Dr Creeds Voluminous Defense of Hammons Ektenesteron, Part 2
Dr. CREED.
For what think you, Sir, of all univocal Productions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn, when a Man begets a Ma…, and one heat make another; does not one and the ſame word, as a genus, comprehend the Efficient and the Effect?
When I Read this paſſage, I was about, I confeſſe, with a juſt indignation to throw away your book, as unworthy mine, or any other Schollars further peruſal. I deſire to have low and humble thoughts of my ſelf, but yet I cannot think him a dompetent Adverſary for me to Encounter, who is ſo Ignorant in Logick, as to ſay, that Man and Fire are genera: I propounded the Queſtion to a Freſh ma…, an … ſit genus? and he anſwered no, and readily confirmed his Negative thus: Nulla ſpecies infima eſt genus: hom… eſt ſpecies infima; Ergo homo non eſt genus. I make no doubt but that our Defendant hath great abilities in other learning, but I ſhall never acknowledge him to be a Philoſopher, or School-man, that thus treſpaſſeth againſt the very A. B. C. of Logick. I ſhall give him this friendly advice for the future, that before his next attempt in Scholaſtical Divinity, he firſt con over Smith, Breerwood, Sanderſon, or ſome other ſuch comp…ndium of Logick, that ſo he may be able to avoid ſuch miſtakes as this, which will Expoſe him unto the Deriſion of every Boy.
If any ſhall Object in the Defendants behalf, that the Ramifts hold that every ſpecies is genus, and that individuum is ſp… cies infima, as may be ſeen in Scheiblers T…picks: c. 28. n. 77, 78, &c. uſque ad 85. This yet can be no ſta…ting hole for the Defendant, for this propoſition, every genus is predicated equally of its ſpecies, is a Maxime of the Ariſtotelians, delivered by them long before ever Ramus ſaw the light; and there is no doubt can be made that they take genus and ſpecies in a Peripat…tical, and not Ramiſtical ſen…e.
If it be ſaid again ſecondly, that even Dr. Sanderſon in his Logick, l. 3. c. 24. confeſſeth that Topically ſpecies infima is genus.
Why this can as little availe the D…fendant as the former ſhift, for tis undeniable that we ſpeak of genus as praedicabile, and the Maxime, Genus p…aedicatur aequaliter de ſpeciebus, is delivered by P…phy…y in his Iſag…ge, where he handles the Doctrine of the Predicables.
In a third place it may be replyed, that in that Interrogation of our Defendant, does not one and the ſame word as a genus comprehend the Efficient and the Effect? He is not to be Interpreted of any of the words imediately preceding Fire, Corne, a Man, Heat, but of ſome words that are to be underſt…d and Supplied as Elementum, which as a genus comprehends the Fire producing, and the Fire produced: and planta, or corpus animatum, which in like manner is predicated of the Corne bringing forth, and the Corne brought forth as a genus: and animal, which is predicated in the ſame manner as a genus of the man b…getting, and the man begotten: and qualitas patibilis prima, which in the ſame way is predicated of the Heat making, and the Heat made.
But Firſt, what Reaſon have I to make this Supply in your Words?
Secondly, We cannot Supply, or underſtand theſe words, Elementum, Corpus animatum, animal qualitas patibilis prima: For Elementum is predicated of the Fire producing, and the Fire produced; Corpus animatum, of the Corn bringing forth, and the Corne brought forth, &c. and ſo Animal of the Father, and the Son, onelyonly as of Individualls: whereas the comprehenſion, and predication of the Genus, that we ſpeak of, is onelyonly concerning its Species.
Unto all this I ſhall adde Ex abundanti, out of Irenaeus, a Modern Thomiſt, that which will anſwer your Objection. And 'tis the more pertinent, becauſe it ſpeaks of one of your Inſtances, viz. Fires producing Fire; Cave tamen putes quamlibet dependentiam facere noſtram Analogiam, nam ignis generat ignem, qui ambo un voce conveniunt in natura ignis, quia cum illa dependentia Phyſica non reperitur dicta inaequalit…s: Vel melius iſta dependentia eſt ſolum quoad actualem exiſtentiam, ſeu poſitionem extra cauſas, non autem quoad participationem ſecundum eſſenti…, ſeu eſſe objectivum ſi enim quaeratur, utrum ignis B. genitus ab igne A. et ab eo dependens, ut generetur, et exiſtat, ab eodem dependeat eſſentialiter ſpectatus, non conſiderata exiſtentia? dicendum erit, quod non quia ignis A. non eſt principium igneitatis, altoqui eſſet principium ſui ipſius. At vero accidens dependet a ſubſtantia eſſentialiter, ut ſit ens. Qu…d fiet evidens comparanti ſingula hoc modo. Leo non minus erit animal, eti… ſi homo ſit impoſſibilis: At accidens non erit ens, ſi ſubſtantia ſit impoſſibilis; cum enim accidens ſit entis ens, cujus erit ens, ſi nulla ſit ſubſtantia? ergo aliter accidens participat ens, quam l…o participet animal. Nec refert, quod ſublato hommine tolleretur leo, quatenus rationale, & irrationale ſunt relata, ac proinde ſimul ſunt natura: Nam hic non conſiderantur ut relata, ſed preciſe ut Animalia. Diſcept. in Univerſ. Logic, p. 113.
In the next place you tell us great news, of the difference betwixt Ʋnivocall and Equivocall productions, a thing that is known, and obvious unto every Puiſny. But you ſpend many lines about it, and very gravely confirm it, by the teſtimonies of Scheibler and Svarez: Then you intimate that I forget this Notion, and therefore referre me for it to Aquinas his Summes. But what ground, nay colour, have you to ſay that I forget it? The truth is, you have not ſo much as a ſhadow for ſuch an imputation; but to Caluminate, is grown to be ſo familiar with you, that 'tis even incorporated into your diſcourſe.
But what inferre you from all this? Why forſooth, that Individuals, whereof one is the Efficient, and the other the Effect, may be comprended under the ſame word as a Genus. But what is all this to the purpoſe? Is it not clear, that my Major is to be underſtood concerning the comprehenſion of Species by the Genus? Indeed no Reader, but ſuch a Diſ-ingenuous Caviller, as Dr. Creed will underſtand me, concerning the comprehenſion of Individualls.
This ſupply of Species is no ſubter-ſuge, but may eaſily be gathered from the coherence of my words. For the Propoſition which I undertake to prove, is that Love as a Genus, doth not comprehend as Species, the Expreſſions of Love, equally with the Habit.
But let us ſee next whether you have any better ſucceſs with your Equiv…call productions.
Firſt, Moſt of your inſtances are of Genus remotum; whereas Dr. Han. and I, are all along to be underſtood of G…nus pro…cimum, and the Maxime of Porphy…y, which is the foundation of all this argumentation, hath the ſame ſenſe too.
But you next bring inſtances, wherein the Cauſe and the Effect, are both ranged under the ſame immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal. When an Aſſe begets a Mule, or a Man produces Wo…mes and Vermine in his Head and Entrailes, and when a Woman brings forth M…nſtruous birth inſtead of Legitimate Iſſues, at Serpents, M…les, and Freggs, and other ſuch lich like (of which among Phyſ…ians there are many true Stories) I pray, Sir, muſt not the Cauſe and Effect be both ranged under the ſame immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal?
But fieſt, that Animal is a Genus proximum unto an Aſſe and Mule, unto Wormes and Vermin, unto Se…pents, Moles and Froggs, is a groſſe falſhood, eaſily diſcernable by every one that knowes any thing almoſt in the Predicament of Subſtance. For ſuch a one cannot be ignorant, that b…u…m intervenes betwixt all theſe and Animal: Ariſt…le in the 7th of his Meraph. text. 28. ſaith, That the Gerus proximum of Mulus, and Equus wants a Name. And the ſame may be ſaid touching the Genus proximum of an Aſſe and a Mule.
Secoudly, All theſe inſtances are impertinent, becauſe they are of ſuch Efficients and Effects as are per accidens: Whereas 'tis undenyable, that I am to be underſtood of ſuch only as are per…ſe: For ſo at e…habituall and actuall Love, as alſo the ſincere and cordiall Expreſſions thereof. Thus in generall.
But to take a particular Survey of the ſeverals:
I. When an Aſſe begets a Mule, it is a Monſtrous and Unnaturall production, and Monſtra fiunt per accidens, as not being intended by particular nature.
II. That a Man produceth Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailes, as an efficient, is new, ſtrange, and falſe Phyloſophy▪ For,
1. No particular cauſe *Suarez Metaph. diſp. 18. ſ. 2. n. 26. Averſa Philoſ. tom. 2. p. 238.239.240.241. Compton Carlton diſp. 25. Phyſ. ſ. 3. n. 7, 8. p. 304.can be the Efficient, viz. Principall, of any Eſſentiall forme ſpecifically different from its own. I… may concurre thereunto diſpoſitive, diſponendo, …ut praeparan…o …ueri…n, nec … cam praeb…nd…, or applicative applicando acti… paſſivis, non effective, immediate attingendo productionem ipſius formae. Nay, 'tis a received Opinion, that no Angell can produce any ſubſtantiall forme, but only as cauſa applicans: and therefore the production of Animals out of putrid matter, is generally reſolved to be by a Ʋniverſall Cauſe, either the Heavenly B…dyes, or the firſt cauſe.
But 2. That man is not the Efficient of Wormes and Vermine in his Head, &c. The Reader may ſee in Poncius. p. 3. pag. 22, 23. Cauſalitat…m effectivam reſpectu vermium, qui producuntur ab aliis cauſis extri…ſecis: Contra h…ines habent activiratem reſpectu humoris, ſeu ſubſtantiae illius, ex qua preducuntur vermes: Ergo poſſunt dici habere activitatem reſpectu vermium; nec enim alia ratione ma…es habent activitam, aut dicuntur principia productiva aliorum hommum, niſi quatenus habent actitatem productivam ſeminis ex quo f…unt.
Reſpondetur, negando corſequentiam ad cujue probationem dicitur, quod non pr…ptere… preciſe home dicatur eſſe p…incipium alterius k…minis exeo, quod producat, ſemen ex quo fit alter home, ſed etiam, qu…a illud ſemen habet aliquam activitatem in ordine ad preducendum al…m illum h…minem.
III. A Woman may bring forth monſtrous births inſtead of legitimate iſſues, as Serpents, Moles, Froggs: but that ſhe is the Efficient of them, viz. Pe…ſe is a palpable untruth; and that for the ſame reaſon, that man is denyed to produce Wormes, and other Vermin in his Head and Entrailes. Unto this let me add, that the Effective dependanc…, which I ſpeak of, is Neceſſary, and in ſome ſenſe Eſſentiall. But the Dependance of theſe monſtrous births upon a Woman, is per accidens, Fortuitous and Caſuall; and ſo moſt impertinently alledged.
Now let us ſumme up the State of my Major Pr…poſition, and thus it runs. No word as a Genus proximum doth equally comprehend as its Species, the Efficient per ſe and the Effect. Unto this, now, let us ſee what a brave and gallant oppoſition you make.
You ſay.
1. That one word as ſpecies infima doth comprehend the Efficient and the Effect.
2. That one word as Genus doth comprehend, viz. Mediately, Individualls, whereof one is the Efficient, and the other the Effect.
3. That one word, as Genus rem…tum doth comprehend equally as ſpecies, the Efficient and the Effect.
4. That one word as Genus doth equally comprehend the Efficient per accidens, and the Effect.
Now none of all this doth in the leaſt degree impugne my Major Propoſition, as meant by me: And therefore I might here juſtly deſire you to ſit down, and ſadly to conſider, how groundleſſe and ſooliſh your Tragical Exclamation is againſt my Major Propoſition. But I appeale from you and your ignorant and partiall Admirers, unto the Learned and Ʋnprejudiced Readers.
I go on unto the Defendants fourth and laſt Shiſt. There was, ſaith he, in Chriſt, a twofeld actuall Love of God, The one agreeing to him as Compreh…nſor, being a ſequell of the Bentiſick Viſion; this he grants to be alwayes equally full and intenſe. But this love, ſaith he, was neceſſary, and therefore not meritorious. There is therefore belonging unto Chriſt another Actuall Love of God, as he was Viat…r, which was free, and by which he merited: and this ſprang from the infuſed knowledge of God, and the infuſed habit of Charity. And this▪ Love was more intenſe at one time then another, or one Act of it was more intenſe then another Act: and this diſtinction he proſecutes very largely, pag. 68. 244. 288.290. 333, 334, 33…, 330, 336, 339, 344, &c. Uſque ad 357, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 522, 524, 525, &c. Uſque ad 540, 622, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629, 635, 636, 637.
1. This Anſwer I ſaw in Suarez, but could not foreſee that Dr. Ham. would make uſe of it. Indeed I had no ground to think that he would: for it cannot do him the leaſt ſervice, as I ſhall ſhew anon; and therefore I had no Reaſon to trouble the Reader with any mention of it.
2. Where you read this diſtinction in Suarez, you might have alſo ſeen an Objection againſt it, which might have deterred you from uſing it, if you had conſi…ered how unſatisfying …uarez his anſwers are therunto. The Objection is, that two accidents only numerically diſtinguiſhed, cannot be at the ſame time in the ſame ſubject. But now Chriſts beatifick love of God, and that which ſprings from the inſuſed habit of charity, are diſtinguiſhed only in number: And therefore they could not be at the ſame time in Chriſt.
The firſt Pro…oſition, that two accidents cannot be at the ſame time in the ſame ſubject, is a propoſition that you your ſelf acknowledge, p 196.256. to ſay the contrary, you ſay is a g…ſſe abſurdity, the ſalſhood of which, reaſo… it ſelf a… the ve…y first propoſal is able to diſcover.
But it may be ſaid, that Saarez hath unto this Obj…ction two anſwers. B…t how unſatisfying they are, will appear by the examination of them.
The fi…ſt is, that th…ſe two loves differ, not only numerically, but alſo ſpecifically: S…d hoe altero ex duabus modis probabilibus diſſolvi pot…ſt. Primus eſt, d…cen…o actus illos differre sp…, quia actus amoris beatifici tendit in Deam propter o…nnem pe…fection…m, & rationem, propter quam amabilis eſt: nam to…a ill a per … b…ata… dist n…tè, & clarè vid…tur, & proponitur voluntati; at vero amo, qui conſequitur jcientiam inſuſam, vel tantum fertar in D…um ſub speciali aliq…â ratione bon…, ut juſtitiae, miſericordiae, &c. v…l ſolum ſub rationae ſummi boni, qu…ſi confuſè cognita, & non diſtincte p…opofita: quatenus in ſe con…inet omnem bo…it atem & perfectionem, Q…ae diverſitas ſatis eſſe videtur ad diverſitatem specificam illorum actuam. In certiam part. Thom. tom 1. diſp. 49. f. 2. p. 622.
Unto this I ſhall reply in the words of Beca…s Sum. Theol. Scholaſt. part. 3. trast. 1. cap. 22. q…aeſt. 5. having averred againſt Cajetan and Capreolus, that actus cha…ttatis, in via, and in patria do not diſſerre specie; he confirms his concluſion from the teſtimonie of Aquinas, and from reaſon. T…rtia Co…l …. Actus charitatis non ſolum poteſt eſſe tam in…enſus in via, quam in patria, ſed …tiam tam perfectus in eſſentiali perfectione objectiva. Eſt contra Cajetanum, & c…prcolum, qui do…ent actum charitat is in patria d…ffe re specie ab actu charitatis in via, & eſſontialiter perſectiorem eſſe. … eſt, qu…a alter verſatur cirea Deum clare viſum, alter cirea D…i…m obſcare cogni…am. S…out ergo clara viſio, & obſeura cognitio differunt sp…cie, ita etiam amo… viae, & amor patriae, qui in illis fundantur. Sed conc…uſio noſtra eſt D. Thom. in 2 quaeſt. 67. art. 6. ad 2. ubi aſſerit dilectionem ſum…re ſuam sp…ciem, & eſſintiam, non ex cognitione, ſed ex re cognita: ac proi…de in via & i… pat…ia eſſe …and…m ſp…cie charitatem, quia licet cognitio ſit diverſa, tamen res cognita eſt eadem. Et confirmatur, quia diverſitas eſſentialis in actibus voluntatis, praeſertim quando conveniunt in genere proximo, debet ſwni ex diverſitate objecti formalis. At in amore viae, & patriae, eſt idem objectum formale, nempe infinita benitas, qua Deus in ſe infinite bonus eſt: ergo in illis actibus non eſt diverſitas eſſentialis.
