The Art of Logic and Rhetoric, Book 3 – Title page 3
The third Book.
CHAP. 1. Of the Originall of Elocution and Pronunciation.
THree things being necessary to an Oration, namely Proof, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which followes.
As for Action, or Pronuntiation, so much as is necessary for an Orator may be fetcht out of the Book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the Action of the Stage.
For Tragedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to Art, then is either Proofe, or Elocution.
And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for Poetry.
But Oratoricall Action has not been hitherto reduced to Art.
And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and faigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a Stile, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words.
But when the Poets changed their St…le, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the Voice and Measures proper to them selves.
Seeing therefore Pronuntiation, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the Art of Poetry.
[In the mean time this may be one generall Rule. If the Words; Tone, Greatness of the Voice, Gesture of the body and Countenance, seem to proceed all from one Passion, then 'tis well pronounced. Otherwise not.
For when there appear more passions then one at once, the mind of the Speaker appears unnaturall and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the Hearer alwayes.]
CHAP. 2. Of the choise of Words and Epithets.
THe vertues of a Word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent; that is, neither above, nor below the thing signified; or, neither too humble, nor too fine,
Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper
Fine Words are those, that are borrowed, or translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.
The reason why borrowed Words please, is this. Men are affected with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is forrain and new.
To make a Poem gracefull, many things help; but few an Oration.
For to a Poet it sufficeth with what Words he can to set out his Poem: but an Orator must not only do that: but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less beleeved; whereas beelefe is the scope of his Oration.
The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Received; and Metaphors.
Words taken from forrain languages, Words compounded, and Words new coyned are seldome to be used.
Synonimaes belong to Poets, and Equivocall words to Sophisters.
An Orator, if he use Proper words, and Received, and good Metaphors, shal both make his Oration beautifull, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Novity, and Sweetnesse.
Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.
1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Metaphor from somwhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Crime, an Error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from somwhat worse, as, calling Error, Crime.
2. A Metaphor ought not to be so far fetcht, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.
3. A Metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the Poets do that choose rather to say, Rosy-finger'd; then Red finger'd Aurora.
In like manner the Rule of Epithets is,
That he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that wil disgrace, should use those of the worse: as Simonides being to write an Ode in honor of the victory gotten in a Course by certain Mules, being not well paid, called them by their name [foreign] that signifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them the sons of swift footed Coursers.
CHAP. 3. Of the things that make an Oration Flat.
THe things that make an Oration flat, or insipide, are four.
1. Words Compounded; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and seldom used.]
2. Forrain words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latine; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are forrain in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.
3. Long, impertinent, and often Epithets.
4. Metaphors, indecent, and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far fetcht. Indecent when they are ridiculous, as in Comedies; or too grave, as in Tragedies.
CHAP. 4. Of a Similitude.
A Similitude differs from a Metaphor only by such Particles of Comparison as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, &c.
A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dilated; and a Metaphor is a Similitude Contracted into one Word.
A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis Poeticall.
An example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Oration, that the Baeotians were like to so many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another.
CAP. 5. Of the Purity of Language.
EOure things are necessary to make Language Pure.
1. The right rendring of those Particles which some antecedent particle does require: As to a Not only, a Not also; and then they are rendred right, when they are not suspended too long.
2. The use of proper Words, rather then Circumlocutions, unlesse there be motive to make one do it of purpose.
3. That there be nothing of double construction, unlesse there be cause to do it of purpose. As the Prophets (of the Heathen) who speak in generall terms, to the end they may the better maintaine the truth of their Prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, then in particulars. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, then how many; and that a thing will be, then when it will be.
4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.
In summe; a Mans Language ought to be easie for another to read, pronounce, and point.
Besides, to divers Antecedents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be correspondent: as, He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound; or he perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, He heard, or saw both.
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by Parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vitious.
CHAP. 6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.
A Man shall adde Amplitude, or Dignity to his language, but by such means as these.
1. By changing the Name with the Definition, as occasion shall serve… As, when the Name shall be Indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.
2. By Metaphors.
3. By using the plurall Number for the singular.
4. By privative Epithets.
CHAP. 7. Of the Convenience, or Decency of Elocution.
ELocutions are made Decent,
1. By speaking Feelingly; that is, with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as Angerly in matter of Injury.
2. By speaking as becomes the Person of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speak Eruditely.
3. By speaking proportionably to the matter; as of great affaires to speak in a high; and of mean, in a low stile.
4. By abstaining from Compounded, and from Out-landish Words; unlesse a man speak Passionately, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or Ironically.
