Letters, Followup correspondence

Letters · Followup correspondence

p. 7Sir,

I underſtand by my very good freind Mr T. C that you are very much troubled at a paſſage in my [further explication of originall ſin] pag: 496: The words are theſe [that every man is inclined to evill, ſome more, ſome leſſe, but all in ſome inſtances, is very true, and it is an effect, or condition of nature; but no ſinne properly.] The offence you conceive is becauſe, one of the reaſons I bring to prove it is, becauſe it is accidentall to nature, not intrinſecall and eſſentiall.] p. 8upon this you fancy that I intend that all ſinne is intrinſecall and eſſentiall to nature: which indeed if I had ſaid, I had been as very a ſool as you conceive me, and worſe; for beſides the reaſons you are pleaſ'd to object, which I am no way by this concern'd to examine, I had deſtroyed my maine intention nay, that which I was proving in that very place; for my worke there was to prove that no ſinne is, or can be naturall.

Now then although I know you could eaſily have underſtood what I did and muſt meane there; yet becauſe you are pleaſed not to doe it; I will point in out to you. To be inclined to evill is an effect or condition of nature; but no ſinne properly, vizt: of nature; for that is the ſubject of the Queſtion: whether inclination to evill be an effect of nature, or an inherent principle of evill; a ſinne naturall and neceſſary. Now that it is not this; I doe ſuppoſe that reaſon, which you ſo miſconſtrued competent: viz: It is not a naturall or neceſſary ſinne, not a ſinne of our nature, becauſe it is accidentall to nature, not int…inſicall, not eſſentiall; If it be in our nature, it muſt be naturally inſeperable, it muſt be at firſt, it muſt be in all perſons, that have our nature. And this is my meaning; and that you may not be troubled at the word eſſential; I meane it not in the ſtrict phyſicall, but in the morall ſenſe; that which is not aſter our nature, but together with it in reall being: and I explicate it, by intrinſecall; I oppoſe it to accidentall; (in this reaſon) and to [ſuperinduc'd] in the next, Sir I did give an account to Mr C. in a letter to him, which I know was ſufficient, and foreign; for cujus eſt loqui, ejus eſt interpretari; I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plaine by the whole deſigne of that, that it muſt be my meaning; it is alſo cleare enough an very eaſy in the expreſſion, and therefore I now appeale to your ingenuity, whether you ought to have made ſuch tragedies with that which common ſenſe would have made plaine to you, unleſſe you had received a prejudice.

And now Sin, to your two ſyllogiſmes, be pleaſed to the ſubject of the two majors, to adde but this qualification; [naturall] and try if thoſe horrid conſequents will follow which you affixed to your own foreign.

But I ſhall for this once conſider the particulars.

1. You charge it with nonſenſe; but with your favour you prove it moſt pitifully, your reaſon is, that to ſay [eſſentiall] is predicated of (ſin) in either of the two wayes, dicendi pe… ſe, is ſuch pitifull and prodigious nonſenſe, that you thinke it not worthy of any ſerious reſutation: ſo that this is your argument [to ſay that ſin is eſſentiall is prodigious and pitifull nonſenſe; g. it is prodigious and pitiful nonſenſe] ſurely a good argument; or thus, that which is ſuch nonſenſe that you thinke not worthy of refutation, is certainly nonſenſe: but to ſay that ſinne is eſſentiall is ſuch nonſenſe that you thinke not worthy of refute: therefore it is nonſenſe. I doe not ſay your argument is nonſenſe, but I am ſure it is no argument, unleſſe a bold affirmative be a ſufficient proofe in your Logicke. But to the thing that ſinne is eſſentiall, is indeed falſe to ſay, but to ſay ſo, is not nonſenſe. And whereas you will ſuppoſe me to ſay ſo, you are uncharitable, and ſomething unreaſonable in it: for I was to prove that inclination to ſinne, was not a ſinne of our nature (as was pretended,) becauſe what was naturall, is intrinſecall and eſſentiall, as docibility to man; which becauſe to be inclined to ſinne is not, g. it is not a ſin, viz: of nature.

In the next place you charge this with blaſphemy If I had lai… or meant what you pretend…; you had reaſon. But then pray conſider how your charge will returne really upon your ſelfe. For if it be blaſphemy to affirme God to be the Authour of ſinne; then what I deriv'd from Adam is no ſinne, for that Adam's ſinne ſhould deſcend upon me, I demand, who was the Author of that? If you pleaſe you may take time to conſider it; but in the interim, if you be pleaſed to read a little diſcourſe of mine called Deus juſtificatus, p. 9you ſhall find my Queſtion not to be anſwered by you, if you have any regard to the authority, or to the reaſon of Mr Calvin, Dr Twiſſe, and ſome other Bigots of your party. Your ſecond charge of Blaſpemy, is that my reaſon does by implication involve Chriſt in the guilt of ſinne; becauſe whatſoever is eſſentiall he had. But than if you remember, that I ſay not, that ſinne is eſſentiall; and that I bring the reverſe of this very argument againſt your party and opinion in ſome of my late diſcourſes, you have reaſon to ſhake the fire out of your owne boſome, not to tell me, that I burne. For if inclination to ſinne be a ſinne naturally, and derived from our Parents, I demand whether or no had not Chriſt all naturall deſires? If he had not, he was not a perſect man. If he had then all naturall deſire: are not natural ſins, for if you ſay they be you are the blaſphemer by the conſequence of your affirmative; not I: But God forbid that either of us ſhould. Your third reaſon alſo is as pretty. For firſt; I demand whether a poſſibility to ſinne be not of the nature of man (for that is all I mean by eſſentiall.) If it be not; …ow came Adam to ſinne his firſt ſine? if it be; I aske whether ſhall the Saints in the reſurrection be raiſed up with it or no? If yea, then you blaſpheme God's full glorification of the Saints in the reſurrection, for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorification; If nay, then it is do blaſphemy to ſay that in the reſurrection the Saints ſhall be raiſed up without ſomething that is eſſentiall to them, or of their nature. But Sir, what thinke you of mortality? is that eſſentiall, or of the nature of man? I ſuppoſe you will not deny it. But yet I alſo believe you will confeſſe that though we are ſowne a corruptible body, yet we ſhall be raiſed an incorruptible; and the mortall ſhall put on immortality. Once more, is it naturall to be naturall? that will not be denyed; but then remember that although to be naturall is eſſentiall, that is, of the eſſence of the body, yet the natural body ſhall riſe without it's naturality, it is ſowne a naurall body, it is raiſed a ſpirituall. So that you ſee if I had ſaid this which you charge upon me, which is ſo contrary to my thoughts, and ſo againſt my purpoſe, yet your arguments could not have overthrowns it. It is good advice, foreign. If you had been pleaſed to have learn'd my meaning, before you had publiſhed your diſlike, I ſhould have eſteemed my ſelfe oblig'd to you in a great acknowledgment: now you have ſaid very much evill of me, though I deſerv'd it not. For ſuppoſe I had not proſperouſly enough expreſſ'd my meaning; yet you who are a man of wit and parts could eaſily have diſcerned my purpoſe and my deſigne, you could not but know and conſider too, that my great deſigne was to ſay, that ſinne could not be natural; that it is ſo far from being eſſentiall, that us is not ſo much as ſubjected in our common nature, but in our perſons only. But beſide this Sir, I am a little to complaine of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other, (intrinſecall and eſſentiall) you would take the hardeſt and the worſt ſenſe, not the eaſieſt and moſt ready: for you cannot but know that (eſſentiall) is not alwayes to be taken in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of Philoſophy …or that which is conſtitutive of a nature; but largely and for all ſorts of proprieties, and the univerſall accidents of nature; as it is eſſentiall to man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortall, to have a body of contrary qualities, and conſequently by nature corruptible; and in a morall diſcourſe to call for metaphyſicall ſignifications, and not to be content with morall and generall, …y proceed from an itch to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity which will be your and my beſt ornament.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet becauſe you are ſo great a Logician, and ſo great an admirer of that, which everyone of your Pupils knowes I meane, Prophyr'es definition of an accident: I care not if I tell you, that the definition is imperfect and falſe, it is not convertible with the Definitum. For even eſſentiall things may be taken away, ſine interitu ſubjecti. I inſtance: to be quantitative, is eſſentiall to a body, and to p. 10have ſucceſſi… of duration; but yet in the reſurrection, when bodies ſhall be ſpiritual and eternal, thoſe other which are now Eſſential predicates ſhall be taken away, and yet the ſubject remain, and be improv'd to higher and more noble predicates. This I have here ſet down, not that I at all value the probleme whether it be ſo or no; but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the reſurrection ſhal be ſpecifically diſtinct from what they are: I believe them the ſame bodies, but enabled in their very beings: For to a specifical and ſubſtantial change, is required that there be an introduction of new forms; but yet the improving of Eſſential, predicates, is no specification of ſubjects, but melioration of the firſt: But the conſequent is, that abeſſe, & adeſſe, &c. is not an excellent definition of an accident. And yet further, it follows, That if ſin were as eſſential to a man, as mortality is, or to be quantitative, yet there is no more need that a man ſhould riſe with ſin, then with mortality: But Ariſtotles Philoſophy, and Porphyries Commentary, are but ill meaſures in Theology; and you ſhould do well to ſcoure bright that armor in which you truſt, which unleſs it be prudently conducted, it will mak… a man a Sophiſter, rather then a Theolog…e; but you are wiſer. I have onelyonly this one thing to adde, That the common diſcourſes of Original ſin, make ſin to be natural, neceſſary and unavoidable; and then may not I uſe your own words? This Tenet is chargeable with Libertiniſm: It is a licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greateſt prophaneneſs: For it takes away all conſcience of ſin, all repentance of it for the time paſt. If ſin be natural, neceſſary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. What reaſon hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? ſo that you have done well againſt your own Opinion; and if I had not uſed the argument before, I ſhould have had reaſon to thank you for it: Now as it is, you are further to conſider it, not I. Sir, Though I have reaſon to give you the priority in every thing elſe, yet in civility I have far out done you: You were offended at a paſſage, which you might eaſily, but would not underſtand: You have urged arguments againſt me, which return upon your own head: The Propoſition you charge me withal, I own not in any of your ſenſes, nor (as you ſet it down) in any at all; and yet your Arguments do not ſubſtantially or rationally confute it, if I had ſaid ſo: Beſides all this, you have uſed your pleaſure upon me, you have revil'd me, ſlighted me, ſcorn'd me, untempted, unprovoked▪ you never ſent to me civilly to give you ſatisfaction in your objection: but talk'd it in my abſenſe, and to my prejudice; yet I have ſent you an anſwer, I hope ſatisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midſt of my many affairs, and ſtraitned condition, is more then I can again afford: And after all this, I aſſure you that I will pray for you, and speak ſuch good things of you, as I can finde, or hear to be in you, and profeſs myſelf, and really be,

Auguſt 15. 1657. Sir, Your affectionate Friend and Servant in our bleſſed Lord and Saviour Ieſus. Jer: Taylor.

p. 11Poſtſcript.

Sir, I received yours late laſt night, and I have returned you this, early this morning, that I might in every thing be respective of you; but I deſire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material; for I have buſineſs of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the ſaw of contention with any man about things leſs pertment. I expect no anſwer, I need none, I deſire none; but expect that you will imploy your good parts in any thing rather, then in being ingenioſus in alieno libro: Your talents can better (if you pleaſe) ſerve God, then by cavelling with, or without reaſon.

To the Reverend and Learned, Dr. Jeremy Taylor.

SIR.

WHat you mean, by my being very much troubled at a paſſage in your further Explication of Original Sin, I know not; Indeed I expreſſed unto Mr. T. C. my diſlike of it, and charged it with nonſenſe and Blaſphemy: And this charge I have proved; and now ſhall briefly vindicate the proof of it, from your Reply in this my Rejoynder. You tell me, that your work in that very place, is to prove, That no ſin is, or can be natural: Now I cannot finde any thing ſounding that way within forty lines of theſe words; and that it was my duty to look further for the Coherence of them, I confeſs, I knew not. Another great miſtake alſo, it ſeems I have committed; in that I have not ſo high thoughts of you, as to think it impoſsible, or very unlikely, that you ſhould be ſo uncautelous as to drop any contradiction unto your main intention: And this is an error that I can hardly ſhake off as yet; but I do aſſure you, that I ſhall endeavour to have as reverend an opinion of you as I poſsibly can; onelyonly, I ſhall never exempt you from a poſsibility of erring: never think that you ſit upon a Chair made of Iriſh Timber, that cannot endure a venomous Spider to hang his web thereon. I ſhall, for that which followeth, inſert the words of your Letter verbatim, that the Reader may the better compare them and my anſwer together.

