſt declares, That he that is not for him, is against him? and why were thoſe that ſhunned the purifying of Gods ordinances admitted to the Table of the Lord ſo freely at his Lordſhips chappel? if his Lordſhip had to object againſt the way of the Goſpel offered to the Church by the Miniſter in writing, why did he not diſprove it? if his mouth was ſtopped, was he not then an enemy to that holy Reformation which he diſcouraged? yea, was not he an enemy to Reformation that ſent a Copy of the Miniſters way and diſcipline to his Lawyers to ſee if their ſubtilty could pick our a Premunire of it? Will not the ſtones and the timber cry out of the wall and witneſs againſt ſuch repugnancy and enmity to Chriſt and the precious unblamable way of Goſpel worſhip? if theſe things do not evidence the crime which are but lightly touched, worſe then theſe if God pleaſe to give time for inquiry may be made to appear, before the great day of the Lord come when he muſt look to be diſcovered before the world. But the Miniſter becauſe he applyed the word of God in the Congregation againſt the Earls ſin in other expreſſions, not theſe, therefore he pleaded not guilty; but the Earl having got witneſs, and a Jury after his heart at Lent Aſſizes 1656. in Kent, Verdict was given for the Plantiffe, 500 li. damages: See yet more cruelty, cruel man, and yet more cruel Law! why? what did the words deſerve that a Jury of men ſhould give ſuch damages upon them? The Lord chief Juſtice Glin profeſſed upon the Bench they were not ſo much as actionable at Common Law, and ſo not worth two pence, and muſt they be judged at 500 l. that were not worth two pence? In Queen Maries days the Statute allowed but 100 li. upon thoſe that had ſpoken horrid forgeries and ſcandals againſt the King or Queen, and is 500 li. given for words againſt the Earl of Leyecſter, ſhall I ſay not ſcandalous? to the quick ſubverſion of an innocent Miniſter and family indeed, but who would judge thoſe words (of no publick concernment) to amount to the quick ſubverſion of the Realm, as the Earl prerends in his declaration? ſee how ſin grows till it be fully ripe; from Enmity to open conteſts, from open conteſts to open blood-ſhed, and devouring of Gods innocent people, as the Prophet Micah obſerves, Ye heads of Jacob and Peers of the houſe of Iſrael,Mic. 3.1, 2, 3 is it not for you to know judgement? who hate the good, and love the evil, who pluck off their skin from off them, and their fleſh from off their bones, who ſo eat the fleſh of my people, and flay the skin from off them, and they break their bones, and chop them in pieces as for the pot, and as fleſh within the Caldron, as if rage could never be ſatisfied.
foreign.
The juſt God ſaw all this, and records it againſt a day of vengeance, and ſays, v. 4. Then ſhall they cry unto the Lord, but he will not hear them: he will even bide his face from them at that time, as they have behaved themſelves ill in their doings.
When the caſe was pondered before the Judges of the Upper Bench for an Arreſt of Judgement, the two Judges were divided upon the caſe, one for the Plantiffe, the others for the Defendant: ſo that there was an Arreſt for two terms, then at length is Juſtice Newdigate put upon the bench, and the ſcales were turned, but the Judges having peruſed the cauſe, and ſeeing in their conſciences the grievouſneſs of it, ſent three meſſages to the Earl to ſtop him from taking out Execution, or moleſting the Miniſter upon the caſe: nevertheleſs the Earl that drove on ſo furiouſly hitherto, could not be perſwaded by the Judges to ſtop his courſe, but took out execution upon Execution, three Writs of Fieri facias within the ſpace of one year, and another Writ in the year following, ſezing at ſeveral times the Miniſters Corn, and Kine, and Horſes, Wood, Hay, Waggons, Bed and Bedding from under him and his Children, and ſervants, and all the houſhold furniture he could light on, even to the poultry about the houſe, and things of the ſmalleſt conſequence that could adde a groat to the Inventory, and that in the bittereſt time of Winter, and yet all this is done by the Earl who would not be accounted cruel. This was an hour of darkneſs, but yet the Lord ordered it with ſuch unexpected unſeen, and admirable recompence of his love, as that though we walked in darkneſs, and ſaw no light of relief, yet we could truſt in the name of the Lord, and ſtay upon our God. We are troubled on every ſide, yet not diſtreſſed, we are perplexed, but not in deſpair, perſecuted, but not forſaken, caſt down, but not deſtroyed, alwayes bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jeſus, that the Life alſo of Jeſus might be made manifeſt in our body, for we which live are alwayes delivered unto death for Jeſus ſake, that the life alſo of Jeſus might be made manifeſt in our mortal fleſh.
