View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Appendix

View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist · Appendix

p. 143An Appendix, or Anſwer to what was returned by the Apologiſt.

TO this Reply of mine what was by the Apologiſt returned in the Margent of my Paper, ſhall be now diſtinctly ſet downe, as the Preface promiſed, with a direction (by ſome Letter of the Alphabet) to that part of any Chapter of the diſcourſe, to which each of his Annotations were applied, and affixed. And for Anſwer to them I ſhall not need enlarging.

In the Introduction, at the letter [A] this Annotation was ſet in the Margent. [I know of neither Scoffes nor Triumphs.]

Anſw. That there are ſuch, the Reader will give credit to his owne eyes, if he review the latter part of your firſt Chapter, as alſo the cloſe of the 8 and of the 15 Chapter; And that you ought to know them, i. e. acknowledge and reform them, as being contrary, the former to that Charity, the latter to that Meekneſſe, which our Saviour left in charge with thoſe that would be called by his name, I hope you will diſcerne, and confeſſe with me.

C. 2. B. the Annotation is [I doe not treat here what is done by ſome, but what in propriety of ſpeech ought to have beene done.]

p. 144To this I anſwer, firſt, That it being true (as this Reply confeſſes) that ſome Romaniſts uſed that ſtile of Catholique Roman Church, (though this Apologiſt did not) This is fully ſufficient to juſtifie his Lordſhips title, becauſe he was not bound to foreſee that this Apologiſt would reforme the ſtile of others; And ſecondly, though it be not propriety of ſpeech, yet was that no argument neither, becauſe his Lordſhip that holds that Church fallible in greater matters, might conceive it poſſible for them to be ſo in matter of propriety of ſpeech, nay was confident that ſo they were, being not able to disbelieve his eyes and eares, that of this they were guilty, as improper as it is. But then thirdly, the matter is yet more cleare againſt the Apologiſt, for though his Lordſhips title did not preſage, yet I which had read that Anſwer, could ſee that he himſelfe ſaid that the Church Catholique was the Roman, and the Roman the Catholique, and that is the thing which I affirm'd from his owne words in that place to which that Annotation is prefixt. And therefore for him to ſay, that in propriety of ſpeech this ought not to be done] as it is an accuſation of himſelfe, who was guilty of that impropriety, ſo is it not a confutation of me, who onelyonly ſaid he was ſo.

Ib. C. [We ſpeak here according to the rules of formall predication, not for reprehenſion of the Enquirer, but for rectifying the manner of ſpeaking, and ſtating the Queſtion rightly.]

Anſw. 'Tis not imaginable how this note could advantage the Writers cauſe. In the very place to which this note is affixt, I am a proving by rules of formall predication, that, by what is ſaid by the Romaniſts, and particularly by your ſelf, it is apparent, that you affirme the Roman Church to be Infallible, though not quatenus Roman. this concluſion you deny not to follow from thoſe rules, but ſay [you ſpeak according to thoſe rules.] And truly I have as yet no neceſſity to d…ny that you doe ſo, nor ſhall I, untill having affirm'd the Roman Church to be the Catholique, you proceed to deny the Roman to be Infallible, though the Cathol…que be. This you doe not yet diſtinctly deny, (though the whole controverſie about the title of his Lordſhips booke ſhews that you are not very willing to ſtand to the affirmative.) p. 145When you doe ſo, I ſhall make bold to put you in mind of thoſe rules, and in the meane onelyonly to take notice of your owne confeſſion, that what you ſaid was not for reprehenſion of the Enquirer: which I muſt affirm to be a retrataction of your former writing, which pretended to prove that in truth it was not ſo, as in the Enquirer's title it is called. This was then ſurely a reprehenſion of the Enquirer, and if now you ſay you meant not to reprehend him, this is to ſay you did not meane to doe what you did, which being a …ile of humility I ſhall never repro…ch or find fault with in you; …ut yet tell you, that what you call in the next words of your Annotation, your [rectifying the manner of ſpeaking, and ſtating the Queſtion aright] is in my Anſwer proved to be contra…y to your owne manner of ſpeaking; and a cleare miſ stating To which proofes as here you reply nothing, (nor is it imaginable how you ſhould, the matter being ſo evident, viz: that they that affirme the Roman Church, to be the Catholique, and the Cathol…que to be infallible, muſt needs affirme the Roman to be infall…bl…) ſo doe you in effect confeſſe that you had nothing to reply to the remainder of that whole Chapter, which as it is the longeſt in the Book, ſo by vindicating the fitneſſe of his Lordſhips title, and ſtating of the Queſtion againſt your exceptions, doth l…y very uſefull grounds for the voyding your pretenſions to infall…bility: For if it be cleared by my firſt Chapter (as I conceive it is, and your Ann…tations do not deny it to be) that the Queſtion is of the infallibility of the Roman Church, then we that deny the Roman to be the Catholique muſt never be charged of denying the Catholique to be infallible, nor be liable to the arguments that are brought againſt us upon that head, (which without queſtion are the b…ſt you have) though we deny it never ſo confidently of the Roman.

Id. D. Surely the meaning is very obvious.]

Anſw. If it be, I am ſure the words doe not clearly expreſſe it, for how ſhould the editor of his Lordſhips tract (to whom the former part of that period belongs, in theſe words [though no notice hath been taken of any anſwer given already]) take notice of giving licence for any other anſwer? Give notice he might, but that in my judgment is not to take; and take notice p. 146you might, but that I conceive would not cohere with the antecedents, and any third way of rendring, I confeſſe I imagin not; and therefore ſtill if the meaning be obvious, it muſt be met with ſomewhere elſe, then in the ſound, and contexture of the words, but this foreign ſhall not be imputed to you, it was onelyonly an officiouſneſſe in me then, to ſhew you it was ſuch.

Id. E. Theſe are bitter ſcoffes, and no way grounded upon my words.

Anſw. That the phraſe [ſad newes] was grounded on your words there recited by me, I muſt ſtill affirme, for they are moſt evidently a forme of complaining, and that is all I meant by [ſad newes:] yet if to you it ſeeme to be a ſcoffe, or bitter, and both thoſe in the plurall, (more ſcoffes than one in that ſingle expreſſion) though my conſcience doth not accuſe me of any ſuch intention, yet I will fall at your judgement, and beſeech you to pardon me for it, and to make you reparations, promiſe to endeavour to offend no more againſt you, or any other Adverſary by any kind of bitterneſſe; and for once be you pleaſed to imitate my reſolution, and remember, that when another man ſpake it [ſad newes] was a bitter ſcoffe, and then perhaps your reprehenſion of me may worke a double cure, and heale you alſo of ſome exceſſes.

Chap. 2. Anſw. to Ch. 2. A. I doe not beg the Queſtion, but deny what the Enquirer aſſumed as true and granted, namely that our proofes of the Church are no other nor better than thoſe by which you impugne it: which aſſumpt of his we deny, and whether juſtly or no, muſt depend upon the triall and the examination of his proofes to follow after; and therefore this deniall of mine is no petitio principii, but a right and Logicall deniall, which either the Enquirer or you were bound to diſprove, and not to tell us as you doe that we are bound to prove againſt the Enquirer, who here chargeth us, and ſuſteineth the Perſon of the Opponent, or one that argues againſt our Infallibility.

I am the Defendent, and no Defendent can begge the Queſtion, p. 147my diſcourſe is Apologeticall as the Title tells you.

Anſw. I did not venture to tell you that you were guilty of a petitio principii, untill I had, as I conceived, made an ocular demonſtration to you that it was ſuch, which you may pleaſe to review in the place; or to ſave you that trouble, I ſhall tell you the ſumme of it; you deny a propoſition, which in that place 'tis cleare that his Lordſhip proves, and having not anſwered one word to his proofes (which is in effect to deny the concluſion) you then give a proofe or reaſon of your deniall [for we affirme that our Churches infallibility is proved by reaſons which are reall and true, &c.] this reaſon of yours being as much denied by his Lordſhip, as your maine concluſion againſt which he diſputes, ought in any reaſon to have beene backt with ſome firme proofe, and of that kind you give none but your owne affirmation; and becauſe you doe not, this I there call a petitio principii, agreeably both to Ariſtotles notion of that Sophiſme, and to the notation of the phraſe. For principium, or foreign, being acknowledged to ſignifie the queſtion, for that or any part of it to be brought in to prove any thing that in that diſputation is denied, is either foreign or foreign, to begge the queſtion, or take it for granted, and in effect, to prove a thing by it ſelfe, (which is the moſt irrationall proceeding that can be.) If you are not yet convinced of this, I ſhall yet farther give you a proofe of it from thoſe antient Authours, which can beſt judge of this matter, the Interpreters of Ariſtotle; Take one for all, ††foreign. fol. 28.Magentius, in his definition of this Sophiſme. foreign, A begging of the queſtion is, when any thing is proved by it ſelfe, which ought to be proved by ſomething elſe. Or againe, foreign, when that which is propoſed to be proved, is uſed as a medium, to prove it ſelfe. Or again, foreign, when we uſe a medium which ſeemes to differ from the queſtion (or the thing to be proved) but is all one with it. As if to prove that pleaſure is good, I ſhould aſſume, that pleaſure is to be choſen, whereas, ſaith he, foreign, that which is good, and that which is to be choſen are all one: and therefore unleſſe p. 148that be farther proved, that pleaſure is to be choſen, there is nothing done toward the proving it to be good. That this is your very manner of proceeding, I need not farther prove, having done it ſo newly by laying your whole proceſſe before you; I ſhall onelyonly adde the note of that Scholiaſt, that foreign, The not demonſtrating of what wee undertake, is the genus of this begging the Queſtion; or Begging the Queſtion is a ſpeciall ſpecies of not demonſtrating; and unleſſe you will diſcerne firſt, and then labour to repaire this infirmity in your diſcourſes, all your mentions of the Philoſopher in his Analytickes, will not perſwade us that you are likely to demonſtrate.

Thus much I had briefly ſaid to you before, but now have been forced to lay downe more largely; and let me tell you, that when I had not onelyonly affirmed, but proved you guilty of this Sophiſme, you ought either by denying my premiſes, or by ſome other way to have anſwered my proof.

