The Duty of Allegiance, Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII.
Of his Remaining Reasons for the same.
HIs next Reason is, (p. 37, 38.) That such denyal of his Right of Providence, Limits the Providence of God in governing Kings, and protecting and preserving injured Subjects.
But as to Government of Kings, Is not the King's Heart in God's Hands, as Solomon says? Then Prov. 21. 1.he may govern Kings, if he pleases, by changing their Tyrannical and Oppressive Purposes: Or, Providence can at any time throw in Hinderances, and Diversions, that when they seem most bent thereupon, they shall not be able to effect them: Or, over-rule Issues, that what they design for the hurt, shall prove and turn to the Advantage of their Subjects. And as to Punishment of Oppressive Kings, God may, at his Pleasure, heap Punishments heavy enough upon them, by removing them from the Possession, though he leaves them the Right to their Crowns. Such Right, indeed, will make the Invaders Unrighteous; but his Providence most justly Scourges one unrighteous Man, by another's Unrighteousness. And if he sees fit to punish them with loss of Right, as well as of Possession, he wants not ways of doing that, without sending them out of the World, if 'tis his good Pleasure to continue, and try them longer therein, by either bringing them to give it up by their own Consent, or by taking it more immediately from them by express Revelation. But when he doth not take any of these ways of Despoyling them of Right, 'tis plain he doth not think fit to punish them with loss of that. And yet he has ways sufficient of curbing them and taking exemplary and present Vengeance for all their Oppressions notwithstanding.
And, then, As to Protection and Preservation of insured Subjects; God never intends they shall always be Protected from suffering Injuries as Subjects, more than from suffering Injuries as Men. And when God sends such Sufferings, there is no way but to receive them as of his sending, and to endeavour patiently to bear, and to profit by them: Poor Subjects, that are tyed to them, must be content to suffer under ill Kings, as poor Wives must under ill Husbands, till God see fit to put an end to their Suffering, either by changing of their Hearts, or hindering, or over-ruling of their evil Practices, or removing their Persons, or their Right from their Persons, (as may be dore in Kings, though not in Husbands) by transferring it to others in such ways as can transfer Right. For all which, the Distressed Sufferers must wait with Faith and Patience upon God, and still Thankfully receive Ease, in one kind or another, as God, who is the Orderer and Disposer thereof, is pleased to send it.
But what if God doth not remove the Right from their Persons, and S…bjects could find Ease by acting against it? May they not act against their Prince's Right, to ease themselves? No, they must prefer doing Right, before getting Ease; and have a greater Regard to the discharge of Duty, than to Temporal Security. And a greater Reverence for Right, and conscionable Care of keeping Innocent and Righteous, would make us hear more of the Danger of Subjects transgressing their Duty, than of their losing Temporal Security in these Changes.
What is to be done then, about this External Security and Preservation, at such times? Trust it to God's Providence; as the Author p. 32, 33, 34.says, We must the recovery of the Dispossed Prince's Right, which seem irrecoverable by his Principles. We must not trust there, when 'tis our Prince's Danger, and distrust here, when 'tis our Own; for that would be not to trust Providence with our selves, but to trust it very easily with other Men. And whilst Subjects take care Faithfully, and Righteously to serve God, they may comfortably trust him.
But besides all this, Why must this observing Duty, and doing Right to Princes, he thought against the Preservation of Subjects? It may chance to expose them on some accidental Turns indeed; but so all Rules of Preservation may, which never hit in all Cases, and yet are to be kept as inviolable Rules, and would give no Preservation at all, if Men might break them at their Pleasure to serve turns. And, as for the contrary way of breaking Right and Duty, to preserve and secure our selves; I am sure, if that is brought into Rules, it destroy's all Security and Preservation; for if there is no Guard in Right, a Man is secure of nothing: And Right is no Guard, if Men are free to break it, when they can get by it. And as for his way of Right by Providential Possession, without other Title; that, in the Consequents, would overthrow all Security, in as much as it overthrows all Right as I have shewn above. And as to the particular Preservation of Subjects, though it might flatter them with present Ease and Preservation, when such Changes are brought about; yet would it press more upon them other ways, and at other times, than this would Compensate: It would authorize their Kings Invasions, upon their Rights and Liberties, as I shewed; and that is not for the Security and Preservation of their Liberties: And it would multiply such Revolutions, and that is against their Security likewise; there being nothing secure to Subjects where the struggle is, whilst the Change is only going on. And when it is finished, and an Usurpation settled, though those Conscientious Persons, that stand off in regard to the others Right, are great Sufferers in it; yet, through the moderation of Possessors, and above all, through the care of God's good and watchful Providence, their Sufferings do not always proceed to such utter Ruin, as Men that are more afraid of Suffering than of Sining, are apt beforehand to affright themselves withall.
