The Glory of Free Grace Displayed, Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII.
The Grace of God further cleared. Divine Providence owned and acknowledged by moſt. God no way the Author of mans ſin. The Dominican notion about Phyſical Predetermination vindicated from the Abſurdities are ſaid to flow from it. The neceſſity of our being Modeſt in enquiries of this Nature. Several reaſons for this, drawn from the Depths of the Myſtery, as well as from the ſhallowneſs of Humane Capacities, and the General Confuſion the Jews, Philoſophers and Schoolmen run into, when too nice in their Diſquiſitions. Some Truths of greateſt importance concerning the exalting Free-Grace, the reaſonableneſs of our diſcharge of Duty notwithſtand Predetermination; and of mans inexcuſableneſs if he neglect it. Theſe Truths known to the Heathen; whence Grace appears in its fuller Glory. A Recapitulation of ſome of the moſt material things inſiſted on, as Inſtances of Free-Grace. The Concluſion with a Caution, that none Preſume to ſin becauſe the Lord is Gracious.
THus, I have ſhewn, in many a reſpect, how the Grace of God, is diſplayed in it… glory; It therefore, now remains only that I evince, That this grace, is ſo infinitely extended towards all men, that what man ſoever periſheth eternally, He doth ſo, becauſe He will.
I have already proved, that the Decree doth lay no cauſal influence on mans will, in order to the determining it to a commiſſion of this, or the other individuated actual ſin, in that, as 'tis acknowledged by all, the Decree, being an Immanent, and not Tranſient act as ſuch, nil ponit in eſſe.
I'le now eſſay to demonſtrate, that ſuch is the Tranſcendency of Free-grace, that, what influence ſoever proceeds from the firſt cauſe, in an execution of the eternal decree, it is not ſuch as doth lay a man under a Phyſical neceſſity of Sinning.
But before I make an entrance, on a Province, ſo intricate, it will be neceſſary, that by way of Prologue, I intimate what in this controverſy is plain, and what ſeems obſcure and difficult.
1. What is plain and undoubtedly True.
1. That God is the firſt Being, yea, and the firſt Efficient, the Holy, Juſt and Wiſe diſpoſer of all things, the Author and Conſerver of all Beings.
2. That ſuch is the purity of the Divine Nature, that 'tis Impoſſible God ſhould be the Author of Sin, and conſequently, have any cauſal influence on the ſinfulneſs of humane actions.
The Truth of the firſt Propoſition, although denied by Epicurus, and by Ennius, [as Cicero de Divinat. lib. 2. Ego Deûm genus eſſe ſemper dixi, & dicam coelitum: Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus.] by Averrois and ſome other Peripateticks, contrary to the ſenſe of the great Ariſtotle [as Franc. Patric. diſcuſ. perip. tom. 4. l. 9. expreſſeth it, 'Quid ergo Averrois quid Peripatetici caeteri aiunt, Deum in ſui contemplatione, in motione primi Coeli contentum, haec noſtratia non curare? Id praeterquam quod nefarium & ſceleſtum dogma eſt, contra praeceptoris mentem ac dicta eſt.]' &c.—I ſay, the Truth of this firſt propoſition, notwithſtanding it hath been denyed by a few, is ſo plain, and obvious, as to command the aſſent of moſt, ſo Franc. Patric. ubi ſupra. tom. 12. l. 3. ſanè de providentia vetuſtiſſimum eſt omnium, nedum Sapientum, ſed Gentium etiam dogma, and the Learned Mornay de verit. Chriſt. Relig. c. 11. Antiqui, foreign ſeu foreign (i.e.) Deum, ſeu Providentiam promiſcue vocabant, quia neutrum ſine altero concipi poteſt. But Lactantius doth ſufficiently evince this, lib. 2. de orig. erroris. where he ſaith 'Nam Divinâ Providentiâ effectum eſſe mundum, ut taceam de Triſmegiſto, qui hoc praedicat, taceam de Carminibus Sibyllarum, quae idem nunciant, taceam de Prophetis, qui opus mundi ac opificium Dei uno ſpiritu ac pari voce teſtantur; etiam inter Philoſophos penè Univerſos convenit. Idem etiam Phythagorici, Stoici, Peripatetici, qui ſunt principes omnis Diſciplinae. Denique à primis illis ſapientibus, à Socrate uſque ad Platonem, pro confeſſo & indubitato habitum eſt; donec unus multis poſt ſeculis extitit delirus Epicurus.' &c.
And not only the old Philoſophers, but among the Jews, the Aſſarian ſect, as well as that of the Muatzali, and the followers of Rambam; and of the Schoolmen not only the Dominican and Janſeniſt, but the Moliniſt, yea, and Durandus himſelf own a Providence.
The Second, is a Truth no leſs evident, owned even by the worſt of Hercticks (excepting the Seleuciani, and the followers of Florinus, who, in oppoſing the Coluthians, fell into this contrary extream. vide Aug. de Haereſibus c. 59.65.66.) This Mar. Scribonius in Pantal. in coſ. de pec. act. diſ. 18. qu. 5. aſſerts, 'Nefarii quidem, ac Sceleſti fuerunt haeretici antiqui, nullus tamen ita vecors, ut Deum totaliter Authorem peccati fecerit. Non tamen Deum aſtruebant eſſe primarium peccati authorem, ut malum morale eſt, ſed ſolùm, quia eſt Creator omnium, vel quia nonnulli illorum duo principia ponebant, unum boni, aliud mali, & ſic unum Deum dicebantbonum, alium malum; nullus autem auſus eſt Deum aſſerere verè ac propriè peccati Authorem.' The ſame is confeſſed by Bellarmine de amiſs. Grat. et ſtat. pecc. l. 2. c. 1. Moreover, the Proteſtants do with the greateſt Zeal conclude, that God is of purer eyes, than to behold iniquity. And as Durandus, the Moliniſts, yea and the Janſeniſts, who have eſpouſed the ſentiments of St. Auſtine, even ſo the Dominicans, if not Peter de Aliaco and Abailardus deny God to be the Author of ſin; for ſurely, as the learned Dr. Stillingfleet has prov'd in his Orig. Sacr. lib. 3. c. 3. Whoever believes the Sacred Scriptures, cannot entertain the thoughts of Gods being the Author of ſin. 'Shall not the Judge of all the World do right? will a God of Infinite Juſtice, Purity and Holineſs, puniſh the ſinner for that which himſelf was the cauſe of? Far be ſuch unworthy thoughts from our apprehenſions of a Deity, much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind ſo much to the contary, that we cannot believe that, and the Scriptures to be true together.'
