Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues, Treatise on ethics

Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues · Treatise on ethics

p. 1Of the NATURE of ETHICKS.

THIS is the peculiar End and Uſefulneſs of the Chriſtian Religion, to eſtabliſh real Virtue in the World: And in the Primitive Ages of Chriſtianity, the Virtues of Charity, Meekneſs, Patience, and Humility, were eſteemed the diſtinguiſhing Graces of the Goſpel; in that time the plain, the humble, and the downright Chriſtian was never diſpiſed as a mere Moraliſt. The firſt Preachers taught Men to purchaſe the Hopes of Salvation by living up to the ſevereſt and moſt exalted Doctrines of their Faith; then to be reformed, was without any more ado to be regenerate.

THE Doctrine therefore of Ethicks contains the principal Part or End of Human Life; An enquiry after the End of human Actions.which tho it is not to be had under the Sun, where nothing either good or bad hath any long Duration; yet ſomething we muſt aim at and lay hold on, in the due culture whereof we may place our greateſt Eaſe and Happineſs. This thing, whatever p. 2it is, muſt neceſſarily include theſe three Conditions.

Firſt, IT muſt be agreeable and proper to Humane Nature; for that we ſeek for, muſt be moſt excellent; and what Excellency can be in that, whereof ſenſleſs and brute Creatures do partake equally with our ſelves?

Secondly, IT muſt give us full Content; for ſo long as we deſire ſomewhat more, it is not poſſible, that the Heart ſhould reſt ſatisfied.

Thirdly, IT muſt be within our power to get it, if we pleaſe; for what ſatisfaction or happineſs can be in that from which we may be hindered, either in the attaining or continuing it?

Moral Virtue hath all the Properties of Happineſs.HE, who in his ſearch for Happineſs can find any thing wherein theſe Properties meet, ſhould ſo highly value that Treaſure, as to ſell all to purchaſe the Field where it is. In the mean time, till ſomething better be brought to light, we will be contented to take Moral Virtue into our conſideration, and ſee whether theſe three Properties are to be found in her. But before we do this, it is fit we ſhould conſider ſome great Miſtakes of the old Philoſophers about this matter; one was, That they would have their Chiefeſt Good in this Life; another p. 3was, They would have it ſo in their own power, and within themſelves, that neither God nor man ſhould be able to hinder them of it.The difference between the Morality of the Academicks and Stoicks. Herein lay the fundamental Difference between the Morality of the Academicks and Stoicks. The courſe the Platoniſts took, was to purge their Minds of froward Humors, to moderate their Paſſions, to furniſh themſelves with Prudence, and then whatever happen'd, to govern themſelves by the Laws of Wiſdom and Moderation; becauſe when the Mind is endued with theſe Virtues, it is able to extract ſomething beneficial to its own Intereſts, from the moſt malicious Accidents. The Stoicks fooliſhly thought, that we ſhould be diſquieted with perpetual Fears, if our Happineſs were not wholly lodged within our own Breaſts: Whereas a wiſe and good Man, that conſiders the uncertainty of things, will neither be ſo ſtupid, as to be ſurpriz'd with any Diſaſter, nor ſo ſilly, as to encreaſe it by a fruitleſs Anxiety, but will make the beſt of his Condition, by a diſcreet management of himſelf and his Actions.

NOW Ariſtotle, that great Maſter of Ethicks, in his inquiſition after the Properties of Moral Virtue, firſt falls upon the p. 4conſideration of Good, what it is, and defines it to be, That which all our Deſires aim at; and indeed, what can ſatisfie our Deſires, but that which is good; for even evil things, when they are ſought after, appear unto us under the ſhew of good: Whence comes that common diſtinction of Bonum apparens & verum Bonum; Bonum ſenſui & Bonum rationi. From this general deſcription of what is good, he comes in particular to conſider of Bonum Homini: And ſeeing there are many things which are indeed profitable and good for Man, he makes yet a more particular Enquiry, whether there be not ſome one thing, wherein every Man places the End of all his Deſires.

'TIS true, that every Man propoſeth to himſelf ſomewhat, which if he could once arrive at, he would think himſelf a happy Perſon.The Philoſophers divided in their Opinions about the Chiefeſt Good. One ſeeketh Pleaſure and Eaſe, as Ariſtippus and the Cyrenaicks did; a ſecond would have Indolence, or a freedom from all Trouble, which the Epicureans wiſhed for; another perhaps prefers a ſort of Wiſdom without Senſe, like that of the Stoicks; One fixes his Mind upon Wealth and Abundance; another upon Honor and State; and a third ſhall purſue with all his might ſome particular Courſe of Life, as a Trade, or any p. 5way of Buſineſs; which if he could bring to any perfection, he ſuppoſes he ſhould have his Deſires fully anſwered. A multitude of Fancies there are of this kind, almoſt as many as there are Complexions amongſt Men, wherein Mankind have been uſed to lodge their final Good, or the utmoſt ſcope of their Wiſhes. It will not therefore be amiſs to enquire, what this is, and whether it be poſſible to find that matter out, which would be adequate to all our Deſires.

And Firſt, IT may well be doubted, ſince no Man was ever yet known to poſſeſs on Earth, that thing which could fully ſatisfie him.

Secondly, IF we ſuppoſe any Man to have had it, yet the very Anxiety and Fear of loſing it, would abate much of the Pleaſure he might take in the Enjoyment of it.

Thirdly, THE unavoidable expectation of Death were enough to draw off all our Inclinations after this World, ſince that after Death, Nature affords us no Proſpect or Certainty of any thing, wherein we may place our laſt Eaſe and Contentment: So that the enquiry, What it is which would finally content us, is likely to prove no other, than that vain phantaſtical Labour which p. 6many Men to their utter ruine have taken in purſuit of the Philoſopher's Stone.

NOTWITHSTANDING all this, we muſt find out ſomething, which we may truly call our final Good: For that reſtleſs Deſire after it, which is generally in all Men, cannot be to no purpoſe, ſince God and Nature never made any thing in vain, neither is it conſiſtent with his Juſtice or Goodneſs to put any Creature upon a continual Rack; the contrary to which were unavoidably true, if under the Sun there were nothing, which might anſwer this univerſal Appetite.

How Men have been miſtaken about their chiefeſt good.BEFORE we affirm any thing concerning it, we muſt firſt determine, what it is not: For the Errors of Men have been ſo many, that we need be ſure of what we do, leſt we run into the ſame Miſtakes. The principal Cheat of all, which hath miſled moſt, is Pleaſure; by which I do not mean any groſs and carnal Pleaſure, of which Men are naturally aſhamed, as being very fickle and ſoon at an end; which will not ſuit with our laſt Hopes, that are eternal. For the Content received in Meats and Drinks, and the Conſequences thereof, Iuſt and Wantonneſs, are ſo ſhort lived, ſo full of Satiety and Sickneſs, that even Epicurus p. 7declared, the ſmalleſt Diet was the beſt; and indeed he that is reſolved to ſubdue his Body, muſt be ſure to cut off all unneceſſary Convoys of Meats and Drinks, and the Seige cannot laſt long. But as for that other more refin'd Pleaſure, which conſiſts in the Satisfaction of the Mind, and in the conſtant Approbation of Virtue; this comes near the point, but fails of it, as being a Concomitant of it, but not the Thing it ſelf.