In such Cases as he puts indeed, p. 40. viz. where an usurping Possessor, that has Power in his hand, will persecute and ruine them for it, by Destroying, Imprisoning, or Transplanting them; this doing Right, and keeping Allegiance to a dispossessed Prince, would be ruinous to Subjects. But so would any other Duties, when a Tyranical Prince shall require the Breach of them on like Conditions. And if the Possessor happen to do so, which is the worst Case that can be put, why must they not suffer for these, as well as for other Commandments? When any Duty is persecuted, Persecution doth not authorize Men to break the Duty, but the Duty obliges them to bear the Persecution. To bear the Cross, and suffer for Righteousness, is their Duty at such times.
But Self Preservation is as much a Law to Subjects, as to Princes. p. 42.and if it will justifie him, to save himself by leaving his Kingdom, will it not justifie them, to submit to the peevailing Power, so far as is necessary for their Preservation? Self Preservation, I grant, is common to both, that is, a Liberty for each, not a Law, as he terms it, to either. But this Liberty is limited by Right and Duty: So neither King nor Subjects must do any thing unrighteous or undutiful, to preserve themselves. And his flight for Safety is not unrighteous, nor would theirs in like Necessity. But if they should preserve themselves by acting against his Right, and by making Payment of their Allegiance to another, against him, whilst he has the Right to it; that acting against his Right is unrighteous.
He adds, (ibid.) If the Necessities of Self Preservation absolve him from his Oath of Governing and Protecting his People, why should not the same Necessity absolve them from their Oath of Allegiance to him? It will absolve both, from the actual Performance and Discharge, whilst they are out of Capacity actually to discharge them. But it absolves neither of them from the Obligation and Disposition to discharge it, when, and as far as they can. He must look upon himself, unless he has resigned his Power, still as their King, that ought, and would (though being forcibly kept separate from them, he cannot) actually Govern them. And they answerably, on themselves, as his Subjects, that are under, and must keep under his Obedience, (unless his Resignation has given them a Discharge) and stand obliged and prepared to do it, though, through hindrance of the same Force, they cannot actually obey him. Actual Performance of any Duties supposes Opportunity, which Men have not, whilst they are out of Capacity; which Incapacity is brought upon both Prince and People by the foresaid necessity. So that Necessity, whilst it lasts, will exempt from actual Discharge, so far as it incapacitates. But it leaves them under the same Relation, and the Obligation and Disposition of Mind dependant thereon. And these, whilst in most things they can not actually perform with him, will hinder them from turning Subject, and transferring Allegiance, to any other Person.
5. Another Reason alledged for his Providential Right giving Authority, and claiming Allegiance to usurping Possessors, is, the Preservation p. 38. 39. & sequ.of human Societies, which cannot be without Government, nor that, but under the present Possessors.
Now as to this, there are several States of Society: Either a natural, wherein all the Communications thereof are derived regularly and as they ought to be, which is a sound and perfect State; or unnatural and forced, when those Communications of the Vital Parts thereof are stopped or intercepted; which is a sickly, lame, and imperfect State. And answerable to these, will be the different Courses of Government: Proceeding, either upon right Principles, which is the way of a sound and perfect Government, when Society is in its natural State; or upon such other as it can get, which is the way of a lame and imperfect Government, that is off its natural Hinges when Society is put into an unnatural Frame. And answerable likewise will be the Benefits of Government and Society; which will be more full and perfect, or lame and limited, according as the other are.
