The Duty of Allegiance, Chapter 3
CHAP. III.
Authority goes by Rightful Titles.
FIrst, as to Civil Authority, he thinks *vid. p. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 21, 23, 25, 32, 36.it is not to go by human Right, but only by being placed on the Throne, without any regard to Precedent Right. A Man, that has the Human Right, he supposes may be out of the Authority; and another, that wants the human Right, may for all that (without any special Revelation) have the Authority. And the bringing in the Question of Right he thinks (p. 1. 18.) has perplexed this Dispute.
But as there are confessedly human Rights to carry Authority, so if personal Nomination and Revelation doth not interpose, which is a better Right, these human Rights must carry it, I conceive, to any Person, or it must be uncarried. Authority must be conveyed in such way of Right, and it cannot be conveyed without it.
For, to think of Authority coming to any one without good Title of Right thereto, neither agrees, I think, with the Nature of things, as Right and Authority, or with the Purposes of him who is to have it; nor with the Honour and Justice of God, who is to give it; nor with the Meaning and Obligation of the Commandment, which is to carry and convey this Authority from God to the Person authorized.
I. First, It suits not with the Nature of things, as of Right and Authority, or with the Purposes of him who is to have the Authority.
The Ends and Purposes, which he has to serve, that pretends to have the Authority, are such as these.
1. To claim Obedience. It is for the Authority that any Obedience is due: That is what the Scripture calls us to be Subject and obedient to; Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be Subject to the higher Power, or Authority. And it is no Sin to disobey him who has no Authority. Set aside any Man's Authority then, and we set aside our own Obedience, and are no longer his Subjects, but our own Masters. But now, if he has no Right to the Authority, what is the Offence of setting it aside? It will offend him, I grant, who has external Strength and Power in his hand; but what is the Offence to God? To deny his Authority, is not to deny him any thing that is his Right; so there is no Unrighteousness in it. If he has no Right to what is denied, such Denial can do him no wrong: and when they have righteously cast off any Man's Authority, I see not but they may very righteously Disobey him.
2. To have the Regal State his Property, and exclude every one else; For the Crown is one single undivided Authority, and can go but to one; it will not admit of Rivals: and Allegiance, as the Author observes, p. 14. can be due but to one; and we cannot have Two Allegiances, or serve Two Masters. So that he, who is to have the Regal Authority, must have it as a Property, and have it to himself, and bar out all other Men. Now, can any thing but Right give Property? Set aside Right, and any one else, that will venture for it, has as much to do with it as he: He must plead a Right to it among Men, who would have a Property in it among Men. For his Right to it will make it his own, and make it unrighteous for any one to take it from him; or, if they do, it will be a part of Righteousness to return it him again. Right cannot always secure Possession; for a Man may be dispossessed of what he has a Right to; but it secures Property, which is an Effect inseparable from it. He that has the Right, is the true Owner and Proprietor; and the unjust Possessor gets no Property: What he holds is not his own; he that has the Right is the Owner, and the unjust Possessor is bound to restore him his own again.
Particularly, he must so have the Authority, as to bar him, that stands Competitor for the same; and this, nothing but Right will do: For leave the Competitor the Right to the Authority, and that will make it his. It is the nature of Right, as I say, to give Property; and where there is no Right, there can be no Property; so that this way, the Right will have Authority, and the Wrong will want it. And what is to be done then, when the Right comes to claim and set up his Authority? If he has Right to it, the other can have no Right to hinder it; for that is to pervert Right, and be very unrighteous. Nor can any of his Subjects help or stand by him in making Hindrance thereto; for that would be, to give an helping hand to oppose Right, which would be as unrighteous in them, as it is in him. So that to think of placing Authority in any Man, without a Right thereto, is to talk of an Authority in him, which another has a Right to take, but he has no Right to defend, nor any of his Subjects can righteously stand by and defend him in.
The Author, indeed, p. 26. is for having two good Rights to the same Crown, in bring at the same time, as the Providential and Legal Right; whereby one may very righteously claim and take a thing, and the other may as righteously hold and keep it. But this, I think, quite overthrows the Notion and Nature of Right, which is to make Property, and that can go but one way. If the thing is one of the Party's, it cannot be the other's, for a very good Reason, because it cannot belong to both; and 'tis nothing but Right that makes it belong to either. So that as only one of them can have it, only one of them can have Right to it: and the better Right must set the worse aside, else one would be righteous in invading the others Right; and the other would be righteous in withholding his Right; since, both in invading and detaining each others Right, each would pursue their own Right; which is evidently to destroy all Right, and to confound the Notion and Use of Right and Wrong.
So that take away Right from Authority, and then Authority in that Person is neither to be Defended, nor Obeyed; the plain Reason is, because both their Defence: and Obedience is to respect the Person: They are to defend him in his Authority, and obey him for his Authority; and they neither may defend him in it, nor are bound to own and obey him for it, unless it be his Authority. Now what is it in any Person, that can make Authority to be his? The very same that can make any Thing else to be his, or any Thing to be any Mans, and that is a Title to it. And if Authority must go by Title, it must plainly go by Right; for that is a very bad Title, and will do a Man but little good, which has no Right in it.
Admit any Person to have no Right then, who pretends to Authority, and you make him a King without Authority; since without some Title to it, the Authority is none of his. Such a King, as they who please, when they can safely, may very rightfully cast off, and disobey: But whom against the Person that has the Right; they cannot righteously obey, and defend. All their Acting there, on his side, is without Authority; and against the other is against Authority; so that Right must come in to give any Authority, which Subjects are either bound to obey, or may lawfully defend. And for any other Authority, that can neither authorize and justifie Defence, nor challenge Obedience, it will not deserve any Dispute, whether it must go by Right or no.
And as this leaves the wrongful Possessor no Authority, so doth it leave him, who has the legal Right (and which no better Right has set aside) still to be in Authority: For if Property go by Right, as it can go by nothing else, the Authority is his, whose the Right is. And what a Difficulty would this make on transferring Allegiance and Obedience, when this way they would pay it all where there is no Authority; and disclaim and deny it all where there is Authority: Which Practice would make a very odd Comment on all those Scripture Texts, and Commandments, that call upon us To be subject and obedient to Authorities.
