Dr Creeds Voluminous Defense of Hammons Ektenesteron, Title page

Dr Creeds Voluminous Defense of Hammons Ektenesteron · Title page

Dr. CREED'S Voluminous Defence OF Dr. HAMMOND'S ἘΚΤΕΝΕ'ΣΤΕΡΟΝ Briefly EXAMINED, And The weakneſſe thereof fully diſcovered.

By HENRY JEANES.

LONDON, Printed for Edward Brewſter at the Signe of the Crane in Saint Paul's-Church-yard, 1661.

p. 1Dr. CREED'S Defence OF Dr. HAMMOND'S ἘΚΤΕΝΕ' ΣΤΕΡΟΝ, EXAMINED.

I Shall premiſe three things touching this doughty Work of Dr. Creeds.

The firſt ſhall be, concerning the Inſolent and Scurrilous Incivilities wherewith it is every where fraught. And it is to acquaint the Reader, That I ſhall not honour them ſo much as to take a diſtinct and particular notice of them, for they are ſo groſs, as that they carry their condemnation in their forehead. Indeed I have not heard of any wiſe, ſober and moderate man, though of the Doctors perſwaſion in other particulars, that hath made the leaſt Apology for them, when they have been told how he hath in them treſpaſſed againſt all good manners. I ſhall therefore leave them unto his Romance… Readers, who are ſo much taken with their gaudy language, and for the Meridian of whoſe ſoft underſtandings they were eſpecially calculated … and they ſhal have my fair leave to make themſelvs as merry with them, as they pleaſe: their mirth may ſtir my pity, but it ſhall have no influence upon either my anger or envy.

The ſecond ſhall be concerning the wonderful prolixity thereof, occaſioned by his frequent extravagancies or out leaps, his numerous, but impertinent Qu…tations, his frivulous Objections, in all which ſhould I follow him foreign the bulk of my Book would be ſo ſwell'd thereby as that all Readers would be a…righted from the peruſal thereof. In favor p. 2therefore to the Reader, I ſhall paſs by moſt of theſe with a juſt and deſerved neglect, and ſelect only ſuch paſſages to be examined, which thoſe learned and judicious friends whom I have conſulted, have judged moſt material and important.

A third thing ſhall be concerning the ſenſe of Doctor Hammond in the controverſie. He never affirms (ſaith the Defendant) that the ſelf ſame numerical act of holy love in Chriſt was more intenſe at one time then at another: but onelyonly that one act of his love of God compared with another, was more high and intenſe then another. pag. 22, 23, 63, 64, 185. Unto this I ſhall readily agree▪ neither know I any reaſon that he hath to charge me for diſſenting herein.

About the ſtate of the Queſtion he objecteth, (pag. 17, 47.) that the terms of the Queſtion are much altered from what they were at the firſt. Saith he, This Refuter charged the Doctor with a direct and flat denial of the all-fulneſs of habitual grace in Chriſt, and now it is onelyonly by conſequence. To prove the notorious falſhood of this crimination, I ſhall onelyonly refer the Reader unto pag. 258, 259. of my Mixture, for there he may ſee▪ … by ſequel I did deduce my charge from the Doctors words; and the validity of this deduction I have made good againſt Doctor Hammond, and ſhall further clear againſt this our Defendant, by diſcovering the vanity of all ſubterfuges, that he hath, to evade the force of my argumentation.

They are in number four.

When the Doctor ſaith that the acts of Chriſt's love of God are … pable of degrees, and ſometimes more heightned, more ardent and intenſe then at other times, or in other acts.

1. He ſpeaks by a Metonymie of the effect, or Synecdoche generis, and not of the love of God properly and formally taken.

2. He is not to be underſtood of thoſe acts of love of God that are immediately terminated on God the onelyonly good; but of thoſe that are immediately terminated on us men for God's ſake.

3. By the actual love of God he underſtands (ſaith he) not the action of loving, but the term of that action, a quality produced thereby, which for want of words is called love.

4. By the actual love of God he underſtands not that which agreeth to him as Compre…enſor, and was a ſequel of the beatifical viſion; but that which belonged to him as he was V…ator, and aroſe from the infuſed knowledge of God, and the infuſed habit of Divine charity.

Having thus propounded the evaſions of the Defendant in General, I ſhall take a diſtinct and ſeveral ſurvey of them.

The firſt is pag. 5, 6, 217, 335, 336, 546. and 'tis, That when Doctor Hammond ſaith that the acts of Chriſt's love of God, or holy charity, are capable of degrees's and ſometimes more heightned, p. 3more ardent and intenſe then at other times, or in other acts; he ſpeaks by a Metonymie of the effect, or Synecdoche generis, and not of the love of God properly and formally taken.

But that Dr. Hammond is to be underſtood of love properly and formally taken, when he aſſerts a greater ardency in Chriſt's love of God at one time, then another, is as clear as the Sun, from ſect. 22. of his foreign. For there he ſaith, that love as a genus is predicated of that love which he ſpeaks of. Now the genus is predicated properly and formally of it's ſpecies, for 'tis predicated thereof in primo modo dicendi per ſe.

But perhaps you may ſay, that though the love which Dr. Hammond ſpeaks of, be love properly and formally taken, yet 'tis called the love of God onelyonly tropically.

Unto this I Reply,

I. That Chriſt's love, which Dr. Hammond ſaith, is capable of degrees, &c. is that very love which is commanded Deut. 6.5. a love of God with all the ſoul, heart, might, and ſtrength, &c. and that is a love proper and peculiar unto God, and not to be communicated unto any creature. And, pray Sir, is not this that high, and tranſcendent act of Divine love you ſpeak of pag. 5. whereby the ſoul is immediately fixed, and knit to God as the onelyonly good? and then with what face can you deny it to be the love of God properly and formally taken? But however, the poor Refuter muſt be condemned lege falſarii (pag. 5.) right or wrong. For whereas Doctor Hammond ſpake expreſly of Chriſt's love of God, the Refuter is ſo dull and ſimple an Animal, as to underſtand him of his love of the Creator, whereas alas, Doctor Hammond had a profounder conceit, which is highly rational in it ſelf, and is to be interpreted concerning his love of the Creature. And this is enough to clear me from the crime of Forgery, with which this ſhameleſſe Defendant aſperſeth me.

But his Calumny will be the more apparent if we inſiſt upon thoſe two Tropes, One of which he ſayes the Doctor makes uſe of.

The firſt is the Metonymie of the effect, and that is when the effect is put for the efficient. Now do not you by your Diſcourſe plainly inſinuate, that the efficient is here taken for the effect; the love of God, for the iſſues and effects of the love of God. If there were then a Metonymie in Doctor Hammond's words, it was by you a Metonymie of the efficient, and not of the effect. And indeed you tell us, pag. 217. that all the acts of piety, and mercy, and charity, and vertue, are called the love of God by a Metonymie of the efficient, becauſe they flow from it. And either this is a flat contradiction to what you here ſay, or elſe the Metonymie of the efficient and of the effect muſt be confounded, and be all one.

But ſecondly, Dr. Hammond doth not make uſe of any Metonymie at p. 4all, either of the efficient, or of the effect. For that which is termed the love of God only Metonymically, is ſo called only equiv…cally▪ and that the love of God is here taken by the Doctor, for that which is ſo ſtiled only equivocally, you dare not aver; for that which is predicated of a thing equivocally, may in propriety of ſpeech be denyed of it: that which is the love of God only equivocally, may be ſaid not to be the love of God.

But you may perhaps ſay that he ſpeaks, if not by a Metonymy of the effect, yet by a Synecdoche generis.

But Synecdoche generis (as Voſſius, Alſted and other Rhetoricians have taught me) is when the genus is put for the ſpecies, as creature for man Mark 16.15. But how the love of God is here by Dr. H. taken for any of its ſpecies, paſſeth my dull imagination. I ſhall not therefore adventure ſo much as to gueſs at your meaning, but patiently wait for your own Learned Explication of it.

And thus the Reader ſees, how this firſt Evaſion, that Dr. Hammond ſpeaks of the love of God only as 'tis taken tropically, by a Metonymy of the Effect, or by a Synecdoche generis, fails againſt both Logick and Rhet…rick.

But it may be objected, from pag. 6. That Chriſts love of God which Dr. Hammond ſpeaks of, is his prayer unto God: now prayer is properly an act of Religion and Devotion towards God; and improperly and figuratively an act of holy Charity or divine Love.

For anſwer

1 Though Prayer conſidered formally in it ſelf, be an act of divine Love only improperly, and figuratively, yet it implieth the love of God properly and formally taken; and 'tis undeniable, that Dr. H. ſpeaketh of Prayer under this conſideration, as implying the love of God properly and formally ſuch; for he bringeth Chriſts praying more earneſtly, as a proof to make good his expoſition of thoſe words, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy ſoul, heart, might and ſtrength, where the love of God is taken properly and formally. Now of this expoſition it can be no confirmation, if the Doctor do not conſider Chriſts prayer, as implying his love of God properly and formally taken.

Though Prayer conſidered formally in it ſelf be not properly an act of divine love, but only implyedly, viz. prepoſi…ivè and concomitantèr, yet the reaſon which the Defendant brings for the confirmation of this, becauſe 'tis properly and formally an act of Religion, is very queſtionable. For

2 According to the language of Proteſtant Divines, one and the ſame Act may properly be an act of both Religion and holy charity too; for they take Religion in ſo large a ſenſe, as that it comprehends all duties of he firſt Table. Thus Ames makes all parts of Gods Worſhip both natural and inſtituted to be parts of Religion. Now if this acception of Religion be proper, it will not be material, though it be ſomewhat different from that of the Schoolmen.

p. 52 But proceed we unto his Second Evaſion, which differs little from the former, if at all, but in termes, and 'tis concerning the acts of Chriſts love of God. Theſe, ſaith the Defendant, are of two ſorts: 1 Thoſe that are immediately terminated on God the only good. 2 Thoſe that are immediately terminated on us men for Gods ſake, in whoſe love as the prime act they are all radicated and founded; the one the Schooles call charitas ut finis; the other they call charitas propter finem. Though then the acts of Chriſts love, as immediately terminated on God, were always at the height and one equal perfection (as was never yet queſtioned or denyed by the Doctor) yet this nothing binders but that the other acts of this love (of which alone the Doctor ſpeaks) regarding us for Gods ſake, might conſiſt in a latitude, and gradually differ from one another, and fall ſhort of the fervour of thoſe acts that immediately reſpected God, &c. See pag. 3, 5, 22, 70, 71, 216, &c. uſque ad 248, 279. uſ que ad 291, 328, 329, 335 336, 338, 343, 361, 372, 373, 516, &c.

Well then, the great miſtake of the Refuter is, That whereas Dr. Hammond ſpake expreſly of Chriſts actual love of God the Creator, and yet meant thereby his actual love of man a creature, the Refuter was ſuch a dull Block-head, as not to reach this hidden and inviſible meaning of Dr. Hammond.

But firſt, if this were a miſtake, it ſhould not (me thinks) be ſo criminous and unpardonable; For

Firſt, The Refuter in his expoſition of the actual love of God went by that common rule, Analogum per ſe poſitum ſtat pro favioſiori analogato; If a word hath two ſignifications, one proper, another improper and …opical, it muſt be taken properly if it be put by it ſelf and have nothing added to determine and carry it unto an improper and tropical ſenſe. Now the actual love of God is taken properly only of thoſe a…s that are terminated immediately unto God, and all thoſe that are terminated unto us men for Gods ſake, are termed the love of God only improperly, and by a trope; and Dr. Hammond ſpeaks abſolutely of the actual love of God, and hath nothing to reſtrain his ſpeech unto the latter ſort of acts; and therefore he is to be underſtood of the former, thoſe that ar… immediately terminated on God.

Secondly, If this were a miſtake, it had been an eaſie matter for Dr. Hammond to have prevented it in his foreign, by a clear and diſtinct explication of his meaning: but he hath not done this, and therefore if the Refuter be to be blamed, Dr. Hammond cannot be altogether excuſed.

But I deny that I am guilty of any ſuch miſtake as is imputed to me. For that Chriſts actual love of God in Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be underſtood of all thoſe acts of love that were immediately terminated on us men, all duties of the Second Table, &c. I ſhall prove by an Argument drawn from the Relation that Dr. Hammonds diſcourſe concerning Chriſts actual love of God, &c. hath to the Commandment Deut. 6.5. Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy …, and p. 6with all thy ſoul, and with all thy might. It is brought as an Exemplification and proof of his interpretation thereof; and therefore this actual love of God in Chriſt, muſt be the ſame with that love of God which is there commanded. Now that love of God which is there commanded, is that only which is immediatly terminated on God. For,

1. It muſt be with all the heart, ſoul, might, and ſtrength: and the Acts of love that are terminated unto the creature immediatly, cannot be performed in ſuch an intenſion without groſſe and palpable Idolatry.

2. The love of God here commanded, is by our Saviour himſelf diſtinguiſhed from the love of our neighbour, and of our ſelves, and conſequently 'tis reſtrained unto the love of God, which is terminated immediatly upon God. Jeſus ſaith, The great Commandement … the Law is, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoul, and with all thy mind, this is the firſt and great Comman…ement; and the ſecond is like unto it, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf, Matth. 22. verſ. 36, 37, 38, 39. Here theſe two Commandements, are the two Summaries of the Commandements of both Tables: And ſeeing they are diſtinguiſhed by our Saviour himſelf, we muſt not make any confuſion betwixt them. But they are confounded when the duties of the ſecond Table, or this Commandement, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf, are ranged under the firſt Table; Or this Commandement, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, ſoul, might, and ſtrength. Now thoſe acts of charity that are immediatly terminated unto us men for Gods ſake, are all Duties of the ſecond Table, and belong unto that Commandment, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf.