Now the Case which he puts, of a Rightful King being violently kept out of the Administration of his Authority, is an unnatural and maimed State of Society: And the Preservation of Government and Society therein, must be preserving it, so as suits with that Condition.
I confess, 'tis a great Blow to Society, to have the Head of the State kept from Communication with the Body. It is then out of the natural Course, and labours in a maimed and forced Condition.
But this doth not dissolve the Being of the Society; for that lyes in the mutual Relation and Obligation of the Head and Members. The respective Societies betwixt a Bishop and his Flock, an Husband and Wife, a Prince and People, are not dissolved when the Prince, or Bishop, or Husband, are kept apart by Force, and hindred from affording their proper Offices and Communications to their several Societies; because the mutual Relation and Obligation still remains.
But besides the Being, there are the Benefits of Society. And how shall they he had, when the Head and Body are thus divided?
Concerning this, I observe, That all seeking of these Benefits is to be under Rules and Limitations. And these are all the Duties of the Second Table, which are Social Duties. So the Rules of Righteousness must rule and bound us in compassing any Benefits of Society, which we must never pretend to set up, or pursue by unrighteous ways.
All these Benefits of Society then, are only such Benefits as can be had in Observance of God's Laws, of Justice, Truth, and Faithfulness. And how shall these Benefits be had in Societies, in the forementioned maimed, forced, and unnatural State, when the Head is kept from free Communication with the Members? 'Tis plain in a lame unnatural State, they cannot be had in the natural and perfect Course; and therefore Men must do the best they can to secure them by other Methods, consisting with these Rules of Justice, which are to limit all Pursuits thereof.
The great Prelate he disputes against on this point, (p, 38. &c,) is for binding all Subjects, even those that adhere to the ejected Prince, *B. Saunders. Prae…ect. 3 de Oblig. Leg. Hum. Sect. 16. 17, 18, 19, 20.to seek the Benefit of Society: And in order thereto to pay much Regard, and to submit to the Usurper in the great Points thereof. As, to be obedient to him in Defence of the Country against Foreigners, in his Administration of Justice, and Preservation of Trade and Commerce, and Observance of Laws. Limiting them only herein, by their Obligations to the Rightful King, that they do not obey the Usurper in any thing against him, or in violation of that Faith which they owe to him. And to this he thinks they are bound, in prudent Care of themselves, in grateful return for Protection, in conscionable Care of the Publick Benefit; though they are not bound by the Authority of the Person; as the Learned Grotius also taught in this Case, (de Iur. B. l. 1. c. 4. Art. 15.)
Now what is there destroyed in Society, yea, or lost of the Benefits thereof, which can Righteously be kept in this supposed Defective, Unnatural, and Forced State of Society? His main Objection to it is, (p. 39.) that there is a want of Authority. And Authority and Obedience, is Essential to Civil Government, and Civil Society. And want of a Perfect, and Natural Course there is of both these, as there is like to be in such an Unnatural State; but no absolute want thereof.
There is no absolute want, either of Authority, or of Allegiance. For the rightful King has Authority, and the Subjects owe him Allegiance; and betwixt these, as the Head and Body, is the Being of the Society.
But what is to be said then, to Administration of Government, should there not be Authority also in that? Yes, and always is, when Government goes on in a Natural Course; and would be in the Case supposed, if he, that has the Authority, could be allowed to exercise his Authority, and to govern by it: But he supposes he is not allowed to that. And the other, who is possessed of External Strength, but without Authority, will administer the Government, and usurp the exercise of all Acts thereof, though he has no Authority for it. So there will be Authority in this Society, though he, that has it, is not allowed to exercise, and govern by it. And there will be Administration and Exercise of all Acts of Government, though he, that usurps this Administration, has no Authority for it. The want is, neither of Authority, nor of Administration, in the Society; but of an Union of these two, so as that he who administers might do it with Authority. This I grant is maimed and unnatural: But the supposed State is maimed and unnatural. And in an unnatural and lame State, when the authorized King and People are kept apart, like as when the Head and Members are in other Societies, there must be an unnatural and lame Course of Government.