The Author thinks this Transfering and Paying Allegiance, p. 26, 27.and turning subject to the Possessor without Right, is no wrong to the other, nor any denial of his legal Right. What Men may still believe in themselves, or own of his legal Right is one Thing; but if the Dispossessed Prince really has such legal Right, such transferring Allegiance, in my Opinion, must needs do him a great Wrong; he will allow it to be casting off Subjection to him, and turning subject to another against him. Now he that has the legal Right, as I have shown, has God's Authority; and casting off Subjection to him, that has God's Authority, is certainly doing him Wrong; for Authority is no Authority, unless it oblige People to be Subject and Obedient to it. And St. Paul requires Every Soul, in Conscience towards God, to Rom. 13. 1, 5.keep Subject to the Authority, meaning to the Persons in Authority. The Authority or Power, v. 1, 2. being called the Ruler, v. 3. and the Minister of God, v. 4. And they would plainly wrong the Persons in Authority, if they should renounce and deny them that Subjection which God, has given, and requires every Soul to pay to them. On the other side, the Possessor without Right, has not God's Authority; and then Allegiance and Subjection is not his due: Allegiance, as the Author himself p. 15. 34.says, being due only to God's Authority; and we being to own p. 52.no King who has not God's Authority. And to cast off Subjection to the Right in Authority, to whom it is due, and to pay it to the wrongful Possessor, without Authority, to whom it is not due, I, think, is dealing very Unduly, and not according to St. Paul's Rule of Justice, when treating of these Duties towards Princes, Rom. 13. 7.He requires us to render to all their Dues.
As for the Author's Reason, That Obedience is not due to the p. 26, 27.Prince of legal Right, but whilst he actually administers the Government: There were more pretence for that, if he were in God's Authority only whilst he administers it, as he supposes. But I imagine he will not deny but some Obedience must always, and inseperably be due to God's Authority. For it would be a strange Authority of God, that no Body were under any Obligation to obey; and as strange to think we perform the Scripture Rules, of being subject to Authority when we cast it off. And what I now urge is, that he, who has the legal Right to Authority, though he has not Possession, has not lost the Authority: So that to transfer and renounce Allegiance to a Prince, he must be stript of Authority, which cannot be without setting up a better Title, and stripping him of his legal Right too.
Add to all this the Nature of Authority it self, which is a Moral Quality, as I noted, or Spiritual Thing. Now how should any Man come by this, but by way of Right and Title? Being a Spiritual Thing, he cannot take it, but must come to be Master of it in its own way, that is, by having Right thereto.
If it be questioned, whether a Man has got the Authority or no, How should he make it out? he may show himself possessed of the External Strength, which was the Means of Exercising and Enforcing it; but the Authority may remain with the right Owner, after all that is taken away from him, as I chap. 2.shewed above. And if he can tell no other way of his getting it, but by such force of Arms, it's a strong Argument he has not got it, since it cannot be seized that way. Mere force of Arms can no more take Right than Righteousness; and Men may as well go to storm Temperance, and Humility, as to storm Authority. If one wants it, mere Strength then can never give it; and if one has it, mere loss of Strength can never lose it. What then must either give, or recal it? If mere Strength and Force cannot, Right must; so that he has Authority that has Right to it; and he keeps Authority who keeps Right to it, though he can keep nothing else.
II. Secondly, To make Authority go otherwise than by ways of Right, Suits not with the Honour and Justice of God who is to give it. The Authority is Gods, and is not to be had but by God's Gift, as we are both agreed; and how will he give it? In ways of Right, or without Right; in ways of Right surely, I think. For,
1. He is a righteous God; and a righteous God will be for planting Right among Men; and this in every Thing. All we have is derived from God, both all the Power, and all the Possessions of the World; and all in the same way of Right, which he is for having universally and unlimitedly Established. So that whilst any man holds, and claims only by Unrighteousness, he doth not hold of God; nor doth God look upon the Thing he holds, as his, till some way of Right makes it so. Whilst he holds it by Wrong, he rates him, not as the Owner, but Usurper, and therefore bids him restore the Right Owner his own again: and that is all any Man ever gets with him by mere unrigheeous Possession, viz. no Property therein but only Guilt and Punishment, and a Necessity of making Restitution. So that as God is to derive this Authority among Men, he derives it where he derives a Right to it; and without Right he derives none upon any Person.
2. If he derive it not in way of Right, there is but one way left, and that is To lay it in the midst, and order it to go to the strongest Arm, or to him that can take it. But this is to throw it up, as a Ball of Strife, and set all in War and Confusion. But God is 1 Cor. 14. 33.the God of Peace, and Order; and there is no keeping Peace, but by ways of Right. If Right be to carry Authority, it will carry it quietly; but if he leave it to Strength and Power; the way, that Power has to get it, is by War and Force, which all men, I think, must needs see can never be the way of the God of Peace and Order. If God be supposed to lay it in the midst, and let it go to the Strongest, then he is also supposed not to meddle in the Contest; and then it is to make him cease to govern, and direct human Affairs.
III. Thirdly, It suits with the Meaning and Obligation of the Commandment, which is to carry and convey this Authority from God, to the Person authorized. For,
1. The Fifth Command ment, and all others requiring Duty to Superiors, are Commandments of Justice. And St. Paul, calling for the Duties to Princes, bids them render to all their Dues; Tribute to whom Tribute, &…. Rom. 13. 7. All Second Table Duties suppose Right in those that claim them; 'tis Unrighteousness to deny them; and there is no Unrighteousness, unless they are denied to those who have Right to them. What is not against any mans Right is no Wrong to him. So the Commandments carry no Obedience, but to him who has Right to the Obedience; then they must carry it only to him who has the Right to the Authority. For if any Man has no Right to the Authority, 'tis no Breach of Right to set aside his Authority: and then what Unrighteousness can it be, for those that are not under Authority, not to obey? So the Commandments cannot be broke towards him that has no Right to Authority; and therefore are only Command ments of Obedience towards him that has Right to it.