This was the firſt caſe wherein the Peerage enjoyed their priviledges after the act of the Common-wealth which took away the houſe of Peers; and muſt this be the firſt caſe whereupon thoſe priviledges are built again that were in ſo many Preſidents laid aſide? Muſt a Miniſter for reproveing of ſin, and his whole family alſo, be plundred and deſtroyed to bear up the unſupportable burthen of this unprofitable greatneſs; there was cruelty enough before without Law, and muſt there be much more miſchief framed by a Law? For ever let the Plantiffe be acquitted, and his cruelty not made mention of in regard of the tranſcendent cruelty of ſuch Law. O ye Courts of Juſtice, ye Thrones of them that are called Gods, is this to do like God? God ſaith, Relieve the oppreſſed, judge the Fatherleſs, plead for the widdow; and do you cruſh the oppreſſed, condemn and deſtroy the innocent, & outvie in cruelty the man that is blemiſhed before you for cruelty?
Ye Jurats upon whoſe account God will ſet theſe damages, how could you think in your conſciences 500 li. a juſt proportion for words; for words not ſo much as actionable in the opinion of the Judges? would you think it juſt that others ſhould mere the the meaſure to you again? can you look upon your Verdict, and hear what hath been done upon a ſpoiled Family, and not ſay, we are verily more guilty then the cruel Oppreſſor.
Ye Honourable Judges, profeſſed Patrons of the afflicted, who ſhould have been afflicted in the afflictions of Joſeph, and as Judah have reſcued him; you that could not imagine any cruelty under a title of honor, or think that your meſſages would be of leſs acceptance and power with the Plantiffe then your ſentence; have not you cauſe alſo to ſay, as Joſephs brethren, Verily we are guilty concerning our brother in that we ſaw the Anguiſh of his ſoul, when he beſought us, and we would not hear.
The Lord give you to know, and to have true remorſe for what you have done, that it may not be laid to your charge in the great day of the Lord.
You had little reaſon for what you have done, let us come cloſer to the matter, and prove it, that you had no Law neither.
I ſhall reaſon it logically and plainly thus,
That Judgement is unjuſt where there is no Law to warrant it,
But this Judgement hath no Law to warrant it,
Ergo, This Judgement is unjuſt:
If there were any Law tranſgreſſed that could give occaſion for ſuch a Judgement, then it muſt be either the Common Law or Statute Law (for no other Law is pretended to by the Plantiffe) but neither of theſe is tranſgreſſed, therefore there is no Law tranſgreſſed to ground the judgement upon, and ſo it muſt be confeſſed to be unjuſt.
The Common Law can be no ground for this judgement, for it was yielded by the Judges (the Lord Chief Juſtice Glin acknowledging it in open Court) that the words alledged would not bear action at Common Law.
If the Statute Law be tranſgreſſed (which were moſt abſurd to ſay, that words which by the Common Law are not actionable, ſhould be counted by the Statute Law to be horrible forgeries, ſubverting the Common-wealth; by common Law not worth a farthing, and by Statute Law ſet up to 500 li.) but I ſay, if any Statute of this Nation be violated, the honourable Plantiffe ought to have mentioned it, and concluded his Declaration Sub forma Statuti; but the Plantiffe doth not mention any Statute Law tranſgreſſed, hereupon the Judges of the Upper Bench were divided in their opinions: Judge Warberton judging the Declaration void upon this default, though the Lord chief Juſtice Glin allowed it.
But let this fault paſs, and let it be ſuppoſed that the Action be intended upon the Statute of Richard the ſecond: we ſhall through Gods help prove that the words alledged by the honourable Plantiffe cannot be concluded within that Statute, and thererefore there is no Law to warrant it.
The Statute runnes thus.
Anno ſecundo Rich ſecundi, Cap. 5.