From theſe two uncontroulable Truths there proceeds another, with as much conviction as either of theſe, viz.
3. That what man ſoever ſinneth, he doth ſo freely, man being the ſole Author of the ſinfulneſs of thoſe evil actions he committeth.
This is agreeable to the ſentiments, both of the Schoolmen, and Philoſophers, as hereafter ſhall be evinced. But
2. To what is Obſcure.
Although theſe things are ſo, there ariſe great difficulties in all humane attempts, how to reconcile the two latter with the firſt propoſition; concerning which, divers men, do diverſly deſcant, every particular Sect amongſt the learned, inſiſting on different Hypotheſes for the ſolving theſe Phaenomena; In doing which, ſome in order to a more ſecure eſtabliſhing the two laſt propoſitions, expreſs themſelves ſo unwarily, as to tempt many to fear, they are not right in the former; again, ſuch as make it their principal deſign to confirm, and illuſtrate the firſt about Divine Providence, &c. have been cenſur'd, as if their Dogmata, had been attended with the moſt black and diſmal conſequences; whence inſtead of a cordial agreement about theſe three confeſſed Truths, there are variety of diſputes; contentions, animoſities, and quarrels concerning the How can theſe things be.
But I humbly apprehend, that ſince, theſe three propoſitions are ſo undoubtedly true, that few, or none preſume openly, or directly to oppoſe them; tis the great intereſt, as well as duty of all, rather to ſatisfy themſelves in the producing plain, cogent, Scriptural arguments fortheir confirmation, than to make a too nice inquiry into the foreign, the way and manner how theſe things are ſo. For,
1. Is it not concerning the Modes, or Media of Divine Knowledge, and operations, that the great conteſt is? which, as they are of what more immediately concerns the Divine Nature, muſt be acknowledged to be infinitely above humane (which are but finite) capacities. Who can by ſearching find out God? who can know him, or his ways, unto perfection? Methinks, the arguing of Le blank, is admirable. de concord. libert. hum. cum decret. Div. theſ. 43. 'Itaque cum r…m tantam ſcrutanti, undique ſe tenebrae offundant & occurrant tricae ac pedicae, ex quibus nos non ſatis extricare valemus, nihil magis tutum & ingenuum puto, quam ignorantiam noſtram hic apertè profiteri, & ſeriò illud Davidis uſurpare, Mirabilis facta eſt ſcientia tua prae me, & ſublimior, quam ut aſſequi poſſim. Ac quanquam aliorum ingenia nolim ex mea tenuitate metiri, & ſuper hac re modeſtam diſquiſitionem damnare, facile tamen adducor, ut credam myſterium hoc ad ea pertinere, de quibus dicit Sapiens, Altiora te ne quaeſieris, & fortiora te ne ſcrutatus fueris. Nec mirum videri debet, ſi mens noſtra tam anguſtis limitibus definita, percipere non poſſit quâ ratione intellectus Divinus, cui planè nulli ſunt fines, ea cognoſcat, & attingat, quae ſunt à cognitione noſtra remotiſſima.'
2. Is there any thing more certain, than that, all our diſcourſes about theſe things can be but about what is Obſcure? But becauſe we cannot comprehend what is Obſcure, muſt we reject what is moſt plain and obvious? Cajetane, as I find it in Bellarmine, de grat. et lib. arbit. l. 4. c. 14. expreſſeth himſelf as to this, moſt excellently, 'Cajetanus in 1. part. q. 22. art. 4 docet concordiam iſtam liberi Arbitrii cum Divina providentia videri inexplicabilem, & non intelligibilem in hac vita; Et quidem ſi ita ſe res haberet, non tamen neganda eſſet, vel Providentia Dei, vel Libertas hominum. Poteſt enim facile contingere, ut aliquid ab una parte manifeſtè conſtet, ab altera ſit maximè dubium, & obſcurum: & tunc non eſt negandum unum propter alterum: Nunquid (inquit S. Aug. lib. de bono perſeverantiae, c. 14.) ideo negandum eſt quod Apertum eſt, quia comprehendi non poteſt quod occultum eſt?' But
3. 'Tis humbly apprehended, That, whatever is extorted, and with the greateſt violence forced from the Dominican Hypotheſis, when laid on the rack by the Moliniſt and ſome others; it may be eaſily evinced, that theſe Dominicans in giving God the glory of being the only wiſe orderer, and diſpoſer of all things do no way caſthim under the blaſphemous reproach, of being the Author of the ſinfulneſs of any of our evil actions; neither, according unto them, is Humane Liberty and Phyſical predetermination Irreconcilable.