Now when one that has not the Authority, which goes not by Strength, but Right, yet having got external Power in his hands, will Administer the Government; if the Subjects will all submit to him therein, the Society will competently enjoy the Benefits of Administration. The natural and best ground of Subjects Obedience is Authority indeed; but that cannot do here, in an unnatural State, and in a Case that supposes he will Administer, who has Possession against Right, and so wants Authority for it. But this Obedience the Bishop fetches from other Grounds, and those of Conscience too, as well as of Prudence; and carries it as far as it righteously can be carried, that is, in all things that are not prejudicial to the true Owners Rights, or to their Fidelity and Obligations to him. And farther than this none must go in seeking any Benefits of Society; they being always under the Restraint of this Limitation, as I observed, and never to be sought unrighteously.
The Bishop, (Sect. 21.) fetches a Liberty, for the Subjects to obey the Usurper in the forsaid Instances, from the Rightful King's presumed Consent. And great Reason there is to presume he will consent to what is done to keep up Government, and not to keep himself out. For a People he would have kept together, and some Order kept up among them; and 'tis to an United People that he claims a Right, and hopes to be restored again. And this presumed Consent, some, as the learned Author, whom he mentions, p. 19. 20. 69. 70. 71.carry farther, to derive Authority in these Acts, to the Usurper and those that act under him, from the Lawful King. And whether this presumed Consent can give him or them Authority to do them, or no; 'tis certainly very equitable that his Acts for keeping up common Order and Justice, no ways prejudicial to the lawful King, should stand good when they are done, and be made authoritative when they can. And so accordingly they use to be made by the Rightful King's Ratification at his Return: As they were by Edward IV. by Q. Mary and K. Charles II. on their several Restorations to the Throne.
But this presumed Consent, he thinks, is not enough to derive Authority to the Usurper. And, not to dispute that Point, whether it be or no, doth he know of any better way? If not, all I can say is, That no body is bound, in my Opinion, to find two Regal Authorities, more than two Kings, which he thinks an Absurdity for one Society, (p. 14.) Nor to find Authority in him that has no Right to it, since Authority can go by nothing else but Right. And if a Man has it not of his own, nor can borrow it, I see no Remedy, but he must want it. However, having external Strength, he will administer all the same Acts of Government, as he would do, if he had Authority to do them. And if all People submit, in regard to private Interests and publick Peace, where there is no Authority to have Regard to, his Administration will not want good Effect of keeping up Order and Peace and Common Justice among them. Indeed they that act in place of Authority, under such as they suppose to have no legal Right, are concerned to look more to the Authority they act by. But as for others, they will have Benefit by the Administration, whether it be with Authority or no.
One Objection he makes, (p. 40.) viz. of the usurping Possessor, that has Power enough in his hand to do it, either destroying, imprisoning, or transplanting all that stand out. And would not an obstinate Allegiance destroy Society in this Case?
He supposes all Subjects to do their Duty, and stand out: Which though all are equally bound to do in Right, yet they are never like to do so in Fact; the Course of this World giving little appearance of a whole Nation being unanimous in quitting all Temporal Interests for a good Conscience. But suppose they should, and the Usurper, being too strong for them, requires them all, either to Swear Allegiance, or undergo these hard things; then they must suffer as Confessors, for their Duty in this, as other good Men have done for Duty in other Instances. And the Duty of Confessing is never the less, because there is so great a number of Confessors. And if that Society be broken up by this means, it is not too good to be parted with, to keep Innocence and a good Conscience. All Civil Society, and the Benefits thereof, being under the Restraint of the Rules of Righteousness, and never to be sought or preserved by breaking any of God's Laws about Society, or any others; but only so far as they can be had by keeping of them: Men must never purchase any Society by Sin; and Sin is never the less sinful for being required of them on that Condition.
But (p. 45.) is not Obedience to Government it self, for the Preservation of human Society? Yes, as all other Rules of Righteousness, which are Social Virtues. But they are for it, not as discretionary means, which Men may use or omit, as they see it serves turns; but as standing Rules and Laws of God, which they are to keep without Exceptions. They must rule us in all Cases and Pursuits, either of Society, or any thing else. And a Liberty to transgress these, when it may seem to serve present turns, would leave neither security in, nor benefit by, any Societies.