Dr. Taylor.

Now although I know you could eaſily have underſtood what I did, and muſt mean there; yet, becauſe you are pleaſed not to do it, I ſhall point it to you.

Jeanes.

I wonder why you ſhould think it ſo eaſie a matter to underſtand your meaning, ſeeing you, who are the Author, differ from your ſelf in aſsigning what it is; for in your Letter unto Mr. C. you apportion'd this ſecond Reaſon ſolely unto the firſt Clauſe; That every man is inclined to evil, ſome more, ſome leſs, but all, in ſome inſtances is very true: And here in your Letter to me, you apply it unto the ſecond Clauſe: It is an effect or condition of nature, but no ſin properly. Suppoſe I were at a loſs, yet you have no reaſon to blame me, until you agree with your ſelf: I have no Spectacles to look into your meaning, but your words, and that they were related onelyonly unto one Propoſition, as a reaſon thereof; and yet related to two Propoſitions, as a proof of each, was a thing that I could never poſsibly divine, nor p. 12cannot yet underſtand; and herein, I am afraid, you are as unable to teach me how this can be, as I am uncapable of learning; but if you can teach any ſuch thing unto me, you ſhall finde me, though perhaps not an apt, yet a willing and thankful Scholar: But to deal plainly with you, I am very confident that your words in themſelves hold forth neither of thoſe ſenſes that you propound; and if by dint of argument you can prove either of them from your words, you ſhall have my moſt penitent and ſubmiſsive confeſsion of my miſtake, and ſhall have full leave to preſcribe me as publick and ſhameful a ſatisfaction, as you can think on; unto which, I do promiſe to conform my ſelf. But let us hear how you point out your meaning to me.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet becauſe you are pleaſed not to underſtand what I did, and muſt mean there, I will point it out to you: To be inclined to evil, is an effect or condition of nature, but no ſin properly, viz. of nature; for that is the ſubject of the queſtion, whether inclination unto evil be an effect of nature, or an inherent principle of evil; a ſin natural and neceſſary? Now that it is not this, I do ſuppoſe that reaſon, which you ſo miſconſtrued, competent, viz. it is not a natural, or neceſſary ſin, not a ſin of our nature, becauſe it is accidental to nature, not intrinſecal, not eſſential.

Jeanes.

To reſcue your ſecond reaſon from that which I charge it with, you are fain to make an additional ſupply unto the Propoſition; unto which, you ſay, your ſecond reaſon is competent. To be inclined to evil, &c. is no ſin properly, no natural and neceſſary ſin, no inherent Principle of evil. Now unto this addition I ſhall apply your words that you have concerning Binius and Baronius in the like caſe; whether it may be allowed you by any licenſe, leſs then Poetical, let Criticks judge: Surely, Sir, if the moſt of your Writings be thus elliptical, they will be unintelligible unto me without a Commentary, and if you muſt be indulged the liberty of making ſuch interpolations, all the Vniverſities in Chriſtendom are no match to diſpute with you.

But to inſiſt a little upon the examination of this Interpolation.

1. You ſeem to make equivalent theſe two propoſitions; Inclination to evil, is an inherent principle of evil; Inclination to evil, is a ſin naturall and neceſſary: But I am utterly unſatisfied touching this their equivalency, and ſhall deſire you to clear it up unto me.

Nay further, I very much queſtion the truth of the firſt Propoſition; this inclination to evil, is not as inherent principle of evil; and ſhall intreat you to inform me, whether you deny it to be a principle of evil, or an inherent principle, and think it onelyonly adherent, circumſtant, or the like: but I believe you will tell me of ſome Ellipſis in your words, that I ought to underſtand, and ſupply ſomething to make out your ſenſe: What it is, I will not adventure to gueſs at, but leave it to you to expreſs it your ſelf.

Secondly, The concluſion that is confirmed by your ſecond Reaſon, is the ſame with that which is proved by your firſt Reaſon; and that was, that inclination to evil was no ſin, without the additional Epithets of natural and neceſſary. It is no ſin, ſay you, properly; becauſe, that which is unavoidable, is no ſin: and indeed, the unavoidableneſs of our inclination to evil, may be a probable argument that it is no p. 13ſin, and require an anſwer; but no competent reaſon at all to prove it not to be natural and neceſſary: But ſeeing you ſay, it muſt be your meaning that theſe Epithets ſhould be interpoſed, we will for once ſuppoſe it, for Diſputation ſake, and ſee whether we can underſtand by any means what you would have.

1. You ſay, your meaning in your concluſion is, that Inclination to evil is no ſin, viz. of nature, which I ſhall conſider anon, when I ſhall come to examine that ſubtilty of yours, That ſin is not ſo much as ſubjected in our common nature.

2. Let us inquire what you mean by natural and neceſſary.

1. What you mean by natural: There be divers ſignifications of the word natural, which are impertinent to our preſent Diſcourſe, and therefore I ſhall omit them. I ſuppoſe that you take natural, either for that, which is ſo termed, in regard of connexion with our nature; or elſe in reſpect of Phyſical, and neceſſary reſultancy from our nature.

If you take it for that, which is ſo termed, in regard of connexion with our nature, which is coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Nativity and Conception of our nature, then your ſecond Reaſon is Tautological, a moſt pitifull and miſerable begging of the queſtion, for you tell us afterward, that by eſſential, you mean that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being; and then, there will be no more difference betwixt eſſential and natural, in this acception of it, then there is betwixt enſis and gladius, and ſo your Argument explained will ſtand thus.

Inclination to evil is not connexed with our nature; becauſe it is not connexed with our nature: it is not coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Conception and Nativity of our nature; becauſe it is after our nature, and not together with it in real being.

2. If you take natural, in regard of neceſſary reſultancy from our nature; then your Argument is impertinent, and concerns not thoſe whom you oppoſe; for they deny, as well as you, that inclination unto evil is natural in ſuch a ſenſe: Let two ſpeak for all.

Firſt, Biſhop Davenant in his Determinations, where his determination of the ſixteenth Queſtion, is, Pro…itas ad malum non fluit ex principiis naturae integrae.

The ſecond is Dr. Baro in his Metaphyſicks, pag. 256. Theologi noſtri aſſerunt, concupiſcentiam nul'o modo eſſe quid neceſſario conſequens naturam humanam in ſe spectatam; & ideo dicu…t eam eſſe quid ſuperadditum, & adventitium, in animo hominis exiſtens poſt …apſum.

But perhaps you may pitch upon ſome other acception of natural; if you doe, I ſhall beſeech you not to chide me, but to certifie my miſtake by explication of your meaning; for I have done my beſt to bolt it out, and muſt needs profeſs, that I cannot gueſs at any other ſignification of natural, which you can here in this place with any probability pretend unto: But if you can acquaint me with any other, when I know it, I ſhall be ready to examine it.

But to proceed unto the next Epithete neceſſary: When you ſaid, that an inclination to evil was not properly a ſin, your meaning was (you ſay) that it was not a neceſſary ſin.

But then I deſire to know how your firſt Reaſon will be ſuited unto this concluſion, for your firſt Reaſon ſtands thus, becauſe that which is unavoidable, is not ſin; and I would intreat you alſo to inform us, what is the difference here betwixt neceſſary and unavoidable; for if there be no difference, I ſhall ſhrewdly ſuſpect your arguments ſick of that infirmity, called petitio principii.

p. 14But perhaps we muſt here make the like ſupply, and underſtand you thus, becauſe that which is unavoidable is not a neceſſary ſin; if ſo, your Argument reduced unto form, will run thus.

Nothing that is unavoidable can be a neceſſary ſin: But an inclination to evil is unavoidable: Therefore it is not a neceſſary ſin.

VntoUnto your major I ſay, that though unavoidableneſs, in one ſenſe, may carry a repugnancy unto ſin, yet not to neceſſary; it may prove a thing not to be a ſin, but it makes nothing againſt its being neceſſary; for that which is unavoidable, may be, and is neceſſary; it is probable therefore, that neceſſary was never in your firſt thoughts, but put in, to ſecure your ſecond Reaſon from mine Objections againſt it.

However, yet I ſhall here propound and apply a diſtinction of neceſſary, uſuall among your Antagoniſts: **Dr. Edw: Reynolds 3 Treatiſes, pag: 209.A thing, ſay they, may be ſaid to be neceſſary, in regard of either primitive and created, or conſequent and contracted neceſſity.

If you ſpeak of that, which is neceſſary with that neceſſity, which is primitive and created, then indeed I grant your concluſion true, and your ſecond reaſon competent unto it: Inclination unto evil is not a neceſſary ſin, in regard of a Primitive and Created neceſsity.

But now this were utterly beſides the main of your intention, for here you would ſight with nothing but your own ſhadow, becauſe your adverſaries do not avouch ſuch a neceſſity in our inclination to evil, but defie and abhor it more then your ſelf; and you cannot affix any ſuch thing unto them, unleſs you groſly calumniate them.

If you ſpeak of that which is neceſſary, with a conſequent and contracted neceſſity; then your concluſion is falſe, and your ſecond reaſon no confirmation thereof; if it be put into form, it will make up two Syllogiſms.

The firſt Syllogiſin.

Nothing that is accidental, can be a ſin neceſſary, with a conſequent and contracted neceſſity.

But our inclination to evil is accidental.

Therefore it is not a neceſſary ſin in reſpect of a conſequent and contracted neceſſity.

The ſecond Syllogiſm.

Every thing that is neceſſary in reſpect of a conſequent and contracted neceſſity, is intrinſecal and eſſential.

But inclination to evil is not intrinſecal and eſſential.

Therefore it is not neceſſary, in regard of a conſequent and contracted neceſſity.

The major in both Syllogiſms is evidently falſe, as will appear, when you attempt the proof of them: and I am very confident, you never will own them, if you can any other way ſhift off my objections.

In the next place, we have a ſtrange Paradox of yours, which I underſtand not, I ſhall propound it, and briefly conſider it.

Dr. Taylor.

If it be in our nature, it muſt be naturally inſeparable, it muſt be at firſt, it muſt be in all perſons that have our nature.

p. 15Jeanes.

I ſhall not peremptorily charge this Propoſition with falſhood, until I know how you explicate it, and yet I will tell you what reaſon I have to ſuſpect it to be very falſe; divers accidents are in our nature, properly and ſtrictly inherent in our nature, which yet are naturally ſeparable from our nature, which were not at firſt, which are not now in all perſons that have our nature: I might inſtance in ſeveral acquired habits, and immanent acts of the rational ſoul, which are neither adequate unto, nor coeval with, nor naturally inſeparable from it.

But I look for ſome ſtrange Ellipſis; a Rhetorical Scheme it ſeems you are much delighted with; but if you uſe it too often, it will prove rather a Weed, then a Flower in your Rhetorick; you expect, it ſeems, I ſhould pay ſuch reverence unto your Writings, as great Criticks do unto the Ancients, in whoſe words, when they cannot make ſenſe, they ſuppoſe ſome Chaſma to fill up, with which they torture their brains; but I have ſomething elſe to do, then to trouble my ſelf with Divinations at your meaning: when you vouchſafe to acquaint us what it is, I ſhall then examine it.

But having ſeen how ill you have ſped in new ſhaping your concluſion, let us ſee next whether your ſucceſs be better in the qualification of your ſecond reaſon for it.

Dr. Taylor.

And this is my meaning, and that you may not be troubled at the word Eſſential; I mean it not in the ſtrict Phyſical, but in the moral ſenſe, that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being, and explicate it by extrinſecal; and I oppoſe it to accidental in this reaſon, and to ſuperinduc'd in the next.

Jeanes.

But firſt, pray who could tell that you thus meant it, until you now tell me: Is this a uſual and received ſenſe of the word? and if it be, direct me unto thoſe moral Philoſophers and Divines, that thus take it; if it be not, my ignorance of it is purae negationis, not pravae dispoſitionis, not privative and blameable: Analogum per ſe poſitum ſtat pro famoſiori Analogato; and therefore I appeal unto your own ingenuity, whether I have injured you, by ſuppoſing that you took Eſſential in the accuſtomed acception thereof.

2. I ſhall beſeech you to ſet down the difference that you make betwixt natural in your concluſion, and eſſential in your ſecond reaſon for it; and when you have done this, I am very confident to make it appear, that your Argument is either a meer tautology, or an utter impertinency; but of this before.