3. Unto this let me adde a third Argument (which may be reduced unto the firſt) taken from the ſecond Part of Doctor Hammona's Expoſition of the place, and thus it ſtands; That act of the love of God which tranſcends all thoſe acts of love that are immediatly terminated on the creature, is that high act of the love of God, which is immediatly fixed and terminated on God, as the only good. But the act of the love of God which is commanded D…ut. 6.5. tranſcends all thoſe acts of love, which are immediatly terminated on the creature: Therefore 'tis that act of the love of God, which is terminated and fixed immediatly on God himſelf, as the only good.

The Major is undeniable, and if the Minor be not Doctor Hammond's own, let the Defendant expound unto us theſe words of his, That Phraſe thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy ſoul; denoteth ſecondly, the loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into competition with him, not … any thing elſe in ſuch a degree.

p. 7This argument may briefly be thus alſo varied. No acts of the love of God, that are ſuperiour unto thoſe that are immediately terminated on us men for God's ſake, can be thoſe very acts that are immediately terminated on us men for God's ſake; for one and the ſame thing cannot be ſuperiour unto it ſelf. But thoſe acts of the love of God that are commanded Deut. 6.5. are ſuperiour unto thoſe that are immediately terminated on us men for God's ſake, and ſo much is evident by Dr. Hammond's expoſition of the place: And therefore thoſe acts of the love of God, that are commanded D…ut. 6.5. are not thoſe that are immediately terminated on us men for God's ſake.

But ſuppoſe that Dr. Hammond ſpake of thoſe acts of holy charity that are terminated on us men for Gods ſake: yet by what the Defendant ſaith, it will be no injuſtice to think, that he ſpeaks of thoſe act…s under this reduplication, as terminated immediately on God himſelf. For by the Defendants opinion, pag. 234, 235 holy charity and it's acts, are terminated unto us mea for God's ſake, onelyonly as a material object, and unto God's infinite goodnſs alone, as the formal object. Now things are rather denominated from that which agreeth unto them formally, then from that which is aſcribed unto them on…ly materially, for d…n… minatio fit à pottori. Now thoſe acts of charity that are terminated unto us men, conſidered as terminated on God as their formal object, ought to be in all, and were in Chriſt alwayes at the height, and one equal perfection.

Our Defendant himſelf confeſſes, pag. 217. that to Engliſh ears, this ph…aſe, the love of God, ſeems eſpecially to import the prime and more principal love that hath God for its immediate Object: but then withal he adds, that in Scripture phraſe it frequently does not.

The firſt place he quotes, is Luk. 11.42. Wo unto you Phariſe…, (ſaith our Saviour) for ye tythe mint, and rue, and all manner of h…rbs, and paſſe over judgement, and the love of God: theſe ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. But this place he confeſſeth to be otherwiſe expounded by divers, and we have (ſaith he) no need of doubtfull places. But 'tis without doubt, that the love of God is not there taken in ſuch a latitude o… amplitude, as to contain the whole duty of man towards God and our neighbour: for 'tis diſtinguiſhed from judgement, and that compriſeth, if not all, yet a great part of our duty towards our neighbour.

But the Defendant in the next place alledgeth inſtances out of the firſt Epiſtle of St. John, that are (he ſaith) beyond all exception.

The firſt inſtance is 1 John 2.5. But who ſo keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him. But to prove the impertinency of this place, p. 8we need go no further then Dr. Hammond's Pa…aphraſe of it. But the obſerving his commands, is the on…ly ſure argument, that he that doth ſo, is a perfect lover of God, truly ſo called (the appellation being falſely aſſumed by the Gnoſticks) and an argument of evidence to himſelf, that be is a branch, a member of Chriſt, as the Gnoſticks boaſt that they are, and that whatſoever they do, it cannot make them ceaſe to be ſo. The obſerving of God's commandments is an argument of the perfect love of God, but it doth not therefore follow, that it is the love of God it ſelf.

The two next places, the 1 Joh. 3.17. 1 Joh. 4.20 every rational Reader will judge wide from the mark. For the utmoſt that can be gathered from them is, that the love of God is inſeparably connexed with the love of our Neighbour, and hath an influence or impery up…n the acts thereof. But what is all this unto the purpoſe?

The laſt place the 1 Joh. 5.3. may perhaps be thought to have ſome colour of an Argument, For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments.

Here 'tis plain, that the Apoſtles ſpeech is to be underſtood Metonymically, and the meaning of it is, that the love of God is the cauſe of the keeping his commandments, and the keeping of God's commandments i… an inſeparable effect, or fruit of the love of God. This meaning of the place is excellently laid down by Eſtius; Senſus idcircò adjec… de mandatis ejus ſervandis: quia diligere Deum, per conſequentiae ratione… eſt mandata ejus ſervare. Charitas ſi quidem erga Deum, ait Cajetanus, ratio eſt ſervandi mandata ejus. Unde quamvis praeceptum diligendi Deum, ab aliis …us praeceptis diverſum ſit: quicun…ue tamen boc dilectionis ſervat praeceptum, ex câ dil…ctione ettam caetera Det praecepta ſervat, ut quorum obſ…rvatio ex dilectione Dei nec…ſſariò dep…ndeat, ac ſequatur tanquam effectus ex propriâ cauſâ. Quod etiam ſignificant illa Ch…ſti verba J…an. 14. Qut babet mandata mea, & ſervat ea: ille eſt qui diligit m…. Et iterum: Si quis diligit me: ſermonem meum ſervabit. Et ca. 15. Ves ami…s met eſtis, ſifeceritis quae ego praecipio vobis. Simile eſt buit loco qued ſupra capite …. dixit Joannes: Qui ſervat verbum ejus: v…è in boc charitas D…i perfecta eſt. By what hath been ſaid, the Reader may perhaps think that this place ſeems to be very advantagious for the Defendants turn.

But upon more ſerious conſideration it will be found to do him no ſervice at all: For,

Firſt, though there be a Metonymy in the Apoſtles words, yet it lieth not in the love of God: the Metonymy is in the praedicate, and not in the ſubject of the Propoſition; and the love of God is the ſubject of the Propoſition, as is evident from the prefixing of the Greek art…cle foreign, and there is nothing hind…eth, but that it may be taken in the greateſt propriety, onelyonly the praedicate (this, that we keep the commandments of God) is affirmed of it Metonymically.

Secondly, it is plain, that in S. John's words there is a cauſal p. 9predication (a)(a)Praedicatio impropria ca… ſalis eſt, quâ unum extremum alteri ad ejus cauſam deſignandam n…n repugnante loqu…di conſuetudine conjungitur, e.g. Ira eſt fervor ſanguinis circa cor, eſt oratio vera ſenſu cauſali. Nee …nim ira, quae eſt affectio auimi, proprie loquendo eſt ſervor ſeu ebullitio, ſed exiſtit ex illà ebullitione, & ebullitio illa exiſtit ex irâ, ſed diverſa reſpectu. Huc reſer & illa: hic bolus eſt mihi mors, boc eſt mortifer. Alſted.for the love of God is the keeping of his Commandements, not formally, but cauſally, that is, 'tis the cauſe of keeping Gods Commandements. Now every one knows, that in a cauſal predication there is ever a Metonymy of either the efficient or effect. But no… in th…s propoſition, one act of Chriſts love of God was more intenſe then another, which the Defendant confeſſeth to be the ſenſe of Doctor Ha… mond; there is no cauſal predication, nor any footſteps of any other argument, from which a man may Logically conclude a Metonymy.

Nay, thirdly, if any Argument can be drawn from coherence, it is (as I have already ſhewen) evident that Dr. Hammond cannot be underſtood of the love of God in a Metonymical acception, for he ſpeaks of the ſame love of God that is commanded, Deut. 6.5. and that is undeniably the love of God properly taken.

In the next place, pag. 219, 220, &c. Uſ que ad 227. the Defendant endeavoureſh to prove by arguments from the Doctors writings, that he takes the love of God in ſuch a large ſenſe, as to take in all duties to our neighbour. The weakneſs of which arguments it were an eaſie matter to diſcover, if it were worth the while: but indeed we may juſtly deſpiſe them, for it being cleared that Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be underſtood of any other love of God, but that which is immediately terminated on God himſelf; if they prove any thing they will conclude that the Dr. contradicts himſelf, and that is a matter wherein I that am none of his Idolaters, am no wayes concerned.

Once it is very apparent, that this large acception of the love of God…s very Catachreſtical, for according to it, the loweſt and meaneſt acts of both Charity and Juſtice towards our neighbour (even the Hangmans conſcientious performance of his Office) may be termed the love of God: and moſt men would judge this to be an unſavoury expreſſion; it would ſound very harſhly unto not only Engliſh but all Chriſtian eares. And whether ſo harſh a Catachreſis be to be tolerated in Controverſal writings may juſtly be doubted. If Dr. Hammonds cauſe then cannot be upheld, but by flying unto ſuch a Catachreſtical and abuſive acception of the love of God, it is a ſhrewd ſigne, that 'tis in a very tottering, if not deſperate condition.

From what hath been ſaid, the Reader may furniſh himſelf with an anſwer unto the greateſt part of the book: But more particularly unto two of thoſe arguments, which the Defendant brings to make good this affection, that there is and muſt be in Chriſt, a gradual difference in reſpect of the ſeveral acts of the habit of the love of God. As for p. 10the third argument, p. 244. the confirmation of it may more fitly be referred unto a more proper place.

The firſt argument he proſecutes from p. 227 uſ que ad 236. and 'tis by him thus ſummed up, p. 227, 228. Where there is, and of neceſſity muſt be, a gradual difference, and more in reſpect of the goodneſs of the Objects of the habit of charity, or the law of God, there is, and of neceſſity there muſt be, alſo a gradual difference in reſpect of the ſeveral acts of this habit of charity, or the love of God. But there is and muſt be a grad…al difference, and more in reſpect of the goodneſs of the objects of the hab…t of charity, or the love of God in Chriſt. Therefore there is, and muſt be, a gradual difference in reſpect of the ſeveral acts of this habit of charity, or the love of God in Chriſt.

In the Argument there is committed that fallacy which is termed fallacia ignorationis Elenchi; for, the concluſion takes the acts of the love of God in Chriſt in ſuch a latitude, as to comprehend thoſe acts of love which were terminated unto man: Whereas Dr. H. and the Refuter are to be underſtood (as hath been ſhewn) only concerning thoſe acts of the love of God, which are terminated on God himſelf: and between theſe there is no gradual difference, for they have one Object alone, Gods infinite goodneſs in himſelf.

Unto this we may add ex abundanti unto the Minor, that the pretended difference betwixt the Objects of the love of God in Chriſt, is by the Defendants opinion, only as touching the material objects thereof, for the formal object or reaſon is aſſerted by him to be ſtill one and the ſame; and hereupon 'twill follow, that the acts of Chriſts love of God are formally the ſame, and conſequently the acts of this love which have their ſpecification from their objects, are, by his opinion, formally the ſame too; and the formal conſideration of things is chiefeſt and moſt to be heeded.

Theſe anſwers might eaſily have been foreſeen, but inſtead of them the Defendant falls to his conjectures, p. 232, 233. There can (ſaith he) be but two things poſſible (as far as I can foreſee) returned in anſwer to this diſcourſe. Firſt, that it is not one and the ſame habit of charity, whereby we love▪ God and our neighb…us a… our ſelves; and and therefore as the precepts are ſeveral, ſo the objects are divers, and the affections of the ſoul, that carry it on to the love of God, and our neighbour, are as different as the Objects themſelves are. And therefore though it be granted that the ſeveral acts that flow from theſe ſeverally diſtinct habits, do gradually differ in themſelves in reſpect of intenſeneſs, according to the gradual diſtance of goodneſs in the object; yet it follows not, that therefore the acts of one and altogether the ſame habit, of charity and holy love, do gradually differ… alſo; which was the thing to be proved.

Secondly, Though it were granted, that the h…bit of charity and holy love to God, and our neighbours, be one and the ſame habit, yet a gradual difference in the goodneſs of the objects of this love will not argue a gradual p. 11difference of intenſeneſs in the inward acts of this love, but onelyonly in the outward acts and expreſſions.

Theſe anſwers are none of mine, but the groundleſs ſictions of the Defendant, and therefore I may juſtly paſs them over in filence.

But yet unto the firſt I ſhall ſay ſomething, becauſe it affords occaſion of ſome diſcourſe that may be acceptable unto the Reader.

Firſt, Scotus reſolves indeed, with Aquinas, that eodem habitu diligimus Deum, & proximum; but then ſcripto Pariſienſi in 3^um. ſent. dist. 28. he determ…ues that diligere proximum is velle eum condiligere D…um. Dico, quod eodem habitu diligimus Deum & proximum, quia eodem actu volo vel diligo Deum in ſe, & volo proximum Deum in ſe diligere, perfecte autem amans, dilectum vult diligi, & Deus, qui eſt bonum commune non vult eſſe bonum particulare, ideo habens habitum talem, cujus actus praecipitur in communi, quod poſſibile est fieri, potest diligere Deum, & proximum velle Deum diligere, quia eodem habitu poſſum tendere in objectum, & reflecti ſuper illud, ergo eadem charitate poſſum diligere Deum, & velle proximum diligere Deum: & hoc est diligere proximum, quod eſt reſpectu honeſti. Quod probatur ex bo…, quod iſta duo, ſc. alquid velle, & diligere, ſunt ejuſdem rationis. To love our Neighbour, is to will, that together with us he ſhould love God. Scotus then doth not take the love of our Neighbour in ſuch a latitude as the Defendant, but far more reſtrainedly.

Secondly, If Aquinas his opinion be, that the habitual love of God, and the habitual love of our neighbour be one ſimple and indiviſible habit, one ſpecie infimâ, then his opinion may be impugned by two arguments, in the ſolution of which the Defendant may do well to take ſome pains.