But as for this Objection against an obstinate Allegiance, it is not peculiar to it, but will lye equally against an obstinate Picty, or any other Virtues, when they fall into the hands of such Persecutors as will allow no benefit of Society, without breach thereof. In the *Lact. de Mort. Per. sec. c. 13. 15.Dioclesian Persecution, he knows, the Christians were removed from the Emperor's Protection, and from all Claim and Use of Laws, (and what benefit of Society then?) if they would not first Sacrifice to the Heathen Gods. And the like may be under any Idolatrous or Heretical Prince, who will tyranically make any other Instances of Idolatry or Heresy the Condition of living under him, or of Civil Society: Or such a Decree as Nebuebadnezzar did, to destroy all People, Nations, and Languages, that would not worship his Golden Image, Dan. 3. 6. And so it may in any Church, when they will tyranically impose any Sins, or Errors, as Conditions of their Communion, to all that live under them, or of Church Society: Which yet all good Christians are bound to seek, for the benefit of their Souls; as much as Civil Society, for the benefit of their Bodies and worldly Interests. So that Obstinacy in any Truths or Duties, will as much destroy Society, as Obstinacy in Allegiance, when they fall into such Princes or Persons hands, who will let none live in their Country, or have any Protection there, if they do, without renouncing them. And yet these are Duties then notwithstanding, and Men are then called to lay down, not only the benefits of Society, but their very Lives, for them.
6. His last Reason is, (p. 43.) That these Principles of his answer all the ends of Government, for Security both of Prince and Subjects.
But First, Do they answer all the ends of Justice, and keeping the Commandments? I think I have made it plain, they do not do that; because they do not give every Man his own, but justifie unjust Possession, and give Right to unrighteous Actions, destroying the Obligations laid, and the Securities given by Right and Wrong, among Men. And Government and Civil Society are for having these things done, and for being ruled in all things by them; and the greatest Blessing, that comes thereby, is the Observance of them.
Then, as to the Purposes of Princes, his Principle indeed answers an Usurpur's Purpose, which is to keep what he has unjustly got; and it shews him he may very justly and conscionably do that; and that he has the People as fast tyed, and as far obliged to him, for all he has no good Title, as they would be, if he had the best Title. But yet all his Purposes it will not serve: For he that is once possessed of a Crown, would not have it lye at other Peoples Liberty, if they can, to take it from him; but would be glad of some such Title (and such, an human Right would prove, if once he came to acquire that) as would make every one else afraid in Conscience, if they make any Conscience of what they do, to desire, or attempt to wrest it out of his hands. And this the Title of Providential Possession doth not do: For as that way he holds it only by Strength; any other, that can make a greater Strength, will start a better Title to it than he has.
And as for the Rightful King's Purpose, I think it no way answers it. For his Purpose, and that a very reasonable and just one too, would be to have his Right; to hold it when he has it, and to have it unlawful for any Man to disturb his Possession of it, or to get it from him, or, when he has done so, to keep it as his own, and not restore it to him again. Yea, to have Right from his Subjects, as well as from the Usurper: That, since it is his Right, they should not help to hinder him of it; and since he has Authority over them, that they should keep under Obedience to him. And as it is the constant Purpose of Authority, to bind to such Obedience; so it is the constant Purpose of Right, to have these Effects, not only in the King, but in any other Person.
And lastly, as for the Purpose of Subjects; if they all purpose, as they all should do, in the first place, to keep a good Conscience, I think his Principles may appear, from what I have said, to be far from that, since they would carry them to resist him that has Authority over them, which would be Rebellious; and to oppose Right, and maintain Wrong, which is very unrighteous. And as to their Preservation and outward Security in this world; though, in making them more externally easie under the Possessor, whilst he holds the Possession, it would serve this end at that turn; yet would it deserve it a great deal more, as I before noted, in destroying Right and Wrong, the best Guard of their worldly Preservation; and in multiplying such Changes and Revolutions, all the Compassings whereof are the greatest Blow and Bane thereto. And though I am sure this is no end, either of Government, or Governors, who are not for serving, but keeping out such Changes and Revolutions; yet it seems a very natural. and the most natural end of his Right of Providence. And then, as he (p. 43.) grants, Princes themselves, as well as Subjects, have Cause enough to be jealous of it; since, whatever Servive it might do them at one turn, it might do them as great Diss…vice at another.