Before I begin to attempt the clearing this, I muſt crave leave, to do my ſelf the right of aſſuring the Reader, that although I do engage my ſelf ſo far in favour of theſe Dominicans, 'tis not to diſcover any Zeal for that faction, who in the Roman Church, are as bloody, as any; nor for the Hypotheſis, which is as Metaphyſically and obſcurely, as boldly worded by ſome of them, but 'tis to ſhew, that ſuch is the Grandure of Free-Grace, that notwithſtanding the ſeeming ſeverity of this Doctrine, none ſhall be able to ſay, that they following the Dominicans, verily believed that they were ſo Phyſically predetermined to the ſinfulneſs of thoſe actions, they committed, that the true reaſon of their damnation, is their doing what they were by an Omnipotent, Overſtrong, and Invincible Force violently compelled to do; for according to the Dominican notion, what ſinner ſoever dieth in his ſin, is a ſelf condemned ſinner; which being ſo, in the ſenſe of theſe Stoical Schoolmen, there can be no ſcruple, but that in the ſenſe of moſt others, ſuch as periſh in their iniquity will be found to be foreign, condemn'd of themſelves. For what more evident, than that the Arminian, and the Moliniſt pretend to oppoſe the Dominican, principally to clear God from the reproach of being a deſtroyer of Humane Liberty, and conſequently, from the being the Author of mans ſin? and 'tis as certain, that for the ſame reaſon, Durandus rejects not only the notion of the Dominican, but alſo that of the Moliniſt, inſiſting only on a Remote, or mediate concourſe of the firſt cauſe with the ſecond, eſpouſing that old Dogma of Origen, and the Pelagians, as Bellarmine aſſerts de Grat. & Lib. Arb. l. 4. c. 4. 'Quidam enim docuerunt, poſſe homines, ut etiam res caeteras, opera ſua efficere ſine ullo Dei auxilio, ſive generali ſive ſpeciali. Ita videtur ſenſiſſe Origines in lib. 3. de principiis, ut annotavit S. Thomas lib. 3. contra Gentiles c. 89. ita etiam ſenſerunt Pelagiani, teſte S. Hieronymo in Epiſt. ad Cteſiphontem, & lib. 1. adv… Pelag. ita ſenſit ex Scholaſticis Theologis Durandus in 2. Sent. diſt. 1. q. 5. & diſt. 37.1.' Whence it appears, that Durandus was not the Author of this Pelagian Hypotheſis; Mention being made of it long before him, even by the Maſter of the Sentences, Albertus, Henricus, and others, yea, and by S. Auſtin de Gen. ad lit. t. 5. c. 20. as I find in Malderus in 12. Thorn. q. 79. dub. 2. 'Meminit hujus ſententiae Magiſter, Albertus Henricus & alii, ſunt enim (inquit Aug.) qui arbitrantur tantummodò mundum ipſum factum à Deo, caetera jam fieri ab ipſo mundo, ſicut ille ordinavit & juſſit, Deum autem ipſum nihil operari:' Theſe things being ſo, I ſhall no ſooner be able to evince the Phyſical Predeterminant to be one who is ſo far from caſting man under a Phyſical neceſſity of ſinning, as to conclude, his deſtruction to be of himſelf, but this following truth will appear in its ſplendor, viz. That ſuch is the Infiniteneſs of Free-Grace towards all, that whoever is for ſin condemned to eternal flames, is ſo moſt Righteouſly, after the abuſe of much patience, and forbearing Love.
In order then, to a more clear, and convincing procedure, it muſt be obſerved,
1. That the Dominican acknowledge the ſecond cauſe to be in a proper ſenſe a cauſe, and conſequently, Man the proper, though not the Solitary Efficient of his own actions: Herein do the Dominicans differ from Peter de Aliaco and Gabriel his follower, as Molina himſelf aſſerts in 1 m. Thom. q. 14. Art. 13. Diſp. 5. 'Gabriel (inquit Molina) in 4. diſt. q. 1. Art. 1. & Art. 3. dub 2. & 3. ſecutus Petrum de Aliaco, in ea eſt ſententia, ut dicat Cauſas ſecundas nihil omnino operari, ſed Deum in illis, atque ad earum praeſentiam ſe ſolo, producere omnes effectus, unde Dub. 3. Citato, ait, Cauſas ſecundas non propriè eſſe cauſas, quaſi influunt in effectum—Cauſas vero ſecundas, dicit appellariCauſas ſine quibus non, quatenus conſtitutum habet Deus ad earum praeſentiam producere effectus;' which opinion of Peter de Aliaco differs not from that of the Sectators of Mahomet; as Bellarmine out of Thom. in q. 3. de potentia, art. 7. doth declare. The clearneſs then of this Truth is ſuch, that, ſhould I enter on an enumerating, the many Authorities, which may be eaſily produced for the evincing it to be the ſenſe of the Dominicans, viz. that the ſecond cauſe is ſuo genere a proper cauſe, and that, man, notwithſtanding that Phyſical Efficient predetermination, that doth premove him to thoſe actions he performs, is ſuarum actionum Dominus, doing what he doth moſt Freely, time would fail me; and ſince, the great conteſt is, rather about the Reconcilableneſs of theſe points, than about the Dominicans avouching them, 'tis become unneceſſary: I will therefore proceed to a 2d. thing.
2. The Dominicans do alſo diſtinguiſh between the materiale, & formale peccati, and aſſert, that Phyſical predetermination hath a cauſal influence only on the materiale, q. d. The Materiale ſeu Subſtratum peccati eſt à Deo tanquam à Cauſa prima, which is but according to the general ſentiment of the Schoolmen, as Mar. Scrib. doth particularly evince, by which they clear God from being the Author of ſin. The Materiale, ſeu actio quatenus actio, being quid phyſicum as ſuch, is ens reale, and conſequently, ſince ens & bonum convertuntur, 'tis ſomewhat good, & à Deo; for, omne ens eſt, aut primum, aut à primo ortum. Thus Gabriel and Richard in 2 diſt. 37. q. 1. (as Scribonius at large in Pantal. in Coſ. de pec. actuali, diſ. 18. q. 4.) 'aſſerunt Deum non eſſe cauſam malitiae peccati, quae conſequitur actum poſitivum; quia quilibet actus peccati, poteſt eſſe ſine malitia; & exemplum poteſt eſſe in odio Dei, quod, quamvis maximè omnium videatur conjunctum cum malitia, poteſt tamen eſſe ſine illa—& ideo, licet Deus concurrat in omnem actum, non tamen concurrit in actus malitiam.' Yea, Sotus li. 1. de nat. & Grat. c. 18. & Canus lib. 2. de locis c. 4. & in lect. de Sacram. p. 4. &c.—'dicunt, quod licet Deus concurrat ad actum peccati ſecundum rationem, & ſubſtantiam operis, non tamen dicit cauſam peccati ſecundum formalem rationem culpae. Sunt enim, inquiunt, Duo cauſarum genera, alterum cauſae naturalis, quales ſunt omnes cauſae Phyſicae, alterum cauſae moralis, qualis eſt ille, qui monet, imperat & conſulit. Cum igitur Deus concurrat cum noſtra voluntate ad actum Peccati, per modum Cauſae naturalis, non moralis, nulla ratione poteſt dici Cauſa Peccati, non enim monet, ſuadet, conſulit ad peccatum, ſed ſolum ad Actum, qui, ſi naturaliter ſumatur, vitioſus non eſt, ſed ſolum prout moraliter, quia Culpa ſecundum rationem Culpae, non à Cauſa naturali, ſed à morali procedit.'