Secondly,Riches cannot be the end of our Deſires. MANY have choſen Riches and Abundance of all things for the End of their Deſires; but this will not hold, becauſe the perpetual Care of preſerving them, or the endleſs Fear of loſing them, will not ſuffer them to bring any Happineſs to us, which ought to be without Care of keeping, and without Fear of loſing.

Thirdly,Our Happineſs cannot be found in Honours. THE more polite and elegant ſort of Men place their Felicity in Honours, but neither is it here to be found; for Honour is not in him that bears, but in him that affords it; as thoſe are honour'd, who diſcharge the greateſt weight of their Princes Affairs; and we often ſee that thoſe Men, which to day were moſt honour'd, and to morrow upon defiance of thoſe that honour'd them, prove moſt contemptible, p. 8even for this reaſon, becauſe Honor eſt in Honorante, non in Honorato. But our laſt and true Happineſs muſt be found in our ſelves, and not in other Men.

Happineſs is not found in the increaſe of Knowledg,Fourthly, SOME have thought themſelves happy only for their great Skill in Letters, which they have gotten with unwearied pains; the Authority of Ariſtotle hath driven them upon this Conceit, who according to his nice way of handling all things, hath divided Knowledg into contemplative and practical; whereas Knowledg is but the outward dreſs and trimming as it were of a Man, and may be found in the moſt unhappy, and cannot therefore be true Felicity.

Nor in the Idea of Good, as Plato fancied.THERE are but two things remaining, in which ſome Men place their Happineſs; the firſt is the Idea of Good, a Fancy of Plato's; for he, conceiving that there were in God certain Exemplaria, or Patterns of all things in full perfection, taught, that in the Contemplation of theſe our final Good conſiſted. Some Doctrines of this kind have been delivered in our Schools; what elſe do the Scholaſtick Writers mean by their ſaying, that our laſt Happineſs muſt be had in the viſual Sight of God: But this muſt be after our Death, when we ſhall behold p. 9and kno… all things, according as they are in their moſt perfect State. But the Happineſs we now enquire for, muſt be ſuch, as may be enjoy'd in this Life: For it is altogether uncertain, whether any ſuch Idea be or no; and if there be, it doth not appear, which way the Contemplation of it hath an influence upon our Manners: So that theſe Ideas are not unlike King Ptolomie's Man in Lucian, who was one half perfectly black, and the other exceeding white; ſo that part of the Platonick Theology, which relates to Practice, is very clear and intelligible, whilſt that which is employ'd in Theory, is monſtrouſly dark and obſcure.

THERE were alſo thoſe, who taught, That Virtue was that excellent thing, in which we ſhould find our chiefeſt Good; theſe Men came near, but fell ſhort of the Truth: For Virtue is a Habit, and Habits are for Actions: Now it is confeſſed, that our chiefeſt Good is our ultimate End, and all things are for it, but its ſelf for no other end. As for what Ariſtotle ſays, That a happy Man cannot be in a calamitous condition, he errs according to his Principles, by which he requires Riches and Health of Body to the making up his happy Man; whereas let him be in his Perſon either p. 10healthful or diſeaſed; let him be for his Fortunes rich or poor, all is one; for every Condition of Life is alike the Object of Virtue, and for that reaſon no ſtranger to Happineſs.

HAVING ſought after Felicity where it is not, it remains that we ſearch for it where it is; otherwiſe the moſt natural and moſt ſincere of all our Deſires would be falſe and unprofitable. Some define it to be ſummum Bonum; others Bonum hominis maximè expetendum; ſome that it's Bonum homini per ſe ſufficiens; that which is able alone to ſatisfie all our Deſires. All this and much more is true, and yet we are never the wiſer: For the Queſtion ſtill is, what wonderful thing this is, in which all theſe attributes are to be found. For in this caſe it happens as it doth with a wayfaring Man, who being asked, Whither he goes? Should anſwer to one Man, That he went to his Journeys end; to another, that he went thither where his Buſineſs lay; to a third, that he was travelling to a place, whither when he came, he need go no farther: For all this is true, and yet he hath not told whither he is going; had he reply'd, That he went to London, to Paris, or to Rome, he had ſatisfi'd the Enquirer. p. 11Some ſuch thing befalls us here; for to be the chiefeſt Good, the laſt End, to be the moſt perfect Good, and a thouſand things beſides we may be told, and yet our Journeys end not known at all. But without any more Circumlocutions, we may be poſitive, that our Happineſs conſiſts in Action, Our Happineſs conſiſts in thoſe Actions that proceed from Virtue.and in that action alone, which proceeds from Virtue, and we may define it thus, Foelicitas eſt actio vitae ſecundum Virtutem; for to lead our Lives according to Virtue, is in this Life the Supreme Good, and he that knows no more of Happineſs than this, may reſt contented, and enquire no farther. Ariſtotle ſeems to require a little more; but ſome Men are ſo vain, that they know not when they have ſaid enough.

THAT the leading our Life by the Rules of Virtue, is the only true Happineſs, appears by this, that it hath all thoſe Properties which are required to make true Happineſs.

Firſt, IT is in our power; for we ſee frequent Advices uſed to bring Men to the Practice of Virtue, which were altogether vain, had they no power to become ſo; for who ever adviſed a Man to an Impoſſibility?

Secondly, IT is proper to Mankind; for what do we behold in any other kind of p. 12Being, that can make us either eaſie or happy? The rational Faculties, which are buſied in moderating thoſe Paſſions, that are common to us and Beaſts, are in none but Man; by the ſtrength whereof we can maſter theſe Heats of the Mind, and make them ſubmit to better Conduct.