For to give Authority to Revolutions, and to justifie those that act in them, I think, are the great ways that any Principles can serve Revolutions. Now he designs his Right of Providence to give Authority to the Revolution, that is, to authorize ones being pulled down, and the others being set up; or to make God transfer the Authority from one to the other thereby. And the Principle it self, and like Scripture Sayings about Providence in that Case too, will give as good Right to those that act in them, as to what is got by them, as I have formerly shewn. So, by this Principle, the Usurpers, in Revolutions, get Right to attempt and invade a Prince's Rightful Crown; and when they have got it from him, to make it their own; and to bind all the Subjects as fully and fast to them, as they were bound to the former King. And what more Service would a Man desire from Principles, whose part is not to act and accomplish things, but only to justifie and confirm Actions, and the Actors in them?
But, quite contrary, the other Principle of Legal Right gives all the Check to Revolutions, that Principles can do; leaving no Man Right to invade a Rightful Prince's Throne, nor to hold it when he has unrighteously got it, but to restore it to the true Owner again: Nor Liberty to the Subjects, to turn over to the Usurpers against their Rightful Prince; which were both to resist Authority, and to oppose Right and support Wrong. And this is to bar and prevent Revolutions, as far as Principles can do it; that is, among all that will be guided by Principles, and do only righteous things.
But if it would prevent all Revolutions of Government, that, says he, (p. 44.) is a Demonstration against it, that it is a bad Principle, and comes not from God. Indeed this seems an odd Fetch, That doing Right cannot come from God, if it would prevent Unrighteousness; which therefore comes from him, because it would do so. But his Reason is, because then God could not exercise a Prerogative he has reserved to himself, of removing, or setting up, a King; whom he cannot set up, unless he can oblige the Subjects to obey him. He should have inferr'd, therefore when God will exercise that Prerogative, he will remove one King's Right, that the Subjects may owe him no Obedience, and give it to another, that they may pay him Obedience; and that because God will have them follow Right, and carry themselves righteously towards both. And though human Laws are the ordinary way, yet God has other ways of making or unmaking Kings, that is Rightful Kings, when he pleases. For he may put an end to the dispossessed King's Right, by taking him out of the World; or by bringing him, whil…t he lives, to resign and part with it by his own Consent; or give it away from him to the other, by immediate Revelation, if he sees fit, as I shewed before. And these are his ways of exercising this Prerogative, of Removing or setting up Kings, when that is to remove and transfer the Allegiance of Subjects. But if he only, by Course of Providence, changes Possession, but neither by human nor divine Title, transfers the Right to a Crown; it is a Punishment or Tryal both on dispossessed Prince and People, and is not the Removal of a King, which sets them loose from him. And this adhering to such dispossessed Princes, till they are some way disauthorized, and deprived of Right as well as Possession, is not for Mankind to be Slaves of Princes, as he says, (p. 45.) but only to be Slaves of Right, if Slavery must be the Term for it; as Princes themselves must be too, if they will be Righteous.
He also (p. 43. 44.) charges the Inconvenience and Defects in Government, all the time such dispossessed Rightful King is shut out, upon this Principle of unalterable Allegiance to Legal Right. Those Inconveniences and Defects indeed are apparently to be imputed to his being kept out. But unalterable Allegiance to his Legal Right surely doth not keep him out. And in such Case, if a Man will speak Justice, and direct the Charge where the Blame is, he must not say, they cause all the Inconveniences or Overthrow of Government, for want of him, that are careful conscienciously to do him Right; but they, who unconscionably keep him out of his Right.
