View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Part 2 · Subpart 42 – Subpart 49
To the 32. Section, Chap. 20.
Whoſoever admits of truth upon no better grounds than others doe admit of falshood, doth not receive it rightly, ſolidly, and as he ought, but after a way defective and infirme. Againe, whoſoever ſearches and is loath to finde, and would not ſee it when he might, this Man refuſeth truth as badly and weakly as the other doth receive it; and as the truth will not benefit the one, ſo the enquiry will not advantage or excuſe the other. As for ſuch as are bred up in a true Religion, and which, without particular examination, they accept, it were raſh judgement to ſay all theſe received truths upon no better grounds, then others did falſhood; for firſt, according to this account, the greateſt portion of Chriſtian men on all ſides would be in a hard condition: amongst whom the ſimple and illiterate, who are not able to read Evagrius either in Greeke or Latine, nor yet the Bible either in Hebrew or Greeke, or otherwiſe to make any ſtrict ſearch into antiquity, for their making diſcoveries which faith was the Antient and Apoſtolique. But though they be unable to doe this, yet doe they not therefore take up their Religion at randome and by chance, or conſult paſſion about it, and not reaſon, but contrariwiſe, doe finde their reaſon ſatisfied each one according to their ſeverall models, or meaſure of capacity, by the preſent view of the majeſty and divine perfections of the Catholique Church and faith therein profeſſed, together with the aſſurances from publique fame and creditable relations. By meanes of which the divine providence and veracity ſhewes them infallibly what wayes they are to take, and what doctrines to receive as revealed from above. And thus, regularly ſpeaking amongst orthodox Believers, where Religion may appeare like it ſelfe, every Man of capacity, though illiterate, may ſee ſufficient to reſolve him, which ſatiſfaction from any falſe Religion he could not receive; for though to a heedleſſe eye, and before a diligent exquiry made, ſome grand falſhoods may ſeeme more probable than truths, and that as Ariſtotle teacheth, multa falſa ſunt probabiliora veris, many falſhoods are more probable than truths; yet, not to a diligent Enquirer after the ſearch is made, and eſpecially, in buſineſſes of great concernment, becauſe God and nature have laid theſe kinde of truths more open to our view, and ſet markes upon them by which they might be knowne and diſcerned from falſhood. Wherefore, in the law of nature, it was more credible, even to the illiterate, that there was a God, then that there was none; and now Judaiſme is not ſo probable as Chriſtianity is, though ſometimes it hath been, nor Mahumetiſme at any time ſo perſwaſible as Chriſtian Religion, or Hereſy ſo credible and ſatisfactory as orthodoxall Chriſtianity, or the Greeke ſchiſme as the Greeke unity; wherefore though the Parents beliefe, and the Religion prevalent in the Countrey have great influence into the minds of Man, and are great and powerfull Perſwaders, yea oftentimes Seducers alſo, and thoſe very dangerous; yet nevertheleſſe in thoſe places where truth is taught, they doe not hinder Men from the right apprehenſion of it, and from making true judgements about it, but rather like a proſperous gale of winde to Veſſels under ſayle, cauſe them to move towards the Port deſired more ſwiftly than otherwiſe they would. And thus much may ſuffice for taking off the ſlander and ſcandall which this Enquirer, and after him Chillingworth, with great acerbity, have almoſt in the very ſame tearmes, labour'd to caſt upon right believing Chriſtians, therewith to diſparage their faith, as if forſooth, they beleived truths invalidly and upon no better reaſons then others beleive falſhood. Thus have both theſe conſpired againſt the truth, for both indeed are but one Author in effect, one the Text, and the other the Commentary; wherefore the Publiſher of this ſmall worke hath ſhewed us all the well head to which Chillingworth went to draw, which Well before was unknowne to the moſt part of Men, and ſo might have ſtill remained, had it not been for this Publiſhers unſeaſonable diligence.
Chap. 20. Anſw. to Ch. 20.
Section 1 Your miſtake is very remarkable in this Paragraph, and your paines very prodigally miſpent in diſproving of that which is by his Lordſhip mentioned onelyonly on ſuppoſition of ſomewhat elſe affirmed by you, and by that meanes demonſtrated to be infirme.