The I. argument is becauſe the habitual love of God is or ought to be more intenſe then the habitual love of our Neighbour: and this inequality is an argument of a real eſſential, and conſequently ſpecifical diſti… ction. For it cannot be numerical, becauſe duo accidentia, numero tantùm diverſa, non poſſunt eſſe in eodem ſubjecto ſimul.

Secondly, If the habitual love of God, and the habitual love of out Neighbour were one and the ſame ſpecifically, then the acts of love that are terminated to our Neighbour, all Duties of the Second Table would be elicite acts of the habitual love of God; whereas 'tis evident, they are onelyonly imperate acts thereof.

But the Defendant objects, pag. 233, 234. That God and our Neighbour, are beloved for one and the ſame formal reaſon or object, and therefore the habit of Divine love towards them muſt be one and the ſame.

Unto this it may be anſwered.

Firſt, That the love of God, and the love of our Neighbour, have one formal ultimate object or motive: Yet their formal immediate objects may be different. The formal object or motive of our love of God is his infinite Goodneſs, conſidered as it is in himſelf, and the immediate formal p. 12object of our love of our Neighbour, is the Goodneſs of God commu… cated unto, and ſhining in, our Neighbour.

Secondly, though the formal object be one and the ſame, yet the application thereof, and the way of tendeney thereunto, is far different. For 'tis applied unto God intrinſecally, unto our Neighbour extrinſecally: Unto God as the end, unto our Neighbour as the means. And therefore our love of God is called Charitas finis, and the love of our Neighbour Charitas propter finem. To clear this, I ſhall quote the words of Suarez, Metaph. diſp. 44 ſect. 11, n 30. Advertendum eſt in omni habitu dari ex parte objecti aliquam rationem tendendi in illud, quam motivum operandi poſſumus appellare, &c. habitus antem voluatatis tendunt ad proſequ…ndum aliquod bonum: omais autem proſe…utio boni eſt ex aliquo motivo, ſeu ex aliqud ratione boaitatis, quae voluntatem attrahit. Hoc ergo motivum ſeu rati… tendendi, eſt abſque dubio, quae dat actui ſpecificam rationem, quae eadem erit, ſi aequaliter aut eodem modo per actus attingatur: quia ſemper id, quod eſt ſermale, eſt quod dat ſpectem: materiale autem eſt quaſi per accidens, vel individuale, reſpectu talis actûs. Dic… autem, ſi aequaliter vel eodem modo talem rationem tendat, nam contingit … & eandem rationem tendendi non aequè applicari diverſis materiis, & ideo non eodem modo attingi per actus. ut ect, v. g. bonitas divina quatenus eſt in Deo, & reddit illum amabilem, vel quatenus per quendam reſpectum applicatur proximo, ut illum etiam amabilem reddat. Nam licet illa bonitas in ſe una ſit, non tamen ill is rebus aequè conve…t: & ideò modus tendendi in illan non eſt idem. Et idem eſt univerſum de bonicate finis, reſpectu ipſius finis, & reſpectu mediorum, & de ſimilibus, in quibus ratio tendendi alteri intr…aſ…cè, altis vero extrinſècè applicatur. I confeſs Suarez holds, that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our Neighbour are but one indiviſible habit. But this is no hinderancè, but that we may make uſe of his words againſt himſelf; and the rather, becauſe what afterwards may be picked out of him in anſwer hereunto, is very unſatisfying: The utmoſt that he ſaith is, that there is a neceſſary sonnexion betwixt the acts of the love of God, and the love of our neighbour; he ſaith the ſame of other acts, But this connexion of the acts, doth not prove an unity of the habits. The habits may be connexed as well as the acts; and connexion, if it be real, implieth a real diſtinction. And 'tis very obſervable, that Suarez himſelf infers from the connexion of acts onelyonly a poſſibility, not a neceſſity of the unity of the habit▪ Tandem, quando actus ipſi ſunt inter ſe connexi, & quaſi radicati in aliquo primo, tunc etiam poſſunt habere ſimilem connexionem, ſaltem virtualem, in ipſo habitu: ergo quantum est ex hoc capite, ſi aliud non obſtet, poterit idem indiviſibilis babitus eſſe principium hujuſmedi actuum. Diſp. & ſect. praedict. n. 32. But I ſhall not pertinacio…ſly contend about this matter, but leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader.

Here I ſhall digreſs a little from the Defendant, to conſider the opinion of ſome School-men, who maintain, that 'tis alwayes one and the ſavie act whereby God and our Neighbour are loved: and they have of it a p. 13pretty illuſtcation, from their tenet of Image-worſhip. Look (ſay they) as an Image and its Prototype are worſhipped with one and the ſame worſh…p, ſo God and our Neighbour are loved with one and the ſame act of love.

But the real diſtinction of the acts of the love of God and the love of our Neighbour, I ſhall prove from four Arguments.

1. From their ſeparability: there may be an actual love of God, when at the ſame time there is not an actual love of our Neighbour. And ſo again on the other ſide, there may be an actual love of our Neighbour, when at the ſame time there is onelyonly virtual or habitual love of God: For at the ſame time there may not be any actual cogitation of God. Now things that may really be ſeparated, are q…eſtionleſs really diſtinguiſhed.

2. From their inequality: The love of God ought to be more intenſe then the love of our Neighbour, (for it is to be with all the ſoul, heart, might and ſt…ength) and therefore 'tis really diſtinguiſhed therefrom.

3. From the dependency of the love of our Neighbour upon the love of God: The actual love of God is the efficient cauſe of the actual love of our Neighbour, and the efficient and the effect are alwayes really diſtinguiſhed.

4. From this may be drawn another Argument, proceeding from the poſteriority of the actual love of our Neighbour, unto our actual love of God: For being the effect thereof, it muſt needs be after it, and that really à parte rei, and not onelyonly in regard of our conſideration. Now this is an evidence of the real diſtinction of theſe acts; for if they were one and the ſame act really, then one and the ſame thing ſhould be really both before and after it ſelf: which is a manifeſt contradiction.

But I return unto our Defendant, and unto his ſecond Argument, which he purſues very copiouſly p. 236, &c. uſque ad 244. The ſum of it is this, There are not onelyonly perfect and effectual, but alſo imperfect, conditionate, and uneffectual acts of Christs will, and thoſe are gradually diſtinguiſhed from theſe, &c.

But what of all this? it will not therefore follow, that one act of Chriſts love of God is more intenſe then another act, unleſs you can prove, that theſe imperfect and uneffectual acts of Chriſts will, are elicite, proper and formal acts of his love of God. This is a thing that you all along preſuppoſe, but have not proved, nor never can prove. Not onelyonly Scholaſtical D…vines, but all that have any moderate inſight into Practi…al Divinity will tell you, Maſter Defendant, that to ſay that Chriſts actual love of God is imperfect, uneffectual, conditionate, is an ignorant, groſs, and very lewd blaſpbemy.

I ſhall but remark two things more, touching this ſecond Evaſion of the Defendant, and then proceed unto a third.

Firſt, Chriſts actual love of God, which Dr. Hammond ſpeaks of, is not (ſaith the Defendant) frequently the action of loving, but a term produced thereby: and yet he ſaith p. 70. that the acts of Chriſts love p. 14of God, are ſome of them terminated immediately on God, and others of them on us men, &c. By this then it ſeems that the ſuppoſed utmoſt term of the action of loving in Chriſt, is terminated further unto another term, if not effective, yet objective. Now this is a very deep ſubtilty the clear explication and confirmation of which, we ſhall juſtly expect from the Defendant.

2. The Defendant grants, that the outward expreſſions of love, are not love it ſelf, and wonders that I can be ſo uncharitable, as to think that Dr. Hammod was a man of ſo ſhallow and ſlendor parts, as to take the outward expreſſions of love for love it ſelf, pag. 84, 90, 95. And yet he tells us, that Dr. Hammond takes Chriſts actual love of God, in ſuch a latitude or amplitude, as that it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbour, whatſoever is good and excellent in him, pag. 216, 219, &c. Now the outward expreſſions of the love of God, are a part of man's duty, and therefore, by the Defendant, are the love of God in Dr. Hammona's ſenſe of the word. How the Defendant will reconcile this, the event will ſhew.

But go we on unto the third Evaſion of the Defendant. He diſtinguiſheth of a two-fold actual love; 1. the action of loving; 2. the term of that action, a quality produced thereby, which for want of words is called love. Now Dr. Hammond (he ſaith) is to be underſtood of the latter, the term, and not of the former, the action of loving. p. 21, 22, 25, &c. uſque ad 42, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 211, 212, 113, 214.

But firſt ſuppoſe, though not grant, that there were ſuch a term of the immanent action of loving, yet this cannot be the actual Divine love which Dr. H. ſpeaks of. For,

1. The actual love which he ſpeaks of, is the matter of that Commandement, Deut. 6.5. Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, &c. Now that the ſuppoſed term of the immanent action of love is not in any probability. For,

1. That is moſt likely to be the matter of this precept, whoſe being is moſt undeniable, and uncontroverted: but the exiſtence of immanent actions is leſs queſtioned, then that of their terms. The exiſtence of theſe hath been much queſtioned by many ſubtil Philoſophers; and ſetting aſide Philoſophers, the moſt of men never ſo much as d…camt of them. Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Queſtion, An omnis actio habeat terminum? and demand of them, whether they think, that by the immanent actions of their ſenſes, their underſtandings, and wills, they preduce within themſelves certain qualities of the ſame name with the actions themſelves? and I am confident that moſt, if not all of them, will return a negative anſwer.

2. The matter of this precept, is of a very important, general, an neceſſary obligation: and therefore it muſt be obvious and evident unt all that have the uſe of their reaſon, ſo that the knowledge of it ma p. 15be gained without any great difficulty, but now the pretended terme of the action of loving, is a very dark and abſtruſe thing, and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men underſtand it: Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet ſtrangers to what the Schoolmen ſay about the nature of it.

3. We may and ought to examine the ſincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded Deut. 6.5. But it would be new Divinity, to ſay that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love, whether they be in us or no: men may with ſome certainty review, and reflect upon the habit of love, and the immanent actions thereof; but their reſlex knowledg of the terms thereof, can be but conjectural.

2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond ſpeaks, is, by the Defendant, ſuch wherein there is exerciſed that freedome of the will, which is uſually called a freedome of indifferency: But there is no freedome of the will exerciſed, in the ſuppoſed terms of the immanent action; for they preſuppoſing the actions, are ſuppoſed to be neceſſary and unavoidable, and therefore the will hath no indifferency unto them: the will indeed is a free cauſe of the action of loving; but this action, if it be the cauſe of a terme, it is the natural and neceſſary cauſe thereof.

3. The Terme of the immanent action of loving is called love, ſaith the Defendant, for want of ſufficient words: but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond ſpeaks of, is very very ridiculous. For of that love (ſaith he) love is predicated as a genus; and ſo in primo mod… dicendi per ſe: the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant, cannot be the terme of the immanent action of loving.

But ſecondly, It is denyed alſo by many great both Philoſophers and Divines, that there is any ſuch terme as the immanent action of loving: and they ſay the ſame of all other immanent actions. Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Diffenters, but my ſelf and my poor Maſter Scheibler. But this bewrayes his groſs ignorance in the School-men, many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion, and go herein a great deale farther then he. Durand is very expreſs for it, Lib. 1. dist. 27. q. 2. Capreolus l. 1. diſt. 27. q. 2. quotes alſo Aureolus, Petrus de Pallude, Gerar. de Carm…lo, as of the ſame judgment unto theſe I may add Scotus upon the ſame Diſt. quaeſt. 3. and two Eminent Scotiſts, Philip. Faber Fav…ntinus, lib. 1. diſp. 21. and Reda l. 1. Controverſ. 7. repreſent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus. Unto all theſe let me farther ſubjoyn Raphel Averſa Philoſ. tom. 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciſcus bonae ſpei in lib. de animâ. Diſp. 2. dub. 3. who mentions others of the ſame perſwaſion. Oviedo though he blame Cajetan, and other Thomiſts, for denying actual intellection to have a terme, becauſe every action he thinks is productive of ſome terme or other, yet he thinks this opinion may be ſo interpreted, as to be drawn into a good ſenſe; and that is done (he ſuppoſeth) by making the terme not to be really diſtinct, but the ſame with actual intellection. Haec opinio jure ab omnibus p. 16rejecta, ſi loquendi modum attemperaret, mea quidem ſententia optime poſſet defendi. Exiſtimo enim tantum in modo loquendi diſcedere à ſententiâ, quam poſte à omnibus praeferam, aſſerente intellectionem conſiſtere in qualitate immediatè per ſe-ipſam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanaute, vel in actione identificatâ cum termino, quod ſic oſtendo: utraque opinio conſtituit intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimanan…e per ſuammet entitatem, ex vi cujus intellectûs in actu ſecundo conſtituitur formaliter intelligens: Ergo tantum differunt hae duae opiniones, ex …o quod una entitatem hanc eſſentialiter per ſuam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem, & nullum diſtinctum terminum reſpicientem vocat actionem ſine termino; & altera …andemmet entitatem vocat actionem …um termino identificatam. Neutra …nim barum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit, vel negat, quam altera opinio diverſo modo de…endat. De anima Controv. 6. punct. 1. S. 1. It were an eaſie matter to produce many other teſtimonies: But the matter muſt not be carried by the number of voices, but by the weight of Arguments. And therefore I ſhall next propound the Arguments on both ſides.

The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two ſorts, the firſt prove that ſome immanent actions have no terms; the ſecond, that no immanent actions have any terme.

The 1. That ſome immanent actions have no terms. Cajetan, as it is ſaid, determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and ſuch are the Beatifical Viſion of the Saints in Heaven, the Angels intuitions of themſelves. And the reaſon which he giveth is, Becauſe the Objects of ſuch intellections are per ſe preſent unto them, and intimately conjoyned with them.