The ſecond anſwer is that duo accidentia ſolo numero diſtincta poſſunt ſalte… ſupernatur aliter eſſe in eadem ſubjecto, &c.
But this ſupernatural providence of God, is not to be fled unto without a man be neceſſitated thereunto by ſome cogent argument and if you can find any ſuch argument in Suarez, good leave may you have to manage it unto your beſt advantage.
All the argument that I can find in Suarez, is, that he thinks it fit to extend the merit of Chriſt unto his love of God. Now his beatifick love of God, was not meritoricus, (ſaith he) bec…ſe 'twas not free, but neceſſary: and therefore he thinks there muſt be another love of God in Chriſt aſſigned, which was free, and ſo capable of meriting. This argument you alſo propound very often.
Unto this argu…here are in the School-men ſeveral anſwers, of which you take no notice: for which concealment I believe no probable reaſon can be rendred, but your late and ſmall acquaintance with the School-men.
1. Some hold that Chriſt did merit by the beatifick act of his love of God, as terminated unto God himſelf. Suarez, in the place by you cited, quoteth for this opinion, Altiſiodorenſis, Gabri…l, S…tus and Capreolus, unto whom you may ſ… in Vaſquez added, Almain, Occam Major. You referre the Reade, to a ſhort paſſage of Scotus, in the place cited by Suarez, which proveth nothing denied by me. But I ſhall now referre you to another paſlage in the ſame place, which expreſſely contradicts you; for there Scotus declareth at large how Chriſt merited by his beaufice love of God, as he was Comprehenſor, Dico (inquit) propter argum…nt…m, quod Ch…istus meruit ſecuadum portionem ſuperiorem & ſecundum omn …actum ejus. Hoe…tamen est difficile tenere propter alios beato…, qui tunc videntur poſſe mereri in infinitum: pro…o autem illud, quia omnis actu…, acceptatus … Deo, tanquam actus …ow…s & landabilis, pro quo Deus velit a… quid retribuere illi, cujus actum acceptat, vel alteri, pro quo fit, eſt meritorius: bujuſmodi eſt omnis actus Cbriſti ſecundum naturam humanun: etiam actus beatificur, quo ſecundum po…tionem ſuperiorem fruitur D…o: quia perſona illa non ſecu…dum omnem conditionem ſui, fuit ſimpliciter in termino; ideo potuit Deus omnem actum creatum illius perſonae acceptare tanquam dignum aliquo boto pro…co retribuendo illi perſonae, ſi indiguiſſet, vel alteri, ſcilicet nobis, pro quibus meruit. Et hoc tenendo, oporter dicere, quod ſi actus beatificus ſecundum portion…m ſuperiorem Christi ſuit meritorius, quod non includit contradictiounn actum beatifieum Michaelis, vel alterius beati, peſſe acceptari tanquam aliquid dignum retributione, quod retribu…um dar…tar propter mer…tum; puta daretur Michaeli aliquid propter actum meritorium cuſtodiae quam exerces circa me, contradictio dico non eſſet; tamen de facto D…us, non ſic…acceptat actum illum, quia perſona illa est totaliter extra ſtatum m…rendi ſecundum totum ſubjectum: non ſic Chriſtus, ſed ſecundum aliquid ſuit in statu viatoris, & propter hoc omnis actus ejus creatus acceptus erat, & meritorius illis, pro quibus offerrebatur Deo.
O…e would think it very ſtrange, that you ſhould over ſee this paſſage in Scotus, in the very ſame queſtion that you quote. I may here make uſe of your words concerning my ſelf, p. 633. I can think of no other probable ground of the Defendants m…ſtake, but only his writing at randome, and c…njectures upon other mens ſhort notes and ſuggeſtions. But this over-ſight is trivial, in reſpect of that which is in your Quotation out of Nicholaus Da Orbellis, p. 349. for in that there are words expreſſely gainſaying your opinion; for they aſſert that it was poſſible for the beati…ick act in Chriſt (that is, in the Scotiſt-language, his fruition of God by love conſequent unto the beatifical viſion) to be meritorious. Ideo potuit Deus omnow actum creatum illius perſonae acce…tare tanqu …n dignum pro ſe, vel pro illis pro quibus offertur Deo, etiam actum beatificum. Sicut enim meritum non tantum conſistit in ipſo actu clicito, ſed in conditionibus per…ſe elieitis; ſic acceptatio divina non ſolum respicit actum, ſed conduioxes accidentales ſuppoſiti elicient is.
In pig. 637. with a great deale of gravity and ſcorn, you adviſe me for the future to let the School men and Scholaſt…cal Divinity alone, &c. But I have juſter reaſon to adviſe you, that ſeeing you have been ſo unhappy in quoting Scotus, and his Epitomator, Nicholaus De-Orbellis; to get ſome able friend, if not to conſture, yet to expound ſuch paſſages, as you ſhall quote for the future our of School men: ſeeing you are ſo wonderfully prone to alledge out of them ſuch things as make nothing for you, but apertly againſt you. But to return to the matter in hand.
This opinion of Scotus touching the meritoriouſneffe of Chriſts beatifick love of God, is maintained by the generality of his followers, as may be ſeen in two renowned ones of them, Faber Favent…nus in Sent. lib. 3. disp. 48. p. 210, 211, 212. Kada Super 3. lib Sent. Controv. 12. a. 1. p. 338, 339. In Faber… Faventinus there are two other arguments, beſides that already urged by S…tus, Contra eandem aſſertionem recentiorum, quod Chriſtus non merucrit actu beatifico, eſt aliud argumentum: nam certum eſt, quod Chriſtus dilexit Deum ex charitate, & voluit illi bonum affectione …uſtitiae, & in hoc praeſertim conſiſtit meritum, lit ait Scot. & ipſi ſaten…u…, quia radix omuis m…iti …p…d Deum eſt charitas, & amor ipſius Dei, ergo non vid…tu… negan…um eſſe hoe meritum: … Chriſto, at hic amor, & dil…io in Chriſto fuit fruitio beatifica, quia erat beatus, & videbat Deum clare, ex qua viſione ſequebatur dilectio, & fruitio perfectiſſima, quae est beatifica.
Praetercà eſt argumentum Sco…i, ſieut in nobis meritum respicit partem intellectivam, ſic in Chriſto, ſed in nohis non eſt meritum, niſi ſit in portione ſuperiori, neque … meremur acti…us noſtris, niſi voluntas nostra perfectiſſime jungatur Deo actibus, qui reſpiciunt Deum, ſicut nec peccamus, niſi …oluntas nostra … cedat a Deo, ergo Chriſtus non potuit mereri ſecundum portionem inſeriorem tantum, & non ſuperiorem, ſi meruit autem ſuperiori, hoc ſuit per dilectionem Dei, quia hic actus immediate tendit in Deum, ergo dilectio, quae eſt fruitio, fuit actus meritorius in Chriſto. loc. praedict.
Unto this ſome Modern-School-men anſwer, by diſtinguiſhing, as our Defendant, out of Suarez, concerning a twofold love of God in Chriſt. This diſtinction Faber Fav…ntinus, in the place but now cited, firſt propounds, and then refutes.
1. He propounds it. Reſpondent ad hoc Recentiores ubi ſupra diffingnendo de duplici actu amoris & dilection is in Chriſto, nam alter actus dilection is crat in Chriſto, quatenus erat comprehenſor, qui ſequcbatur viſionem beatiſicam; & hoc actu non meruit, quia non crat actus liber; alter vero actus dilectionis …rat in Chriſto, in quantum crat Viator, qui ſequ…batur, non viſionem beatificam, ſed cognitionem inſuſam, & hoc actu m…ruit, quia erat actus liber, & hanc ſ…ntentiam …ſſerunt eſſa D. Th. multis in lo…is, ſed p…ae…rtim, 3. p. q. 19. a. 2. in responſione ad primum, uli ait, quod Chriſtus per charitatem meruit, non in quantum crat Comprch…ſer ſed ut …ot Vi…o…r.
2. Having thus propounded the diſtinction, he replieth unto it. Sed contra hanc Responſionem eſt argum ntum ſecundum Sco…i …in ipalc, quo probat, quod actus, quo anima Chriſti f…uebatur Deo, non poteran eſſe duo, ſed unas tantum, quod argumentum eſt tſtud: actus fru…ti…nis eſt actus adaequatus potentiae, quia voluntas creata fenitar quantum oteſt: ſeduna, & cadem potentia cirea id m…objectum, non hab…t actum … adaequa um, & alterum in daequatum, & diſtinctum à primo, quia boc implicat co…radiction m, nam primus non eſſet adaequatus, …rgo voluntas Chriſti per actum ſ…uitio…is non po…eſt diligere Deum per ſe amo…e amicitie ad…qua…e, & per alium actum cundem Deum deligere per ſe amo…e a…icitiae, ſed in d…q…ate.
N…xt he ſets down the Rejoynder of the Adverſary, and unto it ſub, oyns his Triplication. Sed Reſponderunt, quod Major eſt vera, quin actus ſunt omnino cjuſdem rationis, ſed q…ando ſunt d…v…rſi actus, & diverſae rationis, non eſt vera In propoſito autem ſunt dive…ſiactus ſpecie, quia actus fractionis tender in Deum propter omnem perfectionem, & rationem propter quam Deus eſt amabilis, ſed amor, qui eſt meri oriustendit in Deum propter aliquam ſpeccialem …ationem, ut propter juſtitiam, vel miſericordiam, &c. & haec diverſitas dicitur eſſe ſufficiens, ut actus ille diſtinguatur a priori. Secundo dicerent, quod ſ…nt diverſi numero, quia tendant in Deum, quod eſt objectum idem diverſis viis, quia aliud per charitatem conſummatum, aliud per charitatem viae.
Sed iſtae Reſponſiones non ſatisfaciunt argumento, queniam non recte probatur iſtos actus diſtingui, nam actus diſtinguuntur per objecta ex …cando de anima: at objectum actus fruitioni… per ſe eſt ipſe Deus diligibilis propter ſe amore amicitiae, ſimiliter objectum primum meriti eſt. Deus ipſe diligiblis propter ſe amore amicitiae volendo ſibi bonum, cum ergo objectum ſit idem materialiter, & ſecundum eandem rationem formalem actus non poſſunt eſſe diverſi.
Ad primam rationem, qua probat diverſitatem ſpecificam, dico qued illae circumſtantiae, non plu…ificant eſſentiam actus, ſed ſolum mutant in eo aliquas circumſtantias, & accidentia, externa autem accidentia non plurificant ſubſtantiam rei.
Praeterea dato, quod illae circumſtantiae faciant diverſitatem actus, tune non ſolvitur argumentum, quia nos hic quaecimus, an actus amoris, quod tendit in Deum plen…, & amat illum …more amicitiae toto corde, & intenſiori modo, quo poteſt, ſit meritorius, necne, non de aliis actibus dilectionis ſub varils circumſtantiis minus perfectis, nam videtur abſurdum negare in Chriſto actum illum perfectiorem, qu odilexit Deum totis viribus, non eſſe meritorium cum in nebis ſit meritorius, Secunda ratio non concludit, qula eadem charitas, quae eſt in via, remanet in Patria, ut docet Scot. in hoc 3. ſuo leco, ideo ex medio non diſtinguuntur iſtiactus.
Praeterea, ut dictum eſt, m…dium non variat actum ſubſtantialiter, ſed accidentaliter, at diſtinctio accidentalis nihil facit.
Praeterea argumentum Scotiſtat in ſuo robo…e, vis enim argumentieſt, quia nulia poten…ia cadem pot…ſt habere unum actum adaequatum circa al…quod objectum, & ſimal alterum actum inadaequatum circa idem objectum, q…a implicat contrad…ctionem, ratio eſt, qu…a in illo primo actu adaequato includitut actus imperfectus, & inadaequatus. Ad propoſuum, actus fruitionis eſt actus, quo perfectiſſine, & ſub omaibus circumſt untiis diligit illud objectum, ergo non poteſt alſo actu ſub alia circumſlantia dil…gere idem objectum quia jam hic actus includitur in illo & …uſtia maltiplicatur. Quod verod cunt D. Th. fuiſſe hujus ſententiae, ego puto falſum, quia loco citato, dum ait, Chriſtum me…uiſſe charitate non in quantum erat comarchenſor, ſed viator, non infert diverſi…atem actus ut ipſi volunt, ſed diverſitatem ſtatus perſonae; ac ſi dicat, Chriſtus meruit actu elicito ex charitate, quiactus erat fiuitio, ſed quia a…rus ille erat p…rſonae, quae ſimal erat Viat…r, & Comprehenſor, illo mer…it, non in quantum erat comprehenſor, ſed in quantum erat viator, & hoc modo cum intelligendo, conven…t cum Scot. ut infra videbimus. Sed dices, potu…t Chriſtus habere d…plicem actum cognitionis D…i, ſcil. per viſionem beatificam, & per ſcientiam infuſam: Ergo potuit quoque habere duplicem actum amoris, alterum per fruition…m beatam, alterum per charitatem infuſam. Reſpondent, q…d non eſt par ratio de ſcientia, & amore, quia ſcientia eiat de codem objecto, ſed diverſo modo cognito, & per diverſa media, q…ae faciunt cognitionem eſſe diverſam, diſtinguitur enim ſcientia penes m dium, ſed amo…, ut hic loquimur, eſt de cod…m objecto, codem modo, ac etiam medio. Faber Faventinus. lib. 3. diſt. 18. q. 1. diſp. 44.
There are two conſiderable Objections againſt this doctrine of Scotus, which are at large propounded and anſ… ered in theſe two eminent Scotiſts th…t … mentioned, *Sed eſt tune alia difficultas gravis, quia ſi c…n…edatur Chriſtum m…ruiſſe actu fruitionis, & beatifico, videtur idem dic…n lum de aliis beatis, quod eſt abſardum, quia Beati in Pat…ia ſu s…actibus non merentur, quia ſunt in termino. Reſp…d…t S…t. non valere conſequentiam, ratio est, quia ut ſuperins dictum est in ra…on… meritt inc…uditue acceptatio divint, placait …rgo Deo acceptare omnes actus Chriſti, tam poritionis inforioris, & partis ſenſiti…, quam po…tionis ſuperioris, & beatificos promevitoriis, idio facio hoc pacto ab aetern…, actus illi erant merito ji, & hoc codem modo potu…ſſet actus aliorum Beato … pro meritoriis acceptaſſe, ſivolu…ſſet, & ſeciſſet, hoc pactum, quia non implicat conradictionem, tamca quia non fecit hoc pactum, ideo illi non ſunt meritorii, non fecit autem Deus hoc pactum neceptandi actus b…atorum pro meritoriis, quia in illis non crat congruitas, quae erat in actibus Christi, dum erat in bac vita, num Christus in bac vita non crat co…unctus Deo, q. o. ad affectiomem commodi perfecte, ut ceteri beati, ſed poterat pati, & de facto patiebatur, ergo ſuit congruum, quod omnes actus Chriſti, etiam beatiſici acceptarentur pro meritoriis ratione perſonae, qua erat Viator. Faber Faventinus in tertium lib. Sent. diſp. 44. p. 212. Sed his modus dicendi diſſicilis eſt propter alios beatos qui tune videntur poſſe mereri in infinitam. Nihilominus tamen probatur, quoniam omtis actus acceptatus a Deo, tanquam actus bonus, & laudabilis pro quo Deus velit aliquid retribuere illi cujus actum acceptat, vel alteri pro quo ſit, eſt meritorius. Sed omnis actus Chriſti ſec…dum naturam humanam, etiam actus beatificus voluntatis eſt bujuſmodi, ergo eſt meritodius. Conſequentia optima est cum majori, minor probatur. Num quia perſona Chriſti non fuit ſeundwn omnem conditionem ſui ſimpliciter in termino, poruit Deus omnem actum creatum ejus acceptare, tanquam dignu…n aliquo bone, pro co retribu…do, vel Christo ſi indiguiſſet, vel alteri, ſi nobis pro q…bus meruit. Ex quo inſertur non eſſe contradictionem, nec eam includore, acture beatificum Michaclis, vel alterius beati acceptari tanquam aliquid dignum retribution…, qudd daretur propter meritum. Defacto tamen nullum actum beatiſicum alicujus beati, n…c quemlibet alium acceptavit, no… acce tat, quia perſona cujuſcunque beati eſt totaliter extra ſtatum mere…di ſecund…m totum ſubjectum. Non ſic Chriſtus, ſed ſecurdunali quid fuit in statu Viator is propter quod omnis ejus c…eatus ac…u… liber acceptuserat, & meritorius illis pro quibus offerebatur Dco. Sed objicies, quomodo Chriſtus mereri potuit cum ſecundum portionem ſuperiorem ſuerit extra vi, am, non minus, quam alii beati, videtur ſane, quod non plus mereri potuerit quam alius beatus in Patria. Reſpondeo cum Scoto, quod ſicut meritum non respicit, nec conſiſtit tantum in ipſo actu eli…ito, ſed aliquo modo in conditionibus perſona ſuae ſuppoſiti e…cien…is, ſic acceptatio Divin… non ſolum respicit actum, ſed conditiones etiam accid…tates ſuppoſiti clicientis. Atque it… actus Chriſti ctiam beatiſicus, cum ipſe eſſet viator, nec totaliter in termino potuit ob hane conditionem acceptari, non tamen actus beatificus alterius beati, licet in hoc nulla eſſet contradictio. Rada Super tert. lib. ſent. controv. 12. a. 1. p. 338, 339.Faber Faventinus and Rada.
