Letters, Initial correspondence
Letters of the Authour And Dr IEREMY TAYLOR To Mr T. C.
Sir,
I have here, according unto your deſire ſent you my ecceptions againſt that paſſage in Dr Taylor, concerning which you diſcourſed at my houſe; It is in his further explication of the Doctrine of originall ſinne, page 496: and it is the ſecond argument, which he brings to prove; that inclination to evill is no ſinne properly; becauſe it is accidentall to nature, not intrinſecall and eſſentiall. The argument put into forme may be reduced into two ſyllogiſmes.
The firſt.
Sinne properly is not accidentall to the nature of man.
An inclination to evill is accidentall to the nature of man: therefore
An inclination to evill is no ſinne properly.
A ſecond Syllogiſme is.
Sinne properly ſo called is intrinſecall, and eſſentiall to the nature of man.
An inclination to evill is not intrinſecall, and eſſentiall to the nature of man: therefore,
An inclination to evill is not ſinne properly ſo called.
Unto the firſt of thoſe ſyllogiſmes; I anſwer that the major is falſe; and that according to Porphyry his ſo celebrated definition of an accident.
Accidens eſt quod adeſt, & abeſt ſine ſubject… interitu: that is, as the beſt Commentators upon Porphyry expound the words. An accident is that, which may be affirmed, or denied of it's ſubject, without any repugnancy, or contradiction to the eſſence, and definition thereof; now to deny ſinne of man, gives no overthrow to his eſſence and definition, for a man that is no ſinner may bee animal rationale; ſinne therefore is accidentall to the nature of man.
The major of the ſecond ſyllogiſme is no leſſe falſe, than that of the firſt, as for the terme, intrinſecall, I ſhall not ſtay upon it; becauſe the Dr uſeth it as equivalent to eſſentiall, as is apparent by the Antitheſis, he puts between it and accidentall; but ſhall wholy inſiſt upon the word eſſentiall: To ſay, as the Dr doth by conſequence, that ſinne is eſſentiall to the nature of man, is an aſſertion, guilty of nonſenſes Blaſphemy, and libertiniſme.
1. Nonſence. A thing may be ſaid to be eſſentiall unto an other, either à priori, and then it is predicated of it, in primo modo dicendi per ſe; or elſe … poſteriori, and then it is predicated of it, in ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe. And to ſay that ſinne is either of theſe wayes eſſentiall to the nature of man, is ſuch pittifull, and prodigious nonſence, as that I cannot thinke it worthy of any ſerious refutation.
In a ſecond place I charge it with Blaſphemy: it blaſphemes three actions, three acts of God.
1. The creation of man.
2. The incarnation of Chriſt.
3. The full glorification of the Saints at the reſurrection.
1. The creation of man: God was the Authour of whatſoever was eſſentiall unto man; And if ſinne be eſſentiall unto the nature of man, then God was the Author of ſinne.
2. The incarnation of Chriſt: in which God made Chriſt like unto man in eſſentialls; If ſinne then be eſſentiall unto the nature of man, God made Chriſt ſinfull; a blaſphemy that I tremble to mention.
3. This opinion blaſphemes God's full glorification of the Saints in the reſurrection; for it affirmes by juſt conſequence, that they ſhall be raiſed with ſinne; becauſe doubleſſe they ſhall be raiſed with whatſoever is eſſentiall to the nature of man.
In the third, and laſt place this Tenet is chargeable with libertianiſme: 'Tis a licentious doctrine, and opens a gap to the greateſt profaneneſſe; for it takes away all conſcience of ſinne, all repentance of it for the time paſt, all caution againſt it for the future: If ſinne be eſſentiall to the nature of man, what reaſon hath he to be humbled for it? to aske God pardon for it? to make any ſcruple of the committing of it?
And thus having briefly performed my promiſe, and ſatisfied your requeſt, I ſhall reſt
Your affectionate freind, and humble ſervant HENRY JEANES.
Before the receipt of this, Mr T. C. gave an account unto Dr Taylor of what he remembred in our diſcourſe, and received from him an anſwer, which he concealed from me untill the delivery of my paper, and then he produced it. This anſwer together with my reply thereunto I ſhall next offer unto thy Conſideration.