The like Anſelm l. de concord praeſc. praedeſt. Grat. & Lib. Arb. c. 1. 'Facit, inquit, Deus omnia, quae juſtâ, vel injuſtâ voluntate fiunt, (i.e.) opera bona, & mala. In bonis enim facit quod ſunt, & quod bona ſunt; in malis facit quod ſunt, non quod mala ſunt.' So he is quoted by Bellarmine de Grat. & Lib. Arb. l. 4. c. 4.
Thus, they diſtinguiſh between the Materiale and the Formale of ſin: which diſtinction once granted, and added to the foregoing aſſertion about mans being a proper cauſe of his own action, the Dominicans will be ſufficiently defended from all the Reproaches caſt on their Doctrine, about the making God the Author of ſin; and really, this diſtinction (although in other words,) is acknowledged by their adverſaries, who ſay, that the Actus Peccati may be conſidered as in genere, in which ſenſe 'tis quid diſtinctum à formâ ſpecificante, of which God, the Fons naturae, is the Univerſal Cauſe, and what is this actus peccati, condſidered in genere, but the ſame with the Materiale: 'Tis true, if we conſider the action, as a ſinful action, and in the action include the obliquity, that action, as ſuch, is not à Deo; yet in that action, there is the Act it ſelf diſtinguiſhable from the obliquity, which Act is ens Phyſicum, & à Deo, thus Bellarmine de amiſſ. grat. & ſtat. pecc. l. 2. c. 18. 'Actiones intrinſecè nullas malas eſſe niſi ut ſint determinatae in ſpecie; nam entitas ipſa Odii Dei, ſi per ſe conſideretur,non eſt mala ſed ſolum ut eſt talis entitas.' Yea and Durandus himſelf adknowledgeth as much lib. 2. diſt. 37. Q. 1. which is, Utrum actio peccati ſecundum quod actio, ſit à Deo? which he affirms, with this reaſon, 'Quia illud quod non eſt cauſa actus, non eſt cauſa effectus producti per actum; ſed per actionem peccati aliquid effectus in eſſe producuntur: generantur enim homines ex adulteriis. Si ergo talium actionum Deus non eſſet cauſa, per conſequens nec hominum, qui his actionibus generantur, quod eſt inconveniens.' And thence he concludes, 'Quod Deus eſt cauſa actionis peccati Univerſalis & prima; for which reaſon he muſt diſtinguiſh inter actionem peccati & ipſum peccatum, ſeu obliquitatem (i.e.) inter materiale, & formale,' unleſs the very ſin, as to its formality, or obliquity ſit à Deo.
Whence then, according unto the Dominican, the obliquity of a ſinful action, is not from God, but from man; who is a Proper cauſe of all his own actions; and who is the ſole cauſe of the obliquity of them, as hath been proved.
I confeſs that great attempts are made for the reproaching this doctrine, and that the Advantages which ſome (if not too many) Obſcure writers have given, by inſiſting on a Phyſical-Efficient-Praemotion, as the cauſe of the Individuated action, as evil, have been great; but if, notwithſtandingthe unhappineſs ſuch have been guilty of, in expreſſing themſelves ſo unwarily, they mean no more, than what I have ſaid concerning the Materiale peccati, &c. I humbly apprehend, their ſenſe to be defenſible; for what more evident than that their ſeveral oppoſers (as hath been prov'd) acknowledging that God is the cauſe of all Being, and of every Action, as ſuch, do ſeem to grant the whole, theſe Moderate Predeterminants, would be thought to aſſert? However it muſt be acknowledged, that the ſevere and Rigid do aſſert what is attended with Inſuperable difficulties, the conſequences that are ſaid to flow from their Hypotheſis, ſeeming moſt groſly abſurd. And be it ſo, Yet
1. Since theſe, do deteſt the Dogma of Hobbes, and Spinoſa, and with the greateſt indignation, ſhew their abhorrence to all ſuch groſs, and blaſphemous abſurdities, why may we not charitably conclude, that the confuſion, they have plung'd themſelves into, is but equal to that of their bold adverſaries, occaſion'd by a peremptory determining what is too ſublime and high, yea, and what is by finite comprehenſions really indeterminable? Conſider what the learned Mr. Baxter in his Cathol. Theolog. part. 1. Sect. 7. hath moſt excellently evinced in ſhewing, That 'tis impoſſible Finite Mortals ſhould comprehend the modes or media of Divine Knowledge, or of Divine Operations; whence who-ever enters into a diſpute about the controverſies between the Dominicans, Jeſuites, &c. cannot but run themſelves into ſuch intricate, and perplexing Niceties, as will, after the utmoſt attempts, prove diſmally confounding; and therefore what the ſame Reverend Mr. B. ſaith in the following Sect. about Fore-knowledge is true as to Phyſical-Predetermination, viz. 'If any particular manner therefore offer it ſelf to your minds, as that which probably ſeemeth to be the Right, it may afford you reaſon therefore to ſuſpect, that it is not the right: Becauſe it is certain, that the manner is paſt our reach. And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God.'