Thirdly, THIS only affords us Quiet and Contentment. Had we all thoſe glorious things which the Vulgar gaze at and admire; let there be wanting only the inward teſtimony of a good Conſcience, which Virtue only can give us, all theſe are as nothing, and but cold Comforts, and which is worſt of all, they will at length fail. For Honour, Wealth, and Pleaſure have Wings and fly away; only the memory of a virtuous Life laſts for ever.The things of this World not ſufficient to make us happy. The Excellency of all things in the World conſiſts more in Opinion than Reality; in Expectation much more than Enjoyment: Beſides a great part of a Man's Lite is gone before he arrives at 'em; and when his Senſes are dim with Age, Pleaſures are unſavory to the Palate. And if we conſider theſe things ſingly and apart, they are of no weight at all; and this is the Misfortune, no Man can enjoy them all together; for how can any one think it a Felicity to have a ſtrong Body without p. 13ſoundneſs of Mind; to have his Granaries full and his Conſtitution crazy: What are Riches, unleſs Pleaſures attend them? Yet he that follows Pleaſure, ſhall never get Riches: What profits it, to have a healthy Body and a weak Soul? Yet the pampering the former, will ſurely bring feebleneſs upon the latter: What doth it ſignifie to multiply Notions, and enlarge our Knowledg of things, when he that encreaſes his Knowledg, encreaſes only his Sorrow: Nay the Glories of this World will diſappoint a Man in that very matter, which they particularly promiſed him: For if you ask the Rich Man, whether his Wealth hath freed him from Care, or hath afforded him any Eaſe; he will tell you, That the poor Man's Neceſſities are not ſo heavy, as his Troubles are by reaſon of his great Abundance, whereby his Spirits are broken inſtead of being ſupported. So Men in the higheſt Places of Honour, may believe themſelves ſafe and enſlaved to no Man's Will; but it is quite otherwiſe, no Perſons are ſo much concerned in the Humors of thoſe below them and of thoſe above them too, as they are. Thus tranſitory and vain is the Happineſs of every voluptuous Man, he finds in the iſſue nothing but Vexation; ſo p. 14that there is not half ſo much delight in the Fruitions of Luxury, as there is in the Denial of our Deſires after it.

An honeſt Life is the moſt happy ſtate.WHEREFORE ſetting aſide Ariſtotle's Phraſes, in plain Language, the reſult of all our Felicity amounts to no more than this, to live honeſtly: For the Word Honeſty, tho S. Auguſtine could afford it no higher a place in the Life of a Chriſtian, than to be a Tyrocinium Chriſtiani, is indeed the chief Ingredient in a virtuous and good Diſpoſition, and mingleth it ſelf with every part of our Chriſtian Life, whatſoever ſtate it be, high or low: For whether it concern God or man, rich or poor, fortunate or miſerable; whether in publick or private, in a high Condition, or in a low and inferior Orb, to behave our ſelves becomingly, and as we ought, upon every occaſion, is all ſumm'd up in the Word Honeſty. Whatſoever the Philoſophers have aſſerted concerning other things, Bona Fortunae, Bona Corporis, ſerves only to breed unneceſſary Diſputes: Therefore Lucian, that witty and ſharp Senſor of the Philoſophers, calls the Epicureans foreign, the Followers of Plato foreign, the Peripateticks foreign; for according as they ſtood affected to Pleaſure, Honor, and Wealth, ſo they pronounced p. 15of their Happineſs: And Ariſtotle was ſo extremely taken with Wealth, that he made his Vice a part of his Philoſophy, and entitles his Riches unto Happineſs: But we have reſolved upon better Grounds, not to venture our ſelves, where he, a great Maſter in Science, was ſhipwreckt; neither will ſeek for Happineſs where he could never find it in this World: But we muſt look for it in true Religion, the Knowledg of God, in the expectation of future Bliſs, things which Ariſtotle never dreamt of: For all things upon Earth are little and narrow, ſhort and ſcanty, but every thing in Religion is vaſt and infinite; what can be more ſo, than to live always with God, and to have a perpetual Joy in a Man's Self. Here,The Excellency of Religion. as in a Glaſs, we behold the beſt and moſt deſireable Objects; her Revelations refreſh and bear up our Spirits, becauſe in them the Mind is at peace, and we may with the moſt raviſhing delight, lay out our whole Thoughts upon Heavenly things, which as they are moſt remote, ſo they are too fine for the impreſſions of Senſe. Here we have the moſt healing Remedies againſt all the Miſeries of Human Life, a Relief for every Agony of the Mind, and a Comfort againſt every Danger: Whereas to be rich or honorable, p. 16to be wiſe or powerful, will not pacifie one troubled Thought, becauſe they are only the Creatures of Fancy; but the Principles of Religion ſink deeper into our Reaſon, and acquaint it with the glad Tidings of a better Life hereafter.Religion uſeful in all conditions of life. In the Caſe of Religion therefore it is true, what Tully ſays of Phyloſophy, It is uſeful in all Conditions, a Comfort in Proſperity, and a Refreſhment in Adverſity, the ſafeſt Guide to direct us in a proſperous ſtate, and if we fall lower, the moſt faithful Friend to put us in hopes of Deliverance: Therefore it preſcribes ſuch Rules of Life, as will never fail, if they be carefully purſued, neither can a religious Man be ever diſappointed in his Hopes, becauſe they are as certain and true as the Decrees of God: For no Man ever ſought the Kingdom of God and the Righteouſneſs thereof, but found it.

HENCE we may ſay of our Religion, that it is pregnant with Wiſdom and Happineſs; it is admirably conſonant to the Deſires and Needs of Humane Nature; it is agreeable to the Faculties of Men, infinitely ſerviceable to the Content and Tranquillity of the Mind; it is ſuch a thing, as every wiſe Man would chuſe, as moſt becoming the Dignity of Rational p. 17Nature, and moſt conducive to his Happineſs: It rids the Mind of irkſom and vexatious Thoughts, exempts Men from the Troubles and Tumults of diſquieting Paſſions; it frees the Conſcience of all ſad Reflections; is the greateſt Art of Joy and Pleaſure; It makes us Godlike as well in the Happineſs as in the Purity of our Lives; In ſhort, it hath in it all the excellent and amiable Qualities which can prevail upon the Reaſons and Affections of Mankind.

HAVING then defined Happineſs to be, the leading of our Lives according to Virtue, it remains in the ſecond place, that we make enquiry, What Virtue is? Which that we may the better do, we are to enquire, in what order and rank of things to find it. It being a Quality, it muſt be either an Habit, or a Paſſion, but a Paſſion it cannot be; for Paſſions, ſuch as Fear, Anger, Luſt, and the like, are Natural; but Vertue is gotten by Care and Study. Now it was never known, that any Man was born virtuous, but attain'd unto it by long Practice. Virtue therefore muſt be reckon'd amongſt Habits; for they only are contracted by Labor and Induſtry: Now Habits have ſomething of relation; we muſt therefore find out ſomething, unto which this p. 18Virtue, which is a Habit, doth refer: To know this, we muſt underſtand, that there are ſome things in our Nature, which we call Affections, or Paſſions, or Perturbations; if they gently move us, we call them Affections; if more ſtrongly, they are Paſſions; if more boiſtrouſly, then we name 'em Perturbations: So that theſe are really one thing called by three Names, according to that degree of heat into which they put us.