Next you refer me unto your former Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

Sir, I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him, which I know was ſufficient, and foreign.

Jeanes.

The vanity of this brag you will ſoon acknowledge, when you ſhall compare that Letter with this unto me; for in this you apply the ſecond reaſon unto the latter cauſe p. 16as a congruent proof; it it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no ſin properly: And this you point out to be your meaning, and ſay, That I could eaſily have underſtood it: But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver, that this ſecond reaſon is appliable onelyonly unto the firſt clauſe; That every man is inclined to evil, ſome more, ſome leſs, &c. and not at all unto the ſecond; nay, that it is not appliable unto it, without a miſtake of not onelyonly the ſecond, but the four other reaſons alſo; and of this too, you ſay that it muſt be your meaning, and that 'tis clear enough, and eaſie in the expreſſion; and you wonder that Mr. Jeanes, if he be the man, that he would be thought could miſtake it: Here you propound inconſiſtent and contrary meanings, and it ſeems you intend to tie me unto ſuch hard meat, as that I muſt finde out each to be your meaning; but this is a task, that my underſtanding cannot perform, and therefore I ſhall beg aſſiſtance from the light and learning of yours: and until you afford this, I ſhall offer unto your conſideration this common rule in Logick, That contrary propoſitions cannot be both true, but one of them muſt needs be falſe: But theſe two propoſitions, this ſecond reaſon is referred unto the ſecond clauſe, as a competent proof, and this ſecond reaſon is not referred unto the ſecond clauſe, are contrary propoſitions; the oppoſition betwixt ſingular propoſitions, being, as Scheibl…r well ſheweth, de prop: cap. 11. num. 18. moſt aptly reducible unto contrariety; and yet both theſe propoſitions are yours, the firſt in this letter, the latter in your former letter, and therefore one of them muſt needs be falſe; you are not then ſo much foreign, extra teli factum, out of Gun-ſhot, but that my poor trifling Logick is able to reach you: if you ſhould deny the matter of Fact, that both theſe propoſitions, are yours, your letters will convince you of untruth, and I ſhall need no more then to tranſcribe your own words: The firſt Propoſition you have in theſe words of this Letter, To be inclined to evil, is an effect, or condition of nature, but no ſin properly, viz. of nature, &c. a ſin natural and neceſſary; now that it is not this, I do ſuppoſe that reaſon, which you ſo miſconſtrued, is competent, &c. The ſecond, in ſeveral paſſages of your former Letter; as for the other clauſe, it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no ſin properly, that was the leſs principal part of the Propoſition, and to it onelyonly the firſt reaſon was apportioned; and again afterward, none of the other reaſons, the firſt onelyonly excepted, relate to the latter part of the Propoſition: But let us hear your reaſon for the ſufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C.

Dr. Taylor.

For cujus eſt loqui, ejus eſt interpretari.

Jeanes.

I ſhall willingly grant you all fair liberty of interpreting your ſelf, ſo you do it logically and rationally; but that which you expect, is rather a licentiouſneſs, then a true liberty of interpretation.

Firſt, You would have a licenſe of transportation, to carry your words where you pleaſe; you would have the ſecond reaſon placed betwixt the two Propoſitions, and before the firſt Reaſon; thus in your Letter to Mr. C.

Next, You uſurp the licenſe of interpoſition, to put in what you pleaſe; as when in this Letter you adde the Epithets of natural and neceſſary to ſin.

And thirdly, You take up a ſtrange licenſe in expoſition of your Terms; for if you cannot juſtifie what you ſay, if ſuch a term in your words be taken in the common p. 25and uſual ſenſe: Then you impoſe upon me an unuſual, that I ſay not a new and unheard of ſignification thereof. Thus you deal with the word Eſſential.

And laſtly, You aſſume a licenſe of contradiction, to contradict your ſelf, to ſay and unſay; one while to make this your meaning, and another time to make that which is contrary your meaning; and you think that I am obliged to take theſe contrary meanings to be both your meanings.

Surely Sir, if you can get a Patent for theſe four Licenſes, you will, for matter of Diſputation, be ſhot-free and invulnerable; your Opponents may throw their caps at you, but not an Argument of theirs can touch you.

Dr. Taylor.

I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plain by the whole deſign of that, that it muſt be my meaning, it is alſo clear enough, and very plain, and very eaſie in the expreſſion; and therefore I now appeal to your ingenuity, whether you ought to have made ſuch Tragedies with that, which common ſenſe would have made plain unto you, unleſs you had received a prejudice.

Jeanes.

As for this triumphant appeal which you make in the cloſe here to my ingenuity, I need ſay nothing, but refer unto the premiſes; onelyonly I cannot but give one Advertiſement unto your Diſciples, that you ſometimes triumph when you have not conquered.

Dr. Tayler.

And now Sir, to your two Syllogiſms, be pleaſed to the ſubject of the two Majors, adde but this qualification [natural] and try if thoſe horrid conſequents will follow, which you affixed to your own foreign.

Jeanes.

I have already conſidered with how little ſobriety you have added this Qualification of natural, and, I believe, the impartial Reader will conclude with me, that you have foiſted it in upon ſecond thoughts, onelyonly to avoid thoſe horrid conſequents, unto which your words in themſelves are liable.

Dr. Taylor.

But I ſhall for this once conſider the particulars. 1. You charge it with non ſenſe; but with your favor you prove it moſt pitiſully: Your reaſon is, that to ſay [Eſſential] is predicated of [ſin.] in either of the two ways dicendi per ſe, is ſuch pu…ful and prodigious non-ſenſe, that you think it not worthy of any ſerious r…ſutation: So that this is your Argument, To ſay that ſin is Eſſential, is prodigious and pitiful non-ſenſe, therefore it is prodigious and pitiful non-ſenſe.

Surely a good Argument; or thus, that which is ſuch non-ſenſe that you think not worthy of refutation, is certainly non-ſenſe: But to ſay that ſin is Eſſential, is ſuch non-ſenſe, that you think not worthy of refutation, therefore it is non-ſenſe. I do not ſay your Argument is non-ſenſe, but I am ſure it is no Argument, unleſs a bold affirmative be a ſufficient proof in your Logick. But to the thing, That ſin is Eſſential, is indeed falſe to ſay, but to ſay ſo is not non-ſenſe. And whereas you will ſuppoſe me to ſay ſo, you are p. 18uncharitable, and ſomething unreaſonable in it; for I was to prove, That inclination to ſin was not a ſin of our nature (as was pretended) becauſe what was natural is i… …rinſecal and eſſential, as Doc…bility to a man: which becauſe to be inclined to ſin is not, therefore it is not a ſin, viz. of nature.

Jeanes.

Firſt, Here is a groſs and egregious falſification of my words, and that without any advantage to your cauſe: Your reaſon is, ſay you, That to ſay Eſſential is predicated of ſin in either of the two ways, dic…ndi per ſe, is ſuch pitiful and prodigious nonſenſe, that you think it not worthy of any ſerious refutation: Whether theſe words be juſtifiable, or no, I need not inquire; for there are no ſuch words in my Paper, neither can you, with all your wit and learning, infer any ſuch matter therefrom.

Secondly, To make ſport for your followers, you miſ-repreſent my Argument; and firſt, clap it into a ſingle Enthymeme, and then into one Syllogiſm, both of your own forging; in both which you leave out two mediums, that are in my Argument, which reduced unto form, will make up two Syllogiſms: To convince you of this unfair, injurious, and diſ-ingenuous dealing, I ſhall inſert my words at large. To ſay (as the Doctor doth by conſequence) that ſin is eſſential to the nature of man, is an aſſertion guilty of nonſenſe; a thing may be ſaid to be eſſential to another, à priori, and then it is predicated of it in primo modo d…cendi per ſe; or elſe à poſteriori, and then it is predicated of it in ſecundo modo dicend… per ſe. And to ſay that ſin is either of theſe ways eſſential to the nature of man, is ſuch pitiful and prodigious nonſenſe, as that I cannot think it worthy of any ſerious refutation.

The learned Reader will ſoon perceive how little alliance your Enthymeme and Syllog…ſm have with my Argument; and to him I appeal, to judge of the unworthy and unſcholarly in jury that you have herein done me; but yet, for the eternal ſtopping of your mouth, I ſhall Analyze this my Argument. My concluſion was, that to ſay (as you do by conſequence) that ſin is eſſential unto the nature of man, is an aſſertion guilty of nonſenſe; this I prove from a diſtribution of eſſential;

whatſoever is eſſential is ſuch, either à priori, or à poſteriori.

But to ſay that ſinne is eſſential, either à priori, or à poſteriori, is nonſenſe.

Therefore to ſay that ſin is eſſential to man, is nonſenſe.

This Syllogiſm is grounded upon a known and received Maxime [Negatis cunctis partibus ſubjectis totius univerſalis de aliquo ſubjecto negatur ipſum to um univerſale, negatis cunctis membris dividen…ibus, negatur ipſum diviſum]

The major I preſumed none would deny, and as for the minor, that I proved from a deſcription of both ways of being eſſential.

That which is eſſential to a thing, à priori, is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per ſe; that which is eſſential to a thing, à poſteriori, is predicated of it in ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe.

Now to ſay that ſin is predicated of man, in either primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is nonſenſe: Therefore to ſay that ſin is eſſential to man, either à priori, or à poſteriori, is nonſenſe.

The major I thought undenyable, and as for the minor, here indeed I ſtopped too in the proof thereof, as thinking all further proof of it needleſs; becauſe I took it, and ſtill do take it to be, propoſitio per ſe nota, which needs no proof, but a bare explication p. 19of its terms; propoſitio per ſe nota dicitur; quae non eſt nota per aliud, as Lychetus; quae ſuis tantum terminis cognoſcibilis, as Collegium Conimbricenſe gather out of Ariſtotle; quae tales terminos habet, ut ii rectè intelle…i poſſint cauſare evidentem notitiam totius propoſitionis fine addito; omnis propoſitio hactenns eſt per ſe nota, ad quam evidentèr cognoſcendam intellectus non poſtulat aliquod medium, ſed ſolum term…rum penetratione contentus eſt, ſo Scheibl…r.

Now, for the terms of the minor Propoſition: I preſumed, that all explication of them was needleſs unto a Scholar of ſo great a repute as Dr. Taylor: And therefore, without more adoe, I inferred, that to ſay that ſin is either of theſe ways eſſential, either à priori, or à poſteriori, is ſuch pitiful and prodigious nonſenſe, as that I could not think it worthy of any ſerious refutation. And now Sir, I ſhall entreat you to review my Argument, being thus truly Analyzed, and I ſhall appeal unto your conſcience, when you are next upon your knees before God, whether you have not deeply wronged me, to repreſent my Argument thus defectively (that I ſay not falſly) on purpoſe, I am afraid, to render it and me ridiculous. Suppoſe any man ſhould be ſo abſurd, as to ſay, That a Stone is animal; and I to refute him ſhould thus argue, Omne animal eſt aut homo, who is endued with reaſon, as well as ſenſe; or Brutum, which is endued with ſenſe, but not with reaſon; but to ſay that a ſtone is either homo, or brutum, is ſuch pitiful and prodigious nonſenſe, as that I cannot think it worthy of any ſerious refutation. Now he that ſhall ſay this is no Argument, but onelyonly a bold affirmative, will goe a degree beyond boldneſs; for 'tis plain, that here are couched and implyed two mediums. Firſt, a diſtribution of animal in hominem & brutum: Next, a deſcription of each member of the diſtribution, and my Argument is exactly paralell'd unto this. But Sir, though I thought, that, before you, I might have ſpared my labor to prove that 'tis nonſenſe, to ſay that ſin is eſſential unto man, either à priori, or à poſteriori; that its predicated of man, either in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe; yet, becauſe you ſeem to blame mine omiſſion of ſuch proof, I ſhall now give you herein, I hope, ſufficient ſatiſfaction.

Firſt, To ſay that that which is privative is poſitive, is nonſenſe: But to ſay that fin is eſſential unto man, either à priori, or à poſteriori, is to ſay, that that which is privative is poſitive (for the eſſentials of man are poſitive, and the formality of ſin is a privation.)

Therefore to ſay that ſin is eſſential unto man, either à priori, or à poſteriori, is nonſenſe.

Secondly, To ſay that that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of man in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is nonſenſe (becauſe praedicatio per ſe & per accidens, are oppoſite ways of predication.)

