Vindication of Address, Treatise

Vindication of Address · Treatise

A VINDICATION OF D^r. HAMMONDS Addreſſe, &c. From the Exceptions of EƲTACTƲS PHILODEMIƲS, IN TWO PARTICULARS. Concerning

The Power ſuppoſed in the Jew, over his owne Freedome.

The No-power over a mans own life.

TOGETHER WITH A BRIEFE REPLY TO M^r IOHN GOODWINS foreign, as far as concernes Dr. HAMMOND.

LONDON, Printed for R. Royſton, at the Angel in Ivie-lane. 1649.

p. 1A VINDICATION OF D^r. HAMMONDS Addreſſe, &c.

§. 1. THe late Author of the Originall, and end of Civill Power, under the name of Eutactus Philodemius, hath thought fit to queſtion two things ſet downe by Doctor Hammond in his Addreſſe to the Generall, and Counſell of War. page 5.The firſt is this Affirmation, That the Jew under Gods own Government might wholly give up himſelfe, and his Freedome to his Maſters will (the power of life being onelyonly exempted) and by having his eare bored, might of a free-man, become a ſlave for ever.

§. 2. The ſecond is this Queſtion, Whether ever any man was by God or Nature invested with power over his owne Life, i. e.page 18. to take away his owne life, or to kill himſelf?

§. 3. This Affirmation, and this Queſtion, he willingly acknowledges, and is content that the Queſtion ſhall be interpreted a down-right Negation, That never any man was by God, or Nature inveſted with power over his owne life, or power to kill himſelfe. And having thus confeſt the citation, as farre as concernes p. 2him, it remaines, that I proceed to juſtifie, both parts of it. And to that end, I ſhall think my ſelfe ſufficiently fortified by two advantages, which that Authour hath been pleaſed to allow me in this matter.

§. 4. Firſt, that it is not any opinion of Doctor Hammond, but the plaine words of Scripture, which are under his name, thus oppoſed by this Authour in both places. The former is in terminis, Exodus 21. at the beginning, If the ſervant ſhall plainly ſay, I love my Maſter, &c. I will not goe out free, Then his Maſter ſhall bring him to the Judges, &c. And his Maſter ſhall bore his eare thorow with an awle, and he ſhall ſerve him for ever. And againe, Deut. 15.16. And it ſhall be, if he (i. e. the ſervant ſet free at the Sabbatick year) ſay unto thee, I will not goe away from thee, &c. Then thou ſhalt take an awle, and thruſt it thorow his ear unto the door, and he ſhall be thy ſervant for ever, and alſo to thy hand-maide thou ſhalt doe likewiſe.

§. 5. That a plaine place of Scripture ſhould be thus miſtaken for an Aſſertion of Doctor Hammond, I am not permitted to ſuſpect, becauſe that Author hath to his mention of the Doctors Name added the teſtimony of Gen. 21. which, though it be a miſtake, I ſuppoſe, of the Printer, for Ex. 21. will yet be a competent teſtimony of that Authors opinion, that Doctor Hammond had Moſes on his ſide, and conſequently, that both were to be involv'd by him in the ſame condemnation.

§. 6. The ſame, I ſuppoſe, I may aſſume of the other Negation queſtioned by him, that 'tis in Doctor Hammond, but the repeating of the 6. Commandement [thou ſhalt not kill] according to the latitude, wherein all Jewiſh, and Chriſtian Writers have interpreted it to the prohibition of ſelf-murder, as hath been ſhewed by him at large in another place.Pract. Cat. l. 2. ſect. 5.

§. 7. Having mentioned this firſt advantage againſt this Author, ſufficient certainly to ſecure Doctor Hammond from his blame, and to make any Apologie for him unneceſſary, and well-nigh ſcandalous (the Word of God being able to plead its owne cauſe, without the aſſiſtance of any humane Advocate) I have yet the benefit of a ſecond kindneſſe allowed me by this unknowne adverſary; which, though Scripture were not of Authority with him, would encourage the Doctor not to fear the falling under p. 3his diſpleaſure. That is, the unreconcileableneſſe of thoſe two opinions (the one with the other) which he is pleaſed to confront to Doctor Hammond, viz. that it ſhould be unlawfull for a Jew to give up his Freedome, (and that ſervitude ſhould be, as he calls it, an unnaturall ſervitude) and yet that it ſhould be put in his power by God and Nature (for that is to affirme it lawfull, and agreeable to Nature) to take away his own Life, or to kill himſelfe. For it being by Job mentioned as an Aphoriſme of common Nature, that a man will for his life give all he hath; and in the accounts and practiſes of all men, that of Liberty being part of that all; It will conſequently be unreaſonable, and impoſſible for him that hath once affirmed the parting with ones freedome to be an unnaturall ſervitude, to deny the killing of himſelf to be an unnaturall murther; And therefore, having ſo faire advantages before me, not onelyonly the Scripture in terminis on my ſide, but this Adverſary, by ſo eaſie a conſequence, become my Second alſo, I am (not unwillingly) perſwaded to tender a brief reply to thoſe reaſons, which ſeeme to have drawn this Author into this caſuall diſpute, and to endeavour the preventing of thoſe Errours; to which, a Philodemius, or popular diſputer may in ſuch an Age of Licentiouſneſſe betray others.

§. 8. To the caſe of the Jewiſh Servant, giving up his freedome to his Maſter, (which was by the Doctor mentioned out of Moſes) the Authour hath framed three Anſwers.

§. 9. The firſt, That it cannot be affirmed upon good and pregnant grounds, that from nature the Jew had any ſuch power, but that God onelyonly permitted it to be ſo; and the Jew, by this unnaturall ſervitude to his maſter, was a fit type of that ſlavery that man ſhould be in unto Sin, to obey it in the luſts thereof; for his ſervants we are whom we obey.

§. 10. To this I Anſwer, That the affirmation of Moſes in the Scripture, [That this was permitted by God to the Jewes] is to me a good and pregnant ground that the Jew had this power under Gods own Government, which is all that he affirmes to be affirmed by Doctor Hammond in that place; and therefore, the putting in thoſe other words [Of the Jewes not having it from Nature] ſeemes to be on purpoſe deſigned to take off from the clearneſſe, and the pregnancy of the probation, and ſo onelyonly p. 4to darken, but not to invalidate the argument.

§. 11. But then ſecondly, I adde, that Gods permitting any thing to any man, is a pregnant argument, that from Nature that man hath that power: If by Power we mean a morall power, or power of doing it without Sin; And if by Gods permiſſion we underſtand his Approbation, as of a lawfull fact. For, thus it is certaine, that God never ſo permits, as to approve (or not prohibite) any thing, which by the Law of Nature may not be done without ſinne. For the Law of Nature being the Law of God, as truly as any poſitive Law of his promulgating; and God in all his Lawes being conſtant to himſelfe, ſo farre as never to prohibit, and permit the ſame thing at the ſame time to the ſame men; It is moſt certaine, that what God thus permits, Nature permits alſo, i. e. Leaves it lawfull to be done, or poſſible without Sinne.

§. 12. But if by Permiſſion this Author meanes no more then diſpenſation, or grant of preſent Impunity, ſuch as in the Jewiſh Common-wealth was (for the hardneſſe of their hearts) allowed in the buſineſſe of divorce, or (for the multiplying of them) in polygamy, then it will ſure reſt upon him to prove, and not only, as he ſaith, to ſuppoſe, that God thus (and thus only) permitted it to be ſo: But this I ſhall ſuppoſe impoſſible to be proved, though it cannot lie upon me to demonſtrate the Negative, nor ſhall I ſo much fear the probableneſſe of his unprov'd groundleſſe ſuppoſition, as to endeavour it. For indeed, what degree of likeneſſe is there betwixt thoſe divorces and polygamies, (which were ſuch inordinate Liberties) and this other of diveſting himſelfe of Liberty? Only the ſame that is betwixt two Contraries.

§. 13. I ſhall not need further to inſiſt on this, both for the plaine words of Scripture, and becauſe it is the acknowledgment of this very Author, page 18. That this may lawfully be done for the obtaining of a greater good, which being compared with Rom. 3. ver. 8. makes up a demonſtration, that a man hath this power, i. e. that he may lawfully doe it. For 'tis not the intuition of the greateſt morall good, much leſſe of the greateſt advantage to my ſelf, or any other, that may make that lawfull which in it ſelf is unlawfull, or which by nature man hath not power to doe.

p. 5§. 14. And therefore, when he addes, [That in this the Jew was a fit type of mans ſlavery to ſinne] as t'will be eaſily granted, that he was (as type ſignifies Image or Embleme) ſo ſure it will not prove that this ſervitude of the Jew, was an unnaturall ſervitude, any more then any other parts of the Judaicall Law, (which either in the intention of the Law-giver, or by the wit of Man can be made an Image of any preſent ſtate, or condition of men) can by that one Argument be proved to be unnaturall. For, ſure all types are not by that one evidence of their being types demonſtrated to be ſinfull, eſpecially when they are inſtituted, or permitted by God, and by that appeare to be agreeable to his will, in Oppoſition to, or Variation from which all ſinne, or Obliquity conſiſts: Or if this charge muſt fall ſingly on this Type, but not on all others (as ſure the Paſſeover, which was a Type, was not yet unnaturall, and ſo of the reſt) then muſt this charge be proved by ſome other medium, then by this onelyonly, that it is a Type; and till that be produced, I muſt think this way of diſcourſe (which firſt ſuppoſes this giving up of the Jewes Liberty to be a Type, and then concludes it unnaturall for being ſuch) to be the proving of quidlibet ex quolibet, the ſame with his, which firſt ſuppoſes a live man to be a Picture, and then ſends him a challenge for being ſuch: Certainly ſuch reaſoning is too very looſe, and light, to ſet any good Character on that cauſe that wants ſuch ſupporters.

§. 15. His ſecond anſwer is yet a little more ſtrange, and ſuch as could not yet eaſily have been foreſeene, or expected, That his having his ear bored was a puniſhment for his contempt of that Liberty, &c. Tis ſufficiently known that this boring of the ear was the ceremony of receiving a Servant among the Jewes; and therefore, when David ſaith of Chriſt, But mine eare haſt thou opened, 'tis acknowledg'd, that thereby was denoted his taking on him the forme of a ſervant. This boring of the ear with an awle was no very painfull thing, ſure not ſo much as Circumciſion; and yet 'twould be a little ſtrange, that when a Proſelite was received among the Jewes with Circumciſion, that ſhould be deemed a puniſhment on him for his not continuing a Gentile, or that his Converſion to Judaiſme, of which this was the Ceremony, ſhould be thereupon counted an unnaturall Sinne: The anſwering ſuch p. 6Arguments as theſe, would require a more chearfull, and pleaſant humour, then the times, or occaſion of theſe debates will well permit.

§. 16. The laſt Anſwer lookes a little more demurely, That his giving himſelfe up to be a ſlave for ever, did referre to, and terminate in the year of Jubilee, &c. and that he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave, &c. [That this was to terminate in the year of Jubilee] is ſaid without farther proof, then onelyonly of this unteſtified affirmation in a Parentheſis, that that was the year of his freedome from that ſervitude which the corruption of his own will had brought upon him, which is the proving a thing by a bare repeating of it in other words, and onelyonly throwing a little durt upon it. For how doth it appear that it is a piece of Corruption (for a man that loves his Maſter, as the Text ſaith, and is better pleaſed with his ſervice, then with his former liberty) thus to chooſe that which he likes beſt? Or how comes the caſting off Liberty to be a corruption of the will, when caſting off yokes, and ſervitude is made capable of ſo good a Character? Had the words of Saint Paul, ſpeaking of ſervants, [If thou canſt be free, uſe it rather] been brought to back this bare Aſſertion, there had been ſome tolerable excuſe for ſuch a begging of the queſtion as this: But thoſe words extend not to a command, that every man ſhould be obliged to be free, that can, but onelyonly to a permiſſion, that, if he will rather uſe it (i. e. preferre this Liberty) he moſt lawfully, and commendably may. But this Authour hath not thought fit to make this Interpretation, or account of that place neceſſary to be given him. As for the truth of his Affirmation, that this Bondman with his ear bored, was releaſed at the year of Jubilee, 'tis that, which, as it doth not well conſiſt with the words of Moſes, [He ſhall ſerve him for ever] Exod. 21.6. and Deut. 15.17. ſo it is not proved by any other place, or made probable that [for ever] is not an abſolute [for ever.] One place in Leviticus, there is Chap. 25.41. which ſaith, that the poor Brother that is ſold to be a bond ſervant, ſhall be free at the year of Jubilee, and proportionably the ſervant (ſpoken of by me in Exodus and Deuteronomy) is to be ſet free from that ſervitude, to which he was ſold (i. e. the forced and conſtrein'd, not purely voluntarily ſervitude) in the ſeventh, or ſabbatick year, and ſo by the ſame reaſon p. 7in the Jubilee, which is the great Sabbatick (made up of ſeven times ſeven) in the place of Leviticus.