The firſt is taken from a compariſon of Christs beatiſick love, with that of the bleſſed Angels and Saints in heaven. If his beatiſick love of God be meritorious, then alſo that of the bleſſed Angels and Saints in Heaven is ſo too: But this is abſurd, for then they ſhould merit unto all eternity.
They both anſwer out of Scotus by denial of the ſequel of the Major, and for this denial they give this reaſon: God's acceptation is requiſite unto merit, Now God accepteth all the created acts of Criſt as meritoriou…, whereas he made no Covenant with, or promiſe unto the bleſſed Angels and Saints in Heaven, touching any ſuch acceptation. And for this different diſpenſation towards them and Chriſt, they lay down out of Scotus this following congruence. Whilſt Christ was here in this life, he was Viator as well as Comprehenſor, and conſequently all his created actions were capable of meriting: for merit regards not only the action meriting, but alſo the ſtate and condition of the perſon performing the action: but now the bleſſed Angels and Saints in Heaven were abſolutely and altogether comprehenſores, and ſo in termino extra ſtatum merendi uncapable of meriting: You ſee then they reſolve the meritoriouſneſſe of Chriſts beatiſick love of God into the condition of Chriſts perſon: Chriſt merited by it, not ſo much becauſe 'twas beatiſick, but becauſe 'twas the love of a perſon who was in ſome reſpect Viator, in viâ, which was a ſtate of meriting
A ſecond Objection is drawn from the neceſſity of Chriſts beatiſick love of God: Every merito. ious act is free; for freedome is eſſentially requlfite unto merit. But now Chriſts beatiſick love of God was not free, becauſe 'twas neceſſary. And freedome and neceſſity are incompetible in the ſame act: It followeth therefore that Chriſts beatiſick love of God was not meritorious. This argument the Defendant inculcates frequently.
The Scotiſts anſwer by denying the Minor. Christs beatiſick love of God was, ſay they, free, though not with a freedome of indifferency, yet with a freedome of complacency, and that not only concomitant, but cauſal. I call that concomitant, which is in acts whereof the will is not a cauſe, qua voluntas ſibi complacet in aliquo, etſi respectu ejus nullius cauſae…ration…m habet: and ſuch a freedome there was (ſay they) in the Fathers b…get…ing of the Sonne, the Father had a complacency therein, and was well-pleaſed therewith. But he did not beget the Sonne by any act of his will. I call that canſal, which is in acts whereof the will is a cauſe. This is that liberty which the Scotists call the eſſential liberty of the will, and is by Rada thus defined. Haec libertas eſt complacenter cognitione finis ſub propria finis ratione, ſuppoſita, quaſi ſe determinare ad agendum, ſive con ingenter ſe determinet, ſive neceſſario. In 1. lib. ſent. Controv. 13. p. 207. This freedome the Scotiſts make to agree unto every elicite act of the will, and conſequently unto the b…atifick love of God. And the reaſon that they give, is, becauſe freedome is eſſential to the will, and is pred…cated of it quit…nus ipſwn, and a quatenus ad de omni valet argumentum: What is predicated of the will as the will, is p…edicated of every act of the will. This reaſon is urged very acutely by Faber Faventinus againſt Cajetan, who ſaith that the will is a free agent only in reſpect of ſome acts, and not in regard of others, Contra: vel competit vol…ntati ſ…cundum eſſentiam, & abſo…ute eſſe p…ncip…um liberum, vel non, ſi non ergo volun… as accidentaliter eſt principium liberum, & tun… quaere, quaenam fit illa potentia, cui ineſt principium agendi libere per eſſentiam, vel eſt voluntas vel non dabitur principiu… liberum eſſentialiter, quod eſt abſurdum, quia omne per accidens redueitur ad aliquod per ſe, datur principium liberum per accidens; ergo debet dari principium liberum per eſſentiam. Si dicas voluntaes reſpectu aliquorum actum eſt libera per eſſentiam, reſp…ctu a… orum eſt natueale principium. Co…ra quod ineſt alieui per eſſ…ntiam, & ſecundum quod ipſum ineſt …i univerſaliter. Ex Ariſt. 1. Poſt. c. 4. exemplum. Homo per eſlentiam, & ſecundum quod ipſum eſt rationalis, ideo omnis actus, qui provenit ab homine per eſſentiam, eſt rationalis, i. per rationem factus, unde actus naturales ſentiendi, vegetandi, &c. quia non ſunt rationales non competunt homini, ut homo eſt, ſed ut animal & vivens: Eſt ergo veriſſimum, quod ineſt alicui ſecundum quod ipſum ineſſe ei univerſaliter, tunc ſic, at voluntas eſt principium liberum per eſſentiam, ergo univerſaliter eſt libera reſpectu omnis actus, vel eſt dicendum, quod non eſt libera per eſſentiam, ſed per accidens, quod jam rejectum eſt, ut abſurdum, ſi dicas quod ineſt voluntati ſecundum eſſentiam, tenc ſic. Duo praedicata contraria, & mu… ò ſe deſtruentia, non poſſ…nt in…ſſe …dem ſubjecto, ſecurdum id m, quia implicat repugnantiam, ſed voluntati ſecundum eſſentiam ineſt eſſe principium liberum, ergo nonporeſt ſecundum eſſentiam ineſſe principium naturale, ut contra diſtinguitur à libero, ut in propoſito intendimus, ex hace, go ratione colligitur, qued voluntas eſſentialiter eſt libera non naturalis, & ſic patet, quod ratio Scoti concludit, n…m rum quod agere naturaliter, & agere liberè ſunt differentiae primae entis, quae non poſſunt ineſſe eidem potentiae, & principio eſſentialiter, ſed neceſſario conſtituunt duo oppoſita principia activa, quotum unum non redecitur ad alterum, nec ambo ad tertium, & per hoc impugnatur, quo… volt …as r…ſpectu ſin's cla. è…v…ſi, & beatitudinis in communi habeat actum naturalem, ſi en…m eſt potentia eſſentia…ter libera, omnis actus clic…us ab ea eſt ei liber non naturalis.
Conſi matur, quia aliequin voluntas in primo inſtanti, quo habet actum naturalem, noneſſet voluntas, ſed natura, & ita non habe et eſſeperfectum, ſed tranſiret de imperfecto ad perfectum, quod de divina voluntate eſt abſurdum, & …tiam de creata quia illa in inſtanti prod…c…tur, & ideo in illo habet totam ſuam perfectionem. In lib. 1. Sent. diſp. 37. p. 223.
Unto Faber Faventinus let me adde Rada, who Lib. 1. Contr. 13. p. 210, 211. proves largely, That the will, quatenus potentia eſt, cannot be conſidered prout natura eſt, as nature is an active principle diſtinct from that which is free, and therefore conſequently cannot have any natural act, but all its acts are free.
Quinta concluſio voluntas quatenus potentia eſt, nequit conſiderari, ut natura, prout natura eſt principium activum diſtinctum contra liberum, nec ut talis aliquam actionem habet. P…obo priorem hujus concluſionis partem. Primo potentia naturalis & potentia I bera ſunt oypoſitae potentiae, ergo cadem voluntas non poreſt conſiderari, & ut natura, & potentia libera, vel d…ſtingui in naturam, & petentiam liberam. Antece…ens probatur, quia Ariſt.9. Met. tex. & 6. diſtinguit liberum a naturali. Conſequentia probatur, quia tunc idem diſtingucretur in ſe, & in oppoſitum ſui, ſicut ſi animal diſtingueretur in animal, & non animal, vel homo in hominem & equum. Quod patet: quia (ut diximus) potentia naturalis & libera opponuntur, ſed diſtinctio, qua diſtinguitur idem in ſeipſum, & in oppoſitum ſui, eſt prorſus abſurda, ut de ſe paret: ergo illa diſtinctio, qua voluntas in naturam & liberam diſtinguitur, eſt abſurda, Confirmatur argumentum, quia unica potentia non poteſt habere gem…num operandi modum oppoſitum atque diverſum: ſed agere libere & naturaliter ſunt modi oppoſiti immediatae dividentes potentiam activam, ut ſupra diximus: Ergo voluntas non poteſt per modum naturae & libertatis, utrumque conſideretur, operari, &c.
Ad confirmationem dico, maximum eſſe inconveniens …ndem potentiam ſpecie, & numero diverſos, & oppoſitos omni… ò operand modos habere. Nam ſicut duas differentias idem genus dividentes cid…m ſpeciei ineſſe implicat: ita implicat omninò idem prin ipium ſpecie, & numero habere diverſos, & oppoſitos operandi modos, quales ſunt agere libere, & naturalitèr, quod ex aequo, & immed…a…è d…vidunt principium activum. Et cum objicitur, quod an ma operatur cum diſcurſu, & ſine diſcurſu in ord…ne ad diverſa, ſcilicet principia, & concluſiones, R…ſpondeo quod ut ait Scot. in 2. d 1. q 6. … A. agere cum diſcurſu & ſine d…ſc…rſu, non ſunt modi oppoſiti, arque …, diverſas naturas indicantes, cam eidem nitur… …at onali inſ nt: at ve…ò agere libere, & agere per modum naturae, modi ſun… omnino oppoſitid…verſis nec…ſſar ò pri…cipi…s convenient…s: … principium activum prima diviſione dividitur in liberum & naturale, &c.
Secunda pars ejuſdem concluſionis, …t puta, quod voluntas nallam operationem habeat, ut n…ura, ſed ut voluntas, probatur. Voluntas ut natura, pro…t natura diſtinguitur contra agens liberum, nullaten is poreſt ſine repugnantia conſiderari: E go ut natura non poteſt habere actionem. P…aeter…a, cum conſideras voluntatem, ut naturam, vel ly natura, lumitur pro principio oppoſito, & diſtincto contra liberum: & hec j…m manet impugnatum. Volaccipitur in communi ad p…incipium liberum & naturale. Et ſi ſic, claumn eſt quod nullam poteſt habere operationem: quia operatio cum ſit ſingularis & determinata, neceſſariò o…tum habet à principio ſingulari determinato: Ergo neceſſar…ò debet eſſe, vel principitum liberum, vel naturale: E…go ſi eſt illa actio à voluntate, ut natura neceſſariò voluntas ut ſic, erit agens per modum naturae, vel liberum, ſed non primam propter dicta: Ergo ſ…cundum: Ergo voluntas, ut natura, eſt vo…untas, ut libera: Ergò agit liberè. …Et confirmatur: quia ſicut omnis actus elicitus intellectus eſt ab intellectu, quatenus intellectus eſt: ita omnis actus voluntatis, eſt à voluntate, ut voluntas, & libera eſt. Et certè ſi voluntas praeciſè, ut natura quaedam eſt, conſideratur, ſolum habet propenſionem & inclinationem in ſu…m ſinem ſicut lapis in centrum: quia omnis actus & operatio elicita ejus eſt ab ipſa, ut potentia libera eſt contra potentiam naturalem diſtincta. Quod voluntas ut natura nullam habeat operationem, tenet ſubtilis Doctor in 3. d. 15. lit. A.& diſt. 33. paulo ante lit. O.
Whereas 'tis added for the confirmation of the Minor, that Chriſts beatiſick love of God was neceſſary, as being a neceſſary conſequent of the beatifical viſion in him, and freedome and neceſſity are repugnant.
Unto this the Scotiſts *Unde pro dilucidatione hujus rei, & rationum in oppoſitum, notandum eſt, 1st elicitur ex Scoto quodl. 16.a. 2. circaſinem, & dicemus in Metaph. in propria disp. haec quatuor, contingens, neceſſarium, naturale, & liberum ſic ſe habere, quod contingens, & neceſſarium opponuntur, ut patet ex Ariſt. 2. Periher, inc. de modalibus ſimiliter naturale, & liberum opponuntur, utpatet ex corum definitionibus. Naturale enim est quod determinatum ad age adum, liberum, quod eſt indeterminatum ad agendum, ſed ſcipſum determinat, ex quo ſequitur neceſſarium ſtare cum naturali, & cum libero, quia illis non opponitur, non autemſtare cum contingenti; ſimiliter ſequtur liberum ſtare poſſe cum neceſſario, & cum co…i…genti, quia illis non oppenitur, non outens …oſſ… ſtare cum naturali. Confirmatur, quia in Philoſophia multa naturaliter fiunt, & ta…per accidens five contengencer ſiunt, ut monſtra, & quae caſu, & fortuna even unt, ut … Et tam… cauſae per ſe illius omnes ſ…t naturales, multa etiam natural…ter, & neceſſario ſiuat, ut patet in conting… generatione, crgo aliquid produci …, & contingenter no p…g…nt, non crgo hae… …, aliquid ſit naturaliter, ergo …: ſimiliter multa a c…ſſario …, & no… natura…iter, ut quae coaciè, & vio…te ſiunt. … liberè ſiua…, & … ceſſario non contingenter, unde ownes communiter dieu…t, … & p…aeſ…tim D. To. q. 10 de Pot…ia. a. … ad 5. diligit ergo D… ſe liber… …, & …, quia ſi libere, & neceſſario hic eſſet …, quod … Thomiste dicere, quod spiritus ſanctus liberè & …, quo… lamen dicu…t …pugnare, ut rev…ra repuga…t ex corum d…finitio…us, omnes crgo ſuſii: en…es … dicant D…m nece ario ſe deligere, … ut Theologi, & m…i ex P…r…p…teticis, licet in actibus ad extra p…ant D… um agere neceſſariò, & beati in patria ſ…undum nos libere diligunt D…n, & tamen neceſſario, lic…t …rgo in volunt… creata pro hoc ſtatu cou…iagentia concomit…nter libertatem, & ſaepe conſun…ntur, tamen propr è loqu … idem, ut vidimus, ex hoc patet ſolut…o dab…tat onis, quia licet concedamus Spiritum Sanctum procedere libere non tamen ab hoc ſequitur contingerter produci. Faber Faventinus. In 1um lib. Sent. diſp. 37. c 4. p. 224, 325.anſwer, that there is no ſuch repugnancy betwixt freedome and neceſſity, as is imagined: indeed a natural agent, and a free are oppoſite, and ſo alſo a neceſſary agent and cowingent: And therefore the ſame agent in the ſane act cannot work naturally and freel…, w…ſſarily, and contingently. But now there is no ſuch oppoſition betwixt natural and contingent, and betwixt free and n…ceſſary: and hereup on it followeth, that a natural agent may work contingently, and per accidens, as we ſee in Monſters, in caſu, and ſo…wta: and ſo again on the other ſide, a free agent may work neceſſarily; thus God loves himſelf moſt freely, and yet withal moſt nec…ſſarily too. Rada hath four very ſhrewd Arguments, to prove the co…ſiſtency of the higheſt freedome, with the higheſt nec…ſſity, which I ſhall inſert for the Defendant to try his utmoſt still upon. Quod ſumma neceſſitas …ſtar cum ſummâ libertate, probo multipliciter. Primòvoluntas divina neceſſariò vult bonitatem ſuam (ut ſupra oſtendimus) & tamen in volendo eam eſt libera: igitur libertas ſtat cum ſummâ neceſſitate. Conſequentia tenet; minorem verò probo. Voluntas divina refert ad finem alia objecta, quae ſunt volibilia propter finem, igitur ipſa ſub eadem ratione potentiae eſt operativa circa utrunque: ſed circa ea, quae ſunt ad ſinem, operatur ſub ratione potentiae liberae, ut etiam Thomiſtae concedunt, ergo etiam circa ſinem, (ut puta circa bonitatem ſuam) operabitur ſub ratione potentiae liberae, ergò liberè vult bonitatem ſuam. Prima conſequentia hujus argumentationis probatur, quia potentia operans circa unum objectum, non abſolutè, ſed in ordine ad aliud, eadem ſub eadem ratione eſt operativa circa utrunque. Quod pater ex Philoſ. 2. de anima tex. Com. 146. ubi ait, quod potentia illa, qua cognoſcimus differentiam unius objecti ab alio, illamet ſub eadem ratione potentiae, cognoſcit utrunque: ergo ſim…liter in propoſi…o potentia operans circa unum objectum in ordin: ad aliud, ipſa ſub eadem ratione potentiae, operabitur circa ut…unque. Et c…nfi…matunquia alias oporterer conſtituere unam potentiam, quae verſaretur ci…ca ſinem & aliam circa media.