But to ſay that ſin is predicated of man in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is to ſay, That that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of man per ſe (for that ſin is predicated of man, per accidens, will be queſtioned by none, who know what primus modus dicendi per accidens is.)

Therefore to ſay that ſin is predicated of man in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is nonſenſe.

Thirdly, To ſay that that which is predicated contingently of man, is predicated neceſſarily of him, is nonſenſe.

But to ſay that ſin is predicated of man in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is to ſay, That that which is predicated of man contingently, is predicated of him neceſſarily, (for ſin is predicated of man contingently, becauſe man and ſin cohere p. 28contingently; man might not have been a ſinner, and when he ſhall not be a ſinner, he will ſtill be a man; and then foreign, per ſe eſt gradus neceſſitatis.

Therefore to ſay that ſinne is predicated of man in primo, or ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, is nonſenſe.

If theſe arguments ſatisfy you not, you may command more of me when you pleaſe, as alſo any further enlargement of theſe.

Yea but you ſay, that ſinne is eſſentiall is falſe to ſay, but to ſay ſo is not nonſenſe.

To this I anſwer, that however it may be ſenſe in Grammar, yet 'tis nonſenſe in Logick; becauſe 'tis a contradiction; for in Logick every contradiction not only expreſſe, but that alſo which is virtuall and implyed is nonſenſe, a bull, as we uſually ſpeake: thus 'tis nonſenſe to ſay that lignum eſt ſerreum; that a ſpirit is corporeall; that a body is bodileſſe, without quantity or extenſion; that an accident ſubſiſts; or that a ſubſtance properly inhereth.

Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that, to ſay that ſinne is eſſentiall to man is a contradiction; for 'tis in effect as much as to ſay, that that which is privative is poſitive; that that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of him per ſe; that that which is predicated of man contingently, is predicated of man neceſſarily; and theſe are groſſe and palpable contradictions; and therefore not only falſe, but moſt pitifull and prodigious nonſenſe.

You accuſe me of uncharitableneſſe, and unreaſonableneſſe, in ſuppoſing that you ſay that ſinne is eſſentiall unto man; but from this accuſation I have ſufficiently vindicated my ſelfe by beating you from all your miſerable ſhifts; And unto what I have ſaid herein, I ſhall referre both your ſelfe and the Reader.

Dr Taylor.

In the next place you charge me this with blaſphemy: if I had ſaid or meant what you pretended, you had reaſon; but then I pray conſider how your charge will returne really upon your ſelfe; for if it be blaſphemy to affirme God to be the Author of ſinne, that what I derived from Adam is no ſinne; for that Adam's ſinne ſhould deſcend upon me, I demand who was the Author of that? If you pleaſe you may take time to conſider it; but in the interim if you be pleaſed to reade a little diſcourſe of mine; called Deus juſtificatus, you ſhall find my queſtion not to be anſwered by you; if you have any regard to the authority or to the reaſon of Mr Calvin, Dr Twiſſe, and ſome other of the Bigots of your party.

Jeanes.

1. Here you tempt me to a digreſſion; and you may with as good reaſon call upon me to anſwer all the reproaches that Bellarmine in this particular, throweth upon the Proteſtant Churches, and ſome of the moſt eminent members thereof, as propound this queſtion unto me.

2. However yet I briefly anſwer to it, that Adam was the author of the deſcent of his ſinne upon me, not God; for to be the Author of ſinne is to be a deficient, culpable cauſe thereof; and it is impoſſible that God ſhould be defective in a culpable manner; and that our doctrine of originall finne maketh him to be ſuch, you may boldly affirme, but can never prove.

p. 293. Biſhop Davenant in the doctrine of originall ſinne is one of our party; and he ſpeaks that which will abundantly ſatisfy your demands, in his animadverſions upon Hord pag. 323.224. It was not (ſayes he) God's abſolute decree of Preterition, but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion, which brought ſinne, and the guilt of ſinne upon himſelfe, and all his poſterity, God having juſtly decreed that Adam's children ſhould participate with him in his ſtate of righteouſneſſe, did as juſtly decree that they ſhould alſo participate in the ſtate of ſinne.

If this Author deny the propagation of ſinne from Adam, he muſt acknowledge himſelfe a Pelagian, &c. His whole diſcourſe concerning originall ſinne and the propagating thereof unto all mankind is erroneous, in that he falſely preſumeth, that the divine decree muſt needs be effective or cauſative of all the events decreed; whereas if the events be actions ſinfull, God's decrees are permiſſive, and ordinative, not decrees of cauſing, much, eſſe neceſſitating ſuch evill actions, as bath been often told him.

4. I have ſeene your little diſcourſe called Deus juſtificatus; and muſt ſay of it as Florus did of the Ligurians: lib. 2 cap. 3. Major aliquanto labor erat invenire quam vincere; The Rhetorick of it is ſo rank, as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logick and reaſon that is in it.

If you pleaſe to put your arguments into forme, you then may command me to conſider them; but otherwiſe, I ſhall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours; for I find by this preſent debate about two or three lines, that I ſhall not without great difficulty ſearch out what is your meaning.

5. I wonder why you ſay, that by this diſcourſe I ſhall find your queſtion not to be anſwered by me; why (pray Sr) could I anſwer it before you propounded it? but your meaning is, I ſuppoſe, that I ſhall find, that your queſtion cannot be anſwr'd by me: but the event will try that.

6. That which you meane in Mr Calvin, and Dr Twiſſe, are I thinke thoſe places which you quote, pag. 32: of that your diſcourſe; and then unto the place in Calvin you have an anſwer in Dr Twiſſe (vind: gra: lib. 2. dig: 2. cap. 3. pag. 42.) where he cleares it from the crimination of Bellarmine: And then for the place in Dr Twiſſe you may gather an anſwer from that he ſaith unto Mr Hord, (pag. 149.150.) who makes the like objections againſt him from another place.

7. You are the unmeeteſt man in the world to upbraid me with the Bigots of my party; for the rigid Zelots of your party, in your doctrine of originall ſin, are ſuch whom you may be aſhamed to name. Indeed in this point there are very few of your party, ſave the Pelagians of old, and now the worthy Divines of the Racovian denne, and their followers; unto whom the beſt and the moſt learned of Proteſtants will hardly vouchſafe the name of Chriſtians. The Arch-Biſhop of Armagh termed them, in a ſermon of his (that I heard) a company of baptized Turkes; and indeed Turkes, and Infidels can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine perſon, and nature of Chriſt, unto his offices, and unto his great and glorious worke of redemption, and ſatisfaction, than theſe wretched miſcreants are.

Dr Taylor.

Your ſecond charge of blaſpemy is, that my reaſon does by implication involve Chriſt in the guilt of ſinne; becauſe whatſoever is eſſentiall he had; but then, If you remember that I ſay not, that ſinne is eſſentiall; and that I bring the reverſe of this very p. 22argument againſt your party and opinion in ſome of my late diſcourſes, you have reaſon to ſhake the fire out of your own boſome, not to tell me, that I burne; for if inclination to ſinne be a ſinne naturally and derived from our Parents; I demaund whether or no had not Chriſt all naturall deſires? if he had not, he was not a perfect man; If he had then all naturall deſires are not naturall ſinnes; for if you ſay they be, you are the blaſphemer by the conſequence of your affirmative, not I; but God forbid that either of us ſhould.

Jeanes.

Firſt, here is no retortion of my argument; for none of my party or opinion hold, that inclination unto evill is eſſentiall unto man: Flaccius Illyricus maintaines, that originall ſinne was the eſſence, or ſubſtance of the ſoule; but I never heard that his followers were conſiderable; he hath (I am ſure) both Papiſts and Proteſtants; Calviniſts, and Lutherans for his opponents: but, perhaps you confound naturall with eſſentiall, and make them all one; if you doe, your reaſon will be nothing, but petitio principii.

2. I believe, you here play with the equivocation of the word naturall, a thing (though it may be tollerated in a Sophiſter,) altogether unworthy of a Theolegue.

Inclination to ſinne may be ſaid to be naturall, either conſequutivè, or connexivè.

That inclination to evill is naturall conſequ…tivè (that it flowes, and reſults Phyſically, and neceſſarily from our nature,) I flatly deny: and if you can direct me unto any place in your bookes, where you prove it to be naturall in this ſenſe, I ſhall take it into conſideration. Indeed to ſay, that it is in this ſenſe naturall, is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature.

But it is naturall connexivè; together with our nature derived unto us from our firſt Parents; and yet not in Chriſt, who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation, but was miraculouſly conceived by the holy Ghoſt, and ſanctified in the wombe of the Virgin Mary.

This inclination unto evill is a ſinful blemiſh of our nature; becauſe it is a cauſe of ſinne, & qualis cauſa talis eſt effectus. A good tree, ſaith our Saviour, cannot bring forth evill fruit, Matth. 7.18. This inclination to evill bringeth forth much evill fruit, and therefore it cannot be good; and conſequently it is bad, and ſinfull; and therefore could not be in Chriſt; (who even as man) was the moſt holy one of God. Indeed if Chriſt had wanted any propriety of man's nature, he had not then been a perfect man, but, that inclination to evill is a propriety of our nature, ſc: proprium 4 to modo you are never able to make good.

But, Sir, in good earneſt, doe you thinke that Chriſt was inclined unto evill? if you doe not, your diſcourſe of Chriſt is impertinent; if you doe, I ſhall conclude your opinion to be blaſphemous; and unto it ſhall oppoſe this following argument.

He in whom dwelled an all-fullneſſe of the Godhead bodily; he in whom dwelled an all-fullneſſe of habituall grace; he who enjoyed the beatificall viſion, was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

But, in Chriſt dwelled an all-fullneſſe of the Godhead bodily; in him alſo dwelled an all-ſullneſſe of habituall, and ſanctifying grace; he enjoyed the beatificall viſion

Therefore he was not, could not be inclined unto evill.

p. 23The Minor will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine, and we may ſay the ſame of the Major, for, he that ſhall thinke that the grace of perſonall union, the allfullneſſe of habituall grace, and the beatificall viſion are not ſufficient to exclude from Chriſt all inclination untoevil wil render both his learning, & religion too ſuſpected.

But, to put the matter out of doubt, take this following argument for confirmation of the Major: there could not be the leaſt inclination unto evill in that perſon, in whom there was an utter averſeneſſe from evil in ſummo gradu; (for of contraries, that which is in a remiſſe degree is not conſiſtent with the other in the higheſt and moſt intenſe degree) but, in that perſon, in whom there was an all-fullneſſe of the Godhead, an all-fullneſſe of habituall grace, and the beatificall viſion, there was an utter averſneſſe from evill, and that in ſummo gradu; and therefore impoſſible that there ſhould be in him an inclination to evill in the leaſt degree.

The Papiſts extenuate the malignancy of concupiſcence as much as may be, affirming that in the regenerate it is no ſinne, and that it had been in Adam if he had been created in his pure naturalls; yet, they thinke not ſo well of it, as to aſcribe it unto Chriſt.

Indeed Durand is accuſed for ſpeaking ſomewhat ſuſpiciouſly this way; but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolemen; **Suarez in 3 am partem Thom: diſp. 34. Sect. 2. Greg. de. Valentia. Tom. 4. diſt. 1 quaeſt. punct. 3.who hold that ſomes peccati, concupiſcence was neither actu primo, nor ſecundo in Chriſt.

1. Not in actu primo, and for this they alledge three reaſons.

1. The abſolute perfection of his virtues, and all-fullneſſe of grace.

2. The perpetuall vigilancy, and advertency of his reaſon.

3 The government of his humane nature, and actions, by his divine and infinite perſon.

2. Not in actu ſecundo, becauſe in him, the very firſt motions unto ſinne would have been voluntary, and conſequently ſinfull.

Unto this purpoſe Becanus, (Sum: Theolog: Scholaſt: Tom: 5. cap. 12. quaeſt: 5. pag: 200.) obſerveth; that the firſt motions of concupiſcence may be ſaid to be voluntary two manner of wayes.

1. Antecedently; when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them.

2. Conſequently; when one yeelds conſent unto them after they are crept in, in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Chriſt; becauſe Chriſt could have avoided them, by reaſon of the government of the perſon of the word; if he had not therefore avoided them, but willingly admitted them, they had in him been blameworthy.

Dr Taylor.