2. The Fifth Commandment calls for this Obedience to the Father, which carries it to Princes, as well as Natural Parents. In what sense are they Fathers? Natural? No; but Politick. To the Politick Father then Subjects must be obedient: and he is the Politick Father, I think, who is the Father by the Rules of the Polity; and those Rules of making any one a Father, make the Legal Right. Thus also when we are bid to be Subject to the higher Power, or to honour and obey the King; the Command or Law of God, requiring the Subjection to him, doth not make any Person King; that is the proper Business of human Right, or of the Laws of Men: and God's Command doth not put the Person in that State, but suppose him in it, and that the Ways and Laws of Men, to whom that doth belong, have done it already. Whom therefore the Law, or Legal Right, (unless set aside by Divine Nomination, which is a better Right) makes a King; him the Commandment backs, and binds us to be Subject to. Like as the Eighth Commandment makes no Property: But when the Laws of Men, or human Right, have made it, that Command comes in to guard, and forbids any Person to invade it. For
3. In these Commands, Princes are supposed as set up by Laws or human Rights; and the Commandment is to give Authority, and carry Obedience to them, when they are once got in by such Titles; I mean in absence of Divine Nomination, which alone takes place of them. God's Law calls for Obedience to him, who is got on a Throne, that is legally and rightfully his own.
For these human Acts and Rights are supposed in the Commandments of the Second Table, or the Laws about Society. Society is to be a Society of Men; and Men are left by God to order and set up some things therein: and then the Commands of God come to guard, or empower, and carry Obligation to them. And thus it is both with G…vernment, and Matrimony, and Pro…erty, and Converse, which are the great Business of Society, and the greatest Comfort and Convenience of Life in this World,
When Men are placed in this World, the Good Things of the Earth depend on Care and Industry: and there would be no Enjoyment to encourage Industry, without Property; nor any certain Offspring, to be industrious and careful for, without Matrimony; nor any Guard, either for our Properties, or Families, without Government; nor any Society, without Converse and Communication of Minds; nor Converse, without use of Speech, and settled signification of Words.
Now, as for this Civil Government, and Matrimony, and use of Speech, and Property; God has fitted all Men for them, and made Mankind to need them, and to have inducement enough from their own Necessities and Convenience, to set up all these Things, which he designs they should, and is pleased when they do, and has provided sundry Laws to empower and guard, and give them Comfort by them when they have done so. But after all Mankind themselves must set them up; God leaves it to them to make their own Languages, and chuse their own Wives and Husbands, or contract Marriages, and settle Properties, and model Governments, and appoint who shall be their Governours. The Paternal Power, in the long Lives of the Ancient Patriarcks, carried the Matter of Government, I conceive, in the first Governments: But as Men grew shorter lived, and the Sense of Kindred wore out, there would be a Necessity of other Ways of appointing Governours; which therefore human Acts and Ways, must settle as they did the point of Properties, and the other forementioned Things.
Now the way of Mens setting up these is by human Ways and Rights. The vesting either of Power, or Property, for instance, must be in some Persons; that is, some particular Persons must have the Power and the Property. And this way of vesting the Power, or Property, in those Persons, can only be by giving them a Right to them; for it is their Right to them, that must make them to become theirs: So that human Acts and Rights, must give every Man the State and Power of a Prince, or of an Husband, and the Property of an Owner; and that must give Words their settled Meanings, whereby any one, that hears them may know what another means.
And as human Ways and Rights are to set up these States or Things; so, since human kind has every where the like necessity, and the like ability therein, these human Rights and Ways will set them up in all places.
And when these human Rights are in every place passed about them, then comes the Law of God and Nature, which are to be Laws for every place, to empower or guard what such presupposed human Right has given. The Fifth Commandment makes no particular Man a Prince; nor the Seventh, an Husband; nor the Eighth and Tenth, a Proprietor of what he holds among Men; nor doth the Ninth determine any Speech's signification; but all suppose them. And if God has not done it by immediate Interposition, since it must be done, either by God or Men, they suppose that human Rights have made these already. And supposing all these things of Society, in this State, by human Right; these Commandments come to secure their several and respective Duties towards them. So that, in absence of particular Revelation, which alone can make, not only a better, but …ndeed any other Right, it is an Humanly Rightful and Legal Power, which the Fifth Commandment, and all other Laws of Obedience to Superiours, require us to be subject to, and to support; and Rightful and Legal Property, which the Eighth and Tenth Commandments forbid us either to seize or covet; and Rightful Matrimony, which the Seventh Command will not have violated by Adultery; and Words of human Settlement and Institution, wherein the Ninth Commandment forbids all Falsification. So that what human Law fixes, God's Law secures; and to him, that holds any of these things by human Rights, the Commands of God call for this Obedience, and other Duties: And therefore he that has the legal Right, has the Commandment on his side, and must have all the Duty and Obedience which it requires.
And this, I think, may show, That in the Question about transferring Allegiance, the Case of Conscience is not a mere Point of Law, as the Author (p. 53.) seems to intimate, or such as doth not involve Moral and Natural Duties; wherein he allows every Man may and must examine and understand for himself. For tho' the Law must make any Man a Prince, to have the Right to the Allegiance; yet where the Law has given the Right, these Moral and Natural Duties carry all their Obedience to it. The Commandments take him, that has the legal Right, and require all the Duty and Allegiance they enjoyn to be paid to him; and require none of it to any other Person. So that in going against the Human Right, we go against the Moral and Divine Precept; which requiring all to him that has the human Right, is either broken, or kept, according as we observe or reject the human Right. Indeed, if the Point of human Right should happen at any time to be more doubtful, and really disputable, it would be a less Offence to mistake it. But so far as we pay our Duties and Obedience, against the human Law and legal Right, we pay them also against the Divine Law and Moral Duties. But this Disobedience, and Breach both of Divine and Human Laws, in such Case, would be the more pardonable, as having the Plea of pityable Ignorance, and the Mitigation of being in a dark and doubtful Case, wherein Mistakes are less dangerous to honestly disposed Minds.
I observe still further from this, That the Commandment is equally broke, in being undutiful to him, that has an Human Right, as it would be by Undutifulness to one, that had a Divine Right. For the Commandment is equally for securing Obedience to those in Authority by any sort of good Right: Therefore its words, or expression of the Person, is general; to the Father, the Higher Power, the Magistrate; all which must come to be so by some kind of Right, and it matters not what, whether Human or Divine, so long as it is a good Right. It is a Natural Precept, which is equally for Jews and Gentiles; and doth not alter the Style, but is the very same, and calls for one and the same Obedience to a King of Divine Right, by a Divine Intail, or Nomination, as it doth to another of mere Human Right. Which I note, because, in case of Ioash, the Author thinks (p. 35.) there was a stricter and more unalienable Allegiance due to him, on account he came to the Crown, as he says, by an Intail from God. But admit his was a Divine Right; the Commandments for Obedience to rightful Powers cary no more, nor more unalienable Allegiance to it, than they would to an human Right. It calls for it only in the same Words, and lyes equally open to both; and makes no Distinction of either. All it requires for Obedience, is, That they have Right: They must be obeyed whilst they have it, and no longer than they have it. So that be the Right Ioash's, or a King's of any other Nation, it will equally stand till a better Right has set it aside.