§. 17. But this Author muſt mark, that this perſon thus ſet free, is not the Jew of whom Doctor Hammond ſpake, but the other that hath made the voluntary ſurrender of his Liberty, he that, when the Sabbatick yeare comes (or conſequently the year of Jubilee, which offers him the ſame releaſe) reſolves, that he will not goe out free, refuſes to make uſe of the advantage of a Jubilee, and ſo hath no more releaſes behind; and conſequently by this act of his is in an irreverſible eſtate, remains a ſervant for ever. And ſo this more ſpecious anſwer appeares to have as little of truth, or ſubſtance in it, as the two former.

§. 18. To which, yet I might further adde, That in caſe it were granted, that the next year of Jubilee gave this man releaſe alſo, yet would not this avoid the concludency of this place for the lawfulneſſe of giving up our Liberty (which is the onelyonly point in hand) becauſe he that can doe it for ſeven, or for fifty yeares, can ſurely doe it: and although having done it, he ſhall have Liberty, after that number of yeares, to retract, if he pleaſe, yet is this no obligation that he ſhall retract, but onelyonly a priviledge that he may, which priviledge he may againe as lawfully deny himſelfe to make uſe of, as before he did of his firſt Liberty.

§. 19. Mean while the concluſion, or cloſe of this Authors reaſoning is a little more extraordinary yet. For having from (the foreign of) the Jubilee, inferr'd that he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave, he proceeds. [And if ſo (i. e. ſure, if he made not himſelfe a ſlave irrecoverably) where is the warrant from God, or Nature, from paſſiing away his freedome, or Liberty at all? and if ſo, how without recall, and irreverſibly?] Is it poſſible this Author could think theſe concluſions demonſtrated ſo logically, as that he ſhould ſet them downe by way of queſtion, which ſuppoſes them irrefragable at the firſt asking?

§. 20. For the firſt of them, is not the contrary moſt demonſtrable? that if he were a ſlave till the year of Jubilee, (as tis confeſt he was, and withall that he was ſo by Gods permiſſion) then there is warrant from God for paſſing away his Liberty in ſome degree, p. 8and for ſome ſpace, though not irrevocably. Doth not he ſerve at all, that ſerves not eternally? or is that no warrant at all, which is ſuch for a limited time only? Then ſure are we not at all permitted to be men, or warranted by God ▪ or Nature, to live in this world, becauſe we have our Jubilee too, our time of manumiſſion from hence.

§. 21. And for the ſecond, what is that but a plaine Circle, firſt to infer the [not at all] from the [not irrevocably] and then in ſame breath, the [not irrovocably] from the [not at all.] How reconcileable this is with the Authours popular title of Philodemius I diſpute not, but reſolve, it is not the particular merit which beſtowed on him that other more regular of Eutactus.

§. 22. And for the dexterity that is expreſt in the concluſion of the whole ſection, [That therefore, that abſolute, and unreſerved reſignation of a mans native Liberty, &c. without any juſt condition, or adaequate exchange, (which ſaith he, is hereby pleaded for by the Doctor) can have no riſe, or origination from God, or reaſonable nature] (impoſing on the Doctor directly againſt his ſenſe, thoſe words of ſo irrationall importance, [without any juſt condition, or adaequate exchange] I ſhall ſuppoſe that this was an effect of the neceſſary wants of his cauſe, and a diſcreet praeviſion that his concluſion could not ſubſiſt without ſuch ſupplies, which made him venture on ſuch indirect meanes.

§. 23. For Doctor Hammond is not ſuch an enemy to man-kind, as to plead for ſuch irrationall actings, or to become his advocate that makes imprudent, or unthrifty bargaines, (though by the ſtrength of his free will to evill, he may poſſibly do ſo ſometimes, and be obliged by his owne act, and juſtly ſuffer the inconveniences, and ſmarts of it) but reſolveth, that both the Campanians in their dedition, and the Barbarians in their requeſt to the Romans, that they might have leave to become their ſervants; and the Jew in Moſes's ſuppoſition, that loved his Maſter, and preferr'd his ſervice before his manumiſſion, (I ſhall adde my ſelfe alſo, who profeſſe to prefer (in my choice for my ſelfe) ſubjection before abſolute Liberty, nay, before Soveraignty it ſelfe, and believe it a farre more ſober, and conſequently rationall ſpeech in Saul, 1 Sam. 9.21. which expreſt ſome p. 9averſation to Samuels propoſal about anointing him, then that other of Abſolons, O that I were a Judge, or King, &c.) did all part with their Liberty upon adequate exchanges, ſuch, as they (which were the fitteſt judges what themſelves thought) did conceive to be the full worth of the commodity they parted with: And ſuch a rationall power of parting with abſolute Liberty for ſomewhat that I like better, (i. e. for ſubjection to Government, which is, 1. in it ſelfe, farre removed from ſlavery; and 2. is the onelyonly way to ſecure men from the danger of it) is all that that Addreſſe had occaſion to aſſert, or plead for at that time.

§. 24. One thing more there is, which I may be allowed to adde, (having thus farre reply'd to all his anſwers) that the concluſion which was in the Addreſſe inferr'd from that practice of the Jewes, was farther confirm'd by the practice of diverſe Heathens, who can neither be excuſed by the pretence of a permiſſion, or ſpeciall diſpenſation from God to doe unnaturall things (as he thinks may be affirmed of the Jew) nor yet were obſerved by the moſt rational Hiſtorians to have done any thing contrary to Reaſon or Nature, in changing abſolute Liberty for ſomewhat which ſeemed better, and more advantagious to them, to wit, for ſecurity, and protestion, i. e. in changing a ſtate of common hoſtility, (the unhappieſt lot in nature) for that other (ſet down by the Apoſtle as the object of their Chriſtian **foreign.purſuite, and emulation, and **foreign.contention) a quiet ſetled peace. The advantage of which change, he that is not inclined to acknowledge, muſt be of a temper of minde, or body ſo diſtant from that, which God hath given me, that I ſhall not wonder, that that which ſeemes to me moſt demonſtractively aſſerted, is to him ſo farre from being acknowledged ſuch. I ſhall adde no more to the vindicating of the firſt propoſition, till I meet with the temptation of better, or more dangerous arguments againſt it.

§. 25. I proceed as briefly to the ſecond, which is propoſed in the Addreſſe by way of queſtion, Whether ever any man was by God, or Nature, inveſted with power of his owne Life, i. e. with power to take away his owne Life, to kill himſelfe? The vindicating of which, I muſt acknowledge a taske, to which I did not expect, that the Doctor ſhould be call'd; having not, till now, been ſo fully convinced of the danger, and p. 10ill conſequences of favouring the exceſſes of thoſe mens wits, who have maintained paradoxes, or of the improvidence of thoſe that have tempted others by the publiſhing of them.

§. 26. For certainly about two yeares ſince, before the time, that the poſtthumous foreign: was ſet out, a man might in this Nation have adventur'd to have asked ſo calme a queſtion [whether a man might Lawfully kill himſelf?] and not have feared a challenge in Print for this injury, or encroachment upon the liberty of our Nature. And I conceive thoſe Lawes of our Land, which have look'd on this ſelfe-ſlaughter, as an inhumane crime, and puniſh'd it after Death, with the deniall of Chriſtian buriall, & a marke of reproach upon the grave, might, when time was, have been able to have come in to the aſſiſtance of ſo known a truth; had not the ſacred rites of Chriſtian buryall been now ſo deſpiſed, and profaned, that the wanting them hath ceaſed to be eſteemed a puniſhment among us; had not the Cuſtome of killing other men ſo haraſs'd our Conſciences, and obliterated all the remainders of written, and unwritten Lawes, that we need not be wondred at, if the ſwords, which have been ſo fleſht abroad, miſtake their way ſometimes, and return on the owners breſts. And laſtly, had not the deduction been ſo prone, and eaſie from the Generall, to the particulars, from the Lawfulneſſe of a Nations deſtroying it ſelfe, to a ſingle perſons going and doing likewiſe, from the juſtifying of civil inteſtine ſlaughters of the publicke, to that other more tolerable crime of a ſingle violence.

§. 26. As it is, I ſhall not endeavour to perſwade my ſelfe (as the Pyrrhonian in Sextus Empiricus, would teach me to do) that I was in a dream, when I read D. Hammond cited, and confuted for thus affirming; I muſt rather provide for the encounter, and haſten to anſwer the arguments, which this Author hath offered againſt this branch of the ſixt commandement (as he met with it in the Doctors hands) or elſe twill be poſſible this opinion may gather Proſelytes alſo in this age, wherein nothing can be ſaid ſo incredible, which ſome men doe not make a ſhift to take up, and believe very contentedly.

§. 27. His firſt argument is drawne from the Doctors Conceſſion, that man hath power from God and Nature over his owne p. 11body to cut, and lance it, and over his owne freedome to paſſe it away, from whence, if he doe any thing, he muſt undertake to conclude, that therefore he hath power over his life alſo; And to doe that, he muſt make good theſe three things:

§. 28. 1. That ſince the confutation of the former propoſition, he hath now chang'd his minde, and agrees with Doctor Hammond, that a man hath from God or Nature power over his freedome to paſſe it away, (for otherwiſe, though it will be an advantage againſt Doctor Hammond, who confeſt it, yet will it not be of uſe to himſelf who profeſſeth the contrary) and again that he hath forgotten, what in his very laſt period he had affirmed [that God doth not intruſt and allow any man to have power to deſtroy his owne image, i. e. to take away mans life, but him, or them whom he makes Gods, i. e. Magiſtrates to whom he deputes his owne place] for ſure it cannot be thought, that every private man in the community of Nature, is ſuch a Vicegerent of God, or Magiſtrate.

§. 29. 2. That the argument, à minori ad majus affirmativè, is valid, againſt all Logicke, viz: That he that hath power over the body, or over freedome, is ſuppoſed to have power over Life alſo, and ſo that the Surgeon, that may ſcarify the fleſh, or cut off an Arme, may therefore as Lawfully ſlaſh the throate, and cut off the head alſo, and in like manner that the Maſter by being ſuch, is become the Judge of his Servant, and hath among Chriſtians that power of his Life, which he hath ſeldome been allowed among the worſt of Heathens.

§. 30. And 3. That God, which hath put ſomething in our power, is thereby obliged to reſerve nothing to himſelfe; Or that by giving us the uſus fructus, or benefits of Life, he hath giving us the abſolute dominion, and propriety of it alſo.

§. 31. But without either of theſe 3 more difficult undertakings, the Authour hath attempted an eaſier way, by ſuppoſing that neither cutting of fleſh, nor Parting with freedome may be endured by God or Nature, unleſſe they referre to ſuch an end, whereby a farre greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained: that cutting or lancing (without this neceſſary circumſtance of a greater good) is a ſtep or degree toward ſelfe murther, &c. From whence the Concluſion, I ſuppoſe, muſt be, that by the ſame reaſon the Killing of ones ſelfe, may then alſo be conceiv'd allowable by God, when p. 12it is referr'd by me to ſuch an end, whereby a far greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained, but never elſe.