Your third reaſon alſo is as pretty; for, firſt; I demand whether a poſſibility to ſinne be not of the nature of man; (for that is all I meane by eſſentiall) if it be not; how came Adam to ſinne his firſt ſinne? if it be, I aske whether ſhall the Saints in the reſurrection be raiſed up with it or no? If yea; then you blaſpheme God's full glorification of the Saints in the reſurrection; for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorification. If nay; then it is no blaſphemy to ſay that in the reſurrection the Saints ſhall be raiſed up without ſomething that is eſſentiall to them, or to their nature.

p. 32Jeanes.

That poſſibility to ſinne is eſſentiall unto every rationall creature I grant; and hereupon inferte, that 'tis not ſeparated from the Saints in their full glorification; neither ſhall I feare your charge of blaſphemy herein, having the generality of Schoolemen, (both Thomiſts, and Scotiſts) and reaſon too on my ſide. Indeed, the Saints of Heaven do conſtantly, and interruptedly ſhun, and decline ſinne; yet, 'tis an ev…ll poſſible unto their nature, conſidered in it ſelfe; however they are ſecured therefrom by their glorified ſtate and condition: for though ſinne, and a fullneſſe of glory be inconſiſtent; yet 'tis no contradiction, or repugnancy, that their natures abſtractly conſidered, ſecluding the conſideration of their glory, ſhould be ſinfull. Yea, but you ſay, impeccability is certainely a part of the full glorification of the Saints; and what is impeccability but an impoſſibility of ſinning; if God then make the Saints impeccable, he takes away from them all poſſibility of ſinning.

For anſwer.

1. There is a twofold impeccability.

1. By nature.

2. By the grace and gift of God.

Impeccability by nature takes away all poſſibility of ſinning; but it is received generally as a rule among the School-men, that a creature cannot be made impeccabi…is per naturam, (that is) ſuch a one, as cannot by nature ſinne. And, if you pleaſe, you may view the proofes thereof in Capreolus lib: 2. Diſt: 22. quaeſt. 1.

Impeccability by the gift and grace of God doth not eradicate the remote power of ſinning; but only keeps it from being actuated; and 'tis this impeccability only, that is part of the Saints glorification.

2. A thing may be ſaid to be impoſſible, ſenſu diviſo, or ſenſu compoſito.

In ſenſu diviſo 'tis not impoſſible, but poſſible, for the Saints in Heaven to ſin; for that (conſidered in themſelves without the cuſtodient grace of God alwayes underpropping them) they are liable unto ſin, the lamentable fall of the Angels of darkeneſſe is an evident proofe.

But now, ſenſu compoſito, 'tis indeed impoſſible for glorified Saints to ſinne; that is; 'tis impoſſible for them to ſinne conſidered under this reduplication, as fully glorified; becauſe fullneſſe of glory and ſinne cannot ſtand together. This anſwer is in Scotus (lib. 4. diſt: 49. quaeſt: 6.) whoſe words I ſhall inſert for the ſake of ſome Readers who may not have him in their ſtudies:) Reſpondeo; patet, quod beatus eſt impeccabilis in ſenſu compoſitionis, hoc eſt, non poteſt ſimul eſſe beatus, & peccare: ſed in ſenſu diviſionis, quod maneas beatus non habeat potentiam & poſſibilitatem ad peccandum poteſt intelligi duplicitèr: vel per aliquid ſibi intrinſecum, quod excludit potentiam talem; vel per cauſam extrinſecam, quod excludit potentiam propinquam ab illo, &c: nulla eſt cauſa intrinſeca in voluatate Michaelis nunc beati, per quam excludatur potentia ad peccandum pro alias, in ſenſu diviſionis, non eſt autem cauſa intrinſeca prohib…ns iſtam potentiam omnino reduci ad actum: ſed per cauſam extrinſecam eſt impoſſibilis potentia illa propinqua ad peccandum, videlicet per volutataem Dei praevenientem illam voluntatem, ut ſemper continet actum fruendi, & ita nunquam poſſit pote…tiam ſuam r…m…am non ſ…endi, vel peccandi, reducere ad actum: ſiquidem umquam cauſa ſecunda praeveata à cauſà ſuperiori agente ad unum oppoſitum poteſt potentia propinqua exire in aliud oppoſitum. Concedo ergo, quod infert, quod Michael p. 33beatus, & ſit peccabilis in ſenſu diviſionis loquendo de potentiâ remotâ.

Dr. Taylor.

But Sir, what think you of Mortality? is that eſſential, or of the nature of man? I ſuppoſe you will not deny it. But yet I alſo believe you will confeſs, that though we are ſown a corruptible body, yet we ſhall be raiſed an incorruptible, and the mortal ſhall put on immortality.

Ieanes.

For anſwer, I ſhall propound a diſtinction of mortality, that is very obvious and ordinary. A thing may be ſaid to be mortal, either respectu potentiae remotae, or respectu potentiae propinquae.

1. In respect of a remote power of dying, which hath in it the remote cauſe of diſſolution, an elementary matter.

2. In regard of a near power of dying, ariſing from the actual conflict, and corruptive influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

The latter Mortality is ſeparable, but then it is not eſſential.

As for the former Mortality, which alone is eſſential, I think very few doubt, but that 'tis alſo inſeparable from the nature of a mans body: for, the immortality and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the reſurrection, will not be by taking away out of their bodies the remote cauſes of corruption, the Elements, and their contrary qualities, (for, then their bodies would not be mixt; and ſo not for ſubſtance the ſame that they were) but by an hinderance or prevention of the corruptive influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities.

That I am not ſingular in this, I ſhall manifeſt, by tranſcribing the Teſtimonies of ſome few School-men, who though they differ one from another in aſſigning the cauſe and reaſon of the impaſſibility and incorruptibility of glorified Bodies; yet they all agree with Durand in this, That glorified Bodies are not impaſſible, per privationem potentiae paſſivae, ſed per aliquod praeſtans impedimentum actualis paſſionis nè fiat.

The firſt ſhall be of Scotus, (lib. 4. diſt. 49. quaeſt. 13.) Dico ergo quod cauſa impaſſibilitatis eſt voluntas divina non coagens cauſae ſecundae corruptivae, & per hoc, eſt illud impaſſibile, non potentia remota, ſed propinqua, non à cauſâ intrinſecá, ſed extrinſecâ impediente, ſicut dictum eſt de impeccabiliuate ſupra, &c. exemplum hujus de igne in camino, qui non egit ad conſumptionem trium puerorum, non quidem per aliquam impaſsibilitatem intrinſecam pueris, nec ex carentrâ potentiae paſsivae, nee ex contrario intrinſeco impediente, ſed quia Deus ex voluntate ſuá non cooperabatur ad illam actionem.

The ſecond is of Durand (lib. 4. diſt. 44. quaeſt. 4.) Reſtat ergò quod corpora glorioſa non erunt impaſsibilia ſimplicitèr, & abſolutè per privationem principii paſsivi, cùm natura corporum glorioſorum, ſit futura eadem quae prius, ſed erunt impaſsibilia p…r aliquid praeſtans impedimentum actualis paſsionis nè fiat.

Quid autem ſit illud, utrum ſit aliqua forma inhaerens, an ſolum virtus divina aſſiſtens, duplex eſt opinio: dicunt enim quidam quod talis impaſſibilitas erit, per aliquam formam inexiſtentem, &c.

Alius modus eſt, quod impaſsibilitas corporum glorioſorum non erit per aliquam formam p. 32duplicate page p. 33duplicate page p. 34inhaerentem, ſed ſolum per virtutem divinam▪ aſsiſtentem beatis ad nutum & prohibentem actionem cujuſcunque extriaſeci inſerentis paſsionem.

This latter way Durand takes himſelf, and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reaſons.

The third ſhall be of Suarez, (in tertiam part: Thom: diſp: 48. p. 531.) nam licet in corpore glorioſo maneat eadem materia, idemque temperamentum ex qualitatibus contrartis, inde ſolum fit, corpus illud in nudâ naturâ ſuâ conſideratum, eſſe corruptibile, & in beatitudine retinere quaſi cauſam remotam, ſeu naturalem radicem corruptionis: nihilominus tamen ſecundum proximam dispoſitionem intrinſecam eſſe incorruptibile & impaſſibile: quia affectum eſt aliâ quadam perfectione quae ex ſe poteſt impdire, nè illa naturalis corruptibilit as in actum reducatur.

Dr. Taylor.

Once more, Is it natural to be a natural? that will not be denyed: But then remember, that although to be natural is eſſential, that is, of the eſſence of the body, yet the natural ſhall ariſe without its naturality; it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a spiritual.

Jeanes.

1. That that which is natural, is natural, will not be denyed, as you ſay; but 'tis propoſitio identica nugax, a moſt trifling Tautology: and unto what purpoſe you propound a queſtion concerning it, I know not.

2. Of things natural unto man, ſome are natural powers, ſome are naturall acts: Natural (firſt) powers may be and are eſſential unto the body; and ſo they are inſeparable too; our Bodies, when they ſhall be raiſed, ſhall not want ſo much as one ſuch natural power: But natural acts are accidental, and in the reſurrection there may be no place for the exerciſe of, at leaſt, ſome of them, viz▪ Generation, Nutrition, and the like; as touching ſuch things, we ſhall be like the angels in Heaven, as it were ſpiritual.

3. In the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. 15.44. it is not foreign, a natural body, but foreign, an animal or ſouly body, that is, actuated and animated by the ſoul after a natural way and manner, by the intervention of bodily helps, ſuch as eating, drinking, ſleeping, and the like. And in all congruence of oppoſition hereunto, a glorious body is ſaid to be a ſpiritual, in regard of an immediate ſupportance by the ſpirit, without any corporeal means, and without any uſe of the generative and nutritive faculties.

Dr. Taylor.

So that you ſee, if I had ſaid this which you charge upon me, which is contrary to my thoughts, and ſo againſt my purpoſe, yet your Arguments could not have overthrown it.

Jeanes.

Whether you do not here boaſt, and triumph without a victory, I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader.

Since my penning of my exceptions, ſent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphyſicks of Dr. Robert Baro, that learned Scot; and in them I finde the like of theſe p. 35three laſt Arguments of mine, urged againſt the error of Flaccius Illyricus; that Original Sin is of the ſubſtance of man, and eſſential to him after the fall, a propoſition ſubalternate unto that which I charge you with; his words are as followeth, Prima opinio damnanda & à noſtris Theologis & a Pontificiis de naturâ peccati originalis eſt abſurdiſſima haereſis Illyrici, ſtatuentis peccatum originale eſſe de ſubſtantia hominis, ſeu eſſe quid homini eſſentiale poſt lapſum, contra quam ſententiam Bellarminus disputans; varias affert rationes: praecipuae hae ſunt, Primò ſi peccatum eſſet pars ſubſtantiae humanae, aut Deus erit author peccati, quippe qui ſubſtantias omnes creavit, aut ſi quis neget illam ſubſtantiam eſſe à Deo, cogetur ſateri…cam eſſe à Diabolo, qui eſt author peccati; neceſſarium enim eſt, ut habeat aliquam cauſam; at utrumque conſequens eſt abſurdum, ergò & antecedens: Secundò, aut Chriſtus non aſſumpſit naturam humanam integram, aut peccato non caruit, quorum utrumque eſt abſurdum: Tertio, Ad diem judicii natura hominis reſurget, & aeternam vitam poſsidebit, ſaltem quoad electos: Peccatum verò tum nullum erit in glorificatis, ergò peccatum non eſt quid eſſeatiale, ſed quid ſeparabile eſt ab ipſâ naturd, pag. 248, 249. Theſe reaſons differ ſo little from mine, as that you may think perhaps that I have borrowed mine from either Bellarmine or Baro, which yet I aſſure you I did not: The reaſon why now I recite theſe Reaſons, is to ſhew, that my arguments are not ſuch weak and pitifull things, but that very Learned Men have made uſe of the like, to diſprove a propoſition ſubordinate unto that which I goe about to refute.

Dr. Taylor.

It is good advice foreign, if you had been pleaſed to have learned my meaning before you had publiſhed your diſlike, I ſhould have eſteemed my ſelf obliged to you in a great acknowledgement.

Jeanes.

Your advice out of Ariſtophanes, I like very well; I am not conſcious unto my ſelf that I have towards you tranſgreſſed againſt it: for before I uttered a ſyllable of diſlike, I uſed my beſt endeavor to finde out what was your meaning, and to that purpoſe, made uſe of that little Logick and Reaſon which I had; and as for that meaning which I aſſix unto your words, let the Reader determine, whether I have violated any rule of Logick or Reaſon, in imputing it unto you: What I took to be your ſenſe, together with my Objections againſt it, I ſent unto Mr. C. to be tranſmitted ſpeedily unto you, expoſing all unto the utmoſt ſeverity of your examination; and wherein I have here treſpaſſed againſt charity or juſtice, I would fain know.