But omitting Cajetan, I ſhall inſiſt onelyonly upon the Arguments of Scheibter, which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's foreign. The Defendant is pleaſed in deriſion to call him my Maſter: But where the wit of the Sarcaſme lieth, is beſt, if not onelyonly known unto himſelf. If his meaning be, that I have no Metaphyſicks but what I learn'd from him, unto this I ſhall make no Apologie: though he in his Epiſtle Dedicatory, vain gloriouſly boaſteth of his Rhetorick, yet I am not ſo fooliſh as to ſay any thing of my Metaphyſicks. But if he mean that Scheibler is but a poor and ſorry Maſter, one that can teach me but little in Metaphyſical Learning, a vulgar Author, one too low for Doctor H. to conſult, pag. 26. One that firſt lighted his candle at the taper of Suarez, p. 119 I ſhall then refer the Reader unto Dr. Barlow his Epiſtle prefixed unto Scheibler's Metaphyſicks, and by that the Reader will be ſatisfied touching the falſhood, pride, and immodeſty of this cenſure. But proceed we unto Scheiblers Argument. Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 10. n. 30. Quod non omnes actus imman…ntes habeant terminos, patet. Quia ſecùs omnes actus immanentes eſſent foreign, ſive effectivi. Per terminum enim nunc ille intelligitur qui per actionem producitur. At actio poſtquam …lind relinquitur foreign est, ſive effectrix. Abſurdum autem eſt omnes actiones eſſe foreign, ut ſaltem patet ex diſcrimine artis, & prudentiae apud Ariſt…t. p. 17l. 6. Ēthic. quae per agere & facere a…ſtinguuntur. Et confirmatur: quod nullus poſſit dari terminus, qui producatur per actiones aliquas immanentes. Quid enim producit, v. g. intellectio vel viſio. Nihil hic dici ſpecio…è poteſt, quàm quod per iſtos actus producatur notitia habitualis. Sed haec imprimis per accidens eſt ad actus illos, ut hic etiam fatetur Suarez d. l. ali…que. The Argument reduced unto form ſtandeth thus.

If every immanent action be productive of a term, or work, then every immanent action is poieticall or effective.

But ſome immanent actions are not poietical or effective:

Therefore ſome immanent actions are not productive of any term or work.

The ſequel of the Major may be confirmed from this, becauſe foreign or effectio is nothing elſe but the production of ſome term or work.

If it be objected that effection is properly onelyonly in an external matter, efficere ea propriè dicimùr, quae extra edimus: Unto this you may have an anſwer in Scheibler's introduction to Logick, cap. 1. n. 33. where he ſheweth this to be falſe. For there be, as he there declareth, internal as well as external effections, as the making of a Syllogiſm in the mind; and we may ſay the ſame of definitions, diviſions, and propoſitions. Falſum eſt, inquit, quod dicitur: Ea tantum propriè effici, quae extra eduntur. Nam effectio eſt omnis iſta operatio, ad quam opu… ſequitur, ſive extra nos, ſive intra nos ſit; atque ſic factio ſyllogiſmi, etſi in mente noſtrâ enni formamus, eſt reverâ effectio. Probatur: omnis noſtra erudita operatio eſt vel ſpeculatio, vel praxis, vel foreign hoc eſt effectio. At factio Syllogiſmi non eſt ſpeculatio, (haec enim tantum eſt ſecundum habitus ſpeculativos.) Nec praxis, haec enim tantum fit per directionem rationis factam ſecundum prudentiam, vel virtutem moralem, Ergo eſt Effectio. With Scheibler all thoſe concur, that make Ars to be the genus of Logick, for they ſay, that the effection, which is proper unto ars, may be, and often is in an internal, as well as in an external matter. So Doctor Saunderſon in his firſt Appendix De uſu Logicae pag. 309. Effectio, quae eſt propria artis operatio, non minùs eſt in materiâ internâ, quàm externa. Thus the Major is ſufficiently fortified by compariſon of Scheiblty's Metaphyſicks, with his Logick.

As for the Miner, Scheibler confirms it from the difference which p. 18Ariſtot. 6. Ethic. makes betwixt prudentia and ars, which are there diſtinguiſhed by agere and facere or efficere. Prudentia est habitus cum rectâ ratione activus. Ars eſt habitus cum rectâ ratione effectivus, or factivus. Actions then ſtrictly ſo called, moral actions, are not effections.

But the Defendant ſays, that the ſequel is very infirm, and moſt evidently falſe, pag. 28.

And why ſo I pray?

Why firſt, 'tis not true of all tranſient actions, that their terms muſt remain after the action is ended, &c.

And ſecondly, 'tis not true of all actions that are artificial, and ſo confeſſedly poietical, that their terms and work do remain after the action is paſt, as appears in the artificial actions of ſinging, and playing on the Lute, and other muſical Inſtruments: and this (ſaith he) is ſufficient to prove the inconſequence of his argument, and the weakneſs of whatſoever proof the Refuter ſhall draw from it. p. 29.

Any rational by-ſtander muſt needs here wonder at the Defendants confidence, that I give it not another name. For all this nothing infringeth the conſequence of the forementioned Syllogiſme: To manifeſt which, I ſhall reduce it unto a Categorical Syllogiſm, by due change of the Major.

Every immanent action productive of a term or work is effective or poietical.

But ſome immanent actions are not effective or poietical.

Therefore ſome immanent actions are not productive of a term or work.

Now, Sir, apply what you ſay unto the Major, and you will find that it no way oppoſeth it. There be (you ſay) ſome tranſient actions which have terms that are not permanent or laſting after the actions are ended; therefore every immanent action productive of a term is not effective or poietical. A moſt rare and excellent conſequence, which follows à baculo ad angulum.

And your next is of the like, that is, no force. There be ſome artificial actions which are confeſſedly poietical, whoſe terms or works do not remain after the actions are paſt: as appeareth in the artificial actions of ſinging, and playing on the Lute. Therefore every immanent action productive of a term, is not effective or poietical. The Reader by this may ſee, that the Argument ſtands unſhakeable in it ſelf, notwithſtanding all the oppoſition of this daring Defendant.

But I perceive he catcheth at an incommodious expreſſion, in his propoſal of the Argument, and in his Anſwer to the firſt reaſon of Suarez. In the Argument he ſaith, Actio poſt-quam aliud relinquitur, foreign, eſt, ſive effectrix. And in his Anſwer to the firſt Objection of Suarez, he ſaith, Non omnis cauſalitas est per m…dum productionis propriè, & rigerosès per quam, ſc. producatur aliquid poſt actionens remanens. From theſe paſſages I believe it is that our Defendant thinks that Scheibler's opinion is, that foreign or effection is onelyonly ſuch an action, whoſe term or work remains after the action it paſt and ended. Indeed if this were p. 19Scheibler's opinion, there were good reaſon for the denial of the ſequel of his Argument. But this opinion cannot reaſonably be faſtened on him. For the inſtance which he gives of an effection, in the preceding number, is the making of a Syllogiſm in the mind; and a Syllogiſm hath no exiſtence in the mind after 'tis made, or longer then 'tis making. As for the two paſſages but now mentioned, a favourable interpretation may be made of them. A term or work may be ſaid to remain after the action is paſt in order of nature, or in order of time: Now the term of immanent actions remain after their effection, in order of nature, not time. And that permanſion or remaining may have ſuch a ſenſe, may be gathered from another place in Schiebler, lib. 1. Metaph. c.16. n.17. Nihilominus ſi ſubtiliter intueamur hanc rem, videtur etiam in unico momento eſſe qualiſcunque permanſio. Momentum enim dicitur per defectum ſucceſſionis temporalis, unde in codem momento poteſt adhuc relinqui ſucceſſio ſecundum prius & poſterius naturae. Veluti in codem momento ſimul ſunt forma, & res formata, ut ſol, & illuminatio, ſive lumen. Vide de his naturae inſtantibus diſtinctis, in codem momento. Conim. l. 4. Phyſ. cap. 14. q. 3. a. 2. Atque ſic etiam relinquitur, in tali momento, ſucceſſio qualiſcunque, ut non ſit prorſus repugnans, durationem & proinde permanſionem tribuere enti inſtantanco.

But our Defendant ſaith, that this of Scheibler is an utter impertinency unto the matter in hand. But now how theſe aſſertions (ſaith he) if all were granted [and theſe are two of theſe aſſertions, Actiones immanentes aliquae non habent terminum: Actio ut ſic non dicit reſpectum ad terminum] can any ways advantage the Refuters preſent Argument, I leave any man to judge. For Scheibler expreſly aſſerts, that as ſome immanent actions have no terms, ſo others of them have; and he proves it by an inſtance borrowed from Julius Scaliger againſt Cardan. Exercit. 307. ſect. 28. & Exercit. 1. ſect. 3. Now to prove that nulla actio immanens habet terminum (which muſt be the Refuters propoſition, if he ſpeak any thing to the purpoſe; (for how elſe will he prove that the immanent acts of love have no term by this medium?) by this aſſertion of Scheibler, that ſpeaks onelyonly of ſome ſuch, and proves the contrary of others, will be impoſſible, till he can ſhew us a new Mood and Figure to prove an univerſal by a particular.

Here I muſt deſire the Defendant to awake, and to conſider, that I propounded an Objection, that omnis actio habet terminum, unto which I oppoſe Scheibler, aſſerting and proving that ſome immanent actions have no term. Now this particular negative propoſition made good, Some immanent actions have no terms, is a full, home, and ſufficient diſproof of the univerſal propoſition objected, Omnis actio habet terminum, becauſe 'tis contradictory thereunto. For of contradictory Propoſitions, that which is true overthroweth the other, becauſe 'tis impoſſible that both contradictory propoſitions, ſhould be both either true or falſe.

But go we on unto a ſecond fort of Arguments, the Arguments of thoſe who hold that no immanent actions whatſoever have terms.

p. 201. They all unanimouſly alledge the teſtimony of Aristotle, l. 9. Metaph. text. 16. Ubi diſtinguens actionem immanentem à tranſeunte, a…t illum diſtingui ab iſta, quia haec habet aliquid operatum pe… ipſum tanquam terminum, illa vero, ſcillcet immanens nullum habet operatum. The words of Ariſtotle by Kada are thus rendred. In quibus igitur aliud quippiam est, quod ſit praeter uſum corum, eorum actus in eo, quod efficitur …eſt, qualis eſt aedificatio, atque actus texendi, illa enim in eo, quod aedifcatur, hic in eo, quod texitur ineſt. In quibus autem praeter actum non eſt aliud quicquam opus, in iis ipſis eſt ipſe actus, nam viſio in eo eſt ſane, quod videt, & contemplatio, in eo quod contemplatur, & vita in anima.

I am not ignorant of the anſwers that Cajetan, Bannes, and Capreolus, give unto this teſtimony of Ariſtotle: but they are ſuch groſs evaſions, as that I ſhall for reply onelyonly refer unto Rada, and Faber Faventinus in the places above mentioned. But Suarez hath another anſwer, which I ſhall lay down, and briefly reply to. Ad primum ex teſtimonio Ariſtotelis dicitur, Ariſtotelis ſententiam non eſſe, per has actiones immanentes nihil fieri; ſed vel nibil fieri extra ipſum operantem, vel (quod magis exiſtimo) nihil fieri, quod maneat tranſacta actione: & hoc modo ait, hujuſmodi actionem conſiſtere in ipſo uſu. Quomodo 1. Ethicorum, cap. 1. ait, In nonnullis artibus operationes eſſe fines, & non aliquid per eas factum, ut in arte cytharizandi: quod neceſſario intelligendum eſt de termino facto, & permanente, quia manet poſt actionem ut ſupra declaravimus tractando de cauſa finali. Sic ergo dicitur, per actiones immanentes nihil factum relinqui, quia per illas nihil fit, quod ill is finitis maneat. Metaph. diſp. 48. ſect. 2. n. 20. The ſum of this is, that the meaning of Ariſtotle is, that nothing is made, or produced by immanent actions, that remain after they are paſt and ended.

But 1. There is nothing in Ariſtotle that gives the leaſt countenance unto this interpretation: and if men may be allowed the liberty of deviſing ſuch ſenſes of Authors for which there is no ground in them, it were no difficult matter to clude the moſt pregnant Authorities that can be alledged.

Secondly, If this were the meaning of Ariſtotle, then the difference of tranſient actions from immanent ſtands in this, that they are productive of a term or quality that remains after they are paſt of finiſhed. But this cannot be the difference of tranſient actions from immanent; for I demand, whether it be predicated of tranſient actions per ſe, or per accidens.