Section 2 His Lordſhip's preſent reaſoning is, that ſuppoſing your infallibility true, yet he that denies it, and withall uſes his beſt reaſon to ſeeke if it be true, will ſure be in as ſafe a condition, as he that believes it, and ſearches not. And this he proves, becauſe the one believes that ſuppoſed falſhood on as good grounds, as the other doth that ſuppoſed truth. Which is ſo fully concluded from thoſe premiſes, (and ſo needs no farther proofe) that indeed theſe premiſes are able to conclude more; viz: that in that caſe that Man believes that ſuppoſed falſhood on better grounds (viz: upon impartiall ſearch) then the other believes that ſuppoſed truth; and then 'twere unreaſonable to thinke, that God that rewards mens actions, and not their fates, their choices, and not their ſtarres, ſhould condemne the one, more ingenuous and guiltleſſe, and reward the other meaner and more criminall part of the parallel.
Section 3 All this you in a manner confirme, by ſaying, that he that thus admits of truth, admits it not ſolidly, rightly, and as he ought, but after a defective and infirme way. Which being borrowed from you out of this Chapter, the reſt will appeare to belong very nothing to his Lordſhip's argument, and therefore I chooſe not to inſiſt on any reply to it. For of thoſe which doe finde their reaſon ſatisfied in your infallibillity, of which you ſpeake a while, his Lordſhip ſpeakes not; and for the truths that God and nature have laid ſo open to our view, of which you ſpeake againe, ſure this of infallibillity is none.
Section 4 As for your diſpleaſure expreſſed againe (without any new occaſion) againſt the unſeaſonable Publiſher (which if you and ſome others of your Friends were meere Students and Votaries, to pray for, and ſtudy the peace of Hieruſalem, and not too active Infuſers and Enterprizers in theſe troubled waters, might indeed be acknowledged leſſe ſeaſonable) it is the very thing you ſaid before, and then was ſufficiently proved to be unſeaſonable.
To the 33, & 34. Sections, Chap. 21.
That the Enquirer did not deny with obſtinacy the infallibility of the Church of Chriſt, or any other Article, we are willing to beleive, yet nevertheleſſe how ſafe he was we know not. For a man may be obſtinate and yet not thinke ſo, though he may peradventure have juſt reaſon to ſuſpect it. It is not likely that Arius for example, or any other Arch-heretique did thinke themſelves to be obſtinate, although it is not to be doubted but they were, for in the heart of Man there be many darke corners in which obſtinacy may lurke and be unſeen; many paſſions that doe corrupt the intention, which without great diligence are not eſpied, especially in Men that are Lovers of the world, or be poſſeſſed with prejudices hefore hand. For which the wiſe Man wiſely ſaid, Verebar omnia opera mea, I diſtruſted all my workes. And ſo hath every Man reaſon to doe in this univerſall corruption of nature and manners. The 34 Sect. hath no difficulty in it which may require an Anſwer.
Chap. 21. Anſw. to Chap. 21.
Section 1 Your Anſwer to the 33 Sect. is very ſtrange; you firſt grant very freely, that you beleive that his Lordſhip did not deny with obſtinacy the infallibility of your Church; and yet in your next words you interpoſe againſt him, that a man may be obstinate, and yet not thinke ſo; and on that, ground your Anſwer to that Section. But ſure, Sir, whoſoever elſe maybe obſtinate, or what grounds ſoever he may have to ſuſpect he is, yet this cannot by you be ſaid of him at the ſame time when you acknowledge he is not obſtinate.
Section 2 I beſeech you compare your Anſwer with that Paragraph of his Lordſhips again, and tell me whether this would not be very ſtrange dealing. Suppoſe a Friend ſhould make this Syllogiſme for you; an honeſt Catholique ought not to be denied the liberty of this Towne, but this Gentleman is an honeſt Catholique, ergo: and to the major I ſhould anſwer by ſilence, (i. e. conſent) and to the minor, [that you are an honeſt Catholique I am willing to believe:] Nevertheleſſe whether you ought to have the liberty of this Towne, I know not, for you may be a diſhoneſt Catholique, and yet not thinke ſo.
Section 3 I pray how would you like this way of diſcourſe? would you not firſt tell me that I did in effect deny the concluſion, i. e. make ſcruple how you ſhould be dealt with, after I had acknowledged both that all honeſt Catholiques ought to be uſed as you deſire, and that you are an honeſt Catholique? And Secondly, that I did ſuck in my conceſſion of your being an honeſt Catholique, aſſoone as I had made it; for if that Reply belong to me, then is it doubted, whether I am ſuch or no. Be pleaſed to compare the caſes, and this is directly your anſwer.
Section 4 What you meane by the no-difficulty in the 34 Sect. (which you confeſſe, and which therefore requires no Anſwer) I doe not perfectly know, but ſhall ſuppoſe you meane, that there is nothing of doubt or queſtion in it, and then I am ſure I have nothing to reply, but that by the ſame reaſon the 33 Section muſt be granted alſo, for the medium is the ſame to inferre both thoſe concluſions.