To his reſpected Freind Mr. T. C. theſe, &c.
Mr. C.
I thanke you for your letter, and friendly information of Mr Jeanes his exception; but if he had been as carefull to underſtand as he was forward to object, and miſtake, he had eaſed you, and me of this little trouble. He objects that I ſay, that enclination to ſinne is no ſinne, becauſe it is accidentall, not intrinſecall, and eſſentiall: and he gives reaſons why ſuch a reaſon is abſurd. To all which I returne this ſoft anſwer, that he ſayes true, but nothing to the purpoſe. For the thing that I was to prove then, was the precedent word: [that every man is inclined to evill, ſome more, ſome leſſe:] that is, that this inclination to evill is not regular and uniforme, and therefore not naturall, for as for the other clauſe] it is an effect or condition of nature, but no ſinne properly] that was the leſſe principall part of the propoſition, and to it only the firſt reaſon was apportion'd, viz: [that which is unavoidable is not a ſin.) But if he had conſidered the buſineſſe I was then upon, be muſt needs have ſeene that I was explicating that clauſe of the Church Article [and is inclined to evill] which I was to ſay, was an inclination not naturall, not intrinſecall, not eſſentiall; but accidentall: and i… this thing I purſue, and to this all the other reaſons relate to the end of that ſection, and none of them, the firſt only excepted, relates to the latter part of the propoſition, which if I had left out, and the reaſons relating to it, the ſenſe had been as compleat, and my argument not the worſe, and my diſcourſe no leſſe pertinent. And unleſſe he refer the l4 aſt reaſons, that is, all after the firſt to that clauſe of the variety of our inclination to evill, he will not only miſtake the ſecond reaſon, but all the reſt. Beſides this if Mr Jeanes had ſo much ingenuity as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived that for me to meane, what he ſayes I meane, had been the perfect deſtruction of all my diſcourſe, and all my intention, for if I had ſayd, that nothing could be a ſinne; but what is intrinſecall and eſſentiall, then I had affirmed that not only ſome ſinne, but all ſinne had beene naturall. Now my Theſis being, that no ſin, properly ſuch, is naturall; it cannot be imagined that I ſhould meane what he dreames of: it had not been to my purpoſe, either there or in the whole queſtion. But all the following reaſons do ſo explicate, and fully manifeſt the meaning of the ſecond; that I wonder how Mr Jeanes if he be that perſon which he would be thought, could miſtake, it, unleſſe he be alſo that perſon he would not be thought: I could ſay many more things, but this being the truth of the buſineſſe, and the reall purpoſe of my diſcourſe, I need adde no more; but one thing I cannot but adde to Mr Jeanes, that is, ſince be inſtances in our B. Saviour, he muſt needs allow that concupiſcence, taking it for thoſe deſires, which are purely naturall, and concreated with us, cannot poſſibly bee a ſinne: Becauſe as Mr Jeanes rightly obſerves, whatſoever is naturall to man, was in Chriſt, becauſe he had all our meere nature, but he had, not our ſin; therefore, our meere nature hath no ſinne: for Chriſt was in all things like to us, ſinne only excepted, but he took upon him our nature, and nothing of that was excepted; therefore our nature of it ſelfe is not properly ſinfull: nothing of our conſtitution is criminall.
Sir, I have given you a faire and eaſie anſwer. I pray let Mr Jeanes have ſo much conveyed to him, as concernes that part to which he objects: and if he writes any thing againſt me, let him take notice of this my anſwer, or elſe all the World ſhall take notice of his impertinent, and uningenious dealing: I pray let not this letter goe out of your hand, becauſe I have no copy of it, if Mr Jeanes ſhould be trouble ſome: But if he be, it will be ſufficient to acquaint his neighbourhood with my defence, for what he ſayes ſhall goe no farther. Sir, I hope you will expound this trouble I put you to in reading a long letter to my readineſſe to doe you ſervice, and as a returne of thoſe great kindneſſes by which you have obliged
London July 4th. 1657. Sir, Your very affectionate friend to love and ſerve you JER: TAYLOR.