And in ſtead of ſo doing, To ſay onelyonly [you are not guilty] is a denying my concluſion, and petitio principii againe. And from this you cannot be cleared by what you adde [that you deny what the Enquirer aſſumed as true and granted;] For Firſt, I ſay you were to have anſwered or denied my premiſes, and you onelyonly aſſay to prove your owne concluſion; Secondly, your way or medium of proving that, is not concluding neither; For the thing aſſumed (by his Lordſhip) being this, [That the meanes brought to prove your Infallibility were fallible meanes, and ſo granted by you] his Lordſhip did not aſſume this as granted or true in it ſelfe immediately or without proofe, but proceeded to prove it to be true and granted by you, and that by this medium, becauſe with you nothing was conceived infallible, but the Church: That concluſion then (being not ſet downe as a premiſe or principle of probation, but as a concluſion proved by that medium) you againe profeſſe to deny, (remember I ſay you deny the concluſion) and then ſure we want no tryall to diſcover the juſtneſſe of ſo doing; and whereas you ſay his proofes follow after, I anſwer, that ſome other proofes follow after, but one ſufficient proofe is brought in that place; and the denying the concluſion without anſwering of that one proofe, is it which p. 149brought all this charge and inconvenience upon you, and therefore you now ſee I doe not require of you (as you ſay I doe) to prove againſt the Enquirer, but onelyonly to anſwer his proofs; But if in ſtead of doing ſo, you will take upon you to prove the concluſion which the Enquirer hath diſproved, and doe that onelyonly by a bare ſaying ſomewhat which you know he denies, this is a petitio principii ſtill. And your ſecond Argument that it is not, taken from your being Defender, or Anſwerer, or Apologist, will no more quit you from that charge; for though an Anſwerer as long as he doth no more but either deny the major or minor, or anſwer to either of them by diſtinguiſhing, limiting, &c. cannot be guilty of that fault, yet if he deny none but the concluſion, he doth in effect, and interpretativè begge the Queſtion, and if inſtead of denying of, or anſwering to the premiſes, he go about to prove the Queſtion in hand, or any part of it, he doth by ſo doing, take the place of an Opponent upon him. Now becauſe 'tis poſſible for an Anſwerer to doe one of theſe, though he ought to doe neither, it followes, that by either of thoſe waies the Anſwerer may begge the Queſtion, and both thoſe are your caſe at this time, as hath, I conceive, already been manifeſted, and therefore I muſt be excuſed, if I ſtill conceive my concluſion is regular, the Apologiſt is guilty of that Sophiſme.

C. 5. Anſw. to C. 5. A. An Anſwerer is not bound to prove but to defend; This Arguer and the Replyer, which is your ſelfe, are bound to prove.

Anſw. He that keeps himſelfe ſtrictly to the Reſpondents taske, i. e. either to deny, or limit, or diſtinguiſh of either of the premiſes in the Objection, is not, I confeſſe, bound to prove, becauſe he is not ſuppoſed to affirme any thing, his repelling the Enemies weapons, or avoiding of them, is enough to defend himſelfe. And if this were your caſe, I ſhould be unjuſt to require any proofes from you. But you muſt be a very great Deſpiſer of my Papers, if you did not take notice in that place, that I was forced to be plaine with you, and tell you that you had not anſwered (either by denying or diſtinguiſhing, &c.) any one word to his Lordſhip in your whole fifth Chapter, but fell into other diſcourſes of your owne, which courſe as it is not the part of p. 150an Anſwerer ſtrictly taken, ſo if it be permitted him at all, it muſt oblige him to give proof for all ſuch aſſertions as he ſhall bring in thus caſually, or elſe never to expect, or require to be heeded by his Adverſary.

And of ſuch aſſertions as theſe, (which were caſuall and extrinſecall to your diſcourſe, and by me conceived falſe) it was, that I required proofe from you, and you are ſtill my Debtour for it.

Chap. 6. Anſw. to the 6. Chap. A. If we affirme our principles be certaine, contrary to the Enquirers ſurmiſe, you, if you can, are to prove they are not, or elſe leave off contending.

Anſw. Certainly this is very ſtrange uſage, when that which you call the Enquirers ſurmiſe, is a concluſion induced by the Enquirer by many ſtrong proofes. This you know is there evidenced by me, and if I had been miſtaken, you ſhould have ſaid ſo.

This being ſuppoſed, I muſt tell you, that it is farre from being ſufficient for you, to affirme your principles to be certaine; for when the Enquirer hath propoſed many Arguments to prove they are not certaine, and among the reſt this convincing one, [That your Church (which is your infallible) is offered to be proved by ſuch markes as the ignorant cannot ſeeke it by, and the learned, though never ſo honeſt, may chance not to finde it by] for you ſtill to affirme they are certaine, and to adde no more, is but to deny the concluſion; and againſt ſuch an one 'tis to little purpoſe for me to bring farther proofes, when thoſe that are already brought are ſo dealt with; and truely unleſſe you pleaſe to give over this courſe of denying concluſions, and not conſidering premiſes, I will ſoone obey your adviſe, and reſolve to leave off contending.

Ibid. B. Our Authours have proved all that we in defending doe affirme, and if the Enquirer had impugned their proofes, we then would have tryed to defend; wherefore that which we affirme and declare, doth not reſt upon a bare affirmation, although p. 151I prove them not in this place, as being here a meere Defendant, and not an Arguer.

Anſw. This annotation being upon the ſame occaſion, and in ſubſtance the ſame with the former, is already anſwered. OnelyOnly I ſhall adde, that if you affirme ought which your Authours in other Bookes bring proofe for, this will not excuſe you from a neceſſity of anſwering his Lordſhips arguments againſt that concluſion of your Authors; or if it doe, you muſt not paſſe for a Defendant. His part it is to ward the Adverſaries blowes, and if he make a thruſt himſelfe, he then turnes Offendent or Arguer, and when he doth ſo, he muſt take care his weapon have ſome edge (I meane, his affirmations ſome proofes annext) or elſe they will wound no body. As for the Enquirer, i. e. his Lordſhip, it was not his preſent taske to deſcend to an enumeration and impugning of all your Authours arguments (though yet thoſe which he could thinke of as your chiefe, he hath inſiſted on; and were he alive, he would from your dealing here have little encouragement to ſeek out for others) his intention was to frame arguments againſt your concluſion, and if you had denied or anſwered them, you needed not to have troubled your ſelf to affirme any thing; or if out of deſigne, or ex abundanti, you will, you muſt be content to be call'd upon to prove it; For call your ſelfe what you pleaſe, you muſt be an Arguer when you ſo affirme.

Ibid. C. Yes ſure by conſequence it is.

Anſw. I am forced to aske your pardon, if I know not certainly to what part of my diſcourſe this Annotation belongs, whether to the end of one period, or the beginning of the other. Yet it falls out luckily, that which ſoever it is, it is againe the denying the concluſion (which you are very ſubject to) for the end of the former period is the mention of a concluſion deduced from grounds immediately before ſpecified. And the beginning of the ſecond period is a negation of mine, with proofe immediately following it, and before I come to the proofe, [For though, &c.] you preſently interpoſe your [Yes ſure by conſequence it is] but will not conſider me ſo much, as after my p. 152example to give the leaſt proofe for what you ſay, or take notice of that proof of mine.

C. 7. Anſw. to C. 7. A. I make no diſtinction here, but ſuppoſe it made and alſo manifeſt.

Anſw. I only ſaid you had given a diſtinction (not made it) and that ſuppoſed it made alſo; and I then conteined my ſelfe from taking any exceptions to it; onelyonly I told you the applying of it to that place would have afforded ſome game if I had been ſo ſportingly diſpoſed. And to that I pray conſider how pertinent your Annotation hath proved. I will not be provoked to adde more.

Ibid. B. Your part was to have confuted what I ſay, and not ſo often, and to no purpoſe repeat this Petitio Principii.

Anſw. If it be a ſufficient confutation of any Sophiſter to finde out, and tell him of his ſophiſme (which ipſo facto is worth nothing when 'tis diſcovered, as the title of Ariſtotles Booke of Elenchs ſuppoſes, foreign being defined by Varinus, foreign, a diſcovery of that which was hid; and 'tis manifeſt by comparing 1 Cor. 14.24. with v. 25. & Eph. 5.13.) then have I obeyed you in confuting what you ſay, though I take not your advice for the way of it. And indeed if it ſhould be in any Duellers power to preſcribe to his Adverſary (when he is in his danger) that he ſhall not wound him this way, but ſome other, or if it were regular for you to forbid me to tell you of a Petitio principii, (when you are clearly guilty of it, and when to evidence that againſt you, is not onelyonly the ſhorteſt, but moſt logicall, moſt expedite and moſt clear way of redargution) your Adverſary might be weary of playing out the prize, though he were ſure to conquer in it. I ſhewed you that an Anſwerer might ſo carry the matter; as to be guilty of Petitio principii, and 'twas but paſſion in you to check or tell me, 'twas to no purpoſe, that I ſaid you were ſo.

C. 8. Anſw. to C. 8. A. We have done it, and doe it continually when occaſion requires.

p. 153Anſw. I beſeech you read over thoſe lines of mine to which your Annotation is affixt, and ſpeak your conſcience, whether you think 'twas fitly noted, If you can be ſo partiall to your own creature, I will not contend with you, but onelyonly tell you, that as I conceive it impertinent, ſo I ſee apparently, that 'tis contrary to that other ſpeech of yours, which within three lines I there recited from you. For if you doe it continually (i. e. prove the Roman Church to be the true by its agreement with Scripture, &c.) as here your Annotation ſaith you doe, how could you ſay his Lordſhip was miſtaken in ſuppoſing you did ſo? I wiſh you had firſt read out to the end of the period, and then I ſuppoſe you would have fitted your Annotation to it the better.

Ibid. B. I doe not diſclaime Scripture, though I doe not hold it to be the firſt or formoſt proof either of the Church or of Chriſtian Religion, and would know how you your ſelfe would convert an Infidell or Atheiſt by Scripture, beginning with that proof.

