Concerning the Indifference of Human Actions, Part 4
Examination.
Firſt, it cannot be denied, but that divers indifferent things may be hic & nunc of ſuch weight, and moment, of ſuch neceſſity, or at leaſt expediency, and conveniency, as that the juſt commands of our lawfull ſuperiours may render them our duty, and omiſſion of them would be ſinfull: of ſubjection unto ſuch commands the Apoſtle ſpeaks, Rom. 13.5 Wherefore ye muſt needs be ſubject, not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience ſake. Where by wrath is underſtood Metonymically puniſhment: we are therefore to obey the Commands of the Magiſtrate, not onelyonly for feare of puniſhment, but alſo for feare of ſin: leſt we wound the Conſcience with tranſgreſſion of the fifth Commandement. To aſſert the contrary, (that 'tis not a ſinfull diſobedience to violate the Commands of Superiours concerning ſome things indifferent in their generall nature,) tends apertly to the diſſolving of all government, and ſtocks up the authority of Magiſtrates, and maſters of families by the very roots.
Secondly, 'tis as unqueſtionable, that all omiſſions of what is commanded by humane lawes are not ſins, unleſſe they be out of contempt of authority: for
Firſt; otherwiſe (as (t)Aliae leges humanae, quia poſſunt eſſe vel juſtae vel injuſtae, idque ratione efficientis, materiae, formae, finis, & hujus aut illius ſubjecti, vel adjuncti; idcirco non ità ſimpli citèr alligant, ut earum quaelibet violatio culpam lethalem inducat. Si enim ſic eſſet, tum quot ſunt leges, tot eſſent laquei animarum, & qui ſub legibus vivunt, pluribus multo peccatis eſſent obnoxii, quam qui in barbaris gentibus, vel abſque legibus, vel cum pauciſſimis tranſigunt vitam. Ameſ. de Conſc. cal. lib. 5. cap. 24. Num. 22.Ames rightly ſaies) as many lawes as there were, ſo many ſnares for ſoules there were, and they that live under lawes, ſhould be ſubject to many more ſins, then they who live among barbarous people, either quite without lawes, or with but a few.
Secondly, there be divers lawes, that be (u)Multae leges ſunt pu…è poe…les, i…a ut ipſis plane ſatisfiat, … poena ſolvatur. Rat. 1. Quia legis finis eſt deterrere homines à communi & frequen…i uſu hujus aut illius rei, ad quem finem ſufficit conſtitutio poenae. 2. In talibus etiam legibus eſt …acita conventio & pactum, d… poena ferenda ſi contra fiat: Contra leges autem conventionales, aut ſub conditione latas, venire quis poteſt abſque peccato. 3. De talibus legibus, intelligentes homines nunquam faciunt ſcrupulum conſcientiae, ſi abſit contemptus, ſcandalum, & notabile damnum. Tales ſunt leges de non ven…ndo, de non piſcando, de volucribus aut feris non capiendis, de non utendo hoc aut i…lo genere veſtium, ciborum &c. num. 28.purely penall, and the intent of ſuch lawes is ſatisfied, when one patiently ſubmits unto the puniſhment inflicted for the breach of them; ſuch are ſeverall lawes of our Land putting reſtraints upon ſome men in fouling, fiſhing, hunting, and the like: as alſo that ſtatute, which prohibited the eating of fleſh, at ſuch times upon politick reſpects, for the breed, and increaſe of cattle, as alſo for the encouragement of fiſhing, Now no man can reaſonably hold, that every breach of ſuch lawes is a ſin, eſpecially when tis not contemptuous, and ſcandalous: I put in that limitation, becauſe contempt of authority, and ſcandall unto others will make a very ſmall, and otherwiſe inconſiderable violation of a meer penall law, to be a very heinous ſinne.
Thirdly, the omiſſion of what is commanded by humane lawes is in many caſes (w)Obligatio legis non poteſt extendi ultra intentionem, & mentemlegiſlatoris, eamque Juſtam. Praeſumendumautem eſt nullum hominem velle ſu. os ſubditos ad …ethalem reatum & damnat…onem obligare, propter quemlibet ſuae voluntatis neglectum. Imo ſi in aliquo caſu magnum damnum, ſcandalum, aut incommodum ex obſervatione quarundam legum ſequuturum eſſet, praeſumitur non intēdiſſe legiſlatorem, ut in illo caſu obſervaretur. Ameſ. de Con. lib. 5. cap. 24. n. 22.agreeable unto the preſumptive will of a juſt magiſtrate. It is to be preſumed, that if he knew the caſes, he would tolerate the omiſſion, and therefore ſuch a bare omiſſion would not be a ſin: Of this Ames ſpeakes very well: the obligation, ſaith he, of a Law, muſt not be ſtretched beyond the juſt intention, and mind of the lawgiver, but it is to be preſumed, that no man would oblige his Subjects to a mortall guilt, and utter damnation, for every neglect of his will and pleaſure. Nay if in ſome caſe, the Law cannot poſſibly be obſerved, but ſome great damage, ſcandall, or inconvenience, muſt needs follow, it is to be preſumed, that the Law-giver never intended that the Law in ſuch a caſe ſhould be obſerved. We would reckon him a very cruell Magiſtrate that ſhould be implacably angry at a ſicke man for eating fleſh in a time of Lent, and can we thinke then, that there was any ſuch thing as Chriſtian pity and commiſeration in the breaſts of thoſe men whom nothing could attone for the omiſſion of the Croſſe, Surplice, &c? while they ſcandalized, that is deſtroyed, the immortall ſoules of many for whome Chriſt dyed. Suppoſe the greateſt Monarch upon the face of the earth ſhould command the meaneſt, and loweſt of his ſlaves upon ſome important affaire to ride poſt through ſuch a City, without any of the leaſt ſtay or diverſion, and then it ſhould happen, that a company of litle children ſhould be playing in the ſtreets, can this ſlave think, that he is obliged to ride over them? Nay, unleſſe we imagine his Maſter to be a moſt bloudy Tyrant, we muſt needs think, that he will be highly diſpleaſed at ſo horrid a cruelty; and can any man then make any tolerable apology for the tyranny of our late Prelates, who commanded all to drive on with a furious career in the courſe of conformity, without any the leaſt ſtop, though hereby were hazarded a world of ſoules, purchaſed at no lower a rate than the divine bloud of our bleſſed Saviour?
It is the will and pleaſure of the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, that matters commanded by his affirmative precepts ſhould be, for a while, forborne, in caſe of the likelihood of ſcandall conſequent; but theſe men (in imitation of him that exalted himſelfe above all that is called God 2 Theſ. 2.4.) could not be perſwaded to diſpenſe with a temporary forbearance of any ceremonies they enjoined: though they well foreſaw, that the ſequele of them was likely to be a very great, and ſpreading ſcandall.