Beſides, my diſtike I expreſſed onelyonly in a private place, before very few, in private diſcourſe, and I have not hitherto publiſhed it, from either Preſs or Pulpit.

Dr. Taylor.

Now you have ſaid very much evil of me, though I deſerve it not.

Jeanes.

This I deny, and flatly challenge you to prove what you aver.

p. 36Dr. Taylor.

For ſuppoſe I had not prosperouſly enough expreſſed my meaning, yet you, who are a man of wit and parts, could eaſily have diſcerned my purpoſe and my deſign: You could not but know, and conſider too, that my great deſign was to ſay, That ſin could not be natural, that it is ſo far from being eſſential, that it is not ſo much as ſubjected in our common natures, but in our perſons onelyonly.

Ieanes.

1. Whether what you ſay of my wit and parts, be not a ſeem, I ſhall not trouble myſelf to inquire, but leave it unto your conſcience: However, I ſuppoſe, you think your ſelf far ſuperior unto my poor ſelf in wit and parts, and I alſo readily acknowledge as much: Now I wonder why you ſhould think that I ſhould ſo eaſily finde out what is your meaning, ſeeing you (whoſe abilities ſo far tranſcend mine) be ſo unproſperous, not onelyonly in the expreſſion, but in the after interpretation of your meaning, as that you diſſent in a latter Letter, from your ſelf in a former Letter: How can you reaſonably expect that I, who am not (as one of your Profelites lately ſaid) worthy to be named the ſame day with you, (I ſhall not deny the truth of the compariſon, nor envy you the honor thereof) ſhould (as the Pro verb is) ſee further into a Mill-ſtone then you, who are ſo Eagle and quick ſighted.

Secondly, Whereas you ſay, That ſin is not ſo much as ſubjected in our common nature, but in our perſons onelyonly; I doubt that I underſtand you not, for to me it ſeems very evident, that ſin, (ſo far as a privation can be inherent) is truly inherent in our natures; for it hath all the Requiſites of inherence, that Ariſtotle layeth down (Categor: cap. 2.)

1. It is in our nature.

2. Not as a part of our nature.

3. Neither can it exiſt ſever'd and apart from our natures: Sin is ſeated in all individuals of our nature, whileſt living here upon earth, Chriſt his humanity alone excepted; and therefore why may not we ſay, that 'tis ſubjected in our common nature? Seeing thoſe accidents are ſeated ſecundarily, and mediately in ſecond ſubſtances, which are primarily and immediately placed in their reſpective firſt ſubſtances; ſubſtantiae ſecundae ſubſtant accidentibus gratiâ primarum.

Yea, but you will (perhaps) ſay, it is ſubjected in our perſons onelyonly, therefore not in our nature: But this is a very ſorry Objection': For who knows not the diſtinction of ſubjectum, in ſubjectum quo, & quod; our perſons onelyonly are ſubjectum quod of fin, our natures notwithſtanding may be ſubjectum quo of it; and we may ſay the ſame of other accidents. I finde you (pag. 494.) quoting that uſual Axiome, actiones ſunt ſuppoſitorum; but, if you had conſidered the limitations that are uſually given thereof, you would have ſpared the urging of it: actio eſt ſuppoſiti (ſaith Scotus) ultimatè denominati ab actione, ſed non ut ſolius denominati ab ipſâ: But you may have ſome deep meaning, which I fathome not; fair leave may you take to explain your ſelf.

p. 37Dr. Taylor.

But beſides this, Sir, I am a little to complain of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other (intrinſecal, and eſſential) you would take the hardeſt and the worſt ſenſe, not the eaſieſt and moſt ready.

Ieanes.

I have here given you, not onelyonly no cauſe, but not ſo much as any ſhadow or colour for complaint.

1. I gave a reaſon why I inſiſted on the word eſſential onelyonly, and paſſed by the term intrinſecal; becauſe you uſe intrinſecal as equivalent unto eſſential, as is apparent, by your oppoſing it unto accidental: And have you ſaid, can you ſay any thing to the contrary.

2. I would fain know why you ſhould ſay that eſſential is a harder word then intrinſecal; there is, I am ſure, that equivocation in the word intrinſecal, which is not in the word eſſential; for, that which is accidental, may be intrinſecal; there being intrinſecal, as well as extrinſecal accidents; interaum & externum (ſay Philofophers) ſumuntur, vel ratione eſſentiae, vel ratione loci, & ſubjecti.

Dr. Taylor.

For you cannot but know, that eſſential is not always to be taken in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of Philoſophy, for that which is conſtitutive of a nature; but largely, and for all ſorts of properties, and the univerſal accidents of nature.

Ieanes.

The diſtinction of eſſential, into that which is ſuch conſtitutivè, as conſtituting the eſſence, or that which is ſuch, conſequentivè, as neceſſarily reſulting from the eſſence, I very well know: and I grant the proprieties which are ſuch, quarto modo, which agree omni, ſoli, ſemper, are in this latter ſenſe ſaid to be eſſential; but that eſſential is ever taken, as you ſay, for all ſorts of proprieties, thoſe which are ſuch, primo, ſecundo, or tertio modo, is notoriouſly falſe, for then eſſential would be taken for that which is moſt accidental; but let us examine your inſtances.

Dr. Taylor.

As it is eſſential to a man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortal, to have a body of contrary qualities, and conſequently by nature corruptible.

Ieanes.

If you ſhould affirm in the publick Schools of either of the Univerſities, that to laugh is eſſential to man, you would not onelyonly be laughed, but hiſſed, and houted at: the groſs and palpable abſurdity of this your Aſſertion, I thus prove.

Nothing that is accidental to man, can be ſaid to be eſſential to him.

But to laugh is accidental to man.

p. 38Therefore it is not eſſentiall.

The Major is apparent from the oppoſition, that you your ſelfe make betwixt eſſentiall, and accidentall.

The Minor is thus confirmed.

That which is predicated of man contingently, is accidentall to man.

But to laugh is predicated of man contingently.

Therefore it is accidental to man.

The Major is plain, becauſe contingency of predication is one of the chief things which diſtinguiſheth accidens praedicabile, from all other predicables, and it is a reciprocal character thereof.

And for the Minor, that is no leſſe evident: indeed riſibile is eſſential unto man, and predicated of him in ſecundo…modo dicendi per ſe; but ridere to laugh is accidental, becauſe it is predicated of man contingently; for a man and actuall laughter cohere contingently: the loweſt degree of neceſſity in affirmative and eſſential predications, is de omni; and de omni poſterioriſticum, requireth univerſitatem temporis as well as ſubjecti; that is, propoſitio foreign debet eſſe ſemper vera; now all men do not alwayes laugh, and therefore laughter is predicated of man contingently, and conſequently accidental to him.

You ſee, Sir, I am bold to trouble you, ever and anon, with my trifling Logick, and you can expect no other, as long as you thus treſpaſſe againſt what is moſt trivial and obvious in Logick, the very A. B. C. thereof.

2. As for the ſecond inſtance, you bring capacity of learning: that is taken for potentia prima, or ſecunda.

1. If it be taken for potentia prima, then it immediately flowes from the ſoule, and is eſſential to man, conſequntivè, as à proprium 4 to modo of man, and ſo 'tis inſeparable from him; but, if taken for potentia ſecunda, ſo it ariſeth from the diſpoſition of the temper and organs of the body, and is not eſſential, but accidental, and ſeparable from man.

As for the third, to be mortal, I have already ſpoken of that ſufficiently.

As for the 4th inſtance; to have a body of contrary qualities is eſſential conſequutivè. and à poſteriori unto an eſſential predicate of man; viz: a mixt body; and ſo is eſſential unto man, and predicated of him in ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe, as a mixt body is predicated of him primo modo dicendi per ſe. For, as Scheibler [de prop: cap: 4. n: 41.] ſheweth, ad praedicationes per ſe ſecundi modi pertinent non ſolum praedicationes illae, in quibus proprium praedicatur de ſubjecto ſuo primo, veluti corpus eſt quantum; ſed etiam illae praedicationes in quibus proprium praedicatur de ſpeciebus ſui primi ſubjecti, veluti homo eſt quantus: but this hath no alliance with laughing, for it agreeth alwayes unto all men.

Dr. Taylor.

And in a morall diſcourſe to call for Metaphyſicall ſignifications, and not to be content with morall and generall, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which will be your and my beſt ornament.

p. 39Jeanes.

It hath hitherto been a receiv'd rule amongſt all Logicians; that in mixt queſtions, the termes of which belong unto ſeverall diſciplines, we muſt for the explication of each terme, have recourſe unto the diſcipline, unto which it appertaineth; and you can ſay nothing to diſprove this rule: whether inclination to evill be eſſentiall to man? is a mixt queſtion; for inclination to evill or ſinne, is a Theologicall terme, and eſſentiall, is a Metaphyſicall terme; and therefore, in taking it in a Metaphyſicall ſenſe, I have done nothing, but what Logick, and reaſon have preſcribed me; and therefore I ſhall not feare your paſſionate, and irrationall cenſure of me for it. To cleare this yet further by inſtancing in mixt propoſitions of the like nature; an formale peccati in genere ſit privatio vectitudinis debitae rationali creaturae? an formale peccati originalis ſit ſolùm privatio originalis juſtitiae? an prenitas ad malum fluat ex principiis naturae integrae? an Sacramentum ſit ens reſpectivum? an Sacramenta ſint cauſae Phyſicae gratiae?

Now if here you ſhould be pleaſed to ſay, that in theſe queſtions to call for Metaphyſicall ſignifications, of privatio, principium, ens reſpectivum, and cauſa Phyſica, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which will be our beſt ornament, you will bewray but little judgment, and leſſe ingenuity.

2. If that, which you call eſſentiall in a morall, and large ſenſe, doe not either conſtitute the eſſence, or neceſſarily flow therefrom, it will in the upſhot prove to be but accidentall; and how then comes it that you oppoſe it unto accidentall? But you will, perhaps,, tell me, that I muſt take accidentall in a morall, and large ſenſe, as well as eſſentiall; But, Sir, what is there in your words to guide me unto this ſenſe of accidentall? I took accidentall for the concrete of accidens praedicabile, and ſo I believe have moſt Schollars that have read you; and why it ſhould not be thus underſtood I thinke you can alledge no reaſon, but that, you know not otherwiſe to make any tolerable ſenſe of your words: your diſcourſe is Polemicall, and if therein you uſe Philoſophicall termes, and I call for a Philoſophicall ſignification of the termes, with what forehead can you accuſe me for being quarrelſome, and diſingenuous? if when you cannot defend what you ſay, according unto the proper, and uſuall ſignification of the words you uſe, you muſt have liberty to fly unto large and unuſuall ſenſes of them, you may ſay even what you pleaſe; for no man will be able to underſtand what you ſay, unleſſe he hath a peculiar key unto your writings,

But let us inquire what can be here meant by accidentall in a morall and large ſenſe: eſſentiall, you ſay, in a morall ſenſe, is that which is not after our nature, but together with it; and, in conformity hereunto, accidentall in a morall ſenſe muſt be that which is after our nature, and not together with it, and then I ſhall deſire you to awake, and conſider, whether your ſecond reaſon be not coincident with your third; for your ſecond reaſon, as you expound it, ſtands thus; inclination to evill is after our nature, and not together with it in reall being: And your third reaſon is this, inclination to evill is ſuperinduc'd unto nature, and is after it, &c.

p. 40Dr Taylor.

Although I have not much to doe with it, yet becauſe you are ſo great a Logioian, and ſo great an admirer of that which every one of your Pupils knowes, I mean Porphyries definiton of an accident, I care not if I tell you that the definition is imperfect and falſe.

Jeanes.

1. You have ever and anon an uncivil ſling at my poor Logick; But, Sir, let me be ſo bold as to tell you, that as my Logick is the object of your contempt, ſo that my Pupils cannot find in that Logick, which you manifeſt in theſe your papers, matter for either their envy or emulation.

2. Why, pray Sir, doe you ſay, that I am ſo great an admirer of Porphyries definition of an accident? indeed I ſay, that 'tis a celebrated definition of an accident; but thereby I ſignify only that 'tis frequently and much uſed, commonly known, and in every man's mouth; and this acception of the word is uſuall in Cicero, as theſe inſtances following evidence: Celebratur omnium ſermone laetitiáque coavivium: hoc delatum eſt tum ad vos pontifices, poſt omaium ſermone celebratum, quemadmodum iſte omnia fecit: quod ita eſſe conſtanti fama atque omnium ſermone celebratum eſt: quid porro in graeco ſermone tam tritum atque celebratum eſt quam, &c.