Anſw. You muſt againe remember (what my laſt Anſwer mentions) that in that place when his Lordſhip had ſuppoſed you to prove the Roman Church to be the true Church by its agreement with Scriptures and antiquity, which is in effect by holding the truth, you plainly tell him he is miſtaken in you. On this ground I muſt conclude (and thinke it proved by that confeſſion) that you doe diſclaime Scripture, as farre as I ſaid you did, i. e. not to all purpoſes, but to that of which the diſcourſe was, viz: to prove your Church to be the true Church. And 'tis not enough to ſay that you doe not hold it to be the firſt or formoſt proofe, &c. For if it be uſed by you as any proofe at all, that will alſo be a very probable meanes, (beſides that it makes it evident, that his Lordſhip was not miſtaken in ſuppoſing it ſo) to bring you into the circle which you were ſo carefull to avoid. You ſee I am cleare from your Animadverſion, and ſo have no occaſion to enter into that new controverſie, whether the Scripture be the formoſt proof either of the Church, or of the Chriſtian Religion, (though ſure it may be one without being the other, it may be the formoſt proofe of evidencing which is the true Church to them that are ſuppoſed Believers (and none elſe will p. 154be fit for that enquiry) yet not be the firſt meanes to prove Chriſtian Religion to Unbelievers:) And yet I ſhall not be over-coy, nor make much ſcruple to tell you my opinion of this alſo, that I would not begin with an Infidel, with that proofe to either purpoſe, as ſuppoſing he did believe it, or that it would of its owne accord attract his beliefe infallibly; but for Chriſtianity it ſelfe, I ſhould firſt labour to win ſomewhat upon his affections by converſe, and by ſhewing him the excellency of the Chriſtian precepts, (and the power of them in my life) bring him to thinke my diſcourſe worth heeding, then when I had gotten that advantage, I would relate the rem gestam of Chriſtianity, where all the acts, and miracles, and paſſages of Chriſts life would come in; then, if he doubted of the truth of it, tell him the authority, by which it comes downe to us in a continued, undiſtributed, undenied tradition; from thoſe that were foreign, oculate Witneſſes of Chriſt, and the whole matter; and to as good an advantage as I could, compound the ſeverall motives of Faith together, which if you pleaſe you may view at leiſure in Grotius de verit. Chr. Rel. and when by theſe meanes I had converted him, I ſhould then by Scripture and antiquity, (which would now be of ſome authority with him) and not by miracles, attempt to manifeſt to him which were the true Church. To which end it may be worth your remembring, that your Apoſtle of the Indies Xaverius ▪ thought fit for their uſe to compile a double Goſpel, one of Chriſt, another of S. Peter, by the authority of one of them to teach them Chriſtianity, of the other, the ſupremacy and infallibility of S. Peters chaire. But I ſhall not give my ſelf liberty to enlarge on this.

Ib. C. I deliver the method, and how it may be, I alſo affirme or declare that it is, I was not in this place to prove, but to defend againſt the Enquirers arguments, and no other, and therefore thoſe two quarrels needed not.

Anſw. The deſigne of moſt of your Notes is to ſave your ſelfe from the neceſſity of proving any thing that you affirme, whereas it might be but an act of a little ſupererogating charity if you would ſometimes prove your aſſertions, even when by ſtrict law you were not bound to it. But, Sir, I will not require p. 155your almes, but onelyonly your justice, and though that will not oblige you to prove, when you onelyonly defend, i. e. when you onelyonly deny the premiſes of his Lordſhips arguments, &c. or when you are ſtrictly an Anſwerer; yet when inſtead of that, you confront any affirmation of yours to his Lordſhips concluſion (as here you doe, and in all places when we charge petitio principii upon you) I muſt then be pardoned to put you in mind of your duty (which is that of Arguers then, and not of Reſpondents) either to prove what you ſo ſay, or not to think you have convinced any man. They that cannot anſwer one argument produced againſt them, may yet think fit to make uſe of ſome argument for them, hoping that may prove as convincing on their ſides, as that againſt them: and ſo by divertiſement put off the heat of the impreſſion; and this you have been proved to be often guilty of, and 'twill ſatisfie no man to ſay, that you neither are, nor (becauſe Defendant) can be guilty of ſo doing.

Ibid. D. Sure he hath not, for Turnbull hath vindicated himſelfe.

Anſw. If every reply were a Vindication, then you may have affirmed truth, and then theſe few marginall notes of yours (ſuch as they are) would be your Vindication alſo; and then I ſuppoſe you will give your free conſent that they be printed. But the task would be too long to diſprove what you have now ſaid, (for it would require the examination of all thoſe writings betwixt the two Combatants, and when that were done, you would think perhaps, that Turnbull were vindicated, and I that he were not) I ſhall onelyonly tell you that you had beene ſo concluded in a circle infallibly, if you had aſſerted that method, which his Lordſhip there diſproves; which is enough to vindicate his Lordſhip againſt thoſe that doe aſſert that method, (as ſure ſome Romaniſts doe) and againſt them he there argues and not againſt you, or any in that place which renounce that method.

Ibid. E. If our Church be the true Church, it must be proved firſtly, as Chriſtianity is firſt proved; that is to ſay, by motives of credibility, and ſupernaturall oſtenſions, or acts not of naturall p. 156and ordinary, but ſupernaturall and extraordinary providence; and he that will not prove Christianity by this way, will not prove it at all. After this done, Scriptures and Fathers doe come, but not before, and this way is not new, but the way of the Antients.

Anſw. I have here no neceſſity of re-examining of the means of proving Chriſtianity to an Infidell, it will ſuffice to remember that thoſe meanes which are neceſſary to that, may be unneceſſary to prove, which is the true Church, becauſe now to him that is converted (as he that will judge betwixt true and hereticall is ſuppoſed to be) other meanes may ſuffiently ſupply the place; ſuch are Scripture and Antiquity, which to an Heathen are of no authority, but to a Christian, or ſuppoſitâ fide, are, and being ſo (as I conceive you will not think fit to deny) may well be made the umpire betwixt us, who are, I hope, allowed to be Chriſtians ſtill by the conſent of parties, or if we are not, our pretenſions to miracles wil hardly gain any credit with them that have that prejudice againſt us.

Mean while I muſt remember you that motives of credibility, as you call them, are but weake premiſes to induce a concluſion of ſuch weight, as the choice of religion is. I will tell you what I ſhould have ſaid inſtead of it. Motives of exceſſive probability, of the ſame, or greater force then thoſe, on which I ground and build the moſt conſiderable actions of my life, and which (as **Anſw. to C. 14.formerly I told you) if I will diſ-believe, I have as good reaſon to miſtruſt the wholeſomeneſſe of every diſh of meat I taſte on, (which 'tis phyſically poſſible may poiſon me, but yet none but Hypocondriackes think it will, or phanſie it ſo ſtrongly, as to abſt…ine) the ſecurity of any title of eſtate I purchaſe or poſſeſſe, the truth of any matter of fact in the moſt acknowledged hiſtory or tradition among men, that I daily talk of.

All which though they produce not (nor are apta nata to doe ſo) a ſcience or infallible certainty, cui non potest ſubeſſe falſum, yet doe they (or are very ſufficient to doe ſo) a Faith, or fiduciall aſſent, cui non ſubest dubium; of which I doubt no more, then of the demonſtrated probleme before me, a certainty of p. 157adherence, of which the believer is as fully poſſeſt, and from it receives as ſtrong motives to doe any thing proportionable to that belief, as if the certitude of evidence were allowed him. And this I conceive is a degree prettily advanced above motives of credibility, for ſuch is every the loweſt probability▪ nay almoſt poſſibility, and non-repugnance, whatſoever is poſſible to be, being (in it ſelf, and in caſe the oppoſite ballance be not otherwiſe weighed down) credible, i. e. poſſible to be believed alſo. But this by the way, and ex abundanti.

C. 9. Anſw. to C. 9. A. Why cannot the ſimple know this (viz. that the Greek Church doth not pretend from Saint Peter) as ſurely as they know the whole Christian Church pretends from Christ, and from no other?

Anſw. Sir, you are a little too haſty in your annotation, for if you had but read on to the next lines, you had received the anſwer to your queſtion, ſo far as my diſcourſe is concerned in it, viz. a ſpecifying of divers wayes, by which 'tis poſſible the Greek Church might (and one, whereby one part of it doth) pretend ſucceſſion to S. Peter. And then that which ſo manifeſtly may be, and is, will not I hope be ſo eaſie for ignorant men to know ſurely that it is not, or ſo ſurely as that the Christian Church pretends from Chriſt, and from no other. Which yet if it have any difficulty in it not intelligible to ſome ignorant men, I take no pleaſure in frighting any with an apprehenſion that God wil ever damne thoſe ignorants for not being ſure of what is ſo difficult, ſo their lives be believing and Chriſtian, and agreeable to what they doe know of Christ.

C. 10. Anſw. to C. 10. A. No ſure, not against the ordinary neceſſity.

Anſw. The thing I ſay in that place is, that his Lordſhips argument might be (I ſhall adde, is) of force againſt the neceſſity of a guide, (meaning thereby an infallible one, for ſuch only is to our purpoſe) and that that will ſerve his Lordſhips turne, and deſtroy you, I there farther prove by a full explication of the whole matter. And therefore you muſt give me favour to leave out your epithete of [Ordinary] which you would p. 158have me interpoſe, when my diſcourſe in order to its end, hath no need of it. And if you tell me you put it in in your anſwer to his Lordſhip, and that therefore I have not vindicated his Lordſhip from that anſwer, unleſſe I take it in alſo; I muſt then confeſſe to you, that▪ I did not ſo underſtand your words, [all this is nothing againſt the ordinary proviſion and neceſſity of a guide] that the word [ordinary] was foreign to be repeated to the word [neceſſity] but onelyonly that it belonged to [proviſion] And now that I know your pleaſure, I ſhall more clearly returne my anſwer, that his Lordſhip ſuppoſes ſome men (and I confeſſe my ſelfe to be one of them) to believe, that to all who follow their reaſon in the interpretation of Scripture, and ſearch for tradition (i. e. the conſtant interpretation of the Catholique Church concerning any difficulty) God will either give his grace of aſſiſtance to find the truth, or his pardon if they miſſe it. To which purpoſe you may pleaſe to compare Juſtin. Mart. queſt. …. ad Orthod. and, to omit many more, Facundus Hermian. in def. 3. capit. ad Juſt. l. 11. p. 491. & p. 496. & l. 12. pag. 513.