It confers also to perswasion very much, to use these ordinary formes of speaking, All men know; 'Tis confessed by all; No man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprized with the fear to be esteemed the onelyonly Ignorant man.
'Tis good also, having used a word that signifies more then the matter requires, to abstain from the Pronunciation and Countenance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion between it and the matter may the lesse appear. And when a man has said too much, it will shew well to correct himselfe: For he will get beliefe by seeming to consider what he sayes.
[But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in shewing of this Consideration. For the ostentation of Carefulnesse is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth then is required.]
CHAP. 8. Of two sorts of Stiles.
THere be two sorts of Stiles.
The one continued or to be comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by Periods.
The first sort was in use with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.
An example of this Stile is in the History of Herodotus; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole History.
In the other kind of Stile, that is distinguished by Periods, a period is such a Part as is perfect in it selfe; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.
This later kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appeares finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has alwayes somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he fore-sees no end, and has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence (which is the cause that verses be easily remembred;) the other not.
Every Sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interposed.
Period is either simple, or divided into Parts.
Simple is that which is Indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.
A Period divided, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the Period.
The parts, or members, and periods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.
Too long are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.
Too short, are they that end before he expects it.
Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usuall end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that walkes with him.
They that be too short, make the Hearer stumble; for when he looks farre before him, the end stops him before he be aware.
A period that is divided into Parts, is either divided only; or has also an Opposition of the parts one to another.
Divided onelyonly is such as this; This the Senate knowes; the Consull sees; and yet the man lives.
A Period with Opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together; or also joyned by a third.
Contrary parts are put together, as here, The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.
Antitheta are therefore acceptable; because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leads to Impossibility.
Parts, or Members of a Period, are said to be equall, when they have altogether, or almost equall Number of Syllables.
Parts, or Members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equality there is of Syllables, the more gracefull is the Period.
CHAP. 9. Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightfull.
FOrasmuch as there is nothing more delightfull to a man, then to finde that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those Words are most gratefull to the Eare, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the thing signified.
And therefore forrain Words are unpleasant, because Obscure; and Plain Words, because too Manifest, making us learn nothing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Genus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man is called Stubble; a man suddainly learns that he growes up, florisheth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to Stubble, and to Old Men.
That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.
Such Enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very Manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.
The things that make a speech gracefull, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Animation.
Of Antitheta, and Antichesis hath been spoken in the precedent Chapter.
Of Metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from Proportion.
[Aristotle (in the 12 Chapter of his Poetry) defines a Metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the Generall to the Particular. 2. From the Particular to the Generall. 3. From one Particular to another. 4. From Proportion.]
A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a Year without a Spring.
Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes; as …he that said, The Athenians powred out their City into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an Oration.
If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both Metaphor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it cannot choose but be very gracefull.
That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, Animation and Antithesis, hath been said: but how 'tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.
CAP. 10. In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.
TIs graced by Animation, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the sword is said to devoure.
Such Metaphors as these come into a Mans minde by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.
A Metaphor without Animation, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.
Also Paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do beleeve them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somwhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a mans expectation.
And Paragrams; that is, allusions of words are gracefull, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with Antithesis: for by these means the ambiguity is taken away.
And …he more of these; namely, Metaphor, Animation, Antithesis, Equality of members a Period hath, the more gracefull it is.
Similitudes grace an Oration, when they contain also a Metaphor.
And Proverbes are gracefull, because they are Metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another.
And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthfull, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not comly in Old men.
CHAP. 11. Of the difference between the Stile to be used in Writing, and the Stile to be used in Pleading.
THe Stile that should be Read ought to be more exact and accurate.
But the Stile of a Pleader ought to be suted to Action and Pronuntiation.
Orations of them that Plead, pass away with the Hearing.
But those that are Written men carry about them, and are considered at Leasure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.
Written Orations appear flat in Pleading.
And Orations made for the Barr, when the Action is away, appear in Reading insipide.
In Written Orations Repetition is justly condemned.
But in Pleadings, by the help of Action, and by some change in the Pleader, Repetition becomes Amplification.
In written Orations Disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by Action.
But in Pleadings 'tis Amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.
Of Pleadings, that which is Iudiciall ought to be more accurate, then that which is before the people.
And an Oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to Action, then a Iudiciall.
And of Iudiciall Orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few Judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to Many. As in a Picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine: so in Orations, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his Oration to be Elegant.
Therefore Demonstrative Orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be Read.