This being the Truth; no wonder, if the bold entangle themſelves, and by an unwarineſs of expreſſion inſiſt on ſuch Notions, as are accompanied with difficulties moſt invincible; In order to an eſcaping which, I humbly apprehend a conſulting that moſt excellently Treatiſe of the learned and Judicious Dr. Burthogge. viz. his Organon novum, may be of great uſe. For in that little Tract, there are ſuch Harmonical (which are the moſt convincing) Arguments, as cannot but oblige the Diſcreet Reader to ſatisfy himſelf in being modeſt in his inquiries about moſt things, eſpecially about what is ſo abſtruſe, ſince otherwiſe looking too near things, inſtead of obtaining more diſtinct and full conceptions, he may be abundantly confounded: There muſt be a due diſtance between the faculty, (as well as the Organ) and its object; for by our looking too near the Object, we run into the dark, contradicting one another even when agreed; or if there be a difference, ſuch, as embrace not the one extreme, muſt be cenſured, as Aſſerters and Abettors of the other; yea, and in the heats of diſputation, many fall into the Error they would oppoſe: Many inſtances of each particular might easily have been produc'd, but I'le only mention ſome. As, 1. Alvarez, who repreſents Calvin as an oppoſer of the Dominican opinion, even when by others the ſame Calvin is blam'd for eſpouſing it. 2. Victorinus by the learned (but proud) Illyricus is revil'd, as if the denyal of that ſtrange error contended for by Simon Muſaeus, and himſelf, had been Pelagianiſm. Moreover, 3. In the preſent diſpute, How do the confident, on every ſide, diſcover their weakneſſes by falling into the errors they pretend to reject? Thus the Anti-Dominicans, who deſpiſe the Predeterminants diſtinctions, for reaſons that are as much againſt their own, and who in forcing ſtrange conſequences from the Dogmata of the Dominican, do themſelves entertain Notions as liable to the ſame abſurdities. How much is ſaid againſt all thoſe who are onelyonly for an Immediate concourſe, not by the Dominican only, but alſo by the Durandiſts, and what is conſiderable is this, That the Reverend Mr. B. in his Cathol. Theol. li. 1. part. 3. § 4. doth argue moſt unanſwerably againſt them, in the following words. 'It ſurpaſſeth my underſtanding to conceive, what it is for God Phyſicè influere in actum immediate, & non in potentiam ſeu virtutem agentem: Nor how he can be ſaid to move the faculties to act, that doth cauſe the act, and not meddle with (and therefore not move) the Faculty. Nor know I how an Act immediately (and not the Agent) can be the terminus of a Phyſical Motion.' But ſince Durandus is the man who ſeems to have an advantage above all others, I will inſtance onelyonly in him: whom Bellarmine has prov'd to aſſert what neceſſarily infer's Deum operari omnia peccata. For ſaith Bellarmine de Grat. & Lib. Arb. l. 4. c. 4. 'Poſt Pelagium Durandus dicit, Deum omnia operari, quia virtutes operatrices rebus attribuit.—But if this ſhould be ſo, ſequeretur Deum omnia peccata operari, quia dedit homini & Angelo Liberum Arbitrium, quo peccata omnia fiunt. Et apud Durandū id maximè locum haberet, cum ipſe contendat in 2. ſentent. diſt. 44. Potentiam peccati formaliter eſſe à Deo.'
Thus the learned may impoſe on each others infirmities ad infinitum, to the great diſhonour of God and of his truths. Oh! what reaſon then have we to be cautelous in our expreſſions concerning theſe matters! for, what we ſpeak, ſince it ſo nearly concerns the Glory of that God, whois cloth'd with terrible Majeſty, and whoſe name is a Great and a Dreadful Name, we ſhould do it with Fear and Trembling; with an humble modeſty, dreading the thoughts of being bold in any determinations, about what is ſo incomprehenſible in it ſelf, and ſo infinitely above the largeſt create capacity. But what is further of weight with me is this, viz.
2. That theſe very things, have been bandied amongſt the learned of all ages, not only by the Antichriſtian (I had almoſt ſaid the Irreligious and Trifling) Schoolmen; but alſo by the Jewiſh Rabbines and Heathen Philoſophers, who ſpent much time in theſe unſearchably deep myſteries, to no accountable advantage; can we then hope to explicate what by woful experience hath been found inexplicable from the beginning. But,
1. As touching the Jews, whoever conſults Rabbi Moſes Ben Majemon in his more Nevoch. part. 3. c. 17. as tranſlated by Buxtorf. Fil. may ſee, that as there are the Dominicans, Moliniſts, and others amongſt the Schoolmen; even ſo, amongſt them, there were, not only ſome who followed Epicurus, but alſo ſome of the Judgement of Ariſtotle, qui credunt, quarundam rerum eſſe providentiam, ita ut ab aliquo regantur & dirigantur; quaedam verò derelicta, & fortunaeeſſe expoſita. But others contrary unto theſe, aſſert, 'omnia eſſe ex certa voluntate, intentione, & gubernatione. Haec ſententia eſt Sectae Aſſariae inter Iſmaelitas, & ſequuntur eam inconvenientia & abſurda multa: Tollitur ſecundum eam natura poſſibilium, quod omnia ſunt vel neceſſaria, vel impoſſibilia. Inſuper ſequitur, nihil quicquam prodeſſe leges. &c. Quarta ſententia eſt eorum qui ſtatuunt, Hominem poteſtatem vel facultatem aliquam habere, &c. Et in hac ſententia eſt Secta Muatzali, licet poteſtatem homini abſolutam non tribuant. Ex hac quoque ſententia, abſurda & contradictoria multa ſequuntur.' And then he comes unto the laſt, which, he ſaith, is according to their Law, which is, Quod homo per naturam, Arbitrium, & voluntatem ſuam faciat, quicquid homo facere poteſt. Thus they preſuming too much on ſacred myſteries, as ſome, came near unto the Truth, others, as far from it, but all in an heat, inſiſting on the abſurdities of each others opinions.