FOR Deviſors of falſe News, and of horrible and falſe lyes, of Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and other Nobles, and great men of the Realm, and alſo of the Chancellour Treaſurer, Clark of the privy ſeal, Steward of the Kings houſe, Juſtice of the one Bench, or of the other, and of other great Officers of the Realm; of things which by the ſaid Prelates, Lords, Nobles and Officers aforeſaid were never ſpoken, done nor thought, in great ſlander of the ſaid Prelates, Lords and Officers, whereby Debates and Diſcords might ariſe between the ſaid Lord, or betwixt the Lords and Commons, (which God forbid) and whereof great peril and miſchief might come to all the Realm, and quick ſubverſion and destruction of the ſaid Realm, if due remedy be not provided.
It is ſtraitly defended upon grievous pain for to eſchew the ſaid damages and perils, that from henceforth none be ſo hardy, to deviſe, ſpeak or tell any falſe news, lyes, or other ſuch falſe things of Prelates, Lords, and of other aforeſaid, whereof diſcord, or any ſlander might ariſe within the ſame Realm: and he that doth the ſame ſhall incurre and have the pain another time ordained thereof by the Statute of Weſtminſter, &c.
Now the Argument we draw to prove that this Statute cannot warrant the judgement, bears three parts, firſt to prove that the words are not concluded Sub ſubjecto Statuti, within the Subject of that Statute.
Secondly, That the words are not concluded Sub materia Statuti, within the Matter of the Statute.
Thirdly, That the words are not concluded Sub fine Statuti, within the End of the Statute.
That we may not carrie forth this diſpute into a volumne, we ſhall inſiſt only upon the firſt of theſe, That the words are not comprehended within the Subject of that Statute, and contract all into five Arguments:
Its proved thus, if the honourable Plantiffe be not a perſon comprehended under the Subject of that Statute, then are not the words comprehended under the Subject of that Statute: now that the Plantiffe is not a perſon comprehended under the Subject of that Statute, I crave leave to argue thus,
If he be not qualified as the Statute ſuppoſes, then is not he a perſon comprehended under the Subject of that Statute: here therefore is the main point, Whether the Earl be qualified, ſo as that Statute doth ſuppoſe to make him Subjestum capax, a Subject capable of the priviledge of that Statute; for if he be not, he cannot have a priviledge by this Statute: Let us therefore fairly debate the point, and we reaſon thus;
The perſons ſpecified in the Statute are Barons of the Realm, as the firſt words import, Barons, Nobles, and great men of the Realm: Now thoſe that were Barons of the Realm, were not titulary Barons, but Parlamentary Barons.
But the Earl of Leyceſter is no ſuch Parliamentary Baron, as the Act of the Common-wealth for aboliſhing the houſe of Lords intimates; therefore by what right can his Lordſhip claim the priviledge of this Statute?
The Act for aboliſhing the Houſe of Peers.
THe Commons of England aſſembled in Parliament, finding by too long experienee, that the Houſe of Lords is uſeleſs and dangeruus to the people of England to be continued, have thought fit to ordain and enact; and be it ordained and enacted by this preſent Parliament, and by the Authority of the ſame, that from hence forth the Houſe of Lords in Parliament, ſhall be, and is hereby wholly aboliſhed, and taken away. And that the Lords ſhall not from hence forth meet or ſit in the ſaid houſe, called the Lords houſe, or in any other houſe or place whatſoever, as a houſe of Lords, nor ſhall ſit, vote, advice, adjudge, or determine of any matter or thing whatſoever as a houſe of Lords in Parliament.
Nevertheleſs it is hereby declared, that neither ſuch Lords as have demeaned themſelves with Honour, Courage and Fidelity to the Commen-wealth, nor their Poſterities who ſhall continue ſo, ſhall be excluded from the Publicke Councells of the Nation, but ſhall be admitted hereunto, and have their free vote in Parliament if they ſhall be thereunto elected as other Perſons of interest, elected and qualified thereunto, ought to have. And be it further ordained and enacted by the authority aforeſaid, that no Peer of this Land, not being elected, qualified and ſitting in Parliament as aforeſaid, ſhall claim have or make uſe of any priviledges of Parliament either in relation to his perſon, quality, or Eſtate, any Law, uſage or cuſtome to the contrary notwithſtanding:
Die Lunae 19. Martii 1648.