Secundò probatur. Libertas eſt Conditio intrinſeca voluntatis abſolute, vel in ord…ne ad actum vol…ndi, ergo eſt compoſſibilis cum conditione perfecta opera…ionis perfectae circa perfect…ſſimum Objectum, praeſertim illa conditio n…n repugnat, im… oteſt convenire tali operationi: ſed talis conditio in operatione perf…ct…eſt neceſſitas: Er…ò libertas eſt compoſſibilis cum neceſſitate. Antecedens eſt manifeſtum, quia voluntas natura ſua int…inſeca libera eſt. Conſequentia probatur, quia conditio intrinſeca potentiae, quae ſecundum ſe nullam dicit imperfectionem, non poteſf eſſe contraria, perfectioni operationis ejuſdem potentiae, quia tunc prorſus repugnaret hujuſmodi potentiae habere perfectam operationem etiam in ente infinito, in quo reperitur. S…d…quod talis conditio perfecta, ſit neceſſitas, patet, quia perfectio voluntatis, unde voluntas eſt, eſt diligere Deum, ergo perfectionis eſt habere illam operationem ſirmiter, & nec…ſſariò. Et confirmatur: quia poſſe non habere illam dicit imperfectionem, ergò neceſſariò habere illam, perfectionis eſt maximae, & rutſus, ergo eſt poſſibilis illa neceſſitas in operatione perfect… voluntatis, ut voluntas eſt: alias enim, nec in Deo reperitetur.
Tertiò probatur. Actio circa finem ultimum, ut finis eſt, eſt perfectiſſima, ergo neceſſitas in tali actione non tollit, ſed magis ponit id, quod ad ejus perfectionem per ſepertinet, ſed libertas maxime eam perficit, ergo neceſſitas quae in tali actione reperitur, non tollit, ſed ponit potius libertatem. Probo aſſumptionem, quia actio libera ex natura ſua eſt perfectior cunctis operationibus, ut in controverſiis quarti, Deo favente, oſtendemus.
Quarto probatur. Q…antoactio voluntatis circa finem ultimum eſt magis neceſſaria, tanto eſt liberior. Ergo ſumma neceſſitas eſt compoſſibilis cum ſumma libertate. Conſequentia eſt evidens, antecedens probo, quia ſecundum Anſelmum & Auguſtinum, quos ſuprà citavimus, illa voluntas eſt liberior, quae omninò à rectitudine deviare non poteſt, ſed illa quae neceſſariò ſimpliciter diligit bonum inſinitum à rectitudine nullatenus deviare poteſt, ergo illa eſt liberrima: ſed talis eſt divina voluntas reſpectu dilectionis Dei, &c. ergo eſt reſpectu carum liberrima. In 1•m lib. Sent. Controv. 13. p. 213, 214.
The Defendant is pleaſed to ſay, page 68. That the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely, with a freedome improperly taken, for a liberty from co…action.
But firſt, the Scotiſts *Cenditio intrinſcca potent…e …n repugnot perf…ctioni in…p rando ip Gus poten…ie, ſi… ab ſulatè pot…mia conſideretu, ſi… in ordine ad…actum perfectum, ſ…d libertas eſt coad tio intrinſcea, & eſſentiatis, voluntatis, ergo non repugnat p…rfici…oni …ſius vol n…a…is in operande ei ca actium porf…ctiſſmum. Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. S…nt diſp. 37. c 3. p. 221.will tell him that freedome is attributed unto their love of God in the greateſt propriety. For the beatiſick love is the greateſt perfection incident unto their wills: and freedome is an intrinſ…cal and eſſential condition of their wills. Now (ſay they) th… which is int…inſ…cal and eſſcut…l unto a power or faculty, cannot be repugnant unto the greateſt perfect on thereof: therefore the beatiſick love of God which is acceſſary, and freedome, are no wayes inconſiſtent.
Secondly, In their love of God there is a freedome, not only from coact on, but alſo from natural neceſſity, ſuch as that which is in the metion of a ſtone downward, which preluppoſeth no act of the underſtanding. The n…ceſſity which is in their love of God, is not ſuch aneceſſity, but a voluntary neceſſity, which hath alwayes foregoing anact of intellectual knowledge. And this for the firſt anſwer unto the difficulty propounded.
There is by ſome School-men given another, indeed a quite contrary anſwer: and 'cis, that Chriſts love of God was not meritorious, and in aſſerting this they think there is no abſurdity, becauſe there is otherwiſe a very wide and ſpacious field for Chriſts merit, in the acts of his love of man, and in the …cts of his other vertues. Of this opinion Beca…us makes mention, Sum. Theol. Scholaſt. tom. 5. c. 14. q. 3. Alij ſic ſ…t unt Christiam ſuiſſe viatorens, not ſolum ratione carnis, & animae paſſibilis, ſicut jam expl…catum eſt, ſed etiam ratione animae, quatenus amabat proximos. Comprehenſorem vero, ratione animae, quatenusamabat Deum clare viſam. Ita que meruiſſe per actium charitatis circa proximos; non tamen per actum charitatis circa Deum. This opinionhe thinks to be probable, and Suarez in 3am part. Thom. tom. 1. diſ…. 39. S. 2. ſaith that it may eaſily be defended. The contrary opinion therefore, at the moſt is but a Scholastical Probleme. But Vaſquez hath a full defence of this Opinion, that Chriſts love of God was not meritorious: and with it he joyneth a refutation of this diſtinction, of Chriſtslove, given by Suarez, and others: the paſſige is ſomewhat large, but becauſe 'tis home, and accurate, I hope I ſhall have the Readers patience for the inſerting of it.
Mihi verò multò probabilius ſemper viſum eſt, Chriſtum non meruiſſe per affectum ullum charitatis, & dilectionis erga Deum, ſed per opera aliarum virtutum, tam circa ſe, quam circa proximum, &c.
Primum igitur Chriſtum non meruiſſe per illum actum charitatis ortum ex ſcientia infuſa in Doctrina S. Thomae, manifeſtum eſt, nam cum ille aperte dicat q. 11. a. 1. eſſentiam Dei, ac proinde myſterium ipſum Trinitatis, non cecidiſſe ſub ſcientiam infuſam, id quod nos etiam ſupra diſputatione 53. c. 11 ſatis ſaperque probavimus, conſequitur nullum potuiſſe in Chriſlo eſſe affectum dilectionis erga Deum p…aeter illum, quem vocant beatificum, cumque ille non potuerit eſſe meritorius, ut p…aecedenti capite monſtravimus, effieitur etiam, per nullum actum dilectionis Dei Ghriſtum mereri potuiſſe: quamvis enim di…amus, in Chriſto manſiſſe ſcientiam naturalem unins Dei, tamen illa non potuit eſſe principium dilect…on…s ipſius Dei ex charitate, ut manifeſtum eſt. Praeterea cum Chriſtus non habuerit fidem, ſequitur, ex nulla cognitione potuiſſe Deum dil…gere. Age tamen, concedamus Chriſto ſcientiam-infuſam eſſentiae Dei diſtinct…m ab adquiſita, nihilom…nus fruſtra in eo concedemus daos affectus charitatis erga Deum, alterum ortum ex viſione clam Dei, alterum…ex ſcientia infuſa; nam affectus dilectionis tendit in rem cognitam, ſicut in ſubjectum, non autem in ipſam cognitionem: ergo licet eſſet ſcientia infuſa Dei in Chriſto, quia tamen eſſet eadem bonitas ipſius Dei propoſita voluntati per ſcientiam infuſam, & per viſionem, idem-effectus eſſet dilectionis: qua ratione, ut communis fert opinio Theologorum, eadem eſt dilectio Dei in via, & in patria, & quamvis viſio Dei in patria eſſ…t cauſa novi actus dilectionis Dei, quia intenſius eliceretur, aut alio modo, tamen non poteſt eſſe cauſa diverſi actus ſecundum ſpeciem, & uterque actus ſimul non poſſet manere in patria, etiamſi in patria poſſet manere fides, non quidem alia ratione, niſi quia dum-voluntas movetur circa objectum duplici modo cognitum, ſolum ab eo allicitur prout perfectiori modo cognito, ipſum autem prout cognitum minus perfecto modo nihil mover voluntatem, ac… eo modo cognitum non eſſet & hoc quiſque quotidie in ſe ipſo experitur; nam cum quis diligit alium ex relatu, atque ipſum, & ea, quae de ipſo audiverat, poſtea vider, jam non ex relatu, ſed ex clara viſione, & experientia ipſum diligit, & aliorum teſtimonium nihil in ipſo operatur, ut eam diligat: quae doctrina multo majori ratione in p…aeſenti locum habet; nam cum eſſentia divina per claram vifionem perfectiſſimo modo videatur, ita ut neceſſariò ad ſe trahat voluntatem per aff…ctum amoris, ut ſupra diximus, neque adeò rapiet ad ſe voluntatem, ut ipſa deinceps moveri non poſſit ex alio genere cognitionis ad diligendum Deum alio affectu, aut codem. Quod verò dicitur Johannis 14. Sed ut cognoſcat mundus, quia d…ligo patrem, & ſicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater, ſic facio, ſurgite, eamus hinc, non probat Chriſtum per dilectionem Dei nobis redemptionem meruiſſe, quia eo loco ſolum commendatur charitas Chriſti erga Patrem, & obedientia, de merito …autem, & operatione meritoria non agitur.
Here Vaſquez preſuppoſeth two things already proved by him.
1. That in Chriſt there was no infuſed knowledge of the eſſence of God and the myſtery of the Trin…ty diſtinct from the beatifical V…ſion.
2. That Chriſts beatifique love of God was not meritorious.
Having premiſed theſe t…o things, he next proves, that though there were in Chriſt an infuſed knowledge of the eſſence of God diſtinct from the beat…fical viſion; yet it would not hereupon follow, that there ſhould be in him a love of God diſtinguiſhed from that, which was the ſequele of the beatiſical viſion; and the reaſon is, becauſe there was one and the ſame goodneſs propounded unto his will, by the infuſed knowledge and the beat…ſique viſion; and therefore the ſame effect of love, where the will is moved, and ſti…ed up about an object known after a twoſold manner, it is only allured, and wrought upon as 'tis known, after the more perfect way and manne…, … when I come to ſee by experience thoſe good things in a man, which before I knew only by report, I then love him only upon mine own experimental knowledge, and no longer upon the relation of others.
Laſtly, Suppoſe this diſtinction of Chriſts love of God were true and ſound, yet 'tis utterly unſerviceable for the defence of D…. Hammond, and that by the opinion of the Defendant himſelf: For Dr. Hammond (ſaith he) is to be underſtood of the acts of Chriſts love terminated towards man for Gods ſake: Now the Authors and Fauto…s of this diſtinction, underſtand it expreſsly concerning the act of Chriſts love *Dico ergo primo, habuiſſe Chriſtum actum amoris Dei liberum, ſupernaturalem, & elicitum à charitate, & ab amore beatiſico distinctum, & illo actu perfectiſſime meruiſſe. Ita intelligo ſententiam D. 'Tho. hic ſolutione ad primum dicentis, meruiſſe Chriſtum per charitatem non in quantum erat charitas comprehenſoris, ſed in quantum crat viatoris: ubi de charitate lequitur, prost terminatur ad Deum. Suarez in 3 part. Thom. tom. 1. diſp. 39. S. 2. p. 622.as terminated towards God himſelf, and they do diſtinguiſh it from the acts of his love of his neighbour. This is ſo plain in Suarez, out of whom the D…fendant borroweth the diſtinction, as that one would think it impoſſible for the Gentl…man to overſee it. But this overſight renders it very probable, that he never read Suarez himſelf, but had the diſtinction ſent him from ſome friend, who knew not the conſiſtency of it with his other diſtinctions.
Unto this we may adde, that thoſe that ſtickle for this twofold actual love of God in Chriſt, as terminated unto God himſelf, have not ſo much as one word or ſyllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator, touching the degrees, whereof all the indifferency that they aſſert therein, is Contradistionis quoad exercitium actus. So much is affirmed by Gregory De Valentia, tom. 4. diſp. 1. q. 19. punct. 2. Hunc actum charitatis aiunt in Chriſto fuiſſe aliquo modo liberum: ita ſcilicet, ut poſſet ab eo certe aliquando deſiſtere, &c. quam libertatem, modo diceudi in Scholis uſitato, vocamus libertatem quoad actus excreitium tantum, &c. But our Defendant himſelf will not deny, that all the inward acts of the love of God in Chriſt, that were terminated immediately on God himſelf, were alwayes at the higheſt equally intenſe: And therefore this diſtinction being meant of the acts of Chriſts love of God as terminated unto God himſelf, can do Dr. Hammond no ſervice at all in this Controverſie.
Having beaten the R…fater from all his Evaſions, I ſhall next examine what he ſaith unto my three Arguments.
The firſt is drawn from the all fuln…ſs and perfection of Chriſts habitual grace. The habits of all graces and vertues in Chriſt were alwayes ful… and perfect, moſt intenſe, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore ſo are the inward acts or actions of thoſe graces and vertues too. Now what is ſaid in general of the habits of all graces, may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity. That in Chriſt was alwayes full and perfect, moſt intenſe, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore ſo were the inward acts, that is, actions thereof too. Here are two Enthymems implyed, the latter ſubordinate unto the former: For habitual grace is the genus of divine charity, and not the equivalent thereof, as the Defendant fondly thinks. That I make it, p. 330. B. the Conſequence of the latter Enthymem; I proved p. 3, 4, 12. from which the confirmation of the former may eaſily be collected. The ſaid proof of the Conſequence I ſhall briefly repeat, and ſomewhat re-inforce. And 'tis, that there can no other ground be aſſigned, for the intenſion of the action: of loving of God in Chriſt, but the intenſion of the habit of love: which Dr. Hammond and his Defendant both affirm, in Chriſt to be alwayes ſo full, and intenſe, as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees: For an action is not capable of degrees of intenſion and remiſſion, but ſ…condarily, mediante qualitate, which it produceth, or from which it proceedeth, vatione termini, or vatione principij: it cannot be ratione termini: any quality that was the effective term, the product of the inward action of love; for that there is no ſuch term or product of the action of love, hath now been largely confirmed. And if it be ſaid, that it was ratione principij, then it muſt be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love: for there are but two qualities, that are the principles of the action of loving God in Chriſt; the power or faculty of the will, and the habitual grace of love. Now the power or faculty of willing, cannot be intended in any man: and the habitual grace of love in Chriſt, was alwayes ſo intenſe, as that in him 'twas uncapable of further intenſion; and conſequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom, were of an equal intenſion.
Here your Anſwer unto which you referre, is, that I ignorantly, or wilfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loying, &c. And that the Doctor ſpeaks of the immanent acts of love, and not at all of the actions, p. 21, 22.
But first, I have proved, that there are no ſuch things in rerum naturá, as the acts of love diſtinguiſhed from their actions as their termes.
Secondly, Suppoſe that there were ſuch termes, yet that the Doctor cannot reaſonably be underſtood of them, hath been ſufficiently demonſtrated.
Unto this I adde ex abundanti, the teſtimonies of ſome few Schoolmen, from which may be gathered, that the habit and the act, are alwayes equal in gradual perfection: and from this it will follow, that if the habit be alwayes equally …ntenſe, the act m…ſt be ſo too. But now for preventing all future miſtakes, and to cut off the Defendants Objections, I ſhall lay down, of this a limitation, which might eaſily have been foreſeen, and is uſually in things of this and the l…ke nature. It is to be underſtood caeteris paribus, provided that all other ca…ſ…s concurre equally, and uniformly unto the act, ſo that the habit be not hindred by them, but left to its natural way of working. Now in Chriſt caetera erant paria: there was no diſ…arity but a moſt abſolute and perfect equality, and uniformity in the influence of other cauſes, viz. The will of Chriſt, and Gods aſſiſting grace, in the production of his actual love of God, h…s will never willed any abatement of the act, and God never withdrew his aſſiſting grace in the leaſt degree or meaſure: and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him alwayes equally and uniformly, as to the inward acts thereof. Having premiſed this limitation, which I ſhall intreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which followeth, Let us come unto what you ſay unto the teſtimonies themſelves.