2. The heathen Philoſophers, were entangled with the ſame perplexities, contradicting each other. So Cicero de Fato, who ſaith that ſome of …he Old Philoſophers. 'cenſerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim neceſſitatis afferret. In qua ſententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Ariſtoteles fuit: altera ſententia eorum, quibus viderentur ſine ullo fato eſſe animorum motus voluntarii;' but Chryſippus, the chief of the Stoicks, would walk in medio, 'tanquam arbiter honorarius, medium ſe ferre voluiſſe: Sed applicat ſe ad eos potius, qui neceſſitate motus animos liberatos volunt. Dum autem verbis utitur ſuis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut neceſſitatem Fati confirmet invitus.' But I humbly conceive that this Chryſippus, and all the Stoicks his ſectators, had a glimpſe of this doctrine about Phyſical Predetermination, which, they concluded to be neceſſarily inferred, from that other about Preſcience, as may be eaſily evinced out of Cicero de divinatione, where their notion de Fato is explained thus, 'Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci foreign (i.e.) ordinem, ſeriemque cauſarum, cum cauſa cauſae nexa rem ex ſe gignat, Ea eſt ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas ſempiterna. Quod cum ita ſit, nihil eſt factum, quod non futurum fuerit… codemque modo nihil eſt futurum cujus no… cauſas id ipſum efficientes, natura contineat. Ex quo intelligitur, ut fatum ſit non id quod ſuperſtitioſe, ſed id quod Phyſicè dicitur, Cauſ… aeterna rerum, Cur & ea, quae praeterierunt, fact… ſint, & quae inſtant, fiant, & quae ſequuntur, futura ſint.' &c.—Whence they conſider th… Doctrine de Divinatione, & de Fato, to be a… 'twere inſeparable, the former neceſſarily i… ferring the latter; for in their judgment, nothin… can be Foreknown, but what hath a Natural Anteceding cauſe. This concluded by the Stoicks, they are plunged into as many an intricate perplexity, as are our Phyſical Predeterminants; ſome aſſerting this to be a dogma attended with the ſame abſurd conſequences, that of Democritus, &c. is viz. that it introduceth a neceſſity on humane actions; 'At qui introducunt cauſarum ſeriem ſempiternam, ij mentem hominis voluntate libera ſpoliatam neceſſitate fati devinciunt.' But Chryſippus, hath his diſtinctions to clear himſelf from ſuch ſmart cenſures, as is to be ſeen in Cicero de Fato, Where you will find him to conclude thus: 'Non enim ſi alii ad alia ſint propenſiores propter cauſas naturales, & antecedentes, idcirco etiam noſtrarum voluntatum, atque appetitionum, ſunt cauſae naturales & antecedentes, nam nihil eſſet in noſtra poteſtate, …ſi res ita ſe haberet,' q. d. Phyſical predetermination doth not infer a Phyſical neceſſity on humane actions, whence Chryſippus, cum & neceſſitatem improbaret, & nihil vellet ſine praepoſitis cauſis evenire, cauſarum genera diſtinguit, ut & neceſſitatem effugiat, & retineat fatum. His diſtinction is this. Cauſarum aliae ſumt perfectae & principales, aliae adjuvantes, & proximae: And concedes, that if the cauſae antecedentes had been perfectae & principales, Humane Liberty had been deſtroyed, but ſince they are but adjuvantes & proximae, 'tis not ſo: But they are mightily confounded. Diodorus contradicting Chryſippus, aſſerting nothing to be poſſible, but what is neceſſary and future: Carneades inſiſting on a diſtinction inter cauſas fortuitò antegreſſas, & inter cauſas cohibentes in ſe efficientiam naturalem, and others arguing againſt both preſcience and predetermination, as what is impoſſible. In the apprehenſion of ſome the one introduceth the other; and again, 'tis urged, as if one deſtroyed the other. In Cicero de divin. l. 2. 'tis thus diſputed;
1. Praeſenſio ſeu praedictio [or if you will praeſcientia] non eſt earum rerum quae ſunt fortuitae: For, 'Nihil eſt tam contrarium rationi, & conſtantiae, quam fortuna; ut mihi nè in Deum quidem cadere videatur,' ut ſciat quid caſu, & fortuitò futurum ſit; ſi enim ſcit, certò illud eveniet; ſin certè eveniet—rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla eſt praeſenſio, [q.d.nulla praeſcientia.] 'Aut ſi negas eſſe fortunam & omnia quae fiunt,' quaeque futura ſint, ex omni aeternitate definita dicis eſſe fataliter; muta definitionem Divinationis, quam dicebas eſſe praeſenſionem rerum fortuitarum, to which I may agreeably enough add [rerum contingentium.] But on the contrary;
2. Praeſenſio [ſeu praeſcientia] non eſt rerum futurarum: 'Nam ſi fato omnia fiant, nihil nos d monere poteſt, ut cautiores ſimus; quoquoenim modo nos geſſerimus, fiet tamen illud quod futurum eſt; ſin autem id poteſt flecti, nullum eſt fatum, ita nec Divinatio [ſeu Praeſcientia] quidem, quoniam ea rerum futurarum eſt. Nihil autem eſt pro certo futurum, quod poteſt aliqua procuratione accidere ne fiat. Si enim nihil ſit extra Fatum, nihil levari re Divina poteſt.'
Thus many an hundred years have been ſpent in theſe inquiries, by ſuch as have been both too curious and confident; and what was the fruit of all their labours, but in ſome, confuſion and much torment; in others, viz. the more judicious and ſober, juſt light enough to ſee their Ignorance, and the truth of this, viz. that there was a Providence, a Fate; which in Laertius his Zeno is Ratio per quam mundus adminiſtratur; and that notwithſtanding this Fate or Providence, man was not ſo diveſted of his rational liberty, as to be by force compel'd to a violation of the Laws. From all which, I thus argue. That either we muſt be modeſt in our inquiry after theſe things; or give our weak underſtandings the liberty of raveling into the whole of this Labyrinth; If the Second, then there remaineth nothing but obſcurity, confuſion and torment, if not, through raſhneſs, much error, and our time ſpent in contradicting, reviling, and ſeverely cenſuring each other ad infinitum: But if the Firſt, if we muſt be modeſt, then ſurely, enough may be ſaid even in favour of the Dominicans, to ſhew, that Phyſical Predetermination, as Preſcience, doth but infer, a Logical neceſſity, which neceſſity is conſiſtent enough, in the judgment of all, with Humane Liberty. The product of all which will be this, viz. That ſuch are the tranſactions of God with men, ſo infinitely wiſe, ſo Juſt, ſo Equal, ſo Holy, and yet ſo merciful and Gracious, that none, no not thoſe who are to be condemned unto Eternal Miſery, will have one word to offer againſt God.