How Virtue moderates the Paſſions.NOW, that which holds the Bridle and governs their Motions; which allays their Heat, if it be too violent; raiſes them if they be too low; which gives their juſt degree, ſets bounds to their raging; keeps 'em from Exceſs, if they prove too warm, and from Deficiency, if they be too tame. This is that which we uſually call Virtue, and may be defin'd Moderatrix Paſſionum; for this Definition ſufficiently opens the Nature and Condition of it: But Ariſtotle would have us go a little more about the Buſh, and takes more pains than needs. Now he will have Virtue to be Habitus foreign in mediocritate conſiſtens; by which word foreign are excluded all thoſe things which are done raſhly and by chance, naturally by coaction or conſtraint, the meaning whereof may be underſtood p. 19by conſidering 1ſt, there is foreign, Reaſon or Advice. 2ly foreign, voluntas, or the Will. Now for want of proper Words to expreſs the thing, we are often forced to confound the ſame Action in Men and in Beaſts: For that which is foreign, the beginning of action, in Men and in Beaſts, in Beaſts hath no proper word to expreſs it, but we call it by that general Name of foreign, and this in the action of Man is named foreign Altho the thing be one and the ſame in both; yet many times the want of a Proper Name to expreſs it by, doth breed ſome Confuſion. The Philoſopher tells us, That Men do many things, foreign, when they follow the Suggeſtions of Senſe, and not the Dictates of Reaſon. S. Auguſtine plainly diſtinguiſhes them, when he ſaith, Voluntas eſt non niſi in bonis; nam in malis flagitioſiſque factis cupiditas propriè dicitur, non voluntas: The intellectual part is that,The intellectual part is the Spring of all rational Actions. from whence ſpring all rational Actions, and in the judgment ruling the Will lies all the blame or the good, that is praiſe-worthy in what we do. Whilſt Beaſts work and act with all ſuddenneſs, and without deliberation, Man works conſiderately and with advice; in our Language we call this Free Will, in p. 20Latin liberum arbitrium, in Greek foreign As for that proud and inſolent word foreign, it is not to be heard of in the Writings of Epictetus, or any modeſt Philoſopher, but only among ſome Greek Divines; and in them nothing more is meant by it, than that Power which Man hath over his Moral Actions: This is that Spirit of our Minds, as the Apoſtle terms it, which makes our Actions virtuous: For we are not moved as natural Agents are, but it is in our power to leave the things we do undone; neither can there be any Choice, unleſs the thing which we take, be ſo in our power, that we might have refuſed it; and we muſt take ſpecial care, that we diſtinguiſh between the Will and the Appetite; the Object of the firſt is, whatſoever good we may be lead to by Reaſon; the Object of the latter is,The Will and Appetite diſtinguiſhed. whatſoever good may be deſired by Senſe: Now Affections, ſuch as Joy, and Grief, Fear and Anger, being, as it were; the ſundry Modes of of Appetite, can neither be ſtirr'd by a thing indifferent, nor forbear being moved at the ſight of ſome other things; ſo that it is not altogether in our power ſo to moderate theſe Affections, as never to be moved by them; but we may command the Actions p. 21that iſſue from the Diſpoſition of the Will. And to our Wills only our Paſſions are ſubject; not that it is in our power wholly, whether we will be angry or not,Paſſions are ſubject only to the Will. whether we will be moved by Luſt or Fear, but only when they are up, and would hurry us into evil Actions, it is in our power to reſtrain their force, and to do … their command: For wherein we … hindred, there only are we free … whatſoever we may be hindered, there we have not this Liberty: So ſmall a matter it is, called Free-will, that hath kindled ſo much Controverſie, and raiſed ſo great a ſtir amongſt Men.

AND here cometh in a third thing, which we are to obſerve, foreign, that is, Conſultation; wherein we ſee the neceſſity of having Free-will. For ſince in many important Caſes of Human Life it doth not appear, what is to be done upon the ſudden, it is neceſſary to take ſome time to adviſe and conſult. Beaſts, becauſe they ſee upon the ſudden what they have to do, have not this benefit of Advice, but as ſoon as ever they ſee what to avoid, and what to purſue, immediatly act accordingly: But with Man it is not ſo; many things there are, which at firſt ſight, ſeem fair and deſireable p. 22that upon examination prove otherwiſe; and many things are harſh, unpleaſant, or dangerous at firſt ſight, which upon tryal are fitted for our uſe, and therefore ought to be purſued.

HENCE it is, that our foreign or Inclination to act, muſt be frequently ſuſpended, and not preſently be ſet on work, but upon ſerious Conſideration, what is moſt fit and convenient for us to do: And here comes in foreign or Election, which is as it were the Concluſion from the Premiſes.

WHATSOEVER therefore offers its ſelf to us, is firſt foreign. for ſome reaſon to be deſired; ſecondly foreign, it muſt admit of Conſultation; and in the third place it muſt be foreign, fit upon good advice to be choſen. This is the juſt meaning of what Ariſtotle ſays of Virtue, that it is habitus foreign vel electivus.

The Art o… …i…ing w… conſiſts much in the wel… …dering … Pa….BEFORE we come to conſider further of his Definition, wherein the very Form of Virtue doth conſiſt, it will not be amiſs to ſpeak ſomewhat of the Paſſions of the Mind, in the due framing of which into order, the very Art, as it were, of living well doth conſiſt.

NOW the mind of Man, from whence they come, hath two principal parts; the one proper to Man; the other common to p. 23Him and Beaſts; the firſt we call the Intellectual Part or Reaſon; the ſecond is Senſe or ſenſual Appetite. Reaſon is the foreign and Guide to Senſe, whoſe Virtues are Prudence, Science, Art, and ſuch like, which becauſe they are not Moral but Intellectual Vertues, we ſhall not at preſent ſpeak to: For Senſe is our Subject, as being the proper Object and Matter of Moral Virtue. Which inferior part of the Soul is divided by Philoſophers into concupiſcible and iraſcible; the former tends to that which is good and delightful; the latter arms the Soul againſt whatſoever is diſagreeable and difficult.