Firſt, you quarrel me for that I cite not Aqui…as from his own writings, But quote him twice from Caprcolus, but I had very good reaſon for this, for the paſſages that I quote are not in Aquinas his S…m…nes or in his book Contra gentes, which is all that I have of Aquinas. The firſt paſſage he quotes out of Aquinas De Vertutibus, q. 1. a. 11. and the ſecond is out of the ſame work, questio de charitate art. 10. I believe that if you had read Caprcolus, you would have been as much to ſeek to ſind theſe places in Aquinas as I was. If you can direct me to them I ſhall thank you, but I ſuppoſe 'tis a book not commonly to be had.
The firſt teſtimony you do not anſwer, but outface. From i… I truly (as you grant) concluded, that a greater vehemency in the operation of love, argued a greater participation in the ſubject of the habit of love. Now from this it undeniably followeth, that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another, then the ſubject doth more participate of the habit of love, at one time than another: and whether this be not to the purpoſe, Let any man judge.
The pertinency of the ſecond teſtimony, is as evident as that of the firſt. For if it be, as you grant, an undoubted truth, that idem eſt cha…tatem augeri ſecundum eſſentiam, & ipſam habere eſſicaciam a… producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum; then 'tis alſo as undeniable … truth, inevitably following hereupon, that if the habit of charity is efficacious in producing a habit of more fervent love, at one time than at another, the habit of charity is encreaſed; according to its eſſence, at one time more than another.
In anſwer unto the third teſtimony you ſpend part of four pages, which is all nothing to the purpoſe: for you miſtake the place of Aquinas, ſuppoſing it to be 22 ae. q 24 a. 8. Co…p. whereas it is not, (as I have ſhewn out of Capreolus) in his Summes at all.
Unto the place out of Scotus, the Defendant, to amuſe the Reader, talks a great deai: p. 341, 342. but I muſt needs profeſs, that I cannot pick out of all that he ſaith, ſo much as one ſyllable that is applyable in a way of anſwer. Unto what I urge out of Sco…us, Actus naturaliter elicitus (pray good Mr. D…f…n…ant mark the word naturaliter:) ab aliqua forma aeq…a … in p…f…ction ill fo…mae.
But of what I urged out of H…tado De Mendoza, that intenſio actus ſecundi ſuppo…it aequalem in enſi nem i… actu primo, you have a very rare, and iubtile explication. His meaning is, ſay you, that the ſecond act c…nnot poſſibly exceed the firſt, in gradwal perſection, though it may come ſhort of it; p 334, 337. Away Triſter: before you write any more Con…ov…ſiet, learn ſome Syleme of Logick: And indeed every Syste ne of Lugick will diſcover the foppery of this conceit, for it will teach that unequals are adequately oppoſed unto eq…als, and that inaequalia a…e minora, as well as majora.
But unto this firſt argument, you have as you think, a moſt ſatisfying anſwer, p. 331b, 337b, which you inculcate very often elſewhere, p. 24, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 185, 186, 209, 210, 247, 249, 250, 340. And it is, that though natural and a…c…ſſa…y cauſes work a…w tyes equally and …ſormly ad extremam viri…m, yet 'tis otherwiſe with fr…e agents: and ſuch are all moral habits in general, and conſequently the habitual love of God in particular, which is as free (you ſay) as the will it ſelf, in which 'tis ſeated.
Unto this I have two things to reply.
First, that any habits, either intellectual, or moral, are free Agents, is new and ſtrange Philoſophy: for hitherto it hath been a Proverb in the Schools, that habitus agunt ad modum naturae, caeteris paribus. But having to do with ſuch a mod…ſt Adverſary as our D…ſendant is, it will be neceſſary to tranſcribe ſome teſtimoties, otherwiſe I ſhall never ſtop his mouth; and I ſhall begin with Scotus, Scripto Oxonienſ. Lib. 1. diſt. 17. q. 2. p. 248. Operatio non elicitur libere, cujus princip…um activum est mere natural…, & agens per modum naturae: ſed habitus cum non ſit formaliter voluntas, nec per conſequens formaliter liber, ſi eſt principium activum, erit mere naturale; ergo operatio ejus non erit lihera; & ita nullum velle erit liberum, ſi eliciatur ab habitu, ut à totali principio acti…o. Scripto Pariſ. lib. 3. diſt. 33. q. 1. p. 431. Q…ilibet habitus, quantum eſt de ſe, inclinat per modum naturae, & charitas per modum naturae ſuae ad actum ſupernaturalem inclinat naturaliter ficut habi…us acquiſitus ad actum ſibi proportionatum, quoniam babitus non est liber, ſed tantum voluntas; habitus enim ita inclinat per modum naturae potentiam in objectum, ſicut gravitas ipſum grave deorſum. Unto Scotus I ſhall adde Suarez in his Metaphyſicks. At que , hine colligitur generalis regula, &c. ſcilicet uihil obstare libertati, vel contingentiae actus…ſcu affectus, quod aliqua cauſa naturali neceſſitate ad illum concu…rat dummedo aliqu… cum indifferentia efficiat, respectu cujus effectus denominetur liber. Ratio hujus ſatis declarata est explicando fundamentum ſecundae ſententiae: amplius v…ro illaſtrari poteſt non nullis exemplis, &c. Simile quid dici poteſt de inſluxu habi us concurrentis cum p…tentia libera; habitus enim ex ſo non habet indifferentiam, aut p…opriam libertatem, ſed ex neceſſitate naturae operatur eperawe ſ…t potentia, disp. 19. ſ. 3. n. 20. Unto Suarez I ſhall ſubjoyn a Modern Scotiſt Pon…us, who, Philoſ. Curſ. part 3. disp. 13. q. 3. n. 39. page 552. expreſſely averreth that it is abſurd to ſay that thè hali of charity either infaſed or …quired is fr…e. Probatur ſequela, quia aſias habitus chari…atis de f…cio tam inſuſus, quam acquiſitus, eſſet liber, quod eſt abſurdum. But I night have ſpared the labe…. of quoting all theſe Authorities, for there is a place which I urged out of Scotus, that the D…fendant tranſcribes at large, p. 340. b that will ſtrike the matter dead. The place in Scotus at large is this, Centra, poſſibile eſt illam anima… hab…re ſummam gratiam, ergo ſummam frurti…nem. Conſequentia p…obatur; quia actus naturaliter elicitus ab aliqua forma equatur in perſectione illi formae; fruitio eſt actus ſupernaturalis, & p…r conſequens elicitus a cauſa ſupernaturali, quae eſt gratia, & patet quod naturaliter, quia gratia non est formaliter libera. Ergo ſee…dum quantit at…m gratiae poteſt eſſe quantitas fruitionis.
Here you ſee Scolus expreſſely affirmeth, that the fruition of God, which he makes to be the actual love of God, is naturally elicited from grace, becauſe grace is not formally free: and is not this apertly contradictory unto our Defendants dictate? pag. 337. b that all the habits of grace, whether in Chriſt, or in all other men, are naturally free and undetermined in their operations. And now can any man think, that the Defendant underſtood this paſſage in Scotus? for if he had, he would in all probability have concealed it, as much as he could, and not thus have tranſcribed it at large, ſeeing 'tis ſo apparently deſtructive to his own Opinion. But by this the Reader may ſee, with what profound judgment he quotes the School-men.
Unto theſe Authorities I ſhall annex a Reaſon, taken from the Defendants own notion of freedome, for he makes it to conſiſt in indifferency: and habits anſwerably to the degree of their intenſion and prevalency, take away and diminiſh the indifferency of both-contrariety and contradiction.
1. Of Contrariety: for by inclining to their own proper acts, they render averſe from all contrary acts: by how much the habit of temperance prevails in a man, by ſo much he abhors all acts of intemperance.
2. Of Contradiction: for they incline unto frequency of their acts, loco & tempore debitis, and incline againſt ſinful omiſſion of their acts.
This Reaſon may, for the ſubſtance of it, be collected from what the School-m…n uſually ſay, to prove that free-will doth not conſiſt in a habit. I ſhall at preſent content my ſelf only with a Quotation of Aquinas, Primâ part. q. 83. a. 2. Corp. Habitus dicuntur, ſecundum quos nos habemus ad p…ſſion…s, vel ad actus b…ne, vel male, nt d…citur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad omcupiſcenti…s. Per intemperantiam a tem male. Per ſcientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum incellectus, dum verum cognoſcimus, per habitum autem contearium, male. Liberum awem arbitrium indifferen…er ſe habet ad bene eligendum, vel male; unde impoſſibile eſt quod liberum arbitrium ſit habi…us. This mutatis matandis will prove that no habit is formally free.
Secondly, Though habits be not formally free, yet I confeſs they are, in regard of their uſe and exerciſe, ſubject *Aquinas. 1. 2 ae. q. 52. a. 3. q. 63. a. 2. q. 71. a. 4.unto the impery of the will. So that the will freely uſeth or not uſeth them. But this will no wayes advantage the Defendant: for all men are obliged to act the habit of love, as touching its inward acts, unto the higheſt, ad extremum virium. They are bound to love God with all their might and ſtrength, therefore with all their habitual might and ſtrength: and if their love fall ſhort of this height, it is ſin…ul and defective, which cannot without blaſphemy be imagined of Chriſt, who was impeccabilis, and therefore fulfilled all righteouſneſs; and therefore when he loved God, he lov…d him as much as he could: the all-fulneſs of his actual love, was for d…grees anſwerable to the all-fulneſs of his nabitual.
As for his Anſwer to my ſecon… Argument, drawn from the beatifical viſion in Chriſt, that hath been ſufficiently replyed unto, in my examination of his diſtinction of Chriſts love of God, as he was Viator, and as he was Comprebenſo.
The third, and laſt Argument was fetcht from Chriſts impeceability. It was impoſſible for Chriſt to ſin: but if the inward acts of his love of God, had been leſs intenſe at one time than at another, he had ſinned; for he had broken that firſt and great Commandment, Thou ſhalte love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy ſoul, with all thy mind, with all thy might and strength, Deut. 6.5. Mat. 22.37. Mark 12.30. Luke 10.27. In Anſwer unto this Argument, the Defdenant inſiſts from pag. 357. uſ que ad 520. of examining which, his own conceſſion will ſave the labour: for he grants that if we ſpeak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himſelf, we are bound to love God to the utmoſt height we can, and that he who doth not ſo love him, doth not love him ſo much as he deſerveth, or as much as man ought: and that therefore the acts of Chriſt… love, as immediately terminated on God, were alwayes at the the height and one equal perfection, p. 71.
Now that Doctor Hammond is to be underſtood of this eminent act of holy charity, that is immediately terminated on God, I have clearly demonſtrated: and unleſſe the Defendant can anſwer my arguments, his accuſation of my third argument, as guilty of that Sophiſme which the Philoſopher calleth foreign, will paſſe but for an idle and ignorant calumny. The Defendants friends may be ready to ſay that … decline the examination of that which followeth, becauſe 'tis unanſwerable, but alaſs▪ there's no ſuch matter: for that it is a very …otten, e…roneous diſcourſe, guilty of complyance with Pop…ry, in a great meaſure, I ſhall ſhortly demonſtrate in a d…ſtinct Treatiſe, if God grant me life, health and liberty. The reaſon then why at preſent I take no further notice of it, is, becauſe not only the Stationer, but divers good friends, have for ſeveral reaſons much importuned me, to contract this Debate as much as I could, and I ſhould now forth with put a period to it, but that I am deſirous to give the Readet in brief, a further taſte of the inconſ…q…ncies with which … work of Doctor Creed is every where fraught.
Firſt, p. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57▪ he concludes that a habit of divine love in Chriſt was not capable of further degrees becauſe the act and exerciſe of it was capable of further degrees. If Chriſts love of God (in the act and exerciſ…) was capable of Deg…ees, more intenſe at one time than another, and had in its latitude, or amplitude ſeveral Degrees, one different from another ſecund…m magis & minus, all them comprehended in becauſe iſſuing from) the habit of Divine Love, then this babitual love of God muſt be acknowledged all-full and perfect, alwayes (pray Maſter Defendant mark the word alwayes) in him ſo fall, and ſo perfect as not to want, and ſo not to be capable of further degrees. But the Antecedent is true, and therefore alſo the Conſequent. The evidence of the ſequel is ſuppoſed, and grounded upon two very …now… Maxims; Nihil eſt in effectu, quod non prius erat in cauſâ, and Nihil dat quod non habit. This is an argument ſilly and ridiculous beyond all compariſon: for, mutatis mutandis, a man from it may argue againſt the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were, are, or ſhall be on the earth. If their love of God in this life, in the acts and exerciſe, was capable of Degrees, &c. then their habitual love of God, muſt be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes in them, ſo full and perfect as not to want and ſo not to be capable of further degrees. As for the two known Maxims, they will do him no ſervice, unleſſe he put in the word ſemper. Nihil est in effectu, quod non erat prius ſemper in cauſa, Nihil dat quod non habet ſemper. And if you adde the particle ſemper every freſh-man will ſoone diſcover their notorious falſhood.
Secondly, p. 57. he hath another rare conſequence: The Apoſtle ſaith that Chriſt's being in the forme of God, though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God, yet made himſelf of no reputation, and took upon him the forme of a ſervant, and was made in the likuneſſe of man, and being found in faſhion as a man, he humbled himſelf, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Croſſe, wherefere God alſo hath exalted him. Therefore Chriſts love, viz. actual and inward, was more intenſe at one time than another: v.z. i… his agony and dying for us more intenſe, than in his ſuffering nakedneſſe and hunger for us.
Thirdly, in p. 18, 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds foreign, I have theſe words. If this be your meaning, I muſt needs aſſume the boldneſſe to tell you, that no ſuch matter is viſible unto me in any of the School-men. But perhaps you may mean ſuch School-men, as ſuch a Puny, as I never ſaw or heard of; however you cannot expect b…lief, until you produce their teſtimonies: And I ſhall intreat you to alledge ſuch as may be had in Pauls-Church yard, o… at leaſt in the Library at Oxford. Now from this the Defendant concludes, …. 62. that I tell the world in effect, that I have all the School-men at my ſingers end: nay juſt as many, no more, nor no leſſe than are in Pauls-Charchyard, and the L…b…ary as Oxford.
Fourthly, p. 88, 89. the Defendant ſaith, that I do not throughly underſtand a paſſage which I quote out of Raynandus: My words are theſe. Kaynaudus makes mention out of Gabriel Biel, of a diſtinction of love into aff…ctive, and eff…ctive: and …hat is this effective love, but the effects and expreſſions of love.
But now that he doth not take this to be a proper deſtribution of a G…nus into its Species, appeareth by what he ſaith out of the ſame Author concerning the diviſion, &c. Well, where lieth my miſtake in theſe words? why plain it is (ſay you) from Raynaudus, that love effective is not only the outward ſenſible effects, and expreſſions, but alſo ſomething elſe. For though it be true, that all the outward ſenſible effects, and expreſſions of love, be love effective, or in plain Engliſh the iſſues, and effects of love; yet the termes are not reciprocil, and convertible. For there are many effects of love, that are not ſenſible, and thus external. For inſtance good wiſhes, good prayers, are the effects of true love, ſo alſo are joy at the we fare of the beloved perſons w…ll-doing, and ſorrow, and grief at his miſcarriage; and yet th…y are not alwayes expreſſed, nor does any prudent man alwayes ſhew his joy or grief, or expreſſe his good wiſhes, thoughts and deſires to him be moſt tenderly affects. Well, what of all this? Why ſaith the Defendant, the ſubject-matter of your diſcourſe leads me neceſſarily to underſtand your interrogation of the outword ſenſible effects and expreſſions of love. Sir, you muſt put in the word only, or elſe you ſay nothing to the purpoſe: and if you put that in, what you ſay is very falſe. It is (I ſay) falſe that the ſubject-matter of my diſcourſe, leads you neceſſarily to underſtand my interrogation, only of the outward ſenſible effects and expreſſions of love, and you can never prove it by any rule of argumentation. Indeed my deſigne is, to prove that love is not a genus unto the outward expreſſions of love, or that the outward expreſſions of love are not a ſpecies of love, and may not this be very well proved, though in my interrogation the effects and expreſſions of love be taken in a general ſenſe, abſtracting from both inward and outward expreſſiens? may not that which is denied of eſtective love in general, that is all effects and expreſſions of love, be particularly denied of the outward and ſenſible expreſſions of love? Did you never hear of arguing à gen…re ad ſp…ciem negativè, grounded upon this Max…me *Sander…m, Log…. p. 205.Quod convenit aut not convenit generi, Convenit etiam, aut non convenit sp…c…e…? Is it not a good argument to conclude, that hom… is not lapis, b…cauſe nullum animal it l…pis: becauſe no effective love, no effects, and expreſſions of love are a ſpecies of love, will it not thence irref…agably follow, that no outward effects and expreſſions of love are a ſpeci…s of love?