The Seditious Jews, I think, were for making a great difference in point of Obedience, between Governments and Kings set up by Revelation, and others by Human Right; and so esteemed the Heathen Powers, who had no Word or Revelation of God for their Government or Governors, but only human Ways and Titles, as no Powers, to whom the Command required Subjection and Obedience. This Was one great cause of their restless Endeavours to cast off those Powers. One Pretence was, recovering their own Liberty, which St. Peter notes the Iudaizers used for a Cloak 1 Pet. 2. 16.of Maliciousness, or Cover of Rebellion; the Insufficiency and Iniquity whereof is attempted to be proved and made plain to them in the Speeches of K. Agrippa and Iosephus. But onother was, Want of God's Ap. Ios. de Bel. l. 2. o. 1. l. 6. c. 11.Authority in these Powers. Much troubled they were with this in our Saviour's time, and brought it as a Question of Conscience to him, Whether it was lawful to own them. They Matt. 22. 17.were more possessed with this when St. Paul writ to those at Rome; and higher still, when St. Peter writ, being so generally filled therewith, as made them ready to burst out into those Commotions, in all places, which brought their Excision, and the final Overthrow of their City and Nation. But in opposition to this, St. Paul tells them, the Powers then in being were of God, Rom. 13. 1. and to resist them would be to resist the foreign, the Divine Ordinance or Precept carrying Obedience, which called for it as much, and as expresly, to these Powers, as to any the most Anointed King.
Thus is the meaning of the Commandment about Obedience to Princes, to carry Authority, and call for Obedience to rightful Powers; or, to those only, who in absence of Divine Revelation, have legal or human Rights to their Thrones.
And thus by Kings, or Higher Powers, and Authorities, in these Commandments must be meant Rightful Powers. Yea, I add, in all Precepts towards one in a State, as towards a King, an Husband, a Master, or the like, Right is supposed. The reason is because these are Things, that go by Right, and the Person is not vested with the State, or it is none of his, nor can be till he has a Right to it; so Right is sufficiently imployed, though it be not mentioned. Thus Honour thy Father, is Honour thy true and real, not thy false and pretended Father. And Husbands love your Wives as your own Flesh, is your right and true Wives, not your Concubines. And Wives obey your Husbands, is your true Husbands, not any as they shall call so, as Usurping their Husbands Place, who are only nominal Husbands, but real Adulterers. In all which Cases Right is not only supposed, as I say it must be in Things, that come to a Person by Right, but is judged so in the common Understanding of Mankind. Nay, the expressing the King, or Husband simply, without any Epithet of Diminution is a sufficient Expression of it; for the Wrong is not the Person simply speaking, but only with a Note of Diminution either expressed, or imploy'd. As in the Case of Kings, they are not real Kings, but real Usurpers, and only pretensed Kings, or Kings de Facto, as the Phrase Stat. 1. Ed. 4. c. 1.and Style of Law is.
And this takes off what the Author objects, viz. That the p. 18, 19.Scripture makes no Exception, or gives no express Caution against submitting to usurping or pretensed Kings; for Caution enough it gives, though not in express Words. The Precept of submitting and keeping subject to Kings, is sufficient Prohibition not to turn subject to Usurpers: For since we cannot have two Allegianoes, or two Kings, as he rightly observes, we cannot be p. 14.subject to both; and therefore the same Scripture, that bids every Soul be subject to the King, forbids them to turn subject to the Usurper, who is not the King; which being a State that comes to one by Right, the Command means of the rightful Person. And had there been no more express Prohibition in Scripture of Wives adhereing to an Adulterer, than there is of a Subjects adhereing to an Usurper; I suppose the Author would think that sufficiently forbid, when she is Commanded to adhere to her own Husband. Why not in the other Case then, when Subjects are required to adhere to their King? For Right is equally expressed, and equally supposed; and one is to go by Right as much as the other is.
I add in the last place, That the World was in the Hand of rightful Rulers, when the Apostles gave Subjects Precepts of Obedience. So that as the Nature of the Thing admitted not, and the use of Speech needed not; so neither did the present Circumstance of Times and Persons, prompt any Occasion to make Exceptions. This p. 20.the Author urges on the other side, and imagines the very giving of these Commands of subjection to the Subjects of the Roman Empire, is little less than a Demonstration, that they were not meant only of legal rightful Powers. But had not the Roman Emperors human Rights? Yes, the Empire was set up by Law, when the Senate, by joynt Consent in open Court, D…ol. 54. p. 570. &c. and 576.Devolved their Sovereingn Power upon Augustus: From which time, by the Lex Regia, it became the legal Government. And the Emperors, that sway'd this legal Empire, Had some kind of Consent from the Senate, says the Author p. 21.himself, Extorted by Fear, or Flatery, or other Arts. I know not what he means by some kind of Consent; but this was a Consent of the Senate legally Convened, and Sitting, and Acting in open Court, and giving every Man his Vote when it was put to the Vote. And such a Consent in Form, and in open Court, is that which makes an human Right, or such as the State of Rome had. And as for Practices by Fear, or Flatery, or hopes of Preferment, or other corrupt Arts; they are not tyed to the Senate of Rome, but are as lyable to be used on all Electors in Elective Kingdoms, and on all Publick Assemblies. But for all this, if a Thing is Voted, and pass in Form, it makes a legal Right; and there is no going to null the Acts by making such Exceptions. So that as the Empire was a Legal Government, the Emperors, I think, were Legal Governors; at least those Emperors, under whom our Saviour Christ, and his Apostles gave these Precepts.