If any will be ſo perverſe and ſo much oppoſite to ſenſe, as to ſay, the Earl may claim the priviledge of this Statute, though he have nothing but an empty Title (if any ſuch be left him whoſe Creation ſtands not in a Title, but in a work and capacity to ſerve the State) againſt this we ſhall argue from the verie original Creation of Parliamentary Barons, which it recorded thus,
Henry the third out of the multitude of thoſe Barons that were in his time, whereof ſome were ſeditieus, choſe out a certain number of good men, and by Writ called them to Parliamentary Councels: This Rule Edward the firſt and his Succeſſors kept to, and thereupon they alone were accounted Barones regni or Barons of the Realm. Afterwards Richard the ſecond, and ſome Kings after him created Barons by their patent and putting on of Robes, and both theſe forms were in uſe whiles that order and conſtitution held, and thoſe that are thus created Barons, are called Barones Parliamenti or Barones Regni, to difference them from others that were only nominal or titulary Barons.
Theſe Parliamentary Barons had not only a meer Title or name, but were all of them by birth Peers of the Realm, Et Conſiliarii nati, and were created by the Kings Writ Ad tractandum de arduis regni negotiis & conſilium de iis impendendum. Now to theſe belonged the priviledge to be judged by their Peers, to judge upon their Faith and honour, not upon oath to be beheaded for crimes deſerving death, to be free from Arreſts and the priviledge granted by the Statute of Richard the ſecond, Now hence the Argument holds firm; that if not titulary Barons but Parliamentary Barons only, according to the firſt conſtitution were honoured with theſe Priviledges, when any Baron ceaſes to be Parliamentary, his privildges muſt ceaſe.
To ſay therefore that meerly titular Barons are capable of this priviledge, were to ſay, that Henry the third when he inſtituted this Order of Parliamentary Baons, in contradiſtiction to other Barons gave both alike priviledges, and ſo as amply honoured the ſeditious as the moſt truſty and faithfull, which were the greateſt abſurdity that could be impoſed; a thing contrary to the Rules and grounds of true honour.
The ſecond Argument to prove that the Earl is not a Subject qualified, as that Statute imports, may be offered from well grounded reaſon; thus,
When the ground of a Priviledge is taken away, needs muſt it be conceived the priviledge it ſelf is therewith taken away; but the ground of this priviledge is taken away, Ergo.
For the minor propoſition. The priviledge conferred by Statute upon Nobles, Barons and Peers above ordinary ſort of men, muſt needs have its ground in that high capacity and native right the Nobles were inveſted with to ſerve the Common-wealth in more eminent manner then ordinary men; and to evince this, that this was indeed the ground of that priviledge, therefore great Officers of ſtate about the King, who were no Peers, yet of great uſefulneſs, are priviledged alſo by this Statute as well as Lords and Nobles of the Land; it being thought meet that men of eminent ſervice above other men ſhould be endowed with priviledges above the common ſort of men: but now this ground fails upon the aboliſhing the houſe of Lords, their high capacity for publick ſervice being taken away, how can it be therefore but the priviledge alſo muſt fail with it?
Shall my Lord the Plaintiffe be in a capacity by a priviledge to undoe his poor neighbours, and not in a capacity to preſerve them? or can it be imagined that the Parliament have took away from Peerage its chief power and capacity to do good, and left nothing but a power to do hurt, a ſting to wound, but no balm to heal? God forbid: till then the plantiffe be re-inſtated in ſuch a capacity for publick high ſervice, as is meet to be a ground for ſo high a priviledge, let him forbear to aſſume it, for I think no man will ſee reaſon for it.
Can there be heat in a Chimny when the fire is put out? or water in the Channel when the fountain is dried up; or light in the horizon, when the Sun is gone down? or a houſe remain ſtanding when the foundation is took away? no more can a priviledge remain when the reaſon or ground thereof is aboliſhed.
The third Argument, A cauſa finali, from the final cauſe or end ſpecified in the Statute, whereupon this priviledge was given the Nobles, I reaſon thus, If the end or final cauſe for which this priviledge was granted the Peers be fruſtrated, the priviledge muſt be alſo fruſtrated, but the end for which this priviledge was granted, the Peers ſeems to be fruſtrated; Ergo, this priviledge it ſelf muſt fall, and be fruſtrated alſo. Let us then examine the end wherefore this priviledge was given the Nobles, and 'tis expreſt plainly in the Statute, To prevent diſturbance and quick ſubverſion of the Common-wealth. Scandals of a high nature and horrible forgeries that tend Per ſe to make Diviſions between Nobles, being laid upon any one of the Nobles of the Realm, it was thought thereby the whole Common-wealth might quickly be diſturbed and diſtracted; and therefore ſuch an Offence was to be ſeverely puniſhed.