Now to them that ſo believe, the argument which you fetch from Gods providence to conclude an infallible guide, will not, ſaith his Lordſhip, be ſufficient to prove it; becauſe he ſtill will be able to ſay, that where imperfection is accepted, meanes of perfection are not neceſſary; if God will pardon weakneſſes, he need not give ſuch a meaſure of ſtrength, as excludes all weakneſſes; if ſincerity, though with ſome mixture of ſinne, will ſerve turne here in viâ, we need not expect from God that integrity of faculties, which either was beſtowed in paradiſe, or will be in heaven, to give us an unſinning innocence. And if you will ſtill interpoſe, that this is nothing againſt the ordinary neceſſity, becauſe theſe are caſes extraordinary. I anſwer, that this is a great miſtake; For under the Goſpell or Evangelicall State (under which all men have beene ſince the promiſe of Christ upon Adams fall) there is no ordinary neceſſity of never miſſing or miſtaking; our naturall ſtate being an eſtate of weakneſſe, is advanced by Chriſt into ſuch a condition, not wherein all weakneſſe is excluded, but wherein ſincerity with mixtures of ſlips and errours ſhall be accepted, and this as infallibly as innocence p. 159had beene rewarded under the firſt covenant made with Adam in the firſt ſtate. To the firſt Covenant, which is ſtricti juris, ſuch pardon for ſlips might be extraordinary; but to this ſecond (whereof foreign or gentleneſſe, is as much apart, as foreign, or ſtrict juſtice, was before) this pardon for invincible infirmities is as ordinary, as obligation to puniſhment for every ſlip had beene before, this being a prime ingredient in that Covenant, and not extraordinarii, but ordinarii juris, that under it ſuch ſlips ſhall not be remembred. In like manner as in this Kingdome Chancery, though it be oppoſed to Common Law (in one ſence, as that ſignifies ſtrict law) yet it is a part of our common law, as that ſignifies the Municipall law, or totall body of lawes by which this Kingdome is ruled; Equity (though perhaps it came in later, and to repaire defects or exceſſes in the ſtrict law) being now as much every Subjects right, and Writs out of that Court as legally required and granted, and the whole proceſſe in Chancery, as clearely ſec. jura & conſuetudines Angliae, and ſo as much Ordinary, or ſecundum Ordinem, as any thing that paſſes in the Common Pleas. And ſo much for your nice interpoſition of the word [Ordinary] to your pretended neceſſity of a guide; where yet I might farther tell you, that infallibility is not eſſentiall to, or inſeparable from a guide; and therefore though the Guide were granted to be ordinarily neceſſary to the finding out of truth, yet this would not come home to infallibility. The antecedent I could make good at large, if it were now ſeaſonable.

Ibid. B. They (i. e. miſſes and miſtakings) are called extraordinary, becauſe happening accidentally beſides the proviſion of the law, and not becauſe they happen ſeldome.

Anſw. That miſſes and miſtakings, infirmities and ignorances, doe happen beſides the proviſion of the ſecond, or the Evangelicall Covenant, is a miſtake, as was intimated then (within few lines after thoſe, whereon your annotation was faſtened) and now at large proved in my laſt anſwer to your former annotation, and I ſhall not need repeate it, but onelyonly tell you there is a law of Faith (aſwell as of workes) and that in that law p. 160there is proviſion for errours, aſwell as ſinnes, and that I hope belongs to all Chriſtians, for we are not under the Law, but under grace.

Ib. C. And why ſo?

Anſw. I had before given you the reaſon, viz: becauſe your diſcourſe hath tended to inferre the one, and not the other.

C. 14. Anſw. to C. 14. A. No man can binde another under paine of Anathema to beleive as he defines, unleſſe his definition be certaine.

Anſw. There was here very little occaſion for this note. For the buſineſſe of Anathema's, I had ſufficiently reſtrained; Firſt, by limiting them onelyonly to excommunications, as an act of Eccleſiaſticall diſcipline upon the refractary; and therefore Secondly, not for matter of ſimple beleiving or disbeleiving; but Thirdly, for matter of diſobedience to our lawfull Superiours, and that diſobedience againe not in refuſing to ſubmit our underſtandings, but our wils, and our conſequent actions: and Fourthly, all this with ſtubborneneſſe and perverſeneſſe, after the uſing of all milder courſes. And with theſe and the like limitations there will be no more difficulty to ſay an Eccleſiaſticall Magiſtrate may excommunicate a diſobedient refractary perverſe Gain-ſayer, without undertaking to be infallible, then to ſay a civill Magiſtrate may puniſh a Malefactour without being inerrable. And therefore when you talke of binding to believe under paine of Anathema; there is ſome miſtake in that, or if there were not, yet Truth (if it were on grounds of Scripture believed to be ſo) would be as ſufficient a foundation of ſo doing, as the infallib…lity of the Judge. For not onelyonly every truth is in it ſelfe as certaine, as that which is infallible, (every matter of fact that is ſo, is as certainly true, as any demonſtration in Euclide, and he that ſpeakes it, ſpeakes as certainly true, as if he did demonſtrate, yet is not in other things infallible for all that) but he that beleives it with a full aſſent, hath as little doubt of that truth, as if it were before his eyes; yet doth it not fide cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum, on any ſuppoſition of its infallibility; by which meanes (though he pretends not to infallibility, yet) having no degree of doubt, he hath that, on which he will confidently p. 161build any action, and even lay downe his life for ſuch truths, if they be of weight: which if it be not ground enough to proceed on to an Eccleſiaſticall cenſure againſt the ſtubborn and perverſe you are very mercifully diſpoſed, and I will not provoke you out of it, but rather give you my ſuffrage, that no man be thus cenſured for matter of opinion but upon that light which is clearely deducible from the Scripture, or univerſall tradition; and then I ſhall confeſſe my ſenſe, that to anathematize men for any matter of doctrine, of any lower alloy, is though not formally, yet interpretativè a kinde of pretending to infallibility, uſurping as much, as if men were infallible, which they that have the ſpirit but by meaſure, ſhould have ſo much humility in themſelves, and charity toward others, as not to be guiltie of.

Ibid: B. The ſword preſerves not inward unity, nor ſatisfies the minde.

Anſw. I had no occaſion to ſay it did. I was ſpeaking (as your anſwer called me to it) of diſcipline, and unity, or ſuch unity as diſcipline produced, which is outward unity, as oppoſed to diviſion and Shiſme; and yet let me tell you, it were not unpoſſible to extend my ſpeech to inward unity, and ſatisfying of the minde. For ſuppoſe a particular Church to have ſufficient meanes to worke in the hearts of her ſonnes this inward unity, viz. by ſetting up the authority of Scripture, as it is interpreted by the Fathers, and receiving with due reſpect, and obedience all Apoſtolicall Traditions; Theſe, if duely revered by all Sonnes and Subjects, would be able to keepe all of one minde in all matters of Faith (and for lower points ſome kinde of liberty being allowed, would preſerve Charity as well) and then while that Church were in this happie temper, you may farther ſuppoſe the ſword of violence to come in, and diſturbe all, wreſting out of her hands the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe meanes, and beating downe the authoritie, and taking away the reputation of them. And then in the caſe thus ſet, you will ſurely grant that the rightfull ſword, if it might be ſo proſperous as to vanquiſh the diſturber, and reſtore what was thus violently taken away, may prove no improbable meanes of preſerving even inward unity in p. 162this ſence; and if you marke it, we ſpake it not in any other. And yet once more, if we had, we might have beene juſtified perhaps in our ſaying. For Hereſie being a piece of carnality in the Apoſtles judgement, 'tis poſſible that the outward ſmart, that comes from the exerciſe of the power of the ſword, i. e. from temporall puniſhments, may cure that diſeaſe, and perſwade them, who inſtead of pleaſure from their hereſie, reap nothing but paine, and ſorrow, to make better proviſion for their owne fleſh and blood, and thinke of hearing that reaſon, to which other honeſt mens eares are open, and then that may produce inward unity alſo, and theſe mens minds may be ſufficiently ſatisfied with that truth coming thus to them tempore congruo, at a fit ſeaſon of working, which at another time had beene rejected. You ſee how little reaſon you had for that annotation.

C. 15. Anſw. to C. 15. A. Chillingworth ſaith it in termes, and him alſo I deſired to anſwer.

Anſw. Can you thinke this faire dealing? His Lordſhip, I made appeare from his words, ſaid it not. And you cannot ſay he did. But Chil: ſay you did ſay it. What is that to his Lordſhip, or to me who undertake onelyonly to vindicate his Lordſhip, and had not that rich harveſt of leaſure to thinke fit to be retained any more in other mens cauſes on ſuch joyleſſe termes as theſe? in which rather then I would adventure to be engaged, I ſhould be content to be thought to have no degree of kindneſſe to him, eſpecially hearing that you had three great volumes prepared againſt Maſter Chill: But then I pray what is the meaning of [him alſo I deſired to anſwer?] Can you thinke fit to impoſe a thing on his Lordſhip, which was ſaid onelyonly by Maſter Chillingworth, and when you were diſproved, thinke you had ſtill confuted Maſter Chillingworth alſo, when you had only falſified, not confuted his Lordſhip? Sure, Sir, this is not faire.

Ib. B. I know very well this was objected by both of them, and this I deſired to anſwer, whether it were in their bookes or no.

Anſw. Here is more of the ſame ſtreine. But I did conceive by your title, that you had confuted his Lordſhips tract that was p. 163publiſhed, not any unwritten diſcourſes, which we have no way of knowing, whether they paſt or no, I am ſure were not undertaken by me to be vindicated. I never reſolved to juſtifie all that you could ſay either of them ſaid, and I might be forced to be uncivill with you, if I ſhould enter any ſuch debate with you.

Ib. C. Neither Arius, Neſtorius, nor others could peep out for ſaying any thing against the doctrine received. How then could this Dionyſius have eſcaped, if he had adventured any thing againſt all the Orthodox?

Anſw. You are very much given, in ſtead of anſwering Reaſons, to deny Concluſions, and if that were backt with Reaſon, 'twere yet very improper for a Reſpondent, which you told us was your office at this time. But then ſecondly, in this matter you know, that neither I, nor his Lordſhip have ſaid that all the Orthodox were for the Millennium. And yet thirdly, if they had, yet the denying the Millennium being a more tolerable opinion than thoſe other of Arius, and Neſtorius, Dionyſius's oppoſition of the Chiliaſts might paſſe more unreſiſted, than Arius, or Neſtorius could doe.