If it be predicated per accidens of tranſient actions, then the difference of them cannot conſiſt therein; if it be praedicated per ſe of tranſient actions, then 'tis predicated of all tranſient actions, for à per ſe ad de omni valet conſequentia. But 'tis not predicated of all tranſient actions, as is a little afterwards confeſſed by Suarez himſelf, concerning the actions of ſinging and playing on Muſical Inſtruments, and therefore 'tis not predicated of tranſient actions per ſe, and conſequently 'tis not the difference of them from immanent actions.

p. 21As for reaſons to confirm the concluſion, moſt of them will ſerve which are brought to prove, that intellection hath no term. For 'tis generally confeſſed, that there is, as to this particular, the ſame reaſon of it, and all other vital immanent actions. If then actual intellection produce no term, then neither is there any term produced by the acts of the ſenſes of the ſenſitive appetite, or of the will. But now that intellection hath no term, no verbum mentis produced by it, Scotus proves by ſeveral reaſons; two of which I ſhall propound as managed by **In lib. controv.Rada, becauſe he urgeth them with a great deal of perſpicuity. Primò ſi verbum eſſet terminus productus per intellectionem, impoſſibile eſſet nos intelligere intellectionem ipſam, quin ſimul intelliger. mus aliquem terminum per ipſam produci (praeſertim cum ex Divo Tho. p. p. q. 27. a. 1. de ratione intrinſec… intellectionis ſit terminus productus ſ…u verbum ibi; …im ait, quod intelligens eo ipſo quod intelligit producit in ſcipſo aliquid) ſicut impoſſibile est nos intelligere calefactionem, quin ſimul intelligamus calorem per ipſam produci, tanquam …jus terminum: Conſequens tamen est falſum, nam experientia conſtat, nos intelligere intellectionem, cum tamen non recordemur, quod aliquid per ipſam producatur: Ergo verbum mentis non eſt terminus per intellectionem productus. Probatur ſequela Majoris (Caetera enim patent) quia ſi intellectio haberet tanquam terminum proprium verbum ment is, diceret ordinem eſſentialem, & intrinſecum ad verbum, ſicut calefactio ad calorem per ipſam productum, ergo non poſſet intelligi ſine ordine ad verbum, ſicut nec calefactio ſine ordine ad calorem, quia eſt talis ordo ei intrinſecus, & eſſentialis. If there were any word or term, produced by intellection, it would be impoſſible to underſtand or conceive the action of intellection, but we muſt withal conceive this term produced thereby. But now the conſequent is falſe, for 'tis manifeſt by experience, that we conceive and apprehend the act of intellection, when we have no thought of any word or term produced thereby, and therefore there is no ſuch term.

The ſequel of the Major is thus proved: becauſe if intellection had ſuch a term, it would carry an eſſential and intrinſical order thereunto, as calefaction does unto heat, dealbation unto whiteneſs: and therefore it could not be conceived or underſtood, without order unto it, even as 'tis impoſſible to conceive calefaction without order unto heat, &c. becauſe ſuch order is intrinſecal and eſſential unto it, and therefore it cannot be abſtracted therefrom. The Argument mutatis mutandis may be applied unto the immanent actions of the Will, and conclude that they alſo have no term produced by them: for if they have any ſuch term, it would be impoſſible to conceive them without order and reference thereunto: But 'tis very poſſible to conceive the immanent actions of the will, and not to think of any terms produced by them; and for this I may appeal unto the boſomes of all men; for their experience will tell them, that they frequently review the actions of their wills, when yet they have no reflection upon any term produced by them.

p. 22A ſecond reaſon, Inteste…to eſt a…s … p…iae …llect…ae, …ltinsaque ejus perfectio (ut ai… Ariſtot…les none Metaphyſicorum ubi ſupra, & 1. Ethie. c. 9.) ergo nihil producitur per eam. Probatur conſequentia: quia jam ille terminus productus eſſet ulterior, & per conſequens ipſa non eſſ…t actus ultimus. Intellection is the ultimate or utmoſt act of the intellective power (as Ariſtotle ſaith in both his Metaphyſicks and Ethicks) and therefore nothing is produced thereby: The conſequence is proved, becauſe if there were any term produced by intellection, this ſuppoſed terme would be beyond, or farther then intellection; and conſequently intellection would not be the utmoſt or ultimate act of the underſtanding. This argument too may be ſadled upon the …mmanent and elicite actions of the will: Volition is the utmoſt act of the will, and the utmoſt perfection thereof; and therefore there is no terme produced thereby, for if there were, that terme would be a perfection beyond it.

Unto theſe two reaſons out of Scotus, I ſhall add three more out of Raphael Averſa Philoſ. tom. 2. q. 58. S. 3. to prove, that intellection does not produce verbum mentis, as a terme diſtinguiſhed therefrom.

The firſt is the uſeleſneſs of this terme or quality; no uſe, office or purpoſe can be aſſigned for which it ſhould ſerve.

1. It is ſaid, That it is for the aſſimilation of the underſtanding unto the object known. But this aſſimilation being only in eſſe intentionali & repreſentative, that is, in eſſe cognito, is ſufficiently made by the action of the underſtanding it ſelf, though no terme be produced by it; for when an object is known by the underſtanding, 'tis …o ipſo repreſented unto the underſtanding.

2. It is ſaid by others, that 'tis neceſſary to exhibit the object preſent unto the underſtanding. But this preſence required of the object in the underſtanding is only intentional and objective; and tis objectively preſent when 'tis actually the object of the action of intellection, and therefore the action of intellection renders the object intentionally preſent, though we ſuppoſe no terme to follow it.

3. **Tertia ratio quam Cajet. Ferrar. & Capreol. addunt; ad hoc ut in ipſo verbo tanquam in imagine expreſſâ ipſe intellectus intueatur objectum, ita ut actus cognitionis immediatè attingat verbum, & mediante verbo Objectum, &c. Neque haec ratio poteſt admitti. Primo enim non cognoſci cognitionis terminum eodem ipſo actu, patet ab experientiâ. Quià du… conſideramus, & contemplamur aliquod Objectum, conſtat nos non percipere aliud, quàm illud ipſum de quo cogitamus, nullamque ſe nobis offerre imaginem mediantem. Quod ſi intueremur ullam imaginem, realiter ab objecto diſtinctam, id nos non lateret, & ſine dubio evidenter diſcerneremus, nos intneri talem imagine…, ſicut evidenter diſcernimus, quicquid aliud ex parte objecti cogitemus.It is ſaid, That 'tis an image, wherein the underſtanding beholds the object that it underſtands. But now if it have this office, then, whenſoever an object is underſtood, the image thereof muſt be underſtood alſo. But now this is falſe, for we conſider and contemplate objects, and yet take no notice of theſe feigned images of them: Nay, p. 23ſuch images are hidden from the moſt of men, none but thoſe that have ſwallowed this dictate, omnis actio habet terminum, are privy to them: and what ſenſe or feeling (I mean knowledg and apprehenſion) they have of them, paſſeth my ſenſe and imagination.

A ſecond reaſon that I ſhall urge out of Averſa, is, that thoſe that aver that intellection bath a terme, which they call verbum mentis, do alſo affirm that this terme is propter intellectionem; Now non eſt ponendus terminus propter actionem, ſed actio propter terminum: Non en…m qui…quam eſt ad hoc ut producatur, ſed productio exercetur ad hoc, ut res producta ponatur. Non bene ergo, ſuppoſita jam intellectione, quae dicitur eſſe cognitio objecti, ponitur verbum propter illam, tanquam terminus propter actionem: ſed potiùs, ſi intellectio eſſet actio productiva verbi, deberet ipſa eſſe, & exerceri propter verbum. Cùm ergo principaliter & per ſe conſtet, dari intellectionem quae eſt cognitio objecti, cenſendum potius eſſet ipſam intellectionem fieriper aliàm actionem, quam intellectionem eſſe actionem per quam fiat alius terminus.

A third reaſon is, becauſe the terme of an action, is more noble and excellent then the action it ſelf: but ſuppoſe there be a terme of intellection, it cannot be more noble then intellection. The Beatifical viſion is an action of the underſtanding, but ſuppoſe it have a terme, yet it connot be ſurmounted thereby in perfection; for in it (as the Thomiſts determino) ſtands our happineſs, and our utmoſt end. Now if one intellection be not productive of a term, then to be productive of a term, doth not agree per ſe and effentially unto intellection: for that which agreeth unto intellection per ſe, agreeth unto every intellection, becauſe à per ſe ad de omni valet conſequentia. But for the further ſtrengthning of this Argument, I ſhall quote the words of Averſa himſelf. Semper terminus eſt nobilior, & praeſtantior actione, ut habetur ex Ariſtot. 1. Ethic. c. 1. & ex re ipſâ notum eſt. Sed certè intellectio quâ anima conſtituitur formaliter c…gn…ſcens, & comprebendens objectum, non poteſt dici nobilitate inferior a…io verbo, quod tanquam terminus ejus inducitur. Et Ariſtot. 10. Ethic. 6. 7, & …. Docuit felicitatem debere eſſe praeſtantiſſimam perfectionem in ammâ, & ſimul determinavit eſſe contemplationem, id eſt intellectionem. Non ergo poteſt addi aliud verbum, quod ſit terminus intellectionis. Et planè repugnat, a…d aliqui ex adverſariis reſpondent, in actibus immanentibus action… eſſe praeſtantiorem termins, & terminum eſſe propter actionem. Id eni… manifeſtè eſt contra rationem & ordinem intrinſcecum action…s, & termini. Thus you ſee that intellèction hath no term; and if that hath none, then neither have the immanent aictons of the Will any.

But Oviedo hath a diſtinct and peculiar Argument concerning the action of love, De anima controv. 6. p. 1. ſect. 3. In amore, de quo eadem est ratio ac d… intell…ctione, ſp…iale inſtituitur argumentum ad probandum in actione confiſtere, ex quo infer…mus talem actionem carere termino, quia in … tota ratio anto…ls ſita est. Argumentum is a precedit cognitio in om…ium ſententiâ praerequitur ad am…rem, ſed cognitio tantùm requiritur ad actionem p. 24voluntatis: Ergo in has actione conſiſtit ratio amoris. Prob… minorem, cognitio ex parte intellectûs requirit, ut v…luntas valeat ſe determinare ad objectum amplectendum: ergo requirstur ad determinatienem voluntatis; …d determinatio voluntatis conſiſtit in actione, per quam ex actu primo reducitur ad actum ſecundum: Ergo cogniti… requi…itur ad actionem voluntatis: Ergo in actione conſiſtit amor, ad quem cognitio praerequiritur. Hac etiam ratione …ptimè aſſignatur ratio formalis amoris, cui primariò & in ſe compet…, eſſe exercitium libertatis, quia hoc exercitium in actione conſiſ…it, ergo ad hoc ut amor ſit exercitium libertatis, in ipſa actione conſtitui debeat, per quam v…luntas conſtituatur amans, quae cùm per…ſe ipſam hunc praeſtet eſſ…ctum, n…lo alio indiget termino, cui nullum ſupereſt munus, quod exerecat reſpectu libertatis, quae per actionem formalitèr amans conſtituitur. What he ſaith may be thus briefly ſummed up, Knowledg is neceſſarily pre-required (he means immediately) unto actual love. But 'tis only pre-required immediately, unto the action of loving, and not unto any terme of ſuch action: and therefore the act of love conſiſts wholly in the action, and not in the term.

It may here perhaps be objected, That all theſe Authors which I have mentioned, differ from me; for they make the immanent actions of the underſtanding and will, to be only qualities, and not predicamental actions: they are only (ſay they) Grammatical actions; that is, they are word…d and expreſſed, after the manner of actions: they are actions (ſaith Rada) non abſolutè & ſimpliciter, ſed ſecundum quid & ſimilitudinarie.

I confeſs this difference betwixt their opinion and mine: but this difference is not material, for it nothing advantageth the adverſary, nor prejudiceth me; and the arguments may be conſidered ſo abſtractly, as that they may very well be applyed unto my opinion.

Ovied… tels us of ſome Thomiſts, who agree with me in making intellection, (and the fame may be ſaid of Volition) to conſiſt in an action not having any terme. But he goes to reconcile them with his own opinion; and againſt this reconciliation, he propounds the ſame Objection, that I now mentioned; viz. that thoſe Thomiſts which he ſpeaks of, held intellection to be a proper action, whereas he made it only a quality. Unto this he anſwers, That the difference is not material, but only modo loquendi. His words I ſhall inſert at large, becauſe I judge them very pertinent unto our preſent: purpoſe: Dices in re differre has opiniones, quia Thomiſtarum opinio aſſerit, illam …ntitatem eſſe p…ram actionem, altera vero opinio formalitatem qualitatis in illa actione cognoſcit. Contra, formalitas qualitatis ab hac opinione in qualitate conſtituta, in co debet conſiſtere, quod haec entitas tali modo afficiat ſubjectum, illudque formaliter conſtituat intelligens, & informatum propria objecti repreſentatione, & imagine; …ed in opinione aſſerente illam centitatem, in qua intellectio conſtiruitur eſſe puram actionem, codem modo aſſicit ſubjectum, illudque cadem ratione conſtituit intelligons, & informat tanquam repreſentatio, p. 25& imago objecti: Ergo in re Thomiſtarum opinio concedit in hac intellectione, quam appellat puram actionem, formalitatem illam, quam altera opinio qualitatem appellat: Ergo in nullo roi differunt, ſed tanquam in loquendi modo. Si dicas, rationem qualitatis non conſiſtere in modo reſpioiendi objectum, peto. âte, quae ſit formalitas qualitatis, quam conſtituit opinio, quae docet intellectione… eſſe actionem cum termino identificatam? Et cum illam dederis, …andem aſſignabo in entitato Thomiſtica, quam actionem ſine termino illius auctores vocant. Concludo, has opiniones tantum in modo loquendi differre. Oviedo loc. praedict.

Before I proceed farther, I ſhall crave the Readers patience, to digreſs in a few lines, for the examination of a paſſage in the Defendant, p. 119. I having proved, that love is not a genus equally comprehending habitual and actual love as its two ſpecies, becauſe they are in ſeveral predicaments: Habitual love in the predicament of quality, and actual in the predicament of action. In the next place I foreſtalled an objection, that might be made from the opinion of divers groat Philoſoghers and Schoolmen, that mak… all 'Imma…ient acts, and conſequently all inward acts of love, to be qualities (they are, ſay they) only Grammatical actions, not Metaphyſical actions in the predicament of action. For refutation of this opinion, I offered unto Dr. Hammonds conſideration two arguments out of S…belble…, unto which let us hear what the Defendant ſaith.

Defendant. And have you not told us news indeed? You ſhould have brought us word that the Sun ſhines at Rbodes, or when it is in its Zenith. There is nothing more generally received in the Schools then that is: And I dare ſay ſearce any Philoſopher or School-man of any note, has for theſe hundred years almoſt delivered any thing to the contrary. Why then urge you Scheibler and his reaſons, as if he, being a late w…tor, had diſcovored a truth which former Authors were miſtaken in? &c.