§. 32. To which I ſhall make theſe clear Replyes, 1. That a thing directly forbidden by God, cannot be thought approveable by him, upon the referring of it to a morall (much leſſe if it be but an advantagious or profitable) good end. Their damnation is juſt, that ſay, they may doe evill that good may come: And that this is not a begging of the queſtion; but that, indeed, ſelf-homicide is evill, and forbidden by God, will be clear by remembring theſe three things, 1. That the command of not killing, is indefinite; and that he that kils himſelfe, doth certainly kill, that he that ſheds his own bloud, ſheds the bloud of a Man: and 2. That the Image of God reſiding on him (which is the ground of this prohibition in Moſes, Gen. 9.6.) is as truly ſo, when 'tis beheld in the reflexion, as when in the direct line, in my ſelf, as in any other man. 3. That the power of Life is Reſerved a peculiar to God, and not communicated to the Creature, (ſave onelyonly to his Vice-gerent) which may thus appear. God as the Creator of the World, and ſole doner of life muſt be acknowledged to have the dominion over it: This dominion conſequently is communicated to none but to thoſe to whom by God it is communicated; To the Magiſtrate this power is given by that Law of God, whereby he preſcribes the putting certain Malefactors to Death; and whereby he conſtitutues the Magiſtrate his Vice-gerent on Earth, and ſo the executioner of that Law, an avenger for wrath, Rom. 13. And whoſoever will challenge the like power, muſt ſhew the like charter, and evidence; and if he cannot doe that, that is ſufficient to prove that he hath it not; As 'tis ſufficient to convict any man of the injuſtice of any his claime to my eſtate, that he cannot ſhew any deed whereby it was convey'd to him from me; And there need no other Affirmative proof againſt ſuch an one, then that it was once in me, and it appeares not how it parted from me to any other. And therefore, till ſome evidence be produced, (which I ſuppoſe will never be) that this power of life is made over from God to every private man, the demonſtration is abundantly clear, that that power is not in any private man any more over himſelfe then others. And it is obſervable to this very purpoſe, that though the Stoicks, to teach their Diſciples apathy, or courage p. 13againſt whatſoever events did talk of that ſure remedy againſt all temporal preſſures, the going out, or killing themſelves, (looking on it favourably as a refuge, or ſanctuary from all thoſe things which might otherwiſe be phanſied unſupportable) yet when they conſidered it this other way, (as every thing, they ſaid, had two handles) i. e. in reſpect of God, who placed them here; it was generally reſolved by them, viz. by Seneca, and the wiſeſt of them (and the more fooliſh of that Sect, are ſeldome found to practice the contrary) that we muſt not on our own heads deſert our ſtation, but maintaine that ground on which our Generall hath ſet us, and waite with courage and patience, till he think fit to command us off againe. As for the other two, power over the fleſh, and the freedome, the cutting of one, and parting with the other, they are no degrees toward the taking away life, but on the contrary are uſed on purpoſe for the preſerving of it, in its being, or well being, the one by the rules of phyſick, the other of policy; and therefore is the power of thoſe allowed us by God, and Nature, becauſe they are thus inſtrumentall to that end, and ſubmitted to our diſcretion, becauſe they may be ſo. Thus are ſome things referred to the Stewards judgement, and put into his power, to diſpoſe for the good of the Family, and yet others reſerv'd peculiar, and ſacred in the Maſters own hands. Thus are my Writings put into my Lawyers hand, for him to uſe to the preſerving of my Eſtate; yet is not my Eſtate put into his power to diſpoſe of it at his pleaſure for ſome greater end. And the argument would be very infirme, becauſe that power which the Steward, or Lawyer hath intruſted to him, ought not to be uſed by him, but in order to ſome good end; that therefore, that which is not ſo entruſted to him, may be thus aſſumed alſo. Some rayes there have alwayes been communicated from Heaven to this Earth of ours; and yet ſome Flowers of of that celeſtiall Crown, which have been reſerved as ſacred, and incommunicable. And ſo there will be no kind of weight or concludency in this preſent way of arguing, this ballancing of fleſh or liberty with Life, till it appear alſo from the ſame, or equall evidence, that thoſe are reſerved by God, as Life appears to be. This certainly without any more help, is a full ſatisfaction to this argument.

p. 14§. 33. But then ſecondly, & ex abundanti, the Killing my ſelf is no way ordinable to good, 1. 'Tis not ordinable to mine owne preſent worldly advant…ge, as lancing, and ſubjection may be, that is clear; and that is a reaſon why God ſhould not give us this Liberty, (though if we were not able to render reaſons, the wiſdome of the Law-giver were reaſon enough) and for future advantages to my ſelfe, the being with Chriſt, which is farre better, 1. that cannot be taken notice of by bare Nature, till that be Chriſtianized: and then 2. according to the Chriſtians rules, we have all reaſon to reſolve that 'twill not be purchaſt by any other way, but by that which God hath preſcribed toward it, i. e. by lawfull unprohibited courſes. It being evident, that the Crown which is held in Gods hand ſhall not be diſpenced to any, but thoſe which doe foreign, ſtrive lawfully, and that patience of waiting till God calls, is one of the Lawes that are thus preſcribed in our foreign.

§. 34. As for advantages to others, the Publick-weal, or peace, 'tis not imaginable, how the killing my ſelf can be directly, or otherwiſe then by accident, ordinable to that; whatſoever can be conceived of it, will be as ſufficiently provided for by the Magiſtrates having power of life; and that he may have from God immediately, as well as he can be ſuppoſed to have it from any act of collation from me, if 'twere in my power.

§. 35. Laſtly, For any morall, or Chriſtian virtue, or yet farther, the illuſtrating of the Glory of our Creatour, (which alone deſerve the title of good ends) 'tis not the having an unlimited power, that immediately, or directly contributes to theſe, but the making uſe of the limited powers we have, the imploying the lives which he hath given us, according to his will, and not the deſtroying them contrary to it, I ſhall not need to proſecute this. All that is in this place pretended by the Author to this purpoſe, is onelyonly this, that a man may freely conſent, and willingly expoſe his life to death for a greater, or publiker good.

§. 36. Where by conſenting I ſhall ſuppoſe him to mean a conſent of the will to that action which immediately followes, i. e. to the expoſing his life to death, (and if by conſent he ſhould mean any thing elſe, as the conſenting, that the other ſhall kill him, or the making it free and lawfull to that other, to take away his Life, p. 15then hath he put two very diſtant things together, and ſo 'tis but the ordinary fallacy plurium interrogationum, and in that Notion of Conſenting I ſhall anon ſhew that man may not, i. e. hath not power ſo to Conſent.) And to the proving of this, it is, that his remaining endeavours (as farr as concernes Doctor Hommond) are directed. And accordingly he ſaith, He will be ſo bold as to ſtate the Queſtion as it ought, i. e. to remove it from the words and ſence wherein Doctor Hammond propoſed it (and in which it is that his whole diſcourſe is grounded) to thoſe other words of his owne, moſt extreamly diſtant in ſound and ſence; and in which I am as confident, that the truth is on his ſide, (if Conſent ſignifie no more then I take it to ſignifie) as I am, that that truth doth not contradict thoſe other truths, which by Doctor Hammond are ſuperſtructed on his foundation; or that the Propoſition, as 'tis ſtated by the Doctor, is all that is neceſſary to be affirm'd for the founding of the reſt of his diſcourſe.

§. 37. For I deſire to know, whether there be no difference betwixt killing my ſelf, and expoſing my life to death? If ſo, then it muſt be not onelyonly lawfull ſo to kill my ſelf (which is all the Author demands) but ſometimes an act of duty, and neceſſity alſo: For ſo certainly (in the aſſiſting my Soveraign, or Country to hazard, and expoſe my life, when I am thereto lawfully called; and ſo againe, to ſuffer Martyrdome in the confeſſion of Chriſt, or diſcharge of any Chriſtian duty, is not onelyonly lawfull for me to doe, but I ſinne if I doe it not. And yet I doe not perceive that this Authour hath laid this obligation, or neceſſity on himſelfe, or any man elſe in any caſe to kill (or lay violent hands upon) himſelfe, and ſo I ſuppoſe he is ſtill of the Doctors mind, (though he be willing to conceal it) that there is a difference between theſe.

§. 38. And if there yet want any farther light to the clearing of this difference between this [having power of my owne life ſo as to kill my ſelfe, and that [having power of my life, ſo as to expoſe it, or venture it in a good Cauſe] I ſhall (for the concluding of this Paper) propoſe the plaine difference betweene them.

§. 39. And that may be taken from the nature of the word [expoſing] for that we know ſignifies no more, then to ſubmit p. 16it to an hazard, and ſo to expoſe my life, is to hazard my life: In doing ſo, all that can be affirm'd of me, is no more then this, that I am willing, or content (and by my actions expreſſe that willingneſſe) to loſe my life, if God pleaſe to permit it to be taken from me.

§. 40. When my life is thus loſt, three things muſt neceſſarily concurre to it, 1. The Violence of the invader; 2. The Providence of God permitting him to invade; and 3. My not reſiſting, or my not uſing the meanes (which were naturally poſſible for me to uſe) to prevent, or avoid the violence of this invaſion, as when Christ might have uſed Angels (and another ſlight, and a third complyance, and caution) but chooſeth not to doe ſo. Of theſe three the onelyonly efficient cauſe of the action (of killing) is the malicious violent invader; ſure neither the providence of God in permitting, nor my owne meekneſſe, or obedience to Chriſt in following him, though it be to the very Croſſe.

§. 41. In this caſe, ſuppoſing that it be for a good End that I now expoſe my life; it is alſo ſuppoſed, that the purſuance of that end is either duty in me, a thing that I am abſolutely bound to, as the Confeſſion of Chriſt, &c. or elſe that tis exceſſe of Charity, to which, though it be not under particular precept, yet the Intuition of ſome great, and glorious end doth ſo invite, and incline me, that tis heroicall Virtue in me to doe it, and that which (though God doth not ſo require it of me, as that I ſinne, if I doe it not, yet) he hath promiſed to reward abundantly, whenſoever 'tis done for his ſake.

§. 42. In the former of theſe caſes, when the purſuance of that good end is ſtrict duty, as in caſe I am commanded to confeſſe Chriſt, or to aſſiſt my Prince in protecting my Country, There as my endeavour is required of me by that precept, ſo is my utmoſt endeavour, ſuch as I muſt not remit, whatſoever the danger be; And if that danger prove to be the utmoſt danger, even of my l…fe it ſelfe, yet the command of Conſtancy, of not fearing, or fainting, and the character of perfect love given by Saint John, that it caſts out fear, and the denunciations againſt the fearfull, or cowardly, doe all joyne to extend my obligation, to purſue this ſo neceſſary End without any receding, and if the Croſſe it ſelf lie in my way toward this end, to take it up, i. e. willingly to p. 17ſubmit to Gods Providence, which hath thought fit to call me to this Tryall, if it be even of reſisting unto bloud. And ſo ſtill all that I doe, is the conſtant, patient, chearfull ſubmiſſion to Gods Will (in his providentiall diſpoſing of my life, and in permitting the injurious to take it from me) and nothing elſe; an abſolute choiſe of Obedience, but not of Death; a ſacrificing to duty all deſire of Life, but not otherwiſe undertaking to diſpoſe of it.

§. 43. Hence is it that my venturing of my Life doth not clear, or free the Invader, from any degree of ſinne, or guilt in thus taking it away from me. 'Twas but a Sarcaſme or Trope in Julians Souldiers, to ſay, they did not wrong the Chriſtians by killing them, but onelyonly haſten them to their deſired home: And the Fathers were able to anſwer the Paralogiſme by the rule in Ethickes, diſtinguiſhing betwixt a mixt, and abſolute will; and ſo concluding their ſlaughters to be Injuries, though they were willingly embraced, the Perſecutors to be Perſecutors ſtill, though the other were Martyrs.