Poſtſcript.
I hope I have ſpoken clearly enough in the explicating, and untying this knot in the bulruſh; but if it be not extreamly plaine, for your own ſatisfaction make but the ſecond part of the propoſition to be a Parentheſis; thus, beginning at (and it is an effect, &c: unto 2.) and then the thing is extreamely plaine, for there the deſigne was only to ſay and prove that although man be (more or leſſe, as it happens) inclined to ſinne, yet his nature is never the more criminall for that: for it is beſides his nature, it is accidentall to it, not but that it is naturall to be inclined to ſuch objects; but that this ſhould be ſinfull is but in ſome caſes, and it is accidentall, and it is becauſe thoſe object; were forbidden after our nature was given to us. Man is naturally inclined to ſome things, which are not naturally, but accidentally ſinfull.
To his Loving friend Mr T. C. theſe &c.
Sir,
I have received Dr Taylor his letter ſent unto you, bearing date July 4th. What deſigne you had in concealing of it ſo long from me I cannot gueſſe. But if you had delivered it before I had ſent you my objections, you would have eaſed me, and Dr Taylor of ſome trouble: for I ſhould then have let alone theſe objections, and have only proved, that I did him no wrong, in charging him with the concluſions, againſt which theſe objections were directed; to wit, that no ſinne is accidentall; that all ſinne is eſſentiall, and intrinſecall.
Two things he layeth to my charge, want of care to underſtand him, and diſingenuity.
1. Want of care to underſtand him. ]If he had been (he ſayth) as carefull to underſtand as he was forward to object, and miſtak…, he had eaſed you, and me of this little trouble.] But if the Dr had been a man of that ingenuity, which you fame him for, he would have confeſſed his careleſneſſe in expreſſing of himſelfe, and not have charged me with want of care to underſtand, that to bee his meaning which I could not underſtand to bee his meaning without offering violence to his words: he propounds two propoſitions (without any thing, but a copulative conjunction interpoſed betweene them) And unto the laſt of theſe propoſitions he ſubjoyneth 6 reaſons. Now what rule of Logicke obliged me to cary the 5 laſt of theſe reaſons backwards, and to place them between the above mentioned propoſitions, I readily confeſſe my ſelfe to be utterly ignorant, and ſhall be very ready to ſit downe at the Doctor's feet, and to learne any ſuch rule of him. If the Dr muſt have ſuch liberty allowed him to make ſuch unexampled tranſpoſitions, he is a very formidable adverſary, not to be coped with by mortall wights, who cannot gueſſe, how he will in an after game ſever theſe reaſons, that he hath firſt joyned together.
Logicke informeth me that ſecondly ſignifies a relation of order betwixt it ſelfe and firſtly. But now if two reaſons be related unto not one, but ſeveral concluſions, I would faine know why one ſhould be the firſt, and the other the ſecond reaſon.
Beſides here is a firſt reaſon, that hath no ſecond reaſon following it, relating unto the ſame concluſion. There goeth a ſtory of an Alderman in Oxford, that upon the reading of ſome records touching ſomething controverted betwixt the Town, and Univerſity, he brake out into this expreſſion; unleſſe we can prove King Henry the 8th to be before King Henry the ſeventh the Univerſity will have the better of us: But if we can make it good, that King Henry the 8th was before King Henry the 7th, then there is no doubt, but that we ſhall in this particular have a full Conqueſt over the Schollars. I take this to be a fable: But however give me leave to make application of it unto my preſent purpoſe. All the wrong, that the Dr can pretend, that I have done him, is becauſe I did not place ſecondly before firſtly, and if he can make it good, that I ought to have placed, ſecondly before firſtly, then I muſt needs confeſſe I have done him a great deale of Injury, and ſhall be ready to aske his pardon; and unleſſe ſuch proofe can be made, he muſt lay the blame upon the Confuſion, and diſorder of his own diſcourſe: But to goe on. The Dr tels us, that this clauſe [it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no ſime properly, is the leſſe principall part of the propoſition:] both clauſes then, according unto him, make but one propoſition; and this is a great failing againſt that Logicke, which the learned have hitherto uſed; for by that, theſe two clauſes are not parts of one propoſition, but ſeverall, intire, diſtinct propoſitions.