Ib. D. Photius tells us there were Anſwers given, though he recites them not, and Schottus in his Notes hath reſolved them.

Anſw. I will not take the paines to ſee or examine whether Photius ſay there were Anſwers. If he recites them not, I ſhall not be much moved with ſuch blanke Papers. The truth is, this hath been the way to ſatisfie the hardeſt Arguments that ever were brought, and confuting whole Books at once, by having it given out, that they are confuted, or that Anſwers are made to them, when what thoſe anſwers are, is not ſo much as intimated; this is a very cheap way of confutations; As for Schottus's Solutions, if he have any, they prevaile little with us, I am ſure they will not conclude that Photius foreſaw, or would have counted them of any moment to alter his opinion, which was the onelyonly thing I there had occaſion to take notice of.

p. 164Ib. E. Though Philoponus cite but one Epiſtle, yet elſwhere he numbers him among the famous Doctors. Baſil, Gregory, &c. thereby inſinuating he had left workes as they had, and not one ſingle Epiſtle to Polycarpus. This is but a conjecture, but ſuch both we and all muſt uſe in matters of fact, and when we are to walke through darke paſſages of Antiquity.

Anſw. Sir, you cited three places out of Philoponus, to prove that Dionyſius Arcopagita wrote thoſe workes now extant bearing his name: This teſtimony I told you would be nothing to your purpoſe, unleſſe it teſtified (if not all thoſe Bookes, yet) of ſome one wherein he wrote againſt the Chiliaſts. But this I ſhewed you was not done, becauſe thoſe places mention nothing of his, but an Epiſtle of Polycarpus, and in that I advertized you there was nothing againſt the Chiliaſts. This it ſeems you cannot deny, but being willing to ſay ſomething, ſay that elſwhere Philoponus numbers him amongst the famous Doctours, &c. I have not now leaſure to read over all Philoponus, for that [elſwhere] (though I have reaſon to thinke that you that before cited the Chapters in Philoponus ſo punctually, would have had the ſame charity to me again, if it had ſuted w^th your intereſts) conſidering how little can be concluded from what you now cite out of him. Dionyſ. was numbred among the famous Doctors, Baſil, Gregory, &c. doth it follow thence, that all the workes now extant under his name were his▪ or particularly that wherein he oppoſes the Chiliaſts? Nay, would not a man rather conclude from that pretended teſtimony of Philoponus that the Authour under the name of Dionyſius Ar…op. was ſome Writer about S. Baſils or S. Gregories time, with whom he is there conſorted, and that is ſomewhat later then Dionyſius in the Scripture. Nay, if Philoponus really meant him, would he not rather have given him the title of an Apoſtolicall Perſon, than of a famous Doctor, ſuch as S. Baſil, &c. As for the inſinuation which you mention from this of Philoponus, if it did conclude as you would have it, that he left Workes as they did, and not onelyonly one ſingle Epiſtle, yet ſure 'twill not ſo much as once inſinuate that they were the Works, that we have under his name, much leſſe that peculiarly, which oppoſes the Chiliaſts, p. 165leaſt of all, that 'twas the Apoſtolicall Dionyſius that really wrote all theſe. But you confeſſe theſe but a conjecture, and therefore ſure 'twill be a very weake prop to hold up infallibility, eſpecially when the conjecture if it ſhould be ſuppoſed true, would tell us that which we had not before been told from you, that the Chiliaſts doctrine was taught, (and ſo capable of being confuted) ſo early as the Apoſtles times, for with them this Dionyſius lived.

You conclude that ſuch conjectures as this, you and all muſt uſe in matters of fact, &c. To which I anſwer that 'tis poſſible you may be forced to it, on ſuppoſition that you think your ſelf obliged to vindicate your Churches Infallibility, for 'tis very poſſible, there may be no better, then ſuch conjectures to ſuſtaine it. But believe me, Sir, I will never maintaine cauſe, as long as God keeps me in my right wits, which hath no better conjectures, than theſe to ſuſtaine it. And for matters of fact ſo long agoe, they are of all things in the World the unfitteſt to be believed upon ſuch conjectures. Becauſe nothing but an authentick expreſſe witneſſe can be ground of faith for ſuch. There is no matter of fact done yeſterday, but may if we will goe by conjectures (I am ſure as good and as probable as yours here) be related 10000 waies, for whatſoever may be, ſome bold Affirmer may conjecture was, and the more antient, and more darke the paſſage was, the more liberty there will be for ſuch Conjecturers, becauſe the leſſe poſſibility to confute any of them.

Ib. F. Salvian doth not refuſe to condemne the Arian hereſie, but ſome of the Gothick Arians for it, as men not guilty of the malice of it.

Anſw. If you looke againe you will find that both his Lordſhip, and I ſay that Salvian refuſed to condemne the Arian Hereticks (not hereſie) and this it ſeems, you confeſſe with the reſtraint of [Gothick Arians] and this will ſerve our turnes perfectly, and ſo we ſhall not quarrell about that, but hope from your owne confeſſion, that he that is not willing to condemne all Proteſtants, may eſcape as well as Salvian even in your cenſure.

C. 16. Anſw. to C. 16. A. The Councell of Conſtance doth not teach this [viz: that no Faith is to be kept with Hereticks] p. 166neither our Doctors hold it, as Molanus, Becanus, Tannerus, Layman, Coeffecteau, Coquaeus, and others doe ſhew us.

Anſw. To teach is an equivocall word, and may ſignifie to define by way of poſition or doctrine in univerſum; In this ſenſe I ſaid it not, nor doe now meane it of that Synod, that they made any ſuch determination, that it ſhould be unlawfull to keep faith with Hereticks, or lawfull for any man in any caſe not to keep it. But then to teach may ſignifie alſo, to teach by example, & to lay grounds of doctrine for the juſtifying of ſuch example. And thus the Councell of Conſtance did teach it; The Emperour had given ſafe conduct to John Hus ▪ &c. and the Synod declared that that ſafe conduct ſhould be no prejudice to any Eccleſiaſticall juriſdiction, and that non obſtante any ſuch conceſſion, any competent Eccleſiaſticall Judge might enquire, and proceed againſt any ſuch Perſons, and puniſh them as much as juſtice ſhould perſwade, if they would not retract their errours. And this coſt thoſe poore men their lives, whoſe preſumption on the Emperours ſafe conduct, made them venture themſelves in that ſnare, never ſuſpecting, that ſuch a diſtinction as that could have proved ſo fatall to them. That you may not hereafter ſay I charge you unjuſtly, I ſhall ſet you downe the very words in the Councell in Binius Seſſ. 19.

Praeſens ſancta Synodus ex quovis ſalvo conductu per Imperatorem, Reges, & alios ſaeculi principes haereticis vel de haereſi diffamatis, putantes eoſdem ſic à ſuis erroribus revocare, quocunque vinculo ſe astrinxerint, conceſſo, nullum fidei Catholicae vel juriſdictioni Eccleſiaſticae praejudicium generari vel impedimentum praeſtari poſſe ſeu deb…re declarat, quo minus dicto ſalvo conductu non obſtante liceat judici competenti & Eccleſiaſtico de ejuſmodi perſonarum erroribus inquirere, & aliâs contra eos debitè procedere, eoſdemque punire, quantum juſtitia ſuadebit, ſi ſuos errores revocare pertinaciter recuſaverint, etiamſi de ſalvo conductu confiſi ad locum venerint judicii, alias non venturi: nec ſic promittentem, cum fecerit quod in ipſo eſt, ex hoc in aliquo remanſiſſe obligatum. I ſhall not trouble you with the Engliſh, but onelyonly aske what this differs from teaching that Faith is not to be kept (i. e. not neceſſarily, but in ſome caſe may be broken) with Hereticks? They that ſhall p. 167after ſafe conduct given, proceed to judgment (be it Eccleſiaſticall) againſt any man, and condemning him for hereſie, deliver him up to that ſecular hand to puniſh him with death, who had given him the ſafe conduct, and tell him, that he, having done what in him lies, remaines not obliged by his promiſe, but may and muſt put him to death, who came to that judicature, onelyonly on confidence of that his promiſe and ſafe conduct, have ſure proceeded upon other notions of juſtice than thoſe with which my education hath embued me, and I muſt profeſſe to appeale from their judgements, as in my Reply to that citation of them, I was bold to doe; and whatever your friends Molanus, &c. have thought fit to ſay for the ſaving the reputation of that Councell, the matter is too groſſe to be palliated, and I ſhall not trouble my ſelf or you to examine their excuſes.

Ibid. B. Hereſie is puniſhed not for the accidentall grievouſneſſe of it, but for the eſſentiall.

Anſw. This is againe a denying the concluſion, (and not ſo much as endeavouring to prove the contrary) for this was the thing in this place cleerly proved by the citation of thoſe Lawes, that all Hereticks, viz: Arians and Macedonians by name) were not to be ſo puniſht, when onelyonly Eutychians were, the former of theſe acknowledged by you as much Hereticks in reſpect of the eſſentiall grievouſnes of their doctrine, as the latter▪ From whence it followes, that either there was great partiality, or elſe the difference aroſe from the accidentalls. And truly, Sir, your ſaying in generall that it is not ſo, will little perſwade any, when here is ſuch evidence in the particular, that it is.

Ib. C. The title of defence is the Argument.

Anſw. There is not in that place any one word of this Title of defence, or of any other argument; And that was all I affirmed. If you pleaſe to ſurvey the place, that will judge it betwixt us.

Ib. D. This is a hard cenſure, and hardly to be proved.

p. 168Anſw. I confeſſe 'tis hard in ſome ſence, i. e. to them that ſuffer under you for being Heretiques (as you call thoſe that depart from your deformations) and for being invaders (which all may at pleaſure be called that are not able to reſiſt) As for the cenſure it is but that for which the grounds are gathered from your owne words. Which till you diſprove, 'tis but your bare ſaying that 'tis an hard cenſure; or when it is proved, it matters little what difficulty there was in doing it.

Ibid. E. Theſe were not ſetled violences, but tumultuous, and outrages not for religion, but for other quarrels occaſioned by religions.