§. 44. Which is a demonſtrative proof, that 'tis the Invader, not Sufferer, whoſe act the killing is ſuppoſed to be, and ſo that I am not in this caſe of expoſing my Life, ſuppoſed to give any Conſent that he ſhall kill me, or conſequently to diveſt my ſelf of the power of my life, or indeed to have any ſuch power over it. For whatſoever is abſolutely in my power to diſpoſe of, that I may lawfully conſent to part with; That if I doe part with it, ipſo facto, and jure **Data …o ipſo quo dantur, ſiunt accipientis. Iurist.becomes his, to whom I part with it (and if there be any errour in it, 'tis chargeable on the giver, who was thus profuſely Liberall above the proportion:) And conſequently for him to take and uſe it, is in him no ſinne; As that part of my Eſtate which is in my power, may by me be paſt over to another by gift, and being ſo, is lawfully poſſeſt, and enjoy'd by the receiver.

§. 45. And therefore, I ſay, if the lawfullneſſe of the expoſing my Life would conclude me to have a power over it, it muſt be as perfectly lawfull for the Tyrant, into whoſe hands my Life (in the confeſſing of Christ) is by me expoſed, to take that Life from me, as 'tis for the poor man into whoſe hands my goods are by me put (in obedience to Chriſts command of mercifulneſs) to receive, p. 18and carry away thoſe goods; which being an abſurdity too groſſe to be defended by any, will, I ſuppoſe, incline this Author to diſcerne the diſtance betwixt the queſtions, as the one is by him, and as the other was by Doctor Hammond propoſed.

§. 46. And in like manner alſo, when the End purſued by me, is (though not abſolutely neceſſary, yet) better and more excellent; there the Precept of being faithfull unto death, and the promiſe of reward made to him tht layes down, or loſes his life for Chriſts ſake, doe as much oblige to constancy, at leaſt, as much aſſure that ſuch conſtancy ſhall be acceptable to God, (and that the more by how much greater the hazards, and terrours, and temptations are to the contrary) as when the particular matter of the action was under precept. And ſo that other accidentall difference will make no variation in the main, nor make it at all probable, that expoſing my life heroically was not warranted by God, when expoſing it neceſſarily, was ſuppoſed to be ſo: it being as certain that God doth warrant me to doe that which he commends, as what he ſtrictly commands to me: And therefore what was ſaid in the caſe of duty, doth as truly hold (and ſo needes not to be repeated againe) in this caſe of [more excellent] alſo.

§. 47. Having thus far proceeded, it will now be unneceſſary for me to anſwer the Arguments which this Author addes in this matter, becauſe the Queſtion being by him changed from that, which was propoſed by Doctor Hammond (and ſtated Negatively) to another, which no man can be more ready to affirme, and aſſert then that Doctor; It would be an impertinent niceneſſe in him to refuſe to have his Opinion confirmed by another mans reaſons; I ſhall rather wiſh that all his proofs were demonſtrative, and effectuall to conclude, what Doctor Hammond affirms with him; and onelyonly briefly ſhew, that they are ineffectuall to prove what that Doctor denies, and that will ſoon be done by the moſt curſory mention of them.

§. 48. For firſt, I grant with him that God permitted his owne Sonne to be put to death by the hands of violent, and unjuſt men, but ſee no conſequence from thence, that Chriſt, as a Man might lawfully have taken away his own Life; as for the phraſe of laying down the life for the ſheep, that ſure ſignifies not the killing himſelf, p. 19for the goodneſſe of the Shepheard conſiſts not in that) the cutting his owne throat, when the Wolfe invades the Flock; but the making uſe of his Life to the utmoſt, wherein it may be advantageous to the Sheep, and venturing, and hazarding it in their defence, or quarrell; yea, and contentedly ſuffering (not acting in) his own death, that he may be able to avert theirs. For this is the meaning of foreign, to lay downe the life, (foreign, to venture himſelfe voluntarily into danger, foreign, in the notion in which the Greek Gloſſaries explain the phraſe, from foreign, i. e. foreign in Heſychius, and the Latine, Parabelanum animae ſuae eſſe, i. e. all one with foreign) to expoſe it, not to be ſo ſolicitous for the defence of it, as to forgoe da…y, or charity, or care of the poor ſheep intruſted to him, for the preſerving of it.

§. 49. A ſecond Argument is by this Author touched on (though not formally urged by him) that the preſerving whole ſocieties from periſhing is a good, and a publick end, and that the impunity of offenders being the readiest way to the diſſolution, and deſtruction of ſocieties, Nature is ſuppoſed to dictate that one man ſhould rather juſtly die, than whole ſocieties unjuſtly periſh. This Concluſion, and Premiſſes, the Doctor doth, as the Author foreſaw, moſt willingly acknowledge, but withall diſcernes not, how it proves that a man hath power over his owne life: It will be ſufficient if God by any other meanes (as by inſtating it in the Prince &c.) do place that power of life in others. The utmoſt which this way of arguing can pretend to conclude, is, 1. That whatſoever any man hath in his own power, that tis reaſonable for him to deliver up into the Governours hand, (thus to make it eaſie, or poſſible to diſcharge his truſt, and by theſe advantages to contribute to the publike quiet and weale.) Nay 2. that God that hath the power of life, and ſees how uſefull 'tis to have that veſted in Governours, ſhould conſequently be ſuppoſed ſo to veſt it (And that he doth ſo, is the clear acknowledgment of the Addreſſe.)

§. 50. But ſure it cannot extend ſo farre, as to make a man give (or have) that which he hath not, nor to reſtraine God from having the ſole Originall power of that, which otherwiſe might be acknowledged to be veſted in him.

§. 51. As for the ſuppoſition, which the Author here addes on the p. 20back of this, [In caſe 10 men in the community of Nature choſe one to rule over them, and one of them thus ſpontaneouſly ſubjected ſhall murther one of his fellow Subjects] (whereupon he demands whether the ruler ſo ſet up may not by his own conſent by virtue of that power he received from him among the reſt, put ſuch a Murtherer to death) To this I anſwer, that the Governour may in this caſe put the Murtherer to death, but this not by virtue of any power, or conſent of the Murtherer, but by authority from God, who alone hath the power of life; In relation to which it is that the Governour is ſtyled foreign, a Miniſter of God, in this very notion, as he is foreign, an avenger for wrath or puniſher of offenders.

§. 52. That which is in the Subjects power the Governour may have by the Subjects conſent, and by virtue of the power which he received from him; And therefore it is that the power of violent reſiſting invaders, the right of repelling force by force, which God and Nature hath given the ſingle man in community of Nature, is now, in caſe of ſubmiſſion to the Governour, parted with, and depoſited by him, ſo far as refers to the Governor, and though it be founded in ſelfe-defence, yet he that thus violently reſiſts the powers, ſhall receive to himſelfe damnation.

§. 53. But ſtill that which is not in the Subjects power, is not, nay cannot be veſted by the ſubject in the Governour, but flowes from an higher principle (from him that really hath the power) and comes from the Subjects conſent, onelyonly, as from the cauſa ſine quâ non, or by way of reſultance; That as God communicates not this power of life to any but the Governour; ſo that mans Conſent, that hee ſhould be his Governour, doth remotely (and by way of condition, or qualifying of the ſubject to a capacity of receiving that power from God) concurre to the veſting of that power in that perſon. Thus doth the temper of the aire contribute to the qualifying the ſlime, or putrid matter to receive influences from the Sunne, and then thoſe influences beget life in it, and endow it with that higher principle, which the temper of the aire, that contributed all it could, (having not thus much in its power) could not be affirm'd to contribute to it.

§. 54. And ſo you ſee the Doctors way of ſtating this queſtion doth as fully provide for the puniſhing of Malefactors, and p. 21preſerving of communities, as the ſuppoſing the power of life to proceed originally from the People, would be able to doe; As he that affirmes the Soule in every birth to be infuſed by God, makes as ſure a proviſion for Generation, and conſequently for the preſervation of the humane ſpecies, as they that ſuppoſe the Soul to be traduced from the Parents, as well as the Body.

§. 55. His laſt Argument is from Rom. 5.7. For a good man one would dare to die, i. e. ſaith he, would with the preſence of a reſolved Spirit die; the word [daring] ſaith he, noting a preſence of minde terrified with no dangers. To this Argument againe, as far as by the Author it can be extended, i. e. to the acknowledgement, or concluding of the lawfullneſſe of a valiant couragious ſuffering of death, either for a publick good, or for ſome act of eminent private charity, I am fully of the Authors mind.

§. 56. But the word [dying] in that place, ſignifying no more then ſubmiſſion of the Will, contentedneſſe, or willingneſſe to ſuffer death, not by his owne, but by ſome other mans hands, an foreign, a taking thoſe blowes (though never ſo ſharp and mortall) on his owne ſhoulders, and breſt, which were meant by the Enemy to another (to the mercifull, or good man in that Text) there is no Logick can conclude from hence, that a man hath any power over his owne life, to take it away from himſelfe by any act of force, (as foreign among the Attick Writers, is, ſaith Phrynicus, uſed foreign, He that kils himſelfe, takes upon him an Independent Authority over himſelfe) or to give it into another mans hands, ſo that he may without any farther Authority (without any inveſtiture of the power of the Sword from God) lawfully take it from him.Nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae voluntatibus verum ex naturae principiis venit, Nam ſaepe mortem cogentibus cauſis, quam natura reformidat, voluntas amplectitur, &c. de conſol. Phil. l. 3. Proſ. 11. I ſhall conclude this with an obſervation of Boethius, that the love of life is not ſeated in the will of the Creature, but in the principles of Nature. That ſo our lives may not be ventured on the uncertainties & hazards of our owne paſſions, or ſatieties, which may incl…ne the will to prefer death ſometimes, but in the inſtincts of that more conſtant immutable Rule, which alwayes preſcribes the preſerving of thoſe treaſures, by God and Nature entruſted to us.

§. 57. Having made this ſhort, and ſuddaine returne to this Authors reaſonings, Doctor Hammond will leave the matter moſt willingly, where this Author hath placed it, at the feet of p. 22all ingenuous, and unprejudiced Readers, and will endeavour (as unpaſſionately as any man) to approve himſelf a Servant of Reaſon, and embracer, or friend of Truth, whereſoever he meets with it; upon which ſcore, he is content to acknowledge ſome Obligations to this Author, who hath occaſioned this farther ſurvey of his former affirmations, and given all other men ſome cauſe to be more confirmed in the perſwaſion and aſſurance of the truth of them. And thus much I conceive is ſufficient to have ſaid upon this occaſion.

§. 58. BUt it ſeemes the Readers quiet is not to be obtain'd ſo eaſily; for while that which hath been thus ſaid was under the Printers hand, Mr. John Goodwin's foreign came forth, and by the mention of Doctor Hammonds name twice in his Title page, gave reaſon to delay this Vindication ſo long, till it might appear whether 'twould be uſefull to adde any thing to it (upon this new occaſion) by way of Poſt-ſcript. And herein it hath proved a little unluckily, that this ſecond Advocate of the ſame cauſe falling upon this paſſage in the Addreſſe (the Subject of our preſent diſcourſe) hath yet in his judgement upon it ſo varied from the former Author, that as he hath yeilded the queſtion hitherto debated,pag. 22. and confeſt that no man hath by nature the power over his owne life; ſo he hath provided a new task for me, by denying the Doctors conſequence from hence, [that then this power cannot be derived to Kings by Men, or from the People.] This I confeſſe is ſomewhat ſtrange that that ſhould be imagined derivable by men, or from the people, which at the ſame time 'tis confeſt no man hath. I have lately learn'd a **That cannot be brought But, that is not the Ben.Scotch Proverb from Maſter Henderſon, and finde by ſearch the meaning of it to be this plaine Engliſh, that nothing is derivable from any place, which was never there: and Mr. Goodwin acknowledges the ſtrength of that conſequence to ſtand in the authority of this Maxime, Nihil dat quod non habet, Nothing gives that to another which it hath not it ſelfe. And truly, I ſhall never deſire a firmer baſis for any concluſion of mine then ſuch an acknowledged Principle as this. Should p. 23I finde any part of my poſſeſſions in M. Goodwins hands, and he juſtifie his Title to it, by pretending the donation, or ſale from Philodemius to him, and I produce evidence that this was never in the poſſeſſion of Philodemius, would there be any more required of me, to conclude conſequently, that 'twas not derivable from Philodemius to him? would it not be a ſtrange reply, to ſay, That this conſequence depended on the Authority of a Topick Maxime? The word [Topicke] I ſuppoſe to be here prefixt by him upon a deſigne of diminution, as Topicall is equivalent with probable, and oppos'd to demonſtrative. But I hope this is not thus a Topick Maxime. Can any demonſtration be more convincing, then that which is built upon a Principle, as acknowledg'd as any in the Mathematicks, and the contrary of which implies a contradiction [to have, and not to have?]