3. Though you care not to tell me, that Porphyries definition of an accident is falſe, and imperfect; yet you ſhould have been carefull to have brought ſtronger objections againſt it, than thoſe you have urged, for they containe ſuch groſſe, and abſurd untruths, as that every one that underſtands them, will think you a very incompetent judge of the definitions of Porphyrie and Ariſtotle. Indeed how farre you are to ſeek in the nature of accidents, appeares by your talking of accidents conſtitutive of a ſubſtance, in your diſcourſe of the Real-preſence, &c: (Sect: 11. num: 12: pag: 209.) but let us heare your objections.

Dr Taylor.

It is not convertible with the definitum; for even, eſſential things may be taken away fine interitu ſubjecti.

Jeanes.

For an anſwer unto this, I ſhall referre you to your ſelfe, in your book, but now mentioned of the Real-preſence of Chriſt in the holy Sacrament. (Sect. 11. num. 30. p. 244. & 245.) God can doe what he pleaſeth, and he can reverſe the lawes of his whole creation, becauſe he can change or annihilate every creature, or alter the manners and eſſences; but the queſtion now is, what lawes God hath already eſtabliſhed, and whether or no eſſentials can be changed, the things remaining the ſame? that is, whether they can be the ſame, when they are not the ſame? he that ſayes God can give to a body all the eſſentiall properties of a ſpirit, ſaies true, and confeſſes God's Omnipotency; but he ſayes alſo that God can change a body, from being a body to become a ſpirit; but if he ſaves, that remaining a body it can receive the eſſentials of a ſpirit, he does not confeſſe God's omnipotency, but makes the Article difficult to be believed, by making it not to work wiſely and poſſibly: God can doe althings, but are they undone, when they are done? that is, are the things changed in their eſſentials p. 41and yet remaine the ſame? then how are they chang'd, and then what hath God done to them?

But to come unto your inſtances.

Dr. Taylor.

I inſtance to be quantitative is eſſential to a body, and to have ſucceſſion of duration; but yet in the reſurrection when bodyes ſhall be ſpiritual, and eternal, thoſe other which are now eſſential predicates ſhall be taken away, & yet the ſubject remain, & be improved to higher, and more noble predicates.

Jeanes.

1. As for the 1. of theſe inſtances it is without doubt, that to be quantitative is eſſentiall unto a body à poſteriori, and conſecutive as a proprium thereof 4 to modo. but.

1. That quantity is ſeparable from a body was never affirmed by any beſides the Patrons of either tranſubſtantiation or conſubſtantiation.

2. If a body were without quantity, it would be without extenſion, and ſo would exiſt in an undiviſible point without diſtinction of parts, and ſo it would be foreign, a bodileſſe body, which is a flat contradiction.

But for refutation of this, I ſhall referre you to your own ſelfe in your diſcourſe of the Real-preſence, &c. (Sect. 11.13 pag. 211.) But I demand, when we ſpeak of a body what we mean by it? for in all diſcourſes and entercourſes of mankind by words, we muſt agree concerning each others meaning: when we ſpeak of a body, of a ſubſtance, of an accident, what does man-kind agree to mean by theſe words? all the Philoſophers and all the wiſe men in the world, when they ſpeak of a body, and ſeparate it from a ſpirit, they mean, that a ſpirit is that which hath no material diviſible parts Phyſically that which hath nothing of that which makes a body that is extenſion & limitation by lines and ſuperficies. And, (Pag. 212.) when we ſpeak of a body all the world meanes that, which hath a finite quantity. Pag. 219.220: that which I now inſiſt upon is, that in a body there cannot be indiſtinction of parts, but each muſt poſſeſſe his own portion, or place, and if it does not, a body cannot be a body. Sect. II. num. 18. Again, (Tag. 221. num. 20: ejuſd: Sect:) If Chriſt's body be in the Sacrament according to the manner of a ſubſtance not of a body; I demand according to the nature of what ſubſtance whether of a material or an immaterial? if according to the nature of a material ſubſtance, then it is commenſurate by the dimenſions of quantity, which he is now endeavouring to avoid. If according to the nature of an immateriall ſubſtance, then it is not a body, but a ſpirit, or elſe the body may have the being of a ſpirit, whil'ſt it remains a body, that is, be a body, and not a body at the ſame time.

Here every material ſubſtance, by your opinion is commenſurate by the diviſion of quantity, and therefore no material ſubſtance can be without the dimenſions of of quantity; afterwards in (pag. 241. & 242. num: 29. ejuſd: Sect:) you bring in a ſhift of Bellarmines unto which you returne a very good anſwer, both which I ſhall tranſcribe. Bellarmine ſayes that to be coextended to a place is ſeparable from a magnitude or body, becauſe it is a thing that is extrinſecal and conſequent to the intrinſecal extenſion of parts, and being later than it, is by divine power ſeparable: but this p. 42is as very a ſophiſm as all the reſt; for if whatever in nature is later than the ſubſtance, be ſepara le from it, than fire may be without heat, or water without moiſture; a man can be without time, for that alſo is in nature after his eſſence, and he may be without a faculty of will, or underſtanding, or of affections, or of growing to his ſtate, or being nouriſhed, and then he will be a ſtrange man, who will neither have the power of will, or underſtanding, of deſiring, or avoiding, of nouriſhment or growth, or any thing, that can diſtinguiſh him from a beaſt, or a tree, or a ſtone; for theſe are all later than the eſſence, for they are all eſſential emanations from it, thus alſo quantity can be ſeparated from a ſubſtantial body if every thing that is later than the forme can be ſeparated from it.

When you wrote this, you thought it a groſſe abſurdity to averre that quantity could be ſeparated from a ſubſtantial body; when you have anſwered your ſelfe, I ſhall then take up the Cudgels, and reply unto your anſwer in the mean while, I ſhall conſider your argument by which you endeavour to prove quantity ſeparable from a body.

It ſtands thus; in the reſurrection bodies ſhall be ſpiritual; therefore to be quantitative, which is now an eſſential predicate, ſhall be then taken away.

For anſwer.

1. If the bodies of the Saints ſhall be raiſed without quantity, then without extenſion, without integral parts, without heads, eyes, armes, legs, feet, and this would be a very pretty, and proper reſurrection; it would indeed be an inviſible reſurrection; this is a very ſtrange, and falſe aſſert on, contrary as to the conſtant tenet of both ancient, and moderne Divinity, ſo alſo unto expreſſe ſcripture; In my fleſh, ſaies Job, ſhall I ſee God, whom I ſhall ſee for my-ſelfe, and my eyes ſhall behold, and not another, Job. 19.26, 27: the bodies of the Saints ſhall in the reſurrection be conformed unto Chriſt's glorious body in his: Philip 3.21: and that was a viſible and palpable body, it might be ſeen and felt, it had fleſh and bones, and hands, feet and ſides, Luk. 24 39, 40: John. 20.27: ſee Aquin: ſup: ad 3 am part. ſum: &c: quaeſt. 30. Art. 1. Tertullian upon theſe words of the Apoſtles [this corruptible ſhall put on incorruption] hath this gloſſe, quantitativam & eandem numero eſſentiam digito demonſtrat, magis enim expreſſè loqui non poterat, n…ſi cutem ſuam manibus teneret.

2. As for the ſpirituality of our bodies in the reſurrection, that ſhall not be deſtructive of their quantity; for they ſhall be ſpiritual, not in regard of ſubſtance; but in reſpect of either immediate ſupportance by the ſpirit, or elſe reſemblance unto a ſpirit.

1. In reſpect of immediate ſupportance by the ſpirit without the help of bodily meanes, meates, drinks, ſleep, medicaments, &c: he that raiſed up Chriſt from the dead ſhall alſo quicken your mortal bodies by his ſpirit that dwelleth in you, Rom. 3.11: or elſe

2. (As others conjecture) in regard of reſemblance unto a ſpirit as touching ſome particulars in the reſurrection; they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the Angels of God in Heaven, Matth. 22.30.

But that ſpirituality of the body in Paul's ſenſe of the word is no impeachment unto the quantity of it is evident enough from what you ſay in your treatiſe of the Real-preſence, &c: for therein you rightly averre, that Chriſt's body is now a ſpiritual body, and yet maintain againſt the Papiſts that 'tis endued with quantity, and hath partem extra partem, one part without the other anſwering to the parts of his place.

Your ſecond inſtance is, to have ſucceſſion of duration, this is eſſential to a body think you; yet in the reſurrection, when our bodies ſhall be eternal, it ſhall be taken away.

p. 43But here Sir, my poor Pupils, becauſe you are ſo great a Metaphyſitian, care not much if they tell you, That ſucceſſion in duration is ſo far from being eſſential to a body, as that it doth not at all agree thereunto; and they have learnt at out of Scheibler, Metap. lib. 1. cap. 16. n. 48.53.91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, cap. 19. n. 9, 10, 11, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. And Saurez, disp: 50. Sect. 5. and 7. Metaphyſitians no ways inferior unto your great ſelf.

Out of them they thus argue, whatſoever hath a ſucceſſive duration, hath alſo a ſucceſſive eſſence or being; but now no body hath a ſucceſſive eſſence or being, therefore no body hath a ſucceſſive duration.

The Major is evident, becauſe as Suarez and Scheibler well prove, the duration of a thing is not diſtinguiſhed from the actual exiſtence thereof, really, but onelyonly ratione ratiocinatâ.

And then for the Minor, it may be thus confirmed, Whatſoever hath a ſucceſſive eſſence or being, hath the parts of its eſſence in fluxu, ſo that 'tis partly paſt, partly preſent, and in part to come; but no ſuch thing can be affirm'd of any body, and therefore no body hath a ſucceſſive eſſence or being.

Or thus, No permanent being hath a ſucceſsive being or eſſence; but every body is a permanent being, therefore no body hath a ſucceſsive being or eſſence.

The Minor, that alone askes proof, may be thus confirmed: Whatſoever hath all the parts of its eſſence or being together (ſo that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requiſite unto its eſſential integrity) that is a permanent being; but every body hath all the parts of its eſſence or being together (ſo that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requiſite unto its eſſential integrity.)

Therefore every body is a permanent being.

If you ſhould ſay, That God onelyonly hath permanency of being, according to that of the Pſalmiſt, Pſal. 102.26, 27. The Heavens ſhall periſh, but thou ſha't endure; yea all of them ſhall wax old, like a garment; as a veſture ſhalt thou change them, and they ſhall be changed, but thou art the ſame.

Unto this they will anſwer, That you do but trifle with the equivocation of the word permanency, it is (they will ſay) oppoſed unto either mutability or ſucceſſion; if it be oppoſed unto mutability and defectibility of being, then God alone hath permanency of being; but if it be oppoſed unto ſucceſsion of being, then every created being, beſides motion, hath permanency of being; and this Scheibler hath taught them, Met: lib. 1. cap. 19. n. 35. Nullae rei (inquit) convenit fluxus vel ſucceſsio partium eſſentialium praeterquam motui (permiſsive loquendo) unde non eſt tempus ſucceſsivum, niſi tempus quo durat ipſe motus: nempe ſicut eſſentia motus conſiſtit in ſucceſsione partium: ita etiam duratio motûs conſiſtit in ſucceſsione partium, & proinde utrumque eſt ens ſucceſsivum, ſi tamen a parte rei loquamur, tùm ſolum unum ens eſt ſucceſsivum, nempe motus, duratio enim motus à parte rei cadem eſt cum eſſentiâ ipſà. If you ſhould ſay with Bonaventure, and others, That ſucceſsion of duration diſtinguiſheth the creature from the Creator, and therefore every creature hath ſucceſſion of duration: They will again (out of the forementioned Authors) diſtinguiſh of a two-fold ſucceſſion, privative and poſitive.