But now the non-conformiſts might ſpare all this diſcourſe touching the obligation of humane lawes in generall: becauſe they hold that humane, religious, Doctrinall Ceremonies the matter in queſtion, cannot be lawfully determined by the authority of either Politicall, or Eccleſiaſticall ſuperiours: and for this they have two, as I take it, very convincing arguments.
Firſt, becauſe all ſuch Ceremonies are Saw…y additions unto the word, and ordinances of God, Deut. 4.2. and cap. 12.32. ſtrange fire which the Lord commanded not, Lev. 10.8.
Secondly, becauſe ſuppoſe they be indifferent (which was a thing never granted) yet they are unneceſſary toyes, and trifles: and therefore it is not lawfull for our ſuperiours to command them, when, from the practiſe of them, it is very probable, that ſcandall will ariſe. For
Firſt, every power is the Miniſter of God to thee for good, Rom. 13.4 the power of the Magiſtrate is like that of the Miniſter, only for edification, and not deſtruction, 2 Cor. 10.8. and cap. 13.10. but now if he ſhould have power to command humane ſymbolicall Ceremonies (that may be well ſpared in Gods worſhip and ſervice) when there is likelihood of the conſecution of Scandall: then he ſhould have power to do miſchiefe, to enjoine things hurtfull, and deſtructive unto the ſoules of men.
Secondly, our Saviours commination againſt ſcandall, Matth. 18.7. (Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh,) reacheth Magiſtrates, as well as private perſons: and we may ſay the ſame of the Apoſtolicall prohibitions of ſcandall both to the Romans, and the Corinthians, Rom. 14.13, 15, 20, 21. 1 Cor. 8.9. and chap. 10.32.
Unto theſe prohibitions adde we Pauls reſolution to avoid ſcandall ariſing from the uſe of things indifferent: if meat make my brother to offend (ſaith he) I will eat no fleſh while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my broth…r to offend, 1 Cor. 8.13. For
From this reſolution the unlawfulneſſe of the injunction of ſuch ceremonies as ours will undeniably follow.
To cleare this I ſhall preſuppoſe that, which cannot (with any colour of reaſon) be denied: to wit, that, that, which Paul held unlawfull for himſelfe to practiſe in his own perſon upon a generall account belonging to all Chriſtians, could not by him be lawfully impoſed upon others by an Eccleſiaſticall Canon; but now Paul held it unlawfull to eat fleſh in caſe of ſcandall probably conſequent, and this was upon a generall reaſon belonging to all Chriſtians: and therefore he thought it utterly unlawfull to impoſe any ſuch matter upon others when ſcandall was likely to follow.
From this thus premiſed, I ſhall hence thus argue Syllogiſtically, againſt our Prelates impoſition of our Ceremonies.
If it were unlawfull for Paul to impoſe upon the Corinthians ſuch ceremonies as ours, then it was unlawfull for our Prelates to impoſe ſuch upon us.
But it was unlawfull for Paul to impoſe ſuch Ceremonies as ours upon the Corinthians.
Therefore it was unlawfull for the Prelates to impoſe ſuch Ceremonies upon us.
The ſequele of the major is evident: becauſe the Prelates could not pretend unto ſo much authority in matters Eccleſiaſticall as Paul had: for in each of the Apoſtles there was a greater fulneſſe of juriſdiction then in any that ſucceeded them.
As for the Minor that may be confirmed by this following Syllogiſme.
If it were unlawfull for Paul to impoſe upon the Corinthians the eating of fleſh when ſcandall was likely to enſue, then it was unlawfull for him to impoſe upon them the uſe of ſuch Ceremonies as ours.
But the former appeareth to be unlawfull by the 1 Cor. 8.13.
Therefore the latter was unlawfull alſo.
There is nothing here can be queſtioned but the Major, and that is eaſily confirmed from a juſt compariſon of fleſh with ſuch Ceremonies as ours.
Firſt, the eating of fleſh was undoubtedly a thing more cleerly indifferent, then the practiſe of ſuch Ceremonies of ours.
Secondly, fleſh was neceſſary unto the maintenance of the life of man by diſjunction: that is, fleſh, or ſome other meat: but now ſuch Ceremonies as ours are not neceſſary unto the worſhip and ſervice of God by diſjunction: for God may be worſhipped without them, or any others in their ſtead: a ſurplice (ſaith Rutherford is not neceſſary by way of diſjunction, for neither is ſurplice neceſſary, nor any other white or red habit, that hath ſome myſticall ſignification, like unto Surplice: So kneeling to the elements is neither neceſſary, nor any the like religious honouring of them by proſtration before them, or kiſſing them.
But againſt this accuſation of our Ceremonies for ſcandall there are objected two Compariſons.
Firſt, of the duties of juſtice and Charity together: the duties of juſtice are more obligatory then the duties of charity, as being not only a morall, but a legall debt: Now to hinder the ſcandall of the weak is a duty of charity, only a morall debt, to obey the lawfull command of authority in things indifferent a duty of juſtice, a legall debt; and therefore of the greater obligation, and moment: I ſhall the rather inſiſt on this argument, becauſe it is of late ſo much ſtood on by Dr Sanderſon [in his laſt Sermons printed 1656. pag. 249.] where we are not (ſaith he) able to diſcharge both: debts of juſtice are to be paid (ſaith he) before bebts of charity. Now the duty of obedience is debitum juſtitiae, and a matter of right: my ſuperiour may challenge it at my hands as his due; and I doe him wrong, if I withhold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but debitum charitatis, and a matter of but courteſie. I am to performe it to my brother in love, when I ſee cauſe: but he cannot challenge it from me as his right, nor can juſtly ſay I do him wrong, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more lawfull for me to diſobey the lawfull command of a ſuperiour, to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren, then it is lawfull for me to do one man wrong, to do another man a courteſie withall, or then it is lawfull for me to rob the Exchequer to relieve an Hoſpitall.(x)Quis eſt, qui dicat, ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamu… furta divitibus? Auguſt. …ont. Mendac. cap. 7.