Here is ſtrange conſidence, indeed down-right impudence; for 'tis as clear as the Sun, that many M…dern, both Philoſophers and School-men, have delivered much to the contrary: and this is well known unto all that have read any thing almoſt in either Philoſaphers or School-men, But you will be ready to but face the matter, and thorefore to conſound your …, confi…ce, I ſhall refer unto ſouſe Philoſophers and School-men that are of good here, and that have ſ…ouriſhed within theſo hundred …, who … terminis aff…m, That immanent acts are only qualities, and nor …, proper and predica…tutal actions. Reda that was printed 1620. ſuper … ▪ c. …. Controv. 7. p. 121, 122, 123, 124 125, 126. Faber …, licenſed April … 1612. In … Rap…ael Averſ…, … Controv… puke…. 1. Pouclus, part 3. … p. 499.500, &c.

p. 26Unto theſe teſtimonies, it were very eaſie to add many others, b… theſe are ſufficient to ſatisfie the Reader, that you neither know nor care what you ſay herein. But to return from this digreſſion.

In the next place I ſhall add ex abundanti, that divers great Philoſophers both Proteſtants and Papiſts maintain that immanents acts are properly predicamental actions, and that yet they are not productive of any terms, that are qualities.

Amongſt Proteſtant writers, I may juſtly reckon the generality of Logicians; for theſe qualities have no place in their predi…amental tables; and if they had thought that there had been ſuch qualities, the omiſſion of them had been an inexcuſable defect in their Logicks, becauſe ſuppoſing, though not granting, ſuch qualities, they would have been as numerous as any other entities whatſoever, and there is nothing can be ſaid to exclude them from the Predicaments.

As for Papiſts Suarez confeſſeth that there are many Thomiſts of this opinion, Metaph. diſp. 48: Sect. 2. n. 5. Secunda ſententla negat eſſe de intrinſecâ eſſentiâ actioni ut ſit, habere terminum, qui per cam fiat, ad quem dicat reſpectum, de eſſentia (inquam) actionis quatenus eſt proprium quoddam genus ſummum ab aliis diſtinc…um, quia ſub eo genere quaedam ſunt actiones habentes terminum, aliae non. Habentes terminum ſunt actiones tranſcuntes, in quo haec ſententia convenit cum praecedenti. Quae verò non habent terminum ſunt actiones immanentes, de quibus longè diverſo modo ſentit haec ſententia, quàm praecedens: Exiſtimat enim has actiones immanentes eſſe propriſſimas actiones de genere & praedicamento actionis, eſſe tamen puras actiones, quae nullum terminum intrinſecum, per ſe loquendo, producunt, ſed immediatè per ſeſe attingu…t ſua objecta. Ita ſentiunt de actionibus immanentibus multi ex diſcipulis Divi Thomae: nam licèt p…culiariter tribuant intellectioni, quod producat verbum tanquam intrinſecum effectum, tamen ne… ſimilem aut proportionalem effectum tribuunt omni actioni immanenti, nam in actionibus ſenſuum, & utriuſque appetitus id ferè omnes negant. Neque inter ſe conveniunt in attribuendo illo effectu omni intellectionis, nam quidam ſolùm propter abſentiam objecti in quibuſdam intellectionibus illum effectum requirunt. Nec denique videntur ponere illud verbum per modum proprii termini intellectionis ut actionis producentis, quia docent verbum & intellectionem eſſe res omninò diſtinctas, quod repugnat actioni & proprio, & termino intrinſeco, quià actio ſolùm poteſt eſſe modus illius rei quae eſt terminus, non re… realiter diſtincta, us ſupra probatum eſt diſputando de cauſalitate effectivâ. Eſt ergò …orum ſententia, actionem immanentem ut ſic perſe nihil producere, quod ſit proprius terminus ejus, ſed eſſe puram actionem, quamvis interdum ex illâ aliquis effectus reſultet. Ita ſentiunt citati Thomiſtae & alii Moderni Interpretes D. Thom. in 1. parte, q. 27, a. r. & Javel. 9. Metaph. q. 16. Ubi non numerat alios effectus actionum immanentium, niſi habitus, ad quos potius comparantur ut principia p. 27agendi, quàm ut actiones: in quo ſatis declarat, illas actiones non habere terminos intrinſecos propriè dictos.

Suarez propounds three grounds they lay down for this Opinion, two are common unto them with others, but the third, I believe, is proper and peculiar unto them. Tertio poteſt adjungi haec ratio, qula hae actiones non ſunt à natura inſtitutae ad aliquid producendum, neque ut agens per illas communicet ſuum eſſe, ſed ut per eas potentiae ſeſe uniant objectis ſuis: Ergo ſine cauſâ tribuitur his actionibus quod aliquid producant. Theſe actions are by Nature inſtituted for this end, that by them their Powers may unite themſelves with their Objects: but this union may be performed without production of any term that is a quality, and therefore theſe actions have no term that is a quality.

Whereas Suarez ſaith in anſwer, that the union is ſufficiently Metapborical, this no ways weakens, but rather fortifieth the Argument: For unto a Metaphorical union of powers unto their objects, what need is there that there ſhould be produced de novo, real and phyſical qualities.

But to ſay nothing further of theſe Thomiſts, I ſhall trouble the Reader but with one Author more, and 'tis a very late one, Franciſcus Bonae Spei: That which I conceive in him to be moſt pertinent, I ſhall here tranſcribe, in lib. de animâ, diſp. 11. dub. 3. Dico 3. intellectio formaliter conſiſtit in actione ſi…e termino realiter à ſe diſtincto. 1. Contra Molinam 1. parte, & Conimbricenſes, Scotum, Leſſium, Hurtadum, Fonſecam, Gonzalem, &c. docentes illam quidem ſormalitèr conſiſtere in actione, ſed habere terminum realiter à ſe diſtinctum. 2. Contra Vaſquez 1. part. Suarez etiam 1. parte. Valentiam, Salas, Arriagam, Poncium poſt Scotam in primum diſtinct. 3. &c. docentes illam conſiſtere in ſola qualitate per actionem realiter diſtinctam producta. Complutenſes verò noſtros diſp. 21. q. 3. in ſola qualitate, producta ſiae actione realiter diſtincta.

Probatur 1. Ex Philoſopho. 9. Met. textu 19. apud Poncium hic, ubi aperte docet, viſionis, ſpeculationis, vitae, &c. non eſſe aliud quoddam opus praeter terminum, ſen actionem. Et 10. Ethic, c. 3. Nec enim virtutis operationes, id eſt, intellectus, & voluntatis operationes, qualitates ſunt. Ergo, &c.

Pro…atur 2. quia alioq… intellectio formaliter conſiſteret, vel in actione ut praec…ſâ à qualitate realitèr, à ſe diſtinciâ vel in ipſâ qualitate ut praeciſà ab actione realiter diſt netâ, ſed neatium dici poteſt: Ergo, &c.

Probatur minor, pro prima part. 1. quia ſi impertinens eſſet qualitas ad intellectionem, ipſâque ablata & per impoſſi…le manente …olâ actione (cui tantum ſub…iſtendae ferviret) remaneret int…llectio, unde illa qualitas eſſet omnino ad conſtituendum intelligentem formalitèr ſuperſlua.

Probatur Minor pro 1. parte 2. quia non eſt ratio, cur in ipſa actiut p. 28praeciſ… à qualit…te realiter à ſe diſtincts, formaliter conſiſtat intellectio, & non in qualitate ut praeciſa, &c.

Probatur Minor pro 1. parte 3. quia illa actio ut ſic praeciſa, ſolùm facit folmaliter producent & productum: Ergo, &c.

Probatur Minor pro 2. parte 1. quia intellectio eſt verbale quoddam, quod ſemper impo…tat formaliter aliquam actionem, five ab intrinſcco five ab extrinſ…co, ut per omnia diſcurrenti patebit; nam viſio facit videre, intell…ctio intelligere, volitio velle, quae omnia important actionem aliq…am.

Probatur Mino… pro 3. parte 2. in actione praeciſè viventis ut vivéntis ſalvati poteſt ratio vitae five accus vitalis, ut patebit diſcurrenti per omnes definitiones actus vitalis ſupra diſput. 3. dub. 2. allatas, quidni & in tali accione praeciſè ſalvari poſſet ratio vitae, ſeu actus vitalis viventis ut talis viventis? Unde non eſt ratio, cur in ipſa qualitatè ut praeciſa ab actione realiter diſtincta conſiſtat intellectio, & non in actione, ut praeciſa, &c. Ergo, &c. Hinc patet ad fundamentum P. Comptoni.

What this Author ſpeaks of intellection, may be extended unto volition, and indeed unto all the vital immanent acts.

Unto what hath been ſaid out of Philoſophers and School-men, I ſhall add the teſtimony of other rational and knowing men, that never ſo much as heard of the Queſtion, Whether all immanent actions are productive of terms that are qualities? Theſe are likely to be the moſt impartial and unprejudiced Judges in the Controverſie, and let them be asked, Whether they think, that they produce ſome quality within themſelves, every time that they ſee, hear, &c. underſtand, will, or deſire … and I am verily perſwaded, that very few will give their Votes for the affirmative; they will much doubt whether there be any ſuch things in Nature. For they will think it very ſtrange, that they ſhould be the Parents of ſuch numberleſs and even infinite ſwarms of beings, and yet not be in the leaſt degree privy to their production.

But this argument may be thought but probable, and therefore I ſhall conclude with one of a convincing nature. And 'tis that which I urged unto Dr. Hammond, Entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate. Now that there is no neceſſity of aſſerting theſe terms of immanent actions, I ſhall evince by anſwering all the Arguments which the Defendant brings to prove them,

1. He refers unto the reaſons of Suarez, p. 31, 32. Secundum hos actus, ſcilicet immanentes, verè dicimur quales, nempe boni aut mali, ſcientes, amantes, irati, &c. Item hi actus ſunt formae ultimo actuantes ac perficientes ipſas ſubſtantias, quibus inſunt; ergo convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis ſupra aſſignata.

The firſt Argument is taken from the denomination by immanent acts. But in this there's petitio principii: for 'tis no leſs doubtfull and controverted, An ſecundum hos actus immanentes verè dicamur quales? as, An p. 29actus ipſi ſint qualitates? And Suarez could not be ignorant, but that the latter would be denied, as well as the former: for he thinks one to be as unknown as the other, and therefore he doth very unlike himſelf, onelyonly to ſuppoſe it, whereas he ſhould have proved it. That he thinks one to be as unknown as the other, will eaſily appear by the exception that he takes at this Definition of Quality, Qualitas eſt quâ quales quidam d…cuntur. Quae deſinitio, inquit, licet…eâ ratione eſſentialis videatur, quod d…tur per habitudinem ad effectum formalem, quem omnis f…ma eſſentialitèr reſpicit: tamen quod ad nos ſpectar, aequè obſcura nobis manet propria ratio qualitatis. Sicut ſi defineretur quantitas eſſe … qua dicimur quanti, licet confuſe indicaretur …ectus & deneminatio quantitatis, tamen aequè ignotum maneret quid in nobis ſit eſſe quantum, vel quid conferat quantitas rei quantae. Ita ergo in praeſenti aequè ignotum manet quid ſit eſſe quale, ſeu quis peculiaris modus affection is per hanc vocem explicetur. Percontanti enim quid ſit quale, bene etiam reſpendebimus eſſe id quod qualitate affectum, vel conſtitutum eſt: tame…iſi alia via ſupponatur ut notum, quid ſit qualitas, tota res aequè ignota relinquetur. Metaph. diſp. 42. S. 1. n. 1. This general anſwer may ſuffice. But I ſhall ſay ſomething unto every particular.

Firſt ſaith he, Secundum hos actus verè dicimur boni & mali. Theſe acts denominate us to be good and evil.

For Anſwer, Immanent acts denominate us to be good and evil, not qualitativè, but effectivè, or activè; they denominate us not to be good or evi habitually, but to do good or evil actually. And ſuch a denomination may be from a meer action, that doth not include a quality as its term, though it preſuppoſe a habit as its principle, from which it floweth.

Secondly, Secundum hos actus dicimur ſcientes, amantes, 'irati, &c.

But is it not every way as doubtfull and controverted, whether theſe concretes, ſciens, amans, &c. be qualitative denominations, as whether theſe abſtracts, actualis ſcientia, actualis amor, actus ſciendi, actus amandi, be qualities? Nay, doth not Suarez himſelf, in the place but now cited, make it to be a moſt obſcure and uncertain matter. Adde inquit, interdum obſcuriſſimum eſſe diſcernere an res denominetur qualis, neene, aliquâ denominatione, ut dicitur homo amans, aut videns: incertum autem eſt, an illa denominatio ſit qualis, vel alterius rationis, &c.

The ſecond Argument is taken from their actuating and perfecting the ſubſtances in which they are: Item hi actus ſunt formae ultimò actuantes ac perficientes ipſas ſubſtantias, quibus inſunt: Ergo Convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis ſupra aſſignata.

The foundation of this Argument is this Propoſition, that Every form which ultimately actuates and perfects the ſubſtance in which it is, is a p. 30quality. But Suarez could not but expect, that this Propoſition would be denied by his Adverſaries.

1. They will ſay, that ſuppoſe immanent acts be pure and meer actions, no ways including qualities, yet even ſo they are ſecond acts, for every action is a ſecond act: and as ſecond acts they actuate their active powers, and his mediantibus they actuate the ſubſtances in which they are.

2. They will ſay, that meer and pure actions may be ſaid to perfect the ſubſtances in which they are. And for this they think they have Ariſtotle on their ſide, for he defines man's happineſs to conſiſt in action; foreign. B…atitudo eſt operatio animae rationatis ſecundum virtutem optini…m, & perfectiſſimam in vita perfecta. Now it cannot be denyed, but that mans happineſs being his ſupreme end, doth perfect him.