BETWIXT theſe two all the affections are divided and are chiefly employed in their Buſineſs: Concupiſcence, Deſire, Luſt, Hunger, Thirſt, Hatred, and others of the like Nature belong to that, which we call the concupiſcible part: Pride, Contempt, Impatience, Anger, Fear, Boldneſs and the like generous and brave Paſſions, belong to what we ſay is the iraſcible part of the mind. Whatſoever it is that ſtrikes the Soul, touches it to the quick,The Office of Moral Virtue is to govern the Paſſions. and moves it to Action or Paſſion, muſt needs proceed from one of theſe: wherefore to give theſe their juſt meaſure and proportion, to mould and temper 'em well, is the proper Office of Moral Virtue.

p. 24NOW all the Paſſions of the ſenſitive Soul are apt to offend in being either too much, or too little, and the prudent choice of juſt what is enough, is the chief work of Virtue. Which Mediocrity is call'd by thoſe who love to talk learnedly or rather obſcurely, Arithmetical and Geometrical: Arithmetical Mediocrity is that, which is equally diſtant from both extremes, is ever one and the ſame; as the Mean between Two and Ten, is unalterably Six, which by Four exceeds Two, and by Four, fails of Ten: For if we add Four to Two it makes Six, but if we add Four to Six, it makes Ten. Geometrical Mediocrity is ſo placed betwixt the extremes, as the matter requires, to which it is refer'd; therefore it is ſometimes more, ſometimes leſs, and not always the ſame: Such a medium, as the Taylor obſerves in making your Apparel, he requires not the ſame meaſure of Cloth for all, but only ſo much as is neceſſary for your Perſon: For the Phyſician, if Two Drams of Rhubarb will not ſerve for his Potion, What the Mediocrity is in which Virtue is …aid to be placed.doth not forthwith infuſe ſix or ten more, but he examines the Niture of the Diſeaſe, the Strength and Conſtitution of the Patient; and accordingly he makes up his Doſe. Such a kind p. 25of medium is Vertue, ſometimes inclining to the leſs, ſometimes to the more; as it is in temperance; where the Mediocrity is not ſtill the ſame, but changes according to the variety of Perſons: A Student, who is but of a thin body, or a ſickly perſon eats not ſo much as a Day-Labourer, but eats in proportion to the ability of his Stomach; the liberal man gives not always the ſame Alms; the wealthy give more, men of meaner Eſtates leſs; So the Widows two Mites were ſufficient, becauſe ſhe gave according to her Condition; the rich Phariſee gives perhaps a great deal more, and yet gives too little, becauſe he beſtows not his Charity according to the Jargeneſs of his Means: Hence it is, that Virtues are foreign, aim at the medium; and hence it alſo comes to paſs, that it is ſo difficult to find the true medium out; for there are infinite ways to miſs, or to ſhoot beſide the Mark, but there is only one way to hitt it.

To do which one thing, a virtuous Man muſt have the perfect uſe of his Reaſon: Why Youth are not fit Hearers of Moral Philoſophyupon this account ſome Philoſophers have diſputed, whether young Perſons ſhould hear or read their Leſſons, and have determined, they ſhould not: And Ariſtotle ſets it down p. 26for a Maxim, that Youth are not fit Hearers of Moral Philoſophy. For the fickleneſs of their Fancy, the unrulineſs of their Paſſions, the wild Sallies of their Affections, ſuffer 'em not to reap any benefit by virtuous Diſcipline or Education: But when Age hath ſomewhat cool'd the Heats of Paſſion; when Wiſdom and Experience hath cured all the Boylings of their Blood, and hath maſter'd every exorbitant Humour: Then is the proper time to cultivate the Soil, and ſow the Seeds of Vertue.

HOWSOEVER it be with this part of Aristotle's Doctrin, yet by the method he preſcribes, the Hearer of Moral Precepts muſt have ſuch a ſhare of Prudence, as may render him able to chooſe ſo much Paſſion, as is due unto the Action which he undertakes.

HOW this Choice can be made by Youth, unleſs they be firſt well diſciplined, is more than Ariſtotle hath taught us: For making all Virtue to flow from Prudence; he allotts no time to learn Wit, which muſt be wrought in us by chance or ſome good fortune: For Prudence being a ſolid and conſtant Habit, and all Habits being gotten by the repetition of frequent Acts, ſome ſpace of time there muſt be in which theſe Acts, that p. 27produce our Habits, muſt be practiſed. Now whether Age or Youth be the fitter ſeaſon to plant Virtue in the mind, let thoſe make it a queſtion who are ignorant, whether the Spring or Autumn be the better Seed-time.

SEEING that the ſowing of this good Seed doth bring forth the beſt and the greateſt Men; thoſe, who are moſt ſerviceable to God, and thoſe that are moſt uſeful in the World: it will be worth our while to conſider what that time of our Life is in which the Principles of Virtue ought to be imbibed: In order to a more cloſe enquiry into this matter, we will firſt ſee, what the natural ſtate of the youthful Age is; ſecondly, we will prove it to be the beſt and moſt proper time to learn the great Art of living well.

Firſt,A Character of the Youthful Age. YOUNG Men are violent in their Deſires, and ever eager to execute them; they have by natural Heat that diſpoſition, which elder Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of Natural Drunkenneſs; they eaſily forſake, what they have much longed for, being very inconſtant, and they love Honour or Succeſs, more than Mony, as having not been yet in want; they are good-natur'd, becauſe they have not been p. 28acquainted with much malice, and they are credulous, becauſe they have not yet been often deceived; they are ſtout for that they have not yet been caſt down by the Mifortunes of Human Life, and on all occaſions are apt to err in the exceſs, rather than in the Defect, becauſe they overdo every thing.

THIS being the natural State of our youthful Age, in the next place we will conſider, whether this be the beſt time to learn Virtue in. Now, in my Opinion, to plant the Principles of Virtue in the firſt Age of our lives, is the ſame thing as to build a Houſe upon a Rock: No Storms nor Winds ſhall ſhake it; it being in Civil as it is in Natural Plantations; where young tender trees, though ſubject to the injuries of the Air, and in danger even of their own flexibility, would yet little want any Underproppings, if they were at firſt well faſtned in their Roots: 'Tis true, at this time the mind is moſt in danger of being miſled by Fancies, and of being diſturbed by Paſſions, which are the various motions thereof towards Objects agreeable or diſagreeable: But theſe and the Inclinations too which are only the more frequent exerciſe of the Paſſions, are all made obedient to ſound p. 29Reaſon and moſt tenacious of the rules of Vertue, if they are received betimes.

FOR before the Veſſel be ſeaſoned with one kind of Liquor it is equally capable of all,Reaſons, Why Youth is the fitteſt time to learn Virtue. and ſo the Wax is indifferent to any impreſſion, before it is moulded and determined by a particular Seal: If the mind be raſa Tabula, as Ariſtotle would have it, then this White Paper may beſt be inriched with good Inſcriptions, before it be ſoiled or blotted with evil: Or if there be any innate, connatural Notions, which the Platoniſts affirm, it is beſt then to awaken them, before evil Cuſtoms of Life deaden their vigor; as it happens to the body from an Obſtruction in the Nerves: For doubtleſs all Evil is a kind of Intellectual Opium, caſts the Faculties of the mind (as I may ſo ſay) into a Moral Apoplexy; and ſo according to the opinion of one Philoſopher blots the White Paper; according to another it is deſtructive of the very firſt principles in Nature: whereas he, who lays his Foundation upon the principles of Virtue, ſhall direct the courſe of his Life with that Uniformity, as will bear him up under all the Accidents, he can be expoſed to; he will be guided by ſuch Rules, as he never needs Change; but his whole Life will be blameleſs, p. 30his Actions well weigh'd, his Words diſcreet, his Thoughts regular, and in all things ſhall he live according to the utmoſt perfection Human Nature is capable of.