Fifthly, I had ſaid p. 10. of my Refutation, &c. I am very loth to enter into a Conteſt with ſo great a Critick touching the meaning of a word: And from this innocent and harmieſs paſſage, the Defendant concludes, That I contemptuouſly undervalue the Docto…'s excellent Critical learning, That with me a Critick is but a whiſting Gramma…ian, an empty Pedag…gae, p. 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101. That the Doctor in my opinion is ſome petty Grammaticaſter, that knows the meaning of Muſa, and can tell how to decline Lapis, ſome great Critick for ſooth, one fit to teach School-boyes perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latine Author: but for any skill in the Arts, and Reſerches of Philoſophy, he is a very Dunce, and not at all ſeen in the curious ſpeculations and ſubtleties of School-learning. But what colour is there for theſe odious ſequeles in my words▪ Indeed they can be drawn from no Topick place, but that of the Defendant's furious malice.
Sixthly, Whereas Dr. Hammond had ſaid, that each of the expreſſions of Chriſts love of God, had an act of internal love of which they were ſo many proportionably different expreſſions: I anſwered, that if the Doctors meaning were, that theſe different expreſſions in regard of intenſion, muſt be proportioned exactly unto their inward reſpective acts of love, muſt be equal or parallel unto them; then I denyed what he ſaid, and called upon him for the proof of it. Now this my denyal, which no rational man can or will deny, the Defendant himſelf moſt unneceſſarily and idly confirms in 16. pages, p. 139, 140, &c. uſque ad 155. and p. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154. he quotes the teſtimonies of many School-men for the confirmation hereof, and in the cloſe of all this, he wonders at my omiſſion of theſe, and the like teſtimonies: And hereupon he concludes my ignorance in School-men. His words are theſe: And therefore I cannot chuſe but wonder, that our Refuter ſhould take no notice of theſe or the like paſſages, which to ordinary eyes would have ſhewed more to his advantage, than all that he has quoted in his Panphlet from the School-men, and Suarez, and Scheibler to boot. But this and ſome other paſſages in his book, which offered themſelves at firſt ſight, make me not value his School-learning at the ſame rate and p…ice he has put upon it in the Title-page of his mixture. But old Homer was blind, though he were the Prince of Poets; and our Writer of Practical, and Scholaſtical Divinity ſees not all things in thoſe Doctors that may moſt ſerve for his advantage. Here by the way I deny, that I put ſuch a rate and value upon my School-learning, in the Title-page of my Mixture, as the Defendant pretends: only I profeſs my ſelf a Well-wiſher unto Scholaſtical Divinity, deſirous to revive the ſtudy thereof: but however there is not either in mine, or in his own diſcourſe any foundation, (ſhall I ſay?) nay, not ſo much as any ſhadow, for either his wender or cenſure. The particle therefore (therefore I cannot chuſe but wonder) &c. plainly intimates, that what he ſaith, is a concluſion drawn from ſomething foregoing. And for my part, I have moſt diligent'y ſought for premiſes unto this concluſion, and can find none, and therefore muſt earneſtly entreat the Defendant, to direct us where or what they are. In my fore-mentioned denyal, I acted the part of a Reſpondent; and by what laws of diſputation a Reſpondent, though a School-man, is obliged to heap up teſtimonies out of School-men, for the confirmation of every denyal that he makes, eſpecially if the propoſition denyed be apparently falſe, as this was, viz. That the outward expreſſions and the inward acts of love of God in Chriſt, muſt of neceſſity be of equal intenſion. And thus hoping that by the next we ſhall know why you fell into this fit of wondering, I paſs on.
Seventhly, In the next place you tell us, that in men the inward affection commonly varies, according to the intenſion and remiſſion of the outward expreſſions and effects: and in proſecution of this he ſpends, with a great deal of noiſe and triumph, about 16. pages more, p. 155, 156, &c. …uſque ad 171. But what of all this, Sir? is this any thing to the matter in hand? Can you from any thing in this tedious diſcourſe inferre any thing againſt my Denyal, vlz. that the outward different expreſſions of love, muſt of neceſſity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love? and if you cannot, (as undoubtedly you cannot,) to what end ſerves all that you ſay, but to waſte time, pen, ink, and paper.
But you tell us often, that the Doctor is no wayes engaged to prove, that the inward acts of love, and the outward expreſſions, are of neceſſity equal in point of intenſion, But the contrary will appear to every Pu…ſ…ny in Logick, that will but peruſe the Doctors ſequel, as 'tis in him at large, for thus it runneth: and from hence I ſuppoſe is unavoidably conſ…que…t (pr…y Mr. Defendant mark the word unavoidably) that that act of internal love exp…eſ…ed by Chriſts dying for us, was ſupe…ur to th…ſe …o…mer act (ſupply in intention) which only expreſt themſelves in his povertie: and ſo the ſame perſon that loved ſincerely, did alſo love, and expreſſe that love more intenſely at one time then at another: which was the very thing I ſaid in another inſtanc…. Now chooſe unto this conſequent what Antecedent you will, out of Dr Hammonds words: either thoſe that are immed…a…ely foregoing▪ yet it being …e…ain that each of theſe expreſ…ions had an act, of internal love, of which they were ſo many propertionab…y different expreſſion…; or th…ſe that precede theſe. To this I ſubjoyne that ſuch as the expreſſion wa…, ſuch was the act of inward love, of which that was an expreſſion and from it it is impoſſible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends, to inferre th…s conſequent. But you pretend p …68, that you have done the feat your ſelf. And now becauſe you p…ſeſſe, (and it is your third charge) that the reaſon of the Doct…rs conſequenc… is to you inviſible, and that you ſhall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate, u…til you be d…iven thereto by …educing his En…hyme…e unto a Syllogiſme: I ſh…l …nce, for your better ſatisfaction, …rſ…r…e it; I… ordina…i…y there i… and muſt be a proportionable agreement in reſpect of In…er…ion and R… miſſion, betwixt the inward acts of love, and the outward expreſſions, then that act of internal love expreſsed by Chriſts dyi…g for us was ſuperiour to th…ſe former acts which only expreſt themſelves in h…s Povertie, &c. But the Antecedent is true, as we have ſhewed from reaſon and experience, and the Auth… rity of Gregory, and the Schoolmen. Ther…f…re alſo is the conſequent.
Firſt, for the major of this your Syllogiſme, I demand concerning the Conſequent, vvhether you inferre it from your Ante…edent neceſſarily, or only probably; If you ſay only probably, then your Conſequent is none of Dr. Hamm…nds: for he ſuppoſeth that his follovveth nec…ſſarily from vvhat he hath ſaid. Hence I ſuppoſe it (faith he) unavoidably conſequent (that is, neceſſarily conſequent) that that act of intern…l love expreſſ…d by his dying for us, was ſuperiour to thoſe former acts which only expreſt themſelves in his povertie. If you ſay you inferre it neceſſarily, then the conſequent is evidently falſe; you muſt then change in your Antecedent the vvord ordinarily, and in the room thereof put in the vvord neceſſarily, or elſe the conſequent vvill not follovv unavoidably.
As for the aſſumption, that is evidently falſe too, if you ſupply what is to be ſuppoſed, for then thus it runs. Ordinarily there is, and muſt be in all men, and was in Chriſt, a proportionable agreement in reſpect of intention and remiſſion, betwixt the inward acts o… the love of God, and the outward expreſſions thereof. Now all men are by the commandement of God, which Chriſt fulfilled, obl…ged to love God, when they love him, with all their might, and conſequently with all their habitual might. But by the opinion of both Dr. Hamond, and the Defendant, men are not bound in all expreſſions of their love of God, to performe then… with all their might: and therefore 'tis falſe, very falſe, that there muſt be a proportionable agreement in reſpect of intenſion and remiſſion; betwixt the inward acts of the love of God, and the outward expreſſions thereof. And thus you ſee what a rare Syllogiſme you have made, both the premiſes of which are notoriouſly falſe.
By wh…t hath been ſaid, the Reader may, (as diſcover the faiſhood of your Syllogiſme, ſo alſo) frame a true Syllogiſme, againſt the ſequele of Dr. Hammond: and 'tis as followeth. If all the inward acts of Chriſt's love of God were with all his habitual might, then that act of h…s internal love, viz. of God, expreſt by his dying for us, was not ſuperiour, viz. in intenſion to thoſe former acts, which only expreſt themſelves in his poverty: but all the inward acts of Chriſt's love of God, were with all his habitual might: therefore that act of his interral love of God, expreſſed by his dying for us, was not ſuperiour, (viz. in intenſion) to thoſe fo…mer acts, which only expreſſe themſelves in his poverty. The Major is undenyable, and we may ſay as much of the Minor: becauſe Chriſt fulfilled the commandement, which was to love God, with all his might and ſtrength; Therefore with all his habitual might and ſtrength: and this is confeſſed by your ſelf touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himſelf, of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be underſtood.
Eightly, Dr. Hammond ſaies that if it be proved that foreign, according to the vulgar tranſlation, ſignifieth Luke 22, 44. Prolixiùs; the…e will yet be place equally for his concluſion, viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intenſe then another. But if there be any place for ſuch a concluſion, then thus the argument ſtands. Chriſt in his agony prayed longer then before; therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intenſe then before. But this ſequele (as is evident unto every ordinary Reader) is very illogical and irrational, and yet the Defendant juſtifieth it, and in vindication of it ſpends twelve pages, p. 253, 254, &c. uſ que ad 265. But how unſatiſtying this h… vindication is, will quickly appear, if he pleaſe to caſt into Syllegiſmes what he takes to be argumentative therein. But this is a thing that he dates not ſo much as attempt, for then every Freſhman will eaſily diſcover the foppery of his diſcourſe. However in the meane time I ſhall give the utmoſt ſtrength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument, as 'tis propounded by himſelf, and as 'tis reinforced by the Defendant. The concluſion to be proved is, that one inward act of Chriſts love of God was more intenſe then another. Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer: for paralel to a gre…ter length, there's a greater intenſion of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer, compared with that which is ſhorter. All the proofe that I can finde of this, reduced into forme, ſtands thus. Where there is a multiplication of Degrees, more degrees of the inward actual love of God, there's a greater intenſion of the inward actual love of God: but in a larger prayer of Chriſt, there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love, &c. more deg…ee of love, &c. then there was in a ſhorter: And therefore the…e was a greater intenſion, viz. of the actual internal love of God. The Major is confirmed from the nature of intenſion, which is nothing elſe but a multiplication of Degrees in the ſame ſubject, an addition of one. Degree unto another.
And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend, where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love, viz. inward; where there are more acts of love, there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love: for in every act of love, there was ſome degree of intenſion, but in a longer prayer of Chriſt there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love, m…re acts of love then there was in a ſhorter; and anſwerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees o… love, more Degrees of love, &c.
My Anſwer unto th…s Sy…giſme ſhall be, both unto the Major and the Minor.
First then, I anſwer unto the Major, by distinguiſhing concerning the multiplication of Degrees. It is either of the ſame numerical forme, or fo fo…mes numerically different. Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the ſame numerical forme, there is a greater intenſion; but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different, for intenſion is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the ſame numerical forme. The Major then, if underſtood of the latter multiplication of degrees, is falſe: but if underſtood of the former is true. But then th… Minor, if underſtood anſwerably of the ſame, will be falſe. And Dr. Hammond's proofe of it will be moſt impe…inent. For the ſeveral inward acts of Chriſts love of God, are formes numerically different, and therefore let them be multiplyed never ſo much, this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees, in one act of love then there is in another: So that from this it can never be inferred, that one inward act of love in Chriſt, was more intenſe then another. But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affi…meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and ſay, If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplyed as the acts are, there muſt be a growth in their intenſive perfection, and the laſt act, which has the greater number of Degrees in it, will be gradually more perfect then the former. Here you ſay that if the Degrees of Chriſt's love are in number multiplyed as the acts are, there muſt be a growth in their intenſive perfection, and withall you ſuppoſe, that the laſt act hath a greater number of degrees in it: and here upon you conclude of it, that it will be gradually more perfect then the former. But, good Mr. Defendant, inſtead of ſaying and ſuppoſing, you ſhould have proved what you ſay and ſuppoſe: but of ſuch proofe there is not in all that you ſay, any the leaſt footſteps.
B…t …e this how it will, plaine it is, you ſay p. 257. that I do not re…ch the Doctor's meaning, and the force of his argument. I have made the moſt of his words that I could, but as for any hidden and inviſible meaning, diſtinct from that which his words hold forth, I know not that I was obliged to ſearch after it. And therefore I ſhall leave that unto the Defendant, who can ſee further into a Mill-ſtone then other Mortals.
But however, let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's. The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cauſe, thus, where th… z…ale is true and real, and not terſonate and counterf…it, (as in Chriſt without doubt it was most true) there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in them, argues a greater a den…y of inward affection, and true zeale. And for the truth of this aſſ…rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world.
Here if you ſupply what is to be ſupplyed, touching the object of this inwa…d affection, This aſſertion, which you obtrude with ſuch a confidence, is apparently untrue. I ſay 'tis apparently untrue, that a multip…cation of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in th…m, argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God, or love …f him. And for the falſhood of this aſſertion, I appeale to th… boſomes of all experienced, either Miniſters, or Chriſtians, who can t…ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intenſe, in their ſhor…es, as it is in their longer prayers, and that the ſhortneſſe of their prayers, many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God, but from regard to the infirmities of ſuch as joyn with th…m, and for diverſe other reaſons. Mr. Paul Beyne was eſ…eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time, and 'tis ſaid of him, that his prayer in his Family, was not uſually above a quarter of an hour long: as having reſpect to the weakneſſes and infirmities of his Servants and Children; and he uſed to diſſwade others from tediouſneſſe in that duty. I beleive the Defend…nt will not deny, but that a man may, in putting up the Lord's Prayer, have his actual love of God every way as high and intenſe, as in the longeſt prayer either of a man's own or anothers compoſition. But not to inſiſt longer on other men, It is plaine of Chriſt, that his ſhorteſt prayers, his ſhorteſt eiaculations, did proceed from an actual love of God, every way as intenſe as the longeſt. And for the truth of this, I appeale unto the Commandement of God, that enjoyned Chriſt, and all other men, to love God with all their mig…t and strength: therefore with all their habitual might and ſtrength. Now however other men may tranſgreſſe this Commandement, Chriſt did not, could not; and therefore whenever Chriſt loved God actually, he loved him with all his habitual might and ſtrength, ad extremum virium; and conſequently one inward Act of his love of God, was not more intenſe then another.
Ninthly, p. 268 you accuſe my Anſwer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's, as guilty of that fallacy, which is called petitio principii If this be not (ſay you) foreign, I know not what your great Maſter Aristatle mednes. But this is a moſt ridiculous and groundleſſe crimination, for this, as every other fallacy, is a ſault or defect in arguing, not in anſwering, 'tis (ſaith my …rtle Maſter Scheibler) d…cept…o in ſyllogizando. De Sydogiſm, cap. 17. n. 6. 'tis, ſaith my great Master Aristotle, Elenchus Sophisticus. It hath alwaies been obſerved for a rule in d…ſputing, that when the Reſpondent denyes a ſequel, and gives a reaſon for it, it is the Opponents part to …fute the reaſon, and the Reſpondent is not obliged to confirm it. It is then a groſſe non-ſequitur to conclude me g…ltie of this fa…lacie, of petitio principii, becauſe I do not confirm the reaſon, for which I deny Dr. Hammonds conſequence. But, Sir, if you had not falſifted it, by adding muſt to may be, it is a Propoſition ſo plain and evident, as that it needs no confirmation, and can be denied by no rational man. Thus it ſtands, my reaſon is, becauſe in all theſe inward acts of Chriſts love of God, (and we may ſay the ſame of the inward acts of other vertues and graces) there may be no gradual diſſimilitude. Mark, Sir, the word may be, and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Propoſition, in ſeveral inward acts of Ch…ſts love of God there is no gradual diſſimilitude; it there be, pray diſcover it, if there be hot, then give me leave to conclude, that in the multiplied acts of chriſts love of God, there may be no gradual diſſimilitude. You ſay this is the controverſie betwixt me and, the Doctor. But your own conſcience muſt needs convince you that this is a faiſhood: for you your ſelf ſtate the controverſie to be, whether one act of ch…ſts love of God were actually more intenſe then another? and yet if I had ſaid, that in the inward acts of Chriſts love of God, there could be no g…adual diſſimilitude; this I have proved by three reaſons, unto which you have given but …orrie anſwers: and theſe reaſons I am not bound to repeat at every turne, for this would quicklie ſwell my book to ſuch a Volume as yours is.