For anſwer: Firſt, if this argument be applied unto our Ceremonies there will be in ſuch application a meer begging of the queſtion; for that our Ceremonies were things indifferent, the command of them lawfull, the practiſe of them a duty of juſtice, a legall debt, is the maine thing in controverſy betwixt the conformiſts, and non-conformiſts; and therefore all this ſhould be proved, and not barely preſuppoſed as it is. But
Secondly, the fore mentioned rule is to be underſtood with this limitation, caeteris paribus, if the termes of the compariſon be equall: and equall they are not, when the minims of juſtice are put into the ballance with the weightieſt duties of charity: and ſo 'tis in the preſent compariſon, though we ſuppoſe our Ceremonies to be indifferent, and the practiſe of them a dutie of juſtice: for of what importance is ſuch practiſe in compariſon of the not ſcandalizing of our Brother? Who, that is not extreamly tranſported with prejudice, will think, that the commands of the Prelates to weare the ſurplice, to ſigne children with the ſigne of the Croſſe in Baptiſme &c. carry any tolerable proportion with thoſe precepts of the Apoſtle, deſtroy not him with thy meat, thy indifferencies, for whom Chriſt died; for ſuch things d…ſtroy not the worke of God? Rom. 14.15, 20. What lawes, of any earthly wight whatſoever, concerning ceremonies, can be more obligatory, than the Commands of God touching the externalls of his worſhip and ſervice? and yet it is his will, and pleaſure, that theſe externals of his worſhip ſhould be laid aſide for the performance of outward works of mercy? I will have mercy and n…t ſacrifice, Matth. 12.7. Thus are we to leave our prayers, both publique, and private, to forſake a Sermon, for to ſave the life of our neighbours, to quench the firing of his houſe, to helpe his cattle out of the ditch: now, if the ſacred Ordinances of God are to give way unto works of mercy unto the bodies of men, ſurely then much more is the traſh of humane inventions to yeild unto a worke of mercy towards the ſoules of men: This anſwer which I now give was made by Ruth…rford in his diſpute of ſcandall unto the Duplies of the Doctors of Aberdeen pa. 50, 51, 52, 53. his diſcourſe there is ſo ſatisfactory, as that I have thought fit to tranſcribe what he ſaies; and I hope the reading of it will not be irkſome unto the Reader.
It is true theſe duties which we owe to others by way of juſtice, are more obligatory then thoſe, which we owe only by way of charity, caeteris paribus: Wh…n duties of the Law of nature, and morall Law, are compuned together, then indeed the duties, which we owe both by the tye of juſtice and charity, are more obligatory then the duties that we owe onelyonly by the tye of charity. As for example, My Father is in danger before mine eyes to be drowned, in one d…ep water, and before my eyes alſo my neighbour or friend is in danger of the like kind: the two tyes and bands of juſtice and charity, both by the fifth and ſixt Commandements, are more obligatory, hic & nunc, and do more ſtrictly oblige, that I run to ſuccour and preſerve the life of my Father, than the life of my neighbour: f…r the obligation to my neighbour, is only Charity, by the obligation of the ſixth Commandement, which obligation ceaſeth, hic & nunc, at this time, when my fathers life is in hazard: and thus farre the Doctors argument goeth for ſtrong, as School-men, Caſuiſts, and Divines teach. But it is not to a purpoſe for the Doctors: for all offices and duties generally, and univerſally, of what ever kind, which we owe by may of Juſtice, are not more obligatory, than duties which we owe only by way of charity: as when duties of a poſitive commandement of God, enjoined by our ſuperiours, and duties which we owe by charity only, are compared to ether, th…n the Doctors Major propoſition is not cleare of it ſelfe, as they dreame, neither do Caſuiſts, or Ameſius, or Divines ſay with them; but truth, and all our Divines ſay againſt them. Let us ſuppoſe that the King, and Convocation, and Aſſembly of Prieſts and Prophets of Iſrael make a Canon according to Gods word. That no manner of man preſume to eat ſhew-bread, ſave the Prieſts only. All men owe obedience to this, both becauſe it is Gods expreſſe Law, and by the band of Juſtice the Eld…rs and aſſembly of the Ancients have forbidden it. But if our Doctors argument ſtand ſtrong, David at the point and hazard of famiſhing for hunger, ſinned in eating ſhew-bread, yet Chriſt acquitteth him of all ſinne, and ſaith Matth. 12.5. he and his followers are foreign, blameleſſe. Now David was under a duty by mercy, and love to his own life, and the lives of his followers, to eat ſhew bread, and he was under the band of Juſtice, by the Law of the Ancients of Iſrael, and Gods law, not to eat. Therefore in ſome caſes when our ſuperiours commandements are only poſitive Lawes, they are not more obligatory, than duties of Charity, only commanded in the Law of nature. I cleare it further thus, I ſee my …ighbour in danger before my eyes of drowning, and my father commandeth me to goe and labour, or ſow his farme in that time, while I am to preſerve the life of my neighbour, in preſent danger, to looſe his life in a great water. By the Doctors maxime, I am under the higher obligatory tie of Juſtice, to obey my father, who commandeth a thing both lawfull and neceſſary, by vertue of the higher commandement, to wit the firſt of the ſecond Table, than I am obliged by the ſixth Commandement, and of charity only, to give preſent ſuccour and helpe to my dying neighbour, ſo I muſt let my neighbour dye in the waters, to give a duty of Juſtice to my father of farre leſſe neceſſity. I would not commit my Conſcience to ſuch Caſuiſts, as are the Doctors of Aberdeen. But if the Doctors would ſee with ſome new light of reaſon; it is cleare that not only, the tye of juſtice maketh the precept more obligatory, but alſo the weightin…ſſe of the thing commanded; yea, and if the poſitive Commandements of the Lord our God, who of Juſtice, and Kingly ſoveraignty hath right to aske obedience of us above all earthly Superiours, do yeild and cede as leſſe obligatory, then commandements of love only, that are commanded in the Law of nature. What do our Doctors clatter and fable to us of a right of Juſtice, that mortall Rulers have to command in things indifferent, from which the deſtruction of ſoules doth ariſe? for theſe commandements of Rulers, (Kneele religiouſly before bread, the Ʋiceger…nt image of Chriſt crucified) (keepe humane holy dayes) (Croſſe the ayre with your thumb above a