1. A privative or negative ſucceſſion, and that is, either betwixt not being, and being, or betwixt being, and not being; thus when a man is begotten, his being ſucceeds his not being, and when he dies, his not being ſucceeds his being; and this privative ſucceſſion doth diſtinguiſh the creature from the Creator, and therefore doth or may agree to every creature: for even the Angels had a beginning, p. 44and ſo there was a ſucceſſion of their being unto their not being; and they might have an end, by Gods omnipotency, if he had not decreed otherwiſe: nay, God could annihilate them meerly by the withdrawing of his preſervative influence, and ſo there might have been a ſucceſsion of their not being unto their being: this ſucceſſion is oppoſed unto an intrinſecal neceſſity of exiſtence, or unto an immutable permanency, ſeu ſtabilitati permanentiae, as Suarez phraſeth it, Disp: 50. Sect. 5. n. 26. and not unto permanency of being as ſuch: This ſucceſſion, if we ſpeak of the power and capacity of it, is eſſential to our bodies, and withal, 'tis inſeparable from them; for even after the reſurrection, God could (if he had not determined the contrary) reduce them unto their firſt nothing.

A poſitive ſucceſsion hath for both its extreams a poſitive being, and this is again (they will ſay) either diſcrete, or continuous.

1. Diſcrete between beings totally perfect; as the knowledge of one Plant ſucceeds the knowledge of another Plant: But this ſucceſſion doth not conſtitute a ſucceſsive being

There is another ſucceſſion, which they call continuous, and that is not betwixt total beings, but betwixt parts of the ſame being; when they do not exiſt together, but one after another, in fluxu (as they ſay) and this ſucceſſion is proper and peculiar unto motion, though not unto every motion. Thus far my Pupils.

Dr. Taylor.

This I have here ſet down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be ſo or no, but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the reſurrection ſhall be specifically diſtinct from what they are here; I believe them the ſame bodies, but enobled in their very beings, for to a specifical and ſubſtantial change, is required, that there be introduction of new forms.

Jeanes.

1. You will not be throughly and ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from the Socinians in this Article, if you think the bodies in the reſurrection ſhall be numerically diſtinct from what they are here; and therefore I ſhall intreat you to tell us in your next, how far you accord with or diſſent from them in this particular.

2. You here ſay, that to be quantitative, ſhall be taken away from our bodies in the reſurrection; and the ſequel of this is, that bodies in the reſurrection ſhall be specifically diſtinct from what they are here; for a quantitative ſubſtance, and a ſubſtance without quantity, are ſpecifically diſtinct; becauſe the one is material, a body, and the other immaterial, a ſpirit, and not a body at all, unleſſe nomine tenus.

Dr. Taylor.

But yet the improving of eſſential predicates, is no ſpecification of ſubjects, but a melioration of the firſt.

Jeanes.

The ordinary Reader may perhaps think, that there is ſome great myſtery wrapt up under theſe hard words; but the plain meaning of them, is (as I ſuppoſe) that p. 45the improving of eſſential predicates, doth not make a ſpecifical change of ſubjects, but onelyonly advance a ſubject unto a better being. Eſſential predicates may be ſaid to be improved three manner of ways. 1. By abolition of them. 2. By intenſion of them. 3. By addition unto them.

The two latter are impertinent to this buſineſs in hand; for ſuppoſe (though not grant) that the eſſential predicates of ſubſtances might be improved by intenſion of them, or by addition unto them; yet what will this make to the ſeparability of eſſentials from a ſubject: The improving of eſſential predicates, that belongs unto our preſent purpoſe, is by abolition of them, and by ſubſtituting new and more noble eſſentials in their room; and that eſſentials may be aboliſhed, and new eſſentials ſubſtituted in their rooms (the things remaining the ſame) is a thing you may magiſterially and imperiouſly dictate, but can never Scholaſtically prove.

But (perhaps) you will ſay, that you take eſſential in a Moral and Theological ſenſe: But Sir, you muſt remember, that you are not to take eſſential here, in ſuch a latitude, as to include accidental and contingent predicates; for if you ſhould, Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unſhaken by what you ſay: Would not this be a ridiculous Argument? accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away, ſine ſubjecti interitu, therefore adeſſe & abeſſe ſine ſubjecti interit…, is no excellent definition of an accident; and yet this will be your very argument, if by eſſential predicates you mean any thing beſides the four firſt predicables, unto which all eſſential predicates are reducible.

Dr. Taylor.

But the conſequent is, that abeſſe & adeſſe ſine ſubjecti interitu, is not an excellent definition of an accident.

Jeanes.

The arguments from which you infer this conſequent, are overthrown, and therefore this conſequent falleth to the ground of it ſelf, without you ſupport it by ſome freſh arguments.

Dr. Taylor.

And yet further, it follows; That if ſin were as eſſential to a man, as mortality is, or to be qu…ntitative, yet there is no more need that man ſhould riſe with ſin, then with mortality.

Ieanes.

And, pray Sir, why do not you adde, and with quantity? Do you begin to ſtartle at this Propoſition? that men ſhall riſe without quantity: But as touching the ſeparability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the reſurrection, I have ſpoken already ſo fully, as that I may ſpare to ſay any thing anew of it.

Dr. Taylor.

But Ariſtotles Philoſophy, and Porphyry's Commentary, are but ill meaſures in Theology, and you ſhould do well to ſcour bright that armor in which you truſt, which unleſs it be prudently conducted, will make a man a Sophiſter rather then a Theologue: but you are wiſer.

p. 46Ieanes.

Ariſtotle and Porphiry are no contemptible Authors in Philoſophy; but who ever thought them infallible in Philoſophy, or their Books meaſures in Theology? Philoſophy is a very uſefull Hand-maid unto Divinity, and none will decry it, but ſuch whoſe ſayings and writings cannot endure the teſt thereof; nothing that is true in Philoſophy, can be falſe in Divinity; for verum vero non opponitur, one truth doth not, cannot claſh with another: As for my Philoſophy, I hope God will preſerve me from truſting in it, or in any other arm of fleſh: If you can detect any error therein, I ſhall be ready to retract it, and be very thankful to you for your pains; as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon, it will not ſtick, but recoileth on your own face.

Dr Taylor.

I have onelyonly this one thing to adde, That the common Diſcourſes of Original Sin, makes ſin to be natural, neceſſary, and unavoidable, and then may I not uſe your own words, this Tenet is chargeable with Libe…tiniſm, it is a licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greateſt prophaneneſs, for it takes away all conſcience of ſin, all repentance of it for the time paſt; if ſin be natural, neceſſary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, &c. what reaſon hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? ſo that you have done well againſt your own opinion; and if I had not uſed the argument before, I ſhould have had reaſon to thank you for it: now as it is, you are further to conſider of it, not I.

Jeanes.

If you underſtand by natural, that which naturally reſults from nature, and by neceſſary and unavoidable, that which is denominated ſuch from a primitive and created neceſſity, that which you ſay is a foul ſlander againſt the common diſcourſes of Proteſtants againſt Original ſin: But if you mean by natural that which is connexed with, and coeval unto our nature, and by neceſſary and unavoidable, that which is ſuch in regard of a conſequent and contracted neceſsity, it will be nothing to the purpoſe: for you (and you may take in to boot your good friends of Racovia) are never able to prove, that the aſſertion of ſuch a naturality and neceſsity of Original ſin, is any bar to humiliation or repentance for it, unto Prayer for the pardon of it.

Dr Taylor.

Sir, Though I have reaſon to give you the priority in every thing elſe, yet in civility I have far out-done you.

Ieanes.

Firſt, You have written a Letter to me without a Superſcription, and I have returned one unto you with a Superſcription; and this I take, to be of the two, the greater civility.

If I may believe the eccho of the neighborhood, you have written ſeveral Letters unto Mr. T. C. concerning me, that cannot pretend to any great civility, for they are ſaid to be ſtuffed with inſulting reproaches: unto which I ſhall return nothing, but my Prayers for the increaſe of your charity and humility.

p. 47Dr. Taylor.

You were offended at a paſſage, which you might eaſily, but would not underſtand; you have urg'd arguments againſt me, which return upon your own head: The Propoſition you charge me withall, I own not in any of your ſenſes, nor (as you ſet it down) in any at all, and yet your arguments do not ſubſtantially, or rationally confute it, if I had ſaid ſo.

Ieanes.

Here you ſum up your Conqueſts, but whether you do not reckon without your Hoſt, let the Reader judge.

Dr. Taylor.

Beſides all this, you have uſed your pleaſure upon me; you have reviled me, ſlighted me, ſcorned me, untempted, unprovoked; you never ſent to me civilly to give you ſatiſfaction in your Objections, but talked it my abſence, and to my prejudice.

Ieanes.

Unto all this, a general negative is a ſufficient anſwer, until I know the Particulars that your Delator hath informed you with; but perhaps, you may think that for ſuch an obſcure perſon as my ſelf, to dare to except againſt what you write, is to revile, ſlight, and ſcorn you; if you be ſo impatient of contradiction, I ſhall leave it unto your own boſom to judge from what ſpirit it proceeds: When you publiſhed your Book, you expoſed it to every mans cenſure that would read it; and will you accuſe every man of uncivility that paſſeth his cenſure upon any paſſage in it, in a private diſcourſe with friends? But Sir, upon Mr. C. his entreaty, I ſent him in writing the reaſons that I had for my cenſure, and theſe reaſons were by my conſent to be conveyed to you, and therefore I ſent unto you mediately by another to give ſatisfaction to my objections: If you ſhall ſay that 't was uncivil for me not to make my addreſs immediately unto your ſelf, it is a charge will eaſily be wiped off; I was, as I thought, an utter ſtranger unto you, and Mr. C. profeſſed a greet acquaintance with, and intereſt in you, and aſſured me that my Exceptions ſhould be received with all poſsible candor, and promiſed his diligence and fidelity in conveying of them unto you; my objections therefore were ſent civilly unto you, though ſent by him; but however you are thus ſevere, the Reader, I hope, will have a more charitable opinion of my procedure herein, and think, that you have no reaſon to make ſuch Tragical Out-crys againſt me for abuſive uncivilities towards you.

Dr. Taylor.

Yet I have ſent you an anſwer, I hope, ſatisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midſt of my many affairs and ſtraitned condition, is more then I can again afford.

Jeanes.

Unto your long Letter I have returned a longer anſwer; and whether yours or mine be ſatisfactory, I am contented to refer it unto the indifferent Reader: If your condition be ſtraitned, I wiſh it were more plentiful: But my affairs are, I believe, neither for number nor importance inferior unto yours; and from them I have borrowed ſo much time, as to anſwer you, and ſhall be ready to do ſo again to perform unto you the like office.

p. 48Dr Taylor.

And after all this, I aſſure you that I will pray for you, and speak ſuch good things of you, as I can finde, or hear to be in you; and profeſs my ſelf, and really be, Sir, Your affectionate friend and ſervant, in our bleſſed Lord and Saviour Jeſus. Jer: Taylor.

Ieanes.

For this your promiſe I give you hearty thanks, and ſhall endeavor to make you as grateful a return as I can, in the like Chriſtian offices of love, and ſo ſhall reſt,

In Chriſt Jeſus your humble ſervant, Henry Jeanes.

POSTSCRIPT. Dr Taylor.

Sir, I received yours late laſt night; and I have returned you this early in the morning, that I might in every thing be respective of you.

Jeanes.

This I eaſily believe, and am confident, that upon review of your Letter you will acknowledge, that according to the proverb, you have made more haſte then good ſpeed.

Dr. Taylor.

But I deſire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material, for I have buſineſs of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the ſaw of contention with any man about things leſs pertinent. I expect no anſwer, I need none, I deſire none, but expect that you will imploy your good parts in any thing, rather then in being ingenioſus in alieno libro. Your talents can better (if you pleaſe) ſerve God, then by cavilling with or without reaſon.

Ieanes.

Whether or no the controverſie between us be not material, but leſs pertinent; whether your Letter be ſo ſatisfactory, as that it needs no anſwer? as alſo, whether I cavill without reaſon (to cavil with reaſon, is a Catachreſis as harſh as ratione inſanire, and as hardly juſtifiable, but by a licentiâ poeticâ) are things in which I refuſe you for my Judge, and appeal unto the learned and unprejudic'd Reader.

Secondly, That you neither expect nor deſite an anſwer from me may be very probable, but that I was obliged to return you one, I have 3 Reaſons that convince me.

Firſt, By my ſilence, the truth which you have wronged would ſuffer.

Secondly, your Papers have been with a great deal of diligence publiſhed, and if I ſhould not give them an anſwer, I ſhould be acceſſary to the Funeral of my own good name. And

Thirdly, A friend of yours, when he gave me this your Letter, told me, That I could not anſwer it, and that you were, as he thought, infallible: now I thought it my duty to undeceive him, who having your perſon in too great an admiration, greedily ſwalloweth whatſoever falls from your pen, though never ſo falſe and erroneous.

FINIS.

End of the text · Henry Jeanes, Letters (1660)