Its true indeed, as Ariſtotle obſerves, it fell out in Syracuſe conteſts between two chief Magiſtrates, there endangered the ruine of the whole Common-wealth: and ſo it was ſuppoſed by this Statute, that conteſts between the Nobles and perſons in great office, might haply endanger the Common-wealth by civil wars, and therefore to prevent ſuch differences apt to be fomented by falſe reports, carried to and fro to incenſe the ſpirits of great men one againſt the other: therefore I ſay was this Statute made.
But now that the houſe of Lords is aboliſhed, and the Peers ceaſe to be chief Senators and Officers of State, and have no ſuch publick truſt as then, the danger is not now as then; and therefore no ground for the priviledge to be now as then.
The fourth Argument from want of Preſidents in the caſe.
Was there ever any common-wealth, or any age of the world wherein men of great Titles, and little or no uſe in publick adminiſtrations enjoyed, ſuch a priviledge as this is above thoſe that in vertue, wealth and ſerviceableneſs to the State, do far exceed them.
Or is there any one preſident upon Engiſh Records, ſince the Act of the Common-wealth, for aboliſhing the houſe of Lords, to prove that any one of the Nobles had their priviledges allowed them before this caſe? The Lord Arundel, Lord Shandois, and others it ſeems had not their priviledge (though deſired) granted them, and what reaſon that the Earl of Leyceſter only ſhould have his priviledge granted him? If the old priviledges belong to all Peers, why were they not granted others? If they belong to none, why are they given the Earl of Leyceſter? Surely either other of the Nobles, have had much wrong, or this man hath more then his right.
The fifth Argument, to prove that one that ceaſes to be a Parliamentary Baron, is no meet ſubject for the priviledge which the Statute of Richard the ſecond allows, may be drawn from the Act of the Common-wealth in this manner.
THE giving Priviledges to the Peers by ſitting in Parliament, argues they had not them before upon account of their Title; for what need hath a man to have that given him, which he hath already of his own? Or what priviledges doth the Act give the Lords by ſitting in Parliament, if they had better without ſitting?
Now by the Act of March 19. 1648. it is granted that Peers qualified and elected to ſit in Parliameent, ſhall have the priviledges of Parliament, both to their Perſon, Quality, and Eſtate, and not otherwiſe.
What are thoſe priviledges? If the ordinary priviledges of Parliament, then they had no more priviledge then the reſt of the Commons of England; if they were extraordinary priviledges belonging to them as Lords, it argues then they had them not without this grant, upon the ſcore of their dignity and Title, which is as much as we expect to have granted us, and then it muſt needs follow, that their priviledges are grounded upon a parliamentary capacity, and not upon a meer Title.
In the laſt words therefore of the Act this is clearly expreſt, That no Peer of this land not being elested, qualified, and ſitting in Pariiament, ſhall claim, have or make uſe of any priviledge of Parliament, either in relation to his perſon, quality or Eſtate, any Law, Ʋſage or cuſtome to the contrary notwithſtanding.
The Objections were ſo frivolous, that were made in this caſe, that men even of ordinary capacity and reaſon would nauſeat them as ſlight, and too light to weigh a grain in the ſcales that Juſtice holds in her hands, and I purpoſely omit them as not worthy to trouble the READER farther.
As likewiſe I wave other Arguments copious and ſtrong, upon the Subject, and upon the matter, and upon the end of the Statute of Ric. the ſecond, to prove that theſe pretended words, (if they had been ſpoken) yet could not be comprehended under that Statute.
But theſe perhaps will be thought clear and ſufficient enough to convince that this Judgement was unjuſtly given, and cruelly executed; which I leave to the Lord to redreſs in his time, beſeeching him of his wonted grace to give us all joy and patience in ſuffering.
FINIS
End of the text · John Maudit, Defense of the Minister of Pensherst (1660)