baptized infants face) at beſt, are but poſitive Commandements, not warranted by Gods word. But ſhall they be more obligatory by a ſuppoſed band of Juſtice that Prelates have over us to command ſuch toyes, than this divine Law of God, and Nature, Rom. 14. For indifferent dayes, meates, ſurplice, deſtroy not him for whom Chriſt dyed? All the Caſuiſts and Schoolemen, Navarra, Sylveſter, Sanchez, Raphael dela Torre, Meratius, Duvallius, Thomas, Scotus, Bona…entura, Suarez, Ʋaſquez, Greg: de valentia, Albertus, Richardus, Biel, Corduba, Angelus, Adrianus, Alphonſus, Becanus, Yea, and all the h…ſt of our Divines cry with Scripture, that mercy and the precepts of love, and of the Law of nature are more obligatory, than ſacrifice, burnt offerings, and Gods owne poſitive Lawes, yea, and that poſitive Lawes looſe their obligatory power, and ceaſe to be lawes, when the lawes of nature and neceſſary dutyes of mercy, and love (as not to murther our brother) (not to ſcandalize) ſtandeth in th…ir way. I might weary the Reader here with citations, and be wilder my ſelfe alſo, but it is a point of Divinity denyed by none at all. 3. What we owe of Juſtice to our Superiours, is indeed both a morall debt of obedience, and a debt of Juſtice and law, which Rulers may ſeeke by their place, and ex jure, as Ariſtotle ſaith, but this right is limited: Rulers have no right to ſeeke abſolute obedience, but onelyonly in the Lord, not againſt charity. And though the place of Rulers be authoritative, yet their commanding power, as touching the matter of what they injoyne is only Miniſterial, and they cannot but in Gods place exact, that which is Gods due, and ſeing God himſelfe, if he ſhould immediatly in his owne perſon Command, he would not urge a poſitive commandement, farre leſſe the commandement of light and vaine Ceremonies, againſt and beyond the precept of love, not to deſtroy a ſoule for whom Chriſt dyed. Ergò, Superiours under God, who borrow all their light from God, cannot have a higher right, than God hath. 4. The compariſon of a man who oweth moneys to a Creditor, and oweth moneyes to the poore, is cloſe off the way, for he is obliged to pay the Creditour firſt, but the caſe h…re is farre otherwiſe; the debt of practiſing indifferent feathers, and ſtraws, ſuch as kneeling, croſſing, wearing Surplice, is neither like the dept owen to the poore, nor to the Creditor; For natures Law, and Gods word, 1. Cor. 10.18.19. maketh the Non-practiſe, non-murthering obedience to God, when the practiſe of indifferent things is a ſoule ſtumbling to the weake, and the practiſing is but at 'its beſt obedience to a poſitive Law, and ought to ſtoope, and goe off the way, and diſappeare, when natures Law (murther not) doth come in 'its way. When the Doctors put Loyalty above Charity, they ſuppoſe obedience to Commandements commanding ſcandalizing of ſoulès to be loyalty to Superiours; which is queſtioned, it being treaſon to the ſoveraigne of Heaven, and Earth, to deſtroy his Image, it is taken as loyaltie by our Doctors, but not proven to be loyaltie, and ſo a vaine queſtion here, whether Loyalty be above Charity or not.
This diſpute of ſcandall is annexed unto his divine right of Church Government, which was publiſhed 1646. ſince that Dr. Sanderſon 1656 (as I ſhewed you but now) propounds the argument a new, with a great deale of triumph, but without any conſiderable reinforcement; and withall he takes no notice of Rutherford, his anſwer, from whence I gather that he never read it: and indeed it is a thing very incident unto the greateſt Schollars of that party to cenſure, but never to reade their adverſaries.
Thirdly, to ſay ſomething unto Dr. Sanderſon as well as unto the Duplyers, I muſt needs confeſſe, that I am tranſported with a juſt admiration, that ſo great a ſchollar ſhould ſo extenuate, as he doth, the guilt of an active ſcandall; for he makes the care of not giving offence to a brother to be a matter but of courteſy; he cannot, (ſaith he) juſtly ſay I do him wrong, if I neglect it: But firſt, the Apoſtle Paul ſpeakes another language, in his account to make brethren to offend is to ſin againſt them, to wound their weake conſciences, and ſo to ſin againſt Chriſt. 1 Cor. 8.12. Compared with ver. 11.13. and Rom. 14.15.20. he reſolves, that 'tis a deſtroying of a brother for whom Chriſt died, a deſtroying of the worke of God in him: whereupon Divines generally determine, that 'tis ſoule-murther: Now, in wounding the weake conſcience of our brother, in murthering his immortall ſoule, there is doubtleſſe ſome wrong committed againſt him: not to deſtroy him for whom Chriſt dyed &c. is more than a matter of meer courteſy unto him.
Secondly, ſuppoſe the care of not giving offence be, in reſpect of our brother, but debitum charitatis; yet in regard of God 'tis debitum juſtitiae, a legall debt: he may, and doth challenge it as due, and we do him wrong if we diſobey him. Our Saviour thundereth a woe againſt ſuch diſobedience; Woe to him through whom offences come, Luk. 17.1. and in the ſecond verſe this woe is aggravated by compariſon with a very grievous puniſhment, it were better for him that a Mill-ſtone were hanged about his neck, and he caſt into the ſea, then that he ſhould offend one of theſe little ones.
But to proceed unto the ſecond compariſon on which I inſiſted out of Biſhop Morton and Dr Sanderſon: a Compariſon betwixt a ſcandall given to a Magiſtrate, and a ſcandall given to one, who is only a brother: I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magiſtrate, who is a brother, and withall a Magiſtrate be not greater, than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? an impartiall Judg will ſoone determine that the double relation of brother, and Magiſtrate weigheth down the ſingle, and naked relation of a brother &c. ut ſuprà.
For anſwer unto this, diſtinguiſh we of a two … acception of ſcandall. Primary, and Secundary.
Firſt, Primary, and ſo tis an occaſioning culpably the fall of another into ſin.
Secondly, Secundary, and ſo 'tis only the angring, vexing, diſpleaſing of another.
This diſtinction premiſed; the compariſon may be underſtood; either of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a ſecundary acception, with a ſcandall of one, who is onelyonly a brother in a ſecundary acception of the word too; or elſe of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a ſecundary acception with the ſcandall of a brother in a primary acception; or 3. of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a primary acception with the ſcandall of a brother in a primary acception alſo.