Anſw. The paſſage to which this annotation was affixt, was about the pictures of Papall approbation of Maſſacres, to be ſeen at Rome. Which if they were, as you now ſay, tumultuous and outrages, then it ſeemes there is papall approbation for ſuch; and then either that or you are fallible. But ſince you ſee it neceſſary to adde another limitation, that the Maſſacres ſo approved were not for religion, I would faine perſwade my ſelfe that you diſclaime maſſacres for religion (the lawfulneſſe of which you were ſo long defending.) And if you be now in that good mood of mercy, I ſhall not goe about to confute or provoke you out of it, but rather pray that God confirme you and all your friends in it for a longer ſpace, then your charitable not damning us did laſt in the former part of the Chapter.

Ibid. F. Thoſe of Queene Maries dayes had ſpoiled and ſtript the Catholiques of all they had, and therefore no marvaile they did ſeeke to puniſh them ſeverely, and to ſuppreſſe them as men would doe wilde Boares broken into a parke or garden.

Anſw. He that ſhould compare this annotation with the text would wonder how it came in, ſo without all temptation or occaſion. I was there a challenging him to name one, that ſince Queene Maries dayes was in this kingdome put to death for religion. And to the mention of Queene Mary, the annotation is affixed. But I ſhall excuſe the impertinence; that very hint might well put him in minde of that ſea of bloud in p. 169Queene Maries dayes. Which if it were by way of puniſhment for ſpoiling and ſtripping Catholiques, and nor for religion; I beſeech you produce one ſuch bill of indictment brought in againſt the ſufferers. Our ſtories have told us otherwiſe, If you have any authenticke records in your Archives, I pray make us partakers of the truth; In the meane, I feare a Proteſtant ſonne of a Romaniſt father, may when opportunity ſerves, paſſe for ſuch a wild boare and a ſpoiler.

Ib. G. My ſence is that religion may not be planted by armes, but being once planted and in quiet poſſeſſion it may. And this I ſuppoſe no learned man will deny.

Anſw. I may believe you that this is now your ſence, but that it is the ſence of thoſe words of yours, which I was then confuting, I ſhall be confident to deny, not only becauſe the words bear no ſuch ſence, but becauſe you did there your ſelf interpret them thus, that the thing which you diſclaimed the deſigning by armes, was onelyonly the juſtifying the right and truth of religion by them. Which I then conceived to ſignifie, that your ſwords doe onelyonly force men to be of your minds, doe not give them reaſons why they ſhould. Yet if after all this, you tell me in earneſt, that this was not your meaning, I ſhall cry you mercy for the miſtake, but not now enter into a diſpute with you of that new queſtion now propoſed by you, [Whether religion (that muſt ſignifie your doctrines as they are diſtinguiſht from, or oppoſed to ours, or elſe 'twill not be pertinent to our purpoſe) being planted and in quiet poſſeſſion, may] becauſe I cannot imagine what verbe that ſyllable [may] is the moode of. [Plant] it cannot be, for that which is in poſſeſſion, is already planted: But what it ſhould be, I muſt not divine for you. Only at an adventure I ſhall make a plaine ſtate. If your doctrines were in quiet poſſeſſion here, and you ſhould know of any man that taught the contrary to them, muſt your ſword be drawne againſt him, or no? I beſeech you anſwer out of the ſence of your brethren, that we may know what to expect from you. For my own part, I ſhall make no ſcruple to tell you, that though the defender of the Faith have the power of the ſword given him by God to that end, to governe in godlineſſe and quiet, and may p. 170therefore draw it effectually againſt any that raiſe ſedition to bring in ſome other religion againſt that which is by law eſtabliſht, or that vent doctrines that are in themſelves ſeditious, yet ought he not, onelyonly in caſe of any ſingle doctrine or difference in religion (where none of the civill intereſts are concerned, no violent aſſault made, or feared from the diſſenters) to unſheath his ſlaughtering ſword againſt any ſuch diſſenter, provided alwayes that that doctrine be not blaſphemous. (And they that conſenting to this truth, will yet tyrannize over mens ſoules in ordine ad temporalia, as you and ſome others have done over mens bodies and eſtates in ordine ad ſpiritualia, ſhall never be excuſed by me) and of this opinion I conceive there might be vouched as learned, and as primitive-tempered Chriſtians as any that are more zealouſly, and ſo more bloudily minded.

Ibid. H. Aſperſions be eaſily caſt, but ſhould not be admitted, when there are ſtrong preſumptions to the contrary, without evident proofe; The Catholiques were knowne good Patriots under our former Kings, and under this our moſt gracious Prince we have good teſtimony, greater then which cannot be given.

Anſw. The caſe is not here of aſperſions, but of matters of fact, or attempts of Prieſts, whereby Queen Elizabeth was known to have beene in danger. On which provocation the lawes forbidding all ſuch to come into the Kingdome, made it ſuch a legall preſumption, that if they did, they ſhould incurre that ſuſpicion, and ſentence of the law. And ſo every man knowing what meaſure to expect from the lawes, were farther to be preſumed either traiterous or madde, if on thoſe tearmes he would adventure on ſuch a forbidden journey. As for evident proofe, which you require, it belongs little to this matter, becauſe the very being in the Kingdome was a demonſtration of contemning the law, and an evidence that they were the men that were under that legall preſumption; which is farre more then a proofleſſe aſperſion, with evidence to the contrary. As for the fidelity of your Patriots under our formoſt Kings, when they were of their opinions, I ſhall not queſtion it; neither in like manner p. 171your behaviour to our preſent Soveraigne, but onelyonly tell you, that the Queen Elizabeth lawes might be juſt for all that; (which was all we had now in hand) and for the execution of them in latter times, I before gave you an account.

Ibid. I. We doe profeſſe our beſt reaſon hath brought us to our religion, not our paſſion, and we have as much reaſon to be believed as any others can.

Anſw. 'Tis poſſible you may not; for if mens actions give in any teſtimony againſt their words, there will not be ſo much reaſon to believe ſuch, as when there is a concordance of them; But if upon ſerious ſhrift you are able to profeſſe this ſincerity, I ſhall be ſo charitable to believe you and allow you any hope of mercy for your errours, which you can wiſh; but yet tell you, that by making this profeſſion in the plurall number, you doe ſomewhat prejudge it; no man being ſo privy to the hearts of his fellow profeſſours, as to be a fit voucher for them, every man muſt ſtand or fall to his owne Maſter.

Ibid. K. I was to anſwer and not to prove, and therefore might in right deny what the Enquirer falſely ſuppoſes without proofe. It is the respondents right to affirme the very point in queſtion, or to deny it, without caring whether it be granted or no, ſo he himſelfe be ready to defend it; and ſo he that can exact this as his owne, ſhall not need to begge any thing, and if he doe, he cannot begge more then what he hath, and what he affirmes or denies already. For example, I deny against Copernicus that the earth moves, or I affirme that it is quiet, and I ſtand to maintaine my ſaying. Certainly this is no begging, but yet to ſay that it is ſo, may be a begging, or if I ſhould ſay it ſtood ſtill, becauſe it doth not move, were a frivolous speech, but yet for all that no begging of the queſtion.

Anſw. This vindication of your beloved petitio principii, (that ſtands you in ſuch ſtead, and returnes ſo frequently upon you) I have already examined, and diſcovered the miſtakings of it; and muſt now tell you againe, that when the queſtion is by the opponent proved by any medium, it muſt never be lawfull for the reſpondent p. 172to deny it againe any farther then by denying the proofe on which it was inferred; for this would be the denying the concluſion, and petitio principii againe. The reſpondent in this caſe cannot exact the queſtion as his own, nor any otherwiſe defend it, then by repelling the weapons brought againſt him. As for your great ſimile of denying the motion of the earth, and your ſtanding to maintaine your ſaying; if you doe this by any other meanes then by denying or anſwering the proofes produced againſt you, this is not the reſpondents part, but will, when you have done what you can, appeare to be that vulgar Sophiſme. It being certaine that when a thing is queſtioned betwixt two, the affirming without proofe is begging it, and it being not the respondents part to prove (or if he doe, he becomes opponent) it followes neceſſarily, that the reſpondent that in time of diſputation affirmes, muſt either ceaſe to be respondent, or elſe begge the queſtion.

C. 18. Anſw. to C. 18. A. We are to conſider here not what is conceived but what is to be conceived. Now what is to be conceived I have ſhewed, namely that the Church underſtands better then he doth, for right reaſon will tell him this.

Anſw. This is the very thing which is diſproved in that place, and then the bare repeating it over againe, will be but a meane kinde of vindication. Be pleaſed to looke over the place againe, and if you will ſtill thinke that there was any place for this annotation, I ſhall be ſorry I have beene thus troubleſome to you.

Ibid. B. I have ſhewed the reaſon why.

Anſw. When an argument is framed on a double ſuppoſition; without diſputing the truth of either, 'tis not to be allowed the reſpondent to anſwer, by denying the truth of either of the things ſuppoſed, for they are ſuppoſed in that diſpute, but not diſputed of. As for example, if the queſtion were, [Whether ſuppoſing Adam were not falne, and Chriſt were come, the coming of Chriſt could be for the ſinne of Adam.] doe you thinke 'twould be tolerable for the reſpondent to avoid ſome argument p. 173brought againſt him, by ſaying that it was abſolutely falſe to ſay that Adam was not falne, whereas 'twas true that Chriſt was come? This would certainly be ſo groſſe and impoſſible to be juſtified, that I ſhould ſuſpect any mans fidelity, that ſhould tell me, he had rendred a ſatisfying reaſon why this ſhould be. And this is your caſe at this time.

Ibid. C. Whether ſhe be infallible or no, ſhe is like to be wiſer than any private man. And this point cannot be in controverſie with a wiſe man, and therefore here is no petitio principii.

Anſw. This is a rare way of replying, when a diſcourſe hath been proved guilty of a petitio principii, to ſay 'tis impoſſible it ſhould, and when a thing is denied, to ſay it cannot be in controverſie.

But, Sir, I ſhall yeild you the Church may be wiſer than any private man, yet not conceive it to follow (unleſſe ſhe be alſo infallible) that when a private man and the Church differ, ſhe muſt alwaies be in the right. He that is much wiſer than another, may yet in ſome particular be miſtaken, when that other is in the right, yea and may be adviſed and reformed in ſuch a particular, by one that is not ſo wiſe as he. This you may apply to the matter in hand, not ſo farre as to preferre the authority of any one man before the Church in generall, but onelyonly ſo, as not to pronounce it infallible. I might tell you farther, that a member of the Church of England aſſenting fully to the doctrine of that Church, and ſo diſcharging the duty of a private man in preferring the judgement of the Church (whereof he is a member) before his owne judgement, may yet doubt of ſome things affirmed by the Church of Rome, and not make the compariſon between a private mans judgement, and the judgement of the Church, but onelyonly betwixt one particular Church and another. But after all this, I might have ſpared any, or all theſe Anſwers, and doe now onelyonly deſire you to looke back upon the place, and you will ſoone ſee what no ground is to be found there of your Annotation.