§. 59. As for the reaſon of denying this conſequence, which Maſter Goodwin renders, becauſe [though no particular man hath by nature this power over his owne Life, yet as a member of community he hath, not ſimply a power, but a neceſſity lying upon him by way of duty, &c. to conſent with others, that his life ſhall be taken from him] 1. 'Tis not to me imaginable, that he ſhould have a neceſſity of duty lying upon him▪ who hath not ſimply a power, meaning, as here he muſt, a power of doing it lawfully. And 2. For this power, or neceſſity of conſenting onelyonly (as that differs frō the power of giving) this will be of no kind of force, unleſſe it alſo appear that the Magiſtrate derives the power of life (which is ſuppos'd to be in him) from this conſent of theirs, or that it is this conſent of theirs, and nothing elſe which gives him that power. But this is ſo far from being proved, that it is not ſo much as affirm'd by Maſter Goodwin: And on the other ſide 'tis clear, that the bare conſenting that a thing ſhall be taken out of my hands, is very diſtant from the taking upon me to give it; the latter pretends and ſuppoſeth a poſſeſſion, or inveſtiture in the giver, the former doth not in the Conſenter; and ſo, though the latter would be of ſome uſe (if granted) to inferre Mr. Goodwins concluſion, that the power is originally from the people, yet the former will be no way able to inferre it.

§. 60. The matter will be very viſible by example in any Truſt, or Stewardſhip. The Lord intruſts to his Steward the keeping of a p. 24ſumme of money, after that he aſſignes it over to ſome other man by Bill of Attorney, and legally veſts his right in that other. In this caſe the Steward formerly intruſted conſents, that that other ſhall take what is thus by the Lord aſſigned to him, and indeed a neceſſity lies upon him by way of duty ſo to doe. In this caſe I ſhall ask M. G. from whom this money is deriv'd to this other? from the Lord, or from the Steward? I hope he will acknowledge from the Lord: The ſame againe, when the King delivers a Caſtle by way of Truſt, to be kept by one of his Subjects, and after aſſignes it over to his Sonne, and the Subject that kept it, conſents that the Sonne ſhould have it, and ſo the Sonne enters upon the poſſeſſion; the caſe is clear, that 'tis not from the Subject that the Sonne derives this poſſeſſion (though 'tis as true that the Subject conſents to deliver it up) but from the King onelyonly: and that Act of the Subject is no expreſſion of any right in him, from him conveyable to the Sonne, but onelyonly of his Truſt, and ſubordination to the King. And this is generally the difference betwixt Investitures and Truſts: what is veſted in me, I may give, or derive to another, what is intrusted onelyonly, I cannot: the Servant cannot diſpoſe of his Masters goods, yet that his Maſters diſpoſall may ſtand good, he may, and ought to give his conſent. This is ſo groſſely true, that 'tis pitty any longer to inſiſt on it; and yet 'tis the very thing that the whole point in hand depends on, and was therefore, I conceive, ſo induſtriouſly involv'd, and obſcured by Mr. Goodwin.

§. 61. After this, Maſter Goodwin inſenſibly glides into another peice of artifice; The power of life, ſaith he, is eminently and virtually in the people collectively taken, though not formally. And againe, A man, and a body of men, have power over their owne lives Radically, and Virtually, though not formally. This period of Maſter Goodwin ſeemes to be a new way of Anſwer, by applying diſtinction to the Antecedent, as the former was by denying the conſequence. The Antecedent was [That no man hath by nature the power over his owne life, &c.] from whence the Addreſſe concludes that therefore [This power cannot be diriv'd from the people] To this Maſter Goodwin firſt returnes his acknowledgement, That if the conſequence be right, it is a clear caſe, that Regall power is not originally in the people, but conferr'd on the Ruler immediately from p. 25God. This is an acknowledgement in him of the truth of the Antecedent, and a doubt onelyonly of the conſequence, which accordingly he immediately proceedes to invalidate: And therefore 'tis a little ſtrange (and an argument that his firſt attempt was not very ſucceſſefull to him) that he ſhould now ſo ſoone returne to deny the Antecedent ▪ at leaſt to distinguiſh of it, having before ſo abſolutely garnted it. But to paſſe over this, and allow him this liberty of recalling his bounty, let us examine the force of his diſtinction.

§. 62. The force of this diſtinction doth not, I conceive, reſpect the Subject [the people] (as if that might be taken in two notions, either ſingly, or collectively) becauſe preſently, without that diſtinction, he ſpeakes indifferently of [A man] and [A body of men] but it belongs to the Copula, or word [Is] and then it muſt be thus diſſolv'd. The power of life may be ſaid to be in a man two wayes, 1. Formally, 2. Eminently and Virtually, and Radically. This diſtinction of Formaliter, and eminenter hath been apply'd by Philoſophers to the Sun, and Heavenly Bodies: of which it being by them reſolv'd, that they are ſimple and free from thoſe mixtures to which our ſublunary bodies are ſubject, and yet it being apparent, that they warme and heat other things, it is thereupon defined, that they have not heat, or other qualities in them Formally, (i. e. in that manner, or kinde, that fire is hot, or we are hot) but Virtually, and eminently, i. e. that they have ſome other Virtue, or faculty in them, higher, or more eminent then that heat which is in inferiour bodies: and that that doth enable them to warme other things, though they are themſelves ſuch pure creatures, as not to have thoſe groſſe qualities in them. Whether this be rightly affirm'd, or onelyonly nicely conjectured by Philoſophers (for I ſuppoſe there is little known of thoſe diſtant bodies beyond conjecture) I ſhall not now enquire, but onelyonly deſire to be taught by Mr. Goodwin, how this can be made appliable to the matter in hand, i. e. to the power of life and death. This power, we know, is in God firſt, and if in any Eminently, and Radically, and Virtually, certainly in him: And in the Supreame Magiſtrate formally, being actually inherent in him, though not Originally, nor in ſo eminent a degree as in God it is. But can it thus be ſaid alſo to be eminently, &c in the People, i. e. that the People p. 26have in them ſome higher, and more eminent Virtue, or faculty then the power of every man over his own life; and that that ſupplies the place of that formall power, and that by it the People beget, or produce the power of life in the Supream Magiſtrate, as truly, as, if they had it formally, they could doe? This is the meaning of the diſtinction in the ordinary, and onelyonly notion of it, and muſt be it, if it be rightly appliable; but Mr. Goodwin interprets his meaning of it, ſo farre from this, ſo farre from importing, or concluding the People to have ſuch an higher power or faculty (to which [Eminently] and [Virtually] in oppoſition to [Formally] belongs) that 'tis indeed by him ſet downe as much inferiour to that power formally inherent. For thus he interprets it, A Man, and a body of Men, have power over their owne lives Radically, and Virtually, in reſpect whereof, they may render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes, which, if they violate, they muſt be in hazard of their lives, &c. By this I diſcerne two things, 1. That by this eminent, Virtuall, Radicall power, Mr. Goodwin underſtands that (which is farre enough from the meaning of thoſe words, and) which Logicians call a remote, or indirect power, (as that is oppos'd to an immediate, or direct) or rather a power, to which this effect is meerly accidentall, as if the patient were ſaid to have power to cure himſelfe, meaning thereby that he hath power to ſubmit himſelf to the Phyſitian, who is able to cure him. And for Mr. Goodwin to aſſume the liberty of ſpeaking thus largely, was not, I ſuppoſe, his want of knowledge in propriety, but his willingneſſe to receive advantage from this abuſe of words: And then 2. If this be the onelyonly meaning of the four hard words, (Eminently, Virtually, Radically, and Formally) viz. that 'tis in the power of men (or the People in community of nature) to render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes, to which rendring 'twill be conſequent, that they ſhall hazard their lives upon violating thoſe Lawes, then, I ſay, are Mr. Goodwin, and Doctor Hammond very well agreed; for this his explication of that diſtinction is very reconcileable with thoſe words of the Addreſſe. This giving up their (i. e. the peoples) Liberties to one, or more, makes that man, or men, a Ruler over them, and being a Ruler, to him belongs (deriv'd from God, not from them) the power of life which Gods decree hath inſtated in the Supreame Power, or Ruler, who is therefore in p. 27that relation of avenger for wrath or puniſhment, a Miniſter of God, Rom. 13. &c. For whence is it that their rendring themſelves to a Magiſtrate, in Mr. Goodwins ſtile, brings upon them that hazard of lives, in caſe of violation of Lawes, unleſſe it be that he that hath power of their lives, placeth that power in that Magiſtrate to whom they have rendred, or ſubjected themſelves? That this is God, and not the People, I will not conclude to be Mr. Goodwins opinion, becauſe 'tis his maine deſigne to prove the contrary, but that thoſe words of his, and his diſtinction ſo explained will bear that ſenſe, I mean, that they will be true, and acknowledg'd by him, that acknowledges the power of Life to be onelyonly in the Supream Governour, deriv'd from God, I conceive ſufficiently manifeſt; & conſequently, that though this power be ſaid to be in the People remotely, improperly, and indirectly, and ſo in Mr. Goodwins notion of eminently, &c. yet 'tis not from the People, but from God onelyonly, that the Governour hath it.

§. 63. The reply will be as ready, and eaſie alſo to all force, or concludency of his next Argument, that which is taken from the Peoples power, to make, or conſent to the making of Capitall Lawes. For 1. Mr. Goodwin cannot be ignorant that it hath been ſometimes in the power of Kings to make Lawes, without the addition of any conſent of the people: ſuch were the Principum placitae among the Romans: and after it was thought fit by Princes to lay ſome reſtraint on themſelves, both that they might be better adviſed, and more readily obeyed, then, though the peoples conſent hath been deem'd neceſſary, yet doth this belong onelyonly to the regulating, and modifying the exerciſe of this power: the Fundamentall power it ſelfe of life, being in the Supream Governour, before the making theſe Lawes; Now 'tis very eaſie to diſtinguiſh betwixt theſe two, the power, and the Regulating of the exerciſe of that power; the power in the groſſe, and the determination of that power to this, or that particular action. The interpoſition of man in the latter of theſe, doth no way prejudge the ſole priviledge of God, in the donation of the former of them: As the Grace of God is his peculiar, and proper gift; and yet man may give Directions, and Rules, how we are to act by that Principle, what uſe it will beſt become us to make of that pretious talent entruſted to us. And therefore, for the great Noon-day-Truth p. 28which Mr. Goodwin induceth from theſe, and the like conſiderations, viz. [That men by nature have ſuch a power over their lives, as voluntarily, &c. to expoſe them to the ſtroke of publique juſtice, in caſe they ſhall offend, &c.] This being granted, is of no force againſt Doctor Hammond, but doth with him rather ſuppoſe a Publique Juſtice able to ſtrike, i. e. a power of life already veſted in the Magiſtrate, before this conſent of the People, or abſtractedly, without reſpect unto it. And ſo ſtill it is not from this conſent of the People, that this power is deriv'd to the hand of Publick Juſtice, but from ſome other higher principle, viz. that of God, to whom foreign the avenging, or puniſhing of offenders, peculiarly belongs, and no other, but in ſubordination to, and ſubſtitution from him.