But for so many Ages together, their Titles, he says, were all p. 20.of them stark Naught, or the very best of them very Doubtful. Why were there so many then that Reigned without the Content of the Senate? No, that is not his meaning, I suppose; but only that Numbers of them, and sometimes for several Successions, set up and usurped upon their Masters, and came to the Empire by Rebellion, and Murder of the former Emperors: These ways indeed were stark Naught. And whilst their Lawful Emperor was alive, they usurped on him; and when he was dead, till the Senate had put an end to the Usurpation by their Consent, they usurped on them; but when by the Murder of the Legal Emperor, the Senate had no Emperor, they were free to make one. And when they had Consented, and Voted this Usurper Emperor; he would then be Rightful and have the same Right, viz. their Consent, as the formerr …had. And this was the way of these Usurpers, when they had slain their Masters, and possessed themselves of the Army and Power of the Sword; they sent to the Senate for a Title, and their Consent gave them a Right to it; which Consent of theirs could wrong none: Nor in an Elective Empire, had they had no Consent, but Ruled without Right, could any Subjects have had the present Hindrances to voluntary Submitting, by being under a contrary Obligation to any other Person.
But whatever the Emperors were over the Romans, the pag. 21.Romans themselves, he says, were great Usurpers over other Nations; and yet these Scripture Commands are for having those Nations keep under their Obedience. But had not these Nations submitted, the Kings themselves, if alive, coming into those Submissions to the Romans? And so long as People only Consent to give up what is their Own, not what is the Right of a Third Person, such Consent gives an human Right. So by means of this Consent, and Submission of themselves, those Nations gave like Right over them to the Romans, as the Romans by their Consent and Submission gave to the Emperors. And as to the Jews in particular, the Romans had not only this human Right over them, by their own Consent and Submission, but in our Saviour's days; this had stood for well on towards an Hundred Years, which gives another Degree of human Right, that at least is a good Strengthner of the former, and that is Prescription. So that Submission required to the Powers in the Apostles Days, speaks nothing but Submission to a rightful King.
And these Considerations, I judge, may be sufficient to show, that the Submission and Obedience call'd for by the Scripture Commands, is an Obedience to rightful Powers.
But against this he Objects several Things.
1. First, he says, The Powers which these Scripture Commands, pag. 18.call for Obedience to, are the present Powers, without Distinction between rightful Kings and Usurpers. But to make any Person the Power, or Authority in being, or the present Authority, must imply Right. He is not the present Authority, unless at present he has it vested in him, and it be his Authority; and how can it be his, but by some good Right, or his having a Title to it? So the present Power must be he, who at present has the Right to the Power; without a precedent Right to make it his, no Person being capable to pretend to have any Authority, which Subjects may either lawfully defend, or are bound to obey; which either God gives, or the Command means and intends, or calls for Obedience to, as has been already shewed. And this is enough for these Scriptures, which in requiring Obedience to the present Powers, require it only to the present lawful Powers: And such the Powers were, that were then Present, or then in Being, who are expressly meant therein, as I proved before.
2. He says, We have no Example in Scripture of any People pag. 21.ever blamed for submitting to the present usurping Power. Many Usurpations indeed the Scripture mentions, particularly among the Israelitish Kings: But the Scriptures not blaming Peoples Submission to such Usurpers, is no Proof it was without Blame; for the same Scriptures are Ordinarily content to relate, and do not blame the usurping Kings themselves for making the Usurpation; and yet, I am sure, this Reverend Person would blame them. But it is not always blameworthy to submit to Usurpers; but only in them, who at the same time are under Obligation to another's Right, or to submit to an Usurper against a rightful Prince. And these Scripture Submissions to Usurpers, were not against any rightful Princes; For against whose Right did the People submit, or to whom else, Were they under any contrary Obligation? not to the former King, for the Usurper had Murdered him to get into his Throne; nor to any rightful Heir, whom immediately on his Father's Death, the Law made King. For the Crown of Israel was not intailed by Law to lineal Descent, and Proximity of Blood. And the same may be said of other Scripture Submissions to the Egyptians, Babylonians, Persians, or Romans, or to any one else. The People in Iury, or elsewhere, either submitted when they had no King, nor any left, that had Kingly Right over them; or when the Kings themselves came together with the People into the Submission. So these Submissions were against no other Person's Right, nor did any Third Person any Wrong: And therefore the Scriptures might have no Cause to blame them; and yet have Cause enough to blame others for turning subject to an Usurper, whilst they have a rightful King of their own, to whom they are under a contrary Obligation.
3. Our Saviour's Argument, he says, relies wholly on Possession, page 21.and the Image and Superscription of the Coyn, if it be a good Reason for Submission, will carry as much to an Usurper as to the most rightful King. But when our Saviour shewed Caesar's Coyn to the Pharisees, it was a good Reason in their Case. When the Author produces it for Submission to an Usurper against a lawful Prince, it is none in his: The Reason is, because they are two different Questions; and what is a good Answer to one Question, need not to be a good Answer to another. The Question that puzzel'd and stuck with the Pharisees, was not whether they ought to be subject to any other, for no Body else had any pretence of Right over them, nor could they have any exception to this Submission, as being under a contrary Obligation to any Third Person. But theirs was only whether they were subject to him; not only whether his Heathen Power was the Power meant in the Commandment; which is sufficiently decided by our Lord's ordering the dues of Authority to be paid to it; but whether it ought to be a Power over them, as being an infringement of Jewish Freedom; it was a Dispute between their own Liberty, and his Authority, whether they were Caesar's Subjects, or their own Masters; not betwixt Submission to him, as I say, and to any other more rightful Power. Now in the Question, whether they were their own Masters, or Caesar's Subjects, to show the Coyn is a good Reason; for it shewed they were under his Subjection as a Token of their having receiv'd the Roman Yoke, and submitted to their Power, which gives a Right among Men; and of this only our Lord was to give a Reason. But as to the present Case of submitting to an Usurper against the Right of a Third Person, or a rightful King, that was not proposed to him.
4. He says, God Commands Submission to Usurpers, and page 21.Condemns refusal thereof when he Commands the Jews, by the Prophet Jeremiah, to submit to the Babylonians. This, by Ieremiah, he thinks, was an Express Command from God, ibid.to be subject to the King of Babylon. If so, I cannot understand what sort of Usurper the King of Babylon was; for if God by a Prophet exspressly Commands, that they shall be his Subjects; he expressly Commands withall, that he shall be their King. And then he is King by Divine express Command, which is the same, as by Divine express Nomination; which we both agree, is the best Right and Title, whereby any Prince can hold his Throne, and so must absolutely exclude all charge of Usurpation.