Ibid. D. If you have no evidence (that 'tis Gods pleaſure p. 174that your Church ſhould be infallible) nor can have, you ſay true, but this latter is denied.

Anſw. 'Tis eaſie to deny concluſions ſtill. But if you will either anſwer the arguments, which have proved there is none, or produce any ſuch evidence that it is infallible, you ſhall be victorious indeed.

Ib. E. This argument which the Inquirer impugnes, is an argument of his owne making, and none of ours, yet for all that, the argument is not like a Ballad as good backward as forward, as M. Chillingworth, putting it a little differently from the Inquirer, would have it.

Anſw. If you had pleaſed to diſclaime and not defend this argument at the firſt, you might have ſaved us ſome paines, and if you will yet promiſe me that no man ſhall out of M. Knots Book make uſe of this argument any more, I will be very well content that argument ſhall be no longer inſiſted on, yet muſt tell you my opinion from my owne expreſſe knowledge, that they which read that Book before 'twas confuted by M. Chillingworth did verily believe that that argument to prove an infallible judge, taken from the topick of Gods goodneſſe, was M. Knots maſter-piece, and the founation on which the maine weight of his ſtructure was ſupported.

C. 19. Anſw. to C. 19. A. In a Reſpondent there can be no ſuch thing as Petitio principii.

Anſw. We have ſhewed you that a Reſpondent may ſo ill behave himſelf that there may. As for example, when a man hath uſed Arguments to prove that you have been guilty of begging the Question, For you to deſpiſe and not take notice of the arguments, and to ſay onelyonly that there can be no ſuch thing, is the very thing called Petitio principii.

Ib. B. But we againe deny it is [Petitio principii] and the contrary ought to be proved.

p. 175Anſw. It is clearly proved in the place, and not to conſider the proofs, but to deny the concluſion is another guilt of that ſophiſm.

C. 20. Anſw. to C. 20. A. If the Enquirers meaning be as you put it, it makes nothing at all againſt us, nor needs any Anſwer. But Chillingworth goes farther, and ſaies that many of the ſimpler ſort amongst us believe Truth upon no better grounds, than others believe Falſhood, and yet our ſimpler ſort believe Truths, upon all the motives that yours doe, and ſomewhat more.

Anſw. That that is his Lordſhips meaning is plaine, viz: That he that denies your infallibility, and yet uſes his best reaſon to ſeeke if it be true, will be in as ſafe a condition, as he that believes it, and ſearches not. And if this be nothing againſt you, I ſhall hope this quarrell is nearer an end then ever I had thought to ſee it. And then ſure many of us ſhall be capable of that charity, which you beſtow upon your owne, for I am confident what we doe, we doe upon ſearch, and uſe of our beſt reaſon; and yet that we deny your infallibility, you are ſufficiently aſſured.

C. 21. Anſw. to C. 21. A. He might be ſecretly obſtinate, and yet both he and we conceive the contrary.

Anſw. 'Tis true he might. But yet ſure you that believe he was not obſtinate, cannot believe that the puniſhment of obſtinacy ſhould belong to him, but muſt either thinke God unjuſt, or elſe believe him ſafe in the ſame degree that you think him not obſtinate. And this is all I required from you.

C. 22. Anſw. to C. 22. A. Every implicite aſſent muſt be reſolved laſtly into an explicite, or elſe there will be an infinite regreſſion, for every implicite preſuppoſes ſomething in which it is involved or implicite.

Anſw. I beſeech you obſerve the nature of this Annotation of yours. You ſay in your Apology, that one implicite Faith doth not containe another. I proved that falſe by this inſtance, that ſuppoſing I believed by an implicite Faith, that you were an honeſt man, this might containe in it an implicite beliefe of every p. 176Propoſition by you aſſerted, and farther by putting his Lordſhips affirmation by you denied into a downe right Syllogiſme: you after your wont anſwer no proofs, but prove againſt the concluſion. And truely your proof is a ſtrange one, every implicite aſſent muſt be reſolved laſtly into an explicite: Ergo, One implicite faith doth not containe another. As if you ſhould ſay, Every ſubordinate cauſe muſt be reſolved laſtly into a firſt cauſe; Ergò, One ſubordinate cauſe doth not containe another, the Genealogie of Abraham muſt at laſt be reduced to God, therefore Abraham's Grandfather was not Father to Abraham's Father: what ſound of reaſon is there in this arguing? The antecedent is the onelyonly thing which you goe about to prove, and the conſequence that which we deny, and therefore I ſhall need ſay no more to this Annotation.

C. 24. Anſw. to C. 24. A. We meane the fire of this world, and that fire we are ſure is not in all Countries appointed to burne ſuch as doe diſſent from us.

Anſw. What? not to burne ſuch as diſſent in matters of faith? Is there any matter of faith which is not required ſub poenâ ignis? (I meane alſo with you, the fire of this world) If there be, ſpeake out. But you have by your next Annotation in effect confeſt there is not, and ſo by that confuted this, for ſo you adde.

Ib. B. I make no ſuch distinction.

Anſw. i. e. No ſuch diſtinction, that of matters of faith ſome are required ſub periculo ignis, ſome not; which is in effect that in reſpect of that penalty all matters of faith are of the ſame nature. Which is abſolutely contrary to that former, unleſſe in that your meaning were, that fire was not in all Countries appointed to burne Diſſenters from you, i. e. not in thoſe Countries, where you had not the power. And that wil be but a ſlender obligation from you, if it be acknowledged.

Ib. C. If you could make that appeare we were ſatisfied.

p. 177Anſw. It is made appeare as much, as your like Aſſertion of your ſelves, i. e. by our affirming it. But if you will have patience to read on in that place, you ſhall ſee the point ſtated, and as much of it proved, as we have need to aſſert in this matter.

Ib. D. In ſome places we doe (make uſe of the Argument from Mutuall Diſſentions) but in this it is brought againſt us.

Anſw. This is clearly falſe, for in the 40. Sect. his Lordſhip there mentions it as an Argument of yours, and in that place becomes Reſpondent, gives an Anſwer to that Argument, and that is the ground of the preſent debate.

Ib. E. Our Criterion or rule of Faith keeps off diſſentions when it is followed, yours does not. Lutherans and Calviniſts follow the ſame rule, and yet diſſent and condemne one another, ours doe not ſo, but remit the differences to be decided to one and the ſame judge both exterior, and interior.

Anſw. I was a proving by the antient Catalogues of Hereticks, that there were good ſtore of Hereticks in the world before the Reformation, (from which it followes that either your infallible Judge was not then in faſhion, or elſe that it is not ſuch a ſoveraigne meanes or antidote againſt Hereticks) you ſeem to diſtinguiſh that your rule keeps off diſſentions, not alwaies, but when it is followed; and prove that farther, becauſe you remit the differences to be decided to one and the ſame Judge. I might anſwer, that our rule, the word of God doth ſo too, at leaſt in matters of faith, and that any ſuch diſſention, at leaſt uncharitable cenſuring of Diſſenters, is abſolutely againſt that rule. But I conceive that is not the thing that commends a rule as a means to prevent diſſentions, that they that follow it diſſent not, (for the rule if it be but one rule, what ever it is, will doe that) but that it is able & apt to keep men obedient, and to reſtrain them from exceſſes & not following of it. Now this is an excellence that theſe many Catalogues of Hereſies proved, that you had no right to pretend to, and if we have not ſo neither, we are but Partners in this piece of humane infelicity, to which, as long as we carry fleſh about us, p. 178it will be incident, for there muſt be Hereſies among you. As for your inſtance of the Lutherans and Calviniſts diſſentions, and condemning one the other, I muſt tell you that this little concernes the Church of England, which alwayes diſclaimed the being called by the names, or owning the diſſentions of Lutheran and Calviniſt, and profeſſeth only the maintaining of the Primitive Catholike faith, and to have no father on earth, to impute their faith to. I might adde more even for thoſe Lutherans and Calviniſts, that if they did really follow (I ſay not only profeſſe, but follow) the ſame rule, they would certainly agree alſo.

Ibid. F. I doe not excuſe all (the Jeſuits from the doctrine of reſiſting Magiſtrats under colour of Religion, killing Kings, oppoſing the Order of Biſhops &c.) nor ought you to have accuſed all; For neither all the Jeſuites, nor neare all be of that mind, but of the quite contrary. Bellarmine, Valentia, Petavius, and other Jeſuits have written for the Order of Biſhops against Salmaſius and others, but none at all have written against it. Neither was the controverſie between the Saeculars about that point, as it is moſt evident.

Anſw. I have already obeyed your commands; and indeed had no neceſſity to accuſe all of that Order in all places. It was ſufficient to prove the point in hand, (diſſentions among your ſelves) that any conſiderable number were of thoſe opinions, which are the worſt that are to be found among our S…ctaries, And it ſeems you cannot in your owne heart excuſe all, as kinde as you are to them. If others in a matter of ſuch moment are of a contrary mind, this is an argument not againſt, but for the truth of what is laid to you, diſſentions after all your infallible judgements. For the Jeſuites opinion of Biſhops I appeale no farther then the diſputations in the Councell of Trent, and the generall pretenſions of that Order to an Independency, and abſoluteneſſe from any but their owne ſuperiour, and the Pope, and this, though it allow Biſhops over other men, yet is ſufficiently contrary to the Apoſtolick inſtitution, and practice of having all the Churches and Presbyters in them, ſubjected to them. You adde, that the controverſie of the Saeculars (I ſuppoſe you mean p. 179and Regulars) was not about that point, i. e. of Epiſcopacy, I did not ſay it was, any farther then thus, as the neceſſity of Confirmation is all one with the neceſſity of Epiſcopacy, (which truely to me ſeemes to be very neare it▪ and I am ſure the buſineſſe was whether the Catholicks in England ſhould have an Ordinary here reſident or no, and that Ordinary was a Biſhop; ſo that though it was not of Epiſcopacy, in univerſum, yet it came to a debate, whether the having Biſhops was neceſſary, or no) On which ſoever it is, it is enough to prove diſſentions.