YOUTH being an Age fitteſt to learn not only the rudiments of divers Languages, but the moſt uſeful Knowledge both of God and of our ſelves; becauſe in Youth the Powers of the mind and the Strength of the body are alike vigorous, clear and active; the Inſtrument is not as yet broken, nor out of tune; the Organs are not yet diſturbed; the Underſtanding is not bribed with Error; nor the Will as yet grown ſtubborn and ſtiff in bad Courſes; Prejudices are not ſtrong enough to darken the Object, or the Faculty that is to apprehend them; the Habits of Vice are as yet unlearned and unpractiſed; the Memory is not at leiſure to furniſh its Store-houſe with vain Idea's; it is neither choakt with Straw, nor ſtopt wth Mud; the Impertinency of worldly buſineſs is not yet become a burden too heavy for the mind to bear.

BESIDES all Impreſſions made in the days of Youth are ſtrong and deep, ſo that what is now well fix'd in the Soul, will not eaſily leave it: And if the principles p. 31of Virtue, like ſmall and gentle Rain, be by degrees diſtilled on the growing Plant, the riper Age is like to bring forth a more plentiful harveſt; for Vertue only preſcribes to a man a true and certain end to all his Endeavours, which is the Glory of God in the firſt place, then the doing as much Good as he can, to himſelf and others: This being the moſt high and noble End, the ſooner one ſets about it the better 'tis; for thereby we avoid all lowneſs of Spirit, confuſion in our Actions, and all inconſtancy in our Reſolutions: And that Youth is beſt prepared for this work, is manifeſt, becauſe it is an Age very inquiſitive; equally capable, and poſſibly inclined to Good, as Evil; and many of thoſe Sins, which owe both their Birth and Growth to the Senſes, are not yet ſit Temptations; the Paſſions are not yet ready to catch fire at every ſpark; the feign'd, but falſe Beauty of Vice is not alluring; the Virgin Purity of the mind is not defloured, nor its native Modeſty laid waſt. But if this Age be not uſed to the ſeverity of Labour, and the ſtrict exerciſes of Virtue, ſenſual Pleaſures will break in, and then is kindled that continual Combat, ſo much ſpoken of by Philoſophers and p. 33Divines, between Senſe and Reaſon, the Body and the Soul, Pleaſure and Wiſdom.

WHEN the Blood therefore is warm; the Paſſions run high and are powerful, but Reaſon is weak; when the Body, like an unruly Beaſt, is untame and unbroken; when Reaſon and Judgment are, like the Morning Star, ſtifled and overcaſt with Vapours; then it is proper to put on a Bitt and Bridle; to keep ſtrong Reins, and a ſteddy Hand: Then Youth is to be held in, from thoſe Deluſions, that hinder the true Underſtanding and real Notions of things; from all ill Company and Writings, leaſt they ſhould be taken with the beautiful, but falſe colours, that are put upon vicious and bad manners.

FOR Young Men naturally think they can do, and may do every thing, as they liſt; they are blind, therefore the more bold; they are impotent, but yet preſumptuous; Fancy is now as active, as the Wind, but withal it is diſorderly and tempeſtuous: Youth is not idle, and yet ſeldom well imployed; it is reſtleſs and very impertinent: it being that part of our time,Youth is in the greateſt danger of Temptations. wherein we are moſt expoſed to the Snares of the Devil; theſe are troubled Waters in which his Baits are ſeldom ſeen, and therefore they are the p. 33more greedily ſwallowed: Upon this account it concerns men much in their Youth to remember their Creator, becauſe he only can protect them from their Enemies of all ſorts: Their Clay is, as it were, but juſt formed into Human ſhape; it is but as yet ſcarce dry from the Potter's hand: And as it is now in the beſt manner fitted for the Signatures of Virtue; ſo it is moſt lyable to the Impreſſions of Sin and the Father of it: They are now as Tradesmen newly ſet up; their Souls are well furniſhed with a common ſtock of Natural Principles, and their Bodies are adorn'd like the richeſt Shop, in which the Trade of Life and Happineſs is to be driven: They ſhould therefore be careful in a ſpecial manner, that they do not break at the firſt ſetting up, as unwary Merchants are wont to do; for their rational Faculties, the choiceſt Goods of the mind, will waſt and decay, if they are wrapt up in Idleneſs, and the Devil will gain Advantages over them: So that it behoves them to reſiſt his Temptations at firſt; to ſet the ſtrongeſt Guard in the weakeſt place, and to double the ſecurity, where they expect the ſharpeſt Aſſaults; to oppoſe his Craft with Watchfulneſs; his Subtilty with p. 34ſtrict and unwearied diligence; to ſtudy God's Service in the firſt place, and to do their actions the beſtway: And ſince in every Age the ſame Faculties are employed, only the Objects changed, and the Actions of thoſe Faculties are not many; it muſt needs be that our whole Life is but the Reacting the ſame things over upon divers Subjects and occaſions: in Infancy little quarrels with our Brethren and peeviſhneſs, are afterwards Angers, Hatreds, Envies, Prides, Jealouſies; and a ſenſibleneſs in Youth for a frivolous Play-thing is the ſame afterwards for Honour or Intereſt: If it be ſo, then He that begins early to love and fear God, will ſo increaſe in virtuous Deeds, which are conſequent thereupon, that his Converſation will be in every reſpect as becomes the Goſpel of Chriſt.

AND ſince a ſeaſonable time is a circumſtance requiſite both to the Eſſence and Ornament of every Action: in that time therefore, in which the abilities of our Minds are freſh and lively; thoſe of the Body alſo vigorous and ſtrong; it is pity we ſhould be idle and do nothing; and yet more, that we ſhould be active and do evil; we muſt think it a very unjuſt, as well as unreaſonable thing to ſpend the flower and p. 35fruit of our Age upon this; when Vertue and Religion have only broken Intellectuals, dead Affections, a ſlippery Memory, and a tired Judgment, beſides all other infirmities, that neceſſarily attend the ruin of Nature in old Age; when men do every thing leſs earneſtly, than is fit; when they are of poor and mean Spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of Life; when they have weak or no deſires,The unfitneſs of old Age for the ſervices of Vertue. and Hearts to execute nothing; when they are full of murmuring and complaint, as ever thinking themſelves not far from ſome evil or danger; So that this is an Age too much a burden to its ſelf, and to all about it, than to be able, to go through all the ſervices of Vertue. For who can expect Grapes of Thorns, or Figs of Thiſtles; the moroſe and froward time of our Life; the Froſt, Snow and Winter ſeaſon being not for Fruit any more in the workings of Vertue, than it is in Nature: it being very difficult to begin the Chriſtian Race, when that of Nature is almoſt finiſhed, which good Fight is a hard warfare far old and decrepit Limbs.