Oh! How Infinite is the Freeneſs of his Grace!
Thus, I have further ſhewn, the Grace of God to be ſo infinitely glorious, that there is nothing in thoſe profound points about Predetermination, &c.—when modeſtly aſſerted, that can in the leaſt blemiſh it; I ſay, when modeſtly aſſerted, becauſe ſuch as are too confident, and peremptory in their determinations about this point, which is as dark and as myſterious as any in the whole body of Divinity, may ſuddenly break the bounds, and come too near the Mount to their own hurt.
For although a Predetermination is moſt clearly Revealed in Scripture, yet whether by a Phyſical efficient-praemotion to this ſinful action, rather than to that, is not ſo obvious. A praedetermination there is; but whether St. Auſtin, Proſper and Fulgentius had not righter apprehenſions of it, than the Dominicans, who differ from St. Auſtin in ſeveral reſpects as Janſenius in his Auguſtinus de Grat. Chriſt. Salvat. lib. 8. c. 1. &c.—hath unanſwerably proved, is no impertinent Quaery.
But without any further determination of theſe incomprehenſible difficulties, as I have begun, ſo I'le end both this Chapter and Treatiſe with moſt neceſſary and concerning truths, which as they are ſo ſelf-evident as to be known to the Heathen, in like manner they are ſuch as add to the illuſtrating Free-Grace.
1. That, Although God is the great Orderer and Diſpoſer of all things, the Author, and conſerver of all beings, and hath eternally predetermined, and fore-ordained all things that come to paſs in time; yet man is not hereby Phyſically neceſſitated to any ſin, but doth what he doth moſt freely, and therefore, muſt not complain on God, nor neglect the performance of Holy duties unto him.
1. Mans Liberty is not deſtroyed by Predetermination; ſo Seneca Natur. Quaeſt. l. 2. c. 38. 'Iſta nobis opponi ſolent, ut probetur nihil voluntati noſtrae relictum, & omne jus fato traditum. Cum de iſta re agitur, dicam, quemadmodum, manente fato, aliquid ſit in hominis arbitrio' &c.—
2. Men muſt not complain on God, as if they had been compel'd to ſin: So Chryſippus in A. Gell. noct. Attic. lib. 6. c. 2. 'Propterea Negat oportere ferri, audirique homines aut nequam aut ignavos & nocentes & audaces; qui cum in culpa, & in maleficio revicti ſunt, perfugiunt ad Fati neceſſitatem, tanquam in aliquod Fati aſylum; & quae peſſimè fecerunt, ea non ſuae temeritati, ſed fato eſſe attribuenda dicunt.'
3. We ought not to neglect duty, notwithſtanding this Predetermination, but muſt Pray, and uſe ſuch means, as are ſuited to the obtaining the deſired end. So Seneca ubi ſupra c. 37. 'nos quoque exiſtimamus vota proficere, ſalvâ vi ac poteſtate fatorum; quaedam enim à Diis immortalibus ita ſuſpenſa relicta ſunt ut in bonum vertant, ſi admotae Diis preces fuerint; ſi vota ſuſcepta. Ita non eſt hoc contra fatum, ſed ipſum quoque in Fato eſt.'
'Aut futurum, inquit, eſt, aut non. Si futurum eſt, etiam ſi non ſuſceperis vota, fiet: Si non eſt futurum, etiam ſi ſuſceperis vota, non fiet: Falſa eſt illa interrogatio; quia mediam illam inter iſta exceptionem praeteris. Futurum, inquam, hoc eſt, ſed ſi vota ſuſcepta fuerint.' So Cicero, de fato. 'Sic enim interrogant: Si fatum tibi eſt ex hoc morbo convaleſcere; ſive medicum adhibueris, ſive non, convaleſces. Item ſi fatum tibi eſt, ex hoc morbo non convaleſcere: ſive tu medicum adhibueris, ſive non, non convaleſces: & Alterutrum fatum eſt; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet. Rect… genus hoc interrogationis ignavum atque …, nominatum eſt, quod eadem ratione, omn… è vita tolletur actio. But to the Second ſelf-evident propoſition."
2. That although we cannot fully comprehend HOW theſe things are reconcilable; yet we have the greateſt reaſon imaginable, to conclude, that they are moſt true; yea, and capable of a Reconciliation: What is not poſſible with men, is poſſible with God; Gods works do bear the characters of Divinity on them, and conſequently 'tis become impoſſible, that any Finite wight, ſhould have any adaequate conceptions of them; We muſt be ſatisfied, that we know, what is, though we cannot comprehend How it is.
For the confirming this, conſider what is ſaid by Lactantius de Orig. er. l. 2. c. 9. "Adeo nefas exiſtimandum eſt, ea ſcrutari quae Deus voluit eſſe celata.—Quaſi verò ex hoc putandum ſit, non eſſe haec divinitus facta, quia quo modo facta ſunt, non poteſt pervideri—Opera ipſius videntur oculis: Quomodo autem illa fecerit, ne mente quidem videtur: quia (ut Hermes ait) mortale immortali, temporale perpetuo, & corruptibile incorrupto propinquare non poteſt, id eſt propius accedere, & intelligentia ſubſequi.—Denique, cum aperiret homini veritatem Deus, ca ſola ſcire nos voluit, quae interfuit hominem ſcire ad vitam conſequendam; quae verò ad curioſam & profanam cupiditatem pertinebant, reticuit, ut arcana eſſent. Quid ergo quaeris, quae nec potes ſcire, nec ſi ſcias, beatior fias? perfecta eſt in homine ſapientia, ſi & Deum eſſe unum, & ab ipſo eſſe facta univerſa cognoſcat. So Cicero de divinat. l. 1. Hoc ſum contentus, quòd etiamſi Quomodo quidque fiat ignorem, Quid fiat, intelligo—ſic ventorum & Imbrium ſigna, quae dixi, rationem quam habeant, non ſatis perſpicio: vim & eventum agnoſco, ſcio, approbo. Again, Quid quaeris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant, aut qua arte perſpici poſſent? neſcire me fateor: evenire autem, teipſum dico videre.—Quae eſt igitur iſta calliditas, res vetuſtate robuſtas calumniando velle pervertere? Non reperio cauſam, Latet fortaſſe obſcuritate involuta naturae. Non enim me Deus iſta ſcire, ſed his tantummodo uti voluit. Utar igitur," &c.
