View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Part 2 · Subpart 29 – Subpart 30
C. 13. Anſw. to Chap. 13.
Section 1 Your great quarrell to his Lordſhips 19. Sect. comes now to be conſidered; wherein the paradox in, and improbability of his Lordſhips concluſion will not be ſo great, if you obſerve but one thing, that the matter of definitions of Councels, which he ſpeaks of, is not divine truths, (as the following words ſuppoſe them, and upon that preſſe them with abſurdity) but, as I conceive, ſuch things as have beene defined by Councels, being not before defined by Scripture, and ſo though affirmed to be truths, yet not as divine truths, at leaſt of which it is not infallibly true, that they are ſo: of which nature I might inſtance at large in your Councels of Lateran, Conſtance, and Trent; for to the antient generall Councels I confeſſe to beare ſuch reverence, that I ſhall challenge any of you to exceed me.
Section 2 Now to cleare his Lordſhip from the guilt of a frivolous quarrell at this time, I muſt adde, that in ſuch deciſions of Councels, the worth of the matter, and inconvenience of leaving it undecided, are the maine things worth conſidering; and ſo it is poſſible that the deciſion may be ſuch, that it may tend, Firſt, to ſome publique end, whether the clearing of obſcure Scripture, or the recovering of ſome venerable and uſefull practice, or doctrine of the Church. Secondly, to the ſetling and eſtabliſhing of peace, by interpoſing ſuch a judgement which may probably ſway with both pretenders; And in theſe, and the like caſes, the advantages being ſo intrinſecall to the deciſion, and withall ſo great, the inconvenience mentioned by his Lordſhip ought not to prevaile to the diſparaging of Councels, becauſe though it be an inconvenience, yet is it over-weighed with other conveniences, and therefore the argument I confeſſe is not infinitely or unlimitedly true.
Section 3 But then the caſe may be, that the matter of the definition is of no ſuch great weight or uſe, that there is no ſuch aſſurance acquirable from Scripture, that either ſide is true, (nay it may be audacious and untrue) and as little from any other foreign, that either ſide will peaceably ſit downe and acquieſce in the deciſion, (but in matters of opinion probably prove opiniatour) and ſo the deciſion will then rather widen the breach then compoſe it.
Section 4 In this caſe, or when indeed in other reſpects the ballance is even ſet, the good of defining counterpoiſed with the ill, then there is place for his Lordſhip's argument, and 'tis true that then upon that preſent ſuppoſition (that before deciſion 'twere lawfull to hold either way, and damnable after) it were uncharitable to define; my reaſon is, becauſe when charity doth not move to doe a thing, i. e. when no advantage ſhall ariſe to mankinde by it, but on the other ſide charity ſhall adviſe to abſteine; ſome one, (though accidentall) hurt, being foreſeen to ariſe on the other ſide, there to doe that thing is uncharitable.
Section 5 Thus have we heard of an expreſſion of Biſhop Tunſtall of Durham, who died in your communion, that if he had beene Chaplaine to Pope Innocent the Fourth, he would have begg'd on his knees, that he would not define Tranſubſtantiation, as knowing it would tend to the breach of the peace of the Church; and thus in matters of controverſy about Predeſtination, &c. you know the Pope hath in charity abſtein'd to define, and the Apoſtles (or whoſoever elſe were the compoſers of it) in their Creed defined but a few things; and generally thoſe Churches that have avoided multiplying of articles, have by wiſe men beene thought the moſt Chriſtian, becauſe the moſt charitable; and even in matters of rites and humane lawes, the rule is, that they muſt not be multiplyed unneceſſarily; and the reaſon is, becauſe they would conſequently multiply ſnares on mens conſciences, as unneceſſarily, which is juſt his Lordſhip's reaſon in this place.
Section 6 Which you will rather gueſſe, becauſe 'tis cleare his Lordſhip ſpeakes of thoſe things in which before a Councell hath determined, it is lawfull to hold either way, perfectly lawfull, (not excluding alſo that other circumſtance that I have added, viz: when there is no reall gaine expectable by defining) And when the [thoſe things] are by his Lordſhip ſo limited and reſtrained, I know not how (to make up your paradox) you could thinke fit to change the phraſe from [thoſe things, &c.] to [any thing] and after to [divine truths] and [things divine] and [verities] in generall, when 'tis improbable that he did (I am ſure very poſſible and probable that he did not) ſpeake of any ſuch, as are new ſteps toward Heaven, but ſuch as onelyonly fill mens braines, puffe up their phanſyes (and oft make men to thinke themſelves pious men for being of ſuch opinions, and to neglect workes of piety and charity, as not neare ſo conſiderable) and ſo are to them even that believe them, accidentally pathes to damnation, much more (if the doctrine of the deciſions of Councels be to be extended to whatſoever uſeleſſe definitions) to thoſe that doe not believe them.
