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Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Practical Part 2 · Henry Jeanes

Mixture of Scholastical Divinity with Practical Part 2, Excerpt and reply 1

Dr. HAMMOND.

1 Cor. 14. 40.

foreign.

Decently, and according to appointment.

1. SInce the publishing that Answer to Mr. J. concerning the degrees of ardency in Christs Prayer, I am advertised of another passage in that volume, in which I am concerned, relating to some words of mine in the view of the Directory, pag. 19. on the head of Uniformity in Gods Service, and particularly respecting my rendring of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14 40. Let all things be done foreign.

2. These indeed I thus rendred [decently and according to order or appointment] and affirmed the importance of that place to be, that all be done in the Church according to Custome and appointment, rendring this reason of the former, because it was implyed in foreign, decently (custome being the onelyonly rule of decency, &c.) and of the latter, because the words do literally import this, foreign, i. e. according to order or appointment.

3. To the former of these he makes his first exception, thus, [he dares not affirme that this is the immediate sense of the place, but onelyonly that it is implyed; it cannot be denyed, but that decency doth imply such customes, the omission of which doth necessarily infer indecency; but that the omission of such ceremonies as ours, doth infer indecency, the Doctor and all his party can never make good: What undecencie can the Doctor prove to be in the administration of Baptism without the Crosse; as also in publique Prayers and Preaching without a Surplice? But of this see farther in … in the places but new quoted: The Doctor may perhaps look upon him as an inconsiderable adversary. But we shall think his Arguments considerable, untill the Doctor, or some other of his party give a satisfactory answer unto them. In the mean while let us examine the proof that … Doctor brings for this sense: and it is because custome is the onelyonly rule of decency.

This Proposition, though very strange, is …; and therefore we might as well reject it, as the Doctor dictates it. But I shall adde a consutation of it, from these follow: ing arguments.

1. If custome be the only rule of decency, then nothing else can be a rule thereof besides custome; but this is false; for the light and law of Nature, is also a rule thereof, and that ….

2. Nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto the onelyonly rule of … but divers things are undecent, which yet can plead custome; and this is so evident, as that I will not so much undervalue the Doctors judgement, as to endeavour any … thereof It is … that the onelyonly rule of decency should be undecent; but yet … is very possible that many customes should be …, and therefore I shall conclude, that custome is not the … rule of ….

3. Lastly, unto custome, as you may see in both Aristotle and Aquinas, the frequent usage of a thing is required. But new there may be decency or handsomnesse in the … usage of a thing; and of this decency custome is not the rule, and therefore it is not the only rule of decency.

4. The … thing here charged on me, is …, that I … not say what I said not, and this attended with a concession (in a limited sense) of the truth of what I did say; the … is the … unsufficiency of that, in that limited sense, to prove what he … I would have from it, viz. that the omission of our ceremonies … … indecency: And the proof of this charge …, 1. by way of question, founded in two …, the Crosse in Baptism, and the … in publique Prayer, and …: 2. By reference to Ames, and resolving to think his arguments considerable, till a satisfactory answer be given them. And his third charge, is my using an unsufficient proof to prove my interpretation, viz. this, [because custome is the onelyonly rule of decency] which he confutes by three arguments.

These three charges I shall now very … examine, and, if I mistake not, clearly evacuate. The first by assuring him, 1. that I did dare to say, and indeed said (as I then thought perspicuously) the full of what I meant; but that it was no way incumbent on me, to say either what I did not mean, or what Mr. J. or any other should be justly able to charge of want of truth in the least degree. And 2. if what I said cannot, as he confesses, be denied, to have truth in it in one sense, I demand why must it be a not daring (which is wont to signifie timidity or cowardise) … I … it not in another sense, wherein … doth not consent to it.

Jeanes.

The not daring of a thing proceeds from, not only timidity, but also from conscience and shame: When we say of men in controversal writings, that they dare not affirm such and such errours, we do not reproach them with cowardise, unlesse he be a coward that is afraid, or ashamed to deliver an untruth. That according unto custome is the immediate sense of foreign, is a very gross & evident falshood; & when I said that you dared not to … it, my meaning plainly was, that your conscience or shame kept you from such an affirmation, and what wrong I have herein done you I am yet to ….

If you demand why I say that, you dare not say what you said not?

I answer, I have two reasons for it:

1. In entrance into this dispute, I did, as is usall in Controversies, premise what I took for uncontroverted on both sides. 1. for your part, I thought you would not deny, but that the immediate sense of foreign was not according unto custome; and then, I propounded for my owne part what I granted.

2. Though in Charity I judge, that you dare not say, that according unto custome is the immediate sense of foreign, yet I must needs tell you, that by your opinion it is incumbent upon you to say as much, and that I thus prove: You … that according to … is the importance of foreign, that is, the adequate and full importance of it, for that you should so …, as to say, that you meant, it is onelyonly the partiall, and inadequate importance of it, I will not so much as imagine: But now, if it be not the expresse, and immediate sense of the word, but onelyonly … …, as drawn there-from, as a sequele or …; by way of deduction or consequence, it may onelyonly be a part or peice of the importance therof: to prove then, that 'tis the full and adequate importance of the word, you must make good, that it is the immediate sense of it.