Tenthly, he hath a paſſage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the leaſt toundation: And will not every man think that our Refute… was a man of great judgment and parts, and fit to quote Suarez againſt Dr. Hammond? But I rather think he was miſguided by ſome Notes, and that he never conſulted the Authors he quot…s, but took them upon truſt: otherwiſe m…thinks it is impoſſible he ſhould be ſo ſtrangely deceived. But, pray Sir wherein, wherein is the …efuter ſo ſtrangely deceived in Suarez? why 'tis clear and evident by Suarez, though every act of Chriſt, in reſpect of the perſon that performed it, was of an infinite, and ſo of an equal in enſive value, yet in reſpect of the moral goodneſſe, that is intrinſecally inherent in Chriſts actions, nothing hinders but that one in this reſpect may be better and more intenſely perſect then another, as well as one grief and torment which he ſuffered was greater then another. And therfore (ſay you) the ſame Suarez, even in that very page and columne, and in the ſection immediately preceding that paſſage that our Refuter has quoted, expreſſely ſayes to this purpoſe. Primum omnium ſatendum eſſe, opera Chriſti fuiſſe inequalia in prep…â bonitate intrinfec…, & eſſentiall, vel …ter inhaerente ipſi actai: quia ut dictum est, … hee bonites … fini…a, po…rat ergo eſſe major & … & allunde unum …pus Chriſ… erut metioris objects quam aliud, & u…m in…thſ…u's …, & ſic de …, …go … vol poter…nt eſſe inaequalta in h…c bonitate, &c. Why what of all this? h…e I delivered a…y thing that contradicts this either expreſly, or implyedly, or doth Suarez here oppoſe, in the leaſt deg…ee, any thing that I have ſaid? doth not †Sed haec ſententia & tot… objectio procedunt ex falſo principio: ſingunt enim eſſe in eodem acta plures valores, ſeu plura merita, juxta varias ejus circumst…ntias, quod patet eſſe falſum ex his quae paulò ſuperiùs dicebamus de infinitate ſacriſicii, ex re obla…a, vel perſon a offeren…e ſumpta. Ostendimus enim reipſa non eſſe duas, ne que pertinere ad diverſa merita, vel ſatis… actiones: quia ratio merit… vel ſatisfactionis (ſieut & ratio b…nitatis) non conſu git ex ſingulis conditientbus actus p…rſe ſumpris, ſed ex col…ec…s ne omn…m. Haec enim ratio ettam in praeſente pro…edit, nam intenſio octus, vel obiectum, out perſona …p…rons per ſe ſing…la non ſ…ffici…nt ad mernum, ut ex ſingali… diſtinctamer…ta in actu orientur, ſed omnia ſimu… neceſſaria …el ſu…t, vel ſu… modo concurrunt ad unum meritum, & quentitate …eius. A… que ita ceſſat objectio: nom ſtoneritum actus tantum eſt unum, & illud eſt infinitum, & aequ…le, …hil eſt me…iti, in que ce…ni poſſit inaequalit…. In tertiam part. Toom. tom. 1. diſp. 4. ſ. …. 49.Su…rez all along aſſert that there is but one me…itotious value, in one act of Chriſt? and that in reſpect of meritorious value, one act of Chriſt was not better and more intenſively perfect then another. Nay, do not you your fel…e p. 271. quote a place out of Su…rez, where in he affirmuth that the moral goodneſſe inherent in the action… of Chriſt, is a thing diſtinct from their meritorious value Therefore Sua…tz (ſay you) acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote, Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum, eſſe quid diſtinctum…d realt boni…ate quae eſt d…ffe entin ipſius actû, prout conſ…ituitur in eſſe vi… tu…c, …el illi a…rquo … inſt…e inh…ret. Now Dr. Hummond is to be underſtood only of a meritorious value, for he is to be underſtood of a value, that was to be rewarded, and that out of debt: and ſuch a one is a meritorious value. Nay, do not you your ſelfe underſtand him to ſpeak of a merito…ious value? p. 266. And now to ſhew the app…ſirneſſe of the Proof. I muſt tell him what either he knowes not, or will not obſerve, That the Doctor …gaine a gues à poſter…ori, from the effect to the cauſe, and the neceſſary rele…n betw…xt th… work and the reward. His …gument is fun…ed upon a Maxune of d…ſ…ributive juſtice; not expreſſed, but ſuppeſed and int…ted, and it is th…; where the reward does proceed of debt, as in Chriſt certainly it did and is properly wages, there muſt be a proportionable incre ſ… of thereward and the work, &c.
By this then the Roader may ſ…e, that all that you have concerning the moral goodneſſe in h…rent in the actions of Chriſt, in reſpect of their re…l en…y and good a…ſe, is nothing at all to the purpoſe: for it is a thing quite different from their meritorious v…lue, as Suarez faith in the very Words that you your ſe…fe quote out of him. What hath been ſaid is enough to convince the Defendant… greateft friends, that I Was not a jot deceived in Suarez. But yet for both his, and their further and fuller conviction, I ſhal compare the paſſa…e that he quote out of Suartz. with the Words fore going and following.
A little before he propounds a ſecond Objection, againſt the inſinite value and efficacy of Chriſts W…ks to ſat…ſle and merlt, Secund… Objectio eſt …b inconveni mi: nam ſi ſatisfactio Chr…ſti infinita eſ…, ſe…u…tur unum vel …fi…itum eſſe majus ulio, in ge…e…e…, in quo …nfiritu… …ſt, quod eſt contra Nationem infiniti, vel unum opus Chriſti no… eſſe majorts v…lor… quà aliud: nec duo, quam unum, quod videtur ubſurdum: …m quia totum eſt majus ſua parte, tum e…am quia unum opus Christ erat mellus alio, & unus dol…r major quàm alius quod muliùm reſert and quantitatem ſatisfactionis: …um deniq… quiainde fieret, non magis redemiſſe nos Chriſtum per paſſionem, & mortem, qu…m per alios actus vitae ſuae, quod eſt contra ſcripturam, quae paſſioni ſemper tribuit redemptionem noſtram, ad Rom. 3.4, and 5. … O…l. 3. ad Hebr. 2.9, and 11.
In AnſWer.
Firſt he propounds a Conceſſion, the very paſſage quoted by the Defendant, and therein he grants, that Chriſts wo…ks Were unequal in regard of that moral goodneſſe, Which Was intrinſecal and eſſential to them, really inherent in them; and in regard hereof one Work might be better then another. Reſponde…ur, pri…ùm omnium fatendum eſſe opera Christi fuiſſe inaequalia in prop…ia bon…tate intrinſeca, & eſſential…, ve… realiter inhaerente ipſi actui quia, ut dictum eſt, tota h…c boni…as erat finita: poterat ergo eſſe major, & minor, & aliunde un…m opus Chriſti erat melioris obj…cti, qu…m aliud & unum i…tenſius alio, & ſic de aliis cercumſtantiis, ergò erant vel poterant eſſe inaequelia in h…c bon…a…e.
But then in the next place he ſheweth at large, quomedo ſt…t aequalitas meri…i, cum inaequali bonitate, as 'tis ſummed up in the margent; how an equality of merit or meritorious value, is conſiſtent w…th the unequal goodneſſe, that is really inherent in the actions them…elves. Nihilomin… addendum ſecundo eſt, quod'ib topus Chriſti ex parte perſonae operantis fuiſſe infiniti valoris, quia licèt …onitas, & aliae conditiones actus c…nfer…t interdum ad hunc valorem, tamen quia haec dignitas infinits perſonae extollit hune valorem ad perfectiſſimum ordinem, & uſ que ad infin…tum gradum, ideò tollitur omnis alia proportie: illa enim perſon…, cùm in omni g…nere infini… fit, eminentér continet omnia alia bena, & idè… conſert actui, quidquid valoris omnes aliae circumſtantiae conferrae p…ſſent. Quo circa totum id, quoderat in opere Chriſti, ex p…te ipſ…s actûs, intelligendum est quaſi materialitèr ſe h…bere, perſonam verò eſſe quaſi formem conferentem valorem, quae omnes illos actus aequaliter informat, & ideò omnibus conſert infinitum, ái que ad… equelem velorem. Exemplo explicari poteſt, fi pecunia tali regio ſigno figurata, tantum vale…e…, cujuſcunq, eſſet materiae ration figurae.
And hereupon in the third place he inferres, that which I cited out of him. Hinc ter…io fit, plura opera Chriſti eſſe quidem extenſivè plura merita, intenſivè tamen non eſſe plus valoris in mu…tis, quam in uno: ut ſi eſſent plures calores infinitè intenſi, eſſent quidem plures, non tamen efficerent unum intenſiorem & pari ratione, ſi in uno opere Christi quod ſucceſſive pe… partes fi…bat, partes cum tot… comparemus, intenſivè tan…us valor erat in qualibet parta, ſicùt in …to opere, & in uno momento, ſicùt in long… tempere: quia forma … quid erat v…lor, tote erat in toto, & tota in ſingulis partibus.
And now …t the moſt partial Reader review this diſcourſe of Suarez, and then let them ſit down and ſadly conſider, whether the Defend…nt doth underſtand Suarez; or if he does underſtand him, whether his conſcience informe him not, that I was not a jot miſtaken in mine allegation of him, and if it doth, then what conſcience is there in h…i affirming that I was.
Eleventhly, p 330. the Defendant pretends a grant of m…ne that I never made. Howſoever, ſaith he, I obſerve that in your firſt Argument you rightly underſtand the Doctors notion of the love of God, and take it here as he ſtill does in the large ſenſe, as it is all one with holy charity, as containing in its general …otion the acts of all graces and ver…ues whatſoever, and therefore becauſe now h…be mus confitentem reum, I am reſolved to hold you to your conceſſion; You are, Sir, very quick ſighted to obſerve that which never dropt from my Pen, nor was ever in my thoughts. Pray Si reflect once more upon my words; put them upon the Rack, and try your utmoſt skill in Logick, nay, call in what aſſiſtance you pleaſe; and if you an from them prove this pretended conceſſion, then trample upon me with a much ſcotne as you pleaſe, and until this be done, I ſhall aſſume the boldneſſe to tell you, that your pretence is a ſhameleſſe untruth.
Twelfthly, p. 370. the Defendant hath two ſtrange ſequels from my wor…s, which until he can juſtifie I ſhall look upon as ſlanders. If in the ſlate of Chriſts humiliation, there vvas by ſpecial diſpenſation, as our Reſuter grants, a reſtraint of his happineſſe or beatifical viſion, he could not then ſee God ſo perfectly, and ſo perfectly enjoy him, as after his Glorification, vvhen there vvas no reſtraint, and conſequently his love could not be ſo ardent, ſo highly intenſe and perfect as aftervvards, vvhen novv he fits at the right hand of God. Let the Reader but view the place quoted by the Defendant, p. 261. and adde unto it another, p. 346. vvherein I mo…e fully explicate my ſelfe; and then if he vvill judge impartia…ly, he cannot but conclude the Defendant to be a moſt unvvorthy Calumniator. My vvords p. 261. are at large, as follovveth. It is not to be denied, but that by ſpecial diſpenſation there vvas ſome reſtraint of the influence of his happineſſe or beatifical viſion, in the vvhole courſe of his humiliation, and particularly in the time of his doleful paſſion. Unto this joyne page 346. vvhere the point is farther explicated. Of this Heaven happineſſe in the ſoul of Chriſt, from the beatifical viſion, there vvould alvvays, vvithout Gods miraculous reſtraint and prevention, have been tvvo, as it were, connatural ſequels. 1. A fulneſſe of unſpeakeable, and unconceivable joy, ſolace, delight, pleaſure and comfort in his ſoul. 2. A redundancy of glory from his ſoul unto his body. But by he ſpecial diſpenſation of God, the reſultancy of the former was ſuſpended and withheld in the time of his paſſion, and the latter the derivation of glory from his ſoul unto his body, was totally deſerted until his exaltation.
Here I do not ſay, that there was a ceſſation, interruption, or abatement of the be…tifical viſion, but only a reſtraint of its influence, not upon his love of God, but upon the fulneſſe of joy in his ſoul, in the time of his paſſion, and the redundancy of glory from his ſoule unto his body, in the whole time of his humiliation… excepting his transfiguration. Now from this the Defendant inferie… two Propoſitions, one in the neck of another, one immediately, and the other mediately.
1. In his ſtate of humiliation he could not ſee God ſo perfectly and ſo perfectly enjoy him, as after his Glorification, when there was no reſtraint.
And 2. Conſequently, his love of God could not be ſo ardent, ſo highly intenſe and perfect as afterwards, when now he ſits at the right hand of God.
But now, if any ſhould preſume to ask for a reaſon of the conſequence of theſe two Propoſitions, I muſt needs tell him that they are dravvn from a Topick place, vvherein the Defendant is vvonderfully sk…led, fallacia coſequentis. And in Keckerman's Logick p. 543, 544. there are amongſt others eſpecially, two rare ſequels inſtanced in, that are of the ſame ſtamp vvith theſe of our Defendants. Beculus ſtat in argul…, e…gò …ra… pluet. Divus Gregorius edit caſ…um. Ergò Div… Veronica ſalt…t. I finde aftervvards, p. …22. that from this very ſame Propoſition of mine, he hath tvvo other like abſurd and inconſequent inferences. His vvords are as follovveth, If the invvard acts of Chriſts love vvere alvvays at the utmoſt height, becauſe this moſt intenſe love is a natural and neceſſity ſequel of the beatifical viſion, then it neceſſarily follovves, if his love vvere alvvays thus intenſe, that then he alvvays enjoyed the beatifical viſion, the ſole and neceſſary cauſe of ſuch a love. For it is an undoubted maxime, That poſitis …ut ſublatis effectu, & cauſa neceſſariis, ponuntur & …olluntur cauſa & effectus. And if ſo, vvhat then ſhall vve ſay to the Author of a mixture of Scholaſtical Divinity vvith Practical, Henry Jeanes of Chedzey? for ſayes he not expreſſely. That it is not to be denied, but that by ſpecial diſpenſation, there vvas ſome reſtraint of the influence of this happineſſe or beatifical viſion, in the vvhole courſe of his humillation, and particularly in the time of his doleful paſſion? And novv if his fervour of love vvere a natural iſſue of the beatifical viſion, it vvill neceſſarily follovv, that as that his happineſſe, and clear intuitive ſight of the divine eſſence vvas reſtrained, ſo the fervour of his love vvas proportionably abated alſo. Here he dravves tvvo Propoſitions from my vvords.
1. That Chriſt did not always enjoy the beatifical viſion.
2. That ſometimes the fervour of his love of God was abated. Now both theſe inferences are very inconſequent. For
Firſt, this ſtands the firſt, there was ſome reſtraint of the influence of the beatifical viſion in Chriſt. Therefore he did not alwayes enjoy the beatifical viſion, with as good Logick a man may conclude, that there was no heat in the fire, D…n. 3. becauſe God reſtrained its influence upon the bodies of thoſe three Worthies. It is very ſtrange, that this our great Schoolman ſhould b… ſo ignorant, as to confound the interruption or ceſſation of the beatifical viſion, vvith the reſtraint of its influence: or to think the former a neceſſary ſequel of the lat…er. Here by the vvay obſerve, that vvhereas the Defendant p. 523. quotes a ſaying of Leo, vvhichwhich he ſaith is approved of by all Antiquity, that at the time of our Saviours paſſion. Non diſſolvit unionem ſed ſubſtraxit viſi…nem; It is to be underſtood vvarily, that the beatifical viſion vvas vvithdravvn only in regard of influence, and never in reſpect of exiſtence; for that in had a perpetual being or exiſtence in the ſoul of Christ▪ i… upon very good reaſons affirmed by the generalitie of both Papiſts and Protestants.