It may be ſaid, that Suarez intimates a confirmation of the conſequence of his E…thymem, from his own definition of quality. Item hi actus ſunt formae ultimò actuantes, ac perficientes ipſas ſubſtantia, quibus inſunt; ergò convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis ſupra aſſignata. Now the definition of quality that he meaneth is, I ſuppoſe, in theſe words, Qualitas e…go videtur eſſe accidens quoddam abſolutum, adjunctum ſubſtantiae creatae, ad complementum perfectionis ejus, tàm in exiſtendo, quàm in agendo. Diſp 42. S. 1. n. 5. Now this definition is refuted by my Maſter Scheibler; and though it be too low for Dr. Hammond to conſult ſuch a vulgar Author as Scheibler, yet I hope I may refer the Defendant to him. But I ſhall refer (as he ſaith of Suarez) not ſo much unto his Authority, as unto his Reaſon. His words are as followeth. Haec definitio ſimiliter mala eſt. Aut enim illae partiçulae: in eſſendo, vel operando, intelliguntur conjunctim, five copulativè, aut disjunctivè. Hoc quidem modo, ut quod alterutrum illorum praeſtat, dicatur qualitas. Illo vero modo, ut intelligatur id ſolùm eſſe qualitas, quod utrunque facit, hoc eſt, quod perficit ſubſtantiam in eſſe, & operarì. Utroque tamen modo vitioſa eſt definitio. Nam ſi qualitas ſit, diviſim loquendo, quod ſubſtantiam perficit, vel in agendo, vel in eſſendo: ſie etiam locus, tempus, &c. erunt qualitates, quae in exiſtendo ſubſtantiam perficiunt: Item actio, quia ipſa forma eſt, undè ſubſtantia agens denominatur: ſin verò qualitas ſit demum, quae utrunique praeſtet, tùm multe qualitates, non erunt qualitates. Multae enim qualitates nullam actionem exercent: velutiex habitibus ſanitas, ſi ea ſit habitus, ex potentiis natu…alibus, potentiae paſſivae: plurimae ex qualitatibus partialibus, quae ipſae in unive ſum, ſi quid operentur, eſt id ſecundario ſolùm, & quaſi eventualiter. Ac den que etiam ſigura, quippe quae activa non eſt, non erit qualitas fuit autem de re plenius ſupra cap. 6. tit. …. art. 3. punct. 1.

p. 31Another Argument we have, pag. 121. As there cannot be an efficient cauſe without its cauſality: ſo impoſſible it is there ſhould be any cauſality, where nothing is produced and cauſed by that cauſality. As it is impoſſible there ſhould be an active power, without reſpect to the act that terminates the power: ſo impoſſible it is, there ſhould be any action, without ſome product to terminate the action.

This argument is in Suarez, Metaphyſ. diſp. 48. Sect. 2. n. 16. and cited by Scheibler, Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 10. n. 31. Eſt ratio à priori, quia actio ut actio, ſi ſit vera, ac propria nihil aliud eſt, quam productio aut effectio, aut cauſalitas efficientis cauſae: ſed impoſſibile eſt vel mente concipere veram productionem, quin per eam aliquid ſit productum, vel cauſalitatem actualem ſine re aliqua cauſata: Ergo impoſſibile eſt etiam intelligere actionem ſine termino. Unto this argument you have an anſwer in my Maſter Scheibler, n. 32. Reſpondeo, omnem actionem eſſe cauſalitatem; ſed non omnis cauſalitas eſt per modum productionis propriè, & rigoroſè, per quam ſcilicet producatur aliquid poſt actionem remanens. Nam & ipſae actiones dicentur effectus praeciſè & in ſe, quia habent eſſe dependens aliunde, ut fatetur Suarez Diſp. 18. Met. ſect. 10. n. 8. Ex quo etiam apparet: nullam in eo repugnantiam eſſe, ſi aliqua ſit cauſalitas, neque tamen ſit aliqua res cauſata, diſtincta caufalitate, quia cauſalitas ipſa poteſt eſſe boc ipſum cauſatum. There is but one expreſſion in the anſwer lyable to exception, poſt actionem remanens. Now leave out that, or elſe rectifie it, by adding ordine naturae, vel temporis, and the anſwer is good, and remains unſhaken by any thing that you ſay.

The ſame objection you have in Franciſcus Bonae ſpei, de animd, diſp. 11. dub. 3. reſol. 3. applyed unto into intellection in particular: unto which his anſwer is, That ſome actions are productive of terms that are really undiſtinguiſhed from them. The words of both the objection and anſwer, are as followeth.

Objicies, actio eſt formaliter fieri termini, ſive modus, quo aliquid fit, ergo intellectio eſt aliquid realiter diſtinctum à ſuo termino.

In forma, Reſponde…, diſtinguendo antecedens, actio eſt formaliter fieri termini realiter à ſe diſtincti, vel indiſtincti, concedo antec, neceſſari… realiter diſtincti, nego antecedens. Sic patet ad conſequentiam.

For further clearing this anſwer of Franciſcus Bonae Spei; I ſhall deſire the Reader to take notice **Quod eadem numere fa…ultas ſimul habeat vim agendi, & ſit principium re…ipiendi actionem quam elicit, non poteſt cum aliqua probabilitate dubitari, ſuppoſita vera dectrina, de actibus immanentibus, qui recipiuntur, ipn e…ſdem potenti is, à quibus eliciunter, five ad eam effectionem indigeant aliquo alio co-rincipio, ut ſpecie vel …bjecto aut ali… ſimili, five non. Nam quidquam in hoc ſentiatur, verum nibilominus eſt eandem facultatem ſ…cundum rem eſſe ſimul potentiam activam & paſſivam reſpectu ejuſdem actus, & reſpecta ſui ipſius, quatenus cundem actum & recipit, & elicit. Et ratio eſt quia illamet qualita…, quatenus h…bet actualem perſectionem talis ſpeciei, poteſt eſſe virtus eminenter, vel virtute continen… alium actum, & poteſt eſſe ſormaliter actuabilis per cundem actum, ut in praedicta diſputatione 18 latius diximus, Nec in hac occurrit nova difficultar, quae ibi tractata non ſit. Suarez Metaph. Diſputat 43. Sect. 2. n. 14.that a faculty or power (verbi gratiâ, the underſtanding) is in ſeveral regards or conſiderations both active and paſſive. It is active, as it produceth the action of underſtanding, and p. 32paſſive, as it receives and ſuſtains it: anſwerably the immanent act of this power or faculty, intellection, may undergo the conſideration of both an action and a term.

1. The conſideration of an action, as it actuates the underſtanding, as an active power, as it is from it, and produced by it.

2. The conſideration of a term, as it actuates the underſtanding as a paſſive power, as it is received and ſeated in it.

But it may be Objected, That by this, intellection ſhould be a term unto it ſelf. But this cannot be, for then it ſhould be both before and after it ſelf, and that is a thing utterly impoſſible.

For anſwer, It is impoſſible for a thing to be both before and after it ſelf, à parte rei, really and indeed: but 'tis no repugnancy, for a thing to be before and after it ſelf, in regard of ſeveral conſiderations; a thing may have ſeveral formalities and conſiderations; and one of them may antecede the other, ſigno or momtato rationis. Thus the conſideration of tho production of intellection by the underſtanding, precedes the reception or inhaeſion of it in the underſtanding. By this you ſee then, that if immanent actions be productive of a term, it is of a term that is diſtinguiſhed from them only ratione raci…einatâ, and therefore they are not properly productions, but conceived and conſidered after the manner of productions.

But perhaps there may be another Argument, p. 116 in theſe words And give me leave to tell you, That it will be impoſſible to make it good, till firſt you ſhall demonſtrate againſt Suarez and the beſt Metaphyſicians and Philoſophers, that actie, ut ſic, non dicit eſſentialens reſpectum ad terminum, and that there can be any motion whether inſtantaneous, or ſucceſſive, and not from a terminns à quo, to a terminus ad quem, and give us a ſolid anſwer to their Arguments.

If there be here any argument at all, thus it ſtands reduced to form.

Every motion, whether inſtantaneous or ſucceſſive, proceeds from a terminus à quo, to a terminus ad quem.

But now every action is motion:

Therefore every action preceeds à termin… à quo ad terminum ad quem.

p. 331 The Minor is falſe, unleſſe motion be taken largely and improperly, and if it be thus taken, then the Major is denied; indeed the Major affirms thus, the foreign, the thing in controverſy: ſo that in the argument there is petitio principi…; for tis every way as doubtful and controverted, whether motion, taking the word in a large and improper ſenſe, hath terminum ad quem effectivum, as whether every action hath. For motion in this large and improper ſenſe, is the equivalent of action, I ſaid, ſignanter terminum effectivum, for there is no doubt, but all actions and motions have an objective terme, ſuch a terme as is their object: the queſtion is, whether every action, and motion in the large and improper ſenſe of the word, have an effective terme; ſuch a terme as is its product or effect? And this being the onelyonly thing in queſtion, is onelyonly affirmed, and not confirmed.

But the Defendant not onelyonly preſſeth us with reaſons, but alſo burdens us with the Authority of Suarez, Ruvio, Smigleſius, &c. p. 30. 31, 11, 6, 11, 7.

Unto theſe it were very eaſy to adde many other, and as eaſy to oppoſe as many on our ſide, but in points controverted amongſt School-men, it ſignifieth very little to muſter up the Abettors of the ſeveral Opinions; for the matter muſt be carried not by multitude of Voices, but by weight of Arguments. It is not therefore material what Suarez, Smigleſius, or Ruvio ſay; unleſs withal they prove what they ſay; having then anſwered all the Arguments that the Defendant produceth, either of his own or of others, there is no reaſon why we ſhould ſtay any longer upon the conſideration of any of his witneſſes.

But yet before I part from them, I cannot but profeſſe my wonder how Scotus comes to be reckoned in the number of them. Faber Faventinus, and Rada repreſent him to be of a contrary Opinion, and they being his profeſſed Champions, are likely to be as well read in him as Dr. Creed. But let Scotus be conſulted, and he will ſpeak another language concerning Intellection, and what he ſaith of that, may be extended to all immanent vitall actions. Nec eſt verbum mentis te…minus aliquis productus per intellectionem, quia intellectio non eſt actio productiva alicujus termini tunc enim impoſſibile eſſet eam intelligere, et non eſſe termini, ſicut impoſſibile eſt intelligere calefactionem eſſe, et non eſſe calorcin, ad quem fit cal…factio non eſt autem impoſſibile intelligere intellectonem in ſe, non intelligendo, qu…d ſit alicujus termini, ut producti per ipſam. But our ſubtile Doctor was but a man, and therefore 'twas poſſible for him to contradict himſelf; but whether he hath done ſo, will appear by examination of the paſſages that our Deſendant quotes out of him, p. 30. And now if our Refuter ſhall think fit to lodge any ſtrength upon Scheiblers confirmation, I ſhall refer p. 34him for an anſwer to Scotus, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. where he ſhall find this largely diſcuſſed, that though habitual knowledge be not the intrinſicke terme of theſe Operations, ſed quaſi conſequens, & extrinſecus, and that operationes hujuſmodi poſſunt intelligi, & eſſe ſine habitu, ur patet in habentibus habitum intenſiſſimum, ut in beatis, and in Chriſt in reſpect of habitual Grace which was alwayes in him in its utmoſt height poſſible; yet they cannot poſſibly be, or conceived to be without actual knowledge, the quality that terminates them. To this purpoſe alſo may the ſame Scotus be ſeen, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult ſ. 130. & 1 Sent. d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3. ex edit cavelli.

As for the firſt place, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. ſ. 32. indeed the former part of the words are in Scotus, that a habit, viz. of knowledge, is not the Intrinſick Term… of immanent Operations, but only their Extrinſick, and Accidental Terme. But now as for the latter words, they, that is, Immanent Operations cannot poſſibly be conceived to be without Actual knowledge, the quality that terminates them: theſe are not found in Scotus, but are a bold Supply, that I ſay not Forgery, of our Defendant, Scotus there propounds three queſtions concerning Intellection, and the like immanent Operations. The firſt, which belongs only to our preſent purpoſe, is cuiuſm…di entitas ſit intellectio, v…litio, et hujuſmodi operationes immanentes? and his Reſolution is, that they are onelyonly Qualities. This he proveth by removal from them of all other kinds of being, and becauſe there is moſt doubt, whether they be not actions, de praedicanento actionis, he cheifly inſiſts upon that, and the cheif reaſon which he brings, is, becauſe they are not productive of any terme; he thought Immanent Operations not to be Predicamental Actions; and herein, I conſeſs, he differs from mine opinion, and ſo he doth alſo from yours. But pray …, mark whats the reaſon, for which he excludes them from the Predicament of Action? It is becauſe they have no term. With what face then do you affirm that Scotus ſayes, That Immanent Operations cannot be without a quality that terminates them. But becauſe you are likely to outface the matter, I ſhall in ert Scotus his words at large: Firſt, he hath, N. 31. this paſſage, Praeterea acti…nis eſt aliqualis terminus realis, hic autem praeter intellectionem? non eſt aliqualis terminus, &c. And again afterwards, N. 32. Quod intellectio non ſit actio, vel paſſi…, p…ob… ſic actio, & paſſi…, ſunt alicu…us termini accipientis eſſe per ipſas ſed operationes immanentes ſunt ultimi termini, quibus nihil accipit eſſe, &c. Marke you me that Sir, Quod ſi dicos, qued cum per actus habitus generantur, habitus eſt term…nus dicta…um operationum, & ſic ſunt actio, vel paſſio.