§. 64. And what if the King, as M. Goodwin next alledgeth, have no power to take away the life of his Subjects without cauſe, or for every cauſe, but onelyonly ſuch as by Law are puniſhable with death; what if he cannot command them to be their own Executioners? Doth it follow from hence, that therefore, he hath the power of life from the People, not from God? Doth the power of God ſo conſiſt in doing cauſeleſſe, or irrationall things, that nothing which is exercis'd moderately, or ordinately, can be imagin'd to come from him? I ſhall ſuppoſe that God himſelfe hath perfect dominion over the world; and yet that he obſerves rules of all-juſtice, and goodneſs in the exerciſe, and diſpenſing of that power, and hath not power of doing any thing contrary to thoſe rules of eternall Juſtice; which he hath preſcribed to himſelf; which to do by all wiſe men hath been counted an act of imbecility, not of power. And conſequently, how naturall is it that he ſhould thus determine, and limit his deputies alſo? give them power of life over their Subjects, and yet command them to exerciſe that power with that juſt temperament, which either naturall, or civill, or municipall Lawes ſhall dictate, and preſcribe them? And therefore Maſter Goodwins arguing is very looſe, and unconcluding; [That if the power which the King hath over the lives of the poeple, were immediately from God, then he might lawfully execute the ſame, and take away the lives of men, without any mediating direction, or warranty from any Law.] For ſure the ſame God that gives the Magiſtrate the power of life, doth command him alſo not to throw away that p. 29pretious truſt cauſeleſly, makes him his Miniſter for wrath to them that doe evill, and contrary wiſe a rewarder to them that doe well, and though he ſubject him not to any earthly ſuperior, but reſerve him to his own ſevere tribunall, yet he ſubjects him to reaſon, and rules of Juſtice, and (when he hath undertaken to governe by that Standard) to the poſitive municipall Lawes of that particular Kingdome alſo, and hath been as particular in preſcribing Lawes to the Prince, to avoid Oppreſſion, or acts of Height, as to Subjects to abſtaine from reſiſtance.

§. 65. As for that proofe which Mr. Goodwin produceth to enforce his arguing, viz. [That the execution of no commiſſion immediately iſſued by God, ought to be ſuſpended upon, or determin'd, or regulated by any comiſſion, or conſtitution of men.] It is as far from truth, as it could well have been contriv'd to be: As will appear if it be conſidered; that the word [Commiſſion] 1. ſignifies not an abſolute, or poſitive Command, but onelyonly a power, or inveſtiture of Authority; or if a Command, yet that 2. onelyonly an Affirmative precept, the nature of which is, that it binds not ad ſemper, and ſo conſequently, may be ſuſpended at ſome time, by the free will of him that hath the Commiſſion, much more if any weighty reaſon interpoſe to determine his will. 3. That this Commiſſion is onelyonly Generall, and indefinite, without application to particular caſes, referring that application to the conjuncture and concurrence of circumſtances, (which ordinarily are humane, and Politicall;) and conſequently to the diſcretion of Rulers judging by thoſe circumſtances: The intervenience of which circumſtances makes the particular exerciſe of that Commiſſion convenient, and ſeaſonable in one place, and at one time; and conſequently, where they do not intervene, there the exerciſe of it may be at that time, and place ſuſpended as unſeaſonable. As when the ſhedder of blood is by God commanded to be put to death, and yet ſome men accidentally, and invountarily fall under that Title, it muſt be in the power of the Magiſtrate, to ſuſpend the execution of that ſentence, or elſe the Innocent muſt looſe the benefit of the Citty of refuge, and run the ſame fortune with the moſt murtherous deſigner.

§. 66. After this manner 'tis clear, that Chriſt had a Commiſſion from heaven to worke Miracles, to cure Diſeaſes; yet 'tis particularly affirm'd of the infidelity of his Country-men, that that p. 30ſuſpended the exerciſe of his power for ſome time; He could not doe many mighty works there becauſe of their unbelief, yet, I hope, this will no way be thought to argue, that Chriſts commiſſion iſſued from his Country-men, or from the belief of men, (though that were neceſſary, to the exerciſe of it) or that Chriſt did ill in ſuſpendi…g the exerciſe of his Commiſſion. In like manner the people of Iſrael had from God not onelyonly a commiſſion, but command to put the nations to death, Deut. 20.10. And yet on thoſe of them that were left, 1 Kings. 9.20. Solomon ſuſpended the act of that commiſſion, and onelyonly levied a tribute of bond-ſervice ver. 21. Once more; I ſhall ſuppoſe a Generall to receive power of Martiall Law from the Soveraigne in any Kingdome, this power he is not willing to exerciſe, but by a cognizance of each malefactors cauſe before a Councell of Warre. Here 'tis plain that that Councell of Warre ſuſpends that exerciſe of the Generalls power upon a particular man; but ſure it will no way follow from thence, that that Commiſſion, which was ſuppos'd to iſſue to the Generall from the Soveraign, doth now iſſue not from the Soveraigne, but that Councell of Warre; and then no more will the poſſibility of ſuſpending the exerciſe of the Kings Commiſſion by Law, &c. conclude that Commiſſion to iſſue from the People, and not from God. And therefore in the caſe which Mr. Goodwin hath been confident to referre to Doctor Hammond to Arbitrate [Whether the King hath any Regular or juſt power over the lives of men, other then that which is proportion'd, &c. by the Lawes of the State] I ſuppoſe the Doctor may agree with Mr. Goodwin, and yet never be enforc'd, or concluded by that conceſſion, to queſtion the Originall of the power from God, the difference being diſcernible between the Power it ſelf, and every particular exerciſe of that power; and the ſuſpenſion of the latter, farre from including the evacuation, or cancelling of the former.

§. 67. The ſame anſwer will clear Mr. Goodwins ſucceeding Plea, pag. 26. That if the power of Kings over the lives of men, were by immediate derivation from God, then muſt this power be uniforme, &c. in all Kingdomes whatſoever.] This conſequence is farr from all appearance of truth; Becauſe the power may be from God, and yet that God that gives the power, may leave it in the particular exerciſes of it, to be determined either by the arbitration, p. 31and free will, and prudence of the Governour, where there are no Lawes, or by the Regulation of Lawes, where there are ſuch; The Dimenſum, or proportion of power over the lives of the Subjects, which a Governour claimes, conſiſts not in indiviſibili, in any certain, or definite point, but is that which may enable him to diſcharge his office of Ruler, i. e. to protect his people, and reſtraine their inordinacies. And as farre as Reaſon, and (which are ſuppoſed to be a branch of that) paticular Lawes, (ſubordinate to Gods Word) ſee it fit to extend the exerciſe of that power, ſo far may that Ruler regularly extend it; And whatſoever proportion it be, that he is intruſted with by God, 'tis not reaſonable that he ſhould irrationally extend the exerciſe of it. And this regulation of indefinite power by ſuch prudent limits as theſe (i. e. by the Ʋniverſall law of Reaſon and Juſtice, or by the particular concluſions, which the wiſdome of Law-givers hath thought fit to deduce from thence) cannot juſtly be quarrell'd, as a retrenchment of power, any more, then the infinite goodneſſe of God which permits him not to be able to do any thing which is contrary to that attribute, is a manicling, or reſtraining his Omnipotence, but is onelyonly a cultivating and dreſſing of it, a paring off the exceſſes, and exorbitances of it, and leaving it a form'd channell, inſtead of a vaſt or unbridled Ocean.

§. 68. And thus I ſuppoſe the nature of Angels or men, which have bounds of Virtue and Conſcience, and Lawes preſcribed them, within which they are to move, and not to range unlimited in the deſert of their owne uncertain propoſals, cannot thereby be ſaid to have loſt the liberty of their ſpecies, or to have received no powers from God in their creation, though ſome regulations (it muſt be acknowledged) they are under, and conſequently, determinations and ſuspenſions for the exerciſe of their powers. And what inconvenience the affirming of this will bring upon the Doctor, what hazard of blaſpheming of God, &c. I muſt profeſſe my ſelf ſo tame, as not to fore-ſee, or imagine, howſoever M. Goodwins foreign hath helpt him to phanſie ſuch inviſible Mormos, and Anakims in our paſſage.

§. 69. Next, it is but affirm'd, and not at all made probable by Mr. Goodwin, that the Affirming the Kings power over the lives of the people to be by immediate derivation from God, is to p. 32ſmite them with blindneſſe, &c. and not to diſcover to them the Dan and Berſheba (I ſuppoſe he meanes by this trope, the due bounds and limits) of ſuch their power] I am ſorry Mr. Goodwin ſhould think it fit that ſuch popular harangues ſhould be admitted to ſupply the place of reaſon, and ſhall briefly reply, That they that affirme the power of the Sword to be from God derived to Magiſtates, doe at the ſame time define, and affirme, that thoſe Magiſtrates are to remaine rationall creatures, and to continue under the Soveraignty of Reaſon, and all the branches of that, as farre as their particulars are concerned in it, i. e. to be ruled by the Ʋniverſall Lawes of Juſtice and Equity, by the Civill Sanctions which tend to the preſerving of Societies, and conſequently by the particular Locall, or municipall Lawes of any Country, which are ſuppoſed to have a peculiar propriety toward the preſerving, and regulating of that People.

§. 70. 'Twill now be to little purpoſe to prove that theſe two affirmations are reconcileable, the one deriving the power of life to the Ruler from God, the other acknowledging the regulation of this power by theſe bounds; For there is no kind of repugnance, or contradiction, nothing but accord and amity between them: The very Hand of God that conferres this power, gives this very direction, and Law for the exerciſe of it, that they that rule other men ſhould themſelves be guided by Reaſon in all their actions: And what that Reaſon is in each particular emergent, they are not alwayes, or onelyonly, the Judicialls of Moſes, which are fit to direct us, but the wiſdom ſometimes of Particular Laws, and Law-makers. And ſo there is ſmall danger either of enſnaring Kings, or diſturbing States, (as he ſeemes willing to fear) by this doctrine; which though it define the Originall of this power to be from Heaven, can yet allow the regulation of this power for the Exerciſe of it to be of an inferiour, Humane, Politicall Orgination.