The ſecond Inference is every way as inconſequent: for thus it ſtands. There was, by ſpecial diſpenſation, ſome reſtraint of the influence of his beatifical viſion: Therefore there vvas a reſtraint of the influence of it upon his love of God; ſo that the fervour of his love vvas proportionablie abated, as the influence of his beatifical viſion vvas reſtrained. Here is palpable fallacie, à dicio ſecund… quid, ad dictum ſimpliciter; the reſtraint of the influence of the beatifical viſion in Chriſt is particular, not univerſal. There vvas, I ſaid, ſome reſtraint of the influence of this happineſſe, or beatifical viſion, &c. And I inſtanced in the particulars, upon vvhichwhich the reſtraint of this influence vvas, of vvhichwhich his love of God vvas none.
Thirteenthly, p. 378, 379, 380, 381. the Defendant chargeth me to make uſe of an objection, that not only oppoſes Dr. Hammond in this particular, but equally overthrovvs the vvhole Chriſtian Religion, that deſtroys the doctrine of the eve…bleſſed Trinitie the Godhead, and ſatisfaction of our Saviour, and the immortalitie of the ſoul, and hell-fire, and eternal torments, that blovvs up as vvell the office as the maintenance of Miniſters, and opens a broad gap for the Socinian and Anabaptiſt, the Ranter and Atheiſt, to come and invade all that is ſacred among us. This is a terrible and moſt horrid accuſation, and if the Defendant cannot make it good, he may (to uſe his ovvn vvords, p. 11.) juſtlie be decried for the moſt monſtrous Railer and Sycophant, or any vvo…ſe thing that Chriſtianitie abominates. But he pretends that he hath made it good. And novv that the Reader may ſee that I do you no vvrong. I ſhall for the preſent ſuppoſe that the Doctor had borrovved this Expoſition from Bellarmine, and conſider the force of your Argument againſt him, upon this ſuppoſition. I reduce it thus into forme, that the ſtrength of it may appear. Whoſoever makes uſe of any Argument or Tenent, or Expoſition of Scripture, that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popiſh Writers, is guiltie of a compliance vvith Papiſts. But Dr. Hammond makes uſe of this very Expoſition vvhichwhich is to be found in Bellarmine. Ergo, Dr. Hammond is guiltie of compliance vvith Papiſts.
That you do me intolerable wrong the Reader may ſee, if he will but peruſe my words. "Your Reader hath juſt reaſon to expect a confirmation of what you ſay.
"Becauſe this very Anſwer is the ſhift of Papiſts in ſeveral controverſies between them and us, Bellarm Tom. 2. De Monarchis. lib. 2. cap. 1. Tom. 4. de amiſſione gratie, & ſtatu peccati. lib. 1. cap. 12. &c. And was it not fit that you ſhould acquaint us, what thoſe cogent reaſons were that neceſſitated you unto this complyance with Papiſts? Now from theſe words of mine, the Father of Lyes cannot inferre that propoſition, which you moſt injuriouſly Father upon me. viz. that whoſoever make uſe of any argument, or Tenent, or expoſition of Scripture, that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popiſh Writers, is guilty of complyance with Papiſts. But the Defendant will extort this propoſition from my word… whether I will or no. What ſay you Sir, is not this your preſent argument? Can you give us any other propoſition, to reduce your Socratial Enthymeme into a Syllogiſme? If you cannot, pray tell me then, what ſtrength is in your Major, and what anſwer you will give to it, when a Socinian, an Anabaptiſt, or Ranter, or Atheiſt, ſhal preſſe you with it, &c. And ſo he raves on moſt furiouſly, as if he were wood, not only in this but the next page.
But to diſcover to every ordinary Reader, that he doth moſt groſſely and palpably calumniate me; I ſhall reduce my words into two Syllogiſmes, and yet leave out that propoſition, which he ſo maliciouſly imputes unto me. The propoſition to be proved it, that it was fit that Dr. H. ſhould acquaint his Readers what thoſe cogent Reaſons were that neceſſitated him unto the anſwer that he gave, and thus 'tis proved. If this anſwer were guilty of complyance with Papiſts then it Was ſit that Dr. H. ſhould acquaint us, vvhat cogent reaſons neceſſitated him hereunto But this anſvver is gu…lty of complyance vvith …apiſts.
And therfore it vvas fit that Dr. Hammond ſhould acquaint us, vvhat cogent reaſons neceſſitated him hereunto.
For conſ…mation of the Minor the particle this, (this complyance) &c. carrieth us to the foregoing vvords, and from them vve may cravv this Syllogiſme.
That anſvver vvhichwhich is the ſh…t of Papiſts in ſeveral controverſies betvveen them and us, is guilty of complyance vvith Papiſts.
But this anſvver is the ſhift of Papists, in ſeveral controverſies betvvixt them and us.
And therefore 'tis guilty of complyance vvith Papiſt. And novv my vvords being thus Analyzed, the Reader cannot but be aſtoniſhed, a S…h…lar, a M…n of wi…, and parts, a Miniſter, a Chriſtian, ſhould ſo forget himſelf, as to lay at my doores a propoſition, that hath no bottome at all in my vvords, b…t is his ovvn meere invention, that I ſay not forgery, and I believe h… can ha…dly tell vvhichwhich to vvonder at moſt, the malice or ignorance that is in this crimination of the Defendant.
But I forget my ſelfe, thus to go beyond the limits that I have prefixed to my ſelfe, in the examination of this Volume. and indeed I beleeve 'tis very inkſome unto the Reader, as vvell as unto my ſelf, to take in ſuch a Dunghil of Non-ſe…uiturs as this vvork is, and therefore I ſhall trouble the Reader vvith the Examination of but one Argument more, and that I am vvilling to in…ſt a little upon, becauſe it ſeems at firſt bluſh …o be of more force and weight then the reſt. And beſides, 'tis concerning that vvhichwhich is the the foreign, the matter in connoverſie, 'tis dra… from Luke 2.52. And Jeſus ino eaſed in wiſdom and stature, and in grate wi…h God and man. This Argument the Defendant proſecutes from page 188. uſq…e a… 206.343, 344, 369, 370, 572 573. &c. uſ…e…od 596. vvhere he heaps up the …eſt monies of a vvorld of Commentators, vvhereof many contradict one ano hen ſt no purpoſe, that I knovv, but to diſtract the unvvary▪ and unlearned Reader, and to vvork in h…m a belief, that our Defendant is a man of vaſt reading.
The Argument for better diſtinction-ſake may be branched into tvvo parts.
Firſt, he argue…h from Chriſts increaſe in vviſdom, he increaſed in wiſdome; therefore he increaſed alſo in the invvard actual love of God.
The reaſon of the conſequence is, because love of neceſſitie bears propotion unto knovvledge, p 60 370 431, 512, 524. Unto this I ſhall return ſeveral Anſvvers.
The firſt is▪ in the firſt part of my mixture, p. 249. The increaſe in wiſdom h…ré ſpoken of, is only extenſive, not in…enſive, and from an extenſive increaſe in wiſdom, can never be inferred an intenſive increaſe, in the inward acts of the love of God. Yea, but ſaith our Defendant, p. 191. how you will reconcile this with what followes, I will le…v… any man to judge: and ſo will I too, provided that he be a man that und …ſtands any thing of an Argument … for ſuch a one will quickly perceive, that there is nothing in that which followeth, either in my own words, or elſe in thoſe quoted one of Amos, which doth in the leaſt degree contradict what I ſay.
Secondly, it is only an increaſe in the knowledge of the formal object of the love of God, viz. his infinite goodneſſe in himſelf, that will argue and inferre an increaſe in the inward actual love of God. Now that Chriſt increaſed in knowledge of the infinite goodneſſe of God in himſelf; St. Luke never averred, neither will any man averr it, but an Ar…ian or Socinian.
The Defendant objects often againſt me, that I confeſſe, that the fulneſſe of Chriſts knowledge in the ſtate of hum…liation, was conſiſtent with the neſcience of di…rs things. But, pray Sir, what were thoſe diverſe things he knew not as man? I ſay the day of judgment, the barrenneſſe of the fig…tree, &c. p. 249. But do I, or any Schoolman, or any Orthodox Proteſtant ſay, that Neſcience of the tormal object of divine love, Gods infinite goodneſſe in himſelf, was conſiſtent w…th the fulneſſe of his know edge. If not, all that you ſay is a meer extravag…ce.
Thirdly, the increaſe in wiſdom that Luke ſpeaks of, is by none of all the Authors that you alledge, applied unto the beatifical viſion; and if Chriſt did not increaſe in his beatifical viſion, then neither in his beatifick love, and conſequently not in his love at all: for there was in him at the ſame time only one inward actual love of God, for accidenti… numero tantum diverſa non p…ſſunt eſſe ſi…nal in e…dem ſubject…: as for the acts of the infuſed habit of divine love, diſtinct from the b…a ifick love, they (as I have already ſhewn) are proved by Vaſquez to be but a fig…nent, and as much may be ſaid of that love of complaeency, that acquiſite and experimental love, which you aſcribe unto Chriſt, p 537. for you make it to ariſe from Chriſts acquiſite or experimental knowledge: And that Vaſquez proves to be impoſ…ble, becauſe the act of the love of God, ſeeing 'tis of a ſupernatural order, ought to ariſe from a ſupernatutal knowledge of God, and ſuch is not that which is acquiſite and experimental. Exſcientiâ …cquiſitâ nullum actam amoris circa Deum eſſe poſſe, …niſeſtum eſt, quia actus charitatis cum ſit ſupernaturalis ordinis, ori…i…d…bet exnotitiâ D… ſupernaturali, in tertiam …tem Thomae tom. 1. d…ſp. 73. c. 3. p. 790.
As for the Reaſon whereby your conſequence is confirmed, our love muſt of neceſſity be …roportioned unto our knowledge; It is, I ſuppoſe, to be underſtood of a gradual proportion, in point of degree, and yet even ſo it needs limitation.
For 'tis evident that it failes, if it be underſtood univerſally of all men. For,
Firſt the knowledge of many ſurmounts their love of vertuous objects: but this is a ſinful diſparity, and therefore I ſhall wave it.
But ſecondly, mens love many times doth, and ſawfully may, exceed their knowledge in point of degree. A mans love of Philoſophy, may be more intente then his skill in it. Aquinas 1.2. q 27. a. 2. the Queſtion there debated is, Ʋ …um …ni…i… fit cauſ… amoris; the ſecond Objection againſt the Affirmative is as followeth, Ejuſdem ratio…is vid…tur eſſe, quod aliqu…d incognitum ametur, & quod aliquid am…tur pluſquon c…gaoſeatur: ſ…d aliqua amantur pluſquam cognoſ…untar, ſicut Deus, qui in hic vit… poteſt per ſeipſum amari, n…n autem per ſeſpſum cognoſci: ergo cogni…o nonest c…uſa amoris. Unto this Objection A…uinas returnes th…s following anſwer, Ad ſecundum dicendum, quod aliquid requi…itur adperfectionem c…g…itio is, quod non requiritur ad perſectionem a…is. Cognitio enim ad…a…onem perti…et, cuius eſt diſtingue e…interea quae ſecundum rem ſunt conjuncta; & componere quodam…odo ea quae ſunt diverſa, unu… …lteri comparando, & id ò ad perſectionem cognitionis req…i…itur quod hom… c…gnoſcat figilla…im qui…quid eſt in re, ſ… ut partes, & virtutes & propriet…tes. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae reſpicit rem ſecundum quod in ſe eſt Ʋ …de ad perfectionem ameris ſufficit, quod res prout in ſe appreh…n litur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod …liquid plus ame…, quam cognoſca…ur: qu…a poteſt perfectè amari et…mſi non perſectè …gnoſcatur: ſicut maximè p…et in ſcientii…, quas aliqui amant propior …iquam ſu…mariam cognitionem quem de eis habent, put a quod ſciun Rhetorican… eſſe ſ…e tiam, …er quam homo porest perſuadere, & hoe in Rhetorica am…nt E…ſimil… ter eſt di…endum circa amore… Dei. From the laſt words Irenaeus the Carm…lite d… Anim… c. 3. ſ. 6. p. 151. hath this inference, Inde fit, u… lic…t Deu… l…vite… cogn…ſcamus, vehementer t…men eum aliqu…ndo amemus. Againſt this doctrine of Aq…s Irenaeus propound, an Objection, and returnes unto it an Anſwer, both which I ſhall inſert, Dices, Tuncigitur voluntas fertur in incogni… rations exceſſûs amoris ſupa cognitionem. R…ſ…. Diſt. aneced. ſertu… in incogni…um ſimpliciter, nego: fertur in incognitum cognitione distinctâ & perfectâ, conc…do. … eti…m…i diſtinc… & explic…e non cognoſ… ſingula, quae ſunt objecti; tamen implicitè … cogn…ſcit, ſaltem novit illud eſſe appetibile. Res…lara est exemplo. Plures enim ardenter appetunt ſcienti…. v.g. Rhe… ricam, Philoſophiam, &c. Eiſ… viae ſciant queles …a ſint, ſed ſolum quod doceant medum diſcrurrendi, &c Hinc etiam fit ut aliquando levis cogit…tio animi, aut propoſitio alicujus objecti intenſum excitet amorem, eò qòod m…gna ſit convenientiatalis objects cum appeti…us, licèt ill…s notitia fit conſuſa in intellectu.
And thus you ſee this propoſition, our love of neceſſity muſt beare propotion unto our knowledge, is not true, if it be underſtood univerſally of all men, and ſo 'tis underſtood by the Defendant, for he ſpeaks not only of Chriſt, but of us: Our love of neceſſity, muſt bare proportion to our knowledge, &c. But now concerning Chriſt we ſhall readily grant, that his love of God was alwaies for degree proportioned unto his knowledge o… God, his knowledge of God's infinite goodneſſe in himſelf. But now that he increaſed in this knowledge, Luke doth not affirme, neither have you proved that he is to be underſtood hereof, by any of the School▪men in Paul's▪Church-yard, or in the Library at Oxford. Nor by any other of the Authorities, of which you make in the pages forecited, ſuch a vain-glorious, but impertinent muſter.
The ſecond branch of the argument is taken from Chriſts increaſe in grace, he increaſed in grace, therefore in the love of God, at leaſt actual: for love is a grace of God.
But is it that grace of God, which Luke ſpeaks of, let the Reader but look upon the words following, foreign, which God and man, and the addition of them, (which addition our Defendant for the moſt part leaves our, in his quotation of the words) will ſoon inform him, that Luke ſpeaketh not of the grace of the Spirit in Chriſt, either actual or habitual, but of the grace of Gods favour towards him: and in our Tranſlation foreign, is rendred in favour. Now in Gods favour he did not increaſe otherwiſe, then in ſome effects, fruits and ſignes thereof, and from that our Defendant can never conclude a gradual increaſe in the inward acts of Chriſts love of God.
The Defendant quotes me p. 189, 369. as ſaying, that Chriſt did as truly and really grow in the invvard acts of vviſdom and grace, as he did in ſtature. Indeed I ſaid that he did as really increaſe in vviſdom aske did in ſtature. But that he did as really increaſe in grace as in ſtature, I never ſaid, I never thought, for I vvell knevv that his increaſe in ſtature vvas proper, vvhereas he increaſed in favour or grace vvith God, only improperly and metonymically, in regard of the effects and tokens thereof. That Chriſt then encreaſed in the invvard acts of grace, as really as he did in ſtature, are none of my vvords, but foiſted in by the Defendant, vvi…h vvhat truth and ingenuity, I leave unto the Reader to judg.
And now I ſhall diſmiſſe the Reader, and take my leave of the Defendant too. The Gentleman is pleaſed (p. 643.) to promiſe, that if I manage my Reply in a Scholaſtical way, then he will keep cloſe unto our Ob. and So… this indeed would be very acceptable, as unto my ſelfe, ſo alſo unto all judicious Readers. But when I conſider how in this pretended Defence, he hath all a long vapored, bragged, railed, and raved, like a Bedlam, I have little reaſon to expect from him any ſuch thing as a faire, candid, regular, and orderly diſputation. Hovvever he ſhall have my hearty prayers unto God, to cure him of this his raging diſtemper, that … the future he may as Paul (Act. 26.25.) ſpeak forth the words of truth and ſober….
FINIS.
End of the text · Henry Jeanes, Dr Creeds Voluminous Defense of Hammons Ektenesteron (1661)