Before I dismiss this Consideration of his Reasons, I shall take Notice of the Distinction he makes, (p. 28, 29.) between Maintaining and Defending, and Restoring in the matter of Allegiance, and the Oath for it.
But unless he can set this aside, by the Conventions Principle, and that of the Publick Acts, viz. the translation of the Legal Right; this nicety, I believe, will not solve, or take it off.
He (p. 27, 28.) distinguishes between Natural and Legal Allegiance. And they are distinct as to the Bond, and Ground of Obligation, one being from the Law of Nature, and the other from our own Laws. But the main of that D…stinction lies, not in their calling for distinct Offices; particularly not in Legal Allegiance binding Subjects to defend their King's Authority, and Natural Allegiance binding to no Defence thereof. For all Subjects were bound to defend their Kings, before they had any written Laws for Allegiance. By the Law of Nature, when Authority is set up, it is to be Defended: And it can have no other Defence, but the Subjects Allegiance. Its inseperable Effects is to oblige; and if it oblige to any Service, it must oblige more especially to such, as is necessary for its own Preservation and Defence. The Union of Subjects to a Prince, is that of Members to the Head, which are certainly bound to defend it, as I at first noted. And therefore when the Law comes, to bind this Defence faster by the Legal Oath, it doth not pretend to bring in a new Duty; but by the addition of an Oath, to make that more secure, which Nature had bound on all before. The Effect, and Substance of Ligeance, is by the Law of Nature, as is declared in †Vid. p. 14. and 25.Calvin's Case; but the Form and Addition of the Oath, est ex provisione hominis. And the Statute it self, which imposes the Legal Oath, declares it, *Stat. 7. Iac. 1. c. 6.To tend only to the Declaration of such Duty, as every true and well affected Subject, not only by Bond of Allegiance, but also by the Commandment of Almighty God, ought to bear to the King's Majesty.
Now, since Defence is implyed as a necessary Duty, and Ingredient of Allegiance; if he leaves any Man Authority to call for Allegiance, How will he hinder him by the same Authority from challenging Defence? And this, whether it be in holding Possession, or in getting it, and seeking Restauration to it. If Allegiance is left Due in both, Defence will be like to be left Due in both, because Defence is part of Allegiance. Indeed, as he says, (p. 31. 27.) All Subjects are not bound to turn Soldiers. Nor will they be alike (p. 29.) in the way of obliging Calls and Opportunities, to defend a Prince, when out of his Throne, as when Seated on his Throne. But as to such Defence, as every one is bound to in his Station, whilst a Prince is among them; How will his way exempt them from paying the same, when they have an obliging Opportunity, whilst he is Dispossessed of his Throne? This, I think, K. W. claim'd from the Irish Subjects, requiring them to come in to him, and to return to their due Obedience, whilst his Errand was Restoring, or getting Possession: And this, in virtue of their Natural Allegiance, they having taken no Legal Oath to him.
And more particularly, as to the Legal Oath, the Maintenance and Defence Swore in that, is with respect to the Legal Right, as is plain in the Oath; and as he himself observes, (p. 28.) And here, methinks, it should be harder to get off from Maintaining and Defending, if the legal Right be allowed to remain, which they Swore to maintain and defend him in. And the Maintenance Promised, was against all Attempts whatsoever against his Person, Crown, and Dignity. Now the Crown and Dignity is his, who has the best Right to them; Right making Property, as I formerly observed. So leaving the Legal Right to any Dispossessed Kings Person, will leave him the Crown and Dignity. And then all continuance of Attempts, to deprive his Person of the Crown and Dignity, will be Attempts against his Person, Crown, and Dignity, I think. And how will this making Attempts thereupon, be Maintaining and Defending, both his Dignity and him against them? So no way will remain, but the translation of Legal Right, to take off this Maintenance and Defence, in my Opinion.