§. 71. One Argument more Mr. Goodwin is pleaſed to take in to diſprove the immediate derivation of this power of life from God. Becauſe, ſaith he, that derivation which is immediate from God, can by no wayes be aſſiſted, furthered, or promoted by any creature, or ſecond meanes, but this derivation of that power of life is at leaſt furthered by the act of the people in electing, &c. Ergo, I ſhall p. 33not examine the force of his enſuing probations, which have frailties enough in them, but ſhall be content to ſuppoſe the moſt he can wiſh, or imagine, viz. That the people doe elect, or chooſe their King; In this caſe, ſaith the Doctor, The people give not the power of their lives to that King, but by giving up their Liberties, &c. to him, nominate him to that office of ſupreame power, which, whereſover it is, God ſuperinveſts with the power of life. This is the Doctors ſtating of the queſtion in his Andreſſe, and thereby the ſeparation is evident between the Act of the People in Electing the perſon of the Ruler, and the Act of God in conferring this power of life. All that can be ſaid of the former of theſe is that that act of the people is the meanes of determining the Generall decree of God (that Rulers ſhall (as his Deputies) have the power of life) to this particular perſon, not that it is an aſſiſtent, or ſociall cauſe in conveying this power to the Ruler, much leſſe that it ſhall undertake to wreſt this power out of Gods hands, and aſſume it into their owne; but, I ſay, as a cauſa ſine quâ non, or a previous preparation of the ſubject, by their choiſe qualifying the perſon to be thus inveſted, and impower'd by God. And ſo, though the people in this caſe are ſuppoſed to doe ſomewhat, i. e. to Elect, and that election to determine this power of Gods to this perſon, yet is this power derived ſolely from God, as the Addreſſe hath ſufficiently explain'd, and not from any act of the People: And therefore the word [Furthering] in Mr. Goodwins Argument, may be taken (as an equivocall word) in a double ſence, either to denote actuall aſſiſtance, or contribution of force, or efficacy, toward the production of the effect, viz. of the power of life in the Ruler: And in that ſence it is not true, that the Act of the People in Electing, doth further this power, it being the ſole act of Gods decree to give that power, and nothing elſe. Or elſe the word [Furthering] may be taken to ſignifie no more then preparing, or qualifying the Subject to a capacity of receiving this power from God, (as John Baptiſt prepared mens hearts for the receiving of Chriſt, when he came, but had nothing to do in the miſſion of him, which was the ſole work of God) and thus indeed, the Election of the People may further the derivation of this power from God to ſuch a particular Ruler; And there is nothing more ordinary then for Gods workes to be thus furthered by ſecond cauſes, or meanes, even p. 34his work of Grace, which he ownes moſt peculiarly. The reſemblance made uſe of in the Addreſſe, is very commodious to clear this whole matter. In the Generation of a child, the parents are acknowledged to contribute much, to be not onelyonly furtherers, but even efficients in the production, Yet is it commonly agreed, that God creates, infuſes, and inſpires the Soul immediately. I need not examine, or atteſt the truth of the ordinary opinion, that the ſoule comes from heaven, not from the Parents; becauſe I now uſe it as a reſemblance onelyonly, and that it may be allowed to be, though it ſhould not be true, and thus far at leaſt it will be argumentative, that the electing of the perſon of the Ruler by the people, doth no more conclude that the power of life is not ſuperinfuſed and derived to the Ruler (ſo choſen) from heaven, then the parents begetting of the child is an argument, that the ſoule is not ſuperinfuſed from God. Our Phoenomena may be all very happily ſolved by this way of ſetting it; and M. G. exceptions ſuperſeded, and the concluſion cleared, which was the onelyonly one, which the Addreſſe deſired to infer by this conſideration, viz. That whatſoever were ſuppoſed of the peoples electing their Ruler, yet the Supream power neither is nor can be in the community of the people by force, meerly of their Originall, or naturall Liberty, upon this firme ground (not yet ſhaken by M. G. or Philodemius) that the power of life, which is part of the Supream Power, is not part of the naturall Liberty, nor conſequently either inherent in the Community of men, nor by them communicable to any Repreſentative. foreign ▪ The onelyonly thing, which this rejoynder (as the former diſcourſe) was deſigned to demonſtrate moſt irrefragably.

§. 72. And having proceeded thus farre to make returne to M. Goodwins offers of reaſon, I ſhall not endeavour to make payment to his Scoffes, pag. 28. or vindicate Doctor Hammond from his charge of overweeningneſſe, &c. Though 'tis not at all intelligible to me, how thoſe words in the Addreſſe (For it is poſſible that I may put you in minde of an evident truth, which perhaps you have not taken notice of] ſhould be chargeable with this foreign, or interpretable to any farther ſenſe, then onelyonly this, That this truth ſo evident in Doctor Hammonds opinion, was not by him …onceived to be ſufficiently taken notice of, or laid to heart by them, to whom he then made his Addreſſe. And if that Doctor p. 35were therein miſtaken, or if he be juſtly charged in his next page (together with the reſt of his perſwaſion, under the title of the whole Legion of the Royall Faction) as the firſt-borne of that evill Generation of Flatterers, for producing plain Arguments of Reaſon, and Scripture to avert, that which appear'd to him a heavy Sinne, and Judgement, from a Nation; I muſt then betake my ſelfe to my Prayers, that God will forgive me my more diſcernible ſinnes, (when innocencies, and good offices to mankind are become ſo culpable) and get out of his company as ſoone as I can, who can ſo readily ſhift the diſcourſe from reaſoning to defaming, and ſupply with reproaches what was wanting in Arguments.

§. 73. I am now come to an end of this debate concerning the Power of life, but cannot be ſo prudent, or thrifty of my paines, as to diſſemble the other exceptions, which (in this book) Maſter Goodwin hath made to ſome other parts of the Addreſſe; I ſhall give you as brief an account of them as is poſſible.

§. 74. The fitſt, is his diſlike of that Critick annotation, as he ſtiles it, of the Royall Doctor, taking notice that the Supream Power, or Ruler is ſtiled by the Apoſtle, Rom. 13. the Miniſter of God, and not of the people] How this comes to be ſtiled a Critick annotation, (which ſuppoſes it a Grammaticall one,Vi. Moſchopul. Gram. Gr. (as foreign, are the parts diviſive of foreign) where there is no uſe made of Grammar to deduce it, nor indeed of any thing but of the plaine words, as they lie in the Text) I have not the skill, or ſagacity to divine. All that Doctor Hammond affirmes is this, that the Supream power, Rom. 13. is ſtiled by the Apoſtle, the Miniſter of God, and not of the people. And is not this manifeſt to any that looks on Rom. 13.4. where he is twice ſtiled foreign, the Miniſter of God, and is neither there, nor any where elſe ſtiled the Miniſter of the People.

§. 75. But, ſaith M. Goodwin, This no way infringes the credit of his concluſion, that Kings are the Servants and Miniſters of the People. The Apoſtles were the Miniſters of God, and yet they preach themſelves alſo the ſervants of Men, 2 Cor. 4.5. and Miniſters of the Saints, Rom. 15.25. &c. To this I anſwer, that the phraſe foreign, Miniſter of God, ſignifies a Miniſter of Gods Ordination, and Inſtitution, and though it may ſignifie ſomewhat p. 36elſe, yet this is the onelyonly notion wherein Doctor Hammond takes it in his Addreſſe, according to Rom. 13. of which he ſpeakes, where the powers are ſaid to be ordained by God, and to be his Ordinance. Now he that is thus a Miniſter of God, cannot be ſo alſo of the People, becauſe theſe two Ordinations being incompatible, he that holds by one, muſt needs diſclaime holding by the other. Another notion there may be of the phraſe, as it ſignifies performing of ſervice to God; and ſo indeed the ſame Apoſtle that ſerves God, may be a ſervant of Men alſo, and to that, all M. Goodwins probations are directed, and though S. Paules foreign, his carrying of almes, and contributions to the poor Saints, be no very proper inſtance to this purpoſe; yet thus 'tis acknowledg'd, that S. Paul may be a ſervant of Men, and performe offices of Humility to them, (though by the way this Servant of theirs behaves himſelf ſometimes very like a Maſter, and comes with a Rod when he ſees it convenient.)

§. 76. But this is nothing to the purpoſe to infer the King to be foreign, a Miniſter of the People in the former notion, i. e. a Miniſter of the peoples Inſtitution; and therefore all that M. Goodwin addes of the Reaſons why the Ruler, Rom. 13. is not called the Miniſter of the people, is very extrinſecall to that purpoſe. The utmoſt that he can enforce from that place is, that the King attends on the publique good. But ſure that will availe as little to prove that he is not a miniſter of Gods inſtituting, or one that hath the power from him, as the Shepheards waiting over the Flock, is a proof that he is ordeined, or inſtituted by his Sheep.

§. 77. The next undertaking of M. Goodwin againſt Doctor Hammond, is to prove that the Civill Magiſtrate is by S. Peter call'd foreign; which he renders the Ordinance, or creature of Man becauſe they receive their very being from the people as Kings, and as Magiſtrates. Doctor Hammond hath, I conceive, ſufficiently vindicated that Text of S. Peter from this interpretation, and 'twere eaſie to ſhew, that the phraſe foreign muſt by all analogy be rendred Humane creature; not Ordinance, or creature of Man; by humane creature, meaning any part of mankind; by creature of man, a thing of mans creating. The phraſe to expreſſe the latter of theſe would be, foreign, p. 37taking Creature for production, or work, and Man for the artificer, or workman of it; what is ſaid in the Addreſſe, is ſufficient to direct any ſober man to a right underſtanding of that place. And M. Goodwins exceptions are very farre from perſwading the contrary. As 1. [That the King is there call'd Supream, not in reſpect of the community of the people, as, ſaith he, the Doctor ſuppoſeth, but as compar'd with ſubordinate Rulers.] But this is of no force againſt the Doctor in that place, where all that he inferres from their title of Supream, is, that they are the very perſons that are enſtiled the Ordinance of God, Ro. 13. & that is the ſignall character which he mentions in that Text, without taking notice of any other aſpect of the word Supream, or drawing any nice concluſion from it.

§. 78. His ſecond exception is againſt the concludence of a Negative Argument. Which I acknowledge an exception ſo far as to keep that Argument from being demonſtrative, in caſe all the force of it were fetcht from the Negative; But that Argument from the Negative (or from the Governours not being ſaid to be ſent by the people) is but praeluſory and preparative to another more forcible branch of the Argument, viz. that (on the contrary) Supremacy is affixt to the King, and Subjection for the Lords ſake, commanded to be paid him, (as miſſion from him is affirmed of all other Magistrates) And both thoſe put together, the Kîngs being Supreme, (i. e. inferior to none but God) and Subiection being affirmed to be due to him for the Lords ſake, (i. e. becauſe of the relation which he ſtands in to God, by whom he is ſaid to be ordained Rom. 13.) may well enough paſſe for a character of ſome remarke upon the King, and keeep the pretended rendring of foreign, from being the neceſſary importance of that text, or the Supreme power from being concluded to be originally in the people.

§. 79. As for the groaning of the creation, or creature] Rom. 8. which Doctor Hammond renders [the hope of the heathen world] tis not all M. Goodwins foreign that will render it an improbable interpretation. That the Heathen world (though without hope, i. e. in a deſperate condition in reſpect of ſalvation, as long as they remained in their idolatries) were yet ſo capable of receiving benefit of Chriſts coming into the world, that Christ is called Deſiderium omnium Gentium, the deſire of all Nations, in p. 38Haggai, and foreign, the expectation of the Gentiles, in the Septuagints rendring of Jacobs Prophecie; that they ſeeing their owne impure condition, deſired the meanes of reſtoring their loſt treaſure, and conſequently are ſaid to deſire Christ, without explicit foreknowing any thing of him, (becauſe that which they deſired was no otherwiſe compaſſable, but by him) is no nicety of the Doctors invention, but largely inſiſted on by S. Auguſtine in his Bookes De Civ: Dei; and this one Conſideration is Reply ſufficient to all the inconveniences which M. Goodwin hath ſprung in this interpretation.

§. 80. As for the other difficulties which to him ſeeme to preſſe and reſiſt the interpreting of the following words to this ſenſe, they are not ſo ſolemnly mentioned by M. Goodwin as to owne my impertinence, if I ſhould enlarge on them; though I can aſſure him, that D. Hammond hath long ſince conſidered the whole Context, and is ready to give an account of the agreeableneſſe of it to his preſent notion, whenſoever it ſhall be ſeaſonable. Only in favour to the Reader, he doth not unneceſſarily obtrude it on him at this time, meaning to expect a fairer opportunity for that, and other the like diſſertations.

§. 81. But M. Goodwin upon the granting of this notion of foreign, for the heathen world, hath falne upon a ſpeciall foreign, that however, It ſignifies the world under the conſideration of being the creature or creation of God. And then he wonders why foreign ſhould not ſignifie the Magistrate to be the creation of man, and how by this interpretation that concluſion of the Kings being the creature of the people, is avoided. To this I anſwer punctually, that M. Goodwin being the affirmer of this doctrine, [That the King is the creature of the people] and his proofe of it being thoſe words of Saint Peter, where obedience is commanded to be paid foreign, as tis by him rendred, to every creation, or ordinance, or creature of man, It is certainly ſufficient for D. Hammond (to diſprove this concluſion ſo inferred from that place of Saint Peter) if he ſhall be able to mention another probable interpretation of thoſe words, from whence that Concluſion will not be inferr'd; eſpecially if by other places of Scripture he make it manifeſt, that that interpretation is moſt agreeable to the analogie of that and other Scriptures. Now p. 39this hath D. Hammond done, by ſhewing that foreign is a phraſe which needs not ſignifie any more then every man, or humane creature, not onelyonly Chriſtian, but Gentile, or Heathen alſo. Which if it be the entire notation of the phraſe (as at this time M. Goodwin is content to grant) then ſure is there no ground for him from thence to conclude, that the King is foreign in that other ſo diſtant ſenſe, an ordinance or creature of the people. As long as M. G. concluſion depends upon that one onelyonly notion of the phraſe, ſo long, unleſſe that be acknowledged the genuine ſenſe of it, (as certainly tis not, when another ſo diſtant from that, is ſuppoſed poſſible to be it) there is no ſtability to be expected to that concluſion, whoſe premiſſes are thus forfeited by his own conceſſion.