To the 35, & 36, Sections, Chap. 22.
To beleive, ſaith he, implicitly what God would have believed, is alſo to beleive implicitly what the Church teacheth, if this doctrine be one of thoſe which God commands, to be believed. My Anſwer to this is negative, and my reaſon of deniall is, becauſe one implicite faith doth not containe another, but it is an explicite aſſent and no other that containes within it an implicite. To the point then I anſwer, that if that ſame generall beliefe, which he falſly calls Implicite, be ſincere and cordiall, we then grant that it may, as he ſaith, implicitly containe the other. But what will he deduce from thence? what? that all who pretend to believe on that manner doe it ſincerely? It is improbable, for if it were ſincere, it would in knowing Men, not ſtay within the narrow compaſſe of an implicite aſſent, but quickly dilate it ſelfe, and become explicite. Indeed this great profeſſion of believing in a preparation of minde all which God would have believed, and goes no farther, ſeemes in moſt Men to be but feigned and deluſory, and ſo no great truſt can be repoſed in it.
Chap. 22. Anſw. to Chap. 22.
Section 1 The force of the argument, Sect. 35. you deny upon a ſhew of ſome ſubtlety, becauſe, ſay you, one implicite faith doth not containe another. This you affirme, but afford us not the leaſt offer of proof for the affirmation. I muſt therefore beſeech you to looke over your principle againe. Suppoſe me to believe by an implicite faith, that you are an honeſt Man, may not that beliefe containe in it an implicite beliefe to every propoſition by you aſſerted? Nay, what need this circumlocution? is not his Lordſhips argument moſt cleare being put into a Syllogiſme?
Section 2 If God commands the Church to be believed, then he that implicitly believes all the commands of God, implicitly believes that the Church is to be believed: but God commands the Church to be believed, ergo. See now which Propoſition you will deny, the major is evident, the minor I preſume you will not deny, whoſoever elſe doth, and then I beſeech you be good to the concluſion.
Section 3 But that it ſeemes you will grant too, but ſuſpect that that generall beliefe is not ſincere and cordiall; But that I am ſure is not for us to diſpute of, or diſcerne, and I am as ſure 'tis nothing to the caſe where 'tis ſuppoſed to be ſincere, and if it be not, no Man ever thinkes it can be relyed on.
To the 37, 38, & 39. Sections, Chap. 23.
Admitting the formoſt of theſe Sections as probable. To the 38, I anſwer, that as ſome are made obſtinate by pride, ſo againe otherſome lazineſſe detaines in ignorance. But what of that? I grant you that it is not pride in you or any Man never to aſſent, till you find good reaſon for it, but rather wiſdome. Nevertheleſſe it may be pride which blinds a Man and hinders him from the ſeeing a juſt reaſon of aſſenting, yea even then when it is not onelyonly perceptible, but alſo eaſie to be perceived; for the eye of the proud ſees not the truth, but overlooks it. The 39 Paragraph containeth in it no buſineſſe conſiderable in the matter of controverſie between us.
Chap. 23. Anſw. to Chap. 23.
Section 1 The 38 Sect. you admit as probable, and now methinks I underſtand your Dialect ſomewhat better then before I did; Doth not [admitting as probable] ſignifie [not underſtanding?] Truly it had been more ingenuouſly done to have uſed that other phraſe; for the truth is, it might have been done at this time without any diſparagement to your underſtanding; for in the beginning of this Section there was at the firſt Edition clearly an errour in the print. It ſhould be thus as 'tis now mended; To the Greeke that concludes the former Section ſhould be adjoyned in the ſame period, If I could, &c. and no new Section be there made; and as the ſence, by that miſtake of the Printer, lyes broken in the firſt Impreſſion, it is non-ſence.
Section 2 Now this being ſaid, It is a little odde that there ſhould be but one piece of non-ſence in the Booke, and that ſhould have the lucke to be in your favour, and by you be confeſtly admitted as probable. But this was but a misfortune. Your Anſwer to the 38 is not ſo excuſable, being not one ſyllable to the matter in hand, [that ſluggiſhneſſe may as probably bring a Papiſt to grant your infallibility, as pride a Proteſtant to deny it] In ſtead of denying or anſwering of which, you onelyonly reply, that pride may poſſibly blind a man. Sure this paragraph you might have admitted alſo, (as well as the other two that encompaſſe it) much better then to have ſaid nothing to the purpoſe.
Section 3 The 39. I would not diſcourage you from granting (it had beene much for my eaſe if you had granted the whole treatiſe) otherwiſe I could ſhew you, that it conteines an argument perfectly concludent againſt your cauſe, in ſatisfying one maine objection of yours againſt us.