Firſt; if the Compariſon be on both ſides to be underſtood of ſcandall taken in a ſecondary ſenſe, there is no doubt, but the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate is more dangerous, than that of one, who is only a brother: for the wrath of the ſupreame Magiſtrate is as the Meſſengers of death, Prov. 16.14. as the roaring of a Lyon, Prov. 19.12. In indifferent things then it will be our ſafeſt courſe to anger a brother, rather then to diſpleaſe the Magiſtrate. But this acception of ſcandall is impertinent unto our purpoſe, and ſo much is confeſſed by Dr Hammond in his treatiſe of ſcandall pag: 23. To be angry, grieved, troubled, at any action of another, is not (to be offended) in the ſcripture ſenſe, nor conſequently doth it follow, that I have done a miſſe in doing that which another man is angry at, unleſſe my action be in it ſelfe evill. The ſcandall we ſpeak of is culpable; but to diſpleaſe a magiſtrate is not alwaies a ſin: the miſtake of ſcandall for the angring of one is taken notice of by Calvin alſo upon 1 Cor. 8.13. having affirmed, that ſome corrupted the doctrine of ſcandall with fooliſh gloſſes, and others with their impious calumnies, he ſheweth the originall of both their miſtakes touching the meaning of offence in the Apoſtle. Ʋtrique errant in verbo offendendi. Nam offendere accipiunt, pro incurrere in odium, vel offenſionem hominum, aut quod idem ferè eſt, facere quod ipſis diſpliceat, vel minus arrideat. Atqui clariſſimè patet ex contextu, nihil eſſe aliud quam malo exemplo tanquam obice fratrem impedire à recto curſu, aut illi praebere cauſam lapſus. Non ergo hic diſputat Paulus de retinendâ hominum gratiâ, ſed de ſublevandis infirmis, nè concidant, & prudentèr rege…, nè à rect â viâ deflectant.
Secondly, if the compariſon proceed of the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate in a ſecondary ſenſe with the ſcandall of a brother in a primary ſenſe, doubtleſſe the ſcandall of a brother is more to be declined: it is farre better to anger, and diſpleaſe a pious Magiſtrate, a religious Prince, a Parliament, a whole Church, & Commonwealth, then culpably to occaſion the fall of the meaneſt, pooreſt, and moſt illiterate artizan into ſin: and this will be denyed by none who know, that 'tis more dangerous to diſpleaſe God, than man.
Thirdly, if the compariſon be to be underſtood of the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate in a primary acception with a ſcandall of a brother in a primary acception too: then I ſhould thinke, that the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate is the greater, and more to be eſchewed, it is a greater ſin culpably to occaſion the fall of the Magiſtrate into ſin, then the fall of a meere brother: becauſe the falls of Magiſtrates are of a more pernicious example, giving greater countenance, and encouragement unto ſin.
But this will no wayes advantage our Sticklers for Ceremonies: for the non-conformiſts deny, that their forbearance of Ceremonies did culpably occaſion the fall of the Magiſtrate into ſinne: and the contrary they expect to have proved and not barely dictated.
One thing let me obſerve on the bie, before I paſſe on: and 'tis: that, if thoſe who make this compariſon of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate with the ſcandall of a brother, take ſcandall on both ſides in the primary acception thereof: then they ſeeme to intimate, that there may be a caſe wherein a man may be neceſſitated culpably to occaſion the fall, either of a Magiſtrate, or of a brother into ſinne: Of a Magiſtrate if he forbeare what he commands, of a brother if he practiſe it: But this is not caſus dabilis, for God by his providence, can never neceſſitate a man unto ſin: of this Rutherford ſpeaks very ſolidly in his refutation of the Dupliers pag. 41, 42. You ſhall (ſaith he unto them) be forced to give a caſe, wherein we are neceſſitated by Gods providence, and that by way of contradiction, whether we forbeare, or forbeare not to murther either the ſoules of ſome weake ones, or the ſoules of ſuperiours, by our forbearance of the practiſe of things judged expedient by ſuperiours: You make us to murther the ſoules of Superiours, by the non-forbearance, or you will have us to murther the ſoules of weake brethren, if we practiſe. This is a wronging of providence, and a Manichean tenent, that we can be under ſuch a neceſſity of ſinning. Yea, there muſt be two contrary revealed Wills in God, Commanding, by forbearing the Ceremonies, not to murther Superiours, and commanding by not forbearing, not to murther weake brethren: and ſo God commandeth both to forbeare and alſo not to forbeare. Mr Tombes [in his treatiſe of ſcandalizing p. 266, 267, 268.] quarrels with Ames, for affirming, that there can be no ſuch perplexity, that it ſhould be neceſſary for a Godly man, whether he do this or that, or not do it, to ſcandalize ſome one: But Dr Ames is to be underſtood of a ſcandall in the primary ſenſe, a culpable occaſioning the fall of another into ſin: and the objections of Mr Tombes proceed only concerning ſcandall in a ſecundary acception thereof, as will be apparent unto any one, that will be pleaſed to peruſe them.
There be two things more I ſhall take notice of in my forementioned diſcourſe.
Firſt, I ſuppoſe all along that the Convocation was our Mother, and the Church of England: but ſurely ſhe was a ſtep mother unto divers of the Godly, uſing towards them farre more rigour, then unto ſuch whom profaneſſe rendered obnoxious unto their Courts: if any indifferent man looke upon their Canons he muſt needs confeſſe, that one of their cheife deſignes was to cruſh, and perſecute ſuch religious perſons, whom they nicknamed Puritans, to deſtroy with their Ceremonies ſuch among them for whom Chriſt died. But I wonder upon what account, I, or any man elſe, could think it to be the Church of England. If in any ſenſe it can be called the Church of England, it was becauſe it repreſented the Miniſtry of England, and that it did not; becauſe the farre major part of it were Cathedrall men, Biſhops, Deanes. Arch-Deacons, and ſuch as were choſen by the reſpective Chapters of each Cathedrall: it might then be a repreſentation of the Cathedrall Miniſters, but not of the miniſtry of England: and that I ſhall make good by two parallels.
The firſt ſhall be, betwixt our Convocations, and the Councill of Trent: many ſober, and moderate Papiſts accuſed this to be a pack'd aſſembly, a repreſentation, of, not the Catholike Church, but the Court of Rome; becauſe the greateſt part of it were of the Popes faction, and depended wholy upon him: So the Major part of our Convocations were of the Biſhops faction, and minded chiefly the intereſts of Cathedrals: and therefore were not a repreſentative of all the Miniſters in England. I ſhall exemplifie this by inſtancing in the Dioceſſe of Bathe, and Wells, wherein I lived: In this there were members of the lower houſe of Convocation, one Deane, three Archdeacons, and one choſen by the Chapter of Wells: and to ballance theſe there were but two Clarkes choſen by the Miniſtry of the whole Dioceſſe: Now what impartiall man, but will determine that theſe ſeaven could be no due repreſentation of the Miniſters of the Dioceſſe of Bathe and Wells, as long as five of them were members of the Cathedrall, in whoſe election the Miniſters of the Dioceſſe had no hand at all.