Ad argumentum dicendum, quod actio illa, quae proprie eſt ad terminum, non poteſt intelligi ſine termin…: ſed operationes hujuſmodi poſſunt intelligi ſine habitu & eſſe, ut patet in habentibus habitum intentiſſimum, ut in Beatis: Ergo proprie non dicitur terminus quaſi intrinſecus, p. 35ſed quaſi conſequens, & accidentalis cum ergo hujuſmodi operationes aliquid ſint & probatum eſt, quod non ſunt ſubſtantia, nec relatie, nec actio, aut paſſio, neque quantitas, vel aliquid extrinſecus adventitium, relin …uitur, quod ſint in genere qualitatis, &c.

The Reader is by this time, I ſuppoſe, convinced of your unworthy falſification of Scotus, for he ſaith no ſuch thing as you ſay; …ay, he ſaith the quite contrary, Operationes Immanentes ſunt ultimi termini, quibus nihil accipit eſſe. This one inſtance is ſufficient, to give a taſte of your fidelity and honeſty in quoting Authors. Of it I ſhall make this Ʋſe, that for the future I ſhall little trouble either my ſelf or the Reader, with Examination of your Authorities; for you have in ſo ſhameleſs, groſs, and palpable amanner, ſalſified Scetus, as that you deſerve but little Credit in any Teſtimonies that you ſhall alledge. In the very ſame queſtion afterwards: N. 35. he expreſly denyeth, that Immanent Operations have any Terme, which receives any being by them. And in this particular he ſayes they are unlike, proper and praedicamental actions. Tertia prepric…as actionis proprie ſumptae, eſt quod eſt circa aliquem termnum, ad quem terminatur, qui eſſe accipit per eum idem intellig…t de paſſione. Operationes ergo immanentes aſſimilantur actioni & paſſioni in prima conditione, et ſecunda, non autem in tertia, que eſt completiva.

A ſecond place is lib. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult. p. 130. n. 11. Iſ… eſt alia conditio ulterior, videlicet, quod iſtae formae de ratione ſui tranſeant in aliquid, ut in terminum, & hoc ſive illud aliud ſit intra operans five extra, non curo non eſt enim intelligibile, quod ſic intellectio, & volitio, et quod non ſit alicu…us term ni hoc a…tem conveni… actioni propriè dicts, ut tranſeat in aliquid, ut ia terminum, propter iſtas igitur duas conditiones concurre…tes in iſtis firmis, dicuntur iſtae formae eſſe actus ſecundi, cum vere ſint f…mae manentes. The words are not quoted, but I ſuppoſe theſe are thoſe the Defendant meaneth.

But 'tis plain that Sectus ſpeaks of an Objective, not Effective Terme.

1. From a compariſon of this place, with other paſſages, that plainly, and expreſly deny Immanent Actions to have Termes.

2 From a following paſſage in the ſame page, Nunc aut…m aliquis actus intellectionis vel volitionis, poteſt eſſe ejuſdem rationis, licet non ſit alicujus termini producti: Here he ſuppoſeth it poſſible for Intellection and Volition not to have any Terme produced by them; And therefore, when he ſayeth in the place objected, Non eſt enim intelligibile, qu…d ſit intellectio, et volitio, et quod non ſit alicujus t…rmini. Here by the Terme he means onelyonly the Object, and not the Product of Intellection and Volition.

3 From the Coherence of the words, with the foregoing: p. 36Scotus his deſign is to prove, that Immanent Operations, though they be not proper actions, de genere actionis, may yet be called Second Acts, becauſe in two reſpects they reſemble Actions: 1 Becauſe of their perpetual dependance upon their cauſes. 2 Becauſe they have a tendency unto a Terme. Now this muſt needs be underſtood of an Objective Terme onelyonly; for if it were underſtood of an Effective Terme, it Would make them to be, by S…o…us his Opinion, proper and Praedicamental Actions, which is a thing that he conſtantly denyeth.

4 That the word Te…m…, which Intellection (ſaith Scotus) regards, ſignifieth onelyonly an Objective Terme; the Defendant, if he had not been in haſte, might have gathered from the Margent, where we have theſe words: Intellectio, & volitio dicunter Actiones, quia dependent continuè a ſuis cauſis, et quia tendunt in aliquid ut in terminum attingentiae. Here terminus attingentiae is diſtinguiſhed plainly, a termino efficientiae. This diſtinction of the Terme of Intellection, is plainly inſinuated by Rada, a great follower of Scotus, controv. Theol. p. 1. controv. 7. p. 124. 125. Intellectio, inquit, habet terminum quem actualliter reſpicit, ſcilicet, objectum, &c. Sed non eſt productiva ſui termini nec per ipſam tanquam per actionem aliquid producitur, &c.

But go we on to a third place in Scotus, lib. 1. ſent. d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3. This place the Defendant quotes again, p. 32. and there he inſerts the very words of Scotus. Howſoever, ſaith he, Though the Refuter thinks fit to refer the Doctor, becauſe he is a Critick, to learn ſome Metaphiſicks from Sheibler; yet I will be ſo civil to him, becauſe he is a School-man, to refer him for his learning in this point, to one of the ſubtleſt of th…ſe Doctors. And let Scotus be the man, it is, l. 1. ſent. d. 27. q. 3. f. 19. …d tertium. The place is ſhort, but full, and not taken notice of by Suarez; and the words are theſe: Ad tertium, concedo quod N…titia eſt proles & vere genita, ſed preductio illa non eſt actualis intellectio, quia, ut dictum eſt ſupra, actualis intell…ctio non eſt actio de genere act…nis, ſed eſt qualitas nata terminare talem actionem, quae ſignificatur per hic quod eſt dicere, vel in communi per hoc quod eſt elicere; non igitur verbum eſt aliquid productum actione, quae eſt intellectio, quia ipſa intellectio non eſt productiva alicujus, ſed ipſa eſt producta actione quae eſt degenere actionis, ſicut dictum eſt ſupra. He here referrs to the place quo…ed by Suarez, 1 Sent. d. 3. q. 6. p. 110. Col. 2. n. 31. & ib. q. ult. p. 130. ex edit Cavel, where he has very ſolidly proved it.

For anſwer, Scotus in this very queſtion delivers (as you have ſeen) another Doctrine; and 'tis very ſtrange that he ſhould ſo forget himſelf, as to contradict it ſo ſoon: But the truth is, that in this paſtage, there is not to much as one word or ſyllable ſounding for the Defendants purpoſe, viz. That all Immanent Actions p. 37are productive of Termes: Nay, here is ſomething that expreſly contradicts this tenet of the Defendant; and 'tis that intellection which the Defendant cannot deny to be an Immanent Action, is not productive of any Term. For which reaſon he makes it a Quality, and denies it to be an Action, De genere actionis, non igitur verbum eſt aliquid productum actione, quae eſt intellectio quia ipſa intellectio non eſt productiva alicujus, &c. Indeed he makes dicere to be productive of intellection as its Term, but the Defendant ſhould take notice, that dicere is by Scotus a Tranſient, and not an Immanent Action; an Explication of which may be ſeen in eeOmnis actio habens terminum productum per ipſam dicitur, tranſiers ab Ariſtotele, non quia tranſeat inexternam materiam, ſed quia tranſit in terminum, ſive ille terminus maneat in agente, five tranſeat in exteram materiam. De q… re videndus eſt Antonius Tromb. to in ſua Metaphiſica. Controv. Theol. pa… 1. Controv. 7. p. 125.Rada.

There is, I believe, now no impartial and unprejudiced Reader, but muſt needs confeſs, that Heat and Rage of Oppoſition, hath here blinded the Defendants judgement: For elſe, how is it poſſible that he ſhould thus miſtake, and miſunderſtand a plain place in Scotus? It is very probable that the Defendant may judge Me uncapable of underſtanding Scotus; but he hath no reaſon to think ſo contemptibly of all his other Readers, into whoſe hands his book may come. For doubtleſs many of them are as able to reach the meaning of Scotus, as himſelf: hereby a Gueſſe may be given at the great Abilities of his Admirers, who ſwallow ſuch ſtuff as this.

Here, before I paſſe on, I ſhall briefly ſum up the State of the Queſtion, A… omnis actio habeat terminum.

For Explication of the Termes,

I. Actions are either Immanent or Tranſient.

II. The Terme of Actions is either only Objective, or elſe Effective alſo.

An Effective Terme is either Extrinſick, and Accidentall, or elſe Intrinſick, and Eſſentiall, unto which an Action carrieth an Intrinſicall and Eſſentiall Reſpect.

Theſe Diſtinctions thus premi…ed: I ſhall lay down three things which are granted, and uncontroverted on both ſides.

1. That all Tranſient Actions have not only an Objective, but alſo an Effective Terme; a Term which they produce.

2. That all Immanent Actiens, have an Objective Terme, an Object unto which they tend, which is called Terminus attingentiae.

3. That ſome Immanent Actions have an Effective, Extrinſick, and Accidentall Terme, viz. Habits. I call it an Extrinſick and Accidentall Term, becauſe 'tis Accidental unto Immanent Actions, to be productive of ſuch a Terme: For there are many Immanent Actions that produce no ſuch Terme.

The matter that is controverted, is, Whether all Immanent p. 38Actions have an Effective, Intrinſick and Eſſentiall Terme?

This is denyed, no Immanent Actions have ſuch a Terme, for reſpect unto ſuch a Terme is not Intrinſick and Eſſentiall unto ſuch Immanent Actions: And the Reaſ…n is, becauſe they may be abſtracted from ſuch a reſp…ct. Now nothing can be abſtracted from that which is Intrinſick and Eſſential to it.

Having thus proved that theſe pretended …arms of Immanent Actions are excluded e…numero entium, it is needleſs to enquire under what head of being they are ranged.

Yea, but our Defendant tells us, page 37. that Suarez makes them to be diſp…ſitions.

Doth he ſo? What then I pray? Is he not our profeſſed Adverſary in this Queſtion? And therefore is it any Newes, or wonder, that he diſſents from us? The truth is, having affirmed that there are ſuch things, it concerns him to place them ſomewhere or othe…, and he could think of no ſuch convenient place to ledge them, as amongſt Diſpoſitions.

Yea, but the Defend. p. 37, 38. acquaints us with a Reaſon, which Suarez hath, why he makes them di…poſitious: For, diſpoſitio is facile m…bilis, and ſo are the Termes of Immanent Actions: They have no fixed and permanent, but a m…v…able being, by reaſon of their dependance on the actuall influx of their Vita…l Powers.

For anſwer. 1. Though every diſpoſition be facile mobilis, yet every thing that is facile mobilis that hath a moveable being, is not a Diſpoſition, as is apparent from predicament all Actions, and ſuch Relations as have tranſient foundations.

Secondly, this Reaſon weighs little with us; for we deny theſe pretended Termes to have any being at all: And if they have no being at all, then conſequently no moveable being. This reaſon were of ſome Validity upon Preſuppoſition, that theſe pretended Termes were Qualities: But we deny them to be Entities, and ſay that they have no being, but a fancied one, in the imaginations of a Party, or Faction of School-men; and for this Affirmation, I have laid down as I ſuppoſe, ſufficient ground.

But ſuppoſe the Terms of ſome Immanent Actions may be called diſpoſitions, yet there is no reaſon for calling ſo the pretended Termes of the Actions of Divine Love in our bleſſed Saviour: Becauſe they diſp…ſe unto nothing; and diſpoſitio diſponit ad aliquid; neither the Name nor Nature of Diſpoſition agreeth unto them; and therefore why ſhould they be called diſpoſitions?

For concluſion of this diſcourſe; I ſhall adventure to give my Gu…ſs at the Reaſon which led ſome of the School-men to deviſe theſe Termes of Immanent Actions. It was, I ſuppoſe, to ſupport, and clear their m…nſt…us, and groundleſ…, Fictions that they have concerning the p. 39doctrine of the Sacred Trinity, which they vent upon the firſt of the Sentences, Diſt. 27. and 32. And on the fuſt of Summes, q. 34. and 37. Where they have uſually theſe bold inquiries An verbum divinum producatur per…actum intelligendi? &c. An Spiritus Sanctus producatur per actum diligendi? By theſe daring and Preſumptu…s Diſputes, they have exp…ſed the Miſtery of the Trinity unto a great deal of ſcandal, and ſcorn amongſt Socinians and other Anti-Trinitarians.

Before I Paſſe on to the f…urth, and laſt Evaſion of Dr. Creed: I ſhall from what hath been ſaid, in impugning the Pretended Termes of Immanent Actions, inferre the impertinency of all that he faith, p. 72.73.74.75.76.77.115.116.117.118. In defence of this pro-Poſition Poſition in Dr. Hammond, the word Love is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species, habitual and actual Love, or the Acts of Love. For Dr. H. by actual Love, or the Act of Love, underſtands, as hath been ſhewn, the Action of Loving, and not (as the Defend▪ moſt vainly pretends) any quality Produced by that Action, which is its Term and Product. His Propoſition then, notwithſtanding all Doctor Creeds Defence, is ſtill chargeable with that abſurdity which I objected againſt it, viz. that it makes Love as a Genus equally to comprehend, as Species, primo dive…ſa, things put in ſeveral Predicaments. For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality, and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action.

For further diſproof of Dr. H. his prepoſition, I ſhall add what I ſaid touching the habit of Love, and the ſincere and cordial expreſſions thereof. No one word can, as a Genus, equally comprehend the efficient, and the effect, viz. as ſpecies; but the habit of Love is the efficient, and the acts of Love are the effects thereof, (the habit of Love (ſaith the Defend.) effectively concurres with the Will, to the production of the inward Acts of Love: therefore Love, as a Genus, doth not comprehend habitual Love, and actual Love, as Species. The Major of this Syll…giſme, the Defendant will ſay is moſt ridiculouſly falſe, as appeares by what he ſaith to the like Syllogiſme, that I framed concerning the habit of Love, and the Expreſſions thereof. His Anſwer is very remarkable, for the tranſcendent and matchleſs, both ignorance and impudence of it; and therefore I ſhall crave the Readers patience for a while to conſider it.