Section 7 Having ſaid thus much for defence of this ſuppoſed paradox of his Lordſhips, I muſt deſire (once for all) theſe two things from the Reader, which Equity will require of him to grant me; Firſt, that his Lordſhip's arguments be not extended infinitely, but onelyonly be ſuppoſed to undertake to conclude as farre as is neceſſary to the preſent matter, and no farther, (an example of which this Chapter hath afforded you) Secondly, that his arguments being by him brought onelyonly to enervate the Infallibility of the Roman Church, be ſo cautiouſly taken, as that they be made uſe of onelyonly to that end, and not at all inclined, or wreſted to the leſſening the authority of the Church or Councels univerſall; for this would be very unjuſt, and ill inferred, there being a wide difference betwixt authority and infallibility, as alſo betwixt univerſall and Roman, though (by reaſon of the manner of his Lordſhips diſcourſe, being, according to the deſigne, wholly deſtructive of the one, and not aſſertive of the other) the Reader may perhaps be tempted to thinke otherwiſe; and therefore I thought it not impertinent thus to fortify him againſt this prejudice.
To the 20, 21, 22, Sections, Chap. 14.
It is true, we condemne ſome doctrines which generall Councels have not condemned, and we have great reaſon for it, becauſe though Councels be one rule of faith, yet not the onelyonly. Againe, theſe we hold to be infallible, becauſe they are the Compendium and quinteſſence of the Church, and the body repreſentative thereof, as a King and the three States be of the whole Kingdome.
The cauſe of Pope John the 22. is cleared ſufficiently by Ciacconius in his life, by Caeffeteau in his learned anſwer to Pleſſye's iniquity, and by many others, and therefore needs not be argued any more. I grant it a point of faith that the ſoules of the juſt ſhall ſee God before the laſt judgement, and doe deny that this doctrine was generally contradicted at any time. Nevertheleſſe I doe not know it to be of faith that all of them ſhall enjoy the ſame viſion before that great day, and that none of them ſhall be detained in ſecret receptacles, as the Antients hold, till they, together with their bodies, ſhall be compleatly purged in the great fire of the worlds conflagration, as I have treated elſewhere.
It was not needfull that Councels ſhould define in tearmes their owne immunity from errour, becauſe a Councell both in ſubſtance and ſemblance is the Church, who needs not define her owne infallibility, and therefore needs not, becauſe that ſame is to be preſuppoſed to all her definitions as a thing knowne without them, before hand; for otherwiſe ſhe would not be believed in any of them at all, either touching her ſelfe, or any other matter. Nevertheleſſe though this definition be not in tearmes, yet it is virtually done, and in actu exercito, as often as a Councell defineth any thing, by the pronouncing of Anathema againſt ſuch as doe not ſubmit, and counting them as Heretiques; It is done againe in the uſing continually this old forme, Viſum eſt Spiritui Sancto & nobis.
For a concluſion I demand of theſe eager impugners both of Church and Councels, what thing it it muſt regulate our beliefe, and keepe us in diſcipline and unity; for if they let all men looſe upon themſelves, and make all men Judges in the Court of faith, as they, de facto, doe, controverſies will multiply apace, and no meanes left to reconcile them; and while all men have authority of deciding, no man hath it. Reaſon alwaies did teach us, that confuſion would be the effect of this new licence; yet could we never underſtand it, till that now coſtly experience, the miſtris of the improvident, hath laid it open before our eies. And now at length we ſmart for our leaving the venerable decrees and definitions of Church a…d Councels, and doe behold all brought to miſery and ruine, both Church and State; yet ſuch is our blindneſſe, as we are not able to diſ…erne the true cauſes of all theſe evils. The daily growing up of new and new devices in ſtead of the old faith, and the continuall diſcords and diſſentions thereupon enſuing, evict unanſwerably the weakneſſe and inaptitude of the rule of faith, and our young and preſuming wits way ſee how farre ſhort they come of their forefathers wiſedome, and how much more unhappy then thoſe who were governed by Church and Councels.