A ſecond paralell ſhall be betwixt our convocation, and a civill aſſembly: wherein we will ſuppoſe, that the Prince chooſeth three hundred, who are his Courtiers, or elſe ſuch as have their dependance, either wholy, or in great part upon him: and the nation chooſe only a hundred: you may call this aſſembly a Parliament, or what you will; but ſurely no rationall man can thinke it to be a repreſentation of the nation: and as irrationall were it to call the Convocation a repreſentation of the Miniſters, of England, ſeeing thoſe choſen by the Miniſters were an inconſiderable part of the Convocation.
And unto this we may adde; that there was ſeldome a due, and regular choice made of the Clerks of the Convocation: I was preſent at the laſt election, that was at Wells: and then Biſhop P…irce told us, that it was an unqueſtionable priviledge due unto his See for him to propound unto us the Clerkes that we ſhould chuſe, unto which he expected our conformity, tacitly menacing all that diſſented.
And when yet, by all this violence, he was unlikely to carry it for ſuch as he had nominated; why then, he had another ſhift, that was (I believe) never heard of before: he enabled the Pluraliſts, of whom either all, or moſt were his favorites, to voice it in ſeverall capacities: to give as many double voices, as they had dignities, and benefices: his Son gave at that time eight ſingle voices, two as he was Archdeacon of Bath, two as he was Prebend of Cudworth, two as he was Parſon of Bucklan-Mary, two as he was Vicar of Kingsbury: Now, to ſay that ſuch an election was regular, and lawfull is as ridiculous, and ſenſeleſſe, as if a man ſhould ſay, that in the Choice of Knights of the Shire for Parliament; men may give as many double voices, as they have Farmes and Livings.
A ſecond thing I ſhall take notice of, in the now mentioned diſcourſe, is my miſinterpretation of the 1 Cor. 10.32. Upon which I thus deſcanted: as Paul exhorts to give none offence neither to Jew nor Gentile, ſo he addes in a further ſpecialty nor to the Church of God: The Jewes and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, ſhe the mother. Here was a groſſe miſtake, in thinking, that the Jewes and Gentiles here ſpoken of were members of the Church: whereas, by the Apoſtles diſtinction of them from the Church of God, it is plaine, that they were not as yet converted unto the Chriſtian faith, but were as yet enemies thereunto, and conſequently ſtrangers unto the Church: And thus having finiſhed my examination of the two limitations that I gave in a former edition of this treatiſe. I ſhall goe on to that which followeth.
But ſuppoſe the action in which this appearance of evill is imagined to be as indifferent in it felfe, ſo alſo not annexed unto a neceſſary duty, and we alſo left to the uſe of our liberty, what then?
Two-things are here eſpecially to be conſidered: firſt, the quality of the action excepted at; ſecondly, the difference of times, and places.
To beginne with the firſt, the action (at which thy brother is ſcandalized, by his groundleſſe imagination, that 'tis evill, or carrieth a reall appearance of evill) is either of none, or great importance to thee.
If it be of none importance, but weightleſſe, as affording thee either none, or but ſmall benefit: offend not thy brother by an unſeaſonable exerciſe of thy liberty. Know that as authority, ſo charity ſhould alſo reſtraine it: conſider that by this undue uſe of thy liberty thou ſinneſt againſt thy brother, and by ſinning againſt him thou ſinneſt againſt Chriſt. 1 Cor. 8.12.
But now if it be of ſome weight, and moment, as yeelding thee ſome great profit, why thou muſt a while forbeare it, untill thy brother may be better informed, and to informe him that the action is lawfull which offends him, thou muſt take care too, otherwiſe thou wilt prejudice the truth, through thy regardleſſe ſilence, and alſo continue his weakneſſe, and foment in him a negative ſuperſtition. Let every one of us, (ſaith the Apoſtle, Rom. 15.2.) pleaſe his neighbour for his good unto edification, And for a man to humour his neighbour in an erroneous and ſuperſtitious opinion, however it may pleaſe him, yet not for his good unto edification: Upon which ground I take it, that the Apoſtle Paul, as he refuſed maintenance at Corinth, to avoid appearance of a coveteous intention, and mercenary affection in preaching; ſo alſo his juſt title, and unqueſtionable right thereunto he at large both profeſſeth, and proveth.
But now if thy brother refuſe, and contemne information: Tunc deſinit eſſe ſcandalum puſilli ex inſirmitate, aut ſimplici ignorantiâ, et incipit eſſe ſcandalum Phariſaei ex purâ malitiâ, aut ignorantiâ affectatâ, & craſſâ. The ſhelter of weakeneſſe is thereby taken from him, his judgment being now overſhadowed no longer with a meere weakeneſſe ariſing out of ſimple ignorance, but with a proud, and wayward, if not envious and malitious perverſneſſe, that is accompanied with a groſſe, willfull, & affected ignorance, He is no longer then to be accounted a weak one, but a proud and wilfull one, and for his peeviſhneſſe thou mayeſt chooſe, whether thou wilt forgoe thy liberty. Calvin upon the 1 Cor. 8.13. tells us of ſome foolliſh interpreters, that leave unto Chriſtians almoſt noe uſe at all of thinges indifferent, upon pretext to avoide the offence of ſuperſtitious perſons inepti ſunt, inquit, qui nullum prope uſum rerum indifferentium reliquum faciont Chriſtianis, nè ſuperſtitioſos offendant, And he diſcovers the ground of their miſtake to be; becauſe they do not conſider, that Paul here inveigheth againſt thoſe, who unſeaſonably abuſe their knowledg before ſuch weake ones, whom they neglect to informe, or inſtruct concerning the matter, at which they are ſcandalized: therefore there will be no place for reprehenſion if ſuch information preceed, In hoc hallucinantur inquit, quod non conſiderant Paulum hic invehi adverſus eos, qui ſcientiâ ſuâ intempeſtivè abutuntur coram infirmis, quos docere negligunt. Ergò reprehenſioni amplius locus non erit, ſi praecedat doctrina. Mr Tombes [in his treatiſe of ſcandalizing, pag. 233, 234.] quotes Peter Martyr, and Bucane for the ſame purpoſe, and this what they ſay is generally, ordinarily, or for the moſt part true; for if we are to forbeare all our conveniences, and matters of expediency, when men are ſcandalized at them, after we have given them, or offered to give them full information; our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent would in theſe our times come to be juſt nothing: nay our ſervitude would be greater, and more unſupportable, than that of the Jewes under the Leviticall Ceremonies.