C. 26. Anſw. to C. 26. A. At leaſt they might have been diſcerned, as well as other errours were, and the Authors of them alſo.

Anſw. This note being reduced to intelligible ſence, will I conceive be, that the now Romiſh errours might have been diſcerned, &c. To which I anſwer, that though they might, yet Firſt, 'tis poſſible that they might not; Secondly, very poſſible that being favoured, if not brought in by thoſe in authority among them, they would not be branded or recorded for errours, and then all that we their poſterity can ſee, may be onelyonly, that the tares are ſowne, but not punctually at what point of the night, or who the man was that ſowed them.

Ibid. B. No more for theſe then for other errours.

Anſw. His Lordſhip had occaſion onelyonly to ſpeake of theſe, but will ſay the like of all others whoſe originall is not diſcernible.

Ibid. C. In all ages errours were cenſured and condemned.

Anſw. All kinde of errours were not thought to be of ſuch weight, as that ſuch heavy cenſures and condemnations which you lay on us, ſhould be faſtened on them. And therefore in caſe ours be not errours, or but in materia non gravi, in diſputable parts, (as if you pleaſe to deſcend to particulars, we will undertake to prove them) thoſe ſevere cenſures of yours, being more contrary to charity, may prove more dangerous to you, then we ſhall otherwiſe affirme your opinions to be.

p. 180Ibid. D. I judge one of theſe two by the event, and the other by the ſemblance of his making a ſearch in manner as he ought.

Anſw. This is a darke ſpeech which I doe not clearly underſtand: if the meaning be, that you judge the ill ſucceſſe of his Lordſhips ſearches by the event, and the fault of them by the ſemblance, &c. I muſt then tell you, that the firſt is a very ill grounded judgement, for no event hath proved the ilneſſe of that ſucceſſe, (unleſſe like thoſe in the Gospel, you count them the greateſt Sinners on whom the Tower of Siloah fell; or like him of late, that being willing to paſſe his opinion on a learned mans choice of a ſide in the differences in the Low Countries, ſaid onelyonly this, Illud notum eſt, partes quas ſecutus non eſt praevaluiſſe; ſi quis infelicitati hoc tribuat, ego prudentiam non probo minus felicem; and Buſbequius tels us ſomewhat like of the Turkes judgments of good and bad enterprizes) but rather on your owne principles I have already proved, that they muſt be good in the ſucceſſe, which were ſo happy in propoſing.

But then what you meane by the ſemblance of his making a ſearch in manner as he ought, by which you judge the fault in his ſearches; I muſt confeſſe I doe not at all underſtand, and therefore muſt be faine to confeſſe my ſelfe overcome and maſtered, though not by the reaſon, yet by the obſcurity of your writing; and if that be a victory, I wiſh you much good of it.

To the Concluſion. A. I here contend no more, but that our Church may be infallible, notwithſtanding any thing the Enquirer hath objected. That ſhe is ſo, hath in due place been proved by others.

Anſw. If you had performed the former, I meane ſatisfied all his Lordſhips arguments, I ſhould not require at this time the latter from you, i. e. proving your Church to be Infallible. I muſt then onelyonly aske you in earneſt, whether you doe believe that no one of his Lordſhips arguments againſt your Infallibility (for any one will ſerve our turne) remaines unanſwered by your Apology; and then whether all that I have ſaid to vindicate his Lordſhip, p. 181be effectually anſwered in your marginall Notes, and whether you can juſtifie all them againſt his laſt Reply. If you are of this opinion in each, I am to crave your pardon for this ſo gainleſſe trouble, but referre the matter to God and impartiall men to judge between us.

Ibid. B. If you would doe it, we then would thinke it more than poſſible.

Anſw. The meaning of this annotation if it be ſence, muſt be this, that if we Proteſtants could or would finde place in you for Scripture and Reaſon to make impreſſion, you Papiſts would then thinke it more then poſſible you might be deceived. Which if it be the meaning, I muſt then onelyonly reply by prayer, that God would ſo ſoften your hearts, that they might be capable of that impreſſion. But if the words be indeed no ſence, but yet miſtaken for ſome other words, which would be ſence, then the likelieſt thing that I can imagine, is, that you would have ſaid ſomewhat to this purpoſe. [If you Proteſtants could by Scripture or Reaſon diſprove our Doctrines, we then would thinke it more than poſſible for us to be deceived] Which though it were no huge Conceſſion, yet I ſhould be glad to have it from you, for then in effect your grounding of Faith on your Infallibility would be laid aſide, and then there would be no more truth in any individuall Doctrine of your Church, than Scripture or Reaſon would inferre, abſtracted from the Authority of your Church, which is all that at this time we demand from you.

And in that we are a little importunate (ſeeing we have you now in a ſeeming good humour:) Firſt, becauſe there is ſo much danger in inſiſting on that priviledge of Infallibility, even in any particular, wherein men are in the right, becauſe he that really doth ſtand, yet may (and therefore ought to take heed leſt he) fall, but moſt eminently, when a man chances to be in the wrong. He that miſtakes firſt in a piece of Divinity, and after in a perſwaſion that he cannot miſtake, ſealeth up that errour, obſtructs all entrance, all approach, all poſſibility of Reformation, is fortified impregnable againſt all aſſaults either of p. 182reaſon, or even the ſpirit of truth; and by that one errour hath a kind of propriety in all other that can by the ſame hand be repreſented to him. Secondly, becauſe we cannot but obſerve the prudence of your fellow-Champions, Maſter Knot &c. now of late, who have choſen to vary the method from inſiſting on the ſeverall points of difference betwixt us, and them (proving themſelves to be the onelyonly true Church from the particular truths profeſt by them, and by no others) to this other more commodious way of putting off all together by whole-ſale, of concluding the truth of all their aſſertions from the unerrableneſſe of the Aſſerter, manifeſting that they are in the right, becauſe 'tis impoſſible they ſhould be in the wrong, uſing all skill to perſwade this one point, and then confident on good grounds, that no other can be reſiſted. Theſe two things put together, will advertiſe you, how ſeaſonable an admonition it is to you, that you will beſtow a little paines on your Brethren, to perſwade them they are mortall or fallible; and then againe Reaſon and Scripture may finde reception, and be agreed on the umpire betwixt us and we ſhall promiſe ſincerely, that whatever that ſhall, ſententiâ latâ, award to you, we will moſt gladly yeild, and never breake with you, till you breake from that umpirage.

Ibid. C. The words are applicable againſt our belief of Chriſtianity, as well as againſt our belief of our Churches doctrine.

Anſw. The words are applied by me onelyonly againſt your infallibility, and if that be as infallible as Chriſtianity it ſelf, I beſeech you either ſhew as plaine teſtimonies from the conſent of all Ages, that the Church of Rome is infallible, as there are for the Canon of the Scripture, or as plaine places out of the Scripture for it, as we can for the ſeverall parts of Chriſtianity, and then I will give you leave ſo to apply the words; In the meane, you may ſpare your labour of applying my words, or elſe prove demonſtratively that they are ſo applicable.

Ibid. D. A poſſibility perhaps of more errours, but a probability of fewer, for if ſhe were fallible, yet ſhe would not be fallible, as a private man; ſo that with theſe fewer errours we ſhould p. 183have quiet and unity, you with more errours ſhould have diſturbances and diſſentions.

Anſw. In this place, whereto your Annotation was affixt, the diſcourſe was upon a ſuppoſition, that your Infallibility were an errour, (which I in that caſe affirm'd, would be the moſt dangerous, becauſe moſt prolificall complicated errour imaginable) and will you ſay that upon that ſuppoſition, there would be a probability of fewer errours? Will the thinking I cannot fall make me ſtand the longer? is there no advantage to be made of care, and caution, and feare? or is there a diſadvantage in them? This is brave fiduciary doctrine, I muſt thinke infallibly I ſhall be ſaved, and that I cannot fall away, and the thinking that, will make it more probable that I ſhall be ſaved, and ſhall not fall. I confeſſe I had thought that humility were a readier way both to truth and Heaven, then either of theſe preſumptions. What you meane by adding (by way of proofe of that ſaying) that if your Church were fallible, ſhe would not be fallible as a private man, I confeſſe I cannot gueſſe. If ſhe would not, I conceive, this would be but little advantage on her ſide, for her fallibility would be a greater ſnare and ſcandall, and more apt to draw into errour thoſe that conceived her infallible, than any private mans fallibility would doe. For that which you adde of quiet and unity, if it were ſuppoſed to be joyn'd with fewer errours, I grant it would be an advantage, but at a time, when that infallibility was ſuppoſed to be one errour, and that prov'd moſt apt to produce a multitude; ſurely this ought not to have been ſuppoſed, any more, than that we ſhould have more errours ſtill, though 'twere not at the ſame time ſuppoſed that we have.

Ibid. E. It was never put into more hands than two, but what thoſe hands might doe, I know not; and to thoſe on purpoſe to make triall what exceptions might be made againſt it, that ſo upon a review, I might know better what to alter in it, what to adde, and what to take away.

Anſw. I conceive one man hath two hands, and therefore 'tis poſſible you may meane, it was never communicated to above p. 185one man. If you doe, 'tis certainly falſe; But if you meane two men by two hands, you acknowledged what I ſaid, for I ſaid no more. As for your affirmation that 't was put into thoſe hands only for triall, &c. This cannot be ſaid of one of them, for to him it was delivered by one of your friends, as an unanſwerable piece, but yet if it were, as you pretend, that you might know better what to alter in it; I am then glad I have given you occaſion to doe ſo, but muſt tell you, that now you have altered it, and delivered it from ſome infirmities, which appear'd to be in it, there be yet enough behind, to be reformed by any body elſe, and when that is done, there will remaine ſomewhat elſe perhaps, but I am ſure no anſwer to my Lord of Falkland.

Ibid. F. Sir, your noble courteſie is gratefully acknowledged, and I deſire with all due reſpects and ſervices to correſpond.

Anſw. This I conceive to be a civility, and I ſhall never go about to confute that, or anſwer it, but by the returne of the like, and my prayers alſo, that the Lord give you a right judgement in all things.