CHAP. 12. Of the parts of an Oration, and their Order.
THe necessary Parts of an Oration are but two; Propositions, and Proos; which are as it were the Probleme, and Demonstration.
The Proposition is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be proved.
And Proof is the Demonstration of the Matter propounded.
To these necessary parts, are somtimes added two other, the Proeme and the Epilogue, neither of which are any proof.
So that in sum, there be four parts of an Oration; the Proeme, the Proposition, or (as others call it) the Narration, the Proofes (which contain Confirmation, Confutation, Amplification, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.
CHAP. 13. Of the Proem.
THe Proem is the Beginning of an Oration, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.
In some kinds of Orations it resembles the Prelude of Musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the Tune they intended.
In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play, that contains the Argument…
Proems of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to fore-tell, or not, what points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not: because when a man has not obliged himselfe to a certain matter, Digression will seem Variety: but if he have ingaged himselfe, Variety will be accounted Digression.
In Demonstratives the matter of the Proem consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or Custome, or in Exhortation, or Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.
Proemes of the second kind are most proper for Iudiciall Orations. For as the Prologue in a Dramatick, and the Exordium in an Epique Poeme, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poeme: so in a Iudicial Oration the Orator ought to exhibit a Modell of his Oration, that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended, and for want of fore-sight, erre or wander.
Whatsoever else belongs to a proeme, is drawn from one of these four; From the Speaker, From the Adversary, From the Hearer, or from the Matter.
From the Speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proems such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.
To the Defendant 'tis necessary in the Proeme to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration.
But to the Plaintife 'tis better to cast his Criminations all in to the Epilogue, that the Judge may the more easily remember them.
From the Hearer and from the Mat…ter are drawn into the proem such thing… as serve to make the Hearer favourable or angry… attentive, or not attentive… as need shall require.
And Hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to thing… that are of great Consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.
But to make the Hearer attentive, is not the part of the proeme only, but of any other part of the Oration, and rather of any other part, then of the proeme. For the Hearer is every where more remisse then in the beginning. And therfore wheresoever there is need, the Orator must make appear both the probitie of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great Consequence; or that it concerns the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delightfull.
He that will have the Hearer attentive to him, but not to the Cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, common, and tedious.
That the Hearer may be favourable to the Speaker, one of two things is re…ired; that he love him, or that he … them.
In Demonstrative Orations, he that …ises, shall have the Hearer favourable …e think himself, or his own manners, course of life, or any thing he loves, …mprehended in the same praise.
On the contrary, he that dispraises, …all be heard favourably, if the Hearer …nd his enemies, or their courses, or any …ing he hates, involv'd in the same …spraies.
The Proeme of a Deliberative Ora…ion is taken from the same things, from …hich are taken the proemes of Iudicial Orations. For the matter of a Delibe…ative Oration needeth not that naturall …oeme, by which is shewen what we …re to speake of; for that is already known: the Proeme in these, being made onelyonly for the Speakers, or Ad…ersaries sake; or to make the Matter appear great, or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the Plaintife or Defendant; or from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations Iudiciall.
CHAP. 14. Places of Crimination, and Purgation.
1. ONe is from the removall of ill opinion in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.
2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtfull, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.
3. A third from the Recompence; as, I did him harm, but withall I did him honour.
4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Errour, Mischance, or Constraint.
5. A fifth from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.
6. A sixth, from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father… Kinsman, or Friend.
7. From the Comprehension of thos… that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who neverthelesse are good men.
8. From Comparison with such as have been falsly accused, or wrongfully suspected, and neverthelesse found upright.
9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therfore not to be believed.
10. From that the Iudgement belong to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer else-where to this Matter.
11. From Grimination of the Crimination; as, It serves onelyonly to pervert Iudgement.
12. A twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation, and is taken from some signe; as Teucer is not to be believed, because his Mother was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's enemy.
13. A thirteenth, proper to Crimination onelyonly, from praise and dispraise mixt; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectuall ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then adde one evill, but a great one.
14. A fourteenth, common both to Crimination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: …or he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact alwaies in the best sense; and he that Criminates, alwaies in the worst; as when Vlysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardize, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honor.
CAP. 15. Of the Narration
THe Narration is not alwaies continued and of one Peece; but somtimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.
For there being in a Narration somthing that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, wihch the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will finde it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his Wisdom; whereby your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.
'Tis not necessary alwaies that the Narratio… be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.
In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somwhat commendable in ones self, and blameable in ones Adversary: As, I advi…ed him, but he would take no Counsell.
In Narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.
The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some vertuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, setting his arms a kenbold, he answered, &c. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.
In an Oration a man does better to shew his affection then his judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; then to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour followes Goodness; whereas wisdome procures envy.
But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendred, as did Antigone. For when she had said, She loved her brother better than her Husband, or children; she added, for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this forme of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For 'tis not easily beleeved, that any man has a mind to doe any thing that is not for his own good.
Besides in a Narration, not onelyonly the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signes that accompany them, are to be discovered.
And in his Narration a man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.
A Narration may have neede somtimes not to be in the beginning.
In Deliberative Orations; that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come; a Narration, which is alwayes of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may Deliberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proof; for 'tis Example.
There may also be Narration in Deliberatives, in that part where Crimination and Praise come in: But that part is not Deliberative, but Demonstrative.
CHAP. 16. Of Proofe, or Confirmation, and Refutation.
PRoofs are to be applied to something Controverted.
The Controversie in Iudiciall Orations is, Whether it has been don; whether it has been hurtfull; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Iust, or no.
In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be insisted on.
In Demonstratives, the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the Fact are to be proved.
In Deliberatives, the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so Great; or whether it be Iust; or whether it be profitable.
Besides the application of the proofe to the question, a man ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a signe he does the same in the Cause.
The proofes themselves are either Examples, or Enthymemes.
A Deliberative Oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather Examples, then Enthymemes.
But a Iudiciall Oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded Syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.
Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they …hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.
Nor ought a man endeavour to prove every thing by Enthymeme, lest like some Philosophers, he collect what is known, from what is lesse known.
Nor ought a man to use Enthymemes, when he would move the Hearer to some affection: For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the Enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.
For the same reason, a man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would expresse Manners.
But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Manners, he may withall use Sentences.
A Deliberative Oration is more difficult then a Iudiciall, because 'tis of the future, whereas a Iudiciall is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from principles, then without.
Besides, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary, of speaking of himself; of raising passion.
He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.
And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principall party, let him praise or dispraise some body else, as his Father, or Kinsman, or the very vertues or vices themselves.
He that wants not proofes, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his Mannerss: but he that has no proofe, let him nevertheles…e insinuate his Manners. For a good man is as acceptable, as an exact Oration.
Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better then those that are direct or osten…ive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, Truth and Falsity, the force of the Syllogisme does the better appear.
Confutation is also a part of proofe.
And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unlesse the Controversie containe many and different matters. And he that speakes last, puts it before.
For 'tis necessary to make way for his own Oration, by removing the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the Man, and his Oration, that is damned before-hand.
If a man desire his Manners should appear well, (lest speaking of himselfe he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous) let him introduce another person.
Last of all, le…t he cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes, let him vary them somtimes with Sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is entire. And this is a Sentence of equall force to it. Wise men make peace, while their Fortune is entire.
CHAP. 17. Of Interrogations, Answers, and Iests.
THe times wherein 'tis fit to ask ones Adversary a question are chiefly four.
1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by Interrogation draw him to confesse the other.
2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of it selfe, and the other likely to be fetch'd out by a question; then the Interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd, without adding that Proposition which is manifest.
3. The third, when a man would make appear that his… Adversary does contradict himselfe.
4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.
Out of these Cases 'tis not …it to Interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.
To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.
To Interrogations which we fore-see tend to draw from us an Answer, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our Answer, presently give an Answer to the objection which is implied in the question.
And where the question exacteth and answer that concludeth against us, we must together with our answer presently distinguish.
Iests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by Iests.
The severall kinds of Iests are set down in the Art of Poetry.
Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please ones selfe.
The other is Scurrility, and tends to please others.
The later of these has in it a kind of basenesse: the former may become a man of good breeding.
CAP. 18. Of the Epilogue.
THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things.
Either of inclining the Judg to favour his own, or disfavour the Adversaries side: For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dispraise the Parties.
Or of Amplification or Diminution. For when it appears what is good or evill, then is the time to shew how great, or how little that good or evill is.
Or in moving the Judge to Anger, Love or other Passion. For when 'tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evill is, then it will be opportune to excite the Judg.
Or of Repetition, that the Judge may remember what has been said.
Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must shew, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration, and how: Namely, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.
FINIS.
THE ART OF RHETORICK Plainly set forth; With Pertinent EXAMPLES for the more easie understanding, and Practice of the same.
By a concealed Author.
LONDON, Printed by Thomas Maxey, 1651.