However yet information doth not alwaies alter the nature of ſcandall; for the ſcandall of the weake may ſometimes laſt, Poſtquam reddita eſt ratio facti, after a reaſon of the fact, whereat they are ſcandalized, is rendred to them. For, by reaſon of their extreame ignorance, and ſlowneſſe of underſtanding, they may be utterly incapable of information, and inſtruction; or elſe ſome opinion, or practiſe, whereunto they have been long accuſtomed, may caſt ſuch a miſt before their weak judgments, as that they may not be able preſently to apprehend the reaſon that is given of the action, at which they ſtumble. And we ſhould ſo farre pitty the ſimplicity of ſuch poore ſoules, as to abſtaine from that which ſcandalizeth them, if by ſuch abſtinence there accrue not to us any great loſſe, or inconvenience.
This is obſerved by Cajetan upon Aquinas 2. 2dae. q. 43. art. 7. Ʋbi dicitur, inquit, articulo 7 mo. de ſcandalo puſillorum, ſi autem poſt redditam rationem hujuſmodi ſcandalum duret, jam videtur ex malitiâ eſſe; adverto, quod author non aſſertivo verbo utitur, ſed opinativo, dicendo, jam videtur ex malitiâ eſſe; poteſt ſiquidem contingere, quod puſilli non ſint capaces rationis redditae, vel propter priſtinam conſuetudinem, quae facit apparere diſſonum, quod veritati conſonat, vel propter rationem apud eos magis apparentem, vel aliquod hujuſmodi: & tunc quia malitia non facit ſcandalum, ſed ignorantia vel infirmitas, quamvis reddita ſit ratio, ceſſandum eſt ab hujuſmodi ſpiritualibus non neceſſariis. Cajetan. in 2.2.0.43. &c. Whereas it is ſaid in the 7th article, touching the ſcandall of the weak, if after a reaſon given, the ſcandall do ſtill remain, it ſeemeth to be of malice; you muſt note the Author doth not uſe (verbo aſſertivo, ſed opinativo) ſaying, it ſeemeth to be of malice. For it may fall out that the weake are not capable of the reaſon that is rendred, either by reaſen of his former Cuſtome, which maketh that to appeare diſcordant with the truth, or for ſome reaſon which in his eyes is more apparent, or by reaſon of ſome ſuch like cauſe, and then it is not out of malice that he is offended, but out of ignorance and infirmity.
After Cajetan, Petrus de Lorica doth roundly and fully expreſſe the matter. Verum eſt (ſaith he) quod Cajetanus advertit, ſcandalum puſillorum perſeverare poſſe adhuc, poſtquam reddita eſt ratio facti, vel quia rationem non capiunt ob mentis tarditatem, vel ob conſuetudinem diu firmatam: in quo caſu docet Cajetanus omittendam eſſe actionem, ex quâ ſcandalum accipiunt; vel differendam, donec ad ſaniorem mentem venerint. Quòd ſolùm verum, ſi actio omitti poteſt ſine jacturâ noſtrae utilitatis. Si enim magna utilitas temporalis vel ſpiritualis interveniat, contemni poteſt ſcandalum puſillorum, poſtquam ſufficienter admoniti ſint. In the next place I will recite a limitation of Gregory de Valentia, that comes under this head, and is very remarkable.
Having laid downe a rule, that for avoiding the ſcandall of our neighbour, which ſpringeth, either from his ignorance, or weakneſſe, it behooveth us by the obligation of Charity, to do, or omit, that which may be done, or left undone without ſin: he afterwards puts this exception. Eſt autem animadvertendum hanc regulam intelligi debere de omni eo, quod ſine peccato fieri, aut omitti poſſit, non quom docunque, ſed moralitèr, attentâ ſuavitate, quae eſt in jugo legum divinarum: id eſt, quod ſine peccato fieri, aut omitti poſſit, ſine maxima etiam aliqua, & penè intolerabili difficultate, ſpectata quoque in hac conditione perſonae &c, And indeed (me thinks) he ſpeaks reaſonably. For improbable ſeems it, that the ſweet moderation, which is in the yoake of divine lawes, ſhould conſiſt with ſo great a rigour, as in all matters whatſoever, not ſimply unlawfull, to exact, not only a brotherly, but alſo a ſervile compliancy with every ſuppoſed weak one, whoſe weakneſſe may be but pretended by thoſe, that are willing to ſpeake favourably of them. For the humouring and contenting of every ſuppoſed weakling in all matters at which he takes offence, I conceive not my ſelfe bound to endanger my life, to hazard my eſtate, and fortunes, or to incurre any other great, or notable inconvenience: for that would truly be durus ſermo, an hard ſaying: who were able to beare it?
But now againſt this may be objected the reſolution of the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. 8.13. if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no fleſh while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my brother to offend: fleſh is of great expediency for the nouriſhment of mans life, and yet Paul reſolves upon a perpetuall abſtinence therefrom in caſe of ſcandall Conſequent; and this example of Paul is obligatory unto all Chriſtians.
For anſwer, firſt, this fleſh may be underſtood only of ſuch as was ſacrificed unto Idols; for words in ſcripture uſually are to be reſtrained unto the ſubject matter ſpoken of, and the meat, and fleſh, here ſpoken of in the Context, was ſuch as had been offered unto an Idoll.
Secondly, Calvin reſolveth that 'tis an Hyperbole: eſt, inquit, hyperbolica locutio, quia vix poſſibile eſt, ut quis à carnibus totâ vitâ abſtineat, ſi remaneat in communi vitâ ſignificat tamen ſe nunquam uſurum potius ſuâ libertate, quam ut fit infirmis offendiculo. Nunquam enim licitus eſt uſus, niſi moderatus ad charitatis regulam. This Hyperbole of Pauls you may Parallel with that of our Saviour, Matth. 5.39, 40, 41. whoſoever ſhall ſmite thee on thy right cheeke, turne to him the other alſo. And if any man will ſue thee at the Law, and take away thy coate, let him have thy cloake alſo. And whoſoever ſhall compell thee to goe a mile, gee with him twaine.