NOW the Prudence of old Age conſiſts in a deliberate knowledg of Men and Buſineſs, founded upon long experience; but the Folly of it is the ignorance of Vertue and p. 36Religion, which at laſt will appear the only true and real Wiſdom. Therefore the Moral Philoſopher chaſtiſes the neglect and indiſcretion of thoſe Men, who then begin to live, when they are to die; there being little ſupport and leſs comfort in declining years, beſides a ſober reflection upon what we have done well; and nothing can ſweeten a ſour and crabbed Age, but the calling to mind a good Life paſſed: For as Vertue and Goodneſs is the moſt excellent accompliſhment of Youth; ſo the innocency thereof is the joy and Crown of gray Hairs: which are then truly honourable, when they are found in the way of Righteouſneſs.

WHEREFORE let us not deceive our own Souls, but with all our might follow the ſervices of Vertue, as ſoon as we are able to diſtinguiſh between true and falſe, good and evil: Let weak and diſeaſed Perſons preſent themſelves to their Prince and ſee, if they can perſuade him to turn his Court into an Hoſpital, make up his Guards with Cripples, and be attended with nothing, but Age and Impotency: If the King will not do this, how can we expect that God ſhould; as if the buſineſs of Religion were to be done, when we are capable of doing nothing, as we ſhould do; and God were to be ſatisfied p. 37with thoſe poor remainders of Strength and Spirit, which the hard ſervices of Sin and the Devil have left us: No ſure; This is an undertaking far more noble and difficult, the work of Angels in Heaven and of the wiſeſt Men upon Earth, and then is moſt acceptable, when it is the Employment of our firſt and beſt Age.

FROM what hath been ſaid then, this Inference may be made; that Youth muſt be taught to moderate their Paſſions, and not be left undiſciplined, till Age and Experience have wrought it in them. And the way to learn Vertue is to watch over our Paſſions betimes, and to make choice of that degree, which befits us. For the actions before the Habit, and by which the Habit is created, differ not ſpecie, but only in perfection from thoſe, which follow the Habit; and it is a general Law, which is laid upon all things, that are acquired by Study, to ariſe from Imperfection to Perfection, from Weakneſs to Strength.

WHICH Perfection conſiſts in this, to demean our ſelves upon all occaſions, prudently, wiſely, and adviſedly: inſomuch that ſome Moraliſts have doubted, whether all Moral Vertues may not be ſumm'd up in one, namely Prudence, nullum numen abeſt, ſi ſit p. 38Prudentia: Wherefore that multiplicity of Vertues, which is delivered by Ariſtotle, was only for our more eaſie learning the diviſion of this one into ſundry parts; that ſo we might as it were eat by ſpoonfuls, where we cannot ſwallow at once the whole Meſs. But before we treat of the Vertues in particular, it will beneceſſary to conſider certain Rules and Obſervations, which Ariſtotle hath made, becauſe they do not a little conduce to the practice of Vertue.

FIRST, Leſt we ſhould flatter our ſelves in thinking, that we have attained unto Vertue, before indeed we have; we muſt learn to diſtinguiſh between the doing of what is Good and the doing it well; betwixt bonum agere & benè agere: For in all kinds of Vertue, we may do that for good, which proves at the laſt an evil Action through the defect of ſome Circumſtance.

Secondly, THAT we may not only do that,The circumſtances requiſite to every virtuous Action. which is good, but do it well; we muſt conſider, that a multitude of Circumſtances attend every virtuous Action that we do; the firſt thing to be known is, who it is, that doth the Action; for every thing becomes not every Man: as for Example, when in the Council of Sparta, a wicked Perſon had given good Advice, the Senators took care, p. 39that a Man of better Credit ſhould give the ſame, leſt the Council, which was good and wiſe, might be ſuſpected, and have ill ſucceſs, through the bad Character of him, who gave it: So in receiving Courteſies, we muſt take heed, we receive not every thing of every Man in every place; foreign; For it is a diſgrace to be obliged by an unworthy Giver; And Abraham would accept no gift from the King of Sodom, that he might not ſay, I have made Abraham rich: again, we muſt conſider, what it is, that is done; For as Circumſtances require, ſo Actions are cenſured either for good or bad; We are bound alſo to conſider, where an Action is done; For all Actions are not in all places alike: Theſe three conſiderations are very well expreſſed in the Advice, which Q. Cicero gave to his Brother Marcus, when He ſued for the Conſulſhip; For He exhorts him thus to think, Novus ſum, Conſulatum peto, Roma eſt; in the words Novus ſum is ſignified the Perſon, who made the Suit; for an Upſtart was to bear himſelf otherwiſe in his Petition, than vir Patricius, an ancient Nobleman: in Conſulatum peto is implyed the ſecond Circumſtance, what it was He ſued for, the ſupreme place of Government in the Commonwealth; p. 40and Roma eſt ſhews the Place, where his Suit lay, not in ulubrae a petty Market Town, but in that Chief City of the Empire.

MANY other Circumſtances there are, by which our Actions are to be managed: the chief whereof are contained in that known Verſe, Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando. He, that can carefully obſerve all theſe Circumſtances, and ſhall do what they require; that Man only ſhall diſcreetly diſcharge every part of Virtue, and behave himſelf according to to the beſt Reaſon:What Reaſon is. For by Reaſon we mean nothing but the Mind of Man making uſe of the wiſeſt and moſt prudential Methods, to guide it ſelf in all its Actions; and therefore it is not confined to any ſort of Maxims and Principles in Philoſophy, but it extends it ſelf to any knowledg that may be gained by Prudence, Experience and Obſervation.

Thirdly, HAVING already aſſerted, that Virtue is lodged in the middle between two Extremes, which are both Vices, and both its Adverſaries, we do now ſay, that the two Extremes, are not for the moſt part alike p. 41repugnant to it; but the one approaches nearer, than the other: As for inſtance, profuſeneſs, one extreme of Liberality, doth much more partake of that Virtue, and comes nearer it, than the other extreme, which is Avarice; for this reaſon Men uſually pity the Prodigal, but abominate and hate the Covetous. In this caſe therefore our Rule muſt be, to decline that Extreme, which is the more hateful, and lean rather to that other, which is more friendly and like the Virtue, which we deſign to practiſe: But we muſt carry our ſelves ſo circumſpectly, that we do not fall into the Crime cenſur'd by the Poet, Dum vitant Stulti vitia in contraria currunt.