Besides, what sort of Usurper will he make Nebuchadnezzar before this Command? Had not all, both King and People, before this, submitted and given up themselves to him? Nay, even the King himself, Zedekiah by name, had accepted the Crown from him, and had taken an Oath of Fealty, and Allegiance to him, and had broken that Oath, in hopes of Succour from Egypt; for which he is so severely threatned by God, Ezek. 17. And this breach of Oath, and Rebellion against his Leige Lord the King of Babylon, was the very Thing, that brought the Babylonian to beseige Ierusalem, when Ieremiah came from God, to bid the Jews under Zedekiah to submit to him, Ier. 21. Justly therefore might God Condemn Zedekiah, and the Jews, for standing out against the King of Babylon; which was only to Condemn Subjects for standing out against their King.
I add, That as to Ieremiah's Prophesies, they were Predictions of Events, and of the final Success of the Babylonian, either against the Jews, or other Nations; and so were Warnings to all that would believe the Prophet, to prevent Extremities by early Submissions, and to compound and make good Terms for themselves. And the great Offence of any People, so far as concerns these Predictions, setting aside what might concern them any otherwise as they were his Subjects before, was Disbelief of God's Prophet, and hearkning to false Prophets against God; which in the Event would be its own Punishment, when they should be carried away by standing out, who might have stayed in their own Land, had they believed God, and submitted as he directed, Jer. 27. 9, 10, 11.
5. Lastly, If Allegiance must only go to rightful Powers, they who are to obey, will be concerned to understand who is the Right; and this, p. 19, 20. 2.he thinks, would be such a Perplexity of Conscience, as God never designs, especially in Duties that concern all Persons.
But now this Perplexity of Conscience is not confined to the Right of Princes, but is common to all Rights, either of Princes, or of private Persons. For if their Conscience is tyed up to a private Right, there is the same Necessity of being able to judge between a pretended and real Right, and of knowing exactly what gives a real Right, that they may not misplace the payment of it; which are the Difficulties of Conscience he mentions, in page 19.giving a Prince his Right. And yet, for all these Perplexities, 'tis plain God has bound all Mens Consciences to such Right, else they would not be bound in Conscience to give every Man his Due, or to be Righteous; other Duties also are as lyable to these Perplexities, as Right is. Idolatry concerns all Mens Consciences, and particularly the Worship of Images against the First, and Second Commandments. And are not all Mens Consciences, as lyable to be perplexed in understanding what Idolatry it, and what is an Idolatrous Image, and what an Idolatrous Worship thereof; and are not as perplexed Disputes raised about them, betwixt us and the Papists, as any that are lyable to be raised about Rights? Lying concerns all Mens Consciences. And may not Mens Consciences be sufficiently perplexed in inquiring, what makes the Evil of a Lye, and how far Men are obliged, and how they come to be so, to use Words in such a certain Sense, to know when they do, and when they do not tell those Lies, which are against Conscience? And the like Perplexities are lyable to be started about Oaths, and Sabbaths, and Government, and Property, and Adultery, that is, about all the Commandments. And yet, for all this lyableness to such Perplexities, God has made them all, to be matter of Conscience to all Men. So that this is no more an Argument against our Consciences being bound to the Rights of Princes, than against their being bound to any other Thing.
The Truth of the Case is, as I conceive, there is a plain understanding of the Things themselves, and that is obvious. But there is a seeking to understand further, by searching into Grounds and Reasons, and that is full of Perplexities. The First way of Understanding is, the way of plain Minds; the later of nice Wits, and Philosophers. And Men generally understand the First way, whilst they are willing to do a Duty; but they then more especially set their Wits to understand the later way, when they are unwilling to do it, and fall a turning every Stone to evade it. And thus, I think, all the foresaid Duties are plain to all Men, who would take them in a plain and obvious Understanding, as Men willing to do them; and all will be perplexed when they come to be Disputed and Spun out into Niceties by learned Men, when they grow uneasy under, and study to avoid them. And, I think, one shall hear no Complaint of the perplexedness of any of the foresaid Moral Duties, till Disputing Wits came to perplex, and meddle in them.
Particularly, as to the Right of Princes, I see not, but that is as plain as the Right of a private Person. They have as plain a way among us of coming to have Right, as any private Person; for it is the very same, viz. Proximity of Blood, or Lineal Descent, by inheriting from their Fathers, or Predecessors. And do not other Men, in every Neighborhood, come the same way by their Estate? So that in ordinary Course, they may as easily know their Princes Right, as their own Right, or their Neighbor's Right: And then they may as easily know how to do him Right, as how to do them Right. And who should have the Crown after him, is as well known, as who should have their own Estate of Inheritance after them. 'Tis as easy to know who is the King's Heir, as who is their own, or their Landlord's Heir: For the King's Children are more notirous, or better known, and the Ages of them, than the Children of any private Person. Sometimes, I grant, a Dispute may be raised about them; and all Disputes bring on Allegations to serve turns, and will perplex any Thing. But may not the same be raised concerning any private Right, or any other Thing? So their Rights are knowable, as any private Persons in all ordinary Course, and lyable only, as these are, by accident to be perplexed by contingent Disputes; and therefore one is no harder upon the Conscience, for ought I see, than the other is.
But were it their Duty to submit only to him that has Right, they could not Discharge that Duty, he pag. 2, 19.says, or understand the Prince to be Right who claims it, without turning over the Laws and History of a Nation, and being well skilled in them. But cannot a Man that knows neither Law, nor History, know the next in Blood to the former King, has the Right to the English Crown? This is known by the general Consent and Acknowledgment of Men in all parts of the Realm. And if a Man is not Book learned, such a Traditionary Knowledge of the Law in that Point is enough for him. So that thus far he may easily satisfy himself, viz. who is the rightful King, according to the present received way of Succeeding.
But whether this has always given Right, and was formerly the way, must depend on History, unless the Government had begun within Memory of Man, and were but of yesterday. But the same Question must do so in any other Thing, that begun long ago. And in particular, all the Truths and Duties of our Holy Religion are much Older than our Government. And if any one is not content to take any of them, as he finds them now at present in the Holy Scriptures, and the Practice and Profession of the Church, shall make a Question whether they were Held and Practised so in all Ancient time; this would lead us, and doth lead the Disputants of all Parties into another kind of Historical Search than this which he speaks of, into our Laws and Chronicles. And yet, for all such a Question, about the Reception of them in times past, would draw on such an Historical Search; the Author very well knows, That all these Duties are bound by God on all Men's Consciences.