Thirdly, Paul is to be underſtood, only upon ſuppoſition that the Goſpell ſhould not be fully promulgated, and brethren ſhould remain uninſtructed concerning the nature of Chriſtian Liberty; for uſually 'tis in this caſe only, that to eat fleſh involves in the guilt of an active ſcandall, makes a brother to offend: hence the Apoſtle exhorts the ſtrong amongſt the Romans to abſtaine from meats forbiden by the Law of Moſes, for prevention of the ſcandall of the weake: but amongſt the Galathians, and Coloſſians he diſlikes ſuch an abſtinence, and dehorts from it: & the reaſon, of this his different carriage, was: becauſe the weak amonſt the Romans were not fully taught the doctrine of Chriſtian liberty, & the Galathians & Coloſſians were Julian, miſtaking the Apoſtles doctrine of ſcádall, thought to make uſe of it for the ſtarving of the Chriſti…s, and therefore, in Antiochia, and in the region round about, he dedicated all the fountaines to the Goddeſſes of the Gentiles, and cauſed all the victuall, that was to be ſold in market places, to be ſprinkled with Ethnick, holy waters, thinking that ſome would be ſcandalized at the drinking of the water of ſuch fountaines, and at the eating of ſuch victuall, and that the Apoſtles doctrine obliged all to forbeare any thing in the caſe of ſcandall: never-theleſſe Chriſtians, without ſcruple of conſcience, dranke of the water, that was in the Wels, and ate of the meat, which they bought in the market; beeing, ſince the full publication of the Goſpell, fully perſwaded, that to the cleane all things are cleane. Rutherford determines; that, ſince the plenary promulgation of the Goſpell, wee are not obliged to forbeare the good Creatures of God, things good, fit, and uſefull for the life of man, or of phyſicall uſe in the worſhip of God, though men be ſcandalized at ſuch things, and the reaſon of their ſcandall be, becauſe they have been abuſed unto Idolatry, and ſuperſtition: he inſtanceth in Churches, abuſed unto the ſaying of Maſſe, and unto the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and in bells that have been abuſed by Papiſts by being conſecrated, baptized & uſed to chaſe away divels: & for this his determination you may gather out of him [p. 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, &c.] theſe two reaſōs.
Firſt, becauſe abſtinence from ſuch things, (upon a religious account, for avoidance of ſcandall, becauſe abuſed to Idolatry, and ſuperſtitiō,) would be, (after a full publicatiō of the Goſpell) a Judaizing, an externall Cōformity with the Jew, a betraying of our Chriſtian liberty, a cōfirming & hardning the Jewes in their Apoſtacy: it would make, as Paul ſaies, Jeſus Chriſt of no effect, it would make us debters to Circumciſiō, & to all the Ceremonies of Moſes, Ga. 5.3, 4.
Secondly, the practiſe of ſuch things, ſince we are fully poſſeſſed in that liberty, wherewith Chriſt hath made us free, is morally and Theologically neceſſary, for the aſſerting of our Chriſtian liberty: to ſhew, that every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refuſed, 1 Tim. 4.4. That unto the pure all things are pure, Titus 1.15. that we dare not call that uncleane which God hath cleanſed, Act. 10.15.
But there is one paſſage in this authour concerning ſcandall, which I cannot in any waies approve of: it is pag. 58, 59. where he averreth, that things of meere civill uſe, that are neceſſary with a neceſſity of conveniency are to be forborne, if ſcandall follow, if they be not convenient in the higheſt degree. And that no man may think I miſreport him, take his own words. There be ſome things of meere civill uſe, as Bells, gownes, Pulpits, preaching on Tueſday or Thurſday. Theſe be conſidered two waies. 1. As neceſſary with neceſſity of conveniency ſimply. 2. With neceſſity of conveniency ſecundum praevalentem gradum, as convenient in the higheſt degree of neceſſity, or that morall maximum quod ſic. In the firſt degree, what ſcandalizeth, is to be rejected: in the laſt reſpect they oblige, and if any be ſcandalized thereat, it is taken and not given.
But ſure this doctrine if embraced will put and hold mens Conſciences upon a perpetuall rack: For it will be a matter of great difficulty eſpecially for ſome men allwaies to determine what in their indifferencies is convenient in the higheſt degree.
Secondly, we muſt put a difference between times, and places: for however they be but circumſtances of actions, and therefore extrinſecall to them, ſo that they cannot cauſe any ſuch eſſentiall variation in them, as to make thoſe actions materially good, or ſinfull, which are of themſelves in their own nature indifferent: yet notwithſtanding the publick and ordinary abuſe of an action at ſuch a time, or in ſuch a place, may make it then and there, in that place and for that time appeare to be evill; although the ſame action at another time, and in the ſame place; or in another place, at the ſame time, may not be obnoxious to any ſuch cenſure.
Firſt then, time may alter this imaginary appearance of evill in an action. Reſervation of the brazen ſerpent, as for other ends and purpoſes, ſo for commemoration of that miraculous deliverance of the Iſraelites thereby, from the ſtings of fiery Serpents, was for a while free from all ſuſpicion, either of Idolatry or ſuperſtition: but when once it became the generall, ordinary, nay daily occaſion, and object of Idolatry, of the groſſeſt, and moſt palpable kind of Idolatry that can be, when incenſe was offered to it: then if the publique Magiſtrate had not demoliſhed it, he might juſtly have been thought to favour that Idolatry wherewith it was polluted. And therefore commendable was Hezekiah his zeale in breaking it in peices, 2 King. 18.4.
In the former Edition it was obſerved out of Morton that the ſame Hezekiah did not deſtroy the high places, which Solomon had built for Aſtoreth, the abomination of the Sidonians: and for Chemoſh, the abomination of the Moabites; and for Milchom, the abomination of the Children of Ammon, and yet was never taxed for countenancing of Idolatry. For in his daies the Idols there erected, were diſregarded no man worſhipping them, and therefore might ſafely be ſuffered to ſtand: but when afterwards they were generally and uſually adored, then the good King Joſiah juſtly demoliſhed them: and indeed ſhould he have permitted them then when the Idolatry wherewith they were defiled, was flagrant at the height, he might juſtly be ſuſpected to be a favourer of that Idolatry.
But unto this obſervation of Mortons, Ames thus replyeth. He propoundeth, as very obſervable, that Hezekiah did not aboliſh the Idols, which Solomon ſuffered to be ſet up, becauſe they were neglected. But. 1. it may well be thought that thoſe idols were deſtroyed by Hezekiah, and ſet up again before the time of Joſiah, as many other ſuperſtitions were. 2. It cannot be doubted but they ſhould have been deſtroyed, even though they were for the time neglected: becauſe either Hezekiah had as good cauſe to deſtroy them as Joſiah; or elſe he might have prevented that cauſe which Joſiah had: and to prevent evill, we are as well bound, as to correct it.
Unto this Reply of Ames, Dr Burges rejoineth, whoſe Rejoinder and Ames his Triplication I ſhall rather tranſcribe then Epitomize.
Dr Burges his Rejoinder unto the firſt part of the Reply.
Say you ſo? then belike it may be well thought that the holy Ghoſt knew not ſo well as you what was done, for the text ſaith, that Joſiah deſtroyed thoſe high places, which Solomon King of Iſrael had ſet up: and then deſcribes by the very place, where, and by name thoſe ſame Idols, which Solomon had ſet up for his outlandiſh wives, 1 King. 11.5, 7. I hope you will repent this raſhneſſe, I am ſure you ſhould.