He thinks also, (p. 30.) That we are not bound to defend a King, when he illegally Subverts the Laws, or Legal Religion of a Kingdom. 'Tis enough in Conscience, he fancies, (p. 27.) pattently to bear such an one; but a little too much for Subjects to venture all, to keep him on the Throne to oppress them. This, I think, makes Kings illegal Actings a Discharge of Subject's Allegiance, and Legal Defence; which agrees equally ill, in my Opinion, with the Oath of Allegiance, and with Passive Obedience. For that is to be so Passive, as to make no Resistance; and to be so Obedient, as to pay all due Service and Allegiance, even to such illegal Invaders of Religion and Laws.
Nor is this Duty taken off, by the abuse they will make of the Subject's Performance, in turning that Power upon them afterwards, to persecute and oppress those, who were its Dutyful Supporters; for no Duty is taken off, by the accidental abuse, which others may make of our payment of it; nor was this in particular thought to be taken off, by the Primitive Christians. They were not without plain appearances, that if a Persecutor kept the Throne, he would turn, or continue his Power, to persecute and oppress them. But yet for all this, they durst never be wanting in any Part, or Duty of good Subjects, in their several Stations, to keep him thereon, either against any Domestick Rebellion, or Foreign Invasion. The Subject's Duty in these Cases, I think, is, as to the illegal ways, never to act under him, or serve him in the illegal Thing. But yet for all that, to be ready in their several Stations to defend his Person, and the Cause of his Crown, when either Subject, or Foreigner, shall rise against him. And 'tis their Acting in the illegal Thing, that the Law punishes; but no Law will punish them for Acting to support his Person, and defend his Crown. Though a Man may be a Traytor, as he urges, (p. 30.) For Acting for him against Law; yet never for Defending him when Assaulted, for that is according to Law. So though they are not to defend such illegal Opposer, in an illegal Thing; yet are they bound to give him the due Defence of Allegiance, and the Legal Oath, notwithstanding it.
And thus I have considered both the Scriptures and Reasons, he has offered for this Right of Providence. And as the former Proofs, I think, shew Reason enough to overthrow it; so he has brought no good Reason to support it. And therefore mere Providential Possession of another's Crown, without other Title, is no Right; much less such as should set aside the Legal Right: So that the Legal Right will stand good notwithstanding it.
And if he, that has the Legal Right, has the best Right to the Crown, though another be got into Possession: The Supposal of a Legal Right in another, will leave all the first mentioned Difficulties in Force, against transferring Allegiance to the Possessor. For in ingaging by such Allegiance, to help him in keeping out the right Owner, Subjects would be very Unrighteous; and ingaging also thereby, to resist the Authority of their rightful Prince, they would be very Undutiful and Rebellious; and therein, moreover, to break their former Promises and Oaths, they would be very Perfidious and Perjurious. All which, I think, are not to be taken off, by the Supposal of Legal Right in the ejected Prince; but only by proving he has parted from it, and that the Possessor is vested with it, which uses to be the Principle of the publick Acts on such Revolutions, and particularly is so in our present Case; and which, as the Author has not at all medled with, so neither shall I.
And thus, Honoured Sir, I have considered what this Reverend and Learned Person has offered on this Argument. Wherein I have endeavoured to take the Freedom, which is fitting, with his Opinion, but to shew the Respect which I have, and his many Excellent, both Pious and Learned Labours, have so long given the Serious and Wise part of Men cause to have for his Person.
I pray God to enlighten, and thereby to awaken the Consciences of all concerned in this Question. Some may be apt to take Offence, at a free Discussion of these Grounds, thinking it may touch too near on Reputation. But as many as prefer Religion before themselves, will be more careful to keep its Duties in Credit, than to keep up their own Credit. And, I am sure, all that have a serious Sense of Christianity, and reverence for the Commandments of God, must needs see, that they have a much higher Concern than Reputation, in this Dispute. The Difficulties are of highest Importance, in that Account we must all one Day make, before the great Iudge of the World. And if the Grounds several Men satisfie themselves upon at present, will not take them off, it nearly concerns them to see it in time, whilst there may be ways of providing a more comfortable Answer, against they come to be posed upon them. God, in his abundant Mercy, grant us all the Grace to have, and keep Minds raised above this World, and both to see the Truth, and follow it.
I remain, Sir, Your most Faithful and Affectionate Servant, &c.
FINIS.