But perhaps he may ſay, that they make one compounded propoſition.
Unto this I ſhall reply, 1. That a compounded propoſition conſiſts ever of ſimple propoſitions. Now the laſt of theſe clauſes (to ſay nothing of the firſt) is a compounded propoſition it ſelfe, for it is an adverſative prepoſition; and therefore, though theſe two clauſes may make an aggregation of ſeverall propoſitions, yet they can never concurre to the Compoſition of one.
2. If both clauſes make one compounded propoſition, then it is a copulative propoſition; becauſe they are knit together by a copulative conjunction; Now a copulative propoſition is not true, unleſſe all parts be true; and conſequently it is not proved to be true, unleſſe all parts be proved to be true: Now the Doctor for the proofe of this pretended copulative propoſition jumbleth together 6 reaſons without any note of diſtinction to direct the Reader, unto which part of the propoſition (as he cals it) he ſhould apply the ſeverall reaſons: and whether this proofe of a copulative propoſition be not illogicall, I appeale unto any man, that knowes any thing in Logicke.
He informes you, that the firſt reaſon is apportioned to be unto the latter part of the propoſition (as he cals it) and the 5 other reaſons unto the firſt part of the propoſition But what precept of Logicke, or Grammar I have tranſgreſſed in not making ſuch a diſtribution, or application of his reaſons, he doth not acquaint you.
But the Doctor directs you unto two wayes for the finding out of his meaning.
The Firſt to leave out the ſecond clauſe, and the reaſon relating unto it. If I had (ſaith he) left out the latter part of the propoſition, and the reaſons relating to it, my ſenſe had been as compleat, and my argument not the worſe, and my diſcourſe no leſſe pertinent.
But the ſecond clauſe being left in, perturbeth, and confoundeth the ſenſe, and occaſioneth the miſtake: and who (I pray) is to be blamed, the Dr for putting it into the Syntheſis, or I for ſtill keeping it in the Analyſis of his words? It would be a ſtrange, and unheard of way of analyſing, that a Reader ſhould loppe off two lines at a time of an authour: But it ſhould ſeeme wee are to make ſuch defalkations to make your great Dr ſpeake ſenſe; only I would know by what warrant, and obligation.
A ſecond way, which will make it extreamly plaine (as he tels you in the poſtſcript) is to make the ſecond part of the propoſition (as he termes it) and the reaſon relating unto it to be a Parentheſis.
But, 1. that this was not brought in by way of Parentheſis, who is in the fault?
Againe, 2. The Dr hath told us, that it is the ſecond part of the ſame propoſition with the foregoing clauſe, and if ſo, then it cannot be inſerted as a Parentheſis betwixt it, and the following propoſition.
And beſides, 3. If he bring in the words only by way of Parentheſis, I would faine know what is to be done with 2ly, in this caſe he muſt new figure, and number his reaſons. That which he figureth to be the ſecond reaſon, muſt be the firſt, and his ſix reaſons will prove to be but five.
The ſecond thing that he chargeth me with is diſingenuity. Beſides this (ſaith he) if Mr Jeanes had ſo much ingenuity, as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived, &c.
1. As what he ſpeakes of my pretending unto Logicke, I thinke unworthy of any anſwer, and ſhall leave it unto the Reader to judge of the wit, and ingenuity thereof.
2. It is no diſingenuous part in me to charge the Dr with a concluſion, that I prove his words to be guilty of: For as for his meaning, I cannot gueſſe at it, but by his words, but I believe the unpartiall Reader, will judge it a very high point of diſingenuity in the Dr, not to acknowledge the incommodious ſtructure of his words.
But let us heare wherein my diſingenuity conſiſts. If Mr Jeanes (ſaith he) had ſo much ingenuity as he pretends to have Logicke, he would have perceived that for me to meane, what he ſayes I meane, had been the perfect deſtruction of all my diſcourſe, and all my intention.