§. 82. As for the Doctors Anſwer to the ſuppoſed Objection, (where by the parallel command of honouring all, ver. 17. he infers the limitation of the ſubject, All to whom honour belongeth there, (i. e. ſuperiors, not inferiors) and ſo here, every humane creature, (i. e. every ſuch, that is in place of Magiſtracie) certainly M. G. hath failed much in his attempt to invalidate it, by affirming that that Apostle, in his command to honour all, ſuppoſeth a debt of honour due from every man to every man, according to that of the Rom. 12.10. In honour preferring one another. For to this I anſwer, that the meaning of 1 Pet. 2.17. cannot ſure ſo properly be fetcht from Rom. 12.10. as it may from the circumſtances of the Text and verſes on each ſide of it in the place of S. Peter. In the former verſes, 13. and 14. the words clearly refer to the doctrine of obedience to Superiours, and ſo ver. 15. the mention of Gods will [that by well-doing we ſhould put to ſilence the ignorance of fooliſh men] (i. e. that by obeying of our Superiours we ſhould take off the Scandall that lay on Chriſtianity, as if it made men ill Subjects, ver. 16.) doth plenarily belong alſo to the ſame matter. So again, honouring the King in the end of the 17. ver. and ſervants obeying their Masters, ver. 18. are very forward to concurre with this notion; And the precept of loving the brotherhood, i. e. their fellow-Chriſtians, and of fearing God ▪ (from which feare the honour divolves upon his Vice-gerent) will no way prejudice this notion of the honour there ſpoken of, that it belongs onelyonly to the debt of inferiours to ſuperiours; and ſo that the [All] are onelyonly thoſe all that are thus capable of it.

p. 40§. 83. As for the honouring of Widowes (by Maſter Goodwin mention'd from Saint Paul to Timothy) that ſure is not appliable to this matter, ſince the honour there, is the relieving, or feeding of them, giving them that honour of ſupply, which is acknowledged to be another notion of the Word, not that which in the fift Commandement, and thoſe other places, is the principall importance of it.

§. 84. As little reaſon hath Mr. Goodwyn to conclude that the precept of being Subject one to another, 1. Pet. 5.5. ſhould not be a precept of obedience to Superiors, when the words immediately precedent are, Likewiſe ye younger ſubmit your ſelves to the Elders, and thoſe Elders, ver. 2. the foreign & foreign, the Pastors and Biſhops of the Church. 'Tis poſſible indeed, that the [one another] may be, Others beſide Superiors, but ſure tis not ſo probably ſo, when that which immediately precedes, is Submiſſion to Elders, to which the ſubjection here added, is not a phraſe of diminution, but of addition rather, and when Gods reſiſting the proud, that immediately followes, is, ſaith Saint Auguſtine, (as in the Poet, debellare ſuperbos) the direct contrary to Subjectis parcere, the giving pardon, or grace to the obedient Subjects. And thus I conceive the parallel words of Saint Paul, Eph. ….21. Submitting your ſelves one to another] are moſt probably to be interpreted, to thoſe among you who are in any relation of ſuperiority, for ſo it▪ followes immediately, ver. 22. Wives ſubmit your ſelves to your own husbands, &c. Whereas, when he rerurnes to the huſba…ds duty toward the wife, it is not ſubmiſſion but love only, v. 25. Other places I might eaſily mention, where the word (foreign) may very well ſignifie no more then others. So the foreign, confeſſe your faults one to another, Jam. 5.16. cannot farther be extended then to a direction to the ſick to make confeſſion of his ſins, whether to others ſimply, or to thoſe others whom he hath injur'd, but obligeth not them that are in health to tonfeſſe their ſins reciprocally or back againe to the ſick, and ſo in the next words [and pray foreign, for one another] that is, that the brethren in health ſhould pray for them that are ſick, and not reciprocally that the ſick ſhould pray for them in health, the end of the prayer there mention'd being foreign, that ye may be healed; which end, and cloſe doth, I conceive, confine p. 41the diſcourſe to the ſick firſt to confeſſe, and to the healthy, after to pray for the ſick and no more. And ſo foreign, 1 Pet. 4.9. notes hoſpitality to the ſtrangers that wanted, and not mutuall, reciprocall entertainments one of the other: For though it is poſſible that it might note the inhabitants civility to the travailer firſt, and then that travailers repayment of the like, when he comes to be a ſixt inhabitant, yet the word foreign, ſtrangers, being ordinarily taken as a ſpecies of men in want (as beſides ſome places of Scripture, I remember in Juſt: Mar: ſecond Apolog: ſpeaking of the offertory, he ſaith that by that meanes the Praefect became the guardian of ſtrangers, &c. and of all that were in want) I conceive foreign is no more then kind to that ſort of poore ſtrangers, and that without any expectation of being entertain'd by them againe, for that the Almes-giver ſhould expect that returne from the poore, or ſtranger, is both unreaſonable and unchriſtian alſo. So Luke. 12.1. foreign cannot be taken reciprocally, that they which trod on others were alſo trod upon by them, but that one trod upon another agreeable to our preſent ſenſe: ſo Act. 7.…6. foreign; not that the perſon injur'd was injurious alſo, but onelyonly that one injur'd the other. And yet more plainly, Rom. 2.15. their thoughts excuſing or accuſing, foreign, where it cannot be imagined that the thoughts mutually or reciprocally accuſe or excuſe, the accuſation belonging to the conſcience, which accuſeth the erronious will, but not in like manner to the will, that that ſhould accuſe the Conſcience. Theſe places are added ex abundanti; That of Epheſ. 5. will be able alone to ſerve the turne, if theſe others ſhould not be thought to be demonſtrative. I have thus briefly reply'd to theſe other exceptions of Mr. Goodwin as far as concernes that Place in Saint Peter, and I ſuppoſe have vindicated it from being the foundation of Mr. Goodwins beloved dogma (which I ſhall deſire him to ſhew to be the affirmation of any one ancient Father or Commentator on that place, or of any one place of Scripture b… ſides, which might helpe to countenance it) that Kings are the creatures of the people.

§. 85. There are yet ſome old reckonings which Mr. Goodwin is willing to make even with the Doctor, and I muſt b…g a very Little patience from the reader to obſerve what account he hath given of them.

p. 42§. 86. He begins with fair words of D. H. and acknowledgments, that having frequently heard of him, he never heard any thing but well and worthy of a man, his judgement in the grand ſtate-queſtion of the times onelyonly excepted. That the diſcharge of his Conſcience in obedience to the fift Commandement ſhould be thus made an exception againſt the Doctor, he hath ſure learnt foreign neither to think ſtrange, nor take ill at M. G. hands, remembring that ſome of the Chriſtians which were antiently in the world, in the abſence of other viſible crimes, were thought worthy of all reproaches for their common profeſſion, or being Christians. One thing onelyonly I ſhall ſuppoſe, I have the Doctors leave to aſſure M. G. that it was no ſpeciall deſire to engage M. G. which cauſed the particular mentions, and refutations of ſome paſſages in his bookes, but onelyonly the opinion which he had, that they might probably prove matter of ſeduction to the reader (and that ſeduction of a dangerous conſequence) if ſuch neceſſary antidotes were not provided to avert, or prevent the danger. D. H. I ſuppoſe, is not over-fond of ſuch diſputes, or debates as theſe, and is never more in conſtraint, then when he lies under ſuch engagements.

§. 87. Some paſſages in M. G. Butchers bleſſing were a firſt great temptation to him, which, though reſiſted by the love of quiet, prepared him to receive more violent impreſſions from ſome remarkable ſections in the Anticavaleiriſme, And at laſt the fire kindled, and his pen gave teſtimony of it.

§. 88. The particulars he then took notice of in M. G. were 1. His dexterities in evacuating the force of Tertullians teſtimonies concerning the patience, and non-reſiſtance of the Primitive Christians, and theſe are at large refuted in the tract of Reſiſting &c. pag. 10. to pag. 20. Secondly, his ſtrange affirmation of Gods hiding from the first Chriſtians this liberty of reſiſting Superiours, as part of his counſell to bring Antichrist into the world, and his manifeſting it to us now, as a meanes of caſting Antichriſt out. The latter of theſe two, D. H. conceived as ſtrange, and as dangerous a Doctrine, as he ever met with, and therefore examined it to the bottome, Reſiſt. pag. 21. to 28. Theſe two maine matters of difference D. H. acknowledges to have managed againſt M.G. but conceive without any thing of aſperity, or exceſſe in p. 43any kind, which ſhould look like a particular deſire of engaging M. G. And M. G. hath thought fit for many yeares to let theſe reckonings ſleep without ever giving the leaſt reply to either of them. And now that [of Gods hiding of truths from the Ancient Chriſtians, and the helping Antichriſt to his throne] hath not the fortune to be taken notice of at all. And for the other of Tertullian, though that be now mentioned, yet is it a little ſtrange that no other return ſhould be made to all the Doctors anſwers, ſave onelyonly the tranſcribing of two or three pages from M. Rutterford, and M. Pryn, as from a paire of Royaliſts, in their two tracts of Lex Rex, and Soveragine power of Parliaments, which ſure he could not believe will be of any Authority with the Doctor, though he is ſo pleaſant as to mention the friendlineſſe of their judgements, and the Doctors in caſe of the late King: Beſide this tranſcription, there is but one paſſage in thoſe diſſertations of the Doctors, to which he thinkes fit to make reply, and that is a Grammaticall foreign, taken notice of foreign by the Doctor, viz. M. G. attributing to Montaniſt, that he call'd himſelf the holy Ghoſt. This D. H. did conceive to be haſtily written by M. G. and not agreeably to the rules of the Grammer, unleſſe as in Smectymnus, Areopagi, are ſet for the Areopagites, ſo è contra, Montaniſt were ſet by M. G. for Montanus. In this caſuall incidentall charge M. G. thinks himſelfe very neerly concern'd, more it ſeems, then in giving account either of his Cenſure of Tertullians teſtimony of the Chriſtians patience, or of Gods hiding of Truths, and aſſiſting Antichriſt. For to juſtifie the Grammaticalneſſe of theſe words, [Montaniſt who called himſelfe the holy Ghoſt] a great deale of paines is taken, and three whole pages ſpent on that affaire. Tis not poſſible I ſhould think fit to exerciſe my Reader by continuing ſuch a Debate as this any longer, but ſhall think it abundantly ſufficient to aſſure M. G. that the Engliſh remaines ſtill unjuſtified, upon this ground, that the word Montanist is no poſſeſſive, and if he ſtill have inclinations to diſpute it, I ſhall propoſe him this parallel: M. Goodwin is a Chriſtian, who dyed for the ſons of the world, and aske him, Whether it be Grammaticall ſenſe to have ſaid this. As for the deep recriminatior againſt D. H. for uſing the word [Reſolve] for concluding, or being ſatisfied within himſelfe, &c. if this be any matter of eaſe on p. 44refreſhment to M. G. 'twere pitty he ſhould be denyed the liberty to make uſe of it.

§. 89. There now remaines but one particular, the Doctors accuſing M. G. of flattery in the Elogies beſtowed upon that action of the Army, (collected in the Addreſſe, p. 6.) Whether they were thus guilty, I ſhall no farther diſpute, but leave it to the Reader to determine, having no other deſigne in this whole Reply, then that M. G. may reſume the conſideration of his actions, and of his arguments, and remember that the matters of theſe debates, are of ſuch an importance toward the publike peace, that men of our profeſſion owe an account to God for them. And for other paſſages of this Author, wherein the London-Miniſters are concern'd; I leave them to anſwer for themſelves, and ſo conclude this Paper.

THE END.

End of the text · Henry Hammond, Vindication of Address (1649)