Fourthly, WE can do nothing well or virtuouſly, unleſs we diligently look into and try our own natural Inclinations;What our natural inclinations are, and how they are to be governed. which are nearer to us, than all things elſe, and yet nothing is farther off from our Acquaintance; we muſt examine all the windings and Labyrinths of our whole Frame, and ſee, by what Pullies and Wheels all the operations of our Minds are performed; ſo that we may follow her workings from the firſt impreſſions of Senſe, then of the Imagination and Judgment into the Principles both p. 42of Natural and Supernatural Motions: Then we may, as in a Glaſs, perceive, how the Soul arbitrates in the Underſtanding upon the ſeveral reports of Senſe and all the varieties of Imagination; how pliant the Will is to her Dictates, and obeys her, as a Queen doth her King, who both acknowledges a Subjection and yet retains a Majeſty; How the Paſſions move at her Command, like a well governed Army, not for Fighting, but for Rank and Order; from which regular compoſure of the Faculties, all moving in their due Place, each ſtriking in its proper Time, there ariſes a Complacency upon the whole Soul, infinitely beyond all other pleaſures.

BUT there is no Man, that hath his Faculties ſo equally balanc'd, or his Affections ſo juſtly poiſed, as that he doth not incline to one of the extremes of Virtue more, than to the other: Whoſoever then would walk in the middle path of a good life, muſt take particular care to avoid that Rock, upon which he is moſt apt to fall.

FOR when a Perſon skilful in Phyſiognomy was asked to give his judgment upon the natural temper of Socrates, Socrates his great Maſtery over himſelf.and had declared him to be prone to Luſt and Senſuality; the Company about him grew angry, p. 43and young Alcibiades brake out into a Laughter: But Socrates replied, that the Opinion of the Man was right; for ſuch indeed he confeſſed he was by Nature, but by aſſiduous care and pains he had corrected thoſe Inclinations. So much the more induſtrious ought we to be in watching over our own natural Diſpoſitions, not only becauſe we ſlide very faſt and eaſily into Vice, where we find our ſelves ſtrongly inclined to it; but becauſe we are apt to offend on the other Hand, and pronounce our ſelves virtuous, when there is little or no cauſe ſo to do.

HENCE it is, that many Men, as Nazianzen obſerves, attribute that unto Grace, Some things aſcribed to Grace, which are due to Nature.which is indeed due to Nature; For a man, who by his natural diſpoſition is Phlegmatick and Cold, ſoon flatters himſelf with an Opinion of Chaſtity; whereas in truth his Conſtitution doth not miniſter to him ſuch luſtful Heats, as are found in others of a more Sanguine Complexion: where the flame of Luſt or Anger breaketh out, and other potent Allurements to evil make their Aſſaults, there is the trial of Virtue; For what commendation is it to ſtand upright and unſhaken, where no Reſiſtance is made: In fair and calm Weather an ordinary Pilot may p. 44ſteer the Ship; but he acts the part of a skilful Mariner, who can govern the Helm and hold his Courſe, when the Seas work, the Winds are high, and the Tempeſt ſtrong. So it is with Virtue in Human Life; She muſt rule all thoſe Paſſions that raiſe ſo many Tumults in our Veins, and then ſhe is moſt glorious, when ſhe prevails, where the Temptations are moſt powerful; theſe Victories are not to be gotten by the Starts and Sallies of the Mind, but by a reſolute and conſtant Habit: For it deſerves much more praiſe to lead an unblameable life by our own ſtudy and labour, than to be ſo by our natural Condition. Wherefore upon diſcovery of our ſelves, where we find Paſſion ſtrongeſt and moſt apt to be inflamed, there is the greateſt occaſion for the exerciſe of Virtue, to ſubdue its outrage and to make it an Inſtrument of doing well. Laſtly, There is one Rule or rather Counſel more, given by Ariſtotle, and it is this; That in all the Negotiations of Life we take heed eſpecially, how we do admit, as Counſellours, our Pleaſure or our Pain: For Pleaſures ſollicit only unto Vice, and Pains deter us from Virtue: The danger of Pleaſure.the former we ought to be as ſuſpicious of, as the Trojans were of Helena, when they ſaw, how handſom p. 45ſhe was; they preſently began to think it better to ſend her home, than ſuffer their Country to be deſtroyed for her ſake: No leſs hazard do we run in yielding to Pleaſures; which for the moſt part begin in Folly, grow up in trouble, and conclude in ſhame: For when we ſtep out of the way of Virtue; if we aim at Mirth, that will preſently end in Grief; if Ambition, then we are killed with Affronts; if it be Luſt, then it wounds us with the loſs of our good name: In ſhort, Pleaſures of all kinds wear the diſguiſe of Beauty and Lovelineſs; like the Harlot in the Proverbs, they entice with wanton Kiſſes; as ſhe decks her Bed with the covering of Tapeſtry and perfumes her Houſe; but all this while 'tis the Road to Hell, and leads to the Chambers of Death: ſo whoriſh and impudent is the face of pleaſure; it makes uſe of looſe Geſtures, ſmooth and Amorous Addreſſes to draw in the unwary Sinner; all this while ſhe is but a painted Snake, which is no ſooner taken into the Boſom, but the fatal ſting appears; it ſtrikes and wounds with an everlaſting Venom, and beſides the deadly gaſhes it makes in the Conſciences of Men, it infects all the preſent Joys of humane Life. In the right Government therefore of our Actions it behoves us not p. 46to ſtoop for ſuch golden Apples, that are caſt in the way to hinder our work: That great Sophiſt Leontinus Georgias arrived in good health to an hundred and eight Years of Age, and being asked, What Cordial that was, which had preſerved him in health to ſo great an Age? anſwered, foreign, quod nihil unquam voluptatis gratiâ fecerat: So great a preſerver of Life and Health, and of all the good things conſequent thereupon is abſtinence from Pleaſures, from the Exceſſes of Eating and Drinking: for He that eats too much, dozes away his Life, turns his over-charged Body into a Statue of Earth, and ſeems to live in a continual Lethargy; He, who drinks to Exceſs, drenches his Brains in unwholſom Clouds of moiſture, and waſhes away the principles of common Reaſon and Diſcretion: He, that is lacivious, is puniſh'd for it with noiſom Diſtempers, and the peace of his Mind is quite deſtroyed by mad and ungovernable deſires.

HITHERTO we have diſcourſed of ſuch matters, as concern all Virtues in General, it remains, that we explain the Nature of them in particular. The Ancients were wont to divide Virtues into Cardinal or Principal, and Virtues leſs principal: The Cardinal Virtues they accounted to be four, p. 47Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Juſtice; becauſe, as they thought, all others of an inferiour Order, as Magnanimity, Magnificence, Liberality, &c. were reducible unto theſe Four.

BUT we need not tie our ſelves up to the ſtrict Rules of Method, becauſe it is not of any moment upon what peculiar Virtue we diſcourſe firſt: We will therefore follow Ariſtotle, and begin with