If this be all; The Dr hath no reaſon to charge me with want of ingenuity in this particular; for I doe very well perceive, that for him to meane, what I ſay, his words hold forth (for as for any ſecret, and reſerved meaning, I have nothing to doe with) had been the perfect deſtruction of all his diſcourſe, &c. But I believe the Docto'rs meaning is, that it is an ingenuous part in me to think it poſſible, or probable for him to aſſert any thing, that is the perfect deſtruction of all his diſcourſe, and all his intention. Now this I utterly deny. I have no ſuch apprehenſion of the Doctor's infallibility; but take him to be a man as likely to contradict himſelfe, as other mortals.
There is one thing more, that the Dr add's concerning our bleſſed Saviour, that concupiſcence taking it for thoſe deſires, which are purely naturall, and concreated is no ſinne, becauſe it was in Chriſt.
Unto which I anſwer that this is nothing unto the purpoſe; for the concupiſcence in controverſy is prerternaturall, and never created, or concreated by God.
It is an inclination unto evill; and therefore irregular, and diſorderly: it is that which the Apoſtle termeth, the ſin, that dwelleth in him, Rom. 7.17: which made him doe that evill, which he would not, verſ: 19: which he hated, verſ: 15. The law of his members warring againſt the law of his mind, verſ: 23: the body of this death, from which be deſired to be delivered, verſ: 24: And (methinks) he ſhould be affraid to aſcribe this concupiſcence unto Jeſus Chriſt, who was the Lambe of God without blemiſh, and without ſpot, 1 Pet. 1.19: holy, harmeleſſe, undefiled, ſeparate from ſinners, Heb. 7.26: And thus I have according unto the Doctor's deſire, taken notice of his anſwer, and ſhall not be ſo haſty as to write any thing againſt him, but that I ſhall ſtay a convenient time to heare the uttermoſt, that he can ſay; and when our Paper ſhall be made publicke unto all the World, I doe not doubt but there will be more that will accuſe him of incogitancy, than me of impertinency. Many ingenious and learned men, and ſome, that otherwiſe admire the Dr, have made the ſame conſtruction of his words, that I have, and thought that, he here forgat himſelfe. I am informed that the Dr in a letter unto you, tels you, that he deſires not to bee troubled with my trif…ng Logicke, I hope he reviles not Logicke as trifling, for then I know in what herd of writers to ranke him, and ſhould decline him as an irrationall adverſary, who is an enemy to the very art of reaſon.
But it is not Logicke it ſelfe I believe, but my Logicke, that he thus beſpatters: and if it be ſo, I ſhall returne nothing unto this his cenſure, but leave you, and others his admirers to judge of the humility, and ingenuity thereof.
I have heard that the Dr hath printed a very good Grammar, if he will alſo publiſh a Logicke, for the better information of ſuch triflers as my ſelfe, I doe aſſure you, that I will very diligently peruſe it, and if it be more ſolid, weighty, and ſerious, than thoſe which I have hitherto read, give him many thankes for it.
As for his laſt letter, I have not yet had the leaſure fully to peruſe it, but by that curſory view which I have taken of it, I find it to be as empty of reaſon, (though fuller of paſſion) as the former: you have given it out that it is unanſwerable; but I ſhall deſire you to have a little patience, and if I doe not give it a ſatisfying anſwer, I ſhall ſubmit unto what penance you will injoyne me. In great haſt I reſt.
Your affectionate freind, and ſervant, HENRY JEANES. Chedzoy Auguſt 31. 1657.
Mr C. thought, that the Doctor's letter would ſuperſede all further diſputation; but perceiving that I was unſatisfied, and that I intended a replication, he conveyed my objections unto the Doctor, which begat a very angry letter from him; unto which he would not vouchſafe ſo much as a ſuperſcription; but I ſaw the Contents concerned me, and therefore unto thee I ſhall preſent it, together with my anſwer thereunto, ſubmitting both unto thy cenſure, and ſo ſhall reſt
Devoted to thy ſpirituall ſervice HENRY JEANES