From theſe two acknowledged Truths there …oth naturally flow this other. viz.
3. That none more Judicious and wiſe, none more ſober and modeſt, none more regardful of the Dread Majeſty of God, than thoſe who, on the ſtrict eſt inquiry after theſe things, profeſs, that what concerns God, ſo immediately, as theſe profound Doctrines about the modes, and media of Divine operations, being infinitely beyond us, are more meet for our humble admiration, than proud determination. Placeus is to be applauded, who ſaith tract. de lib. arb. (as I find in Le blank de concil. Arb. Hum. cum div. concurſ. ad Theſ. 52.) Nos quidem Qua Reverentia erga Infinitam Dei Majeſtatem ducimur, non Audemus definire quanta ſit dependentia cauſae ſecundae à prima. Nobis ſufficit, modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum noſtrorum, vel minimam labem aſpergat, non poſſe Nimiam ſtatui. So Le Blank himſelf, ubi ſupra. theſ. 55,58,59. "Quantum ad me attinet, horumce Doctiſſimorum virorum modeſtiam maximè laudandam cenſeo: & modum Divini concurſus, quo cum cauſis ſecundis prima cooperatur, pro certo definire temerarium mihi & nimium audax videtur, quum ingenii noſtri tenuitas divinae potentiae & ſapientiae abyſſum penetrare & ſcrutari non valeat, nec ea res ſit ſatis ratione percepta, aut ſat diſtincte in ſacra Scriptura Revelata," &c.—Yea, and before them the ſame was the ſenſe of the Judicious, as I find in Pet. Tartaret. Reportata, in ſenten. &c. "Tota materia praedeſtinationis tangit myſterium imperſcrutabile intellectui humano. Nam ad Roman. 11. Exclamat Paulus, O altitudo &c. Ne igitur ſcrutando, de profundo in profundum eatur, ut dicit Magiſter," &c.
Thus I have gone thorough the Province, I engaged in, and have in ſome meaſure, made a Diſplay of this Glorious Grace. I have ſhewn, That the Election of ſome unto Grace, and Glory, even when others are paſſed by, but left as ſelf condemned wretches, is of Grace. That the Covenant tranſaction, between the Father and the Son from all Eternity, conſidered in its particulars, adds light unto this profound myſtery: That God the Son ſhould aſſume humane nature, and in that nature, lie under both the Guilt and puniſhment of ſin is admirable; and that the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt ſhould be given the elect believer in order to his actual entrance into to Glories of God is no leſs ſurpriſing. That Grace is offered all, and although rejected by all, yet actually given ſome, in ſuch circumſtances that the honour of all Gods other attributes is ſet forth with the greater Luſtre, is alſo of Grace. In the doing all which, to the end, I might, according to the Goſpel of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, Vindicate God, from thoſe blaſphemous, and unworthyabuſes are caſt on his pure Majeſty by the Antinomian; I have proved, that no ſpot of ſin was ever on the Lord Chriſt, He never was ſtained with the filth of any evil, neither are the Elect ſanctified by an imparting or an imputing the ſubjective Intrinſecal Holineſs of Chriſt unto them; nor, are they actually juſtified in God's ſight, while under the pravalcncy of unbelief: Moreover, in oppoſition to the Arminian, I have evinced, That God, in giving Grace unto the Elect, converts them by the Irreſiſtible power of his Holy Spirit, which, although ſo neceſſary to our converſion, that none are ſavingly engaged to believe in Chriſt without it, yet doth it not lay man under any unnatural violence, but ſweetly draws him unto our bleſſed Jeſus. Whence it follows that although mans deſtruction is of himſelf, his converſion and Salvation is wholly of Free-grace. And in fine, that no Debauchee or Atheiſt may have the leaſt pretence for the abuſes he may caſt on God, as if there had been any want of Grace in him, I have prov'd that the Dominican Hypotheſis, which ſeems moſt liable to exception, if modeſtly (i.e. Judiciouſly) look't into, will appear to be Defenſible againſt thoſe reproaches are caſt on it: It being moſt evident, that although God is both our Creator, and Preſerver, He, in whom we live, move, and have our being, yet doth he not lay man under a Phyſical neceſſity of ſinning, for mansſin is from himſelf; as is aſſerted by the Stoicks themſelves; which being ſo, I will only add this Caution, viz. That, although, the Grace of God is ſo infinitely extended, (as hath been fully proved) yet 'tis a ſin to expect the being made a partaker of the ſpecial inſtances thereof, unleſs we ſincerely repent; 'Tis the Believing, Repenting, Humbled ſinner, that is the proper object of this Glorious Grace. Deſpiſe not then this Grace, by continuing in thy ſin; for, as there are mercies with the Lord, 'tis, that he ſhould be feared: Deſpiſeſt thou the Riches of his Goodneſs and Forbearance, and Long-ſuffering, not knowing that the Goodneſs of God leadeth to Repentance? Remember then that if Free-Grace leadeth thee not to Repentance, thou doſt but treaſure up unto thy ſelf wrath againſt the day of wrath, and Revelation of the Righteous judgment of God.
Think on theſe things ſeriouſly, and by an Holy, Humble life give God the Glory of all this Grace.
FINIS.