And now, by all that has been said on this point, I think it may sufficiently appear, That if God doth not fix it in a Person, by special Revelation, Civil Authority must go by human Right. Right is inseparable from it, in the Nature of Things, in the Gift of God, in the Supposal and Intention of the Commandments, that carry it, and call for Obedience to it. So that he who has no good Right to it, has no Authority; but he who has the Right to it, has the Authority, which the Commands of God require us to bear Allegiance, and keep subject to.
And all this is agreeable to that Scripture and Common Reason which tells us, That no man can put himself into Authotity. No man takes this Honour to himself, but must be called to it, says St. Paul, Heb. 5. 4, 5. speaking of the Pastoral or Priestly Authority, which is God's Authority, as the Civil is. And Civil Magistrates, when Obedience is called for to them, are likewise styled God's Ministers, Rom 13. 4. all the Authority they have over others, being as his Deputies and Vicegerents. Authority then no man can have, but by being rightfully Deputed and Called to it, or having it duly committed to him. By what Authority dest thou these things, and who Mat. 21. 23.gave thee this Authority is a Question most natural to be put to every such Person, and must be answered, by shewing some good Call and Commission. Now this calling a Man to Authority, and Deputation of God, must be by some Title of Right, or rightful Way, not by thrusting himself into it, which is setting up uncall'd; and if a man puts himself upon it, without being call'd thereto, and assumes it without any Title of Right, he only puts himself in Commission, which is no Commission. And as his Commission is from himself, his Authority is so too. So such a Man will only be a King of his own making; but there is no Authority of God derived to him, nor Call of his, to carry it, or authorize him. And therefore what he doth require, must be in regard to himself, and not to God; who having never Commissioned, or rightfully called him, calls not the People to obey him.
The like I might also add of our own Laws, which make the Regal Authority to go with the Legal Right, and vest it in the Person that has the Right, and that when another has dispossessed him, and got the Possession from him. Thus Q. Mary having the Right, the Statute declares the Regal Authority to have been vested in her Person, during all the Possession of Q. Iane. And in Richard II. during the Possession of Henry IV. And in the right Heir, by Henry VIII Settlement, during the Possession of the Usurper. Under all which, he that had the Right, in the Eye of Law, had the Authority: And such Acts against Authority, as the Law calls Treason, were declared to be Treason against them. As it was also in K. Charles I. who, keeping his Legal Right, kept his Authority, when he stood dispossessed of all besides, before the High Court of Iustice. As K. Charles II. also did afterwards, all the time he was driven out, and lived an Exile, as I formerly observed Chap. 2.
But the Author thinks, (p. 14 15. 65.) He that is in Possession of the Crown, tho' without Legal Right, is King in the Eye of Law; and he that is turned out of Possession, though he has Legal Right, is not King in the Eye of Law. He ought, as he words it, by the Laws of the Land, to be King, but is not.
As for the Possessor without Right, I will tell him what kind of King, in my Opinion, the Law counts him. If he were a Subject before, it looks upon him, in the height of his usurped Possession, to be still a Subject to him that has the Right, and is dispossessed of it; and, as a Subject, to owe Faith and Allegiance to him: To break that Faith, in acting against him, to be tryable by Law, and attaintable as a Traitor, and punishable for the same. All which is plain, from the Instances of Henry IV. of the usurping Heirs of Henry VIII. and of Queen Iane. And in the several Mutual Attainders, during the Contests betwixt the two Houses; in which, though every King served himself of Law, on pretence of having Right in his own Reign; yet when, on any Turn, the Law came to look upon him as wanting Right, and only as an Usurper, or King in Fact; it still treated, and tryed, and attainted him, as a Subject. Here then, if such an one be a King, in the Eye of Law, is he a Subject, Traiterous, Tryable, Punishable, King? And whether this, in the Eye of Law, is the true Sovereign, or the supream and unaccountable King, I leave him to judge.
And as for him that has Right, who, as he fancies, in the Eye of Law is no King; he is such a No-King, as, in the Eye of Law, has the Regal Authority, as I have shown, still vested in him; as has Allegiance, by Law, due to him; and Treason, by Law, committable against him. As is plain from Q Mary, K. Charles the First and Second, and all the forecited Instances; and will be further, from what I shall note from Law, of the Dueness of Allegiance to a dispossessed Prince. And how such an one, whom the Law vests with the Authority of a King, and to whom it gives the Allegiance due to a King, and against whom it makes Treason as against a King; should yet, for all this, in the Eye of Law, be no King, I cannot imagine.
Though therefore I cannot say, That Allegiance is due only to Right, as the Author words it, p. 1. which I think not so well expressed; yet is it only due to him that has the Right. Allegiance is due to Authority; and, in absence of Revelation, by the Laws both of God and Men, Authority must go by human Right. So that he only, that has human Right to the Authority, is to have the Authority, and, by vertue of that, the Allegiance too. And therefore the Question of Legal Right must come into this Dispute of transferring Allegiance, I conceive, since it must not be paid from him that has, or paid against him to another that has not Right; and there is no way left to justifie such Translation of Allegiance without it. And if what I have offered hereupon has proved this point, I think it strikes home at the main Design of this Learned Person's Book.
And this will show him why, when a rightful Prince is Dispossessed, The Government cannot be settled under the wrongful Possessor, unless he that has the Right submit, and so by his consent come in to make the Settlement. For this, says he, I would very page 9.gladly hear a good Reason. I will tell him what I think a very good one. This Settlement of a Government is a Settlement of a Man in Authority. And without Right there is no having, and so no settling of a Man's self in any Authority. So the Possessor must get Right before he can come to this Settlement. And if the ejected Prince has this Right, he must have it of him; for he must have it where it is to be had. And if he has it of him, he must have it by his Consent; for it's a Man's own Will and Consent that gives away his Right; and thus his Consent comes to be necessary to such Settlement. And the Peoples Consent and Submission cannot settle the Possessor without him, because it cannot give Right to the Authority, which the Case supposes they have not in themselves, but the ejected Prince has. And as this is the Truth of the Case; so, I think, I shall show him it was the meaning of the Convocation, who take in Right into their thorough Settlement, when I come to consider what he has offered on that Point.
Having thus shewed, That in absence of Divine Nomination, Civil Authority is to go by human Right; I will here add something briefly in the
IV. Fourth Place, Of those ways of human Right which are to convey it.
Now what Right Men make, their Consent makes. When they give a Thing, it is their own Will that gives it. A Thing is their own when they may dispose of it as they will; so their Will must part with it: And when they have Consented that another shall have it, they have parted therewith, and transferred their own Power of Disposal on him, or given him a Right to it.
What God has left to Men, is not to give Authority; that contains a Power of Life and Death, which they have not over themselves, and is to reach and lay Obligation on the Conscience, which they are not Lords of; but the Authority is Gods, and he must give what is his: Whence they are called Gods, Ex. 22. 28. Ps. 82. 1. 6. Rom. 13. 4. 6.and God's Vicegerents and Ministers, as Men Commissioned by him, and bearing his Authority, and standing in his Place. And this Authority is derived from God in his Command, which authorizes Princes, and obliges Subjects, as was before Discoursed.
But he has left them to agree upon the Form, after what way it shall be Administred, and to appoint the Person who is to have it, or to give him a Right and Title to it, which will make it his Authority: It cannot be exercised, unless some Person have it; and it cannot be had without some Right and Title to it; and this more especially since the ceasing of the Patriarchical Government, God has left Men to give. And their way of giving it, or any thing else which is in their Power, is by their own Consent, either carryed in their Laws and legal Constitution; for Laws speak the Consent of those concerned in them; or in their Submissions, and that is Consent too, to those who have Conquer'd them.
1. The First is a legal Right, or what the Laws of any Nation make to be a Title to the Crown; whether it be Proximity of Blood, and Course of Descent, as in Hereditary Kingdoms appropriate in some Places to the Males; or common in others to Females, in want of Male Heirs; or it be the Election of those, who are empowered by Law to chuse a King, as it is in Elective Kingdoms, and was Anciently the way in the Empire of Rome; or whatever else that gives Title to the Sovereign Power, by the National Constitution. And this legal Right puts Men in Power, in a Quiet and Peaceable Course of Things, when a Nation are left to themselves, and to the Power and Direction of their own Laws.
2. The later, viz. Submission of a People, left without a King, or of King and People, to those who have conquered them; I call, for Distinction, by the more general Name of an human Right. 'Tis not the particular way of giving Right, by the way of their Nation, which is a limited way of consenting, and giving Right among them; but it is Consent too, which is the general way of giving Right among Men. And Mens Consent doth give what they have to give up, though they do not consent in such or such a Method.
Not that mere Force, or Conquest it self, gives Right; for Right is no more to be taken by Force, than Authority is; but the Consent and Submission of those who are conquered, may give it to him who conquered them. Till they submit to be subject to him as King, he has only Force, but no Authority over them: But their Consent and Submission, when it comes, can give him all that depends on them, that is, a Title to Rule over them. When Law makes a King, Consent carried in Law, gives the Right to him. And why should not Consent without Law do the same?
But this, says the Author, (p. 24.) is only a forced and after Consent. As for its being after, it is after the Conquest, but it is not after the Right; for not the Conquest, but Consent, makes the Right: And Consent will give him what it has to give him, whether after or before he conquered them. And as to its being forced. it was not so forced, but if they had preferred their Liberty before other Conveniences, they might have refused it; tho' in Love of Liberty, and on other accounts, they were loth to come under it. But though they do come unwillingly to it, consent they do, and chuse to submit at last. And this, though not wholly free, but on Consideration to prevent a worse thing, is yet so much Freedom, as transfers things among Men, and makes an human Right. For how many things do Men part withal, as driven by Necessities and Considerations, much against their Wills; but still, at last consenting, that parts with their Right to them. In Treaties, at the shutting up of Wars, do not the weaker Princes usually consent to things much against their Wills? Yet such Concessions confessedly convey human Rights. And was it not much against the Grane, when the Jewish Kings submitted to hold of Nebuchadnezzar? particularly when Zedekiah received the Crown from him, and promised Allegiance upon Oath: Had he not much rather have held the same independent, and have received it from his Ancestors, in way of Inheritance? Yet this Submission and Oath gave Nebuchadnezzar a Right; and God accounts Zedekiah as very unrighteous, and punished him accordingly, for breaking it. And such an human Right all National Submissions gave to the four Monarchies, and other Conquerors, either over the Jews, or over other Nations.
3. Another way there is of giving Right by Submission, and that is not Express, but Presumptive, viz. when he that has it, omits to make any claim of it so long, till all conclude he has given it up; which, I conceive, is the Right of Prescription. A Man's Right must affect all concerned to do him Right, if he stands upon it; but if he never shews he stands upon it, the Presumption of Mankind comes to conclude at last, that he is willing to let it fall, or give it up: Even by our own Law Men may lose Things, by neglecting to claim them in some reasonable Time, which the Law construes a Relinquishment of them. And this giving it up, by seeming to do so visibly in never claiming it, gives that sort of human Right among Men called Prescription. Not that Wrong grows Right by pag. 24.continuance, as the Author objects; but what makes it a Right, is the other's Consent, or Relinquishment, notified sufficiently, as Men presume, by his never making claim thereof. And if he that has the Right to a Crown, will Relinquish it, the Submission of the People is enough to give the Possessor a Right to it. And though this Prescription is not always allowed against the rightful King, by the Laws of particular Nations; as the Duke of Rot. Par. 39. H. 6. n. 16.York pleaded, it was not to bar his Title by our own Laws when he claimed his Right against Henry the Sixth: Yet where it is left to that, and is not by any National Provisions otherwise excepted, it is thought to do so in common human Estimate, and is made to give an human Right; or, however, it is a good Strengthner of the former, when the Consent and Submissions were express before.
Such as these are the ways of any Persons having, or getting a Right to a Throne; either a legal Right, when the Crown is given him by the particular Laws of the Nation, or a more general sort of Right, by the Consent and Submission of those who are subject to him, and own no other to have a Right over them; which is still the more confirmed, the oftener this Consent is repeated; and the longer it is continued, till Time has made it a Prescription, as the Power of the Emperors was over the Jews, in the Days of Christ, and his Apostles. And in absence of Divine Nomination, the human Rights thereto are to put all Persons into any Authority, that they may be the Father, or Higher Power, which the Commandments require us to be subject to.
And this may shew sufficiently, how by this Plea of a mere King de Facto without Right, the Difficulties against the Allegiance in Debate from the Fifth Commandment will still continue, as well as those from the other Commandments. If an ejected King be allowed to have the Right, all the Laws of Obedience, for ought I see, are like to go with the Right. So by this Supposition, such transferring of Allegiance, would be a most open